The International History Review

ISSN: 0707-5332 (Print) 1949-6540 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rinh20

Searching for Allies in America’s Backyard:

Yugoslav Endeavors in Latin America in the Early
Cold War

Agustin Cosovschi

To cite this article: Agustin Cosovschi (2020): Searching for Allies in America’s Backyard:
Yugoslav Endeavors in Latin America in the Early Cold War, The International History Review, DOI:
10.1080/07075332.2020.1755339

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2020.1755339

Published online: 23 Apr 2020.

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THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2020.1755339

Searching for Allies in America’s Backyard: Yugoslav

Endeavors in Latin America in the Early Cold War
Agustin Cosovschi
Centre d’Etudes Turques, Ottomanes, Balkaniques et Centrasiatiques, Paris, France

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
In this paper, I analyze Yugoslavia’s endeavors to create stronger con- Yugoslavia; Latin America;
nections with Latin American governments and left-wing organizations cold war; non-alignment
from the early 1950s until the early 1960s. My central claim is that dur-
ing those years Belgrade pursued a systematic policy that made it that
by the early 1960s the Yugoslavs had become a serious factor in the
region. I also contend that the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment proved
to be a double-edged sword: Belgrade’s neutralism and its prestige as
an alternative to the Soviet model paved the way for it to garner influ-
ence in Latin America, but its less militant stance and its refusal to take
part in bloc divisions became a limitation in the 1960s, when the region
became a hotbed of Cold War conflict and many of Yugoslavia’s local
partners came to see non-alignment as impracticable.
Drawing mainly from Yugoslav archival sources, my analysis focuses on
the activities of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of
Yugoslavia, an organization charged with establishing connections with
left-wing political movements abroad. More succinctly, I also account for
the growing diplomatic importance of international cultural cooperation
and for the part played by Yugoslav experts specialized on Latin
American affairs.

In November 1963, the Yugoslav president, Josip Broz Tito, embarked upon his first visit to Latin
America. The head of the Yugoslav state toured several countries, visiting Chile, Brazil, Bolivia,
Peru and Mexico with the aim to expand trade and bring Latin American nations closer to the
nascent Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). During his visit, he engaged in long conversations with
some of the most progressive heads of state of the continent, such as Adolfo Lo
pez Mateos in
Mexico, Victor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia and Jo~ao Goulart in Brazil, discussing issues such as
peaceful coexistence, nuclear disarmament and the urgent need to reform global trade in order
to close the gap between industrialized and developing nations.1 The official visit caught much
attention then, and was seen by American intelligence as a sign of growing Yugoslav interest in
Latin America.2 However, Tito’s tour was not the starting point of an impending Yugoslav enter-
prise in the continent, but rather the peak moment of an earlier process: already since the early
1950s, socialist Yugoslavia had started to develop a strategic interest in Latin America, increasing
its political activities in the region, while at the same time establishing numerous commercial
and cultural agreements with Latin American countries. Hence, Tito’s visit in 1963 came to give
an official stamp to Belgrade’s interest in the continent, which had been building up during the
previous years.

CONTACT Agustin Cosovschi acosovschi@gmail.com

ß 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 A. COSOVSCHI

In spite of these developments, relations between Yugoslavia and Latin America have been
much disregarded by the historiography. Yugoslav activity in Latin America has remained by and
large overlooked by the literature that deals with the Latin American Cold War, which has for
the most part focused on the influence of the United States in the region, only secondarily ana-
lyzing the part played by the Soviet Union and more seldom touching on connections with the
Third World or NAM.3 A similar gap can be found in the literature on Yugoslav foreign policy,
which has mostly focused on Yugoslav relations with the US, with the USSR and more recently,
with African and Asian nations through the lens of the NAM and the United Nations (UN).4 As
stated by Radonji
c in a recent review of the literature, Latin America has barely been touched by
the historiography concerning Yugoslav relations to the Third World.5 Rare exceptions to this can
be found in Alvin Rubinstein’s classic work from the 1970s where he includes Latin American

nations in his general analysis of non-alignment,6 in Jovan Cavoski’s discussion of the memoires
of Yugoslav ambassador in Argentina during the 1950s7, and more recently in a paper by
Johanna Bockman about the connections between Yugoslav Marxism and Chilean and Peruvian
economic thinking.8 And yet, as I will show in this article, sources show that Yugoslav endeavors
in Latin America increased substantially throughout the 1950s and that the Yugoslavs saw these
efforts as a central aspect of their international strategy after the split with the Soviets in 1948.
In this paper, I analyze socialist Yugoslavia’s endeavors to create stronger connections with
Latin American governments and left-wing organizations from the early 1950s until the early
1960s. My central claim is that from the early 1950s onwards, Belgrade pursued a systematic pol-
icy to gain influence in Latin America which made it that by the early 1960s the Yugoslavs had
become a serious factor in the region in rivalry with the Soviets, the Chinese and the Cubans.
Hence, Tito’s tour in 1963 should not be seen as the departing point of Yugoslav interest in the
continent, but rather as the result of endeavors that had been building up over the previous
years. Moreover, I claim that non-alignment proved to be a double-edged sword in Yugoslav
endeavors: on the one hand, Belgrade’s neutralism and its prestige as an alternative to the
Soviet model paved the way for the Yugoslavs to garner influence and substantially extend their
relations with Latin American governments and left-wing organizations; on the other hand, its
less militant stance and its refusal to take part in the polarizing dynamics of the blocs became a
limitation the 1960s, as Latin America turned into a hotbed of Cold War conflict and many of
Yugoslavia’s local partners came to see non-alignment as impracticable.
In order to account for Yugoslavia’s endeavors in Latin America before 1963, I focus on
Belgrade’s activities beyond the confines of state-to-state relations. Authors have traditionally
tended to approach Yugoslav relations with Third World countries through the lens of large dip-
lomatic platforms such as NAM or the UN, and often underlining the importance of Tito’s charis-
matic brand of personal diplomacy.9 Conversely, in this paper I draw from Yugoslav archival
sources to focus on the role of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ,
Socijalisticki savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije), an official organization that was charged among
other things with creating stronger connections with left-wing political movements abroad,
which channeled many of the party’s international initiatives and played a key role in Yugoslav
activities in Latin America. I extensively analyze the SSRNJ’s activities in the continent on the
basis of their travel reports and discussions, and examine their vision and perceptions of the
Latin American political, economic and social landscape. Complementarily, in order to give a
wider perspective of Yugoslav actions, I also account for the growing activity of the Federal
Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SKKV, Savezna komisija za kulturne
veze sa inostranstvom), which was responsible for organizing international cultural cooperation,
and for the role of Yugoslav experts specialized on Latin American affairs.
Under the direction of the League of Communists (SKJ, Savez komunista Jugoslavije) and the
Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DSIP, Drzavni secretariat inostranih poslova), and in cooper-
ation with the Yugoslav diplomatic corps abroad, all these actors played an important part in
the advancement of Belgrade’s influence in Latin America. Thus, I aim to show that a diversity of
 THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 3

actors and factors at the global and local level were at play in the definition of Yugoslav diplo-
macy in the continent. Hence, as a corollary I suggest that to understand Yugoslav policy
towards the Third World we must go beyond the traditional approach that characterizes most of
the historiography, and focus instead on how these relations were carefully and slowly knitted
throughout the years by the action of diverse actors on the ground.

A continent rediscovered: The Yugoslavs approach Latin America in the

early 1950s
During the first years of the postwar period, Yugoslavia’s relations with Latin America were of lit-
tle significance. Despite having established diplomatic relations with several Latin American
countries after the end of the Second World War and having sent two official delegations to the
region in 1946 and 1949 in an attempt to broaden political and economic relations,10 connec-
tions were considerably weak in many aspects. Even though the split with USSR in 1948 had
forced the Yugoslavs to reorient their economy towards the West, Argentina was the only Latin
American country that counted among its main commercial partners, with mutual trade having
multiplied manifold with regards to the levels before 1948 and reaching more than 5% of
imports and exports in 1950.11 Yugoslav activity was somewhat more significant in the Southern
Cone that in other regions due to the significant presence of Yugoslav immigrants, especially in
countries such as Chile and Argentina,12 but otherwise the Yugoslav regime’s knowledge about
the Latin American context was much limited, and geographical distance made it considerably
hard to develop closer links with the region.
This situation took a turn in the early 1950s, when Yugoslavia found itself in need of support
beyond the Eastern bloc as a result of its expulsion from the Cominform in 1948.13 As attested
by documents from the time, the need to find new allies pushed the leadership in Belgrade
towards a greatest interest in the Latin American political landscape. As expressed in a note
from the Commission for International Relations of the Yugoslav Communist Party (KPJ,
Komunisticka partija Jugoslavije) to the Yugoslav ambassador in Buenos Aires in May 1951, ‘one
of the questions with which we are dealing lately is our relation to social democratic parties in
the world,’ which meant launching a more thorough exploration of potential partners in different
regions. In the note, the Commission asked for the local delegation to send relevant information
about socialist forces and trade unions in Argentina and Uruguay, as well as to inform Belgrade
about developments in the local communist parties and their possible internal rifts with regards
to Moscow. Finally, they asked for ‘an analysis of [president Juan Domingo] Peron’s regime in
Argentina, its connection to the working class and trade unions, its economic policy and the
nationalization of local and foreign companies that it has carried out and currently carries
out, etc.’14
Some months later, a long report was sent to Belgrade containing a detailed assessment of
the situation in Argentina. The document described a growing crisis in the country due to
increasing economic hardships, Pero
n’s fading ascendancy over the working masses, rising rest-
lessness among the army and the ‘unfriendly stance of the United States vis-a-vis Peron’s
regime’, which resulted in a strong campaign against Argentina orchestrated by the United
States ‘through its diverse tentacles.’ Moreover, the report described the Peronist Party as being
internally riven by conflict in face of the coming elections, with Juan and Eva Pero
n monopoliz-
ing the political process and resorting to an ever more radicalized rhetoric against its opposers.
Interestingly enough, the authors did not hesitate in characterizing Pero
n’s use of power as
‘absolute’ and his government as a ‘regime’, stressing thus its authoritarian character.15
Moreover, responding to Belgrade’s needs to assess potential relations with social-democratic
parties abroad, the report extensively described the situation inside the Argentine Socialist Party.
This organization was also riven by disaccord in face of coming elections, with the left-wing
4 A. COSOVSCHI

favoring a coalition with the center Radical Party, and the right wing favoring electoral absten-
tion and potentially leaning towards a military intervention against the government.16 Although
the text described in detail the sufferings of Argentine socialists under Peronism, and the fre-
quent police repression that fell on them, its overall political assessment of the social-democratic
party was nevertheless conclusively negative, claiming:
… it does not represent a party capable of taking responsibility for that which its workers unquestionably
seek, and for what will tomorrow seek a wide sector of workers who are gradually distancing themselves
from Peronism. The Argentine Socialist Party, with some exceptions, finds itself today, as it has happened
many other times in difficult moments of Argentine history, in a mouse-trap and waits for someone else to
solve the main problems of the country, which will create the conditions for a rhetorical and declarative
socialist struggle and big socialist ideals.17

Finally, the report described the positionings of the local Communist Party, which had
decided to distance itself from the rest of the opposition parties, as it considered them to be
allies of American imperialism. The authors did not fail, however, to underline that the party had
until recently been allied with these same forces against Pero
n. This strategy, noted the report,
was not the result of the local leaders’ appraisal of the internal situation in Argentina, but rather
of their fidelity to Moscow, as the Soviets had now become closer to Pero
n and considered him
useful in their struggle against the US.18
The Argentine report sheds light on some of the initial dilemmas of the Yugoslav leadership
when positioning itself vis-a-vis the Latin American political landscape in the 1950s. The authori-
tarian character of some of the local governments, the intensity of American-Soviet tension in
the region and the dependence of communist parties on Moscow posed obstacles for Belgrade’s
interest in the region. This was true even in a country such as Argentina, the only one with
which Yugoslavia entertained significant economic relation at the time, and where the Yugoslav
community was most numerous. This latter factor was nevertheless a double-edged sword, as
much of the Yugoslav diaspora was constituted by recently arrived anticommunist Croatian emi-
gres. The Yugoslav leadership was fully aware of these limitations, as attested by the recollec-
tions of the Yugoslav ambassador in Buenos Aires, Slavoljub Petrovi
c, to whom Tito explicitly
tasked with the goal of broadening relations with Argentina in every domain, ‘especially in the
economic one’, as well as to prevent the ustasa emigration in Buenos Aires from hindering the
development of these relations.19
Additionally, the Argentine report shows the importance of finding local partners in order to
extend Yugoslav activities on the ground. The weakness of alternative left-wing forces beyond
the communist party was specially unhelpful in Argentina, and this deficiency of potential part-
ners represented a severe limitation for the expansion of Belgrade’s actions. But if the Argentine
political landscape did not offer great possibilities on that regard, circumstances in the other
margin of the Andes were entirely different.
In neighboring Chile, a large group derived from a split within the Chilean socialists, the
Popular Socialist Party (PSP, Partido Socialista Popular), approached the Yugoslav representatives
in the early 1950s with the intention to develop closer relations with Belgrade. In many ways,
the PSP constituted almost an ideal partner for the Yugoslavs. The product of a year-long polit-
ical construction dating back to the times of the ephemerous Chilean Socialist Republic of 1932,
their party had a history of active institutional participation through the Popular Front govern-
ments of the 1930s and a good electoral record. However, with the conservative turn of the
1940s in Chile, the party had lost much of its drive and its support in the ballots, and had also
become riven with internal divisions. As a result, the socialists had even lost their official denom-
ination to a lesser right-wing fraction that decided to support president Gabriel Gonz
alez Videla’s
anticommunist laws in 1948. Operating now under the name of Popular Socialist Party and under
the leadership of younger and more radical Rau
l Ampuero, the party had entered a process of
ideological radicalization that made it become ever more distant from the Communists and their
strategy of building coalitions with bourgeois forces.20 As stated by Drake in a classic study,
 THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 5

“during Ampuero’s reconstruction [of the party], socialists were restlessly seeking for a model
between the Radicals and the Communists, between the United States and the Soviet Union”.21
Thus, when the time became ripe for the Yugoslavs to explore Latin America, the Chileans’ quest
for an alternative to both the American and the Soviet model would become the basis for a
strong partnership with Belgrade in the years to come.
In August 1951, the first contacts were made between the Chilean socialists and the Yugoslav
delegation in Santiago. In a note to Belgrade, Yugoslav representative Lazar Lili
c described his
meeting with Rau
l Ampuero, back then general secretary of the PSP, and stated that the
Chileans had not only expressed their admiration ‘for the stance of our party leadership in their
defense of our country’s independence’, but also their wish to ‘become better acquainted with
the theoretical and practical work of the KPJ.’22 From then onwards, the Yugoslavs would
develop a long and fruitful dialogue with Chilean socialists that would help them widen their
reach not only in Chile, but more generally in Latin America.
From the beginning, the Yugoslav delegation in Santiago strongly encouraged the develop-
ment of this connection, especially underlining that cooperation with the PSP could lead to a
strengthening of Belgrade’s influence in the region. As stated in a note to Belgrade from 1953,
formal ties could be established between the PSP and the SSRNJ. Successor to the Popular Front,
the SSNRJ was an umbrella organization of the Yugoslav communist regime that grouped socio-
political organizations in the country, but which also became responsible for establishing links
with progressive forces abroad. As suggested by the Yugoslav authorities in Chile, collaboration
could start with a visit of the PSP delegates to Yugoslavia. Such a visit, they claimed, could be
very useful for the development of Yugoslav positions not only in Chile, but more generally in
South America:
I hold that the experience that the members of the SPS could take from our country would have particular
importance, and that it would surpass the limits of Chile, considering that socialists in Bolivia are very weak,
that in Argentina they are strongly pursued, but that the leadership of the SPS shows an indebted socialist
solidarity towards movements in neighboring countries. Even more reason to do it as it seems that now,
with the growth of the PSP, conditions have emerged to establish contacts with leading movements in
Latin America such as those that already exist with movements in Europe and Asia.23

During the following years, relations between the PSP and the Yugoslav regime would
develop to an impressive extent, involving frequent correspondence between leading Chilean
socialists such as Rau
l Ampuero, senator Aniceto Rodr
ıguez and party intellectual Oscar Waiss
and chief representatives of the SSRNJ such as Svetozar Vukmanovi
c-Tempo and Veljko Vlahovi
c,
and leading to numerous reciprocal visits in Chile and Yugoslavia. On the Chilean side, the
impact of these exchanges was considerable: as Joaqu
ın Fern
andez has shown, the Yugoslav
experience became a model for the PSP in its search for a national and antiimperialist path to
socialism that stepped away from Soviet guidelines.24 But also for the Yugoslavs was the relation
to Chilean socialists of key importance, as this connection paved the way for them to jump into
a region that had until then remained rather unknown and inaccessible.
Some months before the visit of a Chilean delegation to Yugoslavia, Veljko Vlahovi
c, the
President of the Commission for International Relations of the SSRNJ, travelled to Latin America
to pay a visit to the PSP. The proposition came from the Chileans themselves, and the Yugoslav
representation in Santiago insisted that the travel should be settled directly between them and
the SSRNJ.25 It should be kept in mind that, much like other leading members of the SSRNJ,
Vlahovi
c had fought in the Spanish Civil War, having even lost a leg in combat. The years in
Spain had given him and many of his colleagues a solid background in international political
activism, and incidentally, they might have also made him more sensitive to the particularities of
the Latin American context.26 Moreover, Vlahovi
c’s life story could be an asset when dealing
with Chilean socialists. As Kirsten Weld has shown, the Spanish Civil War had a deep impact on
the lives and imaginaries of Chilean socialism, with many socialist leaders and intellectuals hav-
ing committed for the cause of the Republic during the war and advocated for its exiles after
6 A. COSOVSCHI

1939.27 Hence, a former member of the International Brigades such as Vlahovi
c could be particu-
larly cherished as a guest by the Chileans.28
In late 1954, Vlahovi
c came to Chile on a tour that was officially announced as a general visit
to the country in order to avoid any suspicion or conflict, and which also extended to Argentina,
Uruguay and Brazil. According to Vlahovi
c’s report to the SSRNJ, in Uruguay he met with repre-
sentatives of the Socialist Party, whose interest and knowledge of the Yugoslav context and of
self-management took him by surprise, as well as with representatives of the students federation
and with other political figures. In Argentina, he was especially impressed by the social work of
the state-led Eva Pero
n Foundation and by the leisure infrastructure developed for industrial
workers with the support of trade unions. As for Argentine socialists, he confirmed the negative
impressions of previous reports, noting that they were divided between a passive right wing and
an active left wing which fought against Pero
n’s regime, ‘which logically brought it closer to the
Vatican.’ He also commented on the situation of the Socialist and the Communist Party in Brazil,
describing the latter as ‘the most serious Cominform force in Latin America’, and underlining
their recent changes and their decision to abandon the Cominform slogans and turn their atten-
tion to ‘Brazilian problems’.29
With regards to his experience in Chile, Vlahovi
c was particularly enthusiastic. In conversation
with his comrades, he underlined the many virtues of the PSP, claiming that Chilean socialists
were ‘the most interesting in Latin America’, and that their strength and character were astonish-
ing. He also commended their discipline, and stated that ‘their views are absolutely identical to
ours.’ Moreover, he underlined their collaboration with the governing National Revolutionary
Movement in Bolivia (MNR, Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario), which he characterized as ‘one
of the most serious movements of Latin America.’30
In many aspects, Vlahovi
c’s tour in late 1954 marked a turning point in Yugoslav activity in
Latin America. His visit broadened the Yugoslav regime’s contacts on the ground and contrib-
uted to developing Yugoslavia’s prestige among a number of local left-wing movements.
Perhaps more importantly, the experience made the Yugoslavs ever more aware of the need to
establish a closer, more intense and more personal connection to Latin American partners in
order to better understand the local context. Among his general conclusions on the visit,
Vlahovi
c underlined that ‘there is a series of new developments in Latin America, and a series of
problems which are unknown for us, and which cannot be understood only through the special-
ized literature. Personal contact and personal observation are essential to usefully become
acquainted with that part of the world.’31 From then on, the Yugoslavs would respond by sys-
tematically increasing and multiplying their efforts in the region, attempting thus to close the
gap that had prevailed during the previous years.

Entering the race: Between Moscow, Washington and Beijing

After initial contacts in the early 1950s, Yugoslav initiatives in Latin America increased extensively
during the following years. In the late 1950s, the Yugoslav leadership augmented its efforts in
the region at least for two reasons. On the one hand, developments in the international arena
made the Yugoslav leadership realize the strong potential, and the urgent need, for spreading
their influence beyond the European world. In particular, frictions with the American government
and increasing conflict with the USSR after the repression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956
made the Yugoslav leadership understand the difficulties of preserving neutralism in the conflic-
tive setting of the bipolar world.32 In this context, the rise of the Third World as a central actor
in global politics following the Bandung Conference of 1955 provided the Yugoslavs with the
ideal conditions to find new partners in the recently decolonized nations of Asia and Africa,
while frequent diplomatic commonalities with Latin American countries in international platforms
such as the United Nations invigorated Yugoslav interest in bringing these countries closer to
 THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 7

the developing neutralist camp33. On the other hand, Yugoslav growing interest in Latin America
was also strengthened by the encouraging contacts with some Latin American socialists during
recent years, as well as by Veljko Vlahovi
c’s tour in late 1954, which convinced the Yugoslavs of
the need to further develop their networks in the region.
A letter to the Yugoslav delegation in Chile from 1955 attests to the decision to make this a pri-
ority. The letter was sent just weeks after Vlahovi
c’s return, and informed the delegation that ‘the
Commission [for International Relations of the SSRNJ] has discussed the necessity and importance of
establishing firmer relations with socialist parties and workers movements in Latin America.’
Belgrade advanced the idea of inviting a delegation of Chilean socialists to Yugoslavia, covering part
of their expenses. Moreover, the letter mentioned a number of measures that needed to be taken
in order to extend Yugoslav connections in the region, such as placing Yugoslav articles in the Latin
American press, extending relations with local workers movements and trade unions, and more gen-
erally, further developing Yugoslav knowledge about the international workers’ movement.34
A delegation of Chilean socialists did indeed visit Yugoslavia the following year as a result of
previous talks. Aniceto Rodr
ıguez and Oscar Waiss toured the country in 1955, and the experi-
ence is described in Waiss’s book Amanecer en Belgrado, which was published in 1956 by Prensa
Latinoamericana, the PSP’s press, which would also print theoretical works by Yugoslav theoreti-
cians Edvard Kardelj and Boris Ziherl in the following years. In its pages, Waiss described the
Yugoslavs as great heroes, he underlined once and again that many of them had fought in
Spain, he lauded the peace and the camaraderie that the Yugoslav nations had forged in war
against the foreign enemy during the Second World War, he commended the Yugoslavs’ cour-
age, and also portrayed their humanity and sense of humor. Moreover, he praised socialist self-
management and explained in detail the functioning of the communal system, he celebrated
Tito as a hero for the world and extolled Yugoslav socialism as a democratic alternative to the
Soviet system.35 The book became one of the main works on the Yugoslav experience for Latin
American audiences, and an influential piece in the political thinking of Chilean socialism.36
Waiss’s writings are especially revealing of the appeal that Yugoslavia could have for Latin
American socialists as a left-wing alternative to the Soviet model. Moreover, his account is also
instructive of the Yugoslav’s treatment of foreign visitors. The Chileans were taken to see some
of the most spectacular natural beauties of the country, but they were also and especially shown
the functioning of workers’ self-management in great factories such as Rade Koncar and the par-
ticulars of the communal system in cities such as Rijeka. His writings also show the important
legitimizing role of the SSRNJ, an organization that was posited as one of the leading institutions
of Yugoslav socialist democracy. Waiss commended the SSRNJ, claiming that:
It is a sort of broad Parliament where all trends and nuances of socialist thinking have their place, and in
which the clash of opinions prepare its members to apply their conclusions in the organs of self-
management. In other words, the Socialist Alliance does not decide what is to be done; the decision is
always up to the organs of self-management, and therefore there is no danger that it may turn into a
centralized direction that encourages bureaucratism.37

Be it due to the fact that it was formally detached from the party, be it due to the Spanish
experiences of some of its leading members, or more generally to their strong internationalist
leanings, the SSRNJ would be one of the leading actors in Yugoslav initiatives in Latin America
during the following years. The organization’s activities in the continent would be celebrated as
a key achievement in Belgrade’s foreign policy, as attested by a report written by Vlahovi
c in
1959, where he proudly emphasized the establishment of fruitful contacts with socialist leaders
in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Ecuador, and with nationalist forces such as the National
Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia and Accio
n Democr
atica in Venezuela, ‘besides our traditional
contacts with the Socialist Party in Chile’38.
Documents from 1958 and 1959 about the activities of the Socialist Alliance attest to this
organization’s growing activity in Latin America. During those years, the SSRNJ made significant
8 A. COSOVSCHI

efforts to create stronger connections to South American trade unions, especially through the action
of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (SSJ, Savez sindikata Jugoslavije). In January
1959, the Yugoslavs were invited to participate in the congress of the Chilean Trade Unions’ Youth
and in the national conference of the United Confederation of Workers’ (CUT, Central Unida de los
Trabajadores). It was decided that Stane Kavcic, a leading Slovene communist and the President of
the Confederation of Trade Unions of Slovenia, would be sent as a delegate. He was accompanied
by Stane Juznic, expert on Latin American affairs, to perform as a translator and guide. Moreover, as
the financial effort of such a trip was significant, the Yugoslavs decided to send them both on a
regional tour to establish better contacts with Latin American workers movements in Argentina,
Uruguay, Brazil and Bolivia.39 The visit was later corresponded with the coming of a Chilean and a
Uruguayan delegates to the SSJ’s fourth congress in April 1959.40
Moreover, the late 1950s witnessed a significant rise in visits by Latin American left-wing leaders
and intellectuals to Yugoslav soil, mainly channeled through the SSRNJ. During those years, the
Yugoslav regime hosted among others the general secretary of the Brazilian Socialist Party, Domingos
Velasco, as well as the Uruguayan socialist intellectual Carlos Rama and the Argentine intellectual
Silvio Frondizi.41 A particularly remarkable event was the visit of former Bolivian president and leader
of the MNR, Victor Paz Estenssoro, who came to Yugoslavia in June 1959 as part of a wider tour in
Europe. According to Yugoslav sources, Paz requested to visit the country and expressed interest in
getting to know Yugoslavia’s agrarian sector, but more importantly, he explicitly stated the idea that
Latin American countries should ‘follow the same neutralist line in international politics as Yugoslavia,
and African and Asian nations.’ During his visit, the Bolivian leader held a conference about Latin
American politics in Belgrade, and he also had long talks with Yugoslav representatives in which he
gave his impressions of the situation in Latin America. Reports from the time show that the
Yugoslavs had a very positive image of Paz, whom they described as “one of Bolivia’s brightest intel-
lectuals, capable politician and a person of complete moral integrity”, which they especially appreci-
ated in light of the more conservative administration of his successor, Hern
an Siles Suazo.42
In late 1959, contacts with Latin American governments and left-wing movements were rein-
forced through two further visits the region: a mission of good will headed by Vladimir Popovi
c,
then a cabinet member and also a former member of the International Brigades in Spain, that
travelled several countries all along the continent in June, and a narrower tour by a trade union
delegation headed by Svetozar Vukmanovi
c Tempo and Asher Deleon, which was again accom-
panied by Stane Juznic and travelled through much of South America in November.
In his classic book on non-alignment, Rubinstein has succinctly analyzed the mission of good
will headed by Popovi
c, focusing on the commercial and diplomatic gains of the visit and claim-
ing that the attempt to build contacts with socialist parties ‘did not meet with much success’43.
However, sources analyzed in this article suggest otherwise. Judging by Popovi
c’s account to his
comrades and by the discussions that ensued in their meetings, the tour was very useful for the
establishment of contacts with Latin American socialist movements. The members of the delega-
tion travelled through several countries and had rich talks with progressive movements in Costa
Rica, Cuba, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia and Mexico, among other countries. The experience
allowed for the Yugoslavs to strengthen existing relations with local partners and to enter in
contact with political movements such as the Movimiento 26 de Julio in Cuba, the Costa Rican
Party of National Liberation and the APRA in Peru. Equally important, the visit also allowed for
them to further develop their knowledge and to better understand the political, economic and
social landscape of the region, which was now undergoing new developments following the
Cuban revolution in early 1959.
This becomes clear in the very long statement given by Popovi
c to the Commission for
International Relations of the SSRNJ.44 In his account, Popovi
c told the commission that Latin
American countries were going through a process of rapid economic growth and greater eco-
nomic emancipation. American influence and dominance in the region was strong, but move-
ments and transformations were developing in Bolivia, Venezuela and especially in Cuba, where
 THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 9

the revolution had been able to liquidate the reactionary armed forces and start to address the
urgent economic and social problems of the country. In sharp contrast to those movements
stood the dictatorial regimes in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and to a lesser extent in
Paraguay, while Chile and Argentina witnessed political swings to the right and an ever growing
influence of American capital in their economies. As for left-wing actors, Popovi
c said, most of
the local communist parties behaved aggressively and violently, keeping with the logic of bloc
politics and following orders from Moscow, which had resulted in their political decline.
One of the things that stood out in Popovi
c’s exposition was the Yugoslavs’ first impressions
on the developments taking place in Cuba. He underlined the growing importance and popular-
ity of Fidel Castro in the whole of Latin America, but he also mentioned the frequent criticisms
that some Latin American progressive forces made against Castro’s authoritarian and personalist
style. He himself also emphasized the interesting features of this style, which included addressing
the people with speeches on radio and TV every day. ‘How long can he keep like this, that’s the
question’, he noted.45
The journey also allowed the delegation to pay a visit to Yugoslav communities in Latin
America. Popovi
c addressed the issue of the Yugoslav diaspora in the region, underlining that in
most of the countries the diaspora was deep-rooted and generally patriotic, which meant that
most of the clubs and associations did not accept political emigrates. In some countries, how-
ever, the presence of anticommunist political emigration was significant, which also meant that
it would be necessary to fulfill an educating and cultural role there.46
And finally, Popovi
c repeatedly underlined the positive reputation of Yugoslavia in the contin-
ent and the standing of Tito among Latin American leaders. ‘Never in the course of our encoun-
ters ( … )’, he said, ‘was a deep interest for Yugoslavia not expressed’, with Latin Americans
frequently expressing interest for the peculiar features of Yugoslav socialism, in particular com-
munal and workers’ self-management. This interest made Popovi
c insist on the need to produce
and send more materials about the Yugoslav system to Latin American partners.47 It also con-
vinced other members of the commission of the need to increase efforts in the region. During

the discussion of this report, Rodoljub Colakovi
c, also a former fighter in Spain and a leading
member of the party, concluded that there was a need to further expand Yugoslav initiatives in
the region. ‘We have to take advantage of the moral political prestige of our country,’ he stated,
although he also stressed the financial restrictions that existed for such actions. 48
Some months after Popovi
c’s visit, a smaller delegation headed by Svetozar Vukmanovi
c
Tempo toured South America. Tempo was the President of the SSJ, and he was accompanied by
SSRNJ member Aser Deleon. After their return, both Tempo and Deleon gave a statement
describing in detail their contacts with South American workers’ representatives and trade
unions. Much like Popovi
c, Tempo also underscored that in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile,
positive notions of Yugoslavia prevailed among left-wing forces. ‘The will to cooperate and the
desire to visit Yugoslavia are big’, he said, and insisted on doubling efforts. And contrary to

Colakovi
c, he now underlined the need to overcome any existing financial limitation. Latin
Americans should be invited to see Yugoslavia, he asserted, Yugoslav embassies should increase
their staff and more literature should be produced on, and for the region.49
Among other things, the need for greater efforts came out of the realization that Yugoslav ini-
tiatives were encountering growing competition in the continent. As attested by Popovi
c’s and
Tempo’s statements, the Yugoslavs were becoming increasingly aware that Latin America was
turning into a major stage of global conflict. Besides the growing influence of Castro, there was
a systematic campaign against Yugoslavia by the Russians and their allies, the Czechoslovaks.
And they were not the only ones, for Chinese influence was particularly noteworthy. As Tempo
underlined, many people had asked him about Yugoslav relations with China, and he was now
under the impression that the Chinese were competing with the Soviets in the continent. The
Chinese, he claimed, ‘want to lead a policy for the world.’50
10 A. COSOVSCHI

All in all, statements by Popovi
c and Tempo were detailed and very well informed on the minu-
tiae of Latin American politics, especially when compared to reports from the previous years. The
progression of Yugoslav initiatives in Latin America had not only resulted in the enlargement of
Yugoslav contacts in the region, but also in more extensive and better information, which in turn
allowed for more adequate policy. However, as Yugoslavs initiatives multiplied, also did the obstacles
and their contenders, which forced the leadership in Belgrade to increase their efforts. As Tempo
clearly stated in his travel account, ‘China invited 300 people from Brasilia, they pay the tickets and
the food there and they give them expensive gifts. I don’t insist on giving gifts, but I insist on find-
ing the money to pay these people the trip, they don’t have money to come and see Yugoslavia.’51
In other words, if the Yugoslavs wanted to play the same game as the Soviets, the Cubans and the
Chinese, they would have to rise to the challenge.

The Yugoslav jump into Latin America and the limits of non-alignment
By the early 1960s, and in the context of growing Yugoslav contacts with the Third World,
Belgrade’s activity in Latin America had attained unprecedented levels. Repeated visits to the
region and frequent correspondence with local socialist movements were then coupled with
increasingly fluent diplomatic relations with the governments of countries such as Bolivia, Cuba,
Brazil and Mexico, who expressed a growing interest in the development of nonalignment.
As attested by reports from the time, Yugoslav efforts to gain influence in Latin America were
ever more visible and systematic. A CIA Report from 1960 included Latin America among
Yugoslavia’s regions of interest, underlining Belgrade’s efforts to gain industrial contracts and to
expand trade in the continent, and elsewhere in the Third World, through credits such as the
one that Belgrade granted to Argentina in 1959 for the purchase of Yugoslav ships. The docu-
ment also underlined that, contrary to the main leaders of the two great blocs, the Yugoslavs
had a special appeal on the basis of their support for anticolonialism, neutrality and their
defense of freedom from outside interference. ‘This gives them an edge over their counterparts
from the Sino-Soviet bloc’, it stated.52 Similarly, a report from the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs from 1961 described ‘the Yugoslav game’ as an important factor in the continent, claim-
ing that ‘the government in Belgrade seems to be convinced that it will find a fertile ground for
its ideas in Latin America. Practically ignored by this part of the world until 1955, it deploys a
lively activity and multiplies its contacts.’ The French report also underscored the Yugoslavs’ spe-
cial appeal to Latin Americans, claiming that ‘they are less feared than the Russians, but they are
accepted in places where the Russians are not.’53 The report was circulated in Spanish by the
Argentine embassy in Moscow, which also attests to growing awareness of Latin American gov-
ernments about the impact that Yugoslav activities were having in the continent.
Yugoslav efforts in Latin America had a noticeable impact on the economic domain, with
mutual trade rising significantly since the mid 1950s and continuously throughout the following
years. As described in a Yugoslav report from 1960, economic exchange with Latin American
countries went from representing 4% to 7% of total Yugoslav exports from 1954 to 1956, and
from 3% to 5% of total imports.54 Although commercial relations went through certain oscilla-
tions during the late 1950s years as a result of distance and logistic difficulties, they recovered
strength by the end of the decade and, as attested by later economic reports, trade among both
regions kept rising throughout the rest of the 1960s.55
Moreover, Yugoslav endeavors were not limited to the economic and political domains, but
rather started to diversify. In the realm of cultural diplomacy, for instance, Yugoslav activity in
Latin America developed considerably. The implementation of cultural, artistic and academic
activities in the region was part of a larger effort from the Yugoslav state to reinforce cultural
policy towards foreign countries. The Yugoslavs were thus participating in a general trend of the
time by which cultural internationalism came soon to be conceived as a central element in a
 THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 11

country’s strategy of propaganda abroad.56 In 1953, Yugoslavia established the Federal

Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, which became attached to the
Ministry of Foreign Education and Culture in 1958. The country signed its first international cul-
tural convention in 1955, only to establish more than fifty conventions of cultural cooperation
during the following ten years.57 This had an impact on Belgrade’s policy in Latin America, where
Yugoslav cultural activity started to sprout. Between 1957 and 1965, the Yugoslavs signed cul-
tural conventions with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia and Mexico, and they would establish
further agreements in the following years. Moreover, Yugoslav centers of cultural cooperation
operated in places such as Mexico City and Santiago, being partially funded by the Yugoslav
government and organizing activities such as film screenings, while community centers held by
the Yugoslav diaspora were also active in different parts of the continent.
Cultural relations with Latin America were thus going through a phase of expansion. A report
from 1961 mentioned a “visible progress” in these activities, which included efforts to develop
Yugoslav press materials in Spanish and a campaign to invite Latin American journalists to
Yugoslavia.58 As described in a later report from that year, recent cultural cooperation had
included the participation of Yugoslav artists in the Sao Paulo Art Biennial, an exhibition of
Brazilian artists in Yugoslavia and an exhibition of Yugoslav medieval frescos in Mexico, as well
as the granting of fourteen scholarships to Latin American students, a number that would rise to
forty-four the following year. According to the report, Yugoslav films had ‘not even by far pene-
trated in this region of the world’, but still, thirty-two full-length and eleven short-length films
had been sold to Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. Finally, a significant budget had been
planned to fund the activities of Yugoslav communities in Latin America, with as much as ten
million dinars being allocated for the acquisition of books, gramophones and music material in
their centers and associations.59
Moreover, Yugoslav endeavors in Latin America started being supported by the production of
expert knowledge about the region. At the Institute for International Politics and Economy
(IMPP, Institut za med-unarodnu politiku i privredu) and the Institute for the Study of the Workers’
Movement (IRP, Institut za izucavanje radnickog pokreta), researchers such as Stane Juznic,
Ljubomir Paligori
c and Sulejman Redzepagi
c became the leading experts for Latin American
affairs, often accompanying official delegations in their trips to the region and guiding Latin
American visitors in their visits to Yugoslavia. In their own visits to Latin American countries,
they were able to further consolidate Yugoslav links to local left-wing movements, gather litera-
ture and sources and develop personal relations with intellectuals, workers’ representatives and
political figures. In 1959–60, for instance, Redzepagi
c travelled across Latin America for about six
months, visiting Cuba, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. During
the tour, he could meet with representatives of the Cuban government, as well as with leading
socialist figures like Salvador Allende in Chile. Through his encounters, he was also able to con-
firm many of the impressions of previous Yugoslav visitors, such as the pervasiveness of Soviet
views among Latin American communists, but he could also corroborate the extended sympathy
that many Latin Americans expressed for Yugoslavia as an alternative socialist model.60
Redzepagi
c was also the official translator for an official Yugoslav delegation that departed
for Latin America in late 1961 and toured the continent for more than one month. The group
was headed by Mika Spiljak, back then a member of the Executive Committee of the SSRNJ and
the Central Committee of the party, as well as Vice-President of the SSJ. The cause for the visit
was, once again, the Chilean connection: more specifically, an invitation for the SSRNJ to send a
delegation to the 9th Congress of the Chilean socialists in December 1961. The visit to the region
involved a relatively long stay in Chile to participate in the socialists’ reunion and to engage in
diverse meetings and to visit the local Yugoslav community. It would be followed by a visit to
Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, spending about one week in each country.61
The visit came in a rather sensitive moment, months after the Belgrade conference that formally
established NAM had showed difficulties in gathering support among Latin American governments,
12 A. COSOVSCHI

partially due to American pressure.62 Only Cuba had participated as a full member of the confer-
ence, but the island’s growing rapprochement with the USSR and its militant anti-American positions
threatened to endanger the balance in NAM. It also created several tensions with the Yugoslavs,
whom the Cuban press increasingly accused of adopting revisionist positions.63
Along with the governments of Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador and together with other of left-
wing movements, Chilean socialists had taken part in the Belgrade conference as observers, yet
another proof that they were among the Yugoslavs’ closest allies in Latin America. Moreover,
having reunited with the dissenting faction led by Salvador Allende, and having made common
alliance with the communists and other lesser parties in the Front of Popular Action (FRAP,
Frente de Accio
n Popular) under Allende’s candidacy, they represented now the second strongest
political force in Chile and one of the most prosperous left-wing forces in the continent, which
made the Yugoslavs especially attentive to the development of this connection.
In their salutations to the congress of Chilean socialists, the Yugoslav delegation attempted to con-
vey their respect for their partners and to underline what they considered to be the essential spirit of
Yugoslav foreign policy toward the Third World: support for anti-imperialist and anticolonial struggles
in Asia, Africa and Latin America, respect for the diverse and distinctive ways in which movements
and parties from different parts of the world embarked in the construction of socialism, opposition to
bloc divisions in the world and efforts towards peaceful coexistence. In particular, Yugoslav delegates
underlined their optimism with regard to developments in Latin America, claiming:
There is no doubt that workers and progressive movements in Latin American find themselves on the rise,
and that ever more efficiently they influence the solution of problems with which their peoples have to
deal nowadays. The most recent events in some countries of Latin America show the ever growing
participation of the working masses in the sociopolitical life of their countries, and that is what characterizes
current events in this continent. We are convinced that your congress will have great importance not only
for the consolidation and firmer association of progressive forces in your country, but also for the
unification and cooperation of all progressive movements of the countries of Latin America for a more
successful solution of problems of common interest.64

After the congress and throughout the following weeks, the Yugoslav delegates had the
chance to engage in meetings and conversations with politicians, trade union representatives
and with the students’ movements in much of South America. The travel report written by
Redzepagi
c shows that the Yugoslav delegation devoted much time to meeting trade union rep-
resentatives in Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Brasilia, with whom there was much talk about the
specifics of their economic trades and the local economic situation, but also about the features
of Yugoslav self-management.65
Moreover, sources also show that in this occasion the Yugoslavs were especially attentive to
geopolitical matters and to the possibilities of promoting non-alignment in Latin America. When
talking to the leaders of left-wing political parties and organizations, the Yugoslavs granted spe-
cial attention to their views on international affairs and on Cold War politics, especially examin-
ing their stance with regard to developments in Cuba, Albania, China and the USSR, as well as
their views on non-alignment. In particular, the Yugoslavs confirmed now the growing difficulties
of bringing Latin Americans closer to NAM in a time of deepening conflict.
According to the travel report, almost everywhere did the Yugoslav delegation encounter the
ever-present influence of the Cuban revolution, which had by then become a symbol of anti-
imperialist resistance in the continent, as well as a divisive issue among local left-wing forces.
Perhaps more importantly, the Yugoslavs noted that many Latin Americans claimed to have a
very reduced margin of action when it came to resisting the bipolar logics of the Cold War.
Young socialists in Uruguay such as Roberto Copelmayer and Reinaldo Gargano, and many
Chileans including Salvador Allende himself, underlined that even though they were in principle
contrary to bloc divisions and felt close to the values of the Belgrade conference, in case of
eventually arriving to power they would be forced to rely on the USSR to counterbalance
American pressures, as it had happened in Cuba. ‘Latin America is not Europe, Asia or Africa’,
 THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 13

said the Uruguayan socialists, ‘where you can simultaneously get help from the US and the
USSR. Latin American countries are American property, and the only true help is Soviet help.’66
All in all, the visit helped the Yugoslavs to further develop their relations with left-wing forces
in the region. Among other things, the delegation agreed to invite more Latin Americans to
Yugoslavia, to commit more efforts to the production of publications in Spanish and to print
Yugoslav materials in Montevideo and Santiago through the aid of Chilean and Uruguayan
socialists. But perhaps more importantly, this tour allowed the Yugoslavs to get a better feel of
local developments in a time of rapid change and to attest to the growing difficulties of promot-
ing nonalignment in the continent.
By the early 1960s, the Yugoslav leadership saw Latin America as a region that was generally
taking a path towards political and social democratization and struggling for greater independ-
ence from American tutelage, which could naturally bring them closer to nonalignment. The pro-
gressive governments of Adolfo Lo
pez Mateos in Mexico and Victor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia
were interpreted as promising signals. Moreover, developments in Brazil, where Janio Quadros
had taken the country to a more autonomous foreign policy and where his successor, left-wing
leader Jo~ao Goulart had started to push for an agenda of wealth redistribution and restrictions
to foreign capitals, were interpreted by the Yugoslavs as the symptom of a promising time. As
Redzepagi
c said in the conclusion of his travel report:
Brazil is developing as a new independent force in the region, despite all the obstacles that it faces, both
internally and in Latin America. The trend towards independence is nowadays very strong in Brazil. The
sociopolitical processes that take place in Brazil show that this trend will strengthen and make itself a way
toward an ever stronger affirmation.67

In other words, the transformations that were taking place in Latin America since the late
1950s were auspicious, and the Yugoslavs saw room for them to take part in these processes.
Tito’s visit to the region in 1963, when he stayed in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Chile and
reinforced his personal relation to progressive heads of state such as Lo
pez Mateos, Paz
Estenssoro and Goulart, came to crown the developments of the previous decade and give an
official stamp to Yugoslavia’s growing interest in the continent. By then, as a result of its system-
atic policy during previous years, Yugoslavia had become a serious factor in Latin America and
was seen as a prestigious partner by several local left-wing governments and movements who
sought alternatives to both American and Soviet hegemony. The increasing participation of Latin
American countries in NAM in the following years, with Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Bolivia, Brazil and Chile all taking part as observers in the Cairo Conference of 1964, would also
confirm the effectiveness of the Yugoslav enterprise.
But numerous obstacles were in sight. As they travelled the continent and increased their
efforts, the Yugoslavs also became aware of the impact that global politics were having in Latin
America. The continent had turned into a hotbed of Cold War conflict since the late 1950s, and
this made it that nonalignment and neutralism were seen by many of their local partners as
desirable, but impracticable. The Yugoslav leadership had decided to commit itself to a stronger
policy towards the region with substantial results, but the new context of the 1960s made it that
their efforts could be significantly curtailed by the action of rival powers. The military coup
against Goulart in 1964, which opened a new period of growing military repression and
American intervention in Latin America, would be a clear sign of the many difficulties that lay
ahead for Yugoslav endeavors in the continent, and more generally in the Third World.

Conclusions
Until now, relations between Yugoslavia and Latin American countries have for the most part
been disregarded by historiography. In this paper, I have attempted to fill that gap and I have
analyzed Yugoslavia’s endeavors to create stronger connections with Latin American
14 A. COSOVSCHI

governments and left-wing organizations from the early 1950s until the early 1960s. My argu-
ment started with Yugoslavia’s first efforts to develop its knowledge of the region and with
Belgrade’s first meaningful contacts with Latin American socialists, and it concluded with Tito’s
visit to the continent in late 1963. I have claimed that from the early 1950s onwards the
Yugoslav leadership pursued a systematic policy to gain influence in Latin America, which made
it that by the early 1960s the Yugoslavs had become a serious factor in the continent. Hence,
Tito’s tour in 1963 should not be understood as the starting point of the Yugoslav enterprise in
the Latin America, but rather as the result of endeavors that had been building up over the pre-
vious years. Moreover, I have also contended that nonalignment proved to be a double-edged
sword for the Yugoslavs: Belgrade’s neutralism and ideological openness paved the way for the
Yugoslavs to garner significant prestige and build a wide network of contacts, but as Latin
America turned into a hotbed of Cold War conflict in the late 1950s, non-alignment came to be
seen as an unviable position for many local left-wing governments and movements.
Furthermore, in order to analyze these developments, I have offered a perspective on
Yugoslav foreign policy that aims to go beyond the confines of state-to-state relations. When
analyzing Yugoslav relations with the Third World, authors have traditionally focused on large
diplomatic platforms such as NAM or the UN, often also underlining the importance of Tito’s cha-
rismatic brand of personal diplomacy. In this paper, I have attempted to tell a different, but com-
plementary story: one that started years before the creation of NAM, and which was made of
multiple and parallel efforts by a plurality of Yugoslav and Latin American actors, taking place
not only in spectacular events in Belgrade or New York, but also in smaller meetings in places
like Santiago, Sao Paulo and Montevideo. By focusing on these less visible activities and contacts,
I have attempted to show that a diversity of actors and factors at the global and local level were
at play in the development of Yugoslav endeavors in the region.
As a corollary, this suggests that to understand Yugoslav policy in Latin America and more
generally in the Third World, we should go beyond the traditional approach that characterizes
most of the historiography on Yugoslav foreign policy, and turn instead to a more comprehen-
sive perspective that also includes how these relations were systematically woven and sustained
throughout the years by the action of diverse actors on the ground. Thus, by analyzing the
development of Yugoslav relations with local actors in these lively theaters of Cold War conflict,
we may be able to put to test the grand narratives of Yugoslav internationalism and better
understand the problems and limitations that the policy of nonalignment confronted in the
Third World.

Notes
1. See “President Tito’s Visit to Some Latin American Countries”, Yugoslav Survey. A Record of Facts and
Information, 15/1963.
2. NARA, CREST, CIA, “NARA, CREST, CIA, “Special Report: Yugoslav Interest in Latin America,” 12 April 1963.
3. Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapell Hill, NC.: University of North Carolina
Press, 2011); Stephen G Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012); Tobias Rupprecht, Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: Interaction and Exchange
between the USSR and Latin America during the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Vanni
Pettina, Historia m
ınima de la Guerra Fr
ıa en Am
erica Latina (Mexico DF: El Colegio de Mexico, 2018); Vanni
Pettina, “Global Horizons: Mexico, the Third World, and the Non-Aligned Movement at the Time of the 1961
Belgrade Conference,” The International History Review, 38, no. 4 (2016), 741–64; James G. Hershberg, “‘High-
Spirited Confusion’: Brazil, the 1961 Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference, and the Limits of an ‘Independent’
Foreign Policy during the High Cold War,” Cold War History, 7, no. 3 (2007), 373–88; Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting
Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
4. Ljubodrag Dimi
c, Jugoslavija i Hladni Rat (Belgrade: Arhipelag, 2014); Dragan Bogeti
c, “Jugoslavija u Hladnom
Ratu,” Istorija 20. Veka, 2 (2008), 315–70; Natasa Miskovi
c, The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi -
Bandung - Belgrade (London: Routledge, 2014); Alvin Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970); Tvrtko Jakovina, Tre
ca Strana Hladnog Rata (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011);
 THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 15

Tvrtko Jakovina, Americki komunisticki saveznik: Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Americke Drzave: 1945. -
1955. (Zagreb: Profil, 2003); Svetozar Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War:
Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953 - 1957, Cold War History Series 26 (London: Routledge, 2013).
5. Nemanja Radonji
c, “(Post)Jugoslovenska Istoriografija i ‘Tre
ci Svet,’” Historiografija.hr, 2018, http://www.
historiografija.hr/?p=9899.
6. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, 94–105.
7.  ski, “Zemlje Azije, Afrike i Latinske Amerike u Secanjima i Dnevnicima Jugoslovenskih Diplomata,”
Jovan Cavo
Tokovi Istorije, 3 (2012)
8. Johanna Bockman, “Democratic Socialism in Chile and Peru: Revisiting the ‘Chicago Boys’ as the Origin of
Neoliberalism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 61, no. 3 (2019), 654–79,.
9. Jakovina, Tre
ca Strana Hladnog Rata; Natasa Miskovi
c, “The Pre-History of the Non-Aligned Movement: India’s
First Contacts with the Communist Yugoslavia, 1948–50,” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 65,
no. 2 (April 2009), 185–200; Miskovi
c, The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung -
Belgrade; Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World; Dimi
c, Jugoslavija i Hladni Rat; Radina Vuceti
c and
Paul Betts, Tito in Africa: Picturing Solidarity (Museum of Yugoslavia, 2017).
10. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, 94.
11. CIA, “Yugoslav Foreign Trade in 1949–1950”, 25 June 1952.
12. Slobodan Pajovi
c, “La emigracio
n yugoslava a Am
erica latina,” in Acerca de las migraciones centroeuropeas y
mediterra
neas a Iberoam
erica: aspectos sociales y culturales., ed. Mois
es Min~ambres (Universidad de Oviedo,
1995), 83–92.
13. Svetozar Rajak, “No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-
Alignment,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 16, no. 1 (January 2014), 146–79.
14. “Stilinovi
cu”, 11 May 1951, in AJ 507., “Argentina”, IX, 4 / 4.
15. “Untitled”, 10 October 1951, in AJ 507., “Argentina”, IX, 4 / 11.
16. For an analysis of the Argentine Socialist Party’s division in face of Peronism, see Herrera (2003).
17. “Untitled”, 10 October 1951 in AJ 507., “Argentina”, IX, 4 / 11, 12.
18. “Untitled”, 10 October 1951 in AJ 507., “Argentina”, IX, 4 / 11, 13.
19. Petrovi
c, Slavoljub D- era, Se
canja i zapisi jednog borca i diplomate, Beograd: DTA, 2007.
20. Marcelo Casals Araya, El alba de una revolucio
n la izquierda y el proceso de construccio

n estrat
egica de la “v
ıa
chilena al socialismo”, 1956–1970 (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2010); Joaqu
ın Fern
andez, “Nacionalismo y
Marxismo en El Partido Socialista Popular (1948–1957),” Izquierdas, no. 34 (2017), 26–49.
21. Paul W Drake, Socialismo y populismo: Chile, 1936–1973 (Valpara
ıso: Instituto de Historia, Vicerrector
ıa
Acad
emica, Universidad Cato
lica de Valpara
ıso, 1992), 264.
22. “Sifrovano pismo”, 27 August 1951, AJ 507, “Chile”, IX, 21 / III-1.
23. “Sifrovano pismo”, 5 June 1953, AJ 507, “Chile”, IX, 21 / III-3.
24. Fern
andez, “Nacionalismo y Marxismo en El Partido Socialista Popular (1948–1957).”
25. “Telegram”, 12 September 1954, AJ 507, “Chile”, IX, 21 / III-13.
26. For a study on the Yugoslav fighters in the Spanish Civil War, see Vjeran Pavlakovi
c, Yugoslav Volunteers in the
Spanish Civil War (Belgrade: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe, 2016).
27. On the historical impact of the Spanish Civil War on the Chilean left-wing, and more generally on Chilean
Cold War imaginaries, see Kirsten Weld, “The Spanish Civil War and the Construction of a Reactionary
Historical Consciousness in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 98, no. 1
(2018), 77–115.
28. It is worth noting that when recalling Vlahovi
c’s visit in his memoires, socialist party intellectual Oscar Waiss
describes him as a sensitive man and underscores his experience as a fighter in Spain.
29. “Zabeleska sa sastanka Komisije za med-unarodne veze SSRNJ na kome je drug Veljko Vlahovi
c podneo
izvestaj sa svog puta po Latinskoj Americi ”, 1955, AJ 507, “Chile”, IX, 21 / III-13, 1–4.
30. Ibid.
31. “Zabeleska sa sastanka Komisije za med-unarodne veze SSRNJ na kome je drug Veljko Vlahovi
c podneo
izvestaj sa svog puta po Latinskoj Americi ”, 1955, AJ 507, “Chile”, IX, 21 / III-13, 4.
32. Bogeti
c, “Jugoslavija u Hladnom Ratu.”
33. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World.
34. “Sifrovano pismo poslanstvu Cile  (Bolivija)”, 22 February 1955, AJ 507, “Chile”, IX, 21 / II-4.
35. Waiss, Oscar, Amanecer en Belgrado, Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1956.
36. For a more extensive analysis of the influence of the Yugoslav experience on Chilean socialism, see
Fern
andez (2017).
37. Waiss, Oscar, Amanecer en Belgrado, Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1956, 52.
38. Vlahovi
c, Veljko, Sabrani radovi, vol. 6, “Savremeni svijet i med-unarodni radnicki pokret”, Belgrado: Komunist,
p. 105.
39. 
“Zabeleska: Poziv iz Cilea”, AJ 117.
40. 
“Izvestaj o boravku delegata iz Cilea i Urugvaja“, AJ 117.
16 A. COSOVSCHI

41. “Kratak pregled saradnje Socijalistickog saveza radnog naroda Jugoslavije sa socijalistickim pokretima”, 1958 ;
“Neki konkretni podaci iz dosadasnjih odnosa SKJ i SSRNJ sa socijalistickim partijama“, 1959, AJ 142, F. 42,
151; “Zabeleska”, 1959, AJ 142. 40.17–19.
42. “Zabeleska o Victor Paz Estenssoro, bivsi Predsednik Bolivija”, 1959, AJ 142, F. 42, 125.
43. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, 95.
44. “Stenografske beleske”, 3 October 1959, Commission for International Relations of the CK SKJ and the SO
SSRNJ, AJ 142, F. 37.
45. Ibid., 110.
46. Ibid., 118–119.
47. Ibid., 100–101.
48. Ibid., 121–122.
49. “Stenografske beleske”, 7 November 1959, Commission for International Relations of the CK SKJ and the SO
SSRNJ, AJ 142, F. 37.
50. Ibid., 422–429.
51. Ibid., 422.
52. “Yugoslavia and the Non-U Countries”, CIA Reports, 1 June 1960.
53. “Latinoame
rica y el comunismo”, translation into Spanish, January 1961, Archive of the Argentine Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Eastern Europe Section, box AH 017.

54. Cehovin, Dusan, Ekonomski odnosi Jugoslavije sa inostransvom (Belgrado: Kultura, 1960).
55. “Yugoslav Trade With Developing Countries”, Yugoslav Survey. A Record of Facts and Information Yugoslav
Survey. A Record of Facts and Information, 4/1970, 57–58.
56. On the cultural Cold War, see among others Radina Vuceti
c, Koka-Kola Socijalizam: Amerikanizacija
Jugoslovenske Popularne Kulture Sezdesetih Godina XX Veka (Sluzbeni glasnik, 2012); Reinhold Wagnleitner,
Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World
War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Rupprecht, Soviet Internationalism after Stalin.
57. “Informacija o komisiji za kulturne veze s inostranstvom”, AJ 559, Fasc. 1. 1–3.
58. “Zakljucci sa sastanka grupe za koordinaciju informativno-propagandne i kulturne delatnosti u inostranstvu,
odrzanog 13. januara 1961 g. i na kome se diskutovalo o informativnoj problematici Latinske Amerike”, AJ 559,
F. 4–8.
59. “Kulturna saradnja sa zemljama Latinske Amerike”, 20 November 1961, AJ 559, Fasc. 4–8.
60. “Izvestaj o boravku u zemljama Latinske Amerike”, AJ 318. 241–343.
61. AJ 507, “Chile”, IX, 21 / II – 108.
62. Vanni Pettina, “Global Horizons: Mexico, the Third World, and the Non-Aligned Movement at the Time of the
1961 Belgrade Conference,” The International History Review, 38, no. 4 (2016), 741–64,; James G. Hershberg,
“‘High-Spirited Confusion’: Brazil, the 1961 Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference, and the Limits of an
‘Independent’ Foreign Policy during the High Cold War,” Cold War History 7, no. 3 (2007): 373–88.
63. “Material o Kubi”, AJ 507, “Cuba”, IX, 67 / 41.
64. “Nacrt govora”, AJ 507, “Chile”, IX, 21 / II – 108.
65. “Izvestaj”, AJ 507, “Chile”, IX, 21 / II – 108, 1–70.
66. Ibid, 38.
67. Ibid, 70.

Notes on contributor
Agustin Cosovschi is currently a Research Associate at the Centre d’
Etudes Turques, Ottomanes, Balkaniques et
Centrasiatiques in Paris and a Visiting Lecturer at the
Ecole Europ
eenne de Sciences Politiques et Sociales in Lille.
He holds a PhD in History from the
Ecole des Hautes
Etudes en Sciences Sociales in France and the University of
San Mart
ın in Argentina. His research deals primarily with political and intellectual history in the Yugoslav space.

Funding
€
This work was supported by the Osterreichische Austauschdienst-Gesellschaft under an Ernst Mach Grant.