SPE 128347
IMPROVING THE RELIABILITY OF SUBSEA VALVES
Saidu Mamman, Subsea 7 Arnhall Business Park, Westhill Aberdeen; Jesse A Andrawus and Ibiye Iyalla,
SPE, the Robert Gordon University, a Scottish Charity, registration number SCO 13781, Schoolhill Aberdeen,
AB10 1FR, UK
Copyright 2009, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.
This paper was prepared for presentation at the 33rd Annual SPE International
Technical Conference and Exhibition in Abuja, Nigeria, August 3-5, 2009.
This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE Program Committee following
review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents
of the paper, as presented, have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum
Engineers and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material, as
presented, does not necessarily reflect any position of the Society of Petroleum
Engineers, its officers, or members. Papers presented at SPE meetings are subject
to publication review by Editorial Committees of the Society of Petroleum Engineers.
Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper for
commercial purposes without the written consent of the Society of Petroleum
Engineers is prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract
of not more than 300 words; illustrations may not be copied. The abstract must
contain conspicuous acknowledgement of where and by whom the paper was
presented. Write Librarian, SPE, P.O. Box 833836, Richardson, TX 75083-3836,
U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435.
Abstract
Subsea valves are critical component used for the
control of fluid flow in sub-sea Oil & Gas (O&G)
production equipment. Subsea Valves are
susceptible to early-life failure and, are
increasingly utilised in production equipment due
to the current deep water exploration of O&G. The
reliability of valves is indispensable to the
availability of sub-sea production equipment.
Failure of subsea valves can have significant
financial, environmental, health and safety
consequences. Failure Mode and Effect Criticality
Analysis (FMECA) is a technique that permits
evaluation of assets functions to predict critical
failure modes and the resultant consequences in
order to determine appropriate maintenance tasks
for the assets. In this paper, the technique of
FMECA is used to assess the failure
characteristics of sub-sea valves. Common and
dominant failure modes of the valves are
identified. The failure consequences are
calculated in financial terms by taking into account
production losses, intervention cost, repair and
environmental cleaning costs. Failure Elimination
and Prevention Strategy (FEPS) is designed to
prevent early-life failures and improve the overall
reliability of subsea valves.
Introduction
The need to satisfy increasing demand for
hydrocarbons as well as the need to offset the
increasing depletion rate of hydrocarbons has
caused operators to move into deeper waters to
explore oil and gas reserves. The exploitation of
oil and gas in deep water has led to the
development of sea-bed mounted equipment for a
total subsea completion. One of such equipments
is the wet Christmas tree. Wet Christmas tree also
known as production tree is an assembly of valves
used for the control of fluids or injection of
chemicals, water or gas from or into a reservoir.
Thus, subsea valves are critical equipment used
for the control of flow in subsea oil and gas
production equipment. Christmas tree is usually
located on the wellhead and is the primary fluid
flow control system for subsea completed fields [1,
2 and 3]. The reliability of the valves is
indispensable to the availability of the sub-sea
production equipment. One of the major
challenges currently facing the offshore oil and
gas industry is early-life failures of subsea oil and
gas production equipment [4]. Christmas trees are
susceptible to early-life failure. This can have
negative impact on the production field economics
with significant financial, environmental, health
and safety consequences.
Fundamentally, there are three failure patterns
that describe failure characteristics of mechanical
systems [5]. These include reducing, constant and
increasing failures as illustrated in Figure 1. The
figure displays a curve usually referred to as a
hazard rate curve or most commonly a bath-tub
curve. The reducing failure pattern usually known
as the infant mortality denotes failures that occur
at the early-life of equipment and the likelihood of
occurrence reduces as the age of the equipment
increases. The constant failure pattern represents
failures that are independent of equipment age,
that is, the likelihood of occurrence is invariable
through out the life-cycle of the equipment. Lastly,
2 S. Mamman, J.A. Andrawus and I. Iyalla
the increasing failure pattern commonly referred to
as wear-out symbolises failures that occur at the
later life of equipment, that is, the likelihood of
occurrence increases with the age of the
equipment. The reader is referred to [6] for a more
detailed study on types of failure pattern.
Reducing Constant Increasing
H azard rate
Equipment life
Figure 1: A bath-tub curve showing failure
patterns
This paper assess the failure characteristics of wet
Christmas trees. It analyses common and
dominant failures modes of valves using the failure
mode and effect criticality technique. Identifying
and eliminating root causes of failures are
fundamental to improving the overall reliability of
production trees.
Overview of wet christmas tree
There are two types of Christmas trees used for
subsea field development; conventional and
horizontal trees. The main difference between
these Christmas trees is the layout of the valves
and the control modules [1,3]. The conventional
tree consists of a monolithic central valve block
which is machined to hold the entire primary valve
for flow control. The configuration of the
conventional tree comprises four primary valves
on the main production flow line and three on the
annulus access line. To shutdown a well, the wing
valve is first closed, then the upper and lower
master valves and, finally the subsurface valve.
The lower master valve is generally manually
operated while the other valves are hydraulically
operated. These valves are used for well shutting
only and are not used to control or regulate the
flow of production fluid. The regulation and control
of fluid is performed by a choke valve located
further downstream of the wing valve [3].
The horizontal or spool tree has the primary flow
control valves arranged horizontally as opposed to
SPE 128347
the vertical arrangement in the conventional tree.
Basically, horizontal or conventional Christmas
trees consist of the following valves. Upper and
lower master valves (UMV & LMV) to provide
access to bore for wire-line intervention and
chemical injection. They also serve as primary
safety barriers for the Christmas tree. Wing valves
(WV) which are used for shut-in operations.
Crossover valves (XOV) are linked between the
wing valves to enable the well to be killed from the
annulus bore in the case of a kick. Choke valves
to regulate and control the flow of production fluids
[2,3].
Figure 2 shows the components of a typical valve.
The body is the main element that holds together
all the components of the valve. The body is the
first pressure boundary to resist fluid pressure
loads from the connecting piping [7]. The bonnet is
the second pressure boundary; it provides cover
to the opening of the valve [8]. The valve trim is
the internal part of the valve which includes the
valve disk, seat, and stem [7-8].The disk is the
third primary pressure boundary for valve types
that have bonnets. The disk is the main
components of the valve which provides the
capability for permitting and prohibiting fluid flow.
The seat or the seal rings provide the seating
surface for the disk. It is required that the surface
of the seating area is finished fine to provide a
good sealing [7-8]. The stem connects the
actuator to the disk and positions the disk. In most
cases the stem is not a pressure boundary part.
Valve designs that require stem parking or sealing
to prevent leakage need a fine surface finish of the
stem in the area of the seal [7-8]. The valve
parking prevents leakage from the space between
the stem and the valve bonnet. Parking is
commonly made of fibrous material or similar
compounds [9]. Failure of the parking to provide
the required sealing will result in loss of fluid and
corrosion damage to the stem [10]. The actuator
controls the disk and therefore regulates the fluid
flow. There are two types of actuators; manually
operated actuators and the automatically operated
actuators. The former is operated by the use of a
hand wheel while the latter is controlled via electric
motors, pneumatics, hydraulics, or electro
hydraulics. Subsea valves are usually hydraulically
operated [11].
3 Improving the Reliability of Subsea Valves
Figure 2: Basic Parts of Valve [12]
Subsea valves consist of components which
perform different functions and are made of
different materials, therefore, the reliability of the
valve depends on those of its individual
components. Hence, to improve the reliability and
reduce risks associated with failure, it is important
to assess the failure characteristics of the valves
to identify possible failure modes [1].
Failure Characteristics of Subsea Valves
National Engineering Laboratory [NEL] carried out
an assessment of valve failures in the offshore oil
and gas sector of the North Sea. About 2191
valves failed between 1993 and 2001 [4,13].
Similar work was carried out by [4,13], failure data
of subsea valves were collected from operators
and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) data
base. The data were analysed to determine the
underlying causes of failure of the valves. The
result of the analysis reveals that about 50% of the
assessed failure data were early-life failures
caused by design fault. Conversely, incorrect
installation, change in operating conditions,
incorrect specification, inappropriate operating
procedures, etc caused the remaining 50% of
failures [4,13]. Unfortunately, not much effort has
been made to study the ways through which (the
above mentioned) faults find their way into subsea
systems and equipments. To date, there have not
been many practices and procedures provided,
that would completely eradicate these faults. Thus,
a need exits to assess the failure characteristics of
subsea valves to identify potential failure and
suggest design modifications, procedures and
SPE 128347
practices which will prevent or reduce the
likelihood failures.
Failure Mode and Effect Criticality
Analysis
Failure Mode and Effect Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) is a technique that permits evaluation of
assets functions to predict critical failure modes
and the resultant consequences in order to
determine appropriate maintenance tasks for the
assets. The process of FMECA involves asking
and building upon first four of the seven basic
questions of the Reliability Centred Maintenance
(RCM) [6] in the sequence shown below:
• What are the functions and associated
desired standards of performance of the
asset in its present operating context
(functions)?
• In what ways can it fail to fulfil its functions
(functional failures)?
• What causes each functional failure
(failure modes)?
• What happens when each failure occurs
(failure effects)?
These questions identify ways in which a Wet
Christmas tree already in operation can fail to
perform its design intentions and the resultant
effects on the components and systems of the
production tree. Critical failure modes and
subsystems are identified to calculate failure
consequences of a Wet Christmas tree by taking
into account cost of material, labour, down time
cost and anticipated profit.
Function of a Christmas tree. The primary
function of a Christmas tree is to control the flow of
fluid (oil, chemical, water, etc) and gas from and
into an oil production well. The valves are used to
start and stop production flow, vary the volume of
flow, control direction of flow and, regulate
pressure of flow. The primary function is solely
considered to minimise complexity in the FMECA
analysis.
Functional Failure of a Wet Christmas tree.
Two functional failures are defined in view of the
primary function stated above; these include (i)
complete loss of flow control capability and (ii)
partial loss of flow control capability. These were
identified to cover all potential failure modes of the
Wet Christmas tree. Table 1 shows the logical
links between function, functional failure and,
failure modes of a Wet Christmas tree. A valve is
4 S. Mamman, J.A. Andrawus and I. Iyalla SPE 128347

said to have failed at the instant it stops to perform Table 2 shows further sequential breakdown of
its required function. Because of the operational one of the failure modes enumerated in Table 1.
environment of Wet Christmas tree, valve failures Consider as an example the failure mode CT-1-1
can occur either sudden or gradual. The latter type (Upper Master Valve fail to close on command) in
of failures requires comparison of the valves Table 1. The failure mode is logically analysed in
performance and its specification. This task could series of layers (failure mode 2 and 3) as shown in
be difficult as it may not be possible to measure Table 2. Note that the failure mode 3 can be
some certain parameters when the valves are in further assessed to identify the root causes. It is
operation [2]. Some common failure modes of worth noting however that root cause analysis is
complete loss of flow control capability are beyond the scope of this paper.
enumerated in the Table 1. For example, actuator
system failure (CT-1-16) due to spring breakage Table 2 Failure Modes for a Wet Christmas
may result in the jamming of the valve gate. Tree
Leakage of valve in the closed position (CT-2-1)
due to erosion in the sealing is an example of a Failure Mode 1 Failure Mode 2 Failure Mode 3
partial failure. This occurs gradually over time
before it escalates to complete failure. Sudden CT-1-1 Upper Master Valve CT-1-1-1 Actuation system failed CT-1-1-1-1 Hydraulic system failure
failure usually occurs without warning and can fail to close on command CT-1-1-1-2 Electrical system failure
CT-1-1-1-3 Design fault
cause complete loss of function with significant
financial, environmental, health and safety CT-1-1-2 Control system failed CT-1-1-2-1 Software failure
consequences. CT-1-1-2-2 Design fault
CT-1-1-2-3 Electrical system failure

CT-1-1-3 Debris CT-1-1-3-1 Sand

Table 1 Functional Failure and Failure Modes CT-1-1-3-2 Pitting corrosion particles
for a Wet Christmas Tree CT-1-1-3-3 Tools left in by
CT-1-1-3-4 Loose chips

Function Functional failure Failure modes
To control CT-1 Complete loss CT-1-1 Upper Master Valve fail to close on command
flow of fluid of flow control CT-1-2 Upper Master Valve fail to open on command
CT-1-3 Premature closure of Upper Master Valve
CT-1-4 Lower Master Valve fail to close on command
CT-1-5 Lower Master Valve fail to open on command
CT-1-6 Premature closure of lower master valve
CT-1-7 Wing Valve fail to close on command
CT-1-8 Wing Valve fail to open on command
CT-1-9 Premature closure of wing valve
CT-1-10 Cross Over Valve fail to close on command
CT-1-11 Cross Over Valve fail to open on command
CT-1-12 Premature closure of cross over valve
CT-1-13 Choke Valve fail to close on command
CT-1-14 Choke Valve fail to open on command
CT-1-15 Premature closure of choke valve
CT-1-16 Actuation system failure
CT-1-17 Control system failure
CT-2 Partial loss of CT-2-1 Leakage through the valve in closed position
flow control CT-2-2 Valve leakage to the environment
CT-2-3 Valve partially open or closed
CT-2-4 Faulty indication
CT-2-5 Delayed operation
CT-1-1-4 Corrosion CT-1-1-4-1 Inadequate maintenance
CT-1-1-4-2 Wear and tear
CT-1-1-4-3 Production fluid
CT-1-1-5 Human error CT-1-1-5-1 Wrong specification
CT-1-1-5-2 Installation error
CT-1-1-5-3 Inexperienced personnel
Failure Consequences for a Wet Christmas
Tree.
Consider a failure of a production master valve
(PMV) of a wet Christmas tree in a well producing
10,000 bopd. Assume the cost of the PMV is
about US$9,800. Removing the failed PMV and
installing a new one will require 6 divers to work
for 18 hours. A diving support vessel (DSV) will be
required to carry out the replacement of the PMV.
The lead time to hire a DSV is about 14 days (2
weeks). It will take a day to mobilize the DSV and
a day to demobilize. The cost of hiring the DSV
per day is about US$150,000. The current price of
crude oil is about US$52 per barrel. Thus, the
cost of intervention and repair is the product of the
cost of hiring the DSV per hour and the repair
period (i.e. the sum of mob, demob & repair time).
This result in about US$412,500. The cost of down
time is the product of production rate per hour, the
downtime (i.e. the sum of the lead time to hire
DSV, mob, demob & repair time) and the cost of
crude oil per barrel. This result in about
5 Improving the Reliability of Subsea Valves SPE 128347

US$8,710,000. Hence, the consequence of failure Failure elimination and prevention strategy for
of the PMV is the sum of the cost of material Christmas production tree is in this research work
(US$9,800), the cost of intervention and repair divided into two phases; these includes (i) design
(US$412,500) and, the downtime cost and manufacturing phase and, (ii) operation and
(US$8,710,000). This result in about maintenance phase.
US$9,132,300 failure consequences. Indeed, the
crude oil price per barrel has been fluctuation Design and Manufacturing phase. This phase
between US$34 and US$140 for the past 12 primarily deals with design faults which are
months. Figure 3 shows the effect of crude oil responsible for early-life failure. Sharp corners
price per barrel on the downtime cost. The should be avoided in the design of valves. This is
downtime costs at US$34, US$90 and US$140 to prevent stress concentrations which can be
per barrel are about US$5,695,000, developed during manufacturing. Complex shapes
US$15,075,000 and US$23,450,000 respectively. which may cause non-uniform heat treatment of
materials during manufacturing should be avoided.
Down time cost
Design reviews should be carried out by
25000000
manufacturers to verify design completeness of all
aspects of valve design and manufacturing. A
20000000 functional prototype of the valve must be built and
subjected to Highly Accelerated Stress Testing
US Dollars

15000000
(HALT) to precipitate latent faults. Design
10000000 Verification Testing (DVT) should be carried out
Down time cost before mass production of valves. Design data
5000000
and information should be collated, reviewed and
0
stored electronically. It should be made
compulsory for valve designers to review previous
34
40
52
63
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
110
120
130
140

Cost of Crude Oil/ Barrel (USD) designs and the lessons learnt be incorporated
into new designs.
Figure 3: Down time cost at varying crude oil price Computer-aided manufacturing selection process
should be used to select the best and most cost
Figure 4 shows the effect of crude oil price per effective process. Raw material for the
barrel on the consequences of failure. The manufacturing of valves should be inspected for
consequences of failure at US$40, US$95 and defects before they go into manufacturing. A
US$140 per barrel are about US$7,122,300, continuous in-process control and assessment
US$16,334,800 and US$23,872,300 respectively. with a high burn-in should be performed during the
The erratic crude oil price significantly affects the manufacture of valves. The valve components
consequences of failure must be subjected to Highly Accelerated Stress
Screening (HASS). The valves must be subjected
Failure consequences to Proof of Screen (POS) testing to detect faults
30000000 introduced by the HASS testing process. Valve
25000000
components must be stress relieved after casting,
forging and welding. Welded joints of valve
20000000
components must be inspected for inclusions and
US Dollars

15000000 other welding defects.

10000000
Consequence of failure Operation and Maintenance phase. Collating
5000000
and storing the operating and maintenance data is
0 crucial to failure prevention and elimination
34
40
52
63
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
110
120
130
140

strategy. Improving the reliability, availability and

Cost of crude oil/barrel (USD)
maintainability of Wet Christmas tree will depend
on the availability of useful historical failure and
Figure 4: Failure consequences at varying crude maintenance data. It is imperative therefore to
oil price have a comprehensive inventory of all valves
within a Wet Christmas tree in an integrated asset
register and data management system. The
Failure Elimination and Prevention system should be robust to accommodate
Strategy sequential recording of maintenance and failure
 6 S. Mamman, J.A. Andrawus and I. Iyalla SPE 128347

data in an RCM format. This will keep the

maintenance track record of each valve within the
Wet Christmas tree in a meaningful format that
can be used for optimisation processes and for an
informed decision making process. Figure 5: Failure elimination and prevention
model
Figure 5 shows failure prevention and elimination The personnel ensures effective operation and
model at the O&M phase. Effective management maintenance (O&M) of Wet Christmas tree to
of Wet Christmas tree will require the formulation achieve the expected level of performance. Figure
of asset-based business objectives. The 6 shows a model to improve the competencies of
objectives will include effective management of O&M workforce. The quest for excellent
Health, Safety & Environmental (HSE) factors; performance revolves around competent
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) workforce with the right people on the right jobs,
improvements; minimising the Whole Life-Cycle having a manageable work backlogs and zero
Costs (WLCC); and failure elimination. Desirable human error. Achieving this level of excellence will
and achievable targets should be set to reflect the require an effective training and communication
expected level of performance. Suitable strategies scheme, clear work procedures, team work and
for achieving the objectives should be determined effective shift and reward systems. The
by using appropriate Asset Management tools and performance of individuals should be evaluated
techniques such as the Reliability-Centred periodically to identify training needs for the
Maintenance (RCM), Asset Life Cycle Analysis purposes of continuous staff development.
(ALCA) technique to determine appropriate
maintenance strategies for Wet Christmas tree. Start Workforce
Appropriate Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and
the measurement systems should be designed to Define business objectives
align the maintenance activities and the overall
ƒ Right people on right jobs
strategic business values. Actual performance ƒ Achieve competency
should be evaluated periodically and checked
against intended targets. This will provide a Set target
baseline for maintenance optimisation to achieve ƒ Human error= 0%
ƒ Minimum work backlog
the best combination of costs, risks and
performances. Gaps and opportunities should be
identified continuously and appropriate strategies Establish strategies

to harvest the benefits should be determined and ƒ Effective training &

communication scheme
implemented. ƒ Clear work procedures
Evaluate performance Performance Yes ƒ Team work
A Christmas (production) tree periodically according to ƒ Effective shift & reward
targets? system

Set Performance No Evaluate performance

Define asset business Measurement for KPI periodically
objectives Optimise strategies
ƒ Availability= MTBF
ƒ Improve reliability of MTBF + MTTR + PM Use
valves ƒ Reliability= MTTF ƒ Delay-time mathematical No Performance
ƒ Improve availability of MTTF + MTTR model according to
Christmas tree ƒ No of injuries ƒ System failure models- target?
ƒ Minimise Life-Cycle Monte Carlo simulation
Costs ƒ Root Cause Analysis Yes
ƒ Failure elimination
ƒ Manage HSE Identify opportunities and
Establish dynamic KPI implement strategies

ƒ Availability of Christmas Performance Yes

tree according to
Set targets ƒ Failure rate of valves target?
ƒ Availability = 100%
ƒ Reliability = 99% ƒ Maintenance efficiency Figure 6: Personnels competences and
and effectiveness No
ƒ Number of injuries = 0
ƒ Injuries Benchmark performance model.

Evaluate the economics Identify gaps,

Establish strategy opportunities & strategies Conclusions
Use Use This paper assessed the failure characteristics of
ƒ RCM/FMECA to ƒ Asset Life Cycle Analysis
determine appropriate to ensure strategies are valves within a Wet Christmas tree using the
maintenance strategies the most cost effective Yes Any room for
options. improvement?

No
Integrated asset register and data management End
7 Improving the Reliability of Subsea Valves
Failure Mode and Effect Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) technique. Two functional failures were
defined for the Wet Christmas tree in view of its
primary function. The defined functional failures
are complete loss of flow control capability and
partial loss of flow control capability. Common and
dominant failure modes of the valves were
identified. Failure Elimination and Prevention
Strategy (FEPS) was designed to prevent failures
and improve the reliability of valves and the overall
availability of wet Christmas trees.
References
1. MCCARTHY, D.M., 2005. A Study into
Reducing Early Life Failures of Subsea
Gate Valves Through Design and
Reducing Human Errors. M.Sc. Thesis,
Cranfield University.
2. WARBURTON, D., 1995. Availability of a
Subsea Christmas tree: Impact on valve
usage and wear on subsea system
reliability. M.Sc. Thesis, Cranfield
University.
3. CHASSEROT, J.L., 2005. Subsea Oil and
Gas Exploitation, Course Note. Cranfiled
University.
4. PETERS, J., 2003. Assessment of Valve
Failures in the Offshore Oil and Gas
Sector, [online]. Available from:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr16
2.pdf [cited 11 June 2006].
5. DAVIDSON, J., and HUNSLEY, C., The
Reliability of Mechanical Systems. 2nd ed.
Institute of Mechanical Engineers, Great
Britain; 1994.
SPE 128347
6. MOUBRAY, J., Reliability-Centred
Maintenance II. 2nd ed. Butter-
Heinemann; 1991.
7. WARBURTON, D., 1995. Availability of a
Subsea Christmas tree: Impact on valve
usage and wear on subsea system
reliability. M.Sc. Thesis, Cranfield
University.
8. ZAPPE, R.W., 1999. Valve Selection
Hand Book. Fourth Edition. Gulf
Publishing Company, Houston, Texas.
9. PEARSON, G. H., 1978. Valve Design.
Mechanical Engineering Publication
Limited. London.
10. LYONS, J.L., 1982. Valve Designer’s
Hand Book. Van Nostrand Reinhold
Company. London.
11. Valve Diagnostics, [online].
Available from:
http://www.valvediagnostics.com/ [cited 20
March 2009].
12. CHRISTOPHER, E. and NILS, I., 2005.
Targeting the Pump and Valve Industry:
an analysis of two industry makets. M.Sc.
Thesis, Stockhom, Sweden.
13. BRIDIAU, D., 2004. Early-life Failures in
Subsea Oil and GAS Industry. M.Sc.
Group Project, Cranfield University.