Psychological Assessment Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association

2008, Vol. 20, No. 3, 292–299 1040-3590/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0012933

COMMENTS

The Psychobiological Theory of Temperament and Character: Comment on

Farmer and Goldberg (2008)

C. Robert Cloninger
Washington University

The revised Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI–R) is the third stage of development of a widely
used multiscale personality inventory that began with the Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire
(TPQ) and then the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI). The author describes the third stage of
the psychobiological theory of temperament and character; empirical tests of its predictions from
genetics, neurobiology, psychosocial development, and clinical studies; and empirical findings that
stimulated incremental changes in theory and test construction. Linear factor analysis is an inadequate
method for evaluating the nonlinear and dynamical nature of the intrapsychic processes that influence
human personality. Traits derived by factor analysis under the doubtful assumption of linearity are
actually heterogeneous composites of rational and emotional processes that differ fundamentally in their
underlying brain processes. The predictions of the psychobiological theory are strongly validated by
extensive data from genetics, neurobiology, longitudinal studies of development, and clinical assessment.
The distinction between temperament and character allows the TCI and TCI–R to outperform other
popular personality inventories in distinguishing individuals with personality disorders from others and
in describing the developmental path to well-being in terms of dynamical processes within the individual
that are useful for both research and clinical practice.

Keywords: Temperament and Character Inventory, psychobiology, factor analysis, complex adaptive
systems

The qualitative distinction between rational cognitive processes
and prelogical emotional processes is well established in psychol-
ogy but has been essentially ignored by factor analysts working in
the field of personality. The critique of the revised Temperament
and Character Inventory (TCI–R) by R. F. Farmer and Goldberg
(2008) illustrates well the general phenomenon of how adherence
to an inappropriate analytic paradigm can lead to specious conclu-
sions that ignore or misinterpret key observations, like the differ-
ence between emotion and reason. Other analysis of the same data
set considered by R. F. Farmer and Goldberg has already shown
that the TCI–R outperforms other major multiscale personality
inventories in terms of its validity in predicting indicators of
clinical maturity versus clinical disorder (Grucza & Goldberg,
2007). As a result, my comments on factor analytic and other
alternative tests of validity may provide an instructive illustration
for students of personality assessment to begin to recognize the
limitations of linear factor analysis as a way of understanding the
dynamical and nonlinear nature of interactions among emotional
and rational processes in human personality.
C. Robert Cloninger is the copyright holder of the Temperament and
Character Inventory—Revised.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to C. Robert
Cloninger, Washington University, Departments of Psychiatry, Genetics,
and Psychology, School of Medicine, Campus Box 8134, 660 South Euclid
Avenue, St. Louis, MO 63110. E-mail: clon@wustl.edu
Conventional factor analysis assumes that variables are linear.
That is, the measured variables are supposed to have an integral
scale with the same average effects across their range, which is
often untrue for personality variables (Cloninger, 2005; Turner,
Hudson, Butler, & Joyce, 2003). Furthermore, the average effects
of differences between individuals may be almost irrelevant to
what is happening in any particular person across time (Cervone,
2004; Molenaar, Huizenga, & Nesselroade, 2003). “Linear” think-
ing systematically neglects the interactions that are crucial for
understanding the development of the individual as a person over
time in different situations (Bergman & Magnusson, 1997). Nev-
ertheless, linear methods can be a useful first approximation, as
when we sum scores to estimate individual traits in the TCI or
estimate correlations in a particular sample. However, linear meth-
ods often produce inconsistent results in different samples when
applied to nonlinear dynamical systems, as are found in the rela-
tionships between temperament and character (Cloninger, Svrakic,
& Svrakic, 1997) or the relationships between personality traits
and regional brain activity (Turner et al., 2003).
The Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI) has been
developed in three stages (Cloninger, 1987, 2004; Cloninger, Svra-
kic, & Przybeck, 1993). The third stage, relevant to the TCI–R, is
described in my book Feeling Good: The Science of Well-Being
(Cloninger, 2004), which R. F. Farmer and Goldberg (2008) did
not cite. The modifications at each stage were responses to major
empirical findings that forced changes in perspective for me about
the nature of human personality. I briefly summarize the third

292
 COMMENT ON FARMER AND GOLDBERG (2008)
stage of the psychobiological theory of temperament and character
because R. F. Farmer and Goldberg did not describe the theory
underlying the TCI–R correctly. In particular, they ignored the
findings that led to the recognition of the matrix structure of
personality modules and the nonlinear dynamical relations among
these modules.
Psychobiological Theory of Temperament and Character
When I began planning functional brain imaging studies with
the TCI, I realized that my theory of personality needed to be
deepened to understand the modular organization of brain systems
and the dynamics of their regulation over different time frames
(milliseconds in a brain response paradigm or decades across the
life span). The current theory explains how the same structure of
human personality can describe variability in human thought regard-
less of the time scale (milliseconds to decades). The invariance of the
organization of human thought regardless of time scale has strong
implications for understanding the structure and nonlinear dynamics
of personality. The resulting model allowed me to recognize the
underlying matrix structure of the subscales of temperament and
character (Cloninger, 2004) and encouraged greater precision in mea-
surement of the subscales, as is done in the TCI–R.
I see human personality as having five layers, which I call
planes of being and described in detail elsewhere (Cloninger,
2004). These five layers are concerned with human adaptations in
situations that are perceived to be predominantly concerned with
reproduction and sexuality (sexual plane), practical everyday ac-
tivities concerned with power and possessions (material plane),
emotional bonds and social attachments (emotional plane), com-
munication and culture (intellectual plane), and understanding
what is beyond individual human existence (spiritual plane). The
brain systems that make it possible for human beings to adopt
these different perspectives have evolved in a hierarchy of steps
over time to allow the survival of progressively more flexible,
aware, and creative organisms (Cloninger, 1994, 2002, 2004;
Cloninger & Gilligan, 1987).
Table 1
Descriptions of Three Higher Cognitive Processes of Foresight, Judgment, and Insight That Regulate the Emotional Drives Relevant
to Each of the Five Layers of Human Personality
Cognitive function Characteristics of the Characteristics of the
(character dimension) sexual layer material layer
Foresight (Self- Responsible vs. Purposeful vs.
Directedness [SD]) irresponsible (SD1) aimless (SD2)
Judgment Tolerant vs. prejudiced Forgiving vs.
(Cooperativeness (C1) revengeful (C4)
[C])
Insight (Self- Self-forgetful vs. alienated Patient vs. impatient
Transcendence [ST]) (prelogical enaction– (concrete–abstract
categorizing) (ST1) logic)
Note. The five layers of human personality are defined by the predominant focus of the person’s perspective in a situation. Within each layer of
personality, maturation involves increasing each of the three character dimensions. Integration of the whole person requires working through these functions
in each of the layers of personality. The Temperament and Character Inventory subscales predicted to measure these processes are indicated in parentheses.
Adapted from Feeling Good: The Science of Well-Being (pp. 219 –225), by C. R. Cloninger, 2004, New York: Oxford University Press.
293
The development of well-being and the regulation of potential
conflicts among prelogical emotional drives in self-aware con-
sciousness involve three rational cognitive processes of foresight,
judgment, and insight, which TCI character traits are hypothesized
to measure. Each of these “rational” processes has modules for
adapting to each type of situation or layer of personality, which are
supposed to be measured by character subscales. For example, TCI
Self-Directedness is hypothesized to measure the executive func-
tions of foresight, as shown by a person being self-directed in the
sexual plane (i.e., responsible), in the material plane (i.e., purposeful),
in the emotional plane (i.e., cheerfully self-accepting), in the intellec-
tual plane (i.e., resourceful), and in the spiritual plane (i.e., spontane-
ous so that habits and intentions are congruent). Cooperativeness
measures the legislative function of judgment, which involves making
rules that allow us to get along in a reasonable and flexible manner
with one another in each plane of our life. Self-Transcendence mea-
sures the judicial function or depth of insight that allows us to know
intuitively when our legislative rules apply in a particular situation.
The three hypothesized branches of mental self-government and their
components are summarized in Table 1, along with the TCI subscales
hypothesized to measure these functions.
The five layers of personality, and the perspectives that specify
them, can be further decomposed to define 25 modules or subplanes
of being in a 5 ⫻ 5 matrix. Each plane of being has five subplanes that
deal with the sexual, material, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual
aspects of that plane, as described in detail elsewhere (Cloninger,
2004). For example, situations that are viewed from a sexual perspec-
tive differ in terms of their more particular focus: Some situations
involve sexual needs (e.g., copulation), others have a material objec-
tive (e.g., reproduction), emotional desire (e.g., sensuality), intellec-
tual meaning (e.g., acts of sharing), or spiritual awareness (e.g.,
charismatic union). Table 2 summarizes the TCI subscales hypothe-
sized to measure the emotional aspect of each subplane, with assign-
ments based on ordered changes in content of thought as people pass
through a hierarchy of states of fear or transcendence (Cloninger,
2004).
Characteristics of the Characteristics of the Characteristics of the
emotional layer intellectual layer spiritual layer
Exuberant vs. Resourceful vs. Spontaneous vs.
insecure (? SD4) inadequate (SD3) predetermined
(SD5)
Empathic vs. Helpful vs. unhelpful Principled vs.
inconsiderate (C2) (C3) opportunistic (C5)
Transpersonal vs. Creative vs. imitative Spiritual vs.
avoiding (vocal–archetypal conventional
(nonverbal symbols) (preverbal holistic
emotive imagery) schemas) (ST3)
(ST2)
294 CLONINGER
Table 2
Emotional Aspects of the 25 Subplanes of Being as Described by Specific Modules of Temperament for the Nonspiritual Planes
and Modules of Character Development for the Spiritual Plane
Subplane Sexual plane Material plane
Spiritual subplane Shy vs. beguiling Exploratory vs.
(HA3) unexcitable (NS1)
Intellectual subplane Pessimistic vs. optimistic Impulsive vs. rigid
(HA1) (NS2)
Emotional subplane Inhibited vs. uninhibited Irritable vs. stoic
(HA total) (NS total)
Material subplane Fearful vs. risk-taking Extravagant vs. frugal
(HA2) (NS3)
Sexual subplane Fatigable vs. vigorous Disorderly vs. regimented
(HA4) (NS4)
Note. HA ⫽ Harm Avoidance; NS ⫽ Novelty Seeking; RD ⫽ Reward Dependence; PS ⫽ Persistence. Adapted from Feeling Good: The Science of
Well-Being (pp. 98 –108), by C. R. Cloninger, 2004, New York: Oxford University Press.
A prominent feature of the matrix structure of personality mod-
ules is that individual items descriptive of personality may be
related to one another as a result of overlaps in the situation, basic
emotional processes, higher cognitive and spiritual processes, or
combinations of these variables (Cloninger, 2004). All personality
modules involve person by situation interactions that are regulated
by a set of dynamical nonlinear systems, which allows human
beings to be purposeful, flexible, and self-aware in their adaptation
to life. Human personality is not adequately characterized as a set
of linear traits because the components of personality are nonlin-
ear in their functional effects and relationships with one another.
Human thought involves frequent rapid adaptation of a person to
different situations or to different perspectives on the same experi-
ence. The connections between different brain modules change sud-
denly and synchronously with changes in thought. Human beings
have 10 thoughts per second on average, which requires sudden,
reversible, nonlinear changes in connections throughout the whole
brain, as is characteristic of scale-free networks (Cloninger, 2004).
Most of the information about personality can be captured in the
5 ⫻ 5 matrix just described, so personality inventories that are
designed to be thorough, like the TCI, TCI–R, and NEO Person-
ality Inventory—Revised, have around 25 subscales. Less detailed
description is likely to have less useful information, whereas more
detailed assessments are likely to compromise validity by tiring
subjects. The full three-dimensional structure of personality can be
visualized as a three-dimensional spiral with five planes and as
increasing in height, width, and depth from the sexual to the
spiritual plane (Cloninger, 2004). The height of the spiral indicates
a person’s foresight, as measured by their level of TCI Self-
Directedness. The width of the spiral indicates a person’s broad-
ness of social concern and flexibility of judgment, as measured by
their level of TCI Cooperativeness. The depth of the spiral indi-
cates a person’s depth or shallowness of insight, as measured by
their level of TCI Self-Transcendence (Cloninger, 2004). In the
fourth dimension of time, a person’s thoughts can shift rapidly
throughout their possible range, spiraling down with increasing
negative emotions and other indicators of ill-health when stressed
(e.g., preoccupied with fears, threats, or desires) or spiraling up with
increasing positive emotions and other indicators of well-being when
calm and secure (e.g., feeling hopeful, kind, and aware).
Spiritual
Emotional plane Intellectual plane plane
Attached vs. detached Perfectionistic vs. Peaceful
(RD3) pragmatic (PS4)
Sentimental vs. indifferent Determined vs. Patient
(RD1) ambivalent (PS2)
Sociable vs. distant Persistent vs. impersistent Charitable
(RD total) (PS total)
Warm vs. aloof Eager effort vs. lazy Respectful
(RD2) (PS1)
Dependent vs. independent Ambitious vs. Hopeful
(RD4) underachieving (PS3)
Linear factor analysis considers the average differences between
groups at one point in time, which may have little to do with
patterns of change over time. For example, the extent to which
subscales of IQ are increasing across generations (the Flynn effect)
does not correspond to their factor loadings on general intelligence
(Flynn, 2007). Likewise, the TCI character subscales develop over
time as a nonlinear dynamical system with a spiral structure having
five layers (Cloninger et al., 1997). R. F. Farmer and Goldberg
(2008) did not acknowledge the nonlinear dynamics of personality
development, which requires an account of both the correlations
between individuals at one time and the patterns of change over
time, as we have done (Cloninger et al., 1997).
Although human thought is highly dynamic and has a wide
range, we can use averages or modes of our thoughts and relation-
ships as central indicators of states of being that are meta-stable, as
is typical of equilibrium states in nonlinear dynamical systems.
Frequent meta-stable states of being are often described as per-
sonality traits, even though they are neither fixed nor linear in their
functions and relationships.
As a result, personality is a complex expression of nonlinear
interactions among a whole hierarchy of learning systems that
have evolved and that develop over time as a complex adaptive
process, as described in detail elsewhere (Cloninger, 2002, 2004;
Kaasinen, Maguire, Kurki, Bruck, & Rinne, 2005; Turner et al.,
2003). Each personality module has three aspects, each regulated
by dissociable but overlapping systems of learning and memory: a
somatic or emotional aspect regulated by learning of habits and
skills, a cognitive aspect regulated by learning of facts and prop-
ositions, and a spiritual aspect regulated by self-aware learning of
one’s continuity with and participation in a whole greater than
oneself (Cloninger, 2004; Tulving, 2002). These three systems can
be dissociated but normally interact through their extensive inter-
connections. For example, a person can know how to do something
(using procedural memory) but not know the fact that he or she
knows the skill (a deficit in semantic memory). A person can know
a particular fact and report it to others (using semantic memory)
but not have memory of when and where he or she learned the fact
(a deficit in episodic memory). The systems evolve and mature in
sequence but operate simultaneously from early in childhood.
 COMMENT ON FARMER AND GOLDBERG (2008)
Development of Temperament Model
Linear models like factor analysis evaluate the average relations
among variables between individuals in groups, which can be an
informative preliminary approximation for exploring personality
structure, as was done by Eysenck and others. Under certain
conditions, a linear model can be a useful approximation, but its
application requires insight and judgment, not just blind faith in
factor analysis as a gold standard. Jeffrey Gray (1981) made a
seminal contribution to the field of personality assessment when he
pointed out that learning responses within individuals did not
correspond to these average effects—rather, neurotic introverts
were more anxiety-prone and responsive to conditioned signals of
punishment than stable extraverts, whereas neurotic extraverts
were more impulsive in approaching conditioned signals of reward
than stable introverts. Gray recommended a rotation of factors to
provide a better account of the processes taking place within
individuals as they learned. Subsequently social– cognitive and
developmental psychologists have emphasized the need for a
model of learning processes within the person as he or she adapts
to different situations (Bergman & Magnusson, 1997; Cervone,
2004; Mischel & Shoda, 1998) and regard the factor-analytically
derived models of between-persons differences as unacceptable for
understanding emotional and cognitive processes (Cervone, 2004).
However, factor analysts have missed the point of such critiques
and continued to rely on models of the average relations among
variables between individuals rather than trying to understand
personality as a set of dynamic intrapsychic processes by which a
person learns to adapt to different life situations.
Following Gray’s (1981) observations about learning differ-
ences within individuals, I synthesized genetic, pharmacological,
and psychosocial data that also pointed to the need for a model of
learning processes occurring within the person (Cloninger, 1986,
1987). For example, extraversion measures were known to have
differentially heritable components of venturesome risk-taking,
impulsivity, and sociability (Eaves & Eysenck, 1975) that I later
described as low harm avoidance, high novelty seeking, and high
reward dependence. I formulated the processes in terms of pre-
logical emotional processes of associative conditioning, as was
properly described by R. F. Farmer and Goldberg (2008). My
initial development of the temperament dimensions is described in
Table 3
Correlations (r ⫻ 100) Between the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI) Scales and Those of the Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire (EPQ—Revised) and the Zuckerman–Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire (ZKPQ)
Harm Novelty Reward
Scale avoidance seeking dependence
EPQ Neuroticism 59
EPQ Extraversion ⴚ53 44 23
EPQ Psychoticism 41 ⴚ45
EPQ Lie ⫺21
ZKPQ Neuroticism 66
ZKPQ Impulsive Sensation ⫺39 68 ⫺20
ZKPQ Hostility ⫺27
ZKPQ Sociability ⫺38 37 31
ZKPQ Activity ⫺29
Note. Correlations over .40 are in bold. Only significant correlations are shown, N ⫽ 207. Adapted from “Relationships Between Cloninger’s,
Zuckerman’s, and Eysenck’s Dimensions of Personality,” by M. Zuckerman and C. R. Cloninger, 1996, Personality & Individual Differences, 21, p.
283–285.
295
detail elsewhere (Cloninger, 1986, 1987). Eventually harm avoid-
ance, novelty seeking, reward dependence, and persistence were
shown to be independently inherited in large-scale twin studies
(Heath, Cloninger, & Martin, 1994; Stallings, Hewitt, Cloninger,
Heath, & Eaves, 1996).
In addition to the evidence for unique genetic determination of
the four temperaments, the construct validity of these dimensions
has been strongly supported by their correlation with other mea-
sures of normal personality, measures of personality disorder sub-
types, and related psychopathology, as described in detail else-
where (Cloninger, Przybeck, Svrakic, & Wetzel, 1994). For
example, typical findings of relations to other biologically based
models of personality are summarized in Table 3 (Zuckerman &
Cloninger, 1996).
The TCI temperament dimensions are nonlinear in their effects
on emotional responses and behavior. For example, only individ-
uals with high scores in Harm Avoidance have an augmented
startle response when they are previewing unpleasant images. In
contrast, only individuals with low scores in Harm Avoidance have
a reduced startle response when they are previewing pleasant
images (Corr, Kumari, Wilson, Checkley, & Gray, 1997; Corr,
Pickering, & Gray, 1995; Corr, Wilson, et al., 1995). Likewise, the
activation of blood flow in a brain circuit involving the ventral
striatum, anterior cingulate cortex, and orbitofrontal cortex in
response to increasing frequency of frustrative nonreward has a
positive slope for individuals high in TCI Persistence and a neg-
ative slope for those with low TCI Persistence (Gusnard et al.,
2003). Such nonlinearity is a fundamental characteristic of the
functional relationships of all the TCI dimensions of temperament
and character, not just particular dimensions (Cloninger, 2004;
Cloninger et al., 1997; Turner et al., 2003).
There are strong relationships of TCI temperament dimensions
to psychomotor functions in specific brain systems related to
processing of negative emotions and habits. However, the average
relations among temperament, neurotransmitters, and brain func-
tions are usually weak or inconsistent unless there is careful
attention to the specific temperament, specific type of neurotrans-
mitter receptor, and specific location and connections among the
brain regions. For example, carriers of a gene that influences the
activity of the serotonin transporter have increased harm avoid-
Self- Self-
Persistence directedness Cooperativeness transcendence
ⴚ45
18
⫺29 ⫺31 ⴚ42
25 34
ⴚ49
28
⫺32 ⴚ60
46 36
296 CLONINGER
ance, increased reactivity of the amygdala to fear, and increased
risk of depression compared to others (Pezawas et al., 2005). Harm
Avoidance scores explain 30% of the variance in the functional
connectivity between the amygdala and perigenual cingulate,
which are involved in perceptual processing of fearful stimuli.
More generally, the TCI temperament dimensions have strong
nonlinear relations with the specific parts of the brain involved in
processing of negative emotions, habits, and motor skills (Turner
et al., 2003). In contrast, the TCI character dimensions have strong
nonlinear relationships with the parts of the neocortex involved in
the processing of facts and propositions, not negative emotions and
habits (Turner et al., 2003).
Differentiation of Temperament
and Character Dimensions
Despite the success of the Tridimensional Personality Question-
naire (TPQ) as a description of susceptibility to negative emotions
and subtypes of personality disorders, something important was
missing from it as a description of maturity and well-being in
human personality. I found that groups with different configura-
tions of the temperament dimensions did differ in their average
probability of having a personality disorder, as reviewed elsewhere
(Cloninger, 2004, pp. 40 – 44). However, to my surprise, these
average effects in groups did not allow accurate measurement of
whether a particular individual had a personality disorder or how
mature they were (Cloninger et al., 1997)! My colleagues and I
studied personality variation in both the general population and in
samples of people with varying degrees of mental disorder. The
full range of possible temperament configurations occurred in
both mature and immature people, even though the probabilities of
the configurations differed on average. The average associations
allowed no reliable statements to be made about the maturity or
health of any individual person on the basis of their temperament
configuration alone. In response to this observation, I checked
what variables were measured in other personality tests but were
not accounted for by the TPQ (Cloninger et al., 1994). These
variables included three sets of variables that I concluded were
related to self-directedness (e.g., low repression in the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory [MMPI], internal locus of con-
trol, purposefulness), cooperativeness (e.g., agreeability in the
NEO Personality Inventory, low hostility), and self-transcendence
(e.g., absorption in the Multidimensional Personality Question-
naire [MPQ], transpersonal experiences, spirituality).
The TCI was developed to measure the four temperaments and
the three character dimensions of Self-Directedness, Cooperative-
ness, and Self-Transcendence. My colleagues and I found that each
of the seven dimensions had good internal consistency and sub-
stantial unique variability in descriptive content (Cloninger et al.,
1993, 1994). In addition, to summarize briefly a literature of over
2,000 peer-reviewed articles (see https://psychobiology.wustl
.edu), each of the seven TCI dimensions has been shown to have
differential relations with personality disorder subtypes (Goldman,
Skodal, McGrath, & Oldham, 1994; Mulder & Joyce, 1997; Svra-
kic, Whitehead, Przybeck, & Cloninger, 1993), other mental dis-
orders (Cloninger et al., 1994; A. Farmer et al., 2003), unique
patterns of functional brain activity (Turner et al., 2003), and
unique genetic antecedents (Gillespie, Cloninger, Heath, & Martin,
2003).
In particular, low TCI Self-Directedness strongly specified the
presence and severity of all personality disorders diagnosed by
experts using reliable structured interviews (Svrakic et al., 1993).
Low TCI Cooperativeness also contributed to the detection of
milder personality disorders (Strack, 2006; Svrakic et al., 1993).
Various configurations of the TCI dimensions differentiated the
symptoms of the full range of personality disorder subtypes. At the
same time high scores on all three character dimensions are
strongly associated with well-being, as indicated by resilient pos-
itive emotions, satisfying quality of life, and virtuous conduct
(Cloninger, 2004).
The TCI character dimensions differ qualitatively from the
temperament dimensions, as expected for processes that are ratio-
nal rather than emotional. The TCI temperament dimensions can
be roughly described as bipolar: Both extremes of each of the four
temperaments have some practical advantages as well as some
practical disadvantages, depending on the situation. For example,
being high in Harm Avoidance leads to anxiety that can be socially
crippling, but it can also promote caution that can be life-
preserving. On the other hand, being low in Harm Avoidance is
associated with risk-taking, which can lead to death or success
depending on the situation. The temperaments describe a person’s
emotional style without any prejudice about what is socially de-
sirable or undesirable about a particular individual.
In contrast, the character dimensions can be roughly described
as unipolar variables related to a person’s voluntary goals and
values. They are skewed toward high values by the tendency of
people to recognize and endorse socially desirable behaviors. For
assessing the validity of TCI self-reports, we have derived subtle
measures of TCI dimensions based on properties of specific re-
sponse sets, such as the frequency of endorsement of rare items
regardless of their content (Cloninger et al., 1994; Cloninger &
Svrakic, 1997). The character scales, but not the temperament
scales, are strongly influenced by specific variables related to
frequent rare responses, conformity to intermediate cultural norms,
or acquiescence. The temperament scales are influenced by se-
quence contingencies related to the emotional impact of prior item
endorsements.
Findings About the TCI–R
The findings about the TCI–R dimensions reported by R. F.
Farmer and Goldberg (2008) are based on a preliminary version of
the test with 295 items from which we derived the test now called
the TCI–R with 240 items. Subsequently we conducted an inde-
pendent normative study with 917 subjects in Missouri using the
final version of the test and are preparing a report for its publica-
tion elsewhere. Although R. F. Farmer and Goldberg did not report
this result for the Oregon sample, the internal consistency of the
four TCI–R temperament dimensions ranged from .84 to .92, and
for the three character dimensions from .89 to .90 in our Missouri
sample. We expect that these measures are similar to that in the
Oregon sample because the psychometric properties of the 29 sub-
scales and 240 items as reported by R. F. Farmer and Goldberg are
similar to what we have observed with the current test.
The major specific findings about the structure of the TCI–R
stated by R. F. Farmer and Goldberg (2008) were that factor
analyses suggested that (a) there was evidence for six or seven
personality factors in the TCI–R, including a distinct factor for
 COMMENT ON FARMER AND GOLDBERG (2008)
Self-Transcendence; (b) Harm Avoidance and Self-Directedness
were moderately and negatively correlated, and they loaded to-
gether on one factor that is usually called Neuroticism; (c) Reward
Dependence and Cooperativeness were moderately and positively
correlated, and some subscales of both dimensions loaded together
on one factor; (d) the other three factors identified as interpretable
by R. F. Farmer and Goldberg were defined by a factor with three
of four Novelty Seeking subscales, a factor with all four Persis-
tence subscales, and a factor with two of four subscales of Reward
Dependence; and (e) a seventh factor was described by R. F.
Farmer and Goldberg as uninterpretable; however, it is defined by
low disorderliness (NS4) and highly principled behavior (C5),
which can be understood as respect for order and principle rather
than preference for disorder and opportunistic behavior.
The findings of R. F. Farmer and Goldberg (2008) are similar to
what we have usually observed with linear factor analysis of the
TCI and TCI–R in several different countries. It is known that the
structure of interindividual differences does not correspond to that
of intraindividual differences in nonlinear dynamical systems. As
a result, since 1997, I have recommended that linear factor anal-
yses of the structure of the TCI consider temperament separately
from character because of their strongly nonlinear relationship
(Cloninger, 2000; Cloninger et al., 1997; Hansenne, Delhez, &
Cloninger, 2005). Alternatively, some may wish to apply non-
linear factor analytic methods appropriate for intraindividual
development (Molenaar et al., 2003). Nevertheless, this recom-
mendation has not been heeded by some investigators, who
have found results with linear models just like R. F. Farmer and
Goldberg did. As expected for nonlinear systems, the linear
interindividual models do not conform to the hypothesized
intraindividual structure of the TCI (Ball, Tennen, & Kranzler,
1999; Herbst, Zonderman, McCrae, & Costa, 2000).
It is noteworthy that R. F. Farmer and Goldberg (2008) identi-
fied six or seven interpretable factors in the TCI–R rather than only
five factors. I do not disagree with the data presented, but the
appropriateness of their method for structural analysis and psycho-
metric evaluation of the TCI–R is questionable for the fundamental
reasons I have presented earlier. First, the functional relationships
of the TCI dimensions are not linear as assumed by factor analysis.
Second, the average relationships among variables between indi-
viduals do not provide a model of the relationships within indi-
viduals that corresponds to a dynamical intrapsychic model of
personality as the TCI–R is intended to provide. Third, the items of
the TCI are elements of a nonlinear matrix structure that allows for
simultaneous overlap due to common situations, emotional pro-
cesses, rational cognitive influences, and variable combinations of
these variables; consequently, factor analysis at the item level does
not provide a valid way to identify the nonlinear structure of the
intrapsychic processes measured by the TCI because the data
violate the multivariate normal distributions assumed by factor
analysis. Fourth, moderate or even strong correlations among
variables do not ensure psychological or etiological equivalence.
In particular, it is questionable that high scores on Harm Avoid-
ance should be combined with low scores on Self-Directedness
because these qualitatively distinct emotional and rational vari-
ables have different genetics (Gillespie et al., 2003), neurobiology
(Turner et al., 2003), development (Cloninger, 2003), psychomet-
rics, and meaning, as discussed earlier. Likewise, the correlations
among Reward Dependence and Cooperativeness do not imply
297
psychological or etiological equivalence and can be dissociated in
individuals because of their nonlinear functional relationship
(Cloninger et al., 1997). For example, the so-called “love” hor-
mone oxytocin is released into blood after sexual orgasm regard-
less of gender and is moderately correlated with Reward Depen-
dence (r ⫽ .43) but not with Cooperativeness (r ⫽ .09; Bell,
Nicholson, Mulder, Luty, & Joyce, 2006). However, such biolog-
ical findings can be difficult to replicate in nonlinear systems, as
reviewed in depth elsewhere (Cloninger, 2000, 2004).
In addition, R. F. Farmer and Goldberg (2008) pointed out that
the 140-item short form of the TCI–R has nearly the same structure
and reliability as the longer form for measuring the seven higher
order dimensions of temperament and character. I agree that the
short form works well for its purpose. However, the short form
does not provide the precision needed for clinical work with
individuals using the TCI subscales. The main motivation for the
development of the TCI–R was to increase precision in measuring
its subscales by using a 5-point Likert response set rather than
true–false and to provide subscales for Persistence to increase its
reliability.
Conclusions
It is important to underscore the important falsification of one of
the early predictions I made about personality. Based on early
work by Cattell and Loehlin on the differential heritability of
personality traits (Loehlin, 1986), I expected that the character
dimensions would be expressions of higher cognitive processes
involving the propositional learning system and less heritable than
the temperament dimensions (Cloninger, 1994; Cloninger et al.,
1993). I have learned that many people really want these two
hypotheses to be linked because they like to think that we can
separate biology and psychology, at least the psychology of higher
cognitive and social processes. In fact, we confirmed the hypoth-
esis that character is related to higher cognitive processing in more
recently evolved parts of the brain than is temperament (Cloninger,
2002; Turner et al., 2003), but to my surprise, we found that the
heritability of character was as great as that of temperament
(Cloninger, 2004; Gillespie et al., 2003). This important finding
suggests that the popular dichotomy in science between the neu-
robiological and psychosocial paradigms of human personality is
not well justified.
On several occasions I have presented data showing the unique
genetic determinants and functional brain processes characteristic
of TCI Harm Avoidance and Self-Directedness to personality trait
theorists who are accustomed to using factor analytic measures of
neuroticism. I have also pointed out the genetic, neurobiological,
and psychological heterogeneity of the multiple temperament di-
mensions that contribute to factor analytic measures of extraver-
sion. However, factor analysts persist in ignoring these findings
about emotional and rational processes in human personality de-
spite the inability of statistical methods alone to define the struc-
ture of personality unambiguously.
Premature preoccupation with creating the impression of a sim-
ple linear factor structure for the complex architecture of human
personality is likely to give the appearance of precision while
actually reducing the predictive validity of the instruments. A
recent study (Grucza & Goldberg, 2007) set out to compare the
predictive validity of 11 popular multiscale personality inventories,
298 CLONINGER
including the TCI–R. The possibility of such a comparison of validity
is a tribute to the foresight and persistence of Lew Goldberg and to the
trust of many investigators that data about their instruments would be
handled in a collegial and professional manner.
Three types of criteria were used to compare the predictive
validity of the various inventories: clusters of behavioral acts (drug
use, undependability, friendliness, erudition, communication, and
creativity), descriptions of the five factor domains by knowledge-
able informants, and clinical indicators potentially associated with
various types of psychopathology (sociopathy, magical ideation,
obsessive compulsion, depression, dissociation, and borderline
personality). The TCI–R predicted these criteria as well as, and in
some cases better than, every other major inventory. At the level of
the higher order constructs like the seven TCI–R dimensions, the
range of mean predictive validity coefficients ranged from .37 to
.45, with the TCI at .45. At the level of lower order constructs like
the 29 TCI–R subscales, the mean predictive validity coefficients
ranged from .39 to .45, with the TCI–R at .44. The TCI–R was
particularly strong in the prediction of acts of friendliness with
Reward Dependence, indicators of borderline personality with
Self-Directedness, indicators of sociopathy with Cooperativeness,
and indicators of magical ideation with Self-Transcendence. The
TCI–R outperformed all other personality inventories overall in
the prediction of indicators of clinical maturity: The range of
multiple correlations was .27 to .45 for other tests, whereas the
TCI–R had the best mean coefficient of .53.
These findings identify two facts worthy of consideration by
factor analysts in general. First, traditional linear psychometrics
for evaluating personality inventories (such as linear factor struc-
ture and coefficient alpha) may have little bearing on actual
predictive validity. Second, the three character scales of the TCI–R
allowed it to outperform all other popular tests in the prediction of
measures of maturity versus clinical disorder. This suggests that
the psychobiological model of temperament and character may
offer important insights and predictive validity for understanding
the interaction of the rational and emotional in human personality.
We have much to learn beyond what has been established about
linear models of interindividual differences.
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Received November 13, 2007
Revision received February 5, 2008
Accepted February 7, 2008 䡲