Grainger 1996 - Antiochos III in Thrace

Antiochos III in Thrace
Author(s): John D. Grainger

Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 45, H. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1996), pp. 329-343
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4436430
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ANTIOCHOS III IN THRACE
In 197 BC Antiochos III's campaign along the coast of Asia Minor, part of his
war with Ptolemaic Egypt which had begun in 202, was completed when his
fleet reached Ephesos'. His main field army had been sent on ahead by land to
Sardis2. He thus had on hand a fleet of 100 warships and 200 other vessels, and
an army of about 35,000 men. During the winter a detachment of the army
occupied Abydos, on the Hellespont3; in the spring the rest of the army marched
to Abydos and Antiochos himself sailed with the fleet to the Thracian Cherson-
ese; the army was transported from Abydos on the Asian side to Madytos on the
European4. Antiochos III was invading 'Europe'.
This was the beginning of a major series of campaigns, and it also marked a
major step onwards in the relationship between the Seleukid and Roman em-
pires. Attention has been focussed overwhelmingly on the latter of these, which
of course led to a major war, but this attention has not always been fruitful5. The
collision of the empires was the culmination of the first Roman eastern adven-
ture, but in the process of arguing about the negotiations which began at
Lysimacheia in 196, and which led to war in 192, the activities of Antiochos in
Thrace have been very largely ignored. The apparent lack of source material is
some excuse for this, but in fact I hope to show that there are enough indications
in the sources to enable the outlines of Antiochos' work in Thrace to be
discerned, at least tentatively. Detail is mostly unobtainable, but the broad
outlines can be drawn. Once his achievement in Thrace is understood, then the
context of the negotiations which began in the autumn of 195 at Lysimacheia
can be better appreciated. So the object here is to discover just what Antiochos
did in Thrace.
I He used it as his winter quarters (Livy 33.38.1); for its importance, see Pol. 1 8.40a.
2 Livy 33.19.9-10.
3 Seleukid troops at Abydos while Antiochos was still wintering at Ephesos: Livy 33.38.4:
they will have reached it by land from Sardis.
4 Livy 33.38.8-9: by the time Antiochos had sailed from Ephesos to Madytos, the army had
already reached Abydos.
5 The most influential recent discussion has been E. Badian, "Rome and Antiochos the
Great: a Study in Cold War", in id., Studies in Greek and Roman History (Oxford 1968),
112-139, which contains full references to 1959: for later references see CAH VIII2,
bibliography; the account of the Roman-Seleukid collision in that volume (by R. M.
Errington, pp. 274-289) is essentially based on Badian's version; I intend to consider the
whole matter again, and this article may be considered a preliminary study.
Historia, Band XLV/3 (1996)

C) Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart
330 JOHN D. GRAINGER
As Antiochos pointed out later to th

long connection with Thrace6. The founder Seleukos I had been murdered in the
Chersonese on his way to Lysimacheia7; he was travelling to take up the
kingship of Macedon at the time, having defeated and killed his predecessor
Lysimachos at Koroupedion. Seleukos's son Antiochos I made an initial at-
tempt to break into Thrace and continue his father's work by making himself
king in Macedon, but he was foiled by a local alliance of naval powers and
never got another chance8. The irruption of the Galatians into Asia Minor and
the distracting war with Ptolemy II prevented further Seleukid work in Thrace,
and he effectively resigned any claims to Macedon by allying with Antigonos
Gonatas. Antiochos II, however, had campaigned in Thrace with some success
in the 250s, only for his Thracian possessions to be lost to Ptolemy III after his
death in 2469. The Seleukid usurper Antiochos Hierax had been killed in Thrace
in a final attempt to retrieve his lost fortunes'0. All this was sufficient evidence
of Seleukid interest in the area, and demonstrated a continuing claim to rule
there. It also, of course, constituted a series of clear warnings of the dangers and
difficulties and frustrations involved in attempting to campaign in Thrace.
When Antiochos III arrived at the Hellespont, moreover, besides his hered-
itary interest, he could have made a powerful argument that the area was
masterless and anarchic, and that it required a strong hand to calm things. In the
past twenty years several regimes had come and gone. The Keltic kingdom of
Tylis, centred somewhere in Thrace inland of Byzantion, had collapsed about
twenty years before, releasing the suppressed ambitions of Thracian tribes'".
The feeble Ptolemaic control of the Chersonese and several other nearby cities
had been overthrown by the violent campaign along the coast and into the
Propontis by Philip V of Macedon in 20312. In turn, Philip's defeat at
Kynoskephalai in 197 had forced him to withdraw and so had left no-one in
control. The Aitolian League had had influence in some of the cities3, Bithynia
had gained control of others14, and the Attalid monarchy had advanced else-
6 Livy 33.40.-5; Antiochos, in fact, is said only to have cited Seleukos I, not the later
kings; this weakens his argument, though it may be Livy's editorial hand at work.
7 App. Syr. 62; Memnon, FGrH 434 F 8; Pausanias 1.10.2.
8 Memnon, FGrH 434 F 9-10; W. W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas (Oxford 1911), 162-164.
9 Polyainos 4.16; E. T. Newell, Coinage of the Western Seleucid Mints (New York 1941),
337; E. R. Bevan, The House of Seleucus (London 1902), vol. II 176.
10 Justin 27.3.9-11 and Trogus, Prol. 27; Porphyry, FGrH 32 F 8; Polyainos 4.17.
1 1 Pol. 4.46.4 and 8.22.1.
1 2 Pol. 15.21-24; F. W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge 1940), 112-117.
13 Aitolian alliances existed with Lysimacheia, Calchedon and Kios (Pol. 15.23.8); Kios
even had an Aitolian as commander (ibid. 4).
14 Prusias gained Kios after Philip sacked it: Pol. 15.23.10.
Antiochos III in Thrace 331
where'5, but all these had concentrated on the Chersonese and the Asian side. In
Thrace itself the Greek cities of the coast had long suffered from the attentions
of both the Kelts and the Thracians. Byzantion had had to pay protection money
to the Kelts of Tylis, to the value of eighty talents annually towards the end'6,
and by recouping itself by taxing the trade passing through the Bosporos it had
provoked a naval war with Rhodes and others'7. The city of Lysimacheia, at the
root of the Chersonese, had been sacked by Thracians only a year or two before
Antiochos' arrival'8. The powers involved - Rome added itself to the others
within a few weeks of Antiochos' invasion - and their successive failures to
establish any sort of permanent control over any part of Thrace, demonstrated
not merely the difficulties, but also the attractions and the overall and wide-
ranging sensitivity of the whole area.
The south, Asian, coast of the Propontis was the less troublesome when
Antiochos arrived, but even that was bad enough. Prusias of Bithynia, the city
of Kyzikos, and the Attalid monarch had established their power over most of
the coast and the inland territories. Antiochos himself had inserted his power at
Abydos but his forces had been repelled from Lampsakos'9, though their attack
there had been no more than a tentative probe. No doubt Antiochos' plans
included the incorporation of Lampsakos, but the matter was not urgent, and for
the moment the city was left alone20.
The north, European, Thracian, coast was a much greater problem, and was
the one which Antiochos addressed straight away. He landed at the small city of
Madytos, directly across from Abydos, from which he brought over his army21.
There was some initial resistance from the Madytenes, but the approach of
Antiochos' siege machines swiftly persuaded the defenders to surrender. All
the neighbouring cities of the Chersonese then gave in quickly, without waiting
to be attacked. The citizens clearly preferred Antiochos' rule when the only real
alternative was the Thracians. The movement to surrender was general through-
15 In the Troad especially, where Alexandria Troas, Ilion, and Lampsakos were independent
but allied to the Attalids: R. E. Allen, The Attalid Kingdom, a Constitutional History
(Oxford 1983), 58, 61, and 169-170. Antiochos' attack on Lampsakos took place after the
death of Attalos II and so in a time when the city's alliance with the Attalids had been
disrupted.
16 Pol. 4.46.3-4.
17 Ibid. 46.5-47.5.
18 Livy 33.38.10-12.
19 Ibid. 4.
20 It was not under active attack as is sometimes claimed (e.g., Errington in CAH V1112,
the city was 'invested'). The lack of urgency at the situation is shown by the unwilling-
ness of leading Lampsakenes to undertake the embassy to Massalia and Rome: Syll.3 591.
21 Livy 33.38.9.
out the peninsula, though only the city o

Madytos; no community in the Chersonese
Antiochos decided to rebuild and repopu
comrnanded the narrow neck of the peninsula, and its destruction by the
Thracians had left the whole peninsula exposed to their raids - no doubt one of
the main reasons for the rapid acceptance of Antiochos' authority by the
vulnerable communities. Antiochos used his own soldiers for the task of re-
building the city, by which process we must understand a refortification of the
walls and the acropolis and a rehabilitation of the main public buildings, and he
set about finding and freeing the former inhabitants. Some of these had been
scattered and enslaved by the Thracians and these were to be ransomed and
returned; others were living in the cities of the Chersonese as refugees and were
to be collected and reinstated; also, new citizens were to be recruited23. Until
the city was defensible, Antiochos left half his army there, together with 'all the
naval allies' - presumably naval contingents from the Greek cities of Asia
Minor and from Phoenicia - as simultaneous garrison and builder's labourers,
and took the other half into Thrace on a combined reprisal raid and preliminary
campaign of conquest24.
The reconstituted city was linked to Antiochos by a new treaty25. This
envisaged Lysimacheia being a base for further operations by the king and his
army, and at the same time ensured local self-government and defined the areas
of competence of the two contracting parties. The treaty is clearly a document
specific to Lysimacheia, that is, it is not a 'charter' of a type supplied by the
Seleukid chancellery to all the cities who became allies of Antiochos. Indeed,
those students who have studied the inscription recording the treaty in detail
have been at a loss to find close parallels, and one suggestion has been that the
nearest is a treaty between Pharnakos I of Pontos and Chersonesus Taurika,
with a second possibility that 'the ultimate model may perhaps be ... a treaty [of
Lysimacheial with Ptolemy'26. Neither of these suggestions is in any way
convincing. Some confusion has also been caused by the lettering of the
inscription, which has seemed to some to be typical of the time of Antiochos II
rather than his grandson27, but is perhaps best explained as a local peculiarity,
or perhaps as a provincialism28.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. 10-13.
24 Ibid. 14.
25 P. Frisch, Die Inschriften von Ilion (Bonn 1975), no. 45; E. Tasliklioglu and P
"New Inscriptions from the Troad", ZPE 17 (1975), 101-106.
26 E. Piejko, "The Treaty between Antiochos III and Lysimacheia", Historia 37 (1
27 J. L. Ferrary and P. Gauthier, "Le trait6 entre le roi Antiochos et Lysimacheia"
des Savants (1981), 327-45.
28 Piejko (as in n. 26) 161-164.
These peculiarities, in fact, make the existence of an individually negotiat-

ed treaty between the king and the city a virtual certainty, but there were other
cities in the area as well, and arrangements to regulate relations will also have
had to be made between them and the king. Madytos and Sestos are both noted
in Livy's brief account, but there were also other Greek communities in the
Chersonese which had surrendered readily to his forces - Kallipolis, Alopokon-
nesos, Elaios, for example, and others. Each of them made its agreement with
the king separately, though in the case of these smaller cities the process was no
doubt handed over by the king to his officials. Antiochos set off into the interior
with half of his army.
Antiochos' purpose, according to Livy, was to ravage the nearby part of
Thrace29, which suggests a fairly narrow ambition, But other evidence suggests
that Antiochos achieved something of much greater geographical import. His
real intention was scarcely a mere ravaging. In general terms he aimed at the
conquest and occupation of all Thrace. Nothing less can be expected of the
conqueror of Koile Syria and the restorer of the eastern empire of the Seleukids.
Antiochos' method of preparation for such campaigns was by now well
established. He had, after all, been campaigning annually for a quarter of a
century, and with remarkable success. His method of conquest shows a consist-
ent pattern: having chosen his victim, he recruited a local ally whose existence
and activity could distract the main enemy. In his great eastern campaign, an
alliance with the Indian king Sophagasenos had kept Baktria quiet while he
dealt with Parthia, and then Baktria was attacked when similarly isolated30. A
variation on this was to suborn a subject or subjects of the enemy, used first on
a small scale in the attack on Seleukeia-in-Pieria in 219, where the Ptolemaic
governor of that city was paralyzed by the defection of his subordinate offi-
cers3 1, and on a larger scale when he broke into Ptolemaic Syria the next year by
bringing two key Ptolemaic officers over to his side32, and again in 202 when he
suborned the governor of Koile Syria33. It was, of course, an updating of
Odysseus' method at Troy. In the Thracian campaign, the Greek cities of the
coast could perform this function to some extent though their geographical
positions and general weakness made them more suitable as beachheads than as
sources of vulnerability for the Thracians. A better Trojan Horse were the
surviving remains of the Keltic inhabitants of Thrace.
29 Livy 33.38.16.
30 The key to this is the description by Polybios of the later alliance with Sophagasenos as a
'renewal' (Pol. 1 1.39.11) which necessarily implies an earlier alliance; Antiochos was
also allied to Parthia after his war there (Justin 41.5.3).
31 Pol. 5.60.1-2.
32 Ibid. 61.3-5.
33 D. Gera, "Ptolemy son of Thraseas and the Fifth Syrian War", Ancient Society 18 (1987),
63-73; J. D. Grainger, Hellenistic Phoenicia (Oxford 1991), 98.
The Keltic invasion of 280 - 277 had left two Keltic communities in the
Thracian area. In the east, the kingdom of Tylis had operated as a terrorist
overlordship, living on raiding and blackmail: a particular target, and a notably
lucrative one, was Byzantion. The rebellion of the subjugated Thracian tribes
had destroyed the kingdom as a political entity about twenty years before
Antiochos' invasion34. Polybios describes the Kelts of Tylis as being 'annihilat-
ed', but this is likely to be an exaggeration; certainly there remained Kelts in the
Balkan area even after Tylis' destruction.
The location of Tylis is uncertain, but somewhere in the Vize region, close
to or in the Istranca mountains, is a favoured suggestion. The one serious
geographical indication is given by Polybios, who implies that the establish-
ment of the new kingdom in the 270s was especially dangerous to the Byzan-
tines35. These Kelts were, however, by no means the only ones in the Thracian
area. There were still groups on the move for decades, like the Aigosages who
crossed the Hellespont in the 220s, to take service with Attalos II and whom he
settled in the Troad in 21836.
Within the Balkan area archaeological discoveries locate the main centre of
Keltic settlement well inland. In 278 one of the bands of Kelts which split away
from the main force had settled near the Danube. Their descendants formed the
later kingdom of the Scordisci, who fought the Roman governors of Macedonia
fifty years after Antiochos' time. The connection is made explicit by one
source37. The archaeological evidence suggests that the centre of the kingdom
was astride the Danube, in the area later called Dacia Malvensis on the north
side, and on the south the land which straddles the boundary of the later Roman
provinces of Upper and Lower Moesia, where there is a dense concentration of
remains of Celtic type38.
34 Pol. 5.46,4: a brief history of Tylis (all that is possible at present) is in M. Domaradzki,
"L'Etat des Keltes en Thrace avec capitale Tylis et en Asie Mineure-Galatia", Pulpudeva
3 (1980 for 1978), 52-56.
35 Pol. 5.46.2-3.
36 Pol. 5.78.5-6; they were settled in the Troad, where they made nuisances of them
and were destroyed by Prusias of Bithynia; Attalos, having settled them, abandoned
37 Athenaios, 6.234b: the Scordisci are claimed by the former Yugoslavia; J. To
Kelti u jugoistocnoj Evropi (Belgrade 1968), English summary at 161-90, and
vanovic, "The Scordisci and their Art", Alba Regia 14 (1975), 167-71, but it is cle
only modern international boundaries separate this territory from those identified b
and Papazoglu (next note).
38 V. Zirra, "Le probleme des Celtes dans l'espace du Bas-Danube", Thraco-Dacia 1
(1976), 175-82, especially the map, p. 179; F. Papazoglu, The Central Balkan Tribes in
pre-Roman Times (tr. M. Stansfield-Pohovic, Amsterdam 1978), 271-391, on the Scordis-
ci; J. Collis, The European Iron Age (London 1984), 23-5.
The reason for discussing a defunct kingdo

which can have had relations with Antiochos, is to show that Kelts did not
vanish from the Thracian scene with the destruction of the Tylis kingdom.
There were Keltic communities in Thrace before and after Antiochos' cam-
paigns, and hence they were there during them as well. And it is these Kelts who
are the prime candidates to be the ally of Antiochos III in these Thracian
campaigns. The source for this is Appian. He is, one must admit, never the most
reliable of witnesses, but in this case his words are worth taking into account39.
He gives a summary of Antiochos' activity in Thrace, emphasising his connec-
tion with the Greek cities, and he also describes his alliance with the Galatians,
which he acquired 'by gifts and fear', and from whom he also recruited soldiers.
The context makes it quite clear that Appian is referring to Thracian Galatians,
not to the more familiar Galatians of Asia Minor. These can only be either the
survivors of the defunct Tylis, or the predecessors of the Scordisci in the central
Balkans. Either would be ideally placed to be Antiochos' ally against the
intervening Thracians. Antiochos had already employed Galatian mercenaries.
They formed a regiment in his army in the battle against Molon in 22140, and
were also present at Magnesia in 19041. The presumption must be that most of
these soldiers were recruited from the Galatians of Asia Minor, though the
remnants of the Tylians would also provide a ready source of manpower. Such
men would be useful sources of information about conditions in Thrace, even
useful as envoys. He also employed Thracians, at Raphia42 and later at Magne-
sia43. Other sources, of a less useful sort perhaps, were the Greek cities, whose
opinions of both Kelts and Thracians might well have interfered with the
accuracy of their information.
Whether or not the Kelts of Thrace were Antiochos' allies from the begin-
ning, the Greek cities certainly were. He already controlled the cities of the
Chersonese. At the other end of the Straits, on the Bosporos, Byzantion had
long had to buy off Thracian and Keltic raids. The city controlled the Bosporos
- whence the resources for such a massive tribute. Appian also notes Antio-
chos' alliance with the Byzantines, in words which suggest that their geograph-
ical position on the Straits was decisive45. The only reason for this mention of
the Bosporos is the access the strait gave to the Euxine, which creates a
presumption that Antiochos used that access, once an agreement had been
reached with Byzantion. Antiochos' fleet is not mentioned after it was used to
39 App. Syr. 6.
40 Pol. 5.53.2.
41 Livy 37.40.5 and 13.
42 Pol. 5.39.6.
43 Livy 57.40.8 and 11 ('Trallians').
44 Pol. 4.46.4.
45 App. Syr. 6.
transport his army across the Hellespont and some of its men used to help
rebuild Lysimacheia, but it surely did not sit at the Hellespont for the whole
campaigning season doing nothing. At the very least his ships provided Antio-
chos with a means of communication with the coastal Greek cities; more
enterprisingly, they could transport units of the army to make landings in the
enemy rear, or to install garrisons in the cities, or bring supplies to the land
forces. Antiochos had used his ships in all these roles in past campaigns: there is
no reason to suppose he ignored the maritime possibilities at the Straits.
All this, including Appian's words, implies the negotiation of an alliance
between Antiochos and the Byzantines and with other Greek cities. Byzantion
was a notoriously independent city46, and the achievement of an agreement by
Antiochos is a tribute to his diplomatic skills - and as much, perhaps, to the
Byzantines' perception of the locus of real power. This will have been another
individually negotiated treaty, in which the Byzantines no doubt safeguarded as
much of their independence as they could in the face of the implied threat of the
lord of Asia. It may also, as one phrase in Appian suggests, have provided for
the extension of Byzantion's city territory at the expense of the nearby Thrac-
ians47.
To summarize, these indications show that Antiochos cast his diplomatic
net wide: he was solidly based in Lysimacheia and the Chersonese, and allied
with Byzantion at the other end of the Straits; the alliance here suggested with
the inland Kelts meant that the Thracian tribes of the interior were thus sur-
rounded.
There are other indications of the extent and scale of the campaigns Antio-
chos conducted. One of the Roman envoys sent to interview Antiochos was L.
Cornelius Lentulus, who arrived in the area whilst Antiochos was still on his
first campaign in 196. Unwilling to wait, perhaps intent on being the first on the
scene - he had been sent to the king by the Senate, whereas the other envoys had
other tasks as well - or maybe aiming to discover just what the king was up to,
he went on to Selymbria on the Propontis48. There he failed to contact Antio-
chos, and eventually returned to Lysimacheia. But he clearly went to Selymbria
in the first place because he believed the king to be nearby, no doubt on
information from Seleukid officers at Lysimacheia. Since Lentulus apparently
made no effort to move from Selymbria inland in order to reach the king, the
latter was clearly a long way off. Antiochos in fact returned to Lysimacheia by
46 It retained libertas and immunitas for some time in the Roman period: H. B. Mattingly,
"Rome's Earliest Relations with Byzantium, Heraclea Pontica and Callatis", in A. G.
Poulter (ed.), Ancient Bulgaria (Nottingham 1983), 239-252; it defied Severus four
centuries later, to its destruction.
47 This is suggested by Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 12), in the form of a question, p. 190,
note 5.
48 Livy 33.39. 1.
land, that is, through Thrace, reaching the city about the same time as Lentulus
on his return from Selymbria49. Given the relative speed of sea and land travel,
this puts Antiochos on the march somewhere between Selymbria and the
Chersonese when Lentulus missed him, but also so far inland that it was not
worth Lentulus' while trying to reach him. The campaign was therefore some-
where in central Thrace in its late phase. But if Selymbria was a reasonable
place for Lentulus to go, the earlier part of the campaign had been somewhere to
the north of that city, and this points to the territory of the Astai, inland of
Byzantion, which city in turn was clearly more distant from the king on his
campaign than was Selymbria, otherwise Lentulus would have gone there.
Further, for a campaign in central Thrace, Perinthos (or even Lysimacheia)
would have been a more suitable destination. This all points to a campaign in
the Hebros basin or towards the Istranca mountains.
On the other hand, another Roman commissioner, L. Stertinius, freed the
cities of Ainos and Maroneia from control by garrisons of King Philip during
the summer50. He made no effort to contact Antiochos, nor did he come into
conflict with any Seleukid soldiers or administrators. We can conclude there-
fore that Antiochos stayed well clear of that part of Thrace, and kept his people
away as well. Since he was deliberately contacting the Greek cities of Thrace
this omission is clearly deliberate and can best be accounted for by presuming
that Antiochos knew full well that the Romans were involved there. It was not
lack of ambition for control of those cities, for he seized them and garrisoned
them both later. Antiochos' range of activity in the summer of 196 was there-
fore from the Chersonese along the northern shore of the Propontis as far as
Byzantion, and inland to the Hebros basin and the territory of the Astai.
The situation within Thrace which Antiochos faced was of a Thracian
community which was both divided and impoverished. The terrorist overlord-
ship of Tylis had extracted substantial wealth from the Thracians, as it had from
the Greeks, and this wealth appears to have completely vanished. The incipient
urbanization of the early third century - Seuthopolis, Kabyle, Kypsela - had
been either destroyed or stunted5l. The periodic centralizations of power into a
substantial kingdom based on the Odrysai of the Hebros basin had also been
aborted once more52. Out of the wreckage emerged four tribes - the Astai,
49 Ibid. 2.
50 Ibid. 35.2.
51 A. Fol, "Le ddveloppement de la vie urbaine dans les pays entre le Danube et la mer Egde
jusqu'A la conquete romaine", Etudes Balkaniques 2-3, 1966; M. Chichikova, "The
Thracian City of Seuthopolis", and V. Velkov, "The Thracian City of Cabyle", in Poulter
(ed.), Ancient Bulgaria (as in n. 46), 289-303 and 233-238; D. P. Dimitrov and M.
Chichikova, The Thracian City of Seuthopolis, BAR Supplementary Series S 38 (Oxford
1978).
52 L. Ghetov, "Sur I'histoire politique de la Thrace a la haute 6poque hellenistique", Dritter
Internationaler Thracologischer Congress, vol. II (Sofia 1984), 134-136.
whose territory extended west and nort

hinterland of Apollonia on the Gulf of Bu
apparently situated to the north of the Th
perpetrators of the destruction of Lysima
inland and north of Ainos and Maroneia, a
territory; and the Maudatenes, unlocated,
in the middle Hebros valley, the old centr
not the ones which were dominant earlier
emerged as local overlords after the overt
would seem to be the Kaeni and the Asta
since his main political objectives were b
cement his alliance with the Greek cities w
tribes53.
Antiochos will have gathered into his all
that coast: Selymbria, being Lentulus' de
the king's power at the time, but also Bisa
the Straits were the Greek cities of the
Apollonia, had an old Seleukid connection5
as a neighbour of the Astai55. The other Greek cities beyond Apollonia -
Mesembria, Odessos, Kallatis, Tomi, Istros - might also respond to Antiochos'
overtures, particularly if elements of his fleet had passed through the Bosporos
into the Euxine, but this would depend also on the extent of Antiochos'
operations, in particular if he aimed at going north of the Haemos (Balkan)
mountains. It would not be worth while incurring obligations to these cities if
they would then involve him in ever-growing problems.
Antiochos returned to Lysimacheia in late September 196, when the confer-
ence with the Roman commissioners took place56, a time which would also be
the end of his campaigning season. So the conference took place at Antiochos'
convenience, not that of the Romans. Antiochos had thus spent at least three or
four months in Thrace, a full summer's campaign. It was only partly successful,
for he had to campaign there for two more summers at least. Beyond that the
evidence cannot take us, but three campaigns in such an area was a formidable
53 Strabo 7.6.1-2 and frag. 47; Livy 38.40.7; I. Venedikov, "Les migrations en Thrace",
Pulpudeva 2 (1978 for 1976), 162-180, at pp. 177-178.
54 J. Youroukova, "La pr6sence des monnaies de bronze des premiers S61eucides en Thrace:
leur importance historique", Studia P. Naster Oblata I (Louvain 1982), 115-26, and A.
Stepanova, "Observations sur la monnaye de bronze d'Apollonie du Pont", Thracia
Pontica 2 (1985), 272-82.
55 Ptolemy, Geography 3.11.6.
56 He sailed for Syria in time to be caught by a storm off Cyprus, but before the sailing
season closed: hence September.
commitment of time and resources. Antiochos was clearly serious about con-
trolling Thrace.
Antiochos sailed back to Ephesos after the conference with the Roman
commissioners at Lysimacheia in September, but he left most of his army in the
Chersonese, commanded by his second son Seleukoss7. One of the suggestions
he had thrown out at the conference was that he would set up Seleukos at
Lysimacheia as a viceroy58, and Seleukos was certainly left with the task of
continuing the rebuilding of the city59. Antiochos returned next year, with a
force large enough, so Livy claims, to have frightened the experienced consular
L. Villius Tappulus. Villius had been sent by Flamininus in Greece to Antio-
chos in response to a visit by envoys from Antiochos who had arrived at Corinth
just as the Roman forces were coming out of their winter quarters60. These
envoys had thus been sent very early in the year, well before Antiochos' own
campaign had begun. Villius was away most of the campaigning season, and
was able therefore to report on Antiochos' progress61.
The size of the army Antiochos was using can be estimated. In emergencies
such as the great battles he fought in Syria, at Raphia in 217 and at Panion in
200, Antiochos could field an army of 70,000 men62, but this number could only
be achieved by the conscription of the kingdom's reservists, and so at the cost
of much disruption. In extended campaigns, such as his great eastern anabasis
between 211 and 206, his army was about half that size, say 35,000 men. These
men were thus his standing army. The troops included the royal guard (the
agema), the argyraspides (a phalanx numbering 10,000 men), and assorted
mercenary units such as the Galatians and Thracians mentioned above. The
army was well balanced and very flexible, including a pioneer unit, light
infantry, nomad cavalry, and Galatians, as well as the standard heavy infantry63.
It could tackle a mountain campaign, as in the Elburz64, an opposed river
crossing65, a large set-piece battle such as Magnesia66, or a siege such as Sardis
or Baktra67. When he set off for the Aegean in 197, it was this army which
Antiochos sent off to march by land to Sardis, and it was this army which he
57 Livy 33.41.4.
58 Pol. 18.51.8; Livy 33.40.6.
59 Livy 33.41.4.
60 Livy 34.35.1-2.
61 Livy 34.33.12.
62 Pol. 5.79.3-13.
63 Cf. B. Bar Kochva, The Seleucid Army, Organisation and Tactics in the Great Campaigns
(Cambridge 1976), part I.
64 Pol. 10.28-31.
65 Pol. 10.49.
66 Livy 37.50-53.
67 Sardis: Pol. 7.15-18; Baktra: Pol. 10.49.15 and 11.39.1-10.
used in Thrace in 196. He was thus cam

men.
He left much of it behind to winter at
his fleet (and the fleet's allocation of sold
Livy's report of Villius' report to Flamin
with him in the spring68. Allowing for c
of between 30,000 and 35,000 was in Thra
be in garrisons, but most were availabl
equivalent of a Roman army of three legio
than that which was campaigning under
same time69.
These Thracian campaigns, involving a large army and the conquest of a
strategically important land, are thus major political and military events, and
yet neither the Romans in Greece nor Philip V in Macedon showed any
apprehensions about them. Antiochos was at pains to keep Flamininus informed
as to his intentions and his progress, for this was clearly the purpose of the visit
of the king's envoys to Flamininus at Corinth early in 195, and that early arrival
was followed by the return visit of Villius to the king, with whom he stayed for
some time, rejoining Flamininus well into the summer. It seems likely also that
Philip was being kept in the picture (though this martial activity close to the
Macedonian borders may help to explain the reluctance Philip showed in
sending military help to his new Roman ally in the fight against Nabis). Nor did
the arrival of Hannibal at Ephesos have any noticeable effect, either on Antio-
chos' conduct of affairs or on the Romans.
It is widely assumed that Antiochos returned to Thrace for a third campaign
in 194, and indeed some authors place the events recorded by Appian in that
year, without justification70. The only apparent evidence specific to 194 is a
comment by P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who is reported by Livy to have
demanded Macedonia for his consular command for that year on the grounds
that a war was threatening with Antiochos, 'who had already and without
provocation crossed into Europe'71. This, if it is not simply an anticipation of
Scipio's participation in the later war against Antiochos, may still be only a
general reference to the previous Thracian campaigns. This is somewhat strength-
68 Livy 33.41.4 and 34.33.12.

69 Flamininus had two legions plus Latin alae: Livy 31.8.5-6, plus reinforcements: Livy
32.8.2, minus casualties; with his Greek allies he was assaulting Nabis of Sparta at the
time with 27,000 men (Walbank, Philip V [as in n. 12], 186).
70 E.g., Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 12), 190; Errington in CAH V1112 dismisses the whole
affair in two half sentences (on pp. 277 and 278) and puts all the military activity in 195
and 194.
71 Livy 34.43.4.
ened by his reference to a possible war, the threat of which scarcely existed yet.
Certainly the Senate was unconvinced, if the speech really was made.
This is not very strong evidence for a new Antiochan campaign in Thrace,
but if he was not in Thrace we do not know where he was - an unusual problem
- and it is best to assume his presence there in default of positive indications
about anywhere else. The campaign is utterly unknown, nor can conjecture do
more than produce guesses. The reconstruction of Lysimacheia was surely
more or less complete by then, and Seleukos installed as viceroy; Antiochos
will have been completing the conquest. But it is worth pointing out that, while
this presumed third campaign was going on, Flamininus withdrew the Roman
forces from Greece. Even if the king was not in Thrace, both his army and his
son were, and so therefore was his power. It follows that the Romans, including
Flamininus, entertained no apprehensions about the Seleukid conquest - unless
Scipio's scaremongering was really spoken.
That conquest was clearly completed by this third campaign of 194, except
for one detail. In 190, when the Roman army marched along the Thracian
coastal road to attack Antiochos, it was discovered that Seleukid garrisons held
the two old Greek towns of Ainos and Maroneia72. The Roman commanders
simply ignored them. But these garrisons had not been in place in 194, since the
towns had been freed of Macedonian rule in 196 by the Romans - which had
been the purpose of Stertinius' visit, and therefore cannot have been taken over
before Flamininus left. They were therefore occupied later, no doubt in 192 or
191 when it became clear that war had broken out between Rome and Antiochos
and when Antiochos sent his troops into Greece. This would seem to be his final
Thracian conquest73.
That these cities were only extras is shown by the reported words of
Antiochos' envoys at Rome in 193. They asserted quite definitely that Antio-
chos had the right, by inheritance and by conquest, to rule in Thrace, which was
defined as 'the cities of Thrace and Chersonesus'74. Once again, the provenance
of that speech, reported by Livy as being made to a secret senatorial committee,
is such that its authenticity is highly questionable, but it would seem to imply
clearly enough that Antiochos' conquests were both extensive and completed.
A further visit by the king to Thrace, in 192, has been postulated75. It was a
busy summer for Antiochos, with his sieges of Alexandreia Troas, Smyrna, and
72 Livy 37.33.1 (the Romans crossed the territories of the two cities) and 37.60.7 (Antio-
chos' troops were evacuated from the cities).
73 N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, A History of Macedonia, vol. III (Oxford 1988),
44 (by Hammond), claims Antiochos advanced 'as far as Maroneia' in '196/5', but he
cannot have taken Ainos and Maroneia while still at peace with Rome when Rome had so
recently freed those cities.
74 Livy 37.32.1.
75 0. Leuze, "Die Feldzuge Antiochos des GroBen nach Kleinasien und Thrakien", Hermes
Lampsakos, and with diplomatic contacts

other Greek states also, no doubt. So any
scale than before (for part of his army w
The king could not afford to be far from
a time. The death of his eldest son the previous year, and the consequent
promotion of his next son Seleukos to the position of heir and principal royal
lieutenant may have been the pretext for the visit, since Seleukos had been
ruling from Lysimacheia as viceroy. No doubt other problems were dealt with
at the same time. Compared with the previous expeditions this visit was perhaps
more administrative than military; the Romans had no reason to claim fright,
other than the need to find a justification for the war which both sides now felt
was coming.
The extent of Antiochos' Thracian dominions cannot be stated, but the
geographical indications may be set out. Along the coasts he either controlled
or was allied with every Greek city from Maroneia to Byzantion; the cities of
the western coast of the Euxine are also probable allies, at least as far as
Apollonia and the Gulf of Burgas. This implies a conquered area comprising
essentially the basin of the Hebros, as far as the Haemos mountains, but perhaps
not as far as the abandoned Macedonian colony of Philippopolis. Had he gone
so far the threat to Macedon would have become too strong for Philip to ignore.
By not acquiring Abdera, Antiochos had left an unclaimed space between his
new province and Macedon along the coast, and he may well have done the
same inland, where the tribe of the Bessi in the upper Hebros valley could have
been left as an inland buffer state. The bounds were thus, in all probability, and
very approximately, the Haemos mountain range in the north, the sea to the east
and south, and a line north from Maroneia to the Haemos range on the west, an
area of over 35,000 square kilometres.
The conquest was thoroughly done. When the Roman forces marched
through in 190, on their way to eventual victory over Antiochos at Magnesia,
the Thracians did not interfere. The Romans ignored the garrisons of Ainos and
Maroneia, and there were surely other garrisons in the inland areas - the land
had only been conquered three years before, after all, and could hardly be left
uncontrolled. These the Romans also ignored. By holding on to Thrace, Antio-
chos was paradoxically making the approach of the Roman forces all the easier.
This is good evidence, in other words, for Antiochos' success in his conquest.
The garrison and the restored citizens of Lysimacheia were all withdrawn as the
53, 1923, 187-229 and 241-287; E. S. Gruen, The Hellenistic Monarchies and the
Coming of Rome (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1984), 630, n. 90; M. Holleaux, "L'entretien
de Scipion l'Africain et d'Hannibal", in Etudes d'etpigraphie et d'histoire grecques, 2me
partie. Rome, la Macedoine et l'Orient grec (Paris 1957), 184-207, at p. 194, n. 1 and in
CAH VIIII 206, rejected the expedition; Walbank, Philip V (as in n. 12), p. x, accepted it.
Romans approached, in a masterly manoeuvre conducted in secret76, but this

was the only example of such a move. That is, Antiochos was showing no
inclination to give up his new conquest. And the Ainos and Maroneia garrisons
survived until after the peace treaty was signed77. However, after they were
withdrawn, when the Roman forces marched back the way they had come under
the lax command of Cn. Manlius Vulso, they were ambushed by a Thracian
attack, in which all four of the tribes participated78. The removal of Seleukid
garrisons from the interior and the earlier removal of the power of the kingdom
of Tylis, released the Thracians to fight for their land again, and, in this case, for
the booty of Asia and Galatia as well.
Three years later Philip of Macedon, in alliance with Byzantion, cam-
paigned through the Hebros valley, reducing the Thracian tribes there to sub-
mission79. Either then or more probably earlier, he allied with the Bastarnae, a
Keltic tribe of the Danube valley, urging them to migrate in order to threaten his
Thracian enemies80. The parallels with Antiochos' Thracian campaign, as re-
constructed from other evidence, are quite striking. So is the sequel, for Philip
was then told to pull out of Thrace by the Romans. His swift success may be
attributed in part to the earlier thoroughness of the Seleukid campaign, and it
may be that Philip did more than copy Antiochos' political and diplomatic
techniques: he may also have followed in his military tracks.
Middle Littleton, Evesham, Worcs John D. Grainger
76 Livy 37.31.1-2.
77 Ibid. 60.7.
78 Livy 38.40.7.
79 Livy 39.35.4; Pol. 22.14.12.
80 Livy 39.55.4, assuming, as Hammond does (History of Macedonia, vol. III [as in n. 73],
468, n. 2) that Livy's reference to Italy is a product of 'Roman propaganda'.

Grainger 1996 - Antiochos III in Thrace

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Antiochos III in Thrace

Author(s): John D. Grainger

Historia, Band XLV/3 (1996)

As Antiochos pointed out later to th

out the peninsula, though only the city o

These peculiarities, in fact, make the existence of an individually negotiat-

The reason for discussing a defunct kingdo

whose territory extended west and nort

used in Thrace in 196. He was thus cam

68 Livy 33.41.4 and 34.33.12.

Lampsakos, and with diplomatic contacts

Romans approached, in a masterly manoeuvre conducted in secret76, but this

Middle Littleton, Evesham, Worcs John D. Grainger

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