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SHepubltt of tije jUÎjiltpptness
Supreme Court
jffltanila
SECOND DIVISION
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 200815

Petitioner,
Present:
LIERNANDO, J., Acting Chairperson

CAGUIOA,*
- versus - INTING,
DELOS SANTOS, and
BALTAZAR-PADILLA, JJ.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
Challenged in this appeal is the October 21, 2011 Decision 1 2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP. No. 108758 which held that petitioner San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) illegally terminated the services of respondent
Rosario A. Gomez (Gomez).
SMC is a corporation organized under Philippine laws which is engaged

in the business of manufacturing fermented beverages, particularly beer, among
others.3
SMC employed Gomez on September 16, 1986 as a researcher in the

Security Department and concurrently as Executive Secretary to the Head of the
Security Department. Sometime in October 1994, Gomez was assigned as
coordinator in the Mailing Department of SMC. On December 20, 2002, SMC
terminated her services on the ground of fraud or willful breach of trust.4
+
1 Designated as Additional Member vice Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per raffle dated June 22,
2020.
2 Rollo, pp. 12-24; penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario
V. Lopez (now a member of this Court) and Francisco P. Acosta.
3 Id. at 486.
4 Id. at 13.
Decision 2 G.R.. No. 200815
The Antecedents
The circumstances which led to the termination of Gomez’s employment

involved SMC’s arrangement with C2K Express, Inc. (C2K).5 6
C2K is a corporation engaged in courier and delivery services, which

entered into business with SMC sometime in January 2001 as the latter’s courier.
For the first three months, the relationship between C2K and SMC went
smoothly until C2K encountered difficulty in collecting its service fee from
SMC. Eventually, it was found out that C2K’s former manager, Daniel Tamayo
(Tamayo), formed another courier services group, Starnec, which had been using
fake C2K receipts and collecting the fees pertaining to C2K. C2K claimed that it
was through Gomez’s intervention that Tamayo’s group was able to transact
business with SMC?
C2K brought the matter to the attention of SMC, which conducted an

investigation. In line with this, SMC requested C2K’s President, Edwin
Figuracion (Figuracion), to execute an affidavit narrating their claim. In the said
affidavit,7 Figuracion mentioned that Gomez had been collecting 25%
commission from the total payment received by C2K. An audit was conducted
where it was discovered that Gomez was allegedly involved in anomalies which
caused tremendous losses to SMC.8 9
SMC conducted an administrative investigation and hearing where

Gomez was able to present her evidence and witnesses to disprove the charges
against her? After the investigation, Gomez was found guilty of committing
fraud against SMC and of receiving bribes through commissions in connection
with the performance of her function.10 On December 20, 2002, SMC issued a
Notice of Termination of Services11 to Gomez prompting her to file a case for
illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).12
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter:
In a March 30, 2006 Decision,13 the Labor Arbiter held that Gomez’s
employment was validly terminated, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
Respondents’ counter claims are also denied for lack of jurisdiction but without
prejudice.
5* Id.
6 Id. at 13-14.
7 CA rollo, p. 148.
8 Rollo, p. 14.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 92.
12 Id. at 14.
13 Id. at 137-143.
SO ORDERED.14
Ruling of the NLRC:
Aggrieved, Gomez appealed to the NLRC. In its September 23, 2008

Decision15 16 in NLRC NCR CA No. 050019-06, the NLRC reversed and set aside
the findings of the Labor Arbiter and held that Gomez was illegally terminated.
The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring complainant’s
employment was illegally terminated. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to
reinstate complainant to her former or substantially equivalent position and to pay her
backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement, moral
damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and ten percent
(10%) of the total award as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.I:> {Emphasis in the original)
SMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 which was denied by the

NLRC in its April 16, 2009 Resolution.18 19
Unsatisfied, SMC filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari^ under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the NLRC’s September 23, 2008
Decision and April 16, 2009 Resolution. In said petition, SMC imputed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the NLRC
when it reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and held that Gomez
was illegally terminated.
Ruling of the CA :
In its October 21, 2011 Decision,20 the CA dismissed the petition and
upheld the findings of the NLRC. The CA pointed out that “Gomez’s dismissal
on the ground of fraud and loss of trust and confidence was not founded on
clearly established facts.”21 Thus, the dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated September 23, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2009,
both issued by public respondent NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No. 050019-06 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original).
14 Id. at 15 and 143.

15 Id. at 185-204; penned by Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan, and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul
T. Aquino and Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay.
16 Id. at 204.
17 Id. at 205-223.
18 CA rollo, pp. 57-58.
19 Rollo, pp. 259-291.
20 Id. at 12-24.
21 Id. at 20.
22 Id. at 23.
SMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in

its February 27, 2012 Resolution.23 24
Issues;
Thus, SMC filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari13 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, which raises the following arguments:
(i) Gomez’s termination from service was valid, legal and effective.25 (ii)Gomez
can no longer be reinstated since her dismissal was valid, legal and effective. Assuming
that the dismissal was illegal, the CA should have ordered separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement since SMC already lost the trust and confidence it reposed upon
Gomez.26'1
(iii) Gomez’s appeal filed before the NLRC should not have been given
consideration since it was not filed in accordance with the NLRC’s 2005 Rules of
Procedure.27
The Court’s Ruling
This Court finds SMC’s instant petition meritorious. Thus, We reverse

the CA’s ruling and reinstate the Labor Arbiter’s findings that Gomez was validly
terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
SMC claims that it validly terminated Gomez’s services on the grounds

of fraud and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed on her due to her
alleged acceptance of commission from C2K and Tamayo’s group, and for
allegedly allowing the courier to increase the actual weights of the packages in
order to compensate for her commission.28
We find SMC’s arguments tenable.
At the outset, We note that Gomez was accorded with procedural due
process since she was given both notice and hearing where she was able to
present her evidence and witnesses to disprove the charges against her.29
On the substantive aspect, this Court finds Gomez liable for fraud or
willful breach of trust, a valid ground for the termination of her employment.
Article 297 [282](c) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may
terminate the services of its employee for "[fjraud or willful breach x x x of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative." As a
rule, employers have the discretion to manage its own affairs, which includes the
imposition of disciplinary measures on its employees. 30 Thus, “employers are
generally given wide latitude in terminating the services of employees who
23 Id. at 25-26.
24 Id. at 28-61.
25 Id. at 44.
26 Id. at 51-52.
27 Id. at 56.
28 Id. at 18.
29 Rollo, pp. 18 and 142.
30 Manila Hotel Corp. v. De Leon, G.R. No. 219774, July 23, 2018.
perform functions which by their nature require the employer’s full trust and
confidence.”31
Nonetheless, employers may not arbitrarily dismiss their employees by

simply invoking Article 297 1282 |(c). The loss of confidence must be genuine
and cannot be used as a “subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified.” 32 In Mails v. Manila Electric Co.,33 34 We have pointed out that
"[l]oss of confidence as a ground for dismissal has never been intended to afford
an occasion for abuse by the employer of its prerogative, as it can easily be
subject to abuse because of its subjective nature."
In University of the Immaculate Conception v. Office of the Secretary of

Labor and Employment f citing Cruz v. Court of Appeals ,35 this Court
summarized the guidelines when loss of con fidence constitutes a valid ground
for dismissal:
[T]he language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states that the loss of trust and
con fidence must be based on will ful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his
employer. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,
without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. Moreover, it must be based on substantial evidence and not
on the employer's whims or caprices or suspicions otherwise, the employee would
eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Loss of confidence must not be
indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of
an employee was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to
continue working for the employer. In addition, loss of confidence as a just cause for
termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a
position of responsibility, trust and confidence or that the employee concerned is
entrusted with confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as the handling or care
and protection of the property and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is
the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.
Thus, the requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence are: “1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust
and confidence; (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence; [and (3)] such loss of trust relates to the employee’s performance of
duties.”36
In view of the first requisite above, this Court must make a determination
with regard to the true nature of Gomez’s position. SMC claims that Gomez is a
mailing coordinator at the Mailing Department tasked with weighing and
determining the volume of documents and other shipments of the corporation, 37
including the Kaunlaran Magazines. The Mailing Department is headed by a
31 University of the Immaculate Conception v. Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, 769 Phil. 630, 654
(2015); Wuerlh Philippines, Inc. v. Ynson, 682 Phil. 143, 158 (2012); and Ancheta v. Destiny Financial Plans, Inc.,
626 Phil. 550, 562 (2010).
32 The Coca-Cola Export Corp. v. Gacayan, 653 Phil. 45, 66 (201 I).
33 795 Phil. 31 1,322 (2016).
34 Supra at 655-656.
35 527 Phil. 230 (2006).
36Cadavas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 228765, March 20, 2019.
37 Rollo, p. 32.
manager, in this case Ms. Rosanna Mallari (Gomez’s boss), who takes care of the
voluminous mailing as well as courier services of SMC.38 39 40 41
In the leading case of Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission^

which was reiterated in Philippine Auto Components, Inc. v. Jumadlaf and
University of the Immaculate Conception v. Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment f We have explained what constitutes a "position of trust and
confidence":
[L]oss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying
positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely
charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property. To the first class
belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay
down management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and
to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the
normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of
money or property, x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Court finds that Gomez indeed occupied a position of trust and
confidence, as defined by law and jurisprudence, since she was entrusted with
SMC’s property, in particular its mail matter which included weighing and
determining volumes of documents to be shipped. Thus, she was routinely
charged with custody of SMC’s mail matter.
In addition, We find that SMC likewise substantially proved the second requisite
(z.e. there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence). In
Cadavas v. Court of Appeals,42 We have emphasized that “[l]oss of trust and
confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on a willful breach of
trust and founded on clearly established facts. Such breach is willful if it is done
intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.”43
In this case, We find that Gomez willfully, intentionally, knowingly,

purposely, and without justifiable excuse disregarded SMC’s rules and
regulations in the workplace.
This Court notes that it was through Gomez’s intervention that Starnec
(Tamayo’s group) was able to transact business with SMC, wherein Starnec used
fake receipts and collected the fees pertaining to C2K. 44 Gomez, as the
coordinator in SMC’s Mailing Department, should have known or noticed said
fake receipts since she had previously transacted with C2K.
38 Id. at 202.
39 338 Phil. 386, 395-396 (1997).
40 801 Phil. 170, 182-183 (2016).
41 Supra note 30 at 657.
421,1 Supra note 35.
43 Id.
44 Rollo, pp. 13-14.
Moreover, We give credence to the claim of C2K’s President, Figuracion,

in his affidavit45 that Gomez had been collecting 25% commission from the total
payment received by C2K. This was corroborated by SMC’s audit findings where
it was discovered that Gomez’s anomalies caused tremendous losses to SMC. 46
Furthermore, SMC conducted its investigation which resulted in Gomez being
found guilty of committing fraud against SMC and of receiving bribes through
commissions in connection with the performance of her function.47
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that Gomez was validly
terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
In termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
employee’s dismissal was for a valid and authorized cause. Consequently, the
failure of the employer to prove that the dismissal was valid, would mean that
the dismissal was unjustified, and thus illegal.
We are of the firm view that SMC sufficiently discharged the burden.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby

GRANTED. The assailed October 21, 2011 Decision and the February 27, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR SP. No. 108758 are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The March 30, 2006 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter holding that Rosario A. Gomez’s employment was validly terminated is
hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
45 CA rollo, p. 148.
46 Rollo, p. 14.
47 Id.
SO ORDERED.
RAMOJX PAUITETBERNJ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
On official leave
PRISCILLA J. BALTAZAR-
PADILLA
EDGARDO L. DELOS SANTOS Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
L. HERNANDO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Promulgated:
0 8 JUi/2020 I
SECOND DIVISION
Republic ot tlje Îjilippinesf
ABO1TIZ POWER RENEWABLES, G.R. No. 237036
INC./TIWI
Supreme
CONSOLIDATED UNION
Court
(APRI-TCU) ON BEHALF OF jManila
FE R.
RUBIO, MA. VICTORIA A. BELMES,
ELEANORE D. DALDE, RICARDO B.
COMPETENTE, and VICENTE A. Present:
MIRANDILLA; APRI-TIWI
EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION PERLAS-BERNABE, 7,
(APRLTIELU) ON BEHALF OF Chairperson,
VIRGILIO G. MACINAS, ROY D. HERNANDO,
DACULLO, ARNEL C. REPOTENTE, INTING,
and JAIME B. SARILLA; and APRI- DELOS SANTOS, and
TIWI GEOTHERMAL POWER PLANT GAERLAN,* JJ.
PROFESSIONAL/TECHNICAL
EMPLOYEES UN1ON-DIALOGWU
(APRI-TGPPPTEU-D) ON BEHALF OF
VENER I. DELA ROSA, ARVID G.
MUNI, ALVIN Y. SALONGA, ALVIN
M. ENGUERO, MA. BLANCA I.
FALCON, and SALVE V. LIZARDO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
ABOITIZ POWER RENEWABLES,

INC., MICHAEL B. PIERCE, ATTY.
MARTIN JOHN YASAY, JUAN
FELIPE ALFONSO, ARNEL
SUMAGUI, WILFREDO G.
SARMAGO, and ROBERTO L.
URBANO,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------
Designated as additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 2780 dated May II, 2020.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 237036
DECISION
DELOS SANTOS, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeking to set aside the Decision48 49 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 141100 promulgated on February 21, 2017 and its Resolution 50
dated January 11, 2018, affirming the Decision 51 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered on December 18, 2014, which upheld
the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the employees represented by the three
petitioner unions were not illegally dismissed.
The Parties
Aboitiz Power Renewables, Inc. (APR1) is a corporation engaged in the

operation of the Tiwi Geothermal Power Plant in Tiwi, Albay. Respondents
Michael Pierce (Pierce), Atty. Martin John Yasay (Atty. Yasay), Juan Felipe
Alfonso, Arnel Sumagui, Wilfredo Santiago, and Roberto Urbano were
included in the complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice in their
capacity as officers of APRI.52
The three (3) petitioners are unions representing former employees of

APRI, who were allegedly illegally dismissed in September 2013. The three (3)
unions are: (a) Aboitiz Power Renewables, Inc.-Tiwi Consolidated Union
(APRI-TCU), the supervisory union, which was in the process of negotiating
their economic proposal; (b) APRI Tiwi Employees Labor Union (APRI-
TIELU), which represents the rank-and-file employees and was about to
conclude their collective bargaining agreement (CBA); and (c) APRI-Tiwi
Geothermal Power Plant Professional/Technical Employees Union-Dialogwu
(APRI-TGPPPTEU-D), which represents the professional/technical employees
and was undergoing a petition for certification election before Med Arbiter in
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office.6
Petitioner APRI-TCU represents the following supervisory employees: Fe R.

Rubio, Ma. Victoria A. Beirnes, Eleanore D. Dalde,
Ricardo B. Competente, and Vicente A. Mirandilla. Meanwhile, APRI- TIELU

represents the following rank-and-file: Virgilio G. Macinas, Roy D. Dacullo,
48 Rollo, pp. 11-39.
49 Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices
Mario V. Lopez (now a member of this Court) and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring; id. at 40-66.
50 Id. at 67-69.
51 Penned by Commissioner Mercedes R. Posada-Lacap, with Presiding Commissioner Grace E. Maniquiz-Tan
and Commissioner Dolores M. Peralta-Beley, concurring; id. at 92-144.
52 Id. at 42.
Amel C. Repotente, and Jaime B. Sarilla. Lastly, petitioner APRI- TGPPPTEU-

D represents the following employees: Vener I. Dela Rosa, Arvid G. Muni,
Alvin Y. Salonga, Alvin M. Enguero, Ma. Blanca I. Falcon, and Salve V.
Lizardo.
The Facts and the Antecedent Proceedings
The facts of the case, as culled from the assailed Decision and the
records, are as follows:
On September 16, 2013, APRI called for a town hall meeting, wherein
the employees were informed that the company will implement a redundancy
program that would result in the removal of around twenty percent (20%) of its
current employees. According to Atty. Yasay, APRI’s Assistant Vice President
for Legal and Commercial Services, the program was being carried out in light
of the declining steam production in the Tiwi Plant. APRI also cited the
adoption of the Oracle Enterprise Business Suit, which streamlined its supply
and financial system, as the further cause for the redundancy of several
positions within the company. In the afternoon of the same day, APRI’s
representatives began to individually meet the employees. The affected
employees were informed that their position in the company was found to be
redundant and that their employment will be terminated on October 20, 2013.
They were given and made to sign a Notice of Redundancy dated September
20, 2013, which served as the written notice of their inclusion in the
redundancy program. They were also
Q ,
made to sign a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and were given the option of
signing a letter53 54 55 addressed to Pierce, APRI’s President and Chief
Operating Officer. In the said letter, it was stated that the employees recognize
the company’s right to exercise the redundancy program and that they exercise
the option not to report for work from the receipt of the Notice of Redundancy
up to October 20, 2013, the date when their termination becomes effective.
As a consequence of their termination because of the redundancy program, the

affected employees were given two (2) manager’s checks.56 The first check
represented the separation pay, which was composed of the
following:
53 Id. al 472-473, 480-481, 489-490, 498-499, 507-508, 516-517, 525-526, 534-535, 543-544, 551-552, 560-561,
569-570, 578-579, 587-588, 595-596, 604-605, 613-614, 621-622, 630-631, 639-640, 648- 649, 657-658, 666-
667, 674-675.
54 Id. at 477-479, 485-487, 494-496, 503-505, 512-514, 521-523, 530-532, 539-541, 547-549, 556-558, 565-567,
574-576, 583-585, 592-594, 600-602, 609-611, 617-619, 626-628, 635-637, 644-646, 653- 655, 662-664, 671
-673, 679-681.
55 Id. at 474-475, 482-483, 491-492, 500-501, 509-510, 518-519, 527-528, 536-537, 545-546, 553-554, 562-563,
571-572, 580-581, 589-590, 597-598, 606-607, 615-616, 623-624, 632-633, 641-642, 650- 651, 659-660, 668-
669, 676-677.
56 Id. at 476, 484, 493, 502, 511, 520, 529, 538, 546, 555, 564, 573, 582, 591, 599, 608, 625, 634, 643, 652,
661,670, 678.
1. Separation pay of one (1) month of the basic salary rate per year of
service in May 26, 2009 to May 31, 2011;
2. Separation pay of one and a half (1.5) month of basic salary rate
per year of service in June 1, 2011 to the present;
3. Converted unused vacation leaves;
4. Converted unused sick leaves;
5. Pro-rated 13th month pay;
6. Salary from September 21 to October 20, 2013; and
7. Last salary pay.57
The second manager’s check was in the amount of P400,000.00, as the

one-time special assistance to each of the affected employees.58
In addition to the affected employees who assented to the redundancy

program, some employees59 also tendered their voluntary resignation. These
employees likewise received two (2) manager’s checks60 61 consisting of the
same components as those affected by the redundancy program, and were also
made to sign a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.13
Feeling aggrieved that they were forced to accept the redundancy

program or forced to resign, the said employees had the incident of their
termination recorded through a police blotter. Subsequently, they also filed
complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension (for employee Felicito
Torrente), unfair labor practice for union busting, and claims for 13 th month
pay, retirement benefits, damages, and attorney’s fees.62 63
In their complaint, employees contended that: (1) APRI failed to

comply with the notice requirement for redundancy; (2) the Notice of
Redundancy given to them and the notice to the DOLE contained selfserving
allegations without any evidence that justified the exercise of the redundancy
program as an authorized cause for termination; (3) APRI has not shown that it
was overmanned and failed to show proof on the decline on steam production
that justified its redundancy program; and (4) APRI failed to show the criteria
used to determine which employees will be removed due to redundancy in their
positions. Lastly, they alleged that their removal was equivalent to union
busting and unfair labor practice since it came amidst the 17 negotiations
between their respective unions and APRI.
APRI, for its part, countered that the removal of the employees was a
valid exercise of its prerogative to declare redundant positions. According to
APRI, there were two circumstances that led for it to carry out a right-sizing
57 Id. at 43.
58 Id.
59 11 Id. at 102-103; Angel M. Barredo, Emil B. Chiong, Ricardo B. Competente, Vener I. Dela Rosa, Maria C.
Jebulan, Vicente A. Mirandilla, Arvid G. Muni, Crispin B. Pabelina.
60 Id. at 689, 694, 699, 704, 709, 714, 719, 724.
61 Id. at 690-692, 695-697, 700-702, 705-707, 710-712,715-717, 720-722, 725-727.
62 Id. at 44.
63 Id.
study, which thereby revealed the redundancy in the staffing of the company, to
wit: (1) there was a decline in the steam production in its geothermal plant in
Tiwi, which meant that the plant was not utilizing its full capacity; and (2) the
use of upgraded version of Oracle Business Enterprise, that interfaced its
Supply Management Systems to its Financial Systems.64
Moreover, APRI emphasized that it complied with the requisites for a

valid dismissal on the ground of redundancy. It was claimed that the notice of
redundancy to the employees and the notice to the DOLE were both compliant
to the thirty (30) day period required by law. APRI asserted that the affected
employees received not only the required separation pay but also an additional
P400,000.00, which was over and above of what it was bound to give. Lastly,
APRI pointed out that the right-sizing study led the company to come up with
fair and reasonable criteria to be used in determining which employees would
be subject to the redundancy program. APRI maintained that the redundancy
program was implemented in good faith.65 66 67
As regards employees who were allegedly forced to resign, APRI

claimed that these employees voluntarily resigned having executed written
resignations which contain words of gratitude, which was an indicia of
voluntariness of their resignations. Finally, as to the allegation of union busting
or unfair labor practice, APRI argued that these issues were moot and already
academic considering that during the mandatory conference, the 20 parties had
limited the issue to the validity of the redundancy program/
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On March 21, 2014, Executive Labor

9 1 Arbiter (ELA) Jose C. Del Valle,
Jr. (Del Valle, Jr.) rendered a Decision - dismissing the complaints for illegal
dismissal for lack of merit. ELA Del Valle, Jr. ratiocinated that the employees
were legally and validly dismissed due to the implementation of APRI’s
redundancy program. Fie found that: (1) APRI complied with the requisites for
a valid redundancy program, z.e., written notices were sent to and received by
the affected employees and the DOLE at least one (1) month prior to the
intended date of termination of employment; (2) employees were given
separation pay and an additional P400,000.00 as an act of grace; (3) APRI used
fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant and accordingly abolished; and (4) there was good faith on the part
of APRI in abolishing the redundant positions. He rejected the employees’
assertion of unfair labor practice and union busting, and held that the fact that
APR1 implemented the redundancy program in the midst of negotiation for
CBA alone will not suffice to declare the company guilty of unfair labor
practice.68
64 Id. at 44-45.
65 Id. at 45.
66 Id.
67 Not attached to the rollo.
68 Rollo, pp. 45-46.
Feeling aggrieved, the affected thirty-two (32) employees69 filed an

appeal before the NLRC. Some of these employees were members of the three
(3) petitioner unions.
Ruling of the NLRC
In a Decision70 71 dated December 18, 2014, the NLRC also found that
APRI had properly carried out its redundancy program, thus, it ruled that the
dismissal of the employees on the basis of redundancy of their respective
positions was valid. It likewise ruled that the resignation of the following
employees: Angel M. Barredo, Emil B. Chiong, Ricardo B. Competente, Vener
I. Dela Rosa, Maria C. Jebulan, Vicente A. Mirandilla, Arvid G. Muni, and
Crispin B. Pabelina, were voluntary and valid. Lastly, it was held that the
employees failed to show that the actions of APRI constitute unfair labor
practice. According to the NLRC, in order to prove that the employer
committed unfair labor practice under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is
required to support the claim, in which the employees failed to show.
The affected employees filed a Motion for Reconsideration" but was

denied in a Resolution72 dated March 31,2015.
Accordingly, three (3) petitions were filed before the CA to appeal the
Decision of the NLRC, namely: (1) CA-G.R. SP No. 139214, entitled,
Felecito C. Torrente, et al. vs. NLRC and AP Renewables, Inc. (Torrente
case); (2) CA-G.R. SP No. 140436, entitled, Engr. Tito Brizuela, Jr. vs. NLRC
and AP Renewables Inc., et al. (Brizuela case); and (3) CA-GR. SP No.
141100, entitled, APRI-TICU, et al. vs. AP Renewables, Inc. et al. (Unions’
case). Both the Brizuela case and the Unions’ case were consolidated with the
Torrente case (the case with the lowest docket number) on August 14, 2015
and on October 5, 2015, respectively.
Judgment of the CA
At the outset, the CA dismissed the Torrente case citing that the
petitioners therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC
beyond the ten (10) day reglementary period. Thus, the CA held that the
Decision of the NLRC was already final as to them.73
69Id. at 97-99; Ricardo B. Competente, Vicente A. Mirandilla, Tito L. Brizuela, Jr., Felecito C. Torrente, Ma.
Victoria A. Beirnes, Fe. R. Rubio, Eleanore D. Dalde, Crispin B. Pabelina, Arvid G. Muni, Alvin Y. Salonga,
Emil B. Chiong, Maria C. Jebulan, Emmanuel R. Pesebre, Jaime M. De Jesus, Jr., Vicente Jonas C. Zepeda,
Vener I. Dela Rosa, Alvin M. Enguero, Jaime B. Sarilla, Arnel C. Repotente, Roy D. Dacullo, Angel M.
Barredo, Asterio C. Credo, Jr., Jose D. Canezo, Jr., Odon Q. Verbo, Jr., Bonifacio R. Brosas, Miguel C.
Comot, Jr., Sandie C. Ner, Elmer C. Dacuno, Raul C. Brosas, Virgilio G. Macinas, Ma. Blanca 1. Falcon,
Salve V. Lizardo.
70 Id. at 92-144.
73 Rollo, p. 53.
Anent the cases of Brizuela and the three unions, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter (LA) and the NLRC that the employees were validly
dismissed on account of APRTs implementation of its redundancy program.
According to the CA, all the four (4) requisites for a valid implementation of
the program were sufficiently proven by APR!. 74 The CA likewise ruled that
the petitioners failed to present substantial evidence in support of their charge
of unfair labor practice against APR!.75 The CA disposed, thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are DENIED,

there being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent in
rendering the assailed Decision dated December 18, 2014 and the Resolution dated
March 31, 2015.
SO ORDERED.76 (Emphasis on the original)
Dissatisfied, Brizuela and the three (3) unions filed their motions for
reconsideration, which were denied in a Resolution 77 dated January 11, 2018. In
the said resolution, the CA noted that based on their records, petitioners in the
Torrente case filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the
Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 230254.
This is an appeal by the unions in behalf of their members or officers,

who were affected by the subject redundancy program and those who were
allegedly forced to resign.
Issues
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the validity of APRl’s

Redundancy Program;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the validity of the

dismissal from employment of petitioners’ officers and members; and
(3) Whether or not CA erred in discounting unfair labor practice in

the form of union busting against APRI and the other respondents.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the petition.
Prefatorily, it should be noted that in a Resolution^ 2 dated July 31, 2017,

this Court resolved to deny the petition in GR. No. 230254 or the Torrente case.
In the said Resolution, this Court affirmed the findings of the CA that the
Decision of the NLRC as to the said case had now attained finality due to the
74 Id. at 54.
75 Id. at 64-65.
76 Id. at 65.
77 Id. at 67-69.
failure of the petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration within the ten (10)
day period. More pointedly, this Court reiterated therein the settled rule that
factual findings of the CA, which coincide with those of the LA and the NLRC
are generally accorded respect and finality by this Court.
Even then, in this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners claimed

that there was a gross misappreciation of the evidence, which warrants
consideration of this Court. Essentially, petitioners asked for the review of the
factual findings of the LA, NLRC, and the CA.
It is settled that only questions of law may be raised on appeal under

this remedy for the reason that this Court is not a trier of facts. Nevertheless,
this Court may review the facts where: (1) the findings and conclusions of the
LA, on one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, are inconsistent on
material and substantial points; (2) the findings of the NLRC and the CA are
capricious and arbitrary; and (3) the CA’s findings that are premised on a
supposed absence of evidence are in fact contradicted by the evidence on
record/3
In the case of Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa. Pilipinas v.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc.^ this Court reiterated the
adoption of particular parameters of judicial review from the CA’s Rule 65
Decision on a labor case, to wzf.
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA

decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under
Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised
against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the
CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it
correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the
merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the
CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC 78 79 80
decision challenged before it.81 82 83 84 (Emphasis in the original)
Thus, the ultimate question to resolve is whether the CA correctly ruled

that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that: (1)
there was a redundancy; (2) there was no illegal dismissal; and (3) there was no
unfair labor practice. Here, the LA, the NLRC, and the CA were unanimous in
concluding that the petitioners, who are officers or members of the petitioner
7832 Id. at 1270-1271.

7933 Soriano, Jr. v. NLRC, 550 Phil. 111, 125 (2007).
8034 809 Phil. 106(2017).
81 Id. at 121, citing Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, 700 Phil. 1, 9 (2012) and Montoya v.
Transmecl Manila Corporation, 613 Phil. 696, 707 (2009).
82 Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines v. Macapagal, G.R.. No. 232669, July 29, 20 19. (Citations omitted)
83 Rollo, p. 116.
84 Id. at 124.
unions, were legally dismissed by reason of a valid redundancy program by

APRI, and that APRI did not commit unfair labor practice in the form of union
busting.
The Court finds that the CA was correct in its determination that the
NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Decision of the NLRC
was premised on substantial evidence and was consistent with law and
jurisprudence.
Redundancy is an authorized cause for termination of employment under

Article 298 (formerly Article 283) of the Labor Code. It exists when “the
services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the
actual requirements of the enterprise.” It can be due to “a number of factors,
such as the overhiring of workers, a decrease in the volume of business or the
dropping of a particular line or service previously manufactured or undertaken
by the enterprise.” The determination of whether the employees’ services are
no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable for
redundancy, is an exercise of business judgment. In making such decision,
however, management must not violate the law nor declare redundancy without
sufficient basis. To ensure that the dismissal is not implemented arbitrarily,
jurisprudence requires the employer to prove, among others, its good faith in
abolishing the redundant positions as well as the existence of fair and
reasonable criteria in the selection of employees who will be dismissed from
employment due to redundancy. Such fair and reasonable criteria may include,
but are not limited to: (a) less preferred status, z.e., temporary employee; (d)
efficiency; and (c) seniority/
In upholding the legality of the employees’ dismissal, the NLRC ruled

that the evidence submitted by APRI showed compliance to all the four (4)
requisites for a valid implementation of the redundancy program. These
included the following: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the
DOLE one (1) month prior to the intended date of dismissal; (2) payment of
separation pay and the additional P400,000.00; ‘ (3) fair and reasonable criteria
in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly
abolished;85 and (4) good faith in abolishing the
85 Id. at 125.
redundant positions.86
The good faith of APRI can be gleaned from its showing that the
services of the affected employees were indeed in excess of what is required by
the company. Meanwhile, the Right-Sizing Program,87 the study in which the
redundancy program was based, showed the implementation guidelines and
criteria used by APRI in determining redundant positions, which this Court also
found to be fair and reasonable.
As regards the claim of unfair labor practice in the form of union

busting, this Court finds that the record of this case is also bereft of any
substantial evidence to support the charge against APRI.
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to
organize. There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting
unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-organization.
Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be
shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-
organize. To prove the existence of unfair labor practice, substantial evidence
has to be presented.88
Petitioners’ assertion that APRI’s redundancy program was meant to

interfere with or frustrate petitioners’ union activities and negotiation of CBA
was a bare conclusion and unsupported by sufficient proof.
In sum, this Court finds that the rulings of the LA, the NLRC, and the
CA were predicated on the evidence on record and prevailing jurisprudence.
We also found no compelling reason to depart from the general rule that the
unanimous findings of these three tribunals are binding upon this Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 141100 dated February
21, 2017 and the Resolution dated January 11, 2018 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EDGARDO L. DELOS SANTOS

Associate Justice
40
41
86Id. at 128.
87Id. at 426-471.
88 San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., 819 Phil. 326, 337-
330 (2017), citing Zambrano v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing, 811 Phil. 569 (2017).
WE CONCUR:
MJUAZ?
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
RAMON PAUL L. HERNANDO HENRI JEAN PAU . INTING

Associate Justice Associate Justice
SAMUEL H. GAERLAN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
Court’s Division.
ESTELA MI AS-BERNABE
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chie f
Justice
Promulgated: Mepublic of tlje
Supreme Court
0 8. JUL7020^ Manila
SECOND DIVISION
INTERCREW SHIPPING G.R. No. 239299

AGENCY, INC., STAR
EMIRATES MARINE SERVICES Present:
AND/OR GREGORIO ORTEGA,
Petitioners, PERLAS-BERNABE, S.A.J
Chairperson,.
HERNANDO,
INTING, DELOS SANTOS
- versus - and GAERLAN,* JJ.
OFRECINO B. CALANTOC,
Respondent.
DECISION
INTING, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari' under Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated November 27, 2017 and the Resolution3 dated May 10,
2018 of the Court o 'Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. .141153, and to
reinstate the Decision4 dated March 31, 2015 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissing the complaint for disability
compensation for lack of merit.
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2780 dated’May 11,2020.
1
Ro/Io. pp. 32-47.
2
Id. at 13-27; penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda (now a member of the Court) with
Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring.
3
Id. at 29-30.
CA rollo, pp. 25-38; penned by Commissioner Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra with the concurrence of
Presiding Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and the dissent of Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-
De Castro.
Decision 2 G.R.No. 239299
The Antecedents
On March 14, 2008, Intercrew Philippines Agency, Inc. (Intercrew

Shipping) hired Ofrecino B. Calantoc (respondent) for its foreign
principal, Star Emirates Marine Services (Star Emirates), as fourth
engineer for a period of 12 months with a basic monthly salary of
US$700.00. As such, respondent underwent a pre-employment medical
examination and was declared “fit for sea duty,” despite his high blood
pressure.-''
On March 20, .2008, respondent was deployed to join the vessel

MV Oryx. Four months into his contract, respondent already experienced a
slurring of speech, weakness on his right side, and was diagnosed with a
mild stroke. However, he still continued his work on board the vessel, but
he later on requested to be repatriated when his condition worsened.89 90
On July 14, 2008, respondent arrived in the Philippines. Fie

immediately reported to Intercrew Shipping, Star Emirates and Gregorio
Ortega, as the President/General Manager of Intercrew Shipping
(collectively, petitioners) and requested for medical assistance, but to no
avail. Respondent made several requests, but were repeatedly refused. Fie
was then constrained to consult a doctor at his own expense.91 92 93
On January 29, 2009, respondent then underwent a Magnetic

Resonance Imaging (MRI) examination which revealed a large convexity
meningioma* a tumor in the left frontoparietal region. On the same date,
respondent was admitted to the University of Santo Tomas Hospital due to
dysphasia. Fie was also assessed with meningioma, left parietal convexity,
hypertension stage 2. On respondent’s 10th day in the hospital, he
underwent a surgery on his skull, i.e., a "left frontoparietal craniotomy for
excision of meningioma and duraplasty.”*
89Rollo, p. 14.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 14-15.
92 K Id. at 15. Meningioma is a tumor that forms on membranes that cover the brain and spinal cord just
inside the skull, x x x. The causes of meningioma are not well understood. However, there are two
known risk factors: Exposure to radiation, Neurofibromatosis type 2, a genetic disorder. WebMD,
“Meningioma,” <http:// www.webmd.com/cancer/brain-cancer/meningioma-causes- symptoms-
treatment# I> (fast accessed 18 Sept. 2017).
93 Id.
Decision G.R.No. 239299
Respondent now claimed that because of his illness he was unable

to return to his customary work as a seafarer for more than 120 days.
Petitioners repeatedly refused to grant him disability benefits. Thus, he
filed a complaint claiming disability compensation, payment of medical
expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees.10
Petitioners, on the other hand, asserted that there was no accident or

medical incident that happened on board the vessel during the period of
respondent’s employment; that respondent only requested to be signed off
due to a pre-existing high blood pressure; that upon respondent’s arrival,
he was referred to the company-designated physician, but refused to
undergo post-employment medical examination; and that respondent opted
to collect his final pay and in fact, executed a release in petitioners’
favor.11
For the petitioners, respondent failed to prove that he suffered a

work-related illness during the term of his employment; that respondent’s
claim had already been rendered stale by his inaction for two years as
when he was repatriated on July 15, 2008 and only filed the complaint on
December 21, 2010.12
Riding of the Labor Arbiter (LA)
On August 28 2014, LA Jaime M. Reyno rendered a Decision 13,

the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby-

rendered ordering Intercrew Shipping Agency/Star Emirates marine
Services/Gregorio Ortega to pay complainant Ofrecino B. Calantoc the
amount of SIXTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS ($60,000.00)
representing full disability benefits-plus ten percent (10%) thereof as
and for attorney's fees.
Respondents are likewise liable to pay complainant the amount

of P557,062.50 as medical reimbursement plus the amount of
US$2,800.00 as sickness wages.
All other claims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.14
10 Id.
II Id. at >5-16.
12 Id. at 16.
1. CA rollo, pp. 124-133.
1
Id. at 133.
14
Decision G.R.No. 239299
Ruling of the NLRC
On March 31, .2015, the NLRC rendered a Decision, 1' with

Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro, dissenting. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED; and the

assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter is SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.94 95
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.96
On May 15, 2015, the NLRC denied the motion through a

Resolution.97 98
In his Petition for Certiorari^ under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

before the CA, respondent raised the following grounds for the latter’s
consideration, to wit:
I. THE [NLRC] (SIXTH DIVISION) GRAVELY ABUSED

[THEIR] DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN SETTING ASIDE THE. DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE [LA],
II. THE [NLRC] (SIXTH DIVISION) GRAVELY ABUSED

[THEIR] DISCRETION AMOUNTING. TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, DISENTITLING [RESPONDENT] TO PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS[,] MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENT AND
FULL SICKNESS ALLOWANCE AS STATED IN THE CONTRACT AND
THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.
III. THE [NLRC] (SIXTH DIVISION) GRAVELY ABUSED

[THEIR] DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION DISMISSING THE CASE
94 Id. at 25-38.
95 Id. at 3 i -32.
96 Id. at 248-258.
97 Id. at 39-41.
98 Id. at 1-22.
Decision 5 G.R'No. 239299
DISENTITLING [RESPONDENT] TO DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S

FEES.99
Ruling of the CA
On November. 27, 2017, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 100

finding merit in the petition. It approved the Dissenting Opinion of
Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro as to why respondent’s illness is
compensable. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, ’ premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 31 March 2015 and Resolution
dated 15 May 2015 rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated 28 August 2014. is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, in that
attorney's fees in the amount of one thousand US dollars (US$1,000.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine pesos, computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the
time or actual payment, should be paid.
The monetary judgment due to the petitioner shall earn legal interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until fully
satisfied.
SO ORDERED.101
Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion- for

Reconsideration.102 103
On May 10, 2018, the CA issued the assailed Resolution23 denying

the motion.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
THAT RESPONDENT-SEAFARER’S SIGN- OFF FROM THE VESSEL

WAS DUE TO WORK-RELATED MEDICAL GROUNDS CANNOT BE
PRESUMED. RECORDS OF THIS CASE REVEAL
99 A/, at 10.
100 Rollo, pp. 13-27.
101 Id. at 26.
102 Id. at 73-80.
103Id. at 29-30.
Decision 6 G.R:No. 239299
THAT RESPONDENT SIGNED OFF ON 15 JULY 2008 DUE TO HIS

VOLUNTARY REQUEST.
CIRCUMSTANCES SUBSEQUENT TO RESPONDENT’S SIGN OFF BELIE

THE CLAIM. RESPONDENT DID NOT DEMAND FOR POST-
EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION WITHIN 3 DAYS FROM
ARRIVAL - INSTEAD HE RECEIVED HIS FINAL WAGES ON 23 JULY
2008. IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM, RESPONDENT PRESENTED A
MEDICAL ABSTRACT DATED 20 FEBRUARY 2009, 7 MONTHS AFTER
HIS SIGN OFF. MEANWHILE, THE COMPLAINT FOR DISABILITY-
COMPENSATION WAS FILED ONLY ON 26 JANUARY 2011, ALMOST 3
YEARS AFTER SIGN OFF.
THERE IS NO PROOF ON RECORD THAT RESPONDENT’S ALLEGED

ILLNESS IS WORK-RELATED. UNDER THE POEA CONTRACT, ONLY
WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES SUFFERED DURING THE TERM OF
EMPLOYMENT ARE COMPENSABLE. WORK-RELATION CANNOT BE
PRESUMED. NO LESS THAN THE SUPREME COURT HAS RULED THAT
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO PROVE WORK-RELATION BELONGS TO
THE SEAFARER WL.0 IS CLAIMING COMPENSATION.
THE CLAIM WAS DENIED BY PETITIONERS ON JUST AND VALID

GROUNDS. RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES. 104
105
(Italics in the original.)
Our Ruling
The petition is without merit.
“Preliminarily, the Court stresses the distinct approach in reviewing

a CA’s ruling in a labor case. In a Rule 45 review, the Court examines the
correctness of the CA’s Decision in .contrast with the review.of
jurisdictional errors under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review
to questions of law. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court views the CA
Decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari was presented
to the CA. Hence, the Court has to examine the CA’s Decision from the
prism of whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of
grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision.’126
“In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the

NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantia]
evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a
104 Id. at 38.
105 2,1 Pelagio v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R.. No. 231773, March 11, 2019, citing UST v.
Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, et al.. 809 Phil. 212, 219-220 (2017), further citing Quebral v. Angbns
Construction, Inc, 798 Phil. 179, 187 (2016).
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Thus, if

the NLRC’s ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and
jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should
so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the petition.”106
Here, the CA found that the NLRC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it granted petitioner’s
appeal before it. The Court defines, grave abuse of discretion as such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.107 It must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform.a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.108
Given the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA did not err in
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC as the latter’s
finding that there is no sufficient evidence in the case to conclude that
respondent suffered from a work-related illness and is, therefore, not
entitled to permanent and total disability benefits is obviously not in
accord with evidence on record and settled legal principles of labor law.
In this case, respondent executed his employment contract with

petitioners on March 14, 2008. Thus, the provisions of the 2000 Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC)109 are applicable and should govern the parties’ relations.
Section 20(B)(6) of the 2000 POEA-SEC provides:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS x x x x
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or
illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
XXXX
106 Id.
107 2S Ramiro Lim & Sons Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Ciuitaran, G.R. No. 221967, February 6, 20.19 citing
United Coconut. Planters Rank v. Loovuko, 560 Phil. 581,591-592 (2007).
108 Id.
109Philippine Overseas Employment-Administration Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 2000.
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either

injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the
schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of
his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and
the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was
contracted.
Given the foregoing provision, there are two elements that must
concur before an injury or illness is considered compensable: first, that the
injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the work- related
injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarers'
employment contract.110
The “work-related injury,” under the 2000' POEA-SEC, is defined

as “injury(ies)” resu Ong in disability or death arising out of and in the
course of employment; “work-related illness” is defined as “any sickness
resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed
under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied,” to wit:
1. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the

described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such
other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. 1 here was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.111 112
in this case, it is undisputed that in the Pre-Employment Medical

Examination (PEME)JJ of respondent, under his medical history, he
suffered from or had been told that he has a high blood pressure. It is
likewise beyond dispute that, respondent’s mild cerebro-vascular accident
or stroke is a compensable disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-
SEC, as correctly found by the NLRC.113
However, the Court adheres to the findings of both the LA and the
51
110 Bautista v. Ei burg Shipmanagemen! Philippines. Inc. et al., 767 Phil. 488, 497 (2015), citing
Magsaysay Maritime Services, et al. v. Laurel,~ltPI Phil. 210, 221 (2013); Nisda v. Sea Serve Maritime
Agency, 611 Phil. 291,317 (2009).
11112 Id. at 497-498. ’
112w CKrollo, p. 201.
113Id. at 31.
CA that petitioners, despite knowing that respondent has a high blood

pressure, gave the latter a clean bill of health, through the former’s
accredited clinic, before deployment which leads to a conclusion that
whatever illness respondent suffers on board the vessel is work-related. It
goes without saying, too, that respondent’s work as a seafarer could have
attributed to the development of his meningioma.114 115
In the words of the LA, “[wj/zz/e on board the vessel,

[respondent] is exposed, to extremes in temperature brought about by the
harshness of sea travel and the elements of the sea and has no choice of
the food, that they eat because whatever are their provisions, the same
shall be served to them.”3b
Further, the Court adopts the CA’s approval of Commissioner

Nieves E. Vivar-de Castro’s Dissenting Opinion, which reads:
Moreover, the Complainant’s hypertension, while preexisting is

merely one of the factors that caused his stroke. - Conversely, the nature and
conditions of the Complainant’s employment also took, part in the resulting
illness which he had suffered. These include, as aptly stated by the Labor
Arbiter a quo, the Complainant’s exposure to extreme’temperatures brought
about by the harshness of sea travel and the elements of the sea, the quality and
condition of the food he ate, as well as, the strain and stress that he had to suffer
brought about by his duties and tasks on board the vessel. Otherwise stated,
such nature and conditions of work at the very least increased the risk of
contracting the illness, or aggravated his pre-existing .hypertension that led to
his stroke, and for which he should be compensated therefor. As earlier
mentioned, that the work contributed even to a small degree to to the
development or aggravation of the disease is enough to warrant compensation,
xxx
It may noi. be amiss to note at this juncture that due to the lack of
proper medic i' treatment after his repatriation, the Complainant’s medical
condition worsened which ultimately led to a finding of Meningioma, a kind of
brain tumor which is often described as slow- growing xxx. To my mind,
despite having been discovered or. diagnosed six (6} months after the
Complainant’s repatriation, the said
illness nevertheless manifested at the first instance when he suffered a stroke

while on board the vessel, x x x116
Thus, the Court adheres to Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De

114 Id. at 129-130; rollo, p. 23.
1153b CAro/Zu, p. 130.
116 Id. at 33-35.
Castro in saying that petitioners having engaged the respondent as

hypersensitive as he is, they should now accept the liability for his ensuing
ailment in the course of his employment.117
It is not required that an employee must be in perfect health when he

contracted the illness to be able to recover disability compensation'. 118 It is
equally true, that while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the
employees, once he takes the employees as he finds them, then he already
assumes the risk of liability.119
In sum, despite respondent’s pre-existing high blood pressure or

hypertension, he was still initially declared fit for sea duty during his
PEME. Therefore, his meningioma is presumed to have been brought
about by the nature of his employment and occurred during and in the
course of his employment. This goes without saying that respondent is
entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because, as aptly found
by both the labor arbiter and the CA, he would not be able to resume to his
position as a fourth engineer or, at least, be hired by other maritime
employers.120
Section 20(B)(6) of the POE A-SEC mandates the employer to pay

the seafarer disability benefits for his permanent total or partial disability
caused by the work-related illness or injury once’there is already, a finding
of permanent either total or partial disability within the 120-day period or
the 240-day period.121 A permanent disability essentially means a
permanent reduction of the earning power of a seafarer to perform future
sea or on board duties and permanent disability benefits serve as a means
to alleviate the seafarer's financial condition on account of the level of
injury or illness he incurred or contracted.122
A reading of the three kinds of liabilities under Section 20(B) of the

POEA-SEC means that the POEA-SEC intended to make the employer
liable for (1) the seafarer’s sickness allowance equivalent to his basic
wage in addition to the medical treatment that they must provide the
seafarer with at their cost; and (2) seafarer’s permanent total or partial
117,s Id. at 33.

118Id, citing Seagull Shipmanagement and Tran., Inc. vs. NLRC, 388 Phil. 906, 914 (2000).
119•10 Id.
120■" Id. at 128.
121The Laie Alberto 13. Javie ; et al. v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. el a/., 738 Phil. 374, 387
(2014).
122J3 Id. at 388. Citation omitted.
disability as finally determined by the company-designated physician.123 124
The Court ratiocinated that while Section 20 of the POEA- SEC did
not state n clear terms that the employer’s liabilities are cumulative in
nature which means to say that the employer is liable for the sickness
allowance, medical expenses and disability benefits, it does not, however,
state tnat the compensation and benefits are alternative or that the grant of
one negates the grant of the others.125 This interpretation, in fact, is in
accord with the constitutional policy that guarantees full protection to
labor, b cth local and overseas.46
Time and again, the Court is clear that the POEA-SEC is imbued
with public interest. Accordingly, its provisions must be construed fairly,
reasonably, and liberally in favor of the seafarer in the pursuit of his
employment on board ocean-going vessels.126
AU told, the C ourt finds it proper the award to respondent of the

following amounts., to wit: (l)US$60,000.00 as permanent total disability
benefit;127” (2)US$2,800.00 as sickness allowance;128 129 130 131 (3)
P557,062.50 as medical expenses;6” and (4) US$1,000.00 as attorney's
fees.61
In accordance with Nacar v. Gallery Frames?2 the monetary

awards shall earn a legal interest of 6% per annum computed from finality
of the Decision-in this case until full satisfaction thereof.
123 id.
124 id.
125 Id. at 389.
126 Id. at 388-389. .
127 Rolle-, p. 24.
12840 Id. at 25.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 716 Phil. 267 (2013).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 27, 2017 and the Resolution dated May 10, 2018 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 141153 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
HEN JEAN P LB. INTING

Associate Justice ■
WE CONCUR:
tp. ifu//
Chairperson
RA PAUL L.
HERNANDO EDGARDO L. DELOS SANTOS

Associate Justice Associate Justice
SAMUEL H. GAERLAN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
1 attest that the .onclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Divis An.
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division ChairpersonAttestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Divisior
DIOS DADOM. PERALTA

Chief\histice
Republic of tlje Îjihppine#
Supreme (Court
jFRanila
SECOND DIVISION
THE HEIRS OF REYNALDO A. G.R. No. 244361

ANDAG, namely VENERANDA
B. ANDAG, JAYMARK B.
ANDAG, HONEY GRACE B. Present:
ANDAG and KIM PHILIP B.
ANDAG, represented by their PERLAS-BERNABE, S.A.
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, J., Chairperson,
VENERANDA B. ANDAG, J. REYES, JR.,*
Petitioners, HERNANDO,
- versus -
DMC CONSTRUCTION
EQUIPMENT RESOURCES
INC., JORGE A. CONSUNJI,
President, and AGUSTINE B.
GONZALEZ, Area Manager,
Respondents.
x -------------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated
February 28, 2018 and the Resolution3 dated December 12, 2018 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 10946 which upheld the
Designated additional member per raffle dated March 16, 2020.
Designated additional member per raffle dated June 22, 2020.
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2780 dated May 11,2020.
1
Rollo, pp. 24-42.
2
Id. at 63-73. Penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap with Associate Justices Geraldine C. Fiel-
Macaraig and Gabriel T. Robeniol, concurring.
id. at 45-48. Penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos
Santos (now a member of this Court) and Emily R. Alino-Geluz, concurring.
Resolution 2 G.R. No. 244361
Decision1 dated January 30, 2017 and the Resolution132 133 dated March 23, 2017
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. VAC-
01-000024-2017 which held, inter alia, that: (a) petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo A.
Andag (Reynaldo), namely Veneranda B. Andag, Jaymark B. Andag, Honey
Grace B. Andag, et aPs (petitioners) claim for damages against respondent DMC
Construction Equipment Resources, Inc. (DMCI) is a claim based on torts which
is cognizable by the regular courts; and (/?) petitioners are not entitled to the
monetary reliefs sought.
The Facts
Petitioners alleged that on July 16, 2012, respondent DMC Construction

Equipment Resources Inc. (DMCI) employed Reynaldo as Second Mate on its
tugboat, the M/T Alexander Paul. On October 18, 2013, as the tugboat was
towing an overloaded barge, a recoiling rope accidentally struck Reynaldo
causing him to be thrown towards the ship’s iron bars. Reynaldo was rushed to
the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Months after, DMCI
contacted petitioners and told them that it would give them the amount of
P200,000.00 as compensation for Reynaldo’s death under the condition that they
would execute a waiver and quitclaim in its favor. After refusing the offer,
petitioners no longer heard from DMCI, prompting them to send a formal
demand letter, which the latter ignored.134 Thus, they were constrained to file the
instant complaint against respondent before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of Iloilo City
seeking, inter alia, the payment of: (a.) death compensation/benefits; (b) actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees for the latter’s
alleged negligence resulting in the death of Reynaldo; and (c) other monetary
claims due to Reynaldo, e.g., holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th
month pay.135
In its defense, DMCI maintained that: (rz) petitioners should recover

death benefits not from it as Reynaldo’s employer, but from the State Insurance
Fund, i.e., the Social Security System (SSS); (&) the amount of P200,000.00 it
offered to petitioners represents the proceeds of the accidental death insurance
policy it voluntarily secured in favor of its employees which the latter,
unfortunately, refused to accept; and (c) it had already paid Reynaldo’s
monetary benefits as evidenced by various documents such as the latter’s
payslips.136
132 Id. at 233-243. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Violeta Ortiz-Bantug with Commissioners Julie C.
Rendoque and Jose G. Gutierrez, concurring.
133 Id. at211-215.
134 Id. at 234-235.
135 Id. at 233-234.
136 Id. at 236.
Resolution G.R. No. 244361
The LA Ruling
In a Decision137 elated September 28, 2016, the Labor Arbiter (LA)

dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. 138 The LA agreed with
DMCI that petitioners’ claim for death benefits should have been made before
the State Insurance Fund. It also pointed out that petitioners failed to present
evidence of DMCI’s liability for Reynaldo’s death.139 Further, it denied their
claim for moral and exemplary damages for lack of merit.140 Finally, the LA
found that DMCI had already paid all the wages and monetary benefits due to
Reynaldo.141 142 143
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision11 dated January 30, 2017, the NLRC affirmed the LA ruling
with modification, ordering DMCI to turn over to petitioners the P200,000.00
accidental death insurance proceeds without any condition. 13 It ruled that: first, as
to the death benefits, since it was shown that Reynaldo was an inter-island
seaman, z.e., working within Philippine waters, and in the absence of any
contractual provision showing that DMCI is liable for death benefits, petitioners
should seek payment of such death benefits not from DMCI, but from the State
Insurance Fund, particularly the SSS.144 145 146 Second, as for the claim of damages
arising from DMCI’s alleged negligence resulting in the death of Reynaldo, the
NLRC held that the Labor Tribunals have no jurisdiction to hear this cause of
action, as it is a claim based on torts which is cognizable by the regular courts.
Third, as for the additional death insurance proceeds, the same should be released
to petitioners without any condition considering that the same had already been
released to DMCI, albeit the latter was unable to turn-over the same to
petitioners because it unduly conditioned it on petitioners signing a waiver and
quitclaim. ‘ Finally, while the NLRC was silent as to petitioners’ other monetary
claims due to Reynaldo, the ruling implied that it was upholding the LA’s
findings on this regard, z.e., that the same had already been paid by DMCI.
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for partial reconsideration147 but were

denied in a Resolution148 dated March 23, 2017. Hence, they filed a petition
137Id. at 245-253. Penned by Labor Arbiter Rodrigo P. Camacho.

138 Id. at 253.
139 Id. at 251-252.
140 Id. at 252-253.
141 Id. at 253.
142 Id. at 233-243.
143 Id. at 243.
144 Id. at 238-239.
145 Id. at 239-242.
146 Id. at 242.
147 Id. at 216-231.
148 Id. at 21 1-215.
21
for certiorari before the CA, principally assailing the NLRC’s findings that: (a)
petitioners’ claim for damages against DMCI is a claim based on torts which is
cognizable by the regular courts; and (/?) petitioners are not entitled to the
monetary reliefs sought.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision149 150 151 152 dated February 28, 2018, the CA upheld the
assailed NLRC rulings. It held that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion
in holding that: (a) petitioners’ claim for damages against DMCI is a claim based
on torts which is cognizable by the regular courts; and (5) petitioners are not
entitled to the monetary reliefs sought as it was shown that DMCI had already
paid the same.2j
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied in

a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2018. Hence, this petition.153 154
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
ruled that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing its assailed
rulings.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is without merit.
“Preliminarily, the Court stresses the distinct approach in reviewing a

CA’s ruling in a labor case. In a Rule 45 review, the Court examines the
correctness of the CA’s Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional
errors under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of
law. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court views the CA Decision in the
same context that the petition for certiorari was presented to the CA. Flence,
the Court has to examine the CA’s Decision from the prism of whether the CA
correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC decision.”-1
“Case law states that grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason o f passion
or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to
149 Id. at 74-100.
150 Id. at 63-73.
151 Id. at 69-73.
152 Id. at 45-48.
153 See id. at 32-36.
154 Pelagia v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R.. No. 23 1773, March 1 1,2019; citation omitted.
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty

enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.”27
“In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC
when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence,
which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC’s ruling has basis
in the evidence and the applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of
discretion exists and the CA should so deciare and, accordingly, dismiss the
petition.”28
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA

correctly found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in issuing
its assailed rulings, as the same is in accord with the evidence on record, as well
as settled principles of labor law.
At this juncture, the Court deems it worthy to point out that petitioners
seek the following: fy) death compensation/benefits for Reynaldo; (b) damages
arising from DMCI’s purported negligence which resulted in Reynaldo’s death;
(c) additional death benefits; and (d) other monetary claims due to Reynaldo,
e.g., holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay.
Anent the death compensation/benefits, the NLRC aptly noted that while
Reynaldo was indeed employed by DMCI as a seafarer, it must nevertheless be
pointed out that he was merely deployed in an inter-island vessel sailing
domestic waters. This being the case, his employment was not covered by any
POEA-Standard Employment Contract typical to employment contracts
involving seafarers sailing in international waters - a contract which specifically
contains provisions which make an employer liable should a seafarer perish
while on duty. Absent any specific provision in his employment contract with
DMCI, Reynaldo’s death on duty is governed by the Labor Code, particularly,
Articles 174, 178, 179, and 200 (a) [formerly Articles 168, 172, 173, and 194 (a)]
155
thereof. In this regard, case law instructs that “[t]he clear intent of the law is
that the employer should be relieved of the obligation of directly paying his
employees compensation for work-connected illness or injury on the theory that
this is part of the cost of production or business activity; and that no longer
would there be need for adversarial proceedings between an employer and his
employee in which there were specific legal presumptions operating in favor of
the employee and statutorily specified defenses available to an employer.” 156
Hence, “[o]nce the employer pays his share to the fund, all obligation on his part
155 See Department of Labor and Employment Department Advisory 140. 1, series of 2015, entitled
“RENUMBERING THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED”. The foregoing provisions read:
Article 174. [168] Compulsory Coverage. - Coverage in the State Insurance Fund shall be compulsory upon
all employers and their employees not over sixty (60) years of age; Provided, That an employee who is
over sixty (60) years of age and paying contributions to qualify for the retirement or life insurance benefit
administered by the System shall be subject to compulsory coverage.
Article 178. [172] Limitation of Liability. - The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for compensation to the
employee or his dependents, except when the disability or death was
to his employees is ended.”157 158 159 Given the foregoing, the Labor Tribunals
correctly ruled that DMCI is not liable for Reynaldo’s death benefits as it is the
State Insurance Fund, more particularly the SSS, which is liable therefor.
Anent petitioner’s claim for damages arising from DMCI’s purported

negligence which resulted in Reynaldo’s death, the NLRC correctly ruled that
petitioners’ allegations in their Position Paper12 before the LA make out a cause
of action for a tort, which is cognizable not by the labor tribunals, but by the
regular courts. ' On this note, while the maintenance of a safe and healthy
workplace is ordinarily a subject of labor cases, case law nevertheless clarifies
that a claim specifically grounded on the employer's negligence to provide a safe,
healthy and workable environment for its employees is no longer a labor issue,
but rather, is a case for quasi-delict which is under the jurisdiction of the regular
courts,160 as in this case. Lienee, should petitioners wish to pursue this cause of
action against DMCI, it should file the proper case therefor before the regular
courts.
As for the claim for additional death benefits, the Court notes that the
NLRC already ruled that petitioners are entitled to the amount of P200,000.00
representing the accidental death insurance proceeds which DMCI voluntarily
procured for its employees, such as Reynaldo; and that DMCI should turn-over
said amount to petitioners sans any condition.
Finally, as for the other monetary claims purportedly still due to

Reynaldo, the Labor Tribunals had correctly found that the same had already
been paid for by DMCI, as such finding was substantiated by evidence on
record, e.g., payslips. Verily, factual findings of labor tribunals, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded not only with respect, but
even with finality, and are thus binding on the Court.161
156occasioned by the employee’s intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another,
notorious negligence, or otherwise provided under this Title.
157Article 179. [173] Extent of Liability. - Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee,
his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided
for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven Hundred Sixty-One,
as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six Hundred Ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-Eight
Hundred Sixty-Four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other
agencies of the government.
158Article 200. [194] Death, - (a) Under such regulations as the Commission may approve, the System
shall pay to the primary beneficiaries upon the death of the covered employee under this Title, an amount
equivalent to his monthly income benefit, plus ten percent thereof for each dependent child, but not
exceeding five, beginning with the youngest and without substitution, except as provided for in paragraph
(j) of Article 167 hereof: Provided, however, That the monthly income benefit shall be guaranteed for five
years: Provided, further, That if he has no primary beneficiary, the System shall pay to his secondary
beneficiaries the monthly income benefit but not to exceed sixty months: Provided, finally, That the
minimum death benefit shall not be less than fifteen thousand pesos.
30
San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 247 Phil. 338, 348 (1988).
31
Id.
32
See rollo, pp. 254-270, particularly pp. 265-267.
15933 See id. at 239-242.
160 34 See Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. v. Adviento, 740 Phil 336, 348 (2014). See also Tolosa v. NLRC, 449 Phil.
271,284 (2003).
161 See Nahas v. Olarte, 734 Phil. 569, 579 (2014); ODF.JELL Philippines, Inc. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 246776, July
8, 2019 (Notice); and Salazar v. Loxon Wandset, Inc., UDK-16194, June 18, 2018 (Minute Resolution). See
also Kintanar, el. al. v. Sampaguita Tourist Inn/Abella G. Dacudao, et. al. (Minute Resolution), G.R. No.
225563, August 30, 2016; and Padernal v. Pedia-AIDS, Inc., G.R. No. 215665, January 11,2016 (Minute
In conclusion, no grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed in the

assailed NLRC rulings. Lienee, the CA correctly affirmed the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February

28, 2018 and the Resolution dated December 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 10946 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA Ml P1ERLAS-BERNABE
WE CONCUR:
SAMUEL IL GAERLAN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
Court’s Division.
ESTELA
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the^Gpurt’s Division,
Resolution).
DIOSD ADO M. PERALTA

Chief Justice stice

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SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 200815

LIERNANDO, J., Acting Chairperson

SMC is a corporation organized under Philippine laws which is engaged

SMC employed Gomez on September 16, 1986 as a researcher in the

The circumstances which led to the termination of Gomez’s employment

C2K is a corporation engaged in courier and delivery services, which

C2K brought the matter to the attention of SMC, which conducted an

SMC conducted an administrative investigation and hearing where

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter:

Ruling of the NLRC:

Aggrieved, Gomez appealed to the NLRC. In its September 23, 2008

SO ORDERED.I:> {Emphasis in the original)

SMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 which was denied by the

SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original).

14 Id. at 15 and 143.

SMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in

The Court’s Ruling

This Court finds SMC’s instant petition meritorious. Thus, We reverse

SMC claims that it validly terminated Gomez’s services on the grounds

We find SMC’s arguments tenable.

Nonetheless, employers may not arbitrarily dismiss their employees by

In University of the Immaculate Conception v. Office of the Secretary of

In the leading case of Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission^

In this case, We find that Gomez willfully, intentionally, knowingly,

Moreover, We give credence to the claim of C2K’s President, Figuracion,

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby

ABOITIZ POWER RENEWABLES,

DELOS SANTOS, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Aboitiz Power Renewables, Inc. (APR1) is a corporation engaged in the

The three (3) petitioners are unions representing former employees of

Petitioner APRI-TCU represents the following supervisory employees: Fe R.

Ricardo B. Competente, and Vicente A. Mirandilla. Meanwhile, APRI- TIELU

Amel C. Repotente, and Jaime B. Sarilla. Lastly, petitioner APRI- TGPPPTEU-

The Facts and the Antecedent Proceedings

As a consequence of their termination because of the redundancy program, the

The second manager’s check was in the amount of P400,000.00, as the

In addition to the affected employees who assented to the redundancy

Feeling aggrieved that they were forced to accept the redundancy

In their complaint, employees contended that: (1) APRI failed to

Moreover, APRI emphasized that it complied with the requisites for a

As regards employees who were allegedly forced to resign, APRI

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On March 21, 2014, Executive Labor

Feeling aggrieved, the affected thirty-two (32) employees69 filed an

Ruling of the NLRC

The affected employees filed a Motion for Reconsideration" but was

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are DENIED,

SO ORDERED.76 (Emphasis on the original)

This is an appeal by the unions in behalf of their members or officers,

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the validity of APRl’s

(2) Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the validity of the

(3) Whether or not CA erred in discounting unfair labor practice in

The Court denies the petition.

Prefatorily, it should be noted that in a Resolution^ 2 dated July 31, 2017,

Even then, in this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners claimed

It is settled that only questions of law may be raised on appeal under

In the case of Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa. Pilipinas v.

In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA

decision challenged before it.81 82 83 84 (Emphasis in the original)

Thus, the ultimate question to resolve is whether the CA correctly ruled

7832 Id. at 1270-1271.