Controversies of US-USSR Cultural Contac PDF

Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 21 No.
1 March 2008
ISSN 0952-1909
Controversies of US-USSR Cultural Contacts

During the Cold War: The Perspective of
Latvian Refugees1
IEVA ZAKE
Abstract This article analyzes the conflict that emerged regarding the so-called
US-USSR “cultural contacts” during the Cold War within the exile community of
American Latvians. While most of the American political and cultural elites saw
cultural exchanges with the Soviets as beneficial, the reactions of the émigrés were
much more controversial and polarizing. This study reveals the unrecognized side of
the Cold War politics as experienced by the refugee groups. The study employs
American, Latvian and Soviet publications, memoirs, interviews and archival
materials.
*****
Introduction
The fall of 2006 was the 20th anniversary of one of the most notable
US-USSR public diplomacy events of the Cold War era – the
Jūrmala Conference or Jūrmala Dialogues of 1986. This meeting
brought together representatives of the Soviet and American public
in a beach resort on the territory of the then Soviet Socialist
Republic of Latvia. It marked a peak in the long history of the
US-USSR cultural and public diplomacy during the Cold War and
anticipated new political trends soon to be introduced by Mikhail
Gorbachev. The Jūrmala Conference also was the high moment of
the post-World War II anti-Soviet political activities of the American
Latvian émigrés. They arrived in Jūrmala carrying pins with an
American flag crossed with the flag of then non-existent indepen-
dent Latvia, which caused a major political scandal. In 1986 Ameri-
can Latvians seemed willing to employ the so-called US-USSR
cultural contacts and unified in their position. However, as shown
in this article, the issue of cultural contacts with the USSR had a
highly controversial history in the émigré community.
It is often forgotten that the Cold War was not only about two
powers trying to expand their military strength and political influ-
ence. It was also a cultural and ideological battle in which the two
states attempted to influence each other’s ideas and values as well
as technology and scientific knowledge. This aspect of the Cold
War involved propaganda, exploitation of intelligentsia for political
reasons, manipulation of public opinion, and espionage. And one of
the main channels for this competition was the US-USSR cultural
contacts.
© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ,
UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
56 Ieva Zake
Although most Americans remained oblivious about the darker,

more complicated side of the cultural exchanges, refugees such as
American Latvians were directly affected by it. In fact, their expe-
rience represented a striking, yet untold story of the Cold War. To
the refugees, the cultural contacts were not benign exchanges of
films and art exhibitions building friendship between the American
and Soviet peoples. Instead, the cultural contacts were a dramatic
dilemma. On the one hand, the refugees wanted to demonstrate
their loyalty to the US as their host country and support the
American interests in building relations with the USSR. They feared
to be perceived as irrational and fanatic anti-Communists. On the
other hand, they were painfully aware that the Soviets used the
cultural contacts for propaganda purposes and also to immobilize
the émigré community as a vociferous opponent of the USSR.
Struggle against the Soviet regime and Communism formed the
foundation of the exile community’s political and even ethnic iden-
tity. To support the cultural contacts meant giving it up and allow-
ing the Soviets to use them as a propaganda instrument. This
dilemma also had a third side. The émigrés worried about losing
touch with their co-patriots under the Soviet rule, and the Soviet
cultural exchange initiatives offered an opportunity to visit them.
Yet again, accepting this chance meant silencing themselves as
fighters for Latvia’s liberation from the Soviet rule.
This article studies these complications generated by US-USSR
cultural contacts, and it has two main goals. On the one hand, it
reveals that the Cold War was not fought only on the inter-
governmental levels, but it also had a direct effect on particular
groups such as post-World War II refugees. On the other hand, the
article demonstrates that inter-state relationships and large-scale
international conflicts influenced political refugees in a way that set
them apart from other types of immigrants.2 This study shows that
the refugee experience was constructed through “the triadic rela-
tion between diasporas, host states, and home states.”3 The net-
works created by political refugees transcended the territorial
borders of the states as these groups remained materially, politi-
cally and sentimentally tied to their homelands, while establishing
connections to various international agents and organizations in
their host countries.4 Political refugees had to deal with foreign and
domestic issues that did not affect other immigrant groups.5
While residing in the US during the Cold War, American Latvians
mobilized to influence the US policy toward the USSR and to
communicate to the West the truth about conditions behind the
Iron Curtain. The outcomes of their activism were mixed and incon-
sistent as the refugees had to navigate carefully with their demands
and remain apprehensive about exerting too much pressure.6 At
© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 21 No. 1 March 2008
The Perspective of Latvian Refugees 57
the same time, the émigrés were a target of the Soviet intelligence
and propaganda campaigns due to their openly anti-Soviet posi-
tion.7 In addition, they thought of themselves as citizens of the
non-existent independent Latvian state, which American officials
defined as illegally occupied by the Soviets, while the Soviets
described it as voluntarily incorporated. American Latvians literally
became political symbols whose mere existence abroad personified
“a profound criticism of the state they have fled.”8 Therefore they
were used for political and propagandistic purposes by both the
American and Soviet sides locked in the Cold War,9 while the
refugees tried to pursue their own political goals. They were caught
in the middle of the Cold War competition, and this situation had a
controversial effect on the exile community. It became polarized
and fragmented, and created a fortress mentality, that is, a con-
tinuous “feeling of siege, a need to defend oneself.”10
Cultural Contacts and the Cold War Realities

What were the “cultural contacts”?
On the American side, the idea of cultural contacts with the USSR
was largely a product of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s notion of a
“people-to-people exchange” which was supposed to help the two
nations learn about each other.11 While Stalin was in charge, no
such exchanges were imaginable. However, the situation changed
with Khrushchev’s arrival at the power. He appeared interested in
building cultural contacts with the US, and although the Ameri-
cans were aware that the Soviets might use the cultural contacts
for propaganda12 or to smear the international image of the US,13
they decided to take the opportunity. Among the main promoters of
the cultural exchange in the US were non-governmental cultural
and media organizations, academic institutions and some politi-
cians such as Senator Jacob K. Javits and Vice-president Richard
Nixon. Their argument that cultural contacts could relieve the
tension between the two countries reached the ears of important
decision-makers14 and on January 27, 1958 the US government
signed an agreement with the USSR entitled “Agreement between
the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical and Educational
Fields.” This was an executive agreement and did not require
discussion in the US Senate.15
The resulting programs were quite diverse and included
exchanges of scholars and graduate students, visits of musicians,
artists, writers and theatre groups, and art exhibitions. The most
successful were programs of student exchange,16 while the least

58 Ieva Zake
effective were such ideas as film co-production17 and an exchange

of school-aged children.18 The very first Soviet visitors arranged
through the new agreement were Moscow’s Moiseyev dance com-
pany,19 while some of the earliest Americans to perform in the
USSR were the marching band of the University of Michigan.
Despite numerous obstacles the cultural exchange lasted up
until the late 1970s, when it was halted by President Carter in
response to the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan. The contacts
resumed during the second term of Reagan’s presidency, especially
after the Geneva Summit in November of 1985.20 Throughout the
years one of the main concerns for Americans was the USSR’s
pressure to build the cultural contacts on the state level. Americans
wanted to have a free exchange among individuals or non-
governmental organizations, but the Soviets made it clear that they
were interested only in agreements that were signed by government
officials. Eventually the American side gave in hoping that these
contacts could grow into more personal relationships,21 and created
a number of quasi official organizations such as IREX (Interna-
tional Research and Exchange Board) to handle the exchanges.22
As stated in a National Security Council directive of 1958, the
American goal in these exchanges was to give people in the Soviet
Union a better understanding of the United States and to influence
trends within Soviet society by encouraging people to consider
ideas for positive change.23 The American side hoped to introduce at
least minimal flow of free information into the USSR. The State
Department also saw these contacts as a way to force the Soviets
to maintain at least some sort of peaceful and mutually helpful
relationship with the US.24 The Soviets never publicly stated their
intentions. The only way to judge about their goals was by observ-
ing their actions during the cultural contacts process. It appeared
that the Soviets were interested in learning about American
science, technology, industrial and agricultural achievements to
the benefit of the Soviet state and its scientific and technolog-
ical prowess. Politically, the Soviets utilized cultural exchange to
promote their propaganda child – the idea of peaceful coexistence.25
In the 1960s the USSR government decided to demonstrate the
multi-ethnic nature of its empire and encouraged exchanges with
representatives of the ethnic republics such as the Latvian Soviet
Socialist Republic. Thus, a few Latvian Soviet authors, artists and
scientists were allowed to travel to the US under the careful
supervision of the central powers in Moscow. The scientists who
could travel abroad were carefully selected. For example, one
such exchangee, physicist Juris Za k is, was sent on an exchange
program in the late 1960s and early 70s because he had a distinc-
tively Latvian last name and thus could serve as a “token” repre-

sentative of a minority group. He had scholarly publications, but,

more importantly, his parents and closest relatives were not
involved in any suspicious political activities, he had no relatives
abroad, his father had not participated in World War II, he was
married with children and thus more likely to return, and he had a
good command of English. His experience suggested that the
Soviets were more concerned about the exchangees’ political reli-
ability than academic qualifications.26
In this and other cases, the Soviets played the cultural and
academic exchanges as a political game in which they tried to
control everything – who was sent, where, what they were allowed
to study and how they were treated. This applied to both the people
they sent abroad and those who visited the USSR. While the Ameri-
cans only restricted access to information of military importance,
the Soviets did not allow the visiting scholars to learn much of
anything that was not previously approved by the Soviet authori-
ties. The USSR also carefully supervised the content of the cultural
programs sent by the American side. The Soviet government used
visits abroad not as a way to improve exchange of information, but
as a reward to those artists and writers who had been loyal to the
regime.
The US-USSR cultural contacts were often employed in the ideo-
logical war between the two countries. For example, in response to
American involvement in the Vietnam War, the Soviets did not let
Americans perform in the USSR for more than a year, which
Americans took as a sign of bad faith on the Soviet part.27 These
tensions seemed to have eased off,28 until the Americans declared
that they would review their exchange programs due to the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia,29 while the Soviets postponed an
American exhibition to indicate their “displeasure with American
intervention in Cambodia.”30 The US halted exchange programs due
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and when the contacts
resumed, a new problem was the defection of the Soviet artists,
which caused the Soviets to cancel their programs.31
Even when the programs were running relatively smoothly, there
were problems. For example, the American organizers of the
exchanges were continuously faced with the inefficiency and slow
pace of the Soviet bureaucracy in such basic logistical issues as
responding to correspondence. Additionally, due to the Soviet state-
controlled low prices for tickets the Americans had to subsidize
their cultural programs, while the Soviets in the US always made
money. Also, at the beginning the Americans allowed the Soviet
visitors to travel freely within the US, while the Soviets imposed
strict travel regulations on the visiting Americans. In response, the
Americans also enforced the travel limit of 25 miles from the site of

60 Ieva Zake
the Soviet visitor’s residence. Often the American visitors in the

USSR were attacked by the official Soviet press as spies and
provocateurs as in the case of Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn or
visiting American Congressmen who were accused of “subversive
activities.”32
Among the most eager American enthusiasts of cultural contacts
were academics, intellectuals, non-governmental organizations and
certain political activists. In the 1950s and 60s they argued that
cultural contacts could bring the two countries “within the bounds
of legitimate intellectual, political and commercial competition”33
and that improved cultural relations between people could enhance
contacts between the two states as well.34 In the 1980s they saw the
cultural contacts as an instrument for achieving peace through an
“energetic dialogue” with the Soviets power35 and treating it as a
legitimate partner equally responsible for world peace.36
More critical voices were represented by such political figures as
Allen W. Dulles, the Director of the CIA in the 1950s, and the leader
of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union David Dubin-
sky. These and other critics pointed out the cost of the exchange
programs to the American taxpayers and their limited effect on
Moscow’s political attitudes.37 Charles A. Moser, a professor of
Slavic languages at Yale University, attacked the visiting Soviet
writers for serving as regime’s lackeys and helping maintain its
ideological controls.38
In the 1980s the critics of cultural contacts pointed out that
the exchanges had never been “a truly two-way experience,”39
which was also affirmed by a study done by the panel of the
National Academy of Science and led by Cornell University Presi-
dent Emeritus Dale R. Corson in 1982.40 Richard Perle, a staff
member of the Senate Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferations, and Federal Services, and also Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Policy under Reagan’s
administration publicly noted that the Soviets had been abusing
American openness and hospitality.41 Pianist David Bar-Illan
wrote that the cultural enrichment brought by talented Soviet
artists was undeniable, however the price of giving “implicit
approval, a tacit license, to the trampling of human and artistic
right by a repressive, totalitarian regime” was too high to pay.42
Some of the American critics of cultural contacts could not ignore
the manipulated and pointless content of the supposed people-
to-people meetings, where the so-called “youth representatives”
from the USSR turned out to be middle-aged members of the
Communist Party’s nomenklatura.43
Although the debates about the usefulness of the US-USSR cul-
tural contacts in the American political and cultural elite were often

quite loud, they were nowhere as dramatic and emotional as those

taking place among the Latvian refugees.
Cultural Contacts from the Refugees’ Point of View

Latvians who arrived in the US after World War II were former
Displaced Persons, who were stranded in Western Germany’s
refugee camps until they were taken in by different Western
nations.44 An estimated 45,000 Latvian DPs arrived in the US
between 1949 and 1951. In 1990, there were 75,700 Latvians in the
US including the first, second and third generation descendants of
the DPs. The Latvian refugees fled the Soviet re-occupation of
Latvia in 1944 after having witnessed the first year of Soviet occu-
pation in 1940–41, which was followed by the Nazi invasion.
Latvian DPs consisted of diverse groups of people who had either
suffered at the hands of Soviets in 1940, were afraid for their lives
or had been drafted by the Nazis and knew that the Soviets would
execute them immediately. The Soviet officials however declared
that all of the Latvian DPs were war criminals, Nazi collaborators,
“diversionists, spies, adventurers, saboteurs, traitors and common
criminals”45 and demanded their immediate repatriation. Moreover
the Soviet government insisted that the DP’s were actually Soviet
citizens because according to the Soviet laws, “without the govern-
ment’s permission, no individual renunciation of citizenship is
valid.”46
Fortunately, most Western countries disagreed with the Soviet
interpretation of “citizenship” and allowed the DP’s to settle within
their borders.47 The majority of the Latvian refugees came from the
former independent Latvia’s political elite and intelligentsia. In
exile they formed a well-organized and outspoken anti-Communist
diaspora, which worried the USSR because it could promote
nationalist sentiments among the Latvians under the Soviet rule
and disseminate information about the conditions behind the Iron
Curtain. Therefore in as early as 1955, the Soviet government
created the “Committee for a Return to the Motherland” in East
Berlin. The Committee put out a propaganda paper that was sent
directly to the exiles trying to demoralize their community.48 As
time went on and the exile community grew stronger the Soviet
techniques became increasingly sophisticated including building
“cultural contacts” with the exiles.
While in the US, Latvian political refugees became involved in the
early anti-Soviet American propaganda and intelligence efforts.49
For example, they prepared materials for Radio Liberty and Voice of
America. Some émigré organizations were even involved in espio-
nage projects on behalf of the CIA during the late 1940s and early

62 Ieva Zake
50s with the purpose of promoting internal resistance within the

occupied Baltic countries. These early immigrant supported clan-
destine operations were soon abandoned by the CIA50 and American
propaganda pursuits also became more sophisticated using such
ideas as “public diplomacy.”51 This was supposed to address the
Soviet people directly and consisted of meetings or seminars with
delegations of both countries. The first such seminar took place in
Dartmouth in 1960. However it soon became clear that in seminar
after seminar the Soviets sent the same Communist Party staff
members, KGB officers, high-ranking academic administrators and
government bureaucrats thus corrupting the purpose of these
citizen-level meetings.52
Refugees did not support such contacts with the USSR and
organized protests. The Council for the Liberation of Captive
Peoples from Soviet Domination, led by the Latvian Ēriks Dundurs,
was created by a group of Eastern European refugees in Minnesota
in 1962. It wrote to the State Department, Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey and Representative Walter H. Judd asking them to
intercede in the display of a Soviet exhibition in Washington D.C.
because it contained materials from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
thus implicitly accepting that these three countries were a legiti-
mate part of the USSR. The protesters called upon the American
politicians to oppose this since the US government had never
acknowledged the incorporation of the three countries into the
USSR. The following year, the Baltic refugees again protested a
Soviet exhibit of technical books.53
The Department of State responded that the American side was
unable to censor the content of these exhibitions as it would
jeopardize the bi-lateral agreement of cultural exchange.54 This did
not placate the protesters and in 1967 they released yet another
protest in regard to a Soviet Art Exhibit, which had been mislabeled
as a collection of “Contemporary Russian Art,” while apparently
more than 50% of the paintings had been created by artists of
various non-Russian ethnic minorities.55
Such cultural exchange programs put the Latvian émigré com-
munity in a difficult position. They did not wish to oppose American
interests in pursuing relations with the USSR, but they could not
accept the idea of treating the USSR as a legitimate cultural and
political partner. Moreover, to the Latvian refugees’ dismay Ameri-
can scholars, political activists and journalists began to question
the idea of USSR as a totalitarian regime from the 1960s onward.56
Revisionist views on Communists as “idealistic, though some times
failing fighters for social justice” took hold of the American aca-
demia and political Left.57 The American anti-Communism lost its
battle and became fragmented already by the 1970s. Latvians in

the US, however, continued to pursue their anti-Communist posi-

tion and worked to expose the destruction brought about by the
Soviets all throughout the 1980s. They promoted the idea that the
Baltic nations had survived a Soviet organized Holocaust.58 To
them, Communism was the ultimate enemy of all humanity59 and
they desperately tried to convey this to Americans and the rest of
the world. In other words, the refugees could never forget that the
cultural contacts idea developed following Khrushchev’s orders for
“the proliferation of Soviet spy activities” and expansion of Soviet
propaganda.60
The “Ethnic Cultural Contacts” – The Liaison Committee for

Cultural Relations
Returning back to the 1960s, it is important to note that the
understanding of the cultural contacts for the American Latvians
was greatly affected by the Soviet policy to give the cultural contacts
a distinctly ethnic character. Upon Nikita Khrushchev’s initiative a
whole new type of institution was created in the ethnic Soviet
republics in 1964 with a purpose of establishing cultural relations
with their compatriots abroad. The Latvian version of this was
called Kultūras Sakaru Biedrı̄ ba – the Liaison Committee for Cul-
tural Relations with Countrymen Abroad (LCCR). Instead of treat-
ing the exiles as “diversionists” and “criminals,” the Soviets now
wanted to make friends with them,61 while at the same time influ-
encing the refugee community, controlling its political activities and
discrediting it in the eyes of the West. Also, the creation of organi-
zations such as the LCCR was a notable political trick played by the
Soviets. On the one hand, they requested the US government to
sign agreements on the state level, while, on the other hand, they
tried everything to bypass the US government and establish con-
tacts with private American individuals, groups, organizations and
even commercial outlets.62
According to its official publication – a newspaper entitled
“Dzimtenes Balss” (The Voice of the Homeland) – the LCCR had
noble intentions. It aimed to “preserve cultural relations” with
Latvians living abroad, to inform them about life in their homeland,
and supply them with cultural valuables and informational mate-
rials. It sent Soviet Latvian poets, writers, musicians and actors on
tours to the US, organized the showings of Soviet Latvian movies in
the US and invited American Latvian academics and intellectuals to
visit Soviet Latvia. Those who agreed were published in the major
literary publications and given luxurious treatment (public appear-
ances, paid trips, visits with Soviet officials, etc.). The LCCR even
tried to supply Latvian language schools in the US with its

64 Ieva Zake
textbooks and promoted Soviet publications abroad. The LCCR

continuously insisted that it is approaching only those émigrés who
wanted to become engaged.63
However, the LCCR’s intentions were much more sinister. Its
major goal was to create polarizing distinction between the “good”
vs. the “bad” exiles, thus disorganizing the émigré community. This
distinction became apparent when the LCCR stated that: “we are
building and maintaining cultural contacts with those Latvians
abroad who support peace, peaceful co-existence and better rela-
tions between the country of their residence and the Soviet
Union.”64 Thus, the LCCR positioned itself as a measure of which
exiles were “truly democratic” and “humanistic” and which ones
were un-deserving warmongers.65 For example, in 1974 “Dzimtenes
Balss” published a half-page article attacking the Archbishop of the
Latvian Evangelic Lutheran Church outside of Latvia Arnolds Lūsis
because he had dared to criticize the World Peace Congress in
Moscow.66 The LCCR also targeted the leadership of the refugee
organizations as unworthy people who had snatched power without
consideration for the needs of “simple” Latvians.67
To emphasize the difference between the good and the bad exiles,
the LCCR initiated an active “Nazi hunt” campaign demanding that
the émigré community must admit and reveal former Nazis and
Nazi collaborators in its midst.68 This accusatory theme came to
permeate the pages of “Dzimtenes Balss.” Some articles described
the pathetic life of the alleged Latvian war criminals abroad,69 while
others ridiculed the exile organization Daugavas Vanagi (founded
by former Baltic Waffen SS soldiers in the Displaced Persons camps
in Germany) as a useless company of former Nazi accomplices.70
“Dzimtenes Balss” regularly reprinted articles from the American,
European and Soviet press dealing with the alleged Latvian role in
Nazi atrocities and the Nazi-hunt pursued by the IRS and the Office
of Special Investigations.71 The Soviet authors repeatedly pointed
out that the alleged Latvian war criminals had been employed by
the CIA or the FBI and protected by the American court system72
never failing to end such articles with a statement that the Soviet
Union strongly supported the punishment of war criminals in the
interests of international cooperation, peace and justice.73
In 1975 “Dzimtenes Balss” intensified this campaign by arguing
that the Latvian role in World War II atrocities was a logical con-
tinuation of the “bourgeois nationalism” of the independence years
between 1919 and 1940.74 This was a direct political attack on the
exiled Latvians who promoted the ideals of Latvian national inde-
pendence. Two years later “Dzimtenes Balss” published a series of
fragments from a Soviet book “From the SS and SD to. . . ,” which
claimed that hundreds of war criminals were hiding among the

exile Latvians, and that the exile organizations such as Daugavas

Vanagi were planning revenge on the USSR and were financed by
secret Nazi sources.75 In the early 1980s, the accusations continued
with more incriminating information and supposed eyewitness tes-
timonials about additional war criminals among the refugees.76
Another technique used by the LCCR was describing the exile
visitors to Soviet Latvia as spies and provocateurs. Articles in
“Dzimtenes Balss” pictured the visiting exiles as pathetic and
morally deranged people who were seeking out only the negative
sides of Soviet life and contrasted them with the happy and content
Soviet citizens.77 The LCCR blamed the nationalistic refugee orga-
nizations for forcing the visiting American Latvians to take on a
propaganda “mission” of glorifying capitalist exploitation, smug-
gling in subversive literature, promoting bourgeois nationalism and
collecting groundless rumors.78
Finally, the LCCR put a lot of energy into developing the idea that
without the Soviet instigated cultural contacts Latvianness in exile
would die.79 The LCCR’s approach was to argue that there was no
unified Latvian culture, but one culture in exile, which was bour-
geois, nationalist, limited, generally inferior, outdated and ineffec-
tive, and another culture in Soviet Latvia, which was much better,
socialist and supported by the state. Consequently, the culture in
exile was “anti-humanist, anti-peace, dilettantish and opposed to
cooperation among countries” and therefore unworthy of being
brought to Soviet Latvia,80 while the Latvian culture of Soviet Latvia
was ultimately needed for the exiles to survive. Thus, the LCCR
promoted one-way contacts, which would make the refugee com-
munity dependent on Soviet exports for its cultural rejuvenation.
The LCCR was an instrument of ideological and intelligence
warfare from the beginning. It was under control of the KGB and
the Communist Party as its leadership was selected by the head of
the KGB intelligence section and the chairman of the LCCR’s board
was approved by the Central Committee of the Latvian branch of
the Communist Party. In 1975 the Latvian office of the KGB even
appointed its own officer as a deputy to the chairman of the LCCR
in order to strengthen the relations between the KGB and the
LCCR, that is, to secure the KGB’s control over all cultural contacts
with the émigrés. Moreover, since the mid-1970s, the internal
documentation of the LCCR clearly stated that its goal was “frag-
mentation of the Latvian émigré centers in the West” as well as
recruitment of those refugees who were “loyal or neutral toward the
Soviet power” in Soviet Latvia.81
In a recently published memoir, the former head of the Soviet
Latvian office of the KGB Edmunds Johansons revealed that there
were two units that targeted the exile population in particular. One

66 Ieva Zake
was an intelligence unit that worked with the émigré organizations

and observed the visiting exiles. The second unit worked with
Latvians abroad who were suspected of bringing in anti-Soviet
propaganda materials as well as inciting anti-Soviet political
unrest.82 The LCCR was part of this structure. Also, it was head-
quartered in a building on Gorky Street in Rı̄ ga, which also hosted
such well-known Soviet front organizations as the Directorate of
Tourist Affairs, Soviet Latvia’s Peace Committee, and Association
for the Cultural Contacts and Friendship with Foreign Coun-
tries. According to the Soviet byline these organizations would
“bring nations and countries closer thus strengthening friendship
between the nations and peace throughout the world”83 while in
reality they were deception instruments for the Soviet foreign policy
goal to undermine and destroy capitalism.84
Therefore American Latvians who visited Soviet Latvia through
the LCCR’s programs immediately became targets of KGB’s recruit-
ing interests.85 It is also known that the delegations of Soviet
Latvian artists, academics and intellectuals sent to the US went
with a mission to create disagreements among the exiles and
promote Soviet propaganda. Some of the most detailed descriptions
of the LCCR’s secret goals were provided in the 1970s by a defector
named Imants Lešinskis – a former KGB officer, head of the LCCR,
editor of “Dzimtenes Balss” and a translator for the Secretary of the
Soviet Mission to the UN. While most exiles were eager to hear his
exposing testimonies, others worried that this former KGB officer
could not be trusted.86 Nevertheless, Lešinskis became somewhat of
a celebrity making presentations and publishing prolifically. He
also testified in court cases on behalf of alleged Baltic war criminals
where he revealed the Soviet methods for collecting the so-called
“eye-witness testimonies” supplied to the American prosecutors.
His sudden and untimely (he was only 54 years old) death at a
shopping mall on December 23, 1985 alarmed the Latvian exiles.
They suspected that Lešinskis might have been murdered because
he died just after he had announced publication of his revealing
memoirs. Moreover, the manuscript was never recovered. The
American Latvian Association even publicly asked the CIA to look
into the circumstances surrounding his death. In the end, Lešin-
skis remained somewhat of a mystery to the exile community which
wanted to hope that he had been honest, while at the same time
they were afraid of this sophisticated former KGB agent.87
Lešinskis explicitly warned the exiles against maintaining the
so-called “cultural contacts.” He claimed that these exchanges were
controlled and used by the KGB to collect information and recruit
informants. He stated that the Soviet Latvian visitors to the US
were expected to report to Soviet security institutions upon their

return home. He described the LCCR’s propaganda techniques

such as publishing fake “letters to the editor” in “Dzimtenes Balss”
containing slander about the exile’s political leaders; printing mis-
information about the conditions in Soviet Latvia; subverting the
exile publications and sowing paranoia among the exiles.88 In other
words, the “culture” in the “cultural contacts” was just a smoke-
screen89 for the LCCR’s true intentions of subverting and dividing
the émigrés, politically neutralizing the bulk of them while creating
all sorts of “progressive” groups and organizations that could con-
sciously or unconsciously serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy
and intelligence-gathering.
On a number of occasions, the LCCR was quite successful. The
LCCR’s initiatives generated clashes bordering on witch-hunt
within the émigré community. It also managed to recruit a number
of younger generation European Latvian émigrés (G. Pone, A.
Urdze, V. Āboltiņš, O. Rozı̄ tis and M. Būmanis) to not only advocate
close connections with Soviet Latvia, but also promote Marxist
Leninist ideology. According to the reports to the Central Commit-
tee of Latvia’s Communist Party, the LCCR’s leadership considered
these developments the fruit of their work with the émigrés.90
Clashing Views on Cultural Contacts

Supporters
The Latvian refugee community was torn as it witnessed Americans
and Soviets become “friends” and the LCCR expand its influence
among the émigrés. There were two opposing views on the meaning
of the cultural contacts for American Latvians and both positions
were built on quite well articulated ideological doctrines. One was
strongly anti-Communist and driven by a sense of mission and
loyalty to Latvian national independence. The other was determined
by a sentiment that culture, activity and immediate survival issues
should take precedence over lofty political ideals. Clearly, the issue
of cultural contacts was more urgent and complicated for Latvian
refugees than for the rest of American society. They were directly
targeted by the Soviet cultural contacts programs and many of the
refugees felt that the continued existence of the émigré community
as a political actor depended on their attitude toward US-USSR
exchanges. Unlike other immigrant groups, the experience of the
political refugees was significantly shaped, even determined by the
US-USSR relations. For one thing, they had to continuously articu-
late their political position and identify their friends and foes.
The arguments in support of the cultural contacts appeared
already in the late 1960s and flourished throughout the 1970s.

68 Ieva Zake
They received most articulate expression in a private journal

“Tilts” (Bridge) published in Minneapolis, MN. Its authors were
regularly criticized for promoting Soviet propaganda by their
opponents. In response, they evoked arguments about freedom of
the press and insisted that it was vitally important that the
American Latvian community should hear a “different” point of
view originating in Soviet Latvia.91 Later the authors of “Tilts”
started to criticize the Latvian émigré society for becoming too
dogmatic in its politics and culture. As a remedy they suggested
de-politicizing exile activities and paying more attention to pro-
tecting the Latvian cultural identity.92 “Tilts” claimed that the
refugee community had been ineffective and therefore a different
approach to life in exile was desperately needed.93 This publica-
tion suggested more “realism,” that is, focus on the cultural
needs of Latvian community.94
Consequently, “Tilts” perceived the critics of the cultural contacts
as over-sensitive and outright silly. The authors of “Tilts,” saw the
debates about the exchanges with Soviet Latvians as not only
unimportant, but also as playing right into the hands of the com-
munists who already thought of the exiles as lacking in character,
self-centered and annoying.95 “Tilts” also suggested that instead of
fighting about the cultural contacts, exiles must focus on the
nation’s survival, on educating the next generation and on sup-
porting the peace efforts because should there be another war,
Latvians would not survive it.96 Physical existence was more impor-
tant than politics and the best way to make sure that Latvians
lasted was to build cultural bridges with Soviet Latvia.97
In 1971, the poet Olafs Stumbrs articulated the following reasons
for supporting the contacts: first, the real Latvian people lived only
within the borders of Latvia; second, Latvia and Latvians were a
part of the Soviet Union; third, concerns about the Latvian people
had to be concerns about Latvians in Soviet Latvia.98 He believed
that Latvianness could be found only in Soviet Latvia and the most
important goal was keeping as many Latvians alive as possible.99
Stumbrs’ suggestion was that Latvian exiles needed to rely more on
the Latvian culture under Soviet rule. This also required that
refugees stop criticizing each other about collaboration with the
Soviets, give up the idea that “true” Latvian culture exists only
among them and realize that the exile community had been endan-
gered by its own self-centeredness.100 In other words, as it was
stated in the Journal of American Latvian Association in the late
1970s, “the interests of all Latvians require that Latvian nation
itself exists. This is understood most clearly by those Latvians who
live in homeland and who act on behalf of the Latvian nation.
Latvians who live in exile are also working in the interests of the

Latvian nation, however, to my mind, they can no longer speak in

the name of the Latvian nation.”101
These arguments added up to self-depreciation on the part of
Latvian exiles. In 1974 “Tilts” published a long article where its
author Skrasti n, š blamed himself and the refugee community for
the ruined life of his brother in Soviet Latvia who had apparently
been living in hiding for 25 years awaiting the foreign liberators
from the Soviets and finally had ended up in a psychiatric hospital.
Skrastiņš, undeniably feeling personal pain about this tragedy,
claimed that had he stayed in Latvia none of this would have
happened. Essentially, the article suggested that the refugees made
a mistake by fleeing and therefore instead of getting involved in
international politics, they must focus on preserving Latvian
culture and supporting each other.102
In sum, those outspoken exile Latvians who supported the cul-
tural exchanges with Soviet Latvia privileged a culturally based
understanding of Latvianness. They tended to see the refugees as
a part of the nation and were critical of everything happening in
the exile community. Although they offered a certain measure-
ment of healthy self-criticism for the American Latvian commu-
nity, often their ideas appeared too similar to those promoted by
the Soviet LCCR. For example, just like “Dzimtenes Balss,” “Tilts”
implied that the exiles should see themselves as inferior to the
Soviet Latvians. Also, by defining national identity solely in cul-
tural terms, their conception came dangerously close to those
developed by the Soviets, which turned the non-Russian ethnici-
ties and their cultures into folklorized parodies of themselves.
These similarities may not have been coincidental. According to a
secret report of the LCCR to the Central Committee of the Latvia’s
Communist Party, it had succeeded in ideologically influencing
émigrés publications, particularly “Tilts” and “Jaunā Gaita” (The
New Gait).103 Lešinskis also testified that the LCCR supplied
“Tilts” with articles and photos.104
Critics
The other view was radically opposed to that expressed in “Tilts”105
and appeared in such publications as “Čikāgas Ziņas” (Chicago
News) coming out of the Chicago Latvian Lutheran congregation,
“Vēstnesis” (Herald) published in Boston, “Saulainā Krasta Vēstis”
(The News from the Sunny Coast) published in Florida and “Svešos
Krastos” (On the Foreign Shores) published by the Free Latvian
Association of Philadelphia. It is interesting to note that while
“Tilts” was a brightly illustrated and glossy publication, most of the

70 Ieva Zake
materials put out by their opponents had a distinctly grainy and

mimeographed samizdat appearance.
The anti-cultural contacts position insisted that the exchange
with Soviet Latvians had a political, not cultural, meaning. To these
American Latvians, cultural exchanges appeared as a flood of “our
enemies – propagandists of communism and Russian imperialism,
spies, ‘cultural delegations’ under the careful watch of the KGB.”
This unacceptable situation had to be brought to the attention of
the American public instead of remaining just the topic of internal
conflict among the refugees.106 The critics also pointed out that
the USSR deliberately used the cultural contacts to lessen the
influence of anti-communism in the US and thus minimize the
political power of Eastern European refugees most of whom rallied
behind anti-communist politics. Additionally, the cultural contacts
de-moralized and weakened the unity of the exile community
because it was forced into a difficult choice of either remaining loyal
to its political goals or supporting Latvians under Soviet rule.107
Moreover, as explained by one of the leaders of the exile community
at the time Aristı̄ ds Lembergs, those who had contacts with Soviet
Latvia ended up compromising their political potential and backed
off from fighting Soviet communism altogether.108
Importantly, the opponents of cultural contacts did not deny the
necessity of keeping in touch with Latvians under Soviet rule. Many
of them sent money and goods to their relatives and maintained
personal contacts. Nevertheless, they rejected the Soviet organized
contacts as mere propaganda and tools of espionage intended to
demonstrate to the world that Soviet Latvians were not oppressed,
but instead doing just fine – singing, writing poems and acting in
plays.109
These critical exiles wished that the American public would see
how cultural contacts targeted the refugees and forced them into a
political corner. They also were concerned that the rest of the
refugee community did not realize that the USSR used cultu-
ral contacts to disempower them. To these critics, the so-called
exchange with the Soviets was really a one-sided ideological brain-
washing because almost nothing from the exile culture reached
Soviet Latvia, while American Latvians were expected to greet with
enthusiasm everything presented to them by Soviet officials. The
opponents of cultural contacts were highly suspicious of whatever
“culture” had been created under Soviet rule.110
To these critics, the debate over relationships with the USSR was
also about the self-perceived identity and role of the exile commu-
nity itself. To them, the opposition to the cultural contacts was a
mission and an obligation because Latvians continued to be in a
state of war with the USSR until the Latvian state became inde-

pendent. Essentially, they did not think of themselves as immi-

grants, but as refugees whose struggle for their country was a fight
against the evils of communism. To them contacts with the Soviet
Communists meant rejecting this vision and sympathizing with
totalitarianism.111
Interestingly, the conflict between supporters and opponents of
the cultural contacts also turned into a disagreement between
intellectuals and the rest of the American Latvian community,
which was comprised largely of middle class professionals. Exile
intellectuals, especially academics and writers, were among the
first to travel to Soviet Latvia and they also invited the Soviet
Latvian intelligentsia to the US. The rest of the American Latvian
community perceived these intellectuals as traitors. They ridiculed
the naiveté of these “literati” who submitted their poems for pub-
lication in the Soviet press and sharply criticized intellectuals who
described Latvian exile as some sort of a “story,” instead of a
reflection of a large-scale human drama, just so the Soviets would
not be offended.112
In general, to resist the Soviet impositions, the critics suggested
a strictly enforced national discipline, which would demand that all
Latvians made up their minds whether they stood on the side of the
Communists or Latvian patriots. The opponents of cultural con-
tacts did not see any middle ground and proposed to exclude and
censor those who disagreed.113 They did not permit any internal
self-evaluation of the exile community. Those who tried to point
out complexities were quickly labeled as Soviet collaborators or
national traitors and thus silenced.114 In sum, the opponents of
cultural contacts appeared overly invested in their self-prescribed
anti-communist national mission and fortress mentality, which
generated alienation within the refugee community.
The Conflict
These opposing views caused a major clash in the American Latvian
community, which was never fully resolved. In the late 1970s the
conflict was out in the open and affected both local groups and
national organizations. For example, the Oregon Latvian Associa-
tion (Oregonas Latviešu Biedrı̄ ba) together with the Zinaı̄ das
Lazdas Memorial Fond (Zinaı̄ das Lazdas Piemi n, as Fonds) orga-
nized the showings of Soviet Latvian films and presentations about
Soviet Latvian cartoons most likely brought by the LCCR. They had
also invited Soviet Latvian poets and writers to visit Oregon.115 The
American Latvian Association, the national umbrella organization,
chastised the Oregon Latvian Association, to which OLA responded
that it had the right to act as it pleased without having to conform

72 Ieva Zake
to any sort of “party line.”116 This conflict reached the level

of a national scandal when the Zinaı̄ da Lazda Memorial Fund
attempted to gain voting rights in the Congress of the American
Latvian Association in Chicago in 1977. The other delegates vehe-
mently questioned their eligibility accusing the Fund of collabora-
tion with the USSR, specifically, the Consul General of the USSR in
San Francisco, who recently had been identified as a Soviet spy.
The Fund was also seen as too leftist and thus willing to give up the
fight for Latvia’s independence.117 After one of the most dramatic
verbal fights in the history of American Latvian society, the Con-
gress reached a conclusion that due to a number of formalities, the
Fund indeed could not be included in ALA’s membership.
Eventually, the matter of OLA’s membership was resolved.
However the traumatic experience was never forgotten and contin-
ued to echo throughout the exile community.118 In 1978 a member
of the Oregon Latvian Association, J. Sēja published a highly
critical letter in the local Latvian newsletter “Oregonietis” (The
Oregonian), in which he argued that there was no real “cultural
exchange” with Soviet Latvia going on as the Soviet cultural prod-
ucts were forced upon the émigrés, while the American Latvian
songs and books were banned by the Soviets. Sēja insisted that the
mission of the American Latvian community was to warn the world
of the Communist threats, not to become their propaganda instru-
ments, which he believed was happening with the OLA.119 The
Board of the Oregon Latvian Association responded that no one was
forced to attend these events and that some Latvians wanted to
see the movies that had been seen by their friends and relatives
in Soviet Latvia. The Board also assured its members that these
movies had been carefully reviewed before being shown.120
This disagreement within the Oregon Latvian Association epito-
mized the conflict regarding cultural contacts among exile society
at large. With time, the clash grew stronger. In 1980, the Latvian
community in St. Petersburg, Florida made a public appeal to
boycott visits to Latvia due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The main exile newspaper in North America “Laiks” (Time) did not
publish it, which Latvians in Florida interpreted as an attempt to
silence their views.121 In 1983, exile activist Ğirts Zeidenbergs tried
to set up an agency called “Laikmets” (An Era) to organize visits of
exile artists and speakers to Soviet Latvia and bring Soviet Latvian
performances to the US. He argued that Latvian culture under
Soviet rule had made some truly outstanding accomplishments,
which the exiles should know about and appreciate.122 However,
Zeidenbergs himself and his idea appeared highly suspicious to the
refugee community, received a lot of public criticism and was not
developed further.123

Also in 1983 two poets Olafs Stumbrs and Valdis Krāslavietis

were banned from participation in the major émigré cultural event
– the Song Festival. The organizing committee’s decision was based
on the disapproval of the two poets’ regular visits to Soviet Latvia.124
Some exile writers rallied behind the excluded poets, while the
organizing committee refused to change its position causing great
controversy. In 1987, the exile community was shattered by the
visit of the Soviet Latvian choir Ave Sol, which raised a lot of
questions about who organized the trip and accompanied the
artists and why. A little research in the background of the visit
revealed that the LCCR was behind the choir’s tour thus exacer-
bating the exiles’ paranoia.125 Even just before the collapse of the
USSR, some of the émigrés remained suspicious of the initiatives
originating in Soviet Latvia such as pleas for donations for the
reconstruction of the national library and the preservation of paint-
ings and historical buildings. The exiles, while concerned about
the state of Latvian cultural values, could not help but feel that
this was yet another Soviet method for exploiting the refugees’
naiveté.126
In sum, the cultural contacts during the Cold War affected the
political refugees on a much more personal level than it did the
Americans or other immigrants. Some of the émigrés perceived
the Soviet efforts as a direct attack on their convictions about the
evil nature of the Communist regime. They also felt that by sup-
porting the US-USSR cultural contacts the American side had
rejected the refugees’ loyalty to their host country. They were also
greatly concerned about being used to strengthen the might of the
Soviet empire. The part of American Latvian community expected
the cultural contacts to revitalize the exile culture and strengthen
its identity even if it meant collaborating with the KGB agents. Both
sides realized that the cultural contacts with the USSR meant
“normalizing” their exile situation. The supporters of cultural con-
tacts saw that as a positive development, while the critics perceived
it as the end to true Latvianness itself. Additionally, the supporters
of the LCCR appeared wiling or oblivious to being used by the Soviet
propaganda and security organizations, while the opponents of the
cultural contacts mounted a destructive self-defense by silencing
and excluding those they disagreed with. Either way, the activities
of the LCCR and cultural contacts with USSR in general left a
highly negative impact on the Latvian refugee community.
Conclusion
The experience of Latvian refugees during the Cold War was shaped
by an interaction of three different states and contradicting political

74 Ieva Zake
ideals. First, they were faced with the Soviet Union’s plans to
influence the West using cultural contacts. Second, American
Latvians were affected by the American government and public’s
interest in promoting international peace through good relations
with the USSR. Third, American Latvians were influenced by the
politically meaningful memories of the former Latvian statehood,
which pushed them to oppose US-USSR cultural contacts. Thus
Latvian refugees were caught between powerful oppositional forces
defined by the Cold War, and this caused painful conflicts within
their community. While some were willing to play the cultural
contacts game with the USSR and thus become alienated from the
exile community, others refused to accept relations with the Soviets
and contributed to the polarization in the émigré society. In both
cases American Latvians believed they were acting in the best
interests of the Latvian nation. This dramatic situation was unique
to the political refugees as participants or instruments of the Cold
War era.
Today, the Cold War’s cultural and ideological battles have been
gradually fading away from the collective memory not only among
Americans, but Latvians, too. New issues such as Latvia’s national
independence, the complications of the post-communist economic
and political period and entrance into the European Union and
NATO are pushing to the margins the post-World War II dilemmas.
Yet, for at least two generations of American Latvians, concerns
such as US-USSR cultural contacts were crucial because they
marked the refugees’ quest for identity and political struggles. This
parallel Cold War has remained unknown and unnoticed by the
American society as well as researchers of this period. There are
also not enough studies about the ways that the LCCR managed to
shape or poison the relations between the émigrés and Latvians
under the Soviet rule. Overall in many ways groups such as Ameri-
can Latvians were the real casualties of the Cold War antagonism
between the US and USSR.
Notes
1
This research was funded by the Non-Salary Research Support
Grant of Rowan University. Many thanks to my research assistant Laila
Bundza.
2
See, for example, Alba, Richard and Victor Nee. 1997. Rethinking
Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration. International Migration
Review Vol. 31, No. 4: 826–874; Shibutani, Tamotsu and Kian M. Kwan.
1965. Ethnic Stratification. New York: Macmillan.
3
Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the
National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, p. 59.

4
On this idea see, Esman, Milton J. 1986. Diasporas and Interna-
tional Relations. In Modern Diasporas in International Politics, ed. by
Gabriel Sheffer, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 333–349; Sheffer,
Gabriel, ed. 1986. Modern Diasporas in International Politics. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, p.1; Gabaccia, Donna R. 1997. Liberty, Coercion, and the
Making of Immigration Historians. The Journal of American History Vol. 84,
No. 2: 570–575; Gold, Steven J. 1992. Refugee Communities: A Compara-
tive Field Study. Newbury Park: Sage; Hein, Jeremy. 1992. States and
International Migrants: The Incorporation of Indochinese Refugees in the U.S.
and France. Boulder: Westview; Hein, Jeremy. 1993. Refugees, Immi-
grants, and the State. Annual Review of Sociology 19: 43–59; Portes,
Alejandro. 1984. The Rise of Ethnicity. American Sociological Review 49:
383–97.
5
Benard, Cheryl. 1986. Politics and the Refugee Experience. Political
Science Quarterly 101: 617.
6
Shain, Yossi. 1994–95. Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy.
Political Science Quarterly Vol. 109, No. 5: 811–841.
7
Apsitis, Astra. 1994. Documenting the Postwar Baltic Diaspora: The
Gap between DP and American Resettlement. Spectrum 6: 34–37; Wyman,
Mark. 1994. On the Trail of the Displaced Persons: Sources, Problems,
Dangers, Opportunities. Spectrum 6: 19–25.
8
Wyman, 1994: 620.
9
Radzilowski, Thaddeus. 1994. With a Whimper, not a Bang: The Fall
of Communism and US Ethnic Groups. Spectrum 6: 11–15; Leffler, Melvyn
P. 1999. The Cold War: What Do “We Now Know”? The American Historical
Review Vol. 104, No. 2: 501–524.
10
Senn, Alfred Erich. 1994. Emigres and Immigrants: Problems of
National Consciousness. Spectrum 6: 6
11
Richmond, Yale. 2003. Cultural Exchange and the Cold War. Univer-
sity Part, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 14.
12
“Soviet Exports Culture” New York Times May 23, 1954, p. E9; “Red
Propaganda Placed at Record” New York Times September 24, 1958, p. 6.
13
This can be seen in the statement “Text of Soviet Note on Cultural
Ties” (New York Times July 28, 1957, p. 4), where the Soviet government
claimed that the major obstacle to the cultural contacts was a number of
US immigration policies and the apparent unwillingness of the American
side to cooperate.
14
“Pravda Welcomes Times’ Suggestion” New York Times July 4, 1955, p.
2; “Many in U.S. Urge New Soviet Links” New York Times August 30, 1955,
p. 17; Dana Adams Schmidt “U.S. will Step up Culture Program” New York
Times October 24, 1955, p. 27; “Rose, Soviet Plan Trade of Artists” New York
Times July 30, 1956, p. 6; William J. Jorden “U.S. Symphony’s Visit Giver
Russians What They Want” New York Times September 16, 1956, p. E4;
“U.S. to Fight Reds on Cultural Line” New York Times July 5, 1956, p. 24;
“Javits Proposes Cultural Visits” New York Times June 13, 1957, p. 15;
Morris Kaplan “Nixon Bids Soviet Ease Travel Curb” New York Times June
28, 1975, p. 1; “Javits Would Spur Cultural Exchange” New York Times
August 4, 1957, p. 50; Dana Adams Schmidt “U.S. Awaits Reply on
Exchange Pact” New York Times January 24, 1958, p. 6; “Americans Loud
Soviet Schooling” New York Times July 14, 1958, p. 1.
15
The cultural exchange agreements had to be renewed every couple of
years. Throughout the 1960s the negotiations about these agreements
turned into a complicated process in which both sides insisted on having

76 Ieva Zake
the best intentions while accusing the other side of lack of interest or good
will (“U.S.-Soviet Accord in Cultural Field Extended 2 Years” New York
Times November 22, 1959, p. 1; “U.S. and Soviet Set New Culture Talks”
New York Times August 2, 1961, p. 57; “Soviet-U.S. Visits Continue
Strong” New York Times January 9, 1961, p. 14; “Kennedy and Khrush-
chev Plan Joint Broadcast to Two Peoples” New York Times February 11,
1962, p. 1; “U.S.- Russian Pact on Culture Is Set” New York Times
February 21, 1964, p. 1; “U.S. and Russia Agree to Widen Cultural Links”
New York Times January 31, 1965, p. 1; “Soviet Cultural Exchanges Pact
Signed after White House Delay” New York Times March 20, 1966, p. 56;
“U.S. Ends Its Curb on Soviet Artists” New York Times December 21, 1968,
p. 1; “Moscow and U.S. Widen Exchanges” New York Times February 11,
1970, p. 9).
16
Harry Schwartz “U.S. and Soviet Students Praise Exchange” New
York Times May 11, 1959, p. 1.
17
“Soviet-U.S. Films Urged” New York Times May 7, 1958, p. 42;
Thomas M. Pryor “Hollywood Plan: Blueprint for U.S.-U.S.S.R. Film Tie
Outlined by Producer Sam Spiegel” New York Times March 23, 1958, p. X5.
18
Carol Krucoff “Exchange Day Joins Russian, U.S. Children” The
Washington Post November 9, 1978, p. 1.
19
Milton Bracker “Russian Dancers Cheered at ‘Met’” New York Times
April 15, 1958, p. 41.
20
Leslie H. Gelb “U.S.-Soviet Pact on Chemical Arms is Said to be Near”
New York Times November 14, 1985, p. 1.; Carla Hall “Cultural Exchanges:
The Format” Washington Post November 23, 1985, p. G1; Philip Taubman
“Summit Finale: Western Allis Seen Encouraged; Geneva Ceremony Live on
Soviet TV” New York Times November 22, 1985, p. 13; Gary Lee “Summit
Cracks Soviet Culture Wall” Washington Post November 30, 1985, p. A1;
Philip Taubman “Pact on Exchanges: 200-Hour Wrangle” New York Times
November 27, 1985, p. A4; Tom Wicker “Defense vs. Deep Cuts” New York
Times November 25, 1985, p. A19.
21
William H. Chamberlin’s optimistic outlook in “U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cul-
tural Exchange: It Evolved Like a Commercial Treat but It Holds Hope of
Giving Each Nation a Clearer View of the Other” New York Times February
11, 1958, p. 12.
22
Richmond, Yale. 1984. Soviet-American Cultural Exchanges: Ripoff or
Payoff? Washington D.C.: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies,
p. 2–3.
23
Critchlow, James. 2004. Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: The
Record and its Implications. Journal of Cold War Studies 6: 81. See also
Byrnes, Robert F. 1976. Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 1958–1975.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 126.
24
Richmond, 1984: 6.
25
Ibid, p. 4–5.
26
Juris Zakis (personal communication, October 12, 2006).
27
Peter Grose “Moscow ‘Postpones’ ‘Hello, Dolly!’ Run” New York Times
September 3, 1963, p. 1; “U.S. Chides Soviet on Arts Accord” New York
Times November 3, 1964, p. 44; “U.S. to Bar Visits of Soviet Artists” New
York Times January 15, 1966, p. 15; “U.S. Regrets Cancellation” New York
Times July 12, 1966, p. 16; Edwin Bolwell “Soviet Cancels Visit by Troupes
to U.S.” New York Times July 12, 1967, p. 1.
28
Max Frankel “U.S. and Soviet Nearing Talks for New Culture
Exchange Pact” New York Times November 19, 1965, p. 3; Peter Grose

“U.S.-Soviet Cultural Treaty Appears Assured” New York Times February

19, 1966, p. 7.
29
“Cultural Ties with Soviet Being Reviewed by U.S.” New York Times
August 31, 1968, p. 5.
30
Bernard Gwertzman “Soviet Delays American Exhibit as Anti-U.S.
Campaign Raises” New York Times May 11, 1970, p.1.
31
John Rockwell “Moscow Symphony Cancels U.S. Tour” New York
Times September 28, 1972, p. A1.
32
“Freedom of Exchange” New York Times November 15, 1963, p. 32;
Theodore Shabad “Soviet Condemns 3 U.S. Legislators” New York
Times January 18, 1972, p. 6. The American organizers of the exchanges
were also continuously faced with the inefficiency and slow pace of the
Soviet bureaucracy in such basic logistical issues as responding to
correspondence.
33
Louis J. Halle “How Much Can We Expect From Russia?” New York
Times September 25, 1955, p. SM13.
34
Edward Weintal “Analysis of Our Moscow Link” New York Times
August 6, 1961, p. SM10; “U.S.-Soviet Exchanges” New York Times August
5, 1964, p. 32.
35
Mathias, Charles McC., Jr. 1983. Habitual Hatred – Unsound Policy.
Foreign Affairs 4: 1029.
36
See, for example, Stephen F. Cohen “The Parity Principle in U.S.-
Soviet Relations” New York Times June 26, 1981, p. 27; Alan P. Lightman
“‘Cultural Cold War’ Injures Each Side” New York Times August 28, 1982,
p. 23.
37
“Red ‘Slack’ Seen by Allen Dulles” New York Times July 25, 1959, p.
5; Stanley Levey “Dubinsky Rejects Bid to Visit Soviet” New York Times May
17, 1959, p. 81; William J. Jorden “Why Russian Needs the Iron Curtain”
New York Times May 3, 1959, p. SM9; “East-West Exchanges no Easy Way
to Peace” New York Times July 5, 1959, p. E5.
38
Peter Kihss “2 Russians in U.S. Criticized at Yale” New York Times
December 1, 1964, p. 1.
39
Charles Z. Wick “U.S.-Soviet Cultural Ties Must Work Both Ways”
New York Times March 13, 1984, p. A26.
40
Richmond, 1984: 30; 2003: 31, 218–219.
41
Perle, Richard. Like Putting the K.G.B. into the Pentagon. New York
Times June 30, 1987, p. A-31.
42
David Bar-Illan “Cultural-Exchange Czars Sing Same Old Songs”
New York Times July 8, 1987, p. 1.
43
“Visiting Russians Get Scant Attention” New York Times March 10,
1983, p. B10.
44
Wyman, Mark. 1989. DP: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 1945–1951.
Philadelphia: The Balch Institute Press; Luciuk, Lubomyr Y. 1986. Unin-
tended Consequences in Refugee Resettlement: Post-War Ukrainian
Refugee Immigration to Canada. International Migration Review 20: 467–
482.
45
Ginsburgs, George. 1957. The Soviet Union and the Problem of
Refugees and Displaced Persons 1917–1956. The American Journal of
International Law 51: 353, 358.
46
Ibid, p. 354.
47
The only exception was Sweden, which repatriated about 300
Latvian soldiers who had served in the Baltic Waffen SS against their will
to the Soviet Union where they were immediately executed.

78 Ieva Zake
48
Ginsburgs, 1957: 359.
49
Critchlow, 2004: 82; Apsitis, 1994: 35; Leary, William M. 1984. The
Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents. Alabama: Alabama
University Press, p. 48.
50
Garthoff, Raymond L. 2001. A Journey through the Cold War: A
Memoir of Containment and Coexistence. Washington, DC: Brookings Insti-
tution Press, pp. 100–104.
51
Critchlow, 2004: 83.
52
Richmond, 1984: 38.
53
Eriks A. Dundurs Papers, Box 7, Folder 4, Immigration Research
History Center, University of Minnesota.
54
Ibid.
55
Press release from the Council the Liberation of Captive Peoples from
Soviet Domination, ibid.
56
Gleason, Abbott. 1995. Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold
War. New York: Oxford University Press.
57
Haynes, John Earl. 2000. The Cold War Debate Continues: The
Traditionalist View of Historical Writing on Domestic Communism and
Anti-Communism. Journal of Cold War Studies 2: 76–115.
58
See, for example, J. Cerbulis “The Soviet Way” The Morning Call June
7, 1985, p. A15; “Baltic Bondage: Reader’s Letter” The Wall Street Journal
June 14, 1985, p. 2; Seth Lipsky “Baltic Witness Against the Soviet Tyranny”
The Wall Street Journal July 31, 1985, p. 1; Anonymous “The Baltic
Holocaust” Latvian News Digest 5, 1978, p. 2; “Baltic Holocaust Recom-
mended for California School Curriculum” Latvian News Digest 3, 1987, p.
8. Anonymous “Historical Justice” Chicago Latvian Newsletter 8, 1984, p.1.
59
See, for example, A Agnis “Liktenı̄ gas jūnija dienas” Čikāgas Ziņas
26, 1978, pp. 2–3; Arnolds Strautnieks “Quo Vadis America un brı̄ va
pasaule?” Čikāgas Ziņas 47, 1980, pp. 1–2; Ojārs Kalniņš “The Forgotten
War” Chicago Latvian Newsletter January, 1985, pp. 2–3; J. Grodulis “Par
ko pasaule klusē” Čikāgas Ziņas 102, 1986, pp. 5–6; V. Klı̄ ve “Par mūsu
draugiem un sabiedrotiem” Čikāgas Ziņas 123, 1988, pp. 5–6.
60
Israelyan, Victor. 2003. On the Battlefields of the Cold War. University
Part, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 85.
61
See, for example, Max Frankel “U.S.-Russian Pact on Culture Is Set”
New York Times February 21, 1964, p. 1.
62
Ezergailis, Andrievs. 2003. Nazi Soviet Disinformation About the Holo-
caust in Nazi-Occupied Latvia. Daugavas Vanagi: Who Are They? – Revis-
ited. Riga: Latvijas 50 gadu okpuacijas muzeja fonds, p. 67; Atis Lejiņš
“Kurš bija kaķis, kurš pele? Kultūras sakaru spēle ar VDK” Diena 11
September, 2004, p. 15.
63
Imants Lešinskis “Miera un starptautiskā saspı̄ lējuma mazināšanas
interesēs” Dzimtenes Balss December 5, 1974, p. 4. See also A. Jāne and
A. Markss “Desmito gadu sakot” Dzimtenes Balss April 4, 1974, p. 4.
64
Jāne and Markss, 1974: 4.
65
A. Saule “Vēlreiz par kultūras apmaiņu” Dzimtenes Balss April 25,
1974, p. 7.
66
K. Kļava “Kam miers ir ienaidnieks?” Dzimtenes Balss January 24,
1974, p. 7.
67
K. Freibergs “Cēloņi un sekas” Atbalss (“Dzimtenes Balss” supple-
ment) 4, 1980, pp. 4–5.
68
See, for example, J. Kalnājs J. and F. Lı̄cis “Saki, kas ir tavs draugs?”
Dzimtenes Balss March 30, 1977, p. 7.

69
Anonymous “Skaistlauka rotas vı̄ ri. Kad Arāja puiši izklaidējas. . .”
Dzimtenes Balss April, 1963, p. 5.
70
V. Žı̄ gurs “Baiļu un nedrošı̄ bas zı̄ me” Dzimtenes Balss April, 1963,
p. 5; U. Andersons “To nevar nezināt” Dzimtenes Balss August, 1964, p. 7;
Anonymous “Vai V. Arāju vien?” Dzimtenes Balss September 11, 1975, p.
7. “Dzimtenes Balss” also reprinted an accusatory article published in
Canada regarding the alleged Latvian war criminal Haralds Puntulis (“Kara
noziedznieks” Dzimtenes Balss December 2, 1982, p. 7).
71
Anonymous “Nekaitı̄ gi vecı̄ ši?” Dzimtenes Balss January 6, 1977,
pp. 6–7.
72
Kalnājs and Lı̄ cis, 1977: 7. See also Anonymous “Slēpj
noziedzniekus” Dzimtenes Balss January 7, 1982, p. 7; Anonymous “Viņu
asiņainās pēdas Latvijā” Dzimtenes Balss January 7, 1982, p. 7; Anony-
mous “Amerikāņi izbrı̄nı̄ jušies” Dzimtenes Balss May 8, 1983, p. 7.
73
See, for example, Anonymous “Dūmi drošajā paspārnē” Dzimtenes
Balss September 19, 1974, pp. 6–7; J. Vı̄ gants “Klauss Barbjē nav viens”
Dzimtenes Balss April 1, 1983, pp. 6–7.
74
J. Silabriedis “Nekas Viņus nevar atbrı̄ vot no atbildı̄ bas” Dzimtenes
Balss March 6, 1975, p. 7; Vilis Samsons “Antipatriotisma un bezprāta
pozı̄ cijās” Dzimtenes Balss March 13, March 20, March 27, April 3, April
10, April 17, April 24, 1975, pp. 6–7; Anonymous “Piedot, aizmirst? Nē!”
Dzimtenes Balss July 14, 1975, p. 7.
75
Anonymous “No SS un SD lı̄ dz. . .” Dzimtenes Balss March 17,
March 23, April 1, April 21, 1977, p. 7.
76
K. Freibergs “Slepkava atceras” Dzimtenes Balss September 16,
1982, pp. 6–7; V. Liepiņš and A. Martinovs “Apsūdzı̄ ba” Dzimtenes Balss
June 2, 1983, p. 7; J. Bikše “Slepkavam pienākas sods” Dzimtenes Balss
July 14, 1983, p. 7; K. Klāvs “Čikāgā dzı̄ vo slepkava” Atbalss (“Dzimtenes
Balss” supplement) 39, 1987, pp. 1–3.
77
Kalnājs and Lı̄cis, 1977: 7–8.
78
Imants Lešinskis “Miera un starptautiskā saspı̄ lējuma mazināšanas
interesēs” Dzimtenes Balss December 5, 1974, p. 4.
79
Saule, 1974: 5–7.
80
V. Zaļenieks “Būsim atklāti” AtZiņas un pārdomas (“Dzimtenes
Balss” supplement) 4, 1973 , p. 1.
81
Zālı̄ te, Indulis “Kultūras sakari – caurums dzelzs aizkarā” http://
vip.latnet.lv August 25, 1998.
82
Johansons, Edmunds. 2006. Čekas ğenerāļa piezı̄ mes. Atmoda un
VDK. Rı̄ga, pp. 27, 33.
83
Jāne A. and A. Markss “Draudzı̄ bas nams Rı̄ gā, Gorkija ielā 11a”
Dzimtenes Balss April 4, 1974, p. 4.
84
Hook Sidney,Valdimir Bukovsky and Paul Hollander. 1987.
Soviet Hypocrisy and Western Gullibility. Ethics and Public Policy Center, p.
15.
85
Anonymous “How to recruit spies” Latvian News Digest 1, 1981, pp.
3–4.
86
Anonymous “Imantu Lešinski patur, bet kā būs ar Hāzneru?” Vēst-
nesis October 15, 1978, p. 7.
87
Anonymous “Vai noskaidrots I. Lešinska nāves Cēlo̧is?” Svešos
Krastos March, 1986, pp. 16–17; Anonymous “Lesinskis dies: Ex-Latvian
KGB agent Imants Lesinskis dies of a heart attack in Virginia” Chicago
Latvian Newsletter 2, 1986, p. 2; Ojars Kalniņs “Patriot or paradox?”
Chicago Latvian Newsletter 2, 1986, p. 2.

80 Ieva Zake
88
Lešinskis, Imants. 1985. Cultural Relations or Ethnic Espionage: An
Insider’s View. Baltic Forum 1, pp. 10–12.
89
Anonymous “What Imants Lesinkis said – the First Public Appear-
ance of the Former Soviet Diplomat” Latvian News Digest 1, 1979, p. 3; A.
Agnis “Ko saka Imants Lešinskis” Čikāgas Ziņas 41, 1980, pp. 3–4. Leš-
inskis’ descriptions of LCCR’s activities and other programs of cultural
contacts were later affirmed by other Soviet defectors such as Arkady
Shevchenko who had worked in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (R.N.
“Neticiet, neticiet, neticiet!” Čikāgas Ziņas 103, 1986, pp. 3–4).
90
Zālı̄ te, http://vip.latnet.lv
91
Ķiķauka, Tālivaldis. 1966. Kur novedı̄ s cenzūra? Tilts 78/79: 4–5.
92
Ķiķauka, Tālivaldis. 1968. Ielenktā trimda. Tilts 90/91: 4–5. See also
Strūga, Kaspars. 1969. Ko darı̄ sim tālāk? Tilts 96/97: 4–5.
93
Skrastiņš, Uğis. 1972. Kad pienāks latviešiem tie laiki. . . Tilts 128/
129: 14–15.
94
Ibid.
95
Kreicers, Hermanis. 1970. Gāganu kari. Tilts 102/103: 4–5.
96
Jaunzeme, Ausma. 1970. Lielais jautājums. Tilts 104/105: 30–31.
97
Skrastiņš, Uğis. 1972. Kad pienāks latviešiem tie laiki. . . Tilts 128/
129: 14–15.
98
Stumbrs, Olafs. 1971. Olafa Stumbra ieskati par ciemošanos Latvijā.
Tilts 110/111: 14–17.
99
Ibid.
100
Skrastiņš, Uğis. 1972. Šitā zēni dzı̄ vodami, Tilts 122/123: 14–15;
Sakss, Imants. 1974. Mēs un viņi. Tilts 144/145: 14–17.
101
Ādolfs Sprūdžs “Latviešu fikcijas un reālitātes” ALA Žurnāls 20,
1977: 8–12.
102
Skrastiņš, Uğis. 1974. Bez vajadzı̄ bas izpostı̄ ta dzı̄ ve. Tilts 146/147:
26–31.
103
Zālı̄ te, http://vip.latnet.lv.
104
Lešinskis, 1985: 11–12.
105
E.A. “Neizprotamas un nesaprotamas lietas” Vēstnesis June 15,
1973, p. 2.
106
Voldemārs Korsts “Mēs nevaram atļauties gulēt” Čikāgas Ziņas
August, September 1978, pp. 1–2.
107
Akmentiņš, 1979:1–3.
108
Aristı̄ ds Lembergs, interview, August 3, 2006.
109
Leonards Latkovskis “Kāda kultūra ir tagadējā Latvijā?” Čikāgas
Ziņas May 1978, p. 2.
110
Korsts, 1978: 2; V. Vārsbergs “Kādus sakarus?” Čikāgas Ziņas May
1976, p. 14; Latkovskis, 1978: 1–2.
111
Vanagu Kārlis “Trimdinieka piezı̄ mes” Svešos Krastos June, 1982,
pp. 4–8; Osvalds Akmentiņš “Atklātais uzbrukums” Vēstnesis May 15,
1979, p. 2; Aleksandrs Zaube “Kas mēs esam un kas mums jādara”
Čikāgas Ziņas February 1984, pp. 2–3. See also Vanagu Kārlis “Trimdi-
nieka piezı̄ mes 1983” Svešos Krastos December, 1983, pp. 14–16.
112
Vanagu Kārlis “Cik salda boļševiku reklāma” Vēstnesis June 15,
1979, pp. 2–3; Akmentiņš, 1979: 1.; R.L. “Trimdas profesoru parāde Rı̄gā”
Vēstnesis July 15, 1981, pp. 2–3; Anonymous “Komentāri” Vēstnesis Feb-
ruary 15, 1981, p. 7.
113
Vanagu Kārlis, 1979: 3; “Kurā pusē tu stāvi?” Vēstnesis July 15,
1981, pp. 1–2; “Jābūt disciplinētiem!” Svešos krastos September 1981, p.
2; Biruta Senkēviča “Pārdomas” Saulainā krasta vēstis November, 1980, p.

12. As described by Aristı̄ ds Lembergs (Interview, July 30, 2006), he and

other critics of cultural contacts managed to gain control over the ALA’s
board.
114
“Redakcijas piezı̄ me” Vēstnesis December 15, 1980, p. 7.
115
“Zinaı̄ das Lazdas Piemiņas Fonda darbı̄ bas pārskats par 1974.
gadu” Oregonietis June 1975, pp. 48–52.
116
Jēkabs Kalniņš “Dı̄ vains pesimisms vai vienkārsa sadošana” Orego-
nietis November 1972, pp. 7–8; Eduards Skudra “Dı̄ vainas kvalitātes pesi-
misms” Oregonietis July 1972, pp. 10–12.
117
A. Reinvalds “Pārvērtēšana un attı̄ rı̄ šana” Čikāgas Ziņas August,
September 1976, p. 10.
118
Albats, Bruno and Visvaldis Klı̄ ve. 1986. Amerikas Latviešu Apvi-
enı̄ ba 1951–1986. Lincoln, Nebraska: Amerikas Latviešu Apvienı̄ ba, p.
117–118, 123.
119
J. Sēja “Nesaprotami sarı̄ kojumi” Oregonietis April 1978, p. 7.
120
OLB’as valde “Izsakām pateicı̄ bu J. Sējas kungam par parādı̄ to
interesi OLB’as valdes darbı̄ bā!” Oregonietis April 1978, p. 7.
121
Lası̄ tāju vēstules Saulainā krasta vēstis 5, 1980, p. 13.
122
Ğirts Zeidenbergs “Viesošanās Latvijā” Saulainā krasta vēstis 1–2,
1984, pp. 64–66.
123
Al. “Laikmets un mēs” Saulainā krasta vēstis 5, 1983, pp. 39–40 and
Lası̄tāju vēstules Saulainā krasta vēstis 6–7, 1983, pp. 36a–b.
124
Quoted in Ruņğis, Aivars. 1984. Izkliedētās trimdinieku saimes
sociālās saites – to uzturēšana un sargāšana. Treji Vārti 98: 9.
125
Ojars Kalniņs “Artists or Agents?” Chicago Latvian Newsletter Sep-
tember, 1987, pp. 2–3; E. L. “Ave Sol brauciena aizmugure” Čikāgas Ziņas
April 1988, pp. 15–16.
126
Ulafs Jansons “Latviešu kultūra tikai eksportam” Svešos krastos
June/July 1988, pp. 19–20 and “Par naudu pat velns danco” Svešos
krastos June/July 1988, p. 2.


Controversies of US-USSR Cultural Contac PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Controversies of US-USSR Cultural Contac PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 21 No.

Controversies of US-USSR Cultural Contacts

Although most Americans remained oblivious about the darker,

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Cultural Contacts and the Cold War Realities

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

effective were such ideas as film co-production17 and an exchange

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

sentative of a minority group. He had scholarly publications, but,

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

the Soviet visitor’s residence. Often the American visitors in the

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

quite loud, they were nowhere as dramatic and emotional as those

Cultural Contacts from the Refugees’ Point of View

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

50s with the purpose of promoting internal resistance within the

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

the US, however, continued to pursue their anti-Communist posi-

The “Ethnic Cultural Contacts” – The Liaison Committee for

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

textbooks and promoted Soviet publications abroad. The LCCR

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

exile Latvians, and that the exile organizations such as Daugavas

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

was an intelligence unit that worked with the émigré organizations

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

return home. He described the LCCR’s propaganda techniques

Clashing Views on Cultural Contacts

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

They received most articulate expression in a private journal

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Latvian nation, however, to my mind, they can no longer speak in

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

materials put out by their opponents had a distinctly grainy and

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

pendent. Essentially, they did not think of themselves as immi-

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

to any sort of “party line.”116 This conflict reached the level

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Also in 1983 two poets Olafs Stumbrs and Valdis Krāslavietis

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

“U.S.-Soviet Cultural Treaty Appears Assured” New York Times February

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

12. As described by Aristı̄ ds Lembergs (Interview, July 30, 2006), he and

© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

You might also like