Rethinking the defence doctrine

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Comment

Over four months ago, the Chinese army entered territory that India has long
considered its own, and never left. In effect, the multiple incursions have changed
the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and India has lost territory, at least for the time
being. How could this happen?

In part, it was a failure of the warning-intelligence system. Either Indian intelligence

services did not collect sufficient data of Chinese intentions and early moves, or
they did not interpret it correctly, or their policy and military customers failed to take
the warning seriously. Wherever the fault lay, the system apparently failed.

In part, however, the problem also lay in the Army’s concepts for defending the
country’s borders. It is, as the current crisis shows, simply not postured or prepared
for the type of security threat China presents.

As I argued in a recent research study for Carnegie India, the Army’s prevailing
doctrine is designed to deter and defend against major conventional invasions. This
determines how the Army is organised, what equipment it operates, and where it is
deployed. The Army expects to win wars, against Pakistan or China, by launching its
own punitive offensives after an enemy attack, to either destroy enemy forces or
seize enemy land.

In this mindset, the Army expected that any Chinese bid to capture Indian territory
would come as a major conventional invasion, as it did in 1962. The Indian
response would accordingly involve large formations, with planning and command
decisions made at the Corps headquarters or higher.

But the Chinese army’s initial forays in April and May did not look like a guns-blazing
invasion. It crossed the LAC in several places nearly simultaneously, and in larger
numbers than usual. Still, the Indian Army probably expected the stand-off would
repeat the pattern of years past: China would make its point with a temporary
transgression and retreat after talks. In the meantime, Indian forces would reinforce
their positions but hold back. Indian forces were under strict instructions from New
Delhi that any aggressive response must be avoided as it would inflame the
situation.

It is now clear that the national security leadership and the Army miscalculated.
China has no interest in launching a major conventional invasion, but this is not just
a typical probe either. Rather, its quick land grab looks increasingly permanent, like
an attempt to change the border without triggering war. This fait accompli leaves
India with two awful choices: either start a war by launching its own reprisal attack,
or do nothing and accept a new status quo.

Addressing this type of security threat requires preventing, not reversing, such fait
accompli land grabs. This requires a fundamental shift in the Army’s doctrinal
thinking, from strategies revolving around punishing the adversary, to strategies that
prevent its adventurism in the first place.

Speed is of the essence

In practice, this does not mean an unbroken picket of soldiers all along the border. It
does, however, mean a greater investment in persistent wide-area surveillance to
detect and track adversary moves, devolved command authority to respond to
enemy aggression, and rehearsed procedures for an immediate local response
without higher commanders’ approval.
In countering China’s ‘grey zone’ tactics of quick land grabs, speed is of the
essence. The military must be able to detect adversary action and react quickly,
even pre-emptively, to stop attempted aggression from becoming a fait accompli. In
peacetime, local commanders must have the authority and gumption to take
anticipatory action and go on the offensive or fill forward defensive positions. The
late-August incident at Chushul demonstrates how this can and should work. Indian
special forces troops took position on previously unoccupied heights south of
Pangong Tso. In so doing they have complicated future Chinese moves to
consolidate their position, and may even hold some Chinese positions at risk. The
country’s attempts to seize more ground have been foiled.

Unfortunately, China was not foiled in its initial seizure of Indian territory. Reversing
that occupation will require a remarkable feat of Indian statecraft. A military
solution is decreasingly likely as China reinforces its deployments. Taking strident
offensive actions now, amidst a heavily militarised crisis, may be hazardous
because it carries new risks of unintended escalation. The challenge for India is to
learn the right lessons and be alert to similar tactics in other regions, like the Indian
Ocean. It must not rely on doctrines forged in wars half a century ago.

Arzan Tarapore is a South Asia research scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-
Pacific Research Center at Stanford University

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