Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Vol. LXII, No. 2, March 2001

Justified Morality
KURT BAIER

A. The Problem
My topic is Gert’s rich, probing, and brilliantly illuminating treatment of an
“evergreen” in moral theory, the question, “Why be moral?” (Call it “our”
question.) He offers three different reasons which, he claims, together consti-
tute an “adequate” and “satisfactory” as well as “the best possible” answer
(343-49). Here, it suffices to examine its gist: Acting morally is never irra-
tional, hence always rational, hence never rationally forbidden, sometimes
rationally required, and always rationally allowed. As he acknowledges, his
claim “that it is only rationally allowed to act morally may not be
strong enough for some philosophers, but that ...is the most that can be
shown” (343). He concedes “that in the important decisions about whether or
not to act morally, rationality does not provide a guide.... Disap-
pointing as this conclusion seems at first, any other conclusion would be
worse. Were rationality ever to prohibit acting morally, one would be
forced, in the case of conflict, to advocate either irrational or immoral behav-
ior. If rationality were always to require acting morally, one would be forced
to regard all immoral actions as irrational, including that which was
clearly in the self-interest of the agent. Contrasted with either of these alterna-
tives, the conclusion seems far less disappointing than before” (355;
emphasesadded).
Agreed, acting immorally is not always irrational. Still, I understand the
disappointment of those who expect an answer that can line up reason on the
side of morality against self-interest rather than taking no sides between
them. Surely, at least since Thrasymachus, many have suspected that exhorta-
tions always to act morally even when it is contrary to what one wants to do
or to what would be in one’s best interest, are hypocritical or misguided, and
following them is the mark of a sucker. Questioners who, like Glaucon and
Adeimantus (344), or Gert and most of his readers, take rationality as well as
morality seriously, want a justification of always acting morally that
provides adequate reason to think, not merely that reason never sides with
self-interest against morality, but that it always sides with morality
against self-interest when the two conflict. But that means showing either,

BOOK SYMPOSIUM 427

as Plato tried (343), that acting morally never conflicts with acting in one’s
best interest, or that reason always sides with acting morally even when it
does. Gert cannot reassure these questioners because, on the one hand, he
acknowledges that morality and self-interest sometimes conflict and, on the
other, that it is not irrational to do what is in one’s best interest even when it
would be immoral to do so since one then ips0 fact0 has reasons that defeat
the (prima facie) irrationality of acting morally (3580. This may be an
adequate answer for those who, like Glaucon and Adeimantus, think they
already have an adequate reason always to act morally as long as it is not
irrational to do so, but it cannot reassure those who raise our question
precisely because they do not know of any adequate reason why they should
act morally when it is against their best interest. They are prepared to act
morally when it is against their best interest but only if they can be
convinced that in these cases reason would always side with acting morally
and against self-interest. However, on Gert’s account “rationality”’ could do
this only if acting immorally were always irrational, and this, he argues, is
certainly false and, moreover, the consequences of its being true would be
“worse” (343).
To summarize: according to Gert’s best answer, “rationality” cannot guide
us in our choice between acting morally and acting in our best interest unless
one of these options is irrational and the other rational, for only then is one
of them (the irrational one) rationally forbidden and the other rationally
required; hence, when both are rational, “rationality” cannot come down on
either side.

B. A Solution
One premise of this “disappointing conclusion” is Gert’s conception of ratio-
nality. It can be avoided by two modifications: acknowledging a larger range
than he does of what I call “rationality statuses”, and revising his conception
of the relation between morality and rationality.
1. Rationality as an Ability, as an EvaluativeMormative Status, or as a
Point of View. The first of these three uses ascribes a certain acquired abil-
ity-call it “ability rationality”-to a certain sort of being. In ascribing it to,
say, a normal human adult, we also ascribe an innate capacity-call it
“capacity-rationality”-(possesed also by, say, neonates but not mosquitoes)
to acquire that ability. The second use ascribes to several “things,” such as

I I use quotation marks to guard against being taken to accept Gert’s restricted use of this
term as he explains it in Chapter 2, entitled “Rationality and Irrationality”, i.e., the
“evaluative or normative sense of ‘rational”’ (29). the opposite of ‘irrational’. But, as I
hope the next section will make clear, there are other important senses of ‘rationality’ in
which it is not the opposite of ‘irrationality’and he himself, in his revised terminology that
replaces ‘allowed by reason’ with ‘rationally allowed’ (32). does not himself adhere to
his own restriction though he seems not to have noticed it.

428 KURT BAIER

beliefs, desires, actions, or persons, one or other from a range of rationality
statuses, i.e., one kind of contrasting evaluative/normative pairs, such as
Gert’s dyad, “rationaVirrational”-call the former normative rationality-and
his triad, ‘rationally allowed’/‘forbidden’/ ‘required’. The third use ascribes
‘rationality’to the point of view from which we assess the particular rational-
ity status of something. Thus, when we call something “the rational point of
view” or “the point of view of rationality”,or when we call a “thing’s” eval-
uativehormative status its “rationality status”, we are not using ‘rational’ and
‘rationality’ to refer to one particular rationality status, as we do in speaking
of normatively rational actions or persons. The point of view we adopt when
determining the particular rationality status of, say, an action is the same
whether we finally judge it ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’, ‘rationally forbid-
den/allowed/required’ or some other rationality status not countenanced by
Gert, say, ‘rationallypreferable’ or ‘contrary to reason’. In his triad just men-
tioned, he also seems to use the adverb, ‘rationally’, to indicate the point of
view from which something is said to be allowed, forbidden, or required. It,
too, seems to contrast, not with ‘irrationally forbidden’, etc. (as it may if I
use it to say that when something perfectly rational, such as drinking
whiskey, was outlawed, it became something irrationally forbidden), but
contrasts with, say, ‘legally’or ‘morally’or ‘conventionally’forbidden.
Thus, the reason why even Gert’s best answer must disappoint some ques-
tioners who take morality and rationality seriously, is that he allows only
two or three rationality statuses. If ‘rationally preferableldispreferable’or
‘accordinglcontraryto reason’ is added, then an agent’sabiliq rationality (not,
of course, the normative rationality of his options) may be able to guide her
even when all her options are normatively rational. For then, it may be ratio-
nally preferable for her always to act morally even if, on some occasions, that
would be against her best interest, rather than always to act in her best inter-
est even when that would be immoral and none of her options would be
irrational.
This would still be so, even if his claim that, in certain choices,
‘rationality cannot take sides, meant merely that an option’s being norma-
tively rational cannot guide our choice when all our options are so. While
this is surely undeniable, it cannot salvage Gert’s position. For on this
interpretation, either ‘rational/irrational’ refer to the only two evalua-
tivelnormative statuses we can ascribe from the rational point of view-
which is untenable-or they are synonymous with ‘accordinglcontrary to
reason’, but then his claim that acting morally is never irrational (now in the
sense of ‘contrary to reason’) would beg the question.
However, by itself, the recommended augmentation of rationality statuses
only keeps open a possibility Gert’s argument (if sound) would close. For we
might still have to accept the disappointing conclusion that in cases of such a
conflict neither acting immorally nor acting contrary to one’s best interest is

BOOK SYMPOSIUM 429

rationally preferable to the other. Worse still, we might have to swallow
something that cannot even be entertained in Gert’s leaner language, namely,
that, in a choice between them, acting immorally is rationally preferable to
acting against our best interest.
Thus, if those skeptics who take both morality and rationality seriously
are to be convinced, they must be given adequate reasons to think not only
that, in these decisions, reason can take sides one way or the other, but that it
always sides with acting morally even when that conflicts with acting in
one’s best interest. One way to make room for such reasons is to suitably
modify (or rather, as it seems to me, correct) Gert’s conceptions of morality
and rationality.
2. Mores, Morality, and Reason. In outline, the central idea of this second
suggestion is this. Morality (not the opposite of immorality but the informal
system of guidelines) developed out of the mores of all but the simplest soci-
eties, when some of its guidelines came to be subjected to a further test
whose passing seemed a good reason for their inclusion in the mores, and
failing for their exclusion. In time, guidelines not included that seemed to
pass it came to be assembled in a separate system under this new name
(morality) which further developed independently of the mores.
Requiring such guidelines to satisfy this new “acceptability” criterion
would then provide an explanation and justification of when they are
supreme and everyone subject to them liable to the sanctions for non-com-
pliance even when compliance is contrary to other important kinds of guide-
lines, such as, those of religion, law, self-interest, or friendship, and when
they may divide those subject to them into different classes (e.g.,
men/women, whiteshlacks, adultskhildren, parentskhildren, mastersker-
vants, soldierskivilians, citizendaliens, and so on), even if complying with
them will “disadvantage” some more than others.
Not surprisingly, different accounts have been given of the sort of content
that would satisfy this additional criterion: conformity with Reason, Nature,
Divine Commandments, Conscience, Intuition, Super-ego, Utility, etc. It
should by now be obvious that, like Gert, I favor reason. The obvious poten-
tialities for a good life in a well-functioning social order whose guidelines are
generally regarded as supreme suggest that it would be a mistake (even if it
were practically possible) to try not just to move one’s society’s social order
closer to acceptability, but get rid of it altogether, as some anarchists advo-
cate. My suggestion is that this criterion be regarded as applicable also to a
society’s mores (of course, not, as with what Gert calls ‘genuine morality,’
as part of their definition), and that institutions be set up with the task of
transforming it accordingly. In the remaining space I offer what, I hope, are
“considerations capable of influencing the intellect.”
As Gert implies, morality differs from (10, 344), but also remains concep-
tually linked to, the mores. For he takes it that there is moral and rational

430 KURTBAIER
justification for punishing (e.g., 101-3, Chapter 9, e.g., 223-25, 24245)
unjustified violations of what, in one respect-achieving a high level of
conformity by deterrence-is probably morality’s most important part, the
part he calls “the moral rules” (Ch. 5 ) , even though the practice or institution
of punishment plainly transcends the “informality” he ascribes to morality
(26). So it must (at least also?) belong to the mores. A further tie is the
process of socialization which can modify the genetic and environmental
effect on the developing members so as to achieve a higher level of confor-
mity with the society’s moral guidelines.
Why, though, should both these guidelines be regarded as superior to
those other sorts? The explanation is their special sort of end and the behavior
both systems are intended to govern. It is behavior that affects other people,
by “collective agents,” that is, by more than one person performing different
coordinated tasks to attain its end (e.g., three men carrying a piano), whose
end is not a “clockable” event (e.g., arriving somewhere) but a state of affairs
(i.e., a relatively stable system of interrelated changes and continuities, e.g.,
low inflation or a secure wildlife habitat). In a society’s mores or morality,
the collective guidelines have further peculiarities: their end is a state of
affairs all can in reason be assumed to have, if and when they recognize that
this agent’s compliance with such guidelines should be the only or the best
way of attaining it; the collective agent whom they are intended to guide is
constituted by all the members of all the classes (not only those subject to
them at some particular time). However, only some of these guidelines apply
to all, others only to one of the classes (e.g., parents) defined by the mores. I
cannot here examine exactly what this state of affairs must be, but one of the
important conditions it must satisfy is that the society’s institutions and
practices must not require of their members what would significantly reduce
their life prospects below what, without them, they could have been. Lastly,
the behavior in question is such that its patient is always different from its
agent, irrespective of whether he is an individual or a collective one, as when
I kill you, or a gang member does, or you are a gang member, too, or a
member of the same or another gang.
One, perhaps the most important factor, in making such guidelines effec-
tive would be their being widely regarded as superior to individual ones. This
is so although, notoriously, “individual” agents may often be able to attain
their overall “individual” ends, even those concerning their aims in life as a
whole, by actions violating such superior guidelines. Note, however, that
success in this depends very often, if not always, on whether enough “persons
of good will” (or “suckers”, if you prefer) comply with them often enough,
and their violation is hidden or tolerated.
Supposing, then, that the social order under consideration has progressed
beyond the level of Custom to that of law and morality, we can say that the
guidelines of both the mores and morality lay down what sorts of thing the

BOOK SYMPOSIUM 431

classes of people they distinguish must or should or need not, do, and what
they must or should refrain from doing. More questionably, we can perhaps
say that, whereas a society’s mores lay down what the highest ex-officio
authorities (e.g., legislators) or those (e.g., lobbies) who can exert the great-
est influence on them, want the various recognized classes to do and what not
to do, its morality merely purports to lay down what we (the indefinitely
enduring collective agent) can, in accordance with the acceptability criterion
(e.g., in reason), want (i.e., desire or demand) one another to do or not to do,
and really does so if and only if they satisfy that criterion.
But is it even conceivable that (normative) reason is applicable to the
guidelines for the behavior of this sort of agent with this sort of end? It
seems that Gert thinks so, for in his view, normative rationality (though not
irrationality) applies to rationally justifiable moral behavior. In any case, the
behavior of free-riders confirms that the attainment of some large-scale ends
(such as that of mores or morality) is often a prerequisite of attaining many
relatively specific ends one must attain (e.g., a high degree of personal secu-
rity, an adequate proportion of largely trustworthy fellow citizens, the sort of
amenities members of well-functioning orders want to and can take for
granted, and so on) if one wants to lead even a minimally worthwhile life.
Furthermore, a society’s activities of trying to inculcate “good will” in all
those subject to its mores, their exercise of it when it is contrary to their best
interest, and the punishment of those whose socialization has not been
completely successful impose considerable costs on all. But that would seem
to establish a claim that the mores should not generate more or less insupera-
bly inferior life prospects for anyone, by channeling her, without compensa-
tion, into walks of life with unfavorable starting points, inferior opportuni-
ties for, and higher barriers to, improving it, or by institutional arrangements
promoting the interests of some to the detriment of others, and so on.
Gert and others would, perhaps, agree with, at least the spirit of, this
claim, but classify it as one of morality rather than reason. But why? Does
not any member of a collective agent act contrary to reason if he does not
follow the collective guideline compliance with which is the best or only
means to the full attainment of the collective end and, as such, the rational
justification of the collective guideline and of the requirement (not just
optionality) to comply with it? Is not the free-rider in a team in which each
member has good reason to aim at the (“event”)-end of getting the piano up a
floor unreasonable (though not irrational) as well as “unfair” because, while
failing to pull his weight accords with the individual guidelines of reason, it
does not accord with its collective guidelines nor those of rationally
justifiable morality? Is it not unreasonable as well as heartless for the power
company to cut off electricity for a sick unemployed in arrears with his
payments because, while the possibly best or only collective guideline for
attaining its collective end of maximizing its profits irrespective of how that

432 KURT BAlER

affects its customers, may accord with the guidelines of the society’s mores,
it does not accord with those of rationally justified morality? Is not, then, the
behavior in both examples contrary to reason as well as to morality?
Two final tentative suggestions. (i) Practical reason is the ability to
develop, improve, and act on guidelines for leading a life as good as possible.
There are two different methods of pursuing this end, hence two different
types of agent, and two different sets of guidelines as well as two different
closely connected ends, the individual and the collective. The individual
method pursues the agent-relative individual end which is his best possible
life, irrespective of how its pursuit will affect the lives of others he does not
care about, while the collective method pursues the collective end, the best
compatible lives for everyone subject to the mores.
(ii) The guidelines of rationality justified morality comprise two sub-
classes of the collective guideline of practical reason: (a) those that form
something like “a rational constitution” for the mores to guide those of “good
will” with the authority, or the power to influence them, to determine which,
if any of the currently accepted specific guidelines, need to be changed and
how, and if some do, to exercise their authority or power accordingly; (b)
those intended to guide those subject to the mores on whether still to follow
any of the guidelines contrary to reason in the hope that the current efforts
suitably to change them will succeed, or else to support these efforts by civil
disobedience or more radical methods of change.
The collective pursuit of the good life for everyone is therefore a combina-
tion of three things: a society’s mores indispensable for achieving a
sufficiently high compliance with the collective guidelines; an ideal rational
constitution for these guidelines providing a relatively stable framework with
which the mores must conform, and a second set of rational guidelines
becoming operative when some deviate too far from the ideal. This second
subset, virtually undeveloped, seems to me to deserve more attention because
the requirements imposed by the collective pursuit of practical reason (or
rationally justified morality) by means of a social order-and to my knowl-
edge no promising other way has so far been invented-are unlikely to be
found soon.2

* But see Rawls’ influential discussion in A Theory of Justice of ,‘civil disobedience” or the
more recent survey and analysis of a broad range of nonconformist thought and action in
Garry Wills’ A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Government. Simon
and Schuster, helpfully reviewed by Edmund S. Morgan in The New York Review of
Bookr, v.xlvi. n.18, Nov. 18, 1999.

BOOK SYMPOSIUM 433