Professional Documents
Culture Documents
P = a-bQ (ALl)
where: Q = qt +q2
The profit of Firm 1 will therefore equal:
d1t dP
-dq;t = P+-qt-C
dQ
=0 (Al.3)
which, with substitution from (A1.I), and noting that dP/ dQ = -b, gives:
a - Lbq; - bq2- C = 0 (AlA)
By rearrangement of this equation, the profit-maximising output for Firm I
becomes:
a-c 1
qt = ---q2
2b 2
(Al.S)
This gives Firm l's reaction function (that is, its most profitable output given the
output level chosen by Firm 2). Since Firm 2 is identical, its reaction function is
therefore:
262
Appendixes 263
.Q..=..£
3b
a-c
3b
Figure A1.t Coumot duopoly
q2 = -a-c
2b 2
t
- -qt (Al.6)
Market equilibrium is found by substituting (A1.6) into (A1.5) and solving for
qt. This gives qt = (a-c)/3b and a market output of 2(a-c)/3b. This
solution is represented graphically in Figure At.t
The reaction functions for both firms (Rtand R 2 ) cut the maximum point of
any particular isoprofit curvetx). (Note that the isoprofit curves with the
superscript 1 represent a higher level of profits than those with the superscript
2.) If Firm 1 produced zero output then Firm 2 would maximise profits by
selecting output M2 (the monopoly level of output). The Coumot solution is
depicted by point C where the reaction functions intersect.
The Coumot duopoly model can be extended to any number of firms in the
market and to allow for variations in their costs. The assumption of linear
market demand can also be relaxed. The profit for Firm i will therefore equal:
Differentiating gives:
(At.8)
264 Industrial Economics
But price elasticity of demand (e, which invariably takes a negative sign) is (dQI
dP). (PIQ) and q/Q is equal to the market share of the ith firm or Sj. Substituting
gives:
(Al.10)
P-Cj s,
- - = -- (Al.ll)
P £
Multiplying both sides by the market share S, and summing for all firms in the
market gives:
(PIS j - I.cjSj)
=-- (Al.12)
P £
(P-C m ) HHI
=--- (Al.l3)
P £
(With the value of e negative, the price-cost margin in this equation is positive.)
This shows that a profit-maximising firm's price-cost margin is determined by
structural variables, namely the number and size distribution of the firms in the
market (as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) and the price
elasticity of demand of the product. In contrast to the traditional SCP approach,
performance is not determined by market structure; rather structure and
performance are determined simultaneously.
The result derived in equation (A1.13) is contingent on the firms following the
Cournot behavioural assumption. This conduct assumption can be changed by
adopting different conjectures regarding the reactions of other firms to one
firm's change in its own output, i.e. dQldqjwill not equall. In this more general
case structure, conduct and performance are simultaneously determined.
~ ," ,
The Dorfman and Steiner
Condition for Optimal
Advertising Levels
Dorfman and Steiner (1954) show that, for a profit-maximising monopolist, the
optimal level of advertising expenditure is dependent upon price and advertising
elasticities:
A £0
PQ =-E" (A2.1)
n = PQ-CQ-A (Al.2)
where: Q = {(P, A)
Partially differentiating to find the price and advertising levels which maximise
profit gives the first-order conditions:
an aQ acaQ
ap = Q+ P ap - aQ ap = 0 (Al.3)
an = p oQ _ oCoQ_1 = 0 (AlA)
aA aA oQaA
From equation (A2.3), dividing by P (aQ/oP) gives:
Q oP < . (A2.5)
P aQ + 1 - PoQ - 0
This can be rearranged to give:
265
266 Industrial Economics
PdQ-de Q dP
(Al.6)
PdQ = -PdQ
and then:
de
(P--)
dQ Q dP
=-dQP (Al.7)
P
but:
dQ P
£=-- (Al.8)
Q dP
Substituting (Al.S) into (Al.7) gives:
de
(P- dQ) 1
---=-
P = --£ (Al.9)
This is the familiar result that profits are maximised when the price-cost margin
(Lerner index ) equals the reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand (e),
Equation (AlA) can be rearranged to give:
dQ _ 1
(Al.ll)
dA - P_ de
dQ
Multiplying by P gives:
de
(P-a-Q)
P
= --e1 (Al.l3)
therefore:
Appendixes 267
Pi)Q
- - =-£ (A2 .14)
i)A
(Al.15)
and rearranging. Since the expression for the advertising elasticity of demand is:
i)Q A
£ = -- (Al.16)
a Q i)A
A £a
PQ = -£ (Al.17)
Dorfman and Steiner assume that the effects of advertising are fully realised in
the current time period. Nerlove and Arrow (1962) modify the analysis to
recognise advertising's effects in both current and future time periods:
A £a
(Al.18)
PQ = £(r+d)
where: r =rate of discount
d =depreciation rate of the advertising capital
Adopting this approach, the longer-lived the effects of advertising, and the lower
the rate at which future earnings are discounted, the higher will be the optimal
advertising intensity.
• Appendix 3 •
Harbcrgcr's Method of
Estimating the Wclfare Effects
of Monopoly
From the geometry of Figure 5.1, the triangular area 3 (the deadweight welfare
loss, W) is equal to:
1
W = 2~P~Q (A3.1)
where ~P and~Q are respectively the discrete absolute differences in price (P)
and in output (Q) between perfect competition and monopoly.
Since arc price elasticity of demand (e) is defined as:
~Q P
e=-- (A3.2)
Q ~P
substituting for ~Q in (A3.2) from equation (A3.1) gives:
1 ~P
W = 2~PpQe (A3.3)
1 ~P 2
w= -(-)
2 P
PQe (A3.4)
268
• Appendix 4 •
Cowling and Mueller's Method
of Estimating the Welfare
Effects of Monopoly
Since total revenue (TR) is equal to selling price (P) multiplied by the quantity
sold (Q) or:
TR = PQ (A4.1)
marginal revenue is:
MR = dTR = P + Q dP (A4.2)
dQ dQ
Rearranging gives:
MR = P (1 + ~ ;~) (A4.3)
dQ P
E=-- (A4.4)
Q dP
Substituting (A4.4) into (A4.3) gives:
1
MR = P(1+-)
E
(A4.5)
1
MC=P(l+-) (A4.6)
E
which can be rearranged to give the Lerner condition (see also equation (A2.9)):
P-MC 1
--=--
P E
(A4.7)
Hence:
269
270 Industrial Economics
P
E = P-MC (A4.8)
I1Q P _ P
12 I1P -I1P
(A4.10)
I1Q =1 (A4.1l)
Q
This can be incorporated into equation (A3.1) in Appendix 3, which now
simplifies to:
1
W = 2l1PQ (A4.12)
7t = (P-C)Q (A4.13)
Where costs are constant, such that average cost (C) = MC, then:
7t = I1PQ (A4.14)
Cowling and Mueller's (1978) first measure of welfare loss becomes:
W = -7t2 (A4.15)
References
271
272 Industrial Economics
Jewkes, j., D. Sawers and R. Stillerman, The Sources of Invention, 2nd edn
(New York, W. W. Norton, 1969) .
jimenez, E., M. E. Lockheed and V. Paqueo, 'The Relative Efficiencyof Private
and Public Schools in Developing Countries', The World Bank Research
Observer, vol. 6 (1991) pp. 205-18.
johnson, P. S. (ed.), TheStructure ofBritish Industry (London: Granada, 1980).
jones, j. C. H. and L. Laudadio, 'The Empirical Basis of Canadian Antitrust
Policy: Resource Allocation and Welfare Losses in Canadian Industry',
Industrial Organisation Review, vol. 6 (1978) pp, 49-59.
jones, T. T. and T. A. j. Cockerill, Structure and Performance of Industries
(Oxford: Philip Allan, 1984).
jong, H. W. de, 'Sectoral Development and Sectoral Policies in the EC', in A. P.
jacquemin (ed.), European Industry: Public Policy and Corporate Strategy
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
KaJdor, N. and R. A. Silverman, Statistical Analysis ofAdvertising Expenditure
and Revenue ofthe Press (Cambridge: University Press, 1948).
Kamerschen, D., 'An Estimation of the "Welfare Losses" from Monopoly in the
American Economy', Western Economic Journal, vol. 4 (1966) pp. 221-36.
Kamien, M. I. and N. L. Schwartz, 'Market Structure and Innovation: A
Survey', journal of Economic Literature, vol. 13 (1975) pp. 1-37.
Kamien, M. I. and N. L. Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation
(Cambridge: University Press, 1982) .
Kay,j. A and D.]. Thompson, 'Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale',
Economic Journal, vol. 96 (1986) pp. 18-32.
Kay, N. M., The Emergent Firm (London: Macmillan, 1984).
Kay,N. M., 'Markets, FalseHierarchies and the Evolution of the Modern Firm',
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, vol. 17 (1992) pp. 315-
33.
Keating, B., 'An Update on Industries Ranked by Average Rates of Return',
AppliedEconomics, vol. 23 (1991) pp. 897-902.
Keeler, T. E., 'Airline Deregulation and Market Performance: The Economic
Basis for Regulatory reform and Lessons from the US Experience', in D.
Banister and K. j. Button (eds), Transport in a Free Market Economy
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).
Keown, C. F., N. E. Synodinos, L. W. jacobs and R. Worthley, 'Transnational
Advertising-to-sales Ratios: Do They Follow the Rules?', International
Journal ofAdvertising, vol. 8 (1989) pp. 375-82.
Kessides, I. N., 'Advertising, Sunk Costs and Barriers to Entry', Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 68 (1986) pp, 84:-95.
Kessides, I. N., 'Market Concentration, Contestability and Sunk Costs', Review
ofEconomics and Statistics, vol. 72 (1990) pp. 614-22.
Kessides, I. N., 'Entry and Market Contestability: The Evidence from the United
States', in P. A. Geroski and j. Schwalbach (eds), Entry and Market
Contestability (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
KiIlick, T., 'Employment in Foreign-owned Manufacturing Plants', British
Business, vol. 10 (1982) pp, 53~7.
Kim, M., 'The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, Revisited', Journal of Law
286 Industrial Economics
494.
Lieberman, M. B. and D. B. Montgomery, 'First-mover Advantages', Strategic
Management Journal, vol. 9 (1988) pp. 41-58.
Liebermann, Y. and A. Ayal, 'Retailer-Manufacturer Price and Profit
Relationships Along the Advertising Life Cycle: An Empirical Examination',
Management and Decision Economics, vol. 13 (1992) pp. 247-54.
Liebowitz, S. J., 'What Do Census Priee-Cost Margins Measure?', Journal of
Law and Economics, vol. 25 (1982) pp. 231-46.
Lindbeck, A., 'Industrial Policy as an Issue of the Economic Environment',
WorldEconomy, vol. 4 (1981) pp, 391-405.
Lindbeck, A., 'What is Wrong with the West European Economies?', World
Economy, vol. 8 (1985) pp. 153-70.
Lintner, J., 'The Valuation of Risk assets and the Selection of Risky Investments
in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets', ReviewofEconomicsand Statistics,
vol. 47 (1965) pp. 13-37.
Lipsey,R. G. and K. Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review
ofEconomicStudies, vol. 24 (1956) pp. 11-32.
Littlechild, S. C, 'Misleading Calculations of the Social Costs of Monopoly
Power', Economicjournal, vol. 91 (1981) pp. 348-63.
Littlechild, S. C, The Fallacy of the Mixed Economy, 2nd edn (London:
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1986a).
Littlechild, S. C, Economic Regulation of Privatised Water Authorities
(London: HMSO, 1986b).
Littlechild, S. C, 'Myths and Merger Policy', in J. A. Fairburn and J. A. Kay
(eds), Mergers and Merger Policy (Oxford: University Press, 1989) .
Low, P., Trading Free: The GAIT and US Trade Policy (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund Press, 1993).
Lucas, R. E., 'Adaptive Behaviour and Economic Theory', in R. M. Hogarth and
M. \v. Reder (eds), Rational Choice - The Contract Between Economics and
Psychology (Chicago, TIL: University Press, 1987).
Luders, R., 'The Successand failure of State-owned Enterprise Divestitures in a
Developing Country: The Case of Chile', Columbia Journal of World
Business, vol. 28 (1993) pp. 98-121.
Lustgarten,S., 'Gains and Losses from Concentration: a Comment', Journalof
Law and Economics, vol. 22 (1979) pp. 183-90.
Lynk, W.J., 'Information, Advertising and the Structure of the Market',Journal
of Business, vol. 54 (1981) pp. 271-303.
McAnneny, J. 'The Justice Department's Crusade Against Price-fixing:Initiative
or Reaction?', Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 36 (1991) pp. 521-42.
McChesney, F. 5., 'Antitrust and Regulation: Chicago's Contradictory Views',
CatoJournal, vol. 10 (1991) pp. 775-98.
McDonald, K. R., 'Why Privatization is Not Enough', Harvard Business
Review, vol. 71 (1993) pp. 49-59.
McGee, J. 5., 'Patent Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems',
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 9 (1966) pp. 135-162.
McKie, J. w., 'Market Structure and Function: Performance versus Behaviour',
in J. W. Markham and G. F. Papanek (eds), Industrial Organisation and
288 Industrial Economics
Economic Activities - SIC (92), Economic Trends, No. 468 (1992) pp. 165-
70.
Meisel, J. B., 'Entry, Multiple Brand Firms and Market Share Instability',
journal ofIndustrial Economics, vol. 29 (1981) pp, 375-84.
Meyer, R. A., 'Publicly Owned Versus Privately Owned Utilities: A Policy
Choice', Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 57 (1975) pp. 391-9.
Mill,J. S., Principles ofPolitical Economy, ed. W.J. Ashley (London: Longmans
Green, 1909).
Millward, R. and D. Parker, 'Public and Private Enterprise: Comparative
Behaviour and Relative Efficiency', in R. Millward, D. Parker, L. Rosenthal,
M. T. Sumner and N. Topham (eds), Public Sector Economics (London:
Longman, 1983).
Mises, L. von, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (Newhaven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1949).
Molyneux, R. and D. Thompson, 'Nationalised Industry Performance: Still
Third Rate?', Fiscal Studies, vol. 8 (1987) pp. 48-82.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Contraceptive Sheaths, HC135 1974-5
(London: HMSO, 1975).
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Cat and Dog Foods, HC447 1976-7
(London: HMSO, 1977).
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Insulated Electric Wires and Cables,
HC243 1978-9 (London: HMSO, 1979).
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The InnerLondon LetterPost, HC515
1979-80(London: HMSO, 1980).
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Contraceptive Sheaths, Cmnd 8689
(London: HMSO, 1982).
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Gas: A Report on the Existence or
Possible Existence ofa MonopolySituation in Relation to the Supplyin Great
Britain of Gas Through Pipes to Persons Other Than Tariff Customers,
Cmnd 500 (London:HMSO, 1988).
Monopolies and MergersCommission, Kingfisher picand Dixons Grouppic: A
Reporton the Proposed Merger, Cmnd 1079 (London: HMSO, 1990).
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Soluble Coffee, Cmnd 1459 (London:
HMSO, 1991).
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Gillette Company and Parker Pen
Holdings Ltd: A Report on the Proposed Merger, Cmnd 2221 (London:
HMSO, 1993a).
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Contact Lens Solutions: A Report on
the Supply Within the United Kingdom of Contact Lens Solutions, Cmnd
2243 (London: HMSO, 1993b).
Moore, B. C., J. Rhodes and P. Tyler, The Effect of Government Regional
Economic Policy (London: HMSO, 1986).
Moore, T. G., 'The Effectiveness of Regulation of Electric Utility Prices',
Southern Economic journal, vol. 36 (1970) pp. 365-75.
Moore, T. G., 'The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation', journal of Law and
Economics, vol. 21 (1978) pp. 327-43.
Moore, T. G., 'US Airline Deregulation: Its Effects on Passengers, Capital and
290 Industrial Economics
Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations, ed. E. Cannan (London: Methuen, 1961).
Smith, A. D., The Measurement and Interpretation ofService Output Changes
(London: National Economic Development Office, 1972).
Solow, R. M ., 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function',
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 39 (1957) pp . 312-20.
Sosnick, S. H., 'A Criticism of the Concepts of Workable Competition',
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 72 (1958) pp. 380-423.
Spence, A. M., 'Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing', Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science, vol. 8 (1977) pp. 534-44.
Steiner, R. L., 'Does Advertising Lower Consumer Prices?', Journal of
Marketing, vol. 37 (1973) pp. 19-27.
Steiner,R. L., 'Learning from the Past - Brand Advertising and the Great Bicycle
Craze of the 1890s', in S. E. Perrnut (ed.), 1978 Proceedings of the Annual
Conference of the American Academy of Advertising (Columbia: American
Academy of Advertising, 1978a).
Steiner, R. L., 'A Dual Stage Approach to the Effects of Brand Advertising on
Competition and Price', in J. F. Cady (ed.), Marketing and the Public Interest,
Report No. 78-105 (Cambridge, Mass.: Marketing Science Institute, 1978b).
Stevens, B. 'Prospects for Privatisation in OECD Countries', National
Westminster Bank Review, August (1992) pp. 2-21.
Stigler, G. J., 'The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger', Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 64 (1956) pp. 33-40. .
Stigler, G. J., 'The Economics of Information', Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 69 (1961) pp . 213-25.
Stigler, G. J., Capital and Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industries
(Princeton, NJ: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1963).
Stigler, G. J., 'A Theory of Oligopoly', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 72
(1964) pp. 44-61.
Stigler,G. J., Theory of Price, 3rd edn (New York: Macmillan, 1966) .
Stigler, G. J., The Organisation of Industry (Homewood, Ill.: R. D. Irwin,
1968).
Stigler,G. J., 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science, vol. 2 (1971) pp. 3-21.
Stigler,G. J., The Economist as Preacher (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982).
Stoneman, P., The Economic Analysis of Technological Change (Oxford:
University Press, 1983).
Stopford, J. M. and L. Turner, Britain and the Multinationals (Chichester:
Wiley, 1985).
Stout, D. K., 'Deindustrialisation and Industrial Policy', in F. Blackaby (ed.),
Deindustrialisation (London: Heinemann Educational, 1979).
Stout, D. K., 'The Case for Government Support of Rand D and Innovation',
in C. F. Carter (ed.), Industrial Policiesand Innovation (London: Heinemann,
1981).
Sullivan, T. G., 'The Cost of Capital and the Market Power of Firms', Review
ofEconomics and Statistics, vol. 60 (1978) pp. 209-17.
Sutherland, A., The Monopolies Commission in Action (Cambridge: University
Press, 1969).
296 Industrial Economics
World Trade and Investment and for us Trade and Labor; Report to the
Senate Committee on Finance (Washingtont DC: Government Printing Office,
1973).
Urton, M.A. t 'Domestic Concentration and International Trade', Oxford
Economic Papers, vol. 34 (1982) pp. 479-97.
Urton, M. A. and A. D. Morgan, Concentration and Foreign Trade (Cambridge:
University Press, 1983).
Veljanovskit c., 'Privatisation: Monopoly Money or Competition?', in C.
Veljanovski (ed.), Privatisation and Competition: A Market Prospectus
(London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1989).
Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis (Cambridge.
Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).
Vogel, E. F., Japan as Number One - Lessons for America (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1979).
Waelbroeck, J., 'The Logic of EC Commercial and Industrial Policy Making', in
A. P. Jacquemin (ed.), European Industry: Public Policy and Corporate
Strategy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
Wahlroos, B, 'Monopoly Welfare Losses under Uncertainty', Southern
Economic Journal, vol. 51 (1984) pp. 429-42.
Waterman, R. H. jnr and T. Peters, In Search of Excellence (New York: Harper
Collins, 1982).
Waterson t M., Economic Theory of the Industry (Cambridge: University Press,
1984).
Waterson, M. J., 'International Advertising Expenditure Statistics',
International Journal of Advertising, vol. 11 (1992) pp. 14-67.
Weir, C, 'Merger Policy and Competition: An Analysis of the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission's Decisions', Applied Economics, vol. 25 (1993) pp.
57-66.
Weiss, L. W., 'Factors in Changing Concentration', Review of Economics and
Statistics, vol. 45 (1963) pp, 70-7.
Weisst L. w., 'The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust', in H. J.
Goldschmidt H. M. Mann and J. F. Weston (eds), Industrial Concentration:
The New Learning (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1974).
Weiss, L. W. (ed.), Concentration and Price (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1989).
Weiss, 1. W., R. Geithman and H. Marvel, 'Concentration, Price and Critical
Concentration Ratios', Review.of Economics and Statistics, vol. 63 (1981)
pp.346-53.
Weiss, L. W. and G. A. Pascoe Jm; Adjusted Concentration Ratios in
Manufacturing 1972 and 1977 (Washingtont DC: Federal Trade Commission,
1986).
White t 1. J., 'What Has Been Happening to Aggregate Concentration in the
US?'tJournal of Industrial Economics, vol. 29 (1981) pp. 223-30.
White t P. J.t 'Bus Deregulation: A Welfare Balance Sheet', Journal of Transport
Economics and PoliCYt vol. 24 (1990) pp. 311-32.
Whitehead, C. (ed.), Reshaping the Nationalised Industries (Newbury: Policy
joumals, 1988).
298 Industrial Economics
White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, 'Report l' in Trade Regulations
ReportSupplement 10 No . 415 (1969).
Whittington, G., 'Changes in the Top 100 Quoted Finns, 1948-1968' Journal
of Industrial Economics, vol. 21 (1972) pp. 17-34.
Williamson, O. E., 'Managerial Discretion and Business Behaviour', American
Economic Review, vol. 53 (1963) pp, 1032-57.
Williamson, O. E., 'Economies as an Antitrust Defense:the Welfare Trade-offs',
American Economic Review, vol. 58 (1968) pp. 18-31.
Wl1liamson, O. E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975).
Williamson, O. E., 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In General and
with Respect to CAW, BellJournal ofEconomics, vol. 7 (1976) pp. 73-104.
Williamson, O. E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free
Press, 1985).
Williamson, O. E., Economic Organisation: Firms, Markets and Policy Control
(Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986).
Willig, R. D., 'Merger Analysis, Industrial Organisation Theory, and Merger
Guidelines', in M. N. Baily and C. Wmston (eds), Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1991 (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1991).
Willott, W. B., 'Industrial Innovation and the Role of Bodies like the National
Enterprise Board', in C. F. Carter (ed.), Industrial Policies and Innovation
(London: Heinemann, 1981).
Wittink, D. R., 'Advertising Increases Sensitivity to Price', Journal of
Advertising Research, vol. 17 (1977) pp. 39-42.
Worcester, D. A. lor, 'New Estimates of the Welfare Loss to Monopoly in the
United States 1956-1969', Southern Economic Journal, vol. 40 (1973) pp.
234-45.
World Bank, World Development Report 1986 (Oxford: University Press,
1986).
World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Oxford: University Press,
1991).
World Bank (Country Economics Division), Privatisation: The Lessons of
Experience (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992).
Yarrow, G., 'Does Ownership Matter?', in C. Veljanovski (ed.), Privatisation
and Competition: A Market Prospectus (London: Institute of Economic
Affairs, 1989).
Author Index
299
300 Author Index
304
Subject Index 305
40,42-3 90-2,104,269--0
relative measures 46-7 development of 87-8
trends 53-5 empirical evidence 88-103
market failure Harberger approach
and government intervention 88-90,268
145-8 natural 88,196-9,205-7
Coase's critique 139, 140, welfareeffeasof 84-95,105-7,
141-2, 143-4 139-40,196-7,268-70
common property rights 144 monopolypolicy see competition
externalities 142-4,154-5, policy
175,177,180-1 monopolypower see market power
monopoly 139-40,196-7 multinationals 240-2, 253-5
neoclassical explanations of
138-9, 140-1, 142-3, National Enterprise Board 155
144-8 nationalisation see state control
publicgoods 140-2,196 neoclassical models 15, 16-7, 19,
time preference rate differences 27-8,37, 39, 58, 104,
144-5 105,119-22
seealso industry policy neoclassical theory
market power and advertising 62
and advertising 70, 72, 73, and industry policy 148, 154
74,75 and innovation 112-13
and monopoly 83-5,88,89 and monopoly 84-98,196-7,
Austrian view of 105,106 205
emprical evidence of 95-103 assumptions of 4-5, 6
identification of 15-16,39,51, developments in 5-6
55,84,90,95 in industrialeconomics 2, 4,
market structure 259
and advertising 67-9 neutral export assumption 52
and innovation 131-5 new industrialeconomics 5
changesin 27 new industrialorganisation 4,5,
characteristics 19-22 19,21,262-4
defined 14, 18 new institutional economics 7-9,
determinants 17-18 29,58,112,113-16,122,
merit goods 195-6 148,206,259-60,261
Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MfTI) 151-2 open competition 30
mobility barriers 36 opportunism 34
Monopoliesand Mergers organisationalslack 90
Commission 83, 84, 166,
171,173,203,226 parents 21,110,181-2,184,240
monopoly perfectinformation 5, 15,33,34,
and market power 83 37,62,104,112,113,141,
Austrian view of 104-7 143, 144, 149
Chicagoview of 86-7,95-6, performance 15-16,17,18,19,23,
99-100, 104 28,29,35,57,204
Cowlingand Muellerapproach price-cost margin see Lerner index
308 Subiea Index
uncertainty 8,9,10,28,29,31,34,
58,112,113,139,152,181 X-inefficiency 90,93,215