Chapter 6 (draft)

from

"Anti-Communist Minorities in the US: Political Activism of Ethnic Refugees"

(Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009)

Multiple Fronts of the Cold War: Ethnic Anti-Communism of Latvian Émigrés

Ieva Zake

Throughout the Cold War era political refugees from the Communist-dominated

countries in Central and Eastern Europe passionately clung onto their beliefs in the evil

nature of the Communist ideology. Feeling the pressure from the Soviet regime,

experiencing the increasing alienation from the American institutions and seeing

themselves as the lone fighters for the freedom of their occupied country, the émigrés

such as Latvians had a difficult, yet fascinating political experience during the Cold War.

Their political views were determined by their knowledge of the destructive

power of Communism, which they had encountered first-hand in 1941 when the USSR

occupied and destroyed the independent country of Latvia along with two other Baltic

countries of Estonia and Lithuania. In the process, the Soviets murdered and deported

thousands of people. Between 1941 and 1944 Latvia was under the Nazi occupation

giving Latvians insight into another totalitarian regime. When it became clear that the

Soviet army was returning to Latvia at the end of World War II, many Latvians fled to

the West. Although specific reasons for their flight might have differed, all of them were

driven by a conviction that Communism and the Soviet regime was a threat to their and

their nation’s life. About 110,000-112,000 Latvians became stateless at the end of World

164
War II. At first, with hundreds of thousands of other European refugees, they lived in the

Displaced Persons camps in Germany waiting to be taken in by the Western European

countries. The process took a couple of years during which they came to be known as

Displaced Persons or DPs. Their experience of escape from the Soviets and the life in

refugee camps was filled with fear and grave difficulties. The Western countries did not

always understand the dangers the refugees faced and the reasons for their resistance to

return to the USSR. Meanwhile the Soviets pursued an aggressive repatriation policy

claiming that all refugees from the Soviet controlled territories were Soviet citizens and

had no right to leave. As the Western organizations and governments began to cave in to

the Soviet demands of repatriation, the refugees protested in desperation. Some even

committed suicide just so that they would not be returned to the USSR.1

Many Western countries, including the U.S., were either ignorant about the

enormous refugee problem in Europe or stalled their involvement in resolving it.2 After a

prolonged period of doubt, the U.S. President Truman finally decided to offer support to

European DPs in January of 1946. During his State of the Union address he invited the

U.S. Congress to authorize massive influx of the DPs by adopting the Displaced Persons

Act.3 The legislative process took quite a while,4 but finally the DP Act was signed into a

law in 1950. The deadline for receiving entrance visas for the DPs was set for 31

December, 1951. This law brought thousands of Latvian and other Baltic émigrés to the

American shores.

During the execution of this Act, Americans recruited primarily DPs who were

physically fit, healthy, professionally useful, cleared as not having been Nazis, and had

the so-called “assurances” or sponsorship provided by American organizations or

165
individuals. “Assurances” guaranteed that each DP would have housing and employment

upon their arrival in the U.S. Overall Americans were quite idealistic about this system

and thus bound to be disappointed. Soon the cultural and religious differences between

American sponsors and refugees became apparent.5 Still, Latvian refugees shared many

of the American cultural values and already within the first or the second generation

almost all of them reached a comfortable middle-class position. Regardless of this

success, Latvian DPs resisted cultural assimilation by creating an elaborate network of

social and religious organizations. They persistently called themselves “American

Latvians” indicating that their presence in the U.S. was temporary until their country

would be liberated. They organized a strong and active social structure, which enabled

them to maintain a dual identity where they could be “living among Americans

geographically, economically, educationally – [and] living as Latvians socially,

aesthetically, personally.”6 One of the most important elements in this dual identity was

uncompromising anti-communism. It served multiple purposes as an expression of their

loyalty to the host country, as a way to oppose the USSR, as an instrument for

maintaining connections to their lost homeland and as a set of ideas that could unify the

émigré community.

Latvian anti-communist doctrine

The anti-communist doctrine of Latvian anti-communists focused on three major

tasks: 1) telling the truth about the Communist regime; 2) struggle for national liberation

from the Soviet domination; and 3) need to explain the ultimate similarity between the

Communism and Nazism.

166
 One of the main goals of Latvian émigrés in the U.S. was to reveal the

Communism’s “true face” and make sure that Americans realized the enormity of its

threat.7 To accomplish this goal, Latvian organizations collected stories about their own

and their relatives’ experiences under the Communist regime and told them through a

variety of venues in the 1950s. Their mission was to warn the Americans about what their

society would look like should the Communists had their way.

From the refugees’ point of view World War II had not ended. It continued in a

covert form as the Soviets constantly attempted to penetrate every aspect of the Western

societies. Fearing this sinister and manipulative nature of Communism, Latvian anti-

communists were hardly optimistic about the changes in the USSR after the historic 22nd

Congress of the Communist Party, which condemned Joseph Stalin. They felt that

although the Communist leaders were willing to admit the criminal nature of their

activities, they have not applied this to the illegal Soviet occupation of the Baltic

countries. Since only some of Stalin’s crimes had been denounced, while the rest had

been left unquestioned, the so-called “thaw” really was just another example of

Communist propaganda. Instead of liberalization, the Soviet Communists had intensified

limitations on the freedom of religion and expression, increased Russification campaigns

of ethnic non-Russians and persecuted Latvian Communists.8

Clearly, according to Latvian émigré anti-communists, the ultimate test of the

Communist intentions was treatment of ethnic minorities and the occupied Baltic

countries. And there the Soviet record had not improved. Therefore they mobilized

against Khrushchev’s visit to the U.S. in 1959. Latvian anti-communists argued that the

visit of the Soviet leader signaled normalization of relations with the USSR, which was

167
unacceptable until the Soviets gave up their plans to dominate the world. Latvian émigré

organizations disseminated statements demanding U.S. government’s assurances that

Khrushchev’s trip would have no effect on the U.S. policy of non-recognition of the

occupation of the Baltic States. They explained that any exchanges with the USSR were

highly damaging to all captive nations behind the Iron Curtain because these contacts

helped the Soviet propaganda and infiltration.9

Over time, the American public and government became more tolerant toward the

Soviet Union and the Communists at home especially in the post-McCarthy era. The

refugees gradually lost their audience in the U.S. also due to the Soviet Union’s quite

successful external propaganda campaigns portraying itself as a peace-loving country.

The younger generation of Americans was more likely to perceive the USSR as a viable

alternative to what they felt was an oppressive life in the U.S. Already by the end of the

1950s some of the Latvian anti-communists became increasingly aware that in order to

reach the American audience they had to find a rational way to argue about the mistakes

in the Communist logic as opposed to capitalizing on its inherently evil nature.10 Other

Latvian anti-communists, who felt betrayed by the Americans, turned to more irrational

and paranoid rhetoric. They began to criticize the 1960s generation of Americans,

particularly the student movements whose slogans “Do not trust anyone over 30!”

reminded them of Communist campaigns against all traditions, family and past

generations.

These anti-communists watched with terror the changes in American laws and

government policies such as the foreign policy of “peaceful co-existence” with the

USSR. To the ethnic anti-communists, this was an immoral legitimization of slavery and

168
oppression combined with anti-Americanism, for which they blamed American

academics, students, politicians, mass media, the Catholic Church and the World Peace

Congress. 11 Some Latvian anti-communists even declared that all of the American

political left ultimately served the Soviet interests and was secretly supported by the

USSR.12 They wrote that the American students who had completed exchange programs

in the Communist countries later became initiators of underground terrorist organizations

because they had been tutored by the Soviets on how to generate fear, panic and total

terror.13

Still, throughout the 1960s and 70s Latvian anti-communists felt increasingly

lonely in their continuous belief that the USSR was dangerous, but not invincible.

Everyone else appeared interested in suicidal efforts of supporting the USSR and

weakening the military power of the U.S.14 The Latvian anti-communists could not

comprehend the shame Americans felt about the Vietnam War, American inability to act

against Communists in Cuba as well as desire to limit and control the work of the FBI

and CIA.15 Angry about this decline of anti-communism and the growth of anti-

Americanism, Latvian anti-communists became sharply critical of the U.S. as well as the

United Nations. Seeing the U.S. government’s feeble protests followed by a silence in

response to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in the mid 1980s some of the Latvian anti-

communists reached a conclusion that their former ally—the U.S. government—could no

longer be trusted.16

Latvian anti-communists were also critical of American anti-communism,

particularly its naiveté and inability to comprehend that only forceful opposition, not

negotiations, could destroy the Communist regimes. Echoing Barry Goldwater’s

169
argument from the mid-1960s, Latvian anti-communists stated in the mid-1980s that the

U.S. as a country had failed to take a pro-active role in the anti-communist struggle.

Moreover, some of the Latvian activists claimed that no American anti-communist could

be trusted to go through with what they supposedly believed since all Americans were

ultimately driven by business interests.17 While some argued that Latvian anti-

communists should be less pessimistic and more realistic about what to expect from

American politicians, others felt that they had been largely abandoned by their former

Western friends.18 Even though Latvian anti-communists gave enthusiastic support to

Reagan’s Doctrine in the 1980s, they still felt as the few sane ones in the world that was

willing to accept the Soviet madness.

As noted, already by the mid-1950s the Latvian ethnic anti-communists became

aware that their efforts in convincing the American public of Communism’s evil nature

were not successful. Therefore they introduced a conception of the USSR as a colonizing

empire and the Eastern Europeans’ struggle against it as a form of anti-colonialism. This

political idea was employed equally by all types of Latvian anti-communists. Their

argument was that while the peoples of Africa and Asia had gained their independence,

many European nations continued “to suffer under the Russian boot that destroys them in

the most sophisticated and secretive ways.”19 It was hoped that this interpretation of the

Soviet domination could generate more support and credibility for ethnic anti-

Communism among the Westerners. The conception of Soviet colonialism aimed to

broaden the issue of Latvia’s liberation from a specific ethnic concern to a global

problem of imperialism and colonialism.20

170
 In the early 1970s, some of the loudest Latvian anti-communists, such as the

nationalist journalist Ernests Blanks, wrote that the Soviet Union had conflated Marxism

with Russian nationalist chauvinism and turned the USSR into a totalitarian, nationalist

and colonizing state.21 As showed by Blanks, the Soviet state had consciously relocated

large numbers of ethnic Russians to areas inhabited by other ethnicities, deported whole

ethnic groups from their historical lands, forced members of ethnic minorities to use

Russian and switch to Russian alphabet, while discouraged Russians from learning the

language and culture of ethnic groups among which they resided. Such actions had to be

understood only as a form of colonization. Among those making the anti-colonialism

argument was also the Baltic Appeal to the United Nations (BATUN). It targeted the

United Nations’ permanent missions, diplomats and U.S. politicians with a message that

the Baltic nations need to be decolonized just as the Third World countries. To back up

this demand, BATUN activists used historical evidence and information about the human

rights violations inside the USSR.

An intrinsic part of this Soviet colonialism argument in general was the revelation

that the true nature of Soviet policies was Russification. Ethnic anti-communists did not

see Communism as a violation of individual liberty as such. Latvian anti-communists

intended to show that Communism’s essence was institutionalized domination of

Russians over other ethnic groups. Driven by this goal, the World Federation of Free

Latvians began to collect and disseminate vast amount of information illustrating the

nature and scope of Russification in the Baltic countries in the late 1970s.22 They

presented evidence about the declining number of ethnic Latvians and how the Latvian

language was pushed out of the educational system and public sphere. The Latvian anti-

171
communists were keenly aware that their argument of the Communist-qua-Russian

colonization had to be presented very carefully. For example, Americans usually did not

see any problem with the use of a single language throughout the country and therefore

they did not understand Latvians’ concerns about the disappearance of their language

from the public sphere. The Westerners also had a hard time believing that the Soviets

would purposefully relocate ethnic Russians to the Baltic countries in order to destroy the

Baltic ethnic uniqueness. To most Americans, all Soviet citizens were “Russians”

anyway and they saw more of an economic benefit in the population relocation than a

sinister ethnic oppression.

Latvian organizers of the anti-Russification campaign had to prove the Westerners

wrong and prevent embarrassing xenophobic slander of ethnic Russians. Often this was

difficult to avoid and some of the more zealous extremist Latvian anti-communists

crossed the line. Some of them argued that there was no meaningful distinction between

Russians and Communists: “a Russian is a Communist and a Communist is a Russian.”

Moreover, “the Communist system was born and created in Russia. There was no other

country that imposed it upon Russians. Therefore we cannot consider Russians as a

captive nation in the same way as we perceive the nations, which Russians dominate with

their military power.” 23 To such extreme Latvian anti-communists, the ultimate goal was

national liberation from the Russians and their pro-communist culture, not mere

destruction of Communism. They were also convinced that the pro-Russian Soviets

intended to destroy the ethnic identity and unity of Latvians in exile.24

In the late 1970s and 80s, moderate Latvian anti-communists suggested a less

controversial conception that emphasized the struggle for human rights. As the Baltic

172
Appeal to the United Nations had discovered, the anti-colonialism argument did not find

supportive ears in the UN. The new ideological strategy focused on the human rights

violations within the USSR arguing that should the human rights be observed inside the

Soviet Union, the people living there would be able to free themselves and improve their

lives on their own.

Another take on this idea emphasized the nation’s rights as an intrinsic element of

all human rights. It proposed that the conception of human rights incorporated also the

rights of whole ethnic groups and nations as collectivities. The Soviet occupation of the

Baltic countries was interpreted as a human rights violation of a nation. This argument

was actively pursed by the American Latvian Association (a large umbrella organization

uniting close to all Latvian groups in the U.S.), World Federation of Free Latvians as well

as the World Association of the Baltics. To them, the struggle against Communism was

about the right to free speech, dissent, the right of assembly and religion in pursuit of

one’s ethnic identity. To prove that the USSR violated these rights, they collected

information about dissidents and political prisoners who had been persecuted for

asserting their ethnic identity and fighting for national independence. Armed with this

evidence and the UN documents and conventions, the ethnic anti-communists accused the

Soviet Union in violation of the rights of individuals and nations.25

This anti-communist approach was greatly inspired by the process of the Helsinki

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the 1970s and 80s, and its

documents that acknowledged national sovereignty as inalienable human right. Helsinki

accords were intended to protect the dissidents and demand observance of individual

rights in the USSR. Latvian anti-communists, who attended every meeting of the

173
European Conference on Security and Cooperation, focused specifically on the ethnic

aspect. Their goal was to demonstrate that the Soviet state was a nationalistic power that

destroyed and discriminated against ethnic diversity within its own borders.

Finally, throughout the Cold War era, politically active Latvian exiles remained

appalled by the West’s vehement rejection of everything related to Nazism combined

with simultaneous acceptance of Communism. On numerous occasions Latvian anti-

communists felt that the Westerners used a double standard in regard to these two

dangerous ideologies. The émigrés took it upon themselves to prove the equivalency of

the two murderous ideologies.

Their argument concentrated on showing that the tactics used by Communists and

Nazis when victimizing ethnic groups and whole nations were similar. In this context

Latvian anti-communists could not understand why the Nazi attacks on European

countries had been defined as criminal and denounced, while equivalent actions of the

Soviet Union had remained unpunished.26 Latvian anti-communists aimed to demonstrate

that the Soviet regime imposed as great a suffering on particular ethnic groups as the

Nazis had done. The refugee community set forth to tell the story of what they called “the

Baltic Holocaust” according to which about 600,000 Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians

had been arrested, subjected to mass deportations to Siberian labor camps or executed by

the Soviet authorities since 1940.27 From the 1970s onward, Latvian anti-communists

collected information about Latvians and residents of Latvia who had been killed or died

under the Soviet rule.28 The result was a book “These Names Accuse” published in

Sweden. In its numerous editions the book presented evidence to the American and

Western public that the numbers of those destroyed by the Soviets were equivalent to the

174
murder of Jews in Europe by the Nazis. Therefore if the West had denounced Nazism, it

had a moral obligation to do the same for Communism.

On some occasions ethnic anti-communists’ attempts to catch Americans’

attention on this were successful as when the California State Board of Education

recommended that the history of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were included in the

curriculum of the Holocaust and genocide studies in California schools.29 Also, the New

Jersey governor Thomas H. Kean established an educational commission on the history

of Eastern European and Captive Nations in order to generate discussion of their fate in

the history books used in New Jersey schools.30

Unfortunately, the ethnic anti-communists themselves did not always practice

what they preached, that is, they were frequently willing to criticize Communism more

than denounce Nazism. Their own double standard was due to the complicated role of the

Latvians in the World War II and persistent sentiment among the exiles that the Nazis

had “liberated” Latvia in 1941 from the Soviet occupation. Some of the exile political

activism was influenced by the presence of possible Nazi collaborators. Parts of the exile

community had preserved anti-Semitic beliefs from the pre-World War II Latvia.

Additionally, a notable section of the Latvian community was made up of soldiers who

had been drafted into the German Waffen-SS (called Legion) with their own difficult

history of collaboration and resistance. In fact, the complicated history of this group

created serious controversy in and around the Latvian community in the US, especially in

the 1970s and 80s when the Office of Special Investigations began hunting down the

former Nazis hiding in the U.S. While only a few of the former Waffen-SS soldiers were

possibly could have been war criminals, it was very difficult to sort it out. Afraid to

175
accept collective guilt and fearing sweeping accusations, many of Latvian anti-

communists rejected a possibility of an open discussion about the Latvian role in the

Holocaust.31 They were concerned that should they admit the Nazi past of some of the

members of Latvian community, their anti-communist arguments would lose credibility.

For example, a journalist and dedicated Latvian nationalist Ernests Blanks

insisted that the Latvian soldiers, most of whom were forcibly conscripted into the Nazi

military service, had fulfilled a historical mission of “protecting” Western Europe from

the threats of Communism.32 Blanks and other anti-communists writing for the Daugavas

Vanagu Mēnešraksts (a publication of the organization of Latvian World War II veterans

Daugavas Vanagi—The Hawks of Daugava) argued that the Legion and other Latvian

formations during World War II had to be understood as desperate attempts to protect

Latvian nation.33 Believing that Latvians had been victims of merciless oppressors, these

anti-communists silenced any further discussions about the role that some Latvians had

played in the Holocaust and their anti-Semitism.

Nevertheless, there were some attempts to address these issues within the émigré

community. Historian Andrievs Ezergailis from Ithaca College, NY called on the exiles

to disentangle the truth about the Holocaust in Latvia. During the early 1980s he

criticized exile Latvians’ ignorance about the Nazi collaborators in its leadership and

suggested that these people must come forward and admit their faults in order to help the

émigré community to clear its image.34 Ezergailis’ publications were met with criticism

and doubt. In the mid-1980s a long time Latvian anti-communist activist and a former

officer of independent Latvia’s army Ēriks Pārups invited the refugee community to

create a new movement that would be explicitly both anti-communist and anti-Nazi.

176
Pārups suggested that the earlier émigré activities had been tainted by the presence of

Nazi collaborators, but that those Latvians who had suffered from both the Communist

and Nazi occupations were obligated to establish an organization dedicated to fight

against all forms of totalitarianism.35 Pārups’ project did not meet support.

Still, the writings of Ezergailis and Pārups indicated that the Latvian anti-

Communism had a complicated underside of nationalism, occasional Nazi sympathizing

and anti-Semitism. Even if the moderate anti-communists from American Latvian

Association did not endorse the more extreme attitudes of Daugavas Vanagi and there

were occasional disagreements in their publications, the two organizations never publicly

criticized each other. Thus, there were notable differences among the Latvian anti-

communist positions, but the Latvian community worked hard to remain united around

the goal of liberating Latvia. Consequently, all shades of Latvian anti-Communism ended

up harboring elements of Latvian nationalism, the conception of Latvians as mere victims

of Russian Communism and German Nazism, and the idea of the nation’s rights.

Strategies and activities

Although Latvian community had no disagreements about its mission to fight

Communism, there were discussions about the forms, strategies and intensity of this

struggle. Latvian émigré anti-communists of the older generation sent their

representatives to the “All-American Conference to Combat Communism” and

contributed information to the U.S. Congress’ Baltic Committee, which had been

appointed to research the USSR’s domination over the Baltic countries and other captive

nations. The Committee published a 678 page volume of testimonies from the Baltic

177
refugees that revealed the true nature of the Communist regime and countered the Soviet

propaganda.36 These Latvian anti-communists targeted the American political

establishment with memorandums and information materials. They thought of themselves

as a government-in-exile and worked hard to build personal contacts with American

politicians sympathetic to the cause of Baltic independence. Unfortunately, the immediate

results of their efforts were quite modest.

[Insert image #2 about here.

Latvian anti-communist demonstrators hand out information in Boston,

Massachusetts (the 1950s or 60s). Photo by Northeastern Portrait Service. Courtesy of

Herta Grāvītis.]

Disappointed with the political strategies of the older generation, the middle

generation American Latvians developed more assertive forms of political activism

during the late 1950s and early 60s. One of their more innovative strategies was using

contacts with the authorities in Latvian SSR to travel to Latvia and generate subversion

from within. However, contacts with the occupied Latvia caused a major rift among the

émigrés. The older generation of anti-communists staunchly opposed the relations with

Latvian SSR as a Soviet provocation, Communist attempt to exploit the émigré society

for propaganda purposes and mere political manipulation.

However, the middle generation of “realists” such as Uldis Grava and Ilgvars

Spilners from the American Latvian Association were aware of dangers involved in

building contacts with the Soviet authorities, but they also believed that both the émigrés

178
and Latvians under the Soviet rule could reap some benefits from the Soviet-controlled

relations with each other. Still, the debate over visits to Latvian SSR, accepting visitors or

allowing the Soviets to introduce the émigrés to the “Soviet Latvian culture” grew into a

deep conflict. The main contradiction was among those who considered Latvians under

the Soviet rule important agents of national liberation and those who believed that exile

Latvians alone held the key to freedom and the renovated statehood.37

The conflicts within the Latvian community were also greatly influenced by the

increasing efforts on the part of the Soviet intelligence and security institutions to control

and use the émigré organizations for propaganda purposes. The Soviets pursued a

negative campaign against the leadership of Latvia émigré groups and collected and

disseminated all sorts of compromising information about the anti-communists in the

U.S. in order to disorganize the émigré society. At the same time, they continuously tried

to recruit émigrés as informants. The Soviets deliberately tried to destroy émigré anti-

communism as a political force. Although the efforts of the Latvian émigrés to protect

themselves occasionally took on some anti-democratic features such as suspecting

everyone who visited Latvian SSR of being a Soviet spy, undoubtedly there were

legitimate grounds for their fear of Soviet influence on their community.

The youngest or so-called third generation of Latvian refugees in the 1970s and

80s introduced an additional strain. They proposed an increasingly aggressive program

such as creating underground groups, taking up arms and using terrorist methods to blow

up embassies and shoot the Soviet authorities. The enemy of these young extremists was

not only the Soviets, but also the exile society’s overinvestment in Song festivals, cultural

programs and picnics. They suggested destroying the expensive Latvian community

179
centers and churches as symbols of the exile’s political inefficiency, feebleness and

apathy. The young émigrés called for Latvian nationalist and anti-communist fanaticism

qua Mujahideen or Haganah.38 This unprecedented initiative came from some of the

representatives of the American Latvian Youth Association, particularly those connected

to the publication Brīvības Talcinieks (Freedom Worker).

Although the terrorist types remained a minority, other young anti-communists

seemed impacted by the calls for more outside-the-mainstream political actions. Also, the

eye-catching methods of political struggle of the American 1960s and 70s anti-war and

freedom of speech activists encouraged young Latvians to try more innovative

approaches. Some of them enacted scenes of political theatre on the streets, while others

chained themselves to the U.S. government buildings or burned the Soviet flag in front of

the embassy of the USSR in Washington D.C. In 1976 these actions landed some of the

young Latvian anti-communists in court where they were accused of violating the laws of

the District of Columbia. The demonstrators were acquitted, which earned them new

supporters.39 American émigré Māris Ķirsons stepped on the Soviet flag and let the blood

from his veins drip on it during the meeting of the European Conference for Security and

Cooperation in Madrid, Spain. This performance of protest lasted only about 10 minutes

yet it attracted world media’s attention. Another innovative protest was the international

tribunal organized by the World Federation of Free Latvians. It took place in Copenhagen

in 1985 where numerous witnesses (dissidents, victims of Communist repressions,

refugees, etc.) testified in front of the panel of volunteer judges about the Soviet crimes

committed against the Baltic peoples. The tribunal reached a verdict that the occupation

of the Baltic States had indeed been a violation of international laws and agreements. The

180
event attracted attention in the West and received loud denunciations from the Soviets.40

Overall, the appeal of more extremist anti-communist strategies seemed to intensify with

each generation of Latvian émigrés in the U.S.

One of the most important Latvian anti-communist strategies was getting involved

in the captive nations’ activities and organizations. The concept of captive nations was

introduced by Eisenhower in his Captive Nations Resolution adopted in 1959. At the

time, it contained strong language, which condemned the USSR for enslaving Eastern

European peoples and called for self-determination behind the Iron Curtain. Together

with other Eastern European refugees, Latvian anti-communists supported the Resolution

with a variety of events.41 And just as other refugees, they became concerned when the

U.S. rhetoric and attitude toward the captive nations issue became increasingly vague

starting with Kennedy’s presidency.

One of the most notable organizations that promoted the concept of the “captive

nations” was the Assembly of Captive European Nations, which received both

encouragement and financial support from the U.S. government. Among the co-founders

of the ACEN was also the Committee for Free Latvia. It was funded by the Free Europe

Committee, which was closely linked to the CIA and headed by John Foster Dulles, the

Secretary of the State in the 1950s. The membership of the Committee for Free Latvia

was quite small and ranged from eight to three people over the years.

According to its reports, the Committee for Free Latvia was dedicated to

combating Russification and strengthening anti-communist elements in the occupied

Latvia. For this purpose, the CFL published a paper Latvijas Brīvībai (For Latvia’s

Freedom) and informational booklets that were dispatched to Soviet Latvia through

181
various underground channels. These materials described the absurdities of the

Communist regime and the exploitation and destruction of the Latvian people under the

Soviet rule. The CFL also targeted the Western audiences with its research on life behind

the Iron Curtain. The CFL had the linguistic and cultural skills and unique connections

that kept them well-informed about the conditions under the Communist rule and enabled

them to serve as valuable sources of information for the West. In the 1960s, the CFL paid

particular attention to spreading information about what they identified as Russian

imperialism and aggressive Communism among the Asian and African peoples. It

provided the Latin American press with materials about the dangers of Communism and

the suffering of Latvians under the Soviet rule. The CFL established contacts with the

few Soviet Latvian tourists in the West and gathered information from rare exiles

travelling to Soviet Latvia. Finally, the CLF served as a source of information to the

Latvian émigré community.

One of the CFL’s contributions to anti-communism was its assertion that there

were distinct differences in opinion between Russian Communists and the national

Communist parties of the Soviet controlled countries. The anti-communists of the CFL

were convinced that nationalist sentiments remained strong and could be used for

generating anti-communist movements within the USSR. Although these ideas were later

employed by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, in the late 1950s and 60s they found few

supporters among the American foreign policy decision-makers. Consequently, the

CFL’s work greatly declined in the mid-60s. With only three members remaining, Vilis

Hāzners alone worked full time. 42 The CFL was in crisis, yet no additional funding came

as the U.S. government changed its views on the usefulness of Eastern European refugees

182
in the struggle against Communism. Then Nixon’s administration allocated personal

grants to the senior leaders of the ethnic exile communities, which served as an invitation

for them to retire.43 By the early 1970s both the ACEN and CFL had been disbanded.

Some of the captive nations activities continued in Latvian community in the

1980s, though on a much smaller scale and with more dubious content. They were mainly

related to another organization—the Captive Nations Committee established to

commemorate and propagate the Captive Nations Resolution by Ukrainian-American Lev

Dobriansky. Latvian section of the Captive Nations Committee in St. Petersburg, Florida

included an extremist Latvian anti-communist priest Andris A. Lamberts, who

disseminated a controversial resolution demanding to halt funding for the Office of

Special Investigations that found and prosecuted the World War II criminals.44 In July of

1982 during a celebration of the Captive Nations day Andris Lamberts thundered that

while so much had been heard about the Nazi Holocaust, there was silence about the

Communist Holocaust.45

Although organizations such as the ACEN, the CFL and the CNC were very

active and articulate, they achieved few tangible results beyond symbolic influence.

Moreover, American mass media either paid very little attention to the Captive Nations

Weeks or ridiculed the whole concept of “captivity” of Eastern and Central European

countries. Seeing such a reception, the Latvian anti-communists considered Americans

naïve and incapable to understand that they could be the next “captive nation” in near

future.46

At the same time, Latvian anti-communists had some successes. They were

particularly skillful at employing American legislative and political channels to their

183
cause. For example, in the early 1960s they were inspired by the possibility of the Senate

adopting a resolution that would call upon the U.S. President to bring the question of the

liberation of the Baltic States before the United Nations. In order to support this initiative

Baltic activists organized the Americans for Congressional Action to Free the Baltic

States in August 1961. Its goal was to get many such resolutions introduced in the

Congress, so it organized relentless letter writing campaigns and routine visits to Senators

and Congressmen. By the end of 1962, 12 resolutions had been submitted to the

Congress, and by 1 September, 1964 the total number of such resolutions reached 70.

Latvian and other Baltic émigrés were good at targeting the UN, too. The Baltic

Appeal to the United Nations (BATUN) was charged with tasks such as informing the

UN members about the conditions in the Baltic region and encouraging them to support

national independence. The founders of BATUN also made it clear that their organization

was going to be a cross-Baltic and unifying force and completely independent of any

government funding. BATUN’s activists were inspired by the political activism of

American radical movements of the 1960s and wanted to depart from the traditional Cold

War political methods of the Baltic émigré communities. BATUN wrote letters to

numerous Western governments, paid regular visits to the UN and organized protest

actions commemorating the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939.47 It was unique in

ensuring fully equal representation of the interests of all three Baltic nations.48

Another important area of anti-communist struggle was dissemination of

information about the USSR and émigrés’ political activities. For example, the

Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent (CACEED) was

created with a purpose to inform the American public about Eastern European refugees’

184
position on the USSR. In 1967 it published a manifesto appealing to the fellow

Americans not to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution and observe

November 7, 1967 as a day of mourning.49 This appeal was issued during the Viet Nam

war and explicitly stated that the continuance of the war was ultimately the Communists’

fault. This view placed Latvian anti-communists in a controversial position vis-à-vis

increasingly anti-war oriented American public opinion.

Finally, in as late as the early 1980s, the Baltic anti-communists sought new ways

to strengthen their struggle against the Soviet regime. They argued that the situation in

the Baltic countries was getting continuously worse. In order to inform the West about

this, they established the Baltic American Freedom League and hired a professional

public relations company to start a systematic informational campaign throughout the

U.S.50

Another area of activism was Latvian anti-communists’ support for the

Republican Party. It began in the 1950s, when some of the Latvian exiles responded with

enthusiasm to the politics of Republican Senators Knowland and MacCarthy, while

others cautioned that such politicians were politically irresponsible and opportunistic and

it could be a political suicide to support them.51 Overall, most exile Latvians tended to

support the Republican Party because they never forgave the Democrats for selling out

the Baltic States to the USSR during the Yalta conference after the World War II.52

The Latvian engagement in the American partisan politics became particularly

relevant in the 1960s when a large number of Latvians obtained the U.S. citizenship and

realized that they now possessed valuable political power. The American parties,

especially the Republicans understood that too and reached out to the refugees by

185
creating ethnic committees. A notable group of prominent Latvian émigrés such as

Voldemārs Korsts, Laimonis Streips, Ilgvars Spilners and Ēriks Dundurs became

seriously interested in changing the American political scene from within.53

In 1964, Latvian Republicans actively supported Barry Goldwater’s candidacy for

the U.S. President and participated in his campaign in New York City and Minneapolis.

They supplied Goldwater’s campaign with statements made by the Democrat Vice-

President candidate Hubert Humphrey in 1945 where he talked about the acceptance of

the USSR and suggested to grant the Soviet Union’s demands regarding the inclusion of

the Baltic States and the Polish and Rumanian borders.54 This was politically powerful

evidence that could turn Eastern European refugee vote away from the Democratic

candidates. Latvian community sympathized with Goldwater’s staunch anti-communism

and his opposition to busing, which reminded them of the Bolshevik methods of taking

away children from their parents and blindly following dubious political ideals.

One of the most active Latvians in the Republican Party was Ēriks Dundurs who

established and led a Citizens Committee of Nationalities for the Goldwater-Miller

Presidency in the 1964. He was also appointed to the Advisory Committee of the

Nationalities Division of the Republican National Committee and served in the

Nationalities Division of Republican Party of Minnesota. He was an editor of “GOP

Nationalities Reporter” from 1960 to 1972 and a Vice-Chairman of Latvian American

Republican Committee of Minnesota.55 In 1969—70 he led the Coalition of Patriotic

Americans in Minnesota, which included such groups as Young Americans for Freedom,

the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Minnesota Captive Nations

186
Committee. Its goal was to provide public support to Nixon’s policy in Vietnam and

demand American victory.

Dundurs was an unwavering anti-communist and in 1964 he campaigned on

behalf of the House of Un-American Activities Committee when it held its hearings in

Minnesota. He participated in the public debate about the HUAC on the pages of a

magazine Means with a spokesman for the Citizens Against HUAC Denis Wadley.

Dundurs stated that the HUAC hearings in Minneapolis had been fair, objective and

successful in establishing that there was indeed a Community Party in Minnesota and that

it had plans to infiltrate universities.56

Another notable Republican in the Latvian community was Voldemārs Korsts, the

founder and leader of the Latvian Republican Federation. For many years Korsts worked

as the chairman of the Political Committee for the National Republican Nationalities

Groups’ Council. Throughout his political career he argued that Latvians cannot afford to

pursue their struggle against Communism in isolation. He urged Latvian exiles to become

involved in party politics and create a block with other captive nations. He believed that

Latvians had an obligation to make America strong and anti-communist because Latvia’s

liberation depended on the unity and the military, political and economic strength of the

United States.57 In the 1980s Korsts promoted Ronald Reagan as the “true supporter of

people’s freedom” and greeted his election with excitement. Korsts advocated Reagan’s

economic policies, defended him against the attacks of the liberals regarding the military

spending and supported Reagan’s refusal to sign the agreements with the USSR on

nuclear weapons control.58

187
 Unfortunately, after the deaths of Dundurs and Korsts, the presence and visibility

of Latvian anti-communists in the Republican Party dramatically declined. Some even

suggested that the whole experiment of trying to influence American politics from within

had failed and Latvians had completely miscalculated the support of their supposed

allies.59

Successes and failures

Although Eastern European émigrés maintained a politically very active position,

they often did not have much to show for it. Although their countries’ soon liberation had

been promised to the Eastern Europeans during the 1952 election, by 1955 most of them

had abandoned such hopes. Nevertheless, they pressed on and created numerous

organizations that targeted decision-making bodies in the American government. As the

Americans seemed to settle down to a sentiment of co-existence with the USSR, Latvians

along with other Eastern European refugees realized that they had to fight even harder to

be heard. The American press usually ignored the activities of Latvian and other ethnic

anti-communists. Occasional article appeared here and there, but there was no systematic

attention paid to them.

Nevertheless, there were occasions when Latvian and other Baltic anti-

communists were successful at gaining political support. In this respect an interesting

case was the saga regarding the attempts of the Baltic émigrés to convince the U.S.

government to fund Radio Free Europe broadcasts to the Baltic countries. During the

1950s and 60s Latvian and other Baltic émigré activists were not too successful mainly

because they failed to adjust to the intricacies of the U.S. foreign policy and were

188
somewhat inflexible in what they wanted of the U.S. government and what they could

offer to it. Eventually thanks to their ability to pressure Congressional representatives and

due to émigrés’ willingness to make pragmatic political compromises, they accomplished

a goal of gaining broadcasting to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in their natives languages

in 1975.60

Among the leading American political figures Baltic émigrés had the support of

President Ford. Another well-known supporter of the Baltic anti-communist cause was

Senator Bob Dole, who not only sharply criticized the Soviet Union’s treatment of the

Baltic peoples, but also openly used the exile activists as his advisors. Another ally of the

Baltic anti-communist cause was President Ronald Reagan, who signed a Presidential

Proclamation of the Baltic Freedom Day on June 13, 1983. The text of the proclamation

included statements about the illegal Soviet occupation of the Baltic States and reasserted

that the U.S. had never accepted the destruction of these countries’ independence.

Finally, the Proclamation declared June 14 as the Baltic Freedom Day and invited

Americans to commemorate this day thus reaffirming their commitment to freedom of all

peoples. The Latvian and other Baltic anti-communists perceived this Proclamation as a

major political victory.

It has to be noted, however, that the supporters of the Baltic cause were usually

politicians or activists who already possessed quite articulate anti-communist beliefs. In

other words, ethnic anti-communists were able to effectively connect themselves to some

of the forms of Cold War American anti-Communism, but they did not generate support

for their politics in their own right.

189
Conclusion

Very soon after their arrival in the U.S. it became clear to Eastern European anti-

communists that although the American government talked about “rollback” and

“liberation” of Eastern Europe, it was not willing to deliver on these promises.61 Even

Eisenhower assured the Baltic refugees that their nations had all the rights to national

independence, yet was careful to promise military support and promoted instead an idea

of causing internal strains within the USSR.62 While the American government was

essentially “playing East and Central European émigré politics as a card in the Cold

War,”63 American public knew little about the refugees or ethnic anti-communists as

such.

Most of the Latvian anti-communist activities were received with little interest by

the American political establishment and the public. The essential complexity of the

Latvian anti-communist position was captured in the words of the anti-communist

Latvian intellectual Laimonis Streips who wrote in 1967 that “Latvia has no friends”

because “there is no nation in the world whose representatives explicitly argue for its

liberation.”64 Latvian and other Baltic anti-communists felt that their struggle took place

in the context where neither anti-communism, nor the Soviet occupation in Eastern

Europe bothered anyone.

Nevertheless, their activism was an important element of the Cold War period for

the Latvian nation. They preserved Latvian nationalist thought and developed it further

by incorporating more democratic elements. Anti-Communism of Latvian and other

Baltic émigrés was not merely anti-Soviet or nationalistic. It was a fairly well-developed

political doctrine that was able to effectively respond to the changes in the international,

190
Soviet and American political contexts. It also served as a political training ground for

the next generation of Latvian political leadership. Unsurprisingly, many of the ethnic

anti-communists were deeply involved in the establishment of Latvian statehood in the

1990s and contributed to the creation of post-independence political and diplomatic

institutions. In the long run, these refugees managed to leave important mark on the

political history and history of ideas in the U.S. and independent Latvia. Largely thanks

to them, Latvians in Latvia to this day perceive the U.S. as their most important

international ally.

1
Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1985), 296-323.

2
For a quite detailed description of the experience of specifically Baltic DPs see Victoria Marite Helga

Eastes, The Illusion of Peace: The Fate of the Baltic Displace Persons, 1945-1952 (master’s thesis, Texas

A&M University, 2007).

3
Mark Wyman, DPs: Europe’s Displaced Persons.1945-1951 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998),

194.
4
David Reimers, “Post-World War II Immigration to the United States: America’s Latest Newcomers,”

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, no. 454 (1981): 2.
5
Haim Genizi, America’s Fair Share: The Admission and Resettlement of Displaced Persons, 1945-1952

(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993), 152-60.

6
Juris Veidemanis, “The New Immigrant: A Challenge to an Older Theory,” (paper presented at the

Midwest Sociological Society, Des Moines, 1962), 13.

7
Visvaldis Klīve, “Dažas piezīmes par mūsu cīņu pret komūnismu,” Jaunā Gaita, no. 1 (1955): 28-9.
8
Joint Baltic American Committee, “Statement presented to the U.S. Department of State,” 12 December

1961, ALA/CFL Archives, Vilis Hāzners Papers, Box 4, Immigration History Research Center, University

of Minnesota.

191
9
ALA’s Centrālā Valde, “Izraksts no ALA’s Centrālās Valdes sēdes protokola,” 3 August 1958, Erik A.

Dundurs Papers, Box 6, Folder 11, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota;

American Latvian Association, “Resolution adopted at special session of the Board of Directors New

York,” 5 August 1959, Erik A. Dundurs Papers, Box 6, Folder 11, Immigration History Research Center,

University of Minnesota; American Latvian Association, “Resolution adopted at Special Session of the

Board of Directors,” August 1959, Erik A. Dundurs Papers, Box 6, Folder 11, Immigration History

Research Center, University of Minnesota.

10
Jānis Peniķis, “Darbs brīvībai un mūsu uzskati,” Jaunā Gaita, no. 23 (1959): 204-208.
11
See, for example, Ernests Blanks, “Cilvēks grib dzīvot brīvībā,” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 3

(1966): 49-51.
12
Jānis Brūns, “Uzbrukums turpinās,” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 1 (1975): 8-10.
13
Jānis Brūns, “Sarkanās varas balstītāji,” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 1 (1971): 9-16.
14
See, for example, Voldemārs Korsts, “Brīvības centieni un hipokrīti,” Čikāgas Ziņas, no. 2 (1977): 4.
15
Arnolds Strautnieks, “Quo vadis America un brīvā pasaule?” Čikāgas Ziņas, no. 5 (1980): 1-2.
16
See, for example, Ojārs Kalniņš, “The Forgotten War,” Chicago Latvian Newsletter, no. 1 (1985): 2-3.
17
Visvaldis Klīve, “Par mūsu draugiem un sabiedrotiem,” Čikāgas Ziņas, no. 13 (1988): 5-6.
18
J. Grodnis, “Par ko pasaule klusē,” Čikāgas Ziņas, no. 11 (1986): 5-6.
19
Ernests Blanks, “De Jure,” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 1 (1971): 6-8.
20
World Federation of Free Latvians, “Memorandum to the United Nations International Conference on

Human Rights,” April 1968, ALA/CFL Archives, Vilis Hāzners Papers, Box 2, Immigration History

Research Center, University of Minnesota.

21
Ernests Blanks, “Lielkrievu šovinisma purvā,” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 2 (1973) : 7-9.
22
Ilgvars Spilners, Mēs uzvarējām! Pasaules Brīvo Latviešu Apvienība Eiropas Drošības un Sadarbības

Konferencē un daži citi laikmetīgi notikumi, 1972-1986 (Rīga: Elpa, 1998), 153-63.
23
Rita Liepkalne, “Mērķi un ceļi,” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 5 (1977): 3-5.
24
Jānis Frišvalds, “Tēvzemei un brīvībai,” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 1 (1976): 1-4.
25
Vija Klīve and Visvaldis Klīve, “Mums vēl daudz jādara,” Laiks, 9 April, 1980, 2, 6.

192
26
Baltic States Freedom Council, “Manifesto,” June 1968, Raimunds Caks Papers, Box 5, Folder 12,

Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota.

27
Anonymous, “The Baltic Holocaust,” Latvian News Digest 2, no. 5 (1978): 2.
28
Anonymous, “Latvians to collect data about victims of Soviet oppression,” Latvian News Digest 1, no. 1

(1976): 1.
29
Anonymous, “Baltic Holocaust Recommended for California School Curriculum,” Latvian New Digest

11, no. 3 (1987): 8.

30
Anonymous, “Historical Justice,” Chicago Latvian Newsletter 8, no. 4 (1984): 1.
31
One this see Ieva Zake, “’The Secret Nazi Network’: Post World War II Latvian Emigres and the Hunt

for Nazis in the US” (forthcoming in the Journal of Baltic Studies).

32
Ernests Blanks, “Baltijas valstu vēsturiskā loma,” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 1 (1967): 14-6.
33
Ernests Blanks, “Latvijas valstssvētkos,” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 5 (1972): 1-3; V. Lagzdiņš,

“Tagad jācīnās ar patiesības ieročiem!” Daugavas Vanagu Mēnešraksts, no. 1 (1980): 1-4; Irma Dankere,

“Latvietība,”Treji Vārti 98 (1984): 1-3; A. Silgailis, “Latviešu leğiona nozīme,” Daugavas Vanagu

Mēnešraksts, no. 2 (1988): 3-7.

34
Andrievs Ezergailis, “Domājot par Lešinski – II,” Jaunā Gaita, no. 129 (1980): 22.
35
Ēriks Pārups, “LNPK kandidātu pieteikšanās pirminformācija,” Saulainā Krasta Vēstis, no. 1-2 (1986):

29-31.
36
Bruno Albats, “Latviešu sabiedriskais un kultūras darbs Amerikas Savienotajās Valstīs,” in Latviešu

trimdas desmit gadi, ed. H. Tichovskis (Astras Apgāds, 1954), 350; Vilis Māsēns, “ASV Kongresa tautas

vietnieku nama Baltijas komisija,” Okupācijas varu nodarītie postījumi Latvijā 1940-1990, ed. Tadeušs

Puisāns (Stokholma: Memento Daugavas Vanagi , 2000), 544-47.

37
More on the conflicts over the contacts with the Latvian SSR see Ieva Zake, “Controversies of US-USSR

Cultural Contacts during the Cold War: the Perspective of Latvian Refugees,” Journal of Historical

Sociology 21, no. 1 (2008): 51-87.

38
See, for example, the whole issue of Brīvības Talcinieks, 17 June 1983.
39
Spilners, Mēs uzvarējām!, 76-7.
40
Ibid., 224-6.

193
41
See, for example, I.B. “Apspiestās tautas prasa verdzības izbeigšanu: apspiesto tautu nedēļas sarīkojums

Čikāgā,” Čikāgas Ziņas, no. 10 (1985): 6-7.

42
Vilis Hāzners, “Memo regarding the Work of the Committee for a Free Latvia,” 25 January 1965,

ALA/CFL, Vilis Hāzners Papers, Box 2, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota.
43
Uldis Grava, “Letter to President Richard Nixon,” 4 January 1972, American Latvian Association

Archives, Box 14, Folder 1, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota. See also Uldis

Grava, “Letter to President Richard Nixon,” 22 December 1971, American Latvian Association Archives,

Box 14, Folder 1, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota.

44
Anonymous, “Svarīgs paziņojums,” Saulainā Krasta Vēstis, no. 5-6 (1982): 20.
45
Speech reprinted in Saulainā Krasta Vēstis, no. 10 (1982): 24.
46
Zdg., “Kura būs nākošā,” Čikāgas Ziņas, no. 12 (1987): 13.
47
Baltic Appeal to the United Nations, 30 August 1967, Raimunds Caks Papers, Box 5, Folder 1,

Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota; Baltic Appeal to the United Nations,

“Annual Report,” 3 May 1969, Raimunds Caks Papers, Box 5, Folder 1, Immigration History Research

Center, University of Minnesota.

48
This information was received at the workshop at the 21st conference on Baltic Studies organized by the

Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies 29 May-1 June, 2008 at Indiana University,

Bloomington, Indiana.
49
Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent, “Manifesto,” 7 November 1967,

Raimunds Caks Papers, Box 5, Folder 6, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota.
50
“Baltic Freedom League,” Saulainā Krasta Vēstis, no. 1 (1982): 18.
51
Jānis Peniķis, “Darbs brīvībai un mūsu uzskati,” Jaunā Gaita, no. 23 (1959): 206.
52
According to a Latvian émigré activist and historian Uldis Bluķis (personal communication, 30 May,

2008) there was also a Latvian Democratic Club, however it was quite small. There was no evidence of its

activities in the archival materials used in this research.

53
Visvaldis Klīve, “Latviešu organizācijas Amerikas Savienotajās Valstīs,” Archīvs, no. 12 (1972): 118.
54
Jānis Gaigulis to Ēriks Dundurs, 8 October 1964, Erik A. Dundurs Papers, Box 9, Folder 5, Immigration

History Research Center, University of Minnesota.

194
55
See materials in Erik A. Dundurs Papers, Box 8, Folders 3 and 10, Immigration History Research Center,

University of Minnesota.
56
Erik Dundurs, “HUAC,” Means November/September (1964): 9-12. See also Council for the Liberation

of Captive Peoples from Soviet Domination, “Press Release regarding HUAC’s visit to Minneapolis,” 23

June 1964, Erik A. Dundurs Papers, Box 6, Folder 7, Immigration History Research Center, University of

Minnesota.
57
Voldemārs Korsts, “Skatīsimies patiesībai acīs,” Saulainā Krasta Vēstis, no. 6 (1980): 9-11.
58
Voldemārs Korsts, “Ar Regenu pretī labākai nākotnei,” Čikāgas Ziņas , no. 5 (1980): 4.
59
Kārlis Vanagu, “Trimdinieka piezīmes,” Svešos Krastos 46 (1983): 14.
60
On this see Jonathan H. L’Hommedieu, “Broadcasting to the Baltic, 1950-1976: U.S.-Baltic Émigré

Relations Concerning the Role of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Broadcasts and U.S. Foreign

Policy” (master’s thesis, The University of Turku, 2006).

61
On this see Istvan Deak, “Did the Revolution Have to Fail?” The New York Review, 1 March 2007,

46-9; Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt

(Standford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/ Stanford University Press, 2006).

62
Chris Tudda, “‘Reenacting the Story of Tantalus’: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Failed Rhetoric of

Liberation," Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 4 (2005): 3-35.

63
Anna D. Jaroszynska-Kirchmann, The Exile Mission: The Polish Political Diaspora and Polish

Americans, 1939-1956 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2004), 196.

64
Laimonis Streips, “Domas par Latvijas valsti,” Jaunā Gaita, no. 62 (1967): 42.

195