Professional Documents
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REFERENCES
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science and technology during the twentieth century.2 The primitive Western
"hunter-gatherer" approach toward marine resources contrasts sharply with work
in China and the Philippines, which have developed renewable supplies of plants
and animals.
Historical review of the Asian maricultural revolution not only provides insight
into the roots of a revolutionary scientific and technological advance but also gives
other prospective ocean farmers a model on which to base future efforts to tap ocean
resources. In most Western nations, the attitude toward the ocean is not unlike that
toward the land that prevailed during the conquest of the terrestrial frontier. In the
United States, for example, the exploitation that led to the extinction of the passen-
ger pigeon, the American bison, and numerous other plant and animal species is
being repeated in the ocean with the misguided overharvesting of marine species,
including salmon, abalone, and sea urchins. In effect, the ocean frontier is similar
to the Western frontier at the turn of the century, when America began a hundred
years of uncontrolled consumption. The question remains whether people will learn
from the terrestrial experience and break the cycle before devastating yet another
frontier. Mariculture provides an alternative to the continuing slaughter of marine
organisms.
Marine algae are an important source of food in Asia, particularly in China and
Japan, where Laminaria or "haidai" and Porphyra or "nori" are harvested primarily
for human consumption. More recently, Porphyra has appeared on the world market
as a key ingredient in sushi and other dishes. In the Philippines, wild Eucheuma or
2 Stanley Meisler. "Harvest of Prosperity Bypasses Third World:' Los Angeles Times, 30 Aug.
1994, Sect H. p. 1.
''guso" was a source of food long before being harvested for its chemical content.
In California, wild beds of Macrocystis pyrifera or "giant kelp," the world's largest
marine alga and fastest-growing plant, were harvested for use as fertilizer and animal
feed and in the production of high-iodine kelp pills. During World War I, kelp from
California's beds was converted into acetone and potash for munitions production.
Today, beds of Macrocystis in California and Mexico are harvested as a source of
algin, an important chemical with many applications in the food, paper, and textile
industries. China's farmed Laminaria is also an important source of algin and com-
petes with the California wild crop. Agar and carrageenan are extracted from red
marine algae (Gelidium, Eucheuma, Kappaphycus, and Gracilaria), while algin
comes from brown marine algae (Laminaria, Macrocystis pyrifera). At present, Pa-
cific Rim nations are successfully cultivating marine plants for algin and carra-
geenan production. Eucheuma and Kappaphycus are the world's largest source of
carrageenan, an emulsifier used in ice cream, salad dressings, and numerous other
foods.4 Agar is still derived primarily from wild crops, as agar weeds such as Gel-
idium and Gracilaria are not farmed on a large scale.
History of science in the twentieth century, like science itself, is often inextricably
intertwined with policy issues, among them technology transfer, biodiversity, envi-
ronmentalism, and economic development. Scientists frequently become "political"
actors, venturing beyond the laboratory into the policy arena. This is eminently the
case in the maricultural development of East Asia. Strategies varied according to the
situation, but in every case the basic steps-solid science in the laboratory and
ocean, followed by pilot-scale experiments and eventual scaling up to commercial
production-can be discerned. These steps are particularly evident in China, where
ocean farming was a product of post-World War II science.
CHINA
Chinese marine farms are the largest and most productive in the world, thanks to
C. K. Tseng, who is primarily responsible for developing the science and technolo-
gies that provided the basis for large-scale macroalgal mariculture. Tseng was
trained as a marine botanist at Amoy and Lingnan universities in his native country
and then at the University of Michigan, where he completed his doctorate in phycol-
ogy. Tseng defended his dissertation in May 1942, five months after the attack on
Pearl Harbor, and remained in the United States for the duration of the war. He used
3 Peter Neushul, "Seaweed for War: California's World War I Kelp Industry," Technology and Cul-
ture, 1989, 30:561-583.
4 On the Chinese Laminaria crop see Richard A. Fralick and John H. Ryther, "Uses and Cultivation
of Seaweeds," Oceanus, 1976, 19:32-40. A selection of papers describing cultivation of marine algae
is found in Maxwell S. Doty, J. F Caddy, and Bernabe Santelices, eds., Case Studies of Seven Com-
mercial Seaweed Resources (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1987);
and Masao Ohno and Alan T. Critchley, eds., Seaweed Cultivation and Marine Ranching (Yokosuka:
Japan International Cooperation Agency, 1993). On carrageenan see "Carrageenan," Journal of Food
Science, 1973, 38:367-368. Carrageenan may also be extracted from the red algae Chondrus, Gigar-
tina, Irideae, and Hypnea. Of these, wild crops of Chondrus are the only ones harvested in significant
quantities. For a general discussion see Valentine J. Chapman and David J. Chapman, Seaweeds and
Their Uses (London: Chapman & Hall, 1980). Information on Japan that has been excluded from
this paper may be found in the above references and in our report to the Pacific Rim Program of the
University of California: Peter Neushul and Lawrence Badash, "Harvesting the Pacific: A Compara-
tive Study of Maricultural Policy in the U.S., China, Japan, and the Philippines" (1995).
I Tseng's dissertation was a study of the red algae of Hong Kong. Information about Tseng comes
from an interview with C. K. Tseng, conducted by Peter Neushul, Zuoyue Wang, and Lawrence
Badash, 9-11 Sept. 1994, Institute of Oceanology, Qingdao, China; and an interview with X. G. Fei,
conducted by Neushul, Wang, and Badash, 8 Sept. 1994, Institute of Oceanology, Qingdao.
6 On Tseng's early interest in cultivating marine plants see C. K. Tseng, Selected Works of C. K.
Tseng, Vol. 1 (Qingdao: Institute of Oceanology, 1994), p. 3. On his observations in Amoy see Tseng
interview, 9-11 Sept. 1994; and Tseng, "Gloiopeltis and the Other Economic Seaweeds of Amoy,
China," Lingnan Science Journal, 1933, 12:43-63. As a young man, Tseng actually changed his name
to "Ze Nong," meaning "to help the peasants," a practice that was not uncommon among students
who hoped to end China's battles with famine through the application of agricultural science.
I See C. K. Tseng and B. K. Sweeney, "Physiological Studies of Gelidium cartilagineum," Ameri-
can Journal of Botany, 1946, 33:706-715; and Elizabeth Noble Shor, Eighty Years: Scripps Institu-
tion of Oceanography: A Historical Overview, 1903-1983 (La Jolla, Calif.: Scripps Institution of
Oceanography, 1983), p. 127. On the prewar importation of agar see Harold J. Humm, "Agar-A
Pre-war Japanese Monopoly," Economic Botany, 1947-1948, 1:317-329.
8 On the shortage of Japanese agar during the war see "Vegetable Sea Food," Time, 27 July 1942,
40:46. Kelco, Inc., continued to grow in the postwar era but eventually replaced some of its algal
extract products with substitute materials such as xanthan gum. It was a private corporation until the
1980s, when Merck, Inc., purchased the company. In 1994 Merck sold Kelco to Monsanto. See Milt
Freudenheim, "Merck Is Selling a Chemical Unit for $1.08 Billion," New York Times, 21 Dec. 1994,
Sect. C, p. 4.
9 This is not the case when water temperatures are abnormally high, such as during storms gen
ated in El Nifio conditions. Maximum growth requires the upwelling of cold, clear, nutrient-rich
water. This optimizes light and nutrients, causing the marine algae to grow at a fantastic rate.
10 This research was undertaken by Michael Neushul, Jr. (the senior author's father), a phycolo
at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Neushul was a doctoral student at Scripps durin
the late 1950s and was familiar with Tseng's wartime research. Tseng's work was published only
Chinese and Russian during the 1950s and 1960s, so Neushul had his father, a Russian immigran
translate Tseng's papers in order to follow the progress of algal mariculture in China. For furth
details on his career see Raymond J. Lewis, "Michael Neushul (1933-1993)," in Prominent Phycol
gists of the Twentieth Century, ed. David J. Garbary and Michael J. Wynne (Hantsport, Nova Sco
Lancelot, 1996), pp. 217-225; and Daniel C. Reed, James N. Norris, and Michael S. Foster, "Dr.
Michael Neushul, Jr.," Botanica Marina, 1994, 37:287-292. Some results of the NSF-sponsored
study are described in Ricardo A. Melo, Bruce W. W. Harger, and Michael Neushul, "Gelidium Culti-
vation in the Sea," Hydrobiologia, 1991, 221:91-106.
11 Selected publications from this period include C. K. Tseng, "Agar: A Valuable Seaweed Product,"
Scientific Monthly, 1944, 58:24-32; Tseng, "Utilization of Seaweeds," ibid., 1944, 59:37-46; Tseng,
"A Seaweed Goes to War,' California Monthly, 1944, 52:35-46; Tseng, "America's Agar Industry,"
Food Industry, 1945, 17:140-141, 230-234, 356-358; Tseng, "Colloids from Kelp Give Rise to a
Unique Process Industry," Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering, 1945, 52:97-100; Tseng, "Sea-
weed Products and Their Uses in America," Chemurgic Digest, 1946, 5:141, 143-150; and Tseng,
"Seaweed Resources of North America and Their Uses," Econ. Bot., 1947, 1:69-79.
12 Tseng interview, 9-11 Sept. 1994. The Academica Sinica was formed in 1949. See Hans Kuhner,
"Between Autonomy and Planning: The Chinese Academy of Sciences in Transition," Minerva,
Spring 1984, 22:13-44.
13 Tseng interview, 9-11 Sept. 1994.
were given in land-based classrooms and in the ocean. The attendees were expected
to return home and train hundreds more in the techniques of farming Laminaria. 14
The Chinese government was particularly interested in Laminaria because of its
iodine content. Iodine was discovered by Bernard Courtois in 1811; he was leaching
ashes of marine algae for their potassium and sodium salt content. Shortly thereafter,
in 1820, Jean Coindet introduced the scientific use of iodine in the treatment of
goiter. The Chinese goal was to resolve the country's goiter problems by expanding
algal cultivation for human consumption. The Department of Fisheries had on its
staff several former military officers who approached the problem of scaling up
Laminaria farming as something of a military operation. Fortunately, the basic and
applied science had already been perfected by Tseng's research group, so the only
significant barrier to large-scale farming was education. Tseng encouraged his group
to maintain close contact with the fishermen engaged in farming Laminaria. X. G.
Fei, the institute's farming expert, befriended hundreds of fishermen who provided
him with a constant flow of data on the expanded farms. As a result, the institute
was able to expand its knowledge of scaled-up farms in different regions signifi-
cantly. Marine farming is one case where the much-maligned Great Leap Forward
policies actually worked. In an amazingly short time, an enormous new industry
was created through the large-scale application of scientific knowledge accumulated
by Tseng's research group at the Institute of Oceanology.15
Sadly for China, mariculture was the exception among the Great Leap programs.
Food shortages plagued China during the period, leading to what some historians
call a "Great Leap Backward" and causing one of the worst famines in history,
claiming an estimated twenty million lives.16 Tseng worked hard to keep his team
together during these difficult years. In 1962 the group produced a book on Lami-
naria cultivation, the first written on cultivation of a single species of algae. Tseng's
research efforts were constantly affected by the changing political climate. In swift
succession, the Anti-Rightist movement, the Fall Cleansing, and, finally, the Cultural
Revolution destroyed China's scientific infrastructure. Despite its contribution to
China, Tseng's institute was among the hardest hit by the anti-intellectual sentiment
that accompanied the Cultural Revolution.
In 1966, when the Cultural Revolution began, all research came to an abrupt halt.
Red Guards took over the institute and imprisoned Tseng, China's most prominent
marine scientist, in his laboratory. He was beaten, forced to work as a janitor, and
forbidden to read scientific journals or correspond with colleagues. The institute's
Red Guards included a contingent of young scientists and staff who were well aware
of Tseng's academic background; as a result, he was punished for attending a U.S.
college and for modeling the institute after Woods Hole and Scripps. Tseng was
14 The Academica Sinica rewarded the success with Larninaria with a prize of 40 yuan. X. G. Fei,
a member of Tseng's research group, noted that the prize was important to the future of Tseng's
program, despite the minuscule amount of cash that accompanied it: Fei interview, 8 Sept. 1994. On
the workshop see ibid.; and Tseng interview, 9-11 Sept. 1994.
15 Tseng interview, 9-11 Sept. 1994; and Fei interview, 8 Sept. 1994. On the discovery and early
use of iodine see George B. Kauffman, "Discoverer of Iodine Never Published a Paper, Industrial
Chemist, Sept. 1988, 9:20-21.
16 See Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 583. For
further discussion of scientists and the Great Leap see Lynn T. White, Policies of Chaos: The Organi
zational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press
1989), pp. 163-165.
criticized for a lack of patriotism because he had equipped his laboratories with
glassware and instruments from abroad. He was also condemned for his wartime
assistance to the U.S. military, which relied on his intimate knowledge of China's
islands and coastline in planning amphibious assaults against Japanese positions.
Fortunately, his assistant, though a member of the institute's Red Guards, remained
personally loyal to Tseng and preserved his scientific papers. Tseng's colleagues were
not always confined to the institute; at times they were transported to the country-
side, where they worked harvesting wheat or constructing railroad cars. One of the
most arduous tasks was digging a large air-raid shelter in the center of Qingdao, in
anticipation of a Russian nuclear attack. X. G. Fei, Tseng's farming specialist, was
denounced in the early 1960s for learning English in preparation for study abroad.
Shortly thereafter, he joined his mentor as a janitor at the institute.17 As the Cultural
Revolution waned during the early 1970s, Tseng and his coworkers were allowed to
resume their maricultural research. Tseng and Fei then led a successful initiative to
promote large-scale cultivation of Porphyra in China.
The development of Chinese mariculture fostered a new industry that today con-
tinues to diversify and refine its production and processing technologies. China's
network of farms is the world's most technologically advanced system for maricul-
ture. In 1983 and 1984, when California's kelp beds were decimated by El Nifio,
Kelco, the state's largest processor of marine algae, imported Tseng's Chinese Lami-
naria as raw material for its algin extraction process. China's success demonstrates
the enormous potential productivity of the ocean and highlights the importance of
the new marine frontier."8 The success with marine algae is equaled only by the
development of algal mariculture in the Philippines.
THE PHILIPPINES
17 On their lives during the Cultural Revolution see Tseng interview, 9-11 Sept. 1994; and Fei
interview, 8 Sept. 1994. By the 1990s, the immense tunnel dug as an air-raid shelter was converted
into a huge shopping mall, complete with a hotel, restaurants, and storefronts.
18 Interview with C. K. Tseng, conducted by Peter Neushul, 15 Aug. 1986, Goleta, California. See
also C. K. Tseng, "Farming and Ranching of the Sea in China," in The Future of Science in China
and the Third World, ed. A. M. Faruqui and M. H. A. Hassan (Singapore: World Scientific, 1990),
pp. 92-106; and Richard P. Suttmeier, "US-PRC Scientific Cooperation: An Assessment of the First
Two Years," China Exchange News, Mar. 1982, 10:1-9.
19 For information on the late Maxwell S. Doty see Angela S. Miller, "Researcher Gives Hope to
Developing Countries," Makai, Dec. 1993, 15:1-3; and Gerald T. Kraft, "Maxwell S. Doty, 1916-
1996," Phycologia, 1997, 36:82-90. On his first encounter with guso see interview with Maxwell S.
Doty, conducted by Peter Neushul, 22 Apr. 1994, Honolulu, Hawaii. Doty's notebook includes a
recipe for guso salad. "To prepare use 2 cups guso, 2 tomatoes, 1/4 cup vinegar, a little sugar, ginger,
one onion. Wash guso well, cut into small pieces, blanch for about 3 minutes. Meanwhile, mix vine-
gar, sugar and crushed ginger. Finally, mix blanched guso with dressing, and garnish with sliced
tomato and onion rings": Notebook 32, p. 25, Maxwell S. Doty Papers (in family possession), Hono-
lulu, Hawaii.
20 For details on the Irish moss industry see Ralph Surette, "Irish Moss: A Humble Seaweed Pr
vides the Magic Ingredient in Products We Eat and Use Every Day," Canadian Geographic, A
Sept. 1988-1989, 108:30-38. The term "phycocolloid" was coined by C. K. Tseng in "The Termi
ogy of Seaweed Colloids," Science, 1945, 101:597-602. On the uses of phycocolloids see lain C.
Neish, "Innovative Trends in the Marine Colloid Industry," in Pacific Seaweed Aquaculture-P
ceedings of a Symposium on Useful Algae, ed. Isabella A. Abbott, Michael S. Foster, and Louis
Eklund (La Jolla: California Sea Grant College Program, 1980).
21 Doty interview, 22 Apr. 1994. On Dawson see Paul C. Silva, "E. Yale Dawson," Phycologia,
Dec. 1967, 6:218-236. Dawson was an expert on algae of southern California and Mexico but also
conducted surveys in Cuba, Vietnam, the Marshall Islands, Palmyra Atoll, the Galapagos Islands,
Central America, Ecuador, and Peru. He drowned in 1966 while collecting marine algae near Hur-
ghada, on the Red Sea coast of Egypt. His work inspired a generation of American marine phycolo-
gists.
I On Doty's expenses and Anderson~s political problems see William Gentry log, Doty Papers.
Gentry headed Marine Colloids' operations in the Philippines throughout their early period of
involvement. His log covers the years 1968-1977. After leaving the Philippines, Anderson started
experimenting with cultivation of Eucheuma uncinatum in Mexico. On Doty's ties with Alvarez see
interview with Vicente Alvarez. conducted by Peter Neushul, Zuoyue Wang, and Lawrence Badash,
15 Sept. 1994. Quezon City, Philippines.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -
plants in the deeper lagoon continued to die, those at the edges of the nets survived.
The healthy plants grew on top of the reef flat, where the nets were attached for'
support. At this time Doty's team was utilizing only the open areas between the
reefs. He thought that his first surface experiments had demonstrated that the plants
did not thrive in shallow water, despite the obvious advantage of the increased light
and water motion, factors phycologists understood to be very important to algae
growth. Because of his initial failure, D~oty had ruled out the reef flats as a suitable
location for his lines or nets. But after observing the growth of healthy plants, he
made what he described as his "most major contribution" to the development of
Eucheuma farming and moved his farm onto the reef flat. The results were spectacu-
lar, marking the first major breakthrough in Eucheuma mariculture. Doty could
never explain scientifically why Eucheuma thrives on reef flats and not elsewhere.
His scientific expertise was complemented by the farming know-how of Alvarez,
who "implemented the things we dreamed up" and played a signfcant role in all
maor breakthroughs. Doty estimated that the development of a successful farming
system was achieved at a total cost of $1.5 mnillion.'* (See Figure 3.)
hn conjunction with his farm research, Doty began to differentiate between strains
of Eucheuma, comparing growth rates and evaluating seed stock potential. By 1969,
most of Dioty's research funding came from the National Oceanographic and Atmo-
spheric Administration's (NOAA) Hawaii Sea Grant program. Marine Colloids es-
tablished a separate experimental farm, although the company continued to provide
limited funding for Doty's University of Hawaii group.27 In retrospect, Sea Grant's
support for Doty's research was perhaps the most significant decision, in terms of
economic impact, that the agency has ever made toward development of large-
scale mariculture.
During the Sea Grant era, Doty and Alvarez domesticated another species of alga,
similar to Eucheuma, that was also a source of carrageenan. The new species was
discovered by Tambalang Bin Panggian, one of Alvarez's Badjao farmers. The Bad-
jao, or boat people, of Tawi Tawi were ideally suited for farming Eucheuma. The
Tawi Tawi Archipelago lies at the southwestern tip of the Philippines and is a short
boat ride away from Sabah, Malaysia. Sometimes referred to as the "sea gypsies of
Sulu," the Badjao spend their entire lives aboard narrow 20-foot boats known as
"vintas," sheltered from the elements only by low palm roofs. They are excellent
swimmers and fashion their own diving goggles using wood and pieces of glass.
Badjao believe that a prolonged stay on land will make them sick; if a storm arises
while they are ashore, they will immediately put to sea. Ocean farming offered an
alternative to the brutal regime of night fishing and daytime rest aboard their tiny
boats.28
Tambalang was collecting Eucheuma thalli somewhere between Subutu, Omacoy,
and Tunai in the Sulu region when he came across some black algae leaning against
giant eelgrass. He took two 7-inch branches home and tied them on monolines at
his farm. Two months later he harvested the alga and replanted the cuttings on ten
monolines. Three months after that he again harvested the alga and sold seed stock
cuttings (thalli) to farmers from Sitangkai and surrounding areas. The new "Tamba-
lang" strain grew twice as fast as the Eucheuma crop and reached an enormous size.
Tambalang's discovery soon spread throughout the Sulu Archipelago, as farmer after
farmer purchased cuttings for seed stock. Shortly thereafter, Alvarez obtained sam-
ples of the new marine alga and brought them to Doty for identification.9 (See
Figure 4.)
Doty recognized that Tambalang had found an entirely new genus and named the
new marine alga Kappaphycus alvarezii in honor of Alvarez. Following the develop-
ment of farming techniques and the discovery of Kappaphycus, the industry grew
at a rapid pace. In 1974 Doty reported that "the Eucheuma farms are going great:
over 100 of them are exporting over 500 tons of dry (25% moisture) weed per month
now!" In 1990 the Philippines' worldwide export revenue from carrageenan was
$50 million. By 1991 more than four hundred thousand Filipinos were farming Eu-
cheuma and Kappaphycus. In 1996 Philippine revenues from carrageenan exports
amounted to $124.3 million.30
27 Marine Colloids' farm was operated by Henry and Susan Parker. He describes their work in
Henry S. Parker, "The Culture of the Red Algal Genus Eucheuma in the Philippines," Aquaculture,
1974, 3:425-439; and Parker, "Seaweed Farming in the Sulu Sea," Oceans, 1976, 9(2):12-19.
28 Doty interview, 22 Apr. 1994. On the Badjao see Parker, "Seaweed Farming in the Sulu Sea."
29 Transcript of interview with Tambalang Bin Panggian, Doty Papers.
30 Maxwell S. Doty to Michael Neushul, 11 July 1974, Michael Neushul Papers, Scripps Institution
of Oceanography Archive, La Jolla, California. For the 1990 figures see George White, "Seaweed a
Godsend for Filipinos," Los Angeles Times, 9 Sept. 1991, Sect. D, p. 1; and Edward A. Gargan, "They
Plow the Waves for the Squire of Seaweed," New York Times, 5 June 1995, Sect. A, p. 4. For the 1996
figures see Robert Martin, "Carrageenan is RP's Winner Industry," Mindanao News Page, Nov. 1997.
This story appears on the World Wide Web at http://www.mindanao.com/1997news/1197news/
carageenan.html.
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On the lower Philippine prices see Gargan. "They Plow the Waves for the Squire of Seaweed"
On the McLean Deluxe see "McDonald's Tries Seaweed?" NewiJ York Times, 15 Nov. 1990. Sect. D.
p. 5: Laurie Peterson. 'Light as Seaweed and a Big Hit." Adweeeks Marketing Week- Apr. 1991. 18:12:
and Tina Adler. "Designer Fats." Science Vews, May 1994. 145:296-297.
For the critics' complaint see Rigoberto Tiglao. '"Seaweed Scare:' Far Eastern Economic Review
Jan. 1991. 151:50. The FDA decision is noted in White. "Seaweed a Godsend for Filipinos" (cit.
n. 30).
trips to Mecca for those who produced the largest crops of raw material. Once the
industry took off, the Marcos government pressured FMC officials for a share of the
profits. However, lacking control over the farms, Marcos was unable to control the
industry. Alvarez's success in establishing a vast network of farms is all the more
spectacular considering the dangerous environment in which he worked. Doty and
Alvarez employed former Philippine Navy captains, Tandiko Centi and Mariano
Conception, to navigate the pirate-ridden waters of the southern Philippines. Alvarez
recalled that he avoided many conflicts by using a fast boat equipped with deck-
mounted machine guns and plenty of ammunition. In a somewhat lawless environ-
ment, Eucheuma piracy was not unknown.33
From a policy standpoint, the Philippine success story demonstrates the potential
of NOAA's Sea Grant program. The Doty-Alvarez Eucheuma farming technique has
been successfully introduced in Micronesia, Tanzania, and other tropical countries.
Doty believed that marine agriculture was "one of the tools essential to the economic
independence of several nations" and noted that it did not require a significant in-
vestment: "$1.5 million is the ballpark figure for the research and development cost
of the farming used for Eucheuma which grosses about $60 million a year (1993)."34
In the Philippines, maricultural science created an international commercial industry
that changed the lives of more than a hundred thousand families. Yet despite re-
sounding success in Asia, maricultural technologies have yet to be effectively intro-
duced in the West, where corporations continue to rely on foreign supplies of carra-
geenan and agar.
Westerners have been slow to recognize the significance of the Asian blu
even during attempts to jump-start domestic ocean farming. During the 1990s the
United States has remained far behind its Pacific Rim counterparts in the cultivation
of both marine plants and animals. This disparity is hard to understand, given the
drastic decline of domestic fisheries and the increasing demand for seafood. The
U.S. Congress attempted to encourage mariculture by including an Aquaculture Im-
provement Act in the Food Security Act of 1985 but did not allocate sufficient funds
to promote any real development. In 1992 a report by the National Research Council
(NRC) confirmed that "U.S. per-capita fish consumption is going up even as virtu-
ally all the world's major fisheries are being stressed to-or beyond-sustainable
limits." The report recommended a $12 million program for R&D on "environmen-
tally sensitive, sustainable" technologies, creation of a high-level aquaculture office
in the Department of Agriculture, and revision of such laws as the Coastal Zone
Management Act to accommodate aquaculture.35 By 1994, however, a third of the
two hundred fisheries worldwide monitored by the United Nations Food and Agri-
culture Organization were either depleted or overfished. Forty percent of the individ-
ual species monitored by the United States were significantly depleted, while an
additional 42 percent were unable to produce "best catch" harvests. In response,
the United States imposed moratoria on some fisheries and started negotiating an
international agreement on high-seas fishing. Salmon fishing along the Pacific
Northwest coast was banned for 1994 in an effort to preserve fragile stocks. U.S.
commercial fishermen who traveled to Canada to harvest salmon met with opposi-
tion from Canadian officials concerned that too many fish were being prevented
from returning to spawning grounds in the rivers of British Columbia. Overfishing
left West Coast fishing fleets at a mere fraction of their former size. The canneries
they once served had closed during the late 1950s and 1960s, following the decline
in catches of sardines, anchovies, tuna, and mackerel.36
East Coast fishermen were even harder hit, as the seemingly limitless Grand
Banks were devastated by decades of overfishing and a climatic shift that cooled
local waters. During the 1960s the waters of New England yielded nearly 800,000
tons of groundfish (cod, haddock, flounder, and other bottom-dwelling species) ev-
ery year. By 1980 the annual harvest had dropped to 300,000 tons, and in 1994 it was
down to 100,000 tons. Haddock and flounder were fished to the point of commercial
extinction, leaving hundreds of fishermen unemployed. Some compared this oceanic
environmental disaster to the dust bowl of the 1930s.37
Concern over rapidly dwindling fisheries sparked a limited interest in fish maricul-
ture as a substitute for natural harvesting. However, though progress was made in
cultivation of freshwater catfish on land, the concept of ocean farming remained
foreign in North America. Incredibly, algal mariculture received virtually no atten-
tion, even though American corporations were the world's largest importers of raw
material for the production of marine colloids. The 1992 NRC report gave a brief
description of nori farming in Japan, describing the industry as "commercially inter-
esting," but largely ignored other potential crops.38 The only significant long-term
effort to promote large-scale farming of marine algae in the United States took place
after the energy crisis of the 1970s.
In the wake of the oil shortage, government and private agencies began funding
research on alternatives to fossil fuels. Among the projects was a $20 million marine
biomass program to develop a large Ocean Food and Energy Farm (OFEF) as a
source of raw material for generating methane and other products. The OFEF con-
cept was proposed in 1968 by the physicist Howard A. Wilcox, a consultant to Lyn-
don Johnson's Commission on Ocean Resources and program manager at the Office
of Naval Research's China Lake research center. Wilcox was a solar energy advocate
who perceived marine farming as a means for capturing vast quantities of energy.39
36 Emily Smith and William C. Symonds, "Not 'So Many Fish in the Sea,"' Business Week, 4 July
1994, pp. 62-63; "Salmon: Tight Fishing Limits Imposed," Los Angeles Times, 9 Apr. 1994, Sect. A,
p. 29; Bill Richards, "Storm at Sea: As Salmon Catch Falls, U.S. and Canada Slide into a Heated
Dispute," Wall Street Journal, 27 July 1994, Sect. A, p. 1; and David Ferrell, "Defiantly, They Still
Fish the Sea," Los Angeles Times, 26 Oct. 1995, Sect. A, p. 1.
37 Christopher B. Daly, "Fishermen Beached as Harvest Dries Up," Washington Post, 31 Mar. 1994
Sect. A, p. 3; Robert Holmes, "Biologists Sort the Lessons of Fisheries Collapse," Science, 27 May
1994, 264:1252-1253; and "Ebb Tide in the Grand Banks'" Business Week, 4 July 1994, p. 64.
38 National Research Council, Marine Aquaculture (cit. n. 35).
39 On efforts to find alternative fuels see, e.g., Michael Parrish, "A Second Wind for Turbines," Los
Angeles Times, 5 Feb. 1995, Sect. A, p. 1. See also interview with Howard Wilcox, conducted by
Peter Neushul, 5 Sept. 1985, San Diego, California. From 1944 to 1946 Wilcox worked on the atomic
bomb project at Los Alamos, New Mexico. Following the war, he continued his education at the
He knew nothing about marine algae and their uses, nor was he familiar with the
ongoing blue revolution in Asia.
Howard Wilcox's prospectus for farming the ocean assumed a 2 percent efficiency
for converting solar energy into plant material, a 5 percent efficiency for production
of human food, and a 50 percent efficiency for production of fuel and other product
If these numbers were correct, one square mile of sea surface would produce enough
food to feed three to five thousand people and enough energy to support more than
three hundred people at then-current U.S. per capita consumption levels. Wilcox
concluded that, by the year 2000, marine farms could cover 20 billion hectares of
ocean, supplying enough biomass to support the "total food, fuel, and chemical ma-
terial needs of roughly 20 billion people living at the consumption levels and charac-
teristics of the average U.S. citizen of 1970."40
Wilcox envisioned a farm superstructure consisting of a large, loose mesh of lines
suspended 160-320 feet beneath the ocean surface. The farm grid would be sup-
ported from the surface by buoys spaced throughout the structure and concentrated
on its perimeter. Marine algae would be attached to this grid. The farm structure
would not be anchored but would move with the predetermined circulating ocean
currents, allowing for periodic repair and harvesting when it came close to shore.4'
Wilcox's proposed setup differed significantly from existing Asian farms, which are
situated in coastal regions where marine algae grow naturally. He recruited Wheeler J.
North, a marine biologist and kelp expert at Caltech, to assist him in planting the
farms. The two met in 1972, when Wilcox attended North's alumni-day lecture on
California's marine resources. At first North thought the idea of ocean farming was
"a pretty wild concept," but he agreed there was a strong possibility that it could be
accomplished. North realized immediately that, although Wilcox asked numerous
intelligent questions, he had no familiarity whatsoever with marine algae. As a first
step in their collaboration, North agreed to conduct a preliminary survey of marine
plants to determine the best candidates for farming. The Caltech study concluded
that Macrocystis pyrifera, California giant kelp, was the best choice for farming off
the California coast.42
University of Chicago, where he received a Ph.D. in nuclear physics in 1948 as a student of Enrico
Fermi. Wilcox is the author of Hothouse Earth (New York: Praeger, 1975). Although he was the
major instigator of the marine farm concept, others also contributed. See Edward Hall, "The Ocean
Resource Challenge," in The Marine Plant Biomass of the Pacific Northwest Coast, ed. Robert W.
Krauss (Corvallis: Oregon State Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 357-376.
40 Howard A. Wilcox, "Prospects and Problems in Regard to Farming the Open Oceans," invited
paper presented at the 58th International Fair at Milan, Italy, 20 Apr. 1980, pp. 18-19 (copy provided
to Peter Neushul by the author).
41 Howard A. Wilcox, "Project Concept for Studying the Utilization of Solar Energy via the Marine
Bio-conversion Technique," proposal to the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California, 1 Oct.
1972 (unpublished report, copy in possession of Peter Neushul).
42 Interview with Wheeler J. North, conducted by Peter Neushul, 20 Jan. 1993, Corona del Mar,
California. The term "kelp" was first used in Scotland in the eighteenth century as a name for algae
ash. The word was later used to describe large brown algae generally. Today the name refers spe-
cifically to brown algae that are classified in the order Laminariales, since these plants produce
large blades, or lamina. All kelps consist of three basic parts: a rootlike holdfast, a stemlike stipe,
and either a single leaflike blade or multiple blades. The smaller, simpler kelps consist only of these
three basic parts, while the complex varieties, like the giant kelp, can form large branched hold-
fasts, basal branching systems, and many stipes and blades. Giant kelps, like Macrocystis, pro-
duce buoy-like gas-filled floats. The largest giant kelp found to date on the North American Pacific
Coast was 140 feet long. See Frank K. Cameron, W. C. Crandall, G. B. Rigg, and T. C. Frye, Potash
from Kelp, Report No. 100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Apr. 1915); and
Over the next six years, Wilcox obtained approximately $2 million in research
funds from the American Gas Association, the U.S. Navy, and the Energy Research
and Development Administration, predecessor of the Department of Energy. In
1972, while at China Lake, Wilcox submitted a plan for a 100-square-mile marine
farm and a land-based processing facility. Shortly thereafter, the Naval Undersea
Center in San Diego designated $50,000 in locally managed funds for the project
with the understanding that Wilcox would seek further funding from other sources.
Wilcox's plan envisioned large offshore Macrocystis farms that would be a source
of chemicals, fish, and energy.43
Unlike their near-shore Asian counterparts, open-ocean farms faced the serious
problem of plant nutrient supply. Surface waters are almost totally lacking in nutri-
ents. Supplies of nitrate and phosphate compounds needed for kelp growth were
plentiful at depths of 300-1,000 feet and could be made available to the plants if
they were pumped upward with wave- or wind-powered pumps, thereby producing
an artificial upwelling of cool, nutrient-rich deep water. Wilcox assumed that the
major questions confronting the OFEF concept were economic; he believed that the
technical feasibility of many of the processes required by his ocean farm had already
been established in other industries.44
Unbeknownst to him, many of these problems had already been addressed in
China. The Chinese, however, never considered anchoring their farm substrates in
the open ocean when coastal waters provided easy access to the crops. Nor were
they interested in cultivating marine algae as an alternate energy source when the
raw material could instead be used as food for people. Even in the United States,
the idea of using Macrocystis pyrifera as biomass for energy was impractical, as
industry could certainly use immense quantities for higher-valued chemicals, fertil-
izers, and animal feeds.
In 1974 three open-ocean farms were installed as a test of Wilcox's "artificial
bottom" theory. The first "floor" was moored 40 feet below the surface, off the north-
west tip of San Clemente Island, California. This was a 300,000-square-foot (about
7 acres) raft made of polypropylene ropes spaced 10 feet apart and cross-linked
every 50 feet. The farm was anchored to the ocean bottom with stainless steel cables
and concrete blocks. Floats were attached at intersections. The grid was planted with
150 giant kelp plants from nearby natural kelp beds. The plant holdfasts were
attached to the grid by "sewing their claw-like tendrils onto the mesh," a method
North developed while studying kelp bed reforestation techniques for the California
Department of Fish and Game. Later two smaller farms were installed, one near
Corona del Mar and the other off Catalina Island.45
Fertilizer Resources of the United States, 62nd Cong., 2nd sess., Apr. 1911, Senate Document 190,
App. K.
43 See Wilcox interview, 5 Sept. 1985; Wilcox, "Project Concept" (cit. n. 41); and Howard A.
Wilcox, "Marine Farm Project Description," proposal to the Naval Undersea Center, San Diego,
California, 17 May 1974 (copy in possession of Peter Neushul).
44 For the pumping suggestion see Howard A. Wilcox, "Prospects for Farming the Ocean," report
produced for the Naval Undersea Center, San Diego, California, 1976 (copy in possession of Peter
Neushul). Wilcox's artificial upwelling designs drew on the previous experience of engineers work-
ing on Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) technology. For further detail on the history of
OTEC see Walter E. Pittman, Jr., "Energy from the Oceans: George Claude's Magnificent Failure,"
Environmental Review, Spring 1982, 6:3-13.
45 Wheeler J. North and Howard A. Wilcox, "History, Status, and Future Prospects Regarding the
Experimental Seven-Acre Marine Farm at San Clemente Island," unpublished MS (copy in posses-
Our country is not served by the head-in-the-sand approach that this report exemplifies.
Dr. C. K. Tseng of the Peoples Republic of China will be visiting our laboratory this
Friday, and will no-doubt be very amused to learn that "in every respect open-ocean
farming of aquatic biomass does not merit further development." . . . Large scale (hun-
dreds of square miles) marine plant cultivation is now a fact, both in China and Japan,
and not something to speculate about.48
sion of Peter Neushul). For a final perspective see North, "Oceanic Farming of Macrocystis: The
Problems and Non-problems," in Seaweed Cultivation for Renewable Resources, ed. Kimon T. Bird
and Peter H. Benson (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1987), pp. 39-67.
46 For a detailed history of the U.S. marine biomass program see Peter Neushul, "Energy from
Marine Biomass: The Historical Record," in Seaweed Cultivation for Renewable Resources, ed. Bird
and Benson, pp. 1-37.
47 Michael Neushul and Bruce W. W. Harger, "Studies of Biomass Yield from a Near-Shore Macro-
algal Test Farm," Journal of Solar Energy Engineering, Feb. 1985, 107.93-96.
48 Michael Neushul to Robert D. Wildman, 21 Feb. 1978; and Michael Neushul to Roscoe F. Ward
20 Apr. 1978, Michael Neushul Papers. Ward repeated his criticism-quoted by Neushul-in
Neushul encouraged leaders of the marine biomass program to visit China, and
in 1981 a delegation of U.S. scientists and program managers went to Qingdao,
where they observed firsthand the Chinese method for farming Laminaria. They
also discussed future plans with Tseng and members of his research group. Shortly
thereafter, X. G. Fei visited Neushul in the United States, where he participated in
the installation of test farms using the Chinese "long-line" method of cultivation.
Unfortunately, knowledge of Chinese maricultural technology came too late to in-
fluence the marine biomass program, which was terminated in 1983. Despite the
failure of the U.S. deep-water farming program, Tseng did not discount the possibil-
ity of growing Laminaria for energy production, noting that "the human race must
make use of the vast ocean" and predicting that "a new era for the mariculture of
seaweed for biomass will definitely come sooner or later."49
CONCLUSION
Although marine farms are flourishing in Asian Pacific Rim nations, there are no
significant government "policies" that are readily transferable to the United States.
China is a Communist country where marine farming was a shining light in a techno-
logical initiative (the Great Leap Forward) otherwise renowned for its abject failure.
In the Philippines, the corrupt Marcos government had nothing to do with Eucheuma
farming and, in fact, had virtually no influence over the territory where the majority
of algae cultivation took place. To conclude, however, that these industries did not
emerge as a result of policies would be incorrect. Historical review reveals countless
successful policies implemented by the scientists, businessmen, and farmers whose
efforts led to the growth of "maribusiness" throughout Asia. At present there is no
significant literature generated by economists, sociologists, or political scientists
that discusses algae mariculture. We believe that understanding the history of this
industry is an important precursor to forming effective maricultural policies. Among
the wide range of policies implemented in China and the Philippines are several that
may be useful in the United States and other Pacific Rim nations.
Valuable lessons can be learned by retracing the steps of C. K. Tseng and Maxwell
Doty in their efforts to develop marine farming in China and the Philippines. Some
of their research and development policies could be duplicated elsewhere. For ex-
ample, Tseng decided not to focus solely on cultivation of domestic species but
instead chose Laminaria japonica as his primary seed stock. U.S. scientists have
attempted to duplicate the Chinese success using different seed stocks, such as Mac-
rocystis pyrifera and domestic strains of Laminaria, but they have been unable to
attain the same growth rates despite year-round growth conditions far better than
those in China. Tseng's experience suggests that there is no need to look further
for marine algae suited for cultivation. The Chinese have already demonstrated that
farmers using a robust seed stock, such as Laminariajaponica, can generate millions
of tons of harvestable product; this species should be a leading candidate for tests
in U.S. waters. So far, however, U.S. efforts have utilized only domestic species.
Stephen Budiansky, "The Great Kelp Controversy," Environmental Science and Technology, 1980,
14:1170-1171.
49 C. K. Tseng, "Some Remarks on the Kelp Cultivation Industry of China," in Seaweed Cu
for Renewable Resources, ed. Bird and Benson (cit. n. 45), pp. 147-155, on p. 153.
50 The French are already growing Japanese strains of Undaria off the coast of Brittany, where
demand for the brown alga increased when French chefs found they could use it in salads. Se
Deborah MacKenzie, "Seaweed Subsidy Menaces Europe's Marine Life," New Scientist, 25 Apr.
1992, 134:8.
51 Interview with X. G. Fei, conducted by Peter Neushul, 28 July 1995, Santa Barbara, Califo
52 Scott Sonner, "Scientists Warn of Overfishing, Development," San Gabriel Valley News, 7 J
1998, Sect. B, p. 6. This statement was made by Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), a memb
the House Science Committee.
farmed scallops at a fraction of the cost normally required to obtain the wild crop
in the United States. In contrast, urchins, the most significant new marine crop in
California, are gathered in the wild by divers and processed for sale in Asia. Unlike
Chinese scallop culture, where no diving is involved, the U.S. industry is labor inten-
sive and dependent on a dwindling wild crop. The natural population of urchins will
not sustain this industry for long. Urchin divers will undoubtedly join other hunter-
gatherers (such as commercial abalone and lobster fishermen) in the ranks of the
unemployed. The most logical solution is creation of a renewable, farmed source of
urchins-the maricultural alternative that other Pacific Rim nations have success-
fully pursued.
The market for marine algae as a source of algin, agar, and carrageenan has a
long history in the United States and could easily sustain a domestic algae-farming
industry. Furthermore, if animal mariculture were to succeed, renewable supplies of
algae would be required to support it. The fledgling California abalone farming in-
dustry has relied on kelp harvested from wild beds as the primary source of food for
the animals. If this industry scales up, competition with the existing alginates indus-
try will increase and the already-dwindling natural crop will be inadequate. Farmed
urchins will also require a renewable source of algae. In the Chinese and Filipino
experiences, a combination of research and development efforts led to the emer-
gence of large-scale mariculture. At present, maricultural research in the United
States is divided between NOAA (Sea Grant), the Department of Agriculture, and
the National Science Foundation. None of these agencies devotes a significant
amount of funding toward actual development of animal or algal mariculture. Those
funds that are allocated rarely support pilot-scale test farms. The Sea Grant program,
created in 1966, was supposed to emulate the enormously successful nineteenth-
century land grant program by fostering the development of mariculture at univer-
sities. So far, however, the scanty funding available has gone primarily to basic
scientific research and has not fostered any significant domestic maricultural de-
velopment. The lack of development in the United States is not due to any lack of
scientific understanding of marine ecosystems. Several Asian countries, most nota-
bly the Philippines, used American expertise to breach the ocean frontier and expand
the world market for cultivated marine produce. Yet despite a wealth of scientific
knowledge, algal mariculture is practically unknown in the United States.
Mariculture is a topic that is largely ignored by historians of science and technol-
ogy. Indeed, the much larger field of oceanography receives only desultory atten-
tion.53 The lack of scholarship makes the case of the Asian blue revolution difficult
to place within the context of Western-dominated historiography, especially given
the similar dearth of information on twentieth-century science in China and the Phil-
ippines. During the same period in which Tseng and Doty achieved their success in
Asia, Western agricultural scientists were rewarded for promulgating a green revolu-
53 There are no general histories of biological oceanography. For a history of plankton studies in
Europe and the United States see Eric L. Mills, Biological Oceanography: An Early History, 1870-
1960 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1989). For a general history of oceanography see Margaret
Deacon, Scientists and the Sea, 1650-1900 (London: Academic, 1971); and Susan Schlee, A History
of Oceanography: The Edge of an Unfamiliar World (London: Hale, 1973). Historians of oceanogra-
phy focus most often on the historic voyage of the HMS Challenger (1872-1876). For a new perspec-
tive on this noteworthy topic see Helen M. Rozwadowski, "Small World: Forging a Scientific Mari-
time Culture for Oceanography," Isis, 1996, 87:409-430.
tion that used plant genetics and crop improvement programs to help small farmers
in developing countries.54 The blue revolution led to the employment of hundreds
of thousands of farmers and the production of enormous cash crops, yet we know
virtually nothing about the combination of foreign and indigenous science and tech-
nology that contributed to this advance. The work of Tseng and Doty demonstrates
that maricultural science, like its terrestrial counterpart, involves extensive labora-
tory science and pilot-farm experimentation before commercial production becomes
a possibility. The catch, however, is that ocean farming takes place in an environment
that is much less conducive to human intervention. As evidenced by the failure of
ambitious American efforts to develop open-ocean food and energy farms, maricul-
ture is a challenging enterprise that requires a delicate balance of science and tech-
nology. For countries that have yet to introduce the practice of mariculture, the suc-
cessful Asian experience offers an alternative to the continued rape of irreplaceable
marine ecosystems.
54 The plant pathologist Norman Borlaug was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 for his work
in breeding the "miracle" wheat strains that greatly increased grain yields in Mexico and India.