Tribigild in Phrygia: Reconsidering the revolt and the settlement of barbarians

in the 4th century Roman Empire.

In 399 CE the strategically important region of Phrygia, at the heart of the Roman state, was

pillaged and its cities assaulted by the Comes Tribigild.1 The attack was not a revolt as much as a

rampage: Tribigild had become the leader of a group of Greuthungi settled in Phrygia by

Theodosius in 386, having been defeated that same year during an incursion over the Lower

Danube.2 In what followed, Phrygia, Lydia, Pamphylia and Pisidia were ransacked, and an imperial

army soundly defeated.

Zosimus, our fullest source though writing a century after events, is heavily influenced by the

earlier Eunapius, who wrote at the time of the revolt. Another contemporary of the revolt, Claudian,

authored a diatribe in verse against Eutropius, which provides insight into the Constantinopolitan

attitude towards Tribigild and his followers. Philostorgius, an ecclesiastical historian who also wrote

at the time of the revolt, presents an alternative account, though alongside the later Sozomen and

Socrates, his writing obviously represent a certain perspective, more concerned with Christian

developments. By contrast, Ammianus Marcellinus, whose history stops some twenty years before

the revolt, represents a crucial (though sometimes tangential) account of Romano-Gothic relations

leading up to 399. Aside from literary sources, the Codex Theodosianus provides legal evidence

with an official flavour, and a limited number of inscriptions provide a more local insight into

developments on the ground. After the revolt Arcadius also commissioned a triumphal column now

named after him. Though the column is now destroyed, a detailed drawing from 1575 survives

which illustrates a triumphal vision of the revolt. 3 There is typically no evidence from non-Roman

sources on the revolt.4

1 All dates will hereafter be CE.

2 Zosimus, New History, 4.35.1 (trans. R.T. Ridley: Canberra, 1982); all chapter references in parentheses will
hereafter refer to Zosimus, unless stated.
3 J.-P. Sodini, ʻImages Sculptées et propagande impériale du IVe au VIe siècle: recherches récentes sur les colonnes
honorifiques et les reliefs politiques à Byzanceʼ in A. Guillou & J. Durand (eds.), Byzance et les images (Paris,
1994), pp.55-69.
4 W. Goffart, Barbarians and Romans, A.D. 418-584: the Techniques of Accomodation (Princeton NJ, 1980), p.30.

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For thirteen years a group of Goths peacefully inhabited the Roman province of Phrygia, so why did

they revolt after this struggle-free period? The answer provided by our fullest source on the event,

Zosimus, is as follows:

Remembering the arrangement with Tribigildus and considering that the

time was ripe to begin his undertaking, Gainas commanded Tribigildus to
lead his army to the Hellespont. And had he concealed his plot against the
state and quietly left Constantinople with his barbarians, he would have
accomplished his whole plan: all of Asia would have been taken over, with
nothing to prevent the whole east perishing along with it. (5.14.3)

Clearly this is unsatisfactory, and has been rightly challenged by modern studies. 5 The connection

prior to the revolt which Zosimus (via Eunapius) alludes to between Gainas and Tribigild, both

Goths notionally in the Imperial service, is easily disproved. In order to do so, it is necessary to first

establish a clear chronology of events, a necessity evidenced by confusion in the secondary

literature about the sequence and dates of events.

The run-up to the revolt was a political drama which involved Gainas, a Magister Militum,6 and a

plot to remove the eunuch Eutropius from power. 7 Gainas had been involved in a protracted struggle

with Eutropius for influence over the young Emperor Arcadius and as the revolt began, he was in a

particularly weak position.8 As Tribigildʼs revolt developed, an Imperial army led by Leo, an

associate of Eutropiusʼ with no military experience, was defeated.9 A second army, led by Gainas,

was initially set to guard Thrace, but after Leoʼs defeat was ordered to Phrygia. 10 Gainas was

accused of delaying tactics in an effort either to undermine the central government or to grant his

fellow Goth Tribigild enough time to wreak havoc. Neither Claudian nor Philostorgius, the other

contemporaries, mentioned any such plot, and it would seem the device was merely a rhetorical

5 Amongst others P. Heather, ʻThe Anti-Scythian Tirade of Syneiusʼ "De Regno"ʼ, Phoenix Vol.42 No.2 (Summer,
1988), p.158; Goths and Romans 332-489 (Oxford, 1991), p.159.
6 Philostorgius, Ecclesiastical History, 11.8.
7 Zos.5.12.1
8 Zos.5.13.1
9 Zosimus, New History, 5.14.2; Claudian, In Eutropium (trans. M. Plautnauer: London, 1922), II.436ff.
10 Zos.5.14.1, 5.14.4.

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fiction aimed at denigrating Gainasʼ character and history.11 It seems more logical that Gainas was

first forced out of the privileged Imperial entourage after a failed attempt to undermine Eutropius.

Upon being tasked with putting down the rebellion after the initial defeat of the first Imperial army

under Leo, he restrained from sustained assault on Tribigild either through cowardice or calculated

political manoeuvring.12 This last was successful in extracting favourable terms for Gainas: he

advised Arcadius to reach terms with Tribigild, but on the insistence that Eutropius be removed. 13

As Tribigildʼs Goths reached Chalcedon, Gainas managed to convince him to join his coup dʼétat. 14

The two entered Constantinople and ousted Aurelian, another rival for control over Arcadius. Not

long after, however, civil discontent orchestrated in part by the Patriarch John Chrysostom forced

out the unpopular barbarian garrison, but not before a massacre of some 7,000 Goths. 15 Arcadius

then ordered the Goth Fravitta to lead an army to defeat Gainas. In what follows, portrayed on the

Column of Arcadius, first a naval defeat in the Sea of Marmara and a defeat in Thrace forced

Gainas to flee, soon after to be executed by the Hun Uldin.16

Again, in light of the imminent blackmail which Gainas was about to impose on Constantinople, an

earlier plot is more suggestive of rhetoric rather than reality, and rests incongruously on the

assumption that Gainas and Tribigild were both acquainted and friendly towards each other. Ex post

facto such a connection is attractive, but unlikely. In this light Socratesʼ and Sozomenʼs assertion

that the two were related can surely be discounted, especially since neither Zosimus nor

Philostorgius (both equally hostile to the revolt) mention this crucial element of the narrative. 17

Furthermore these two writersʼ accounts are coloured with a Christian tinge. 18 The silence of

11 J.R. Martindale, The Prosography of the Later Roman Empire Volume II - A.D.395-527 (Cambridge, 1980), p.1125.
12 H. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350-525 (Oxford, 1996), p.8.
13 Zos. 5.18.1.
14 R.C. Blockley, ʻThe Dynasty of Theodosiusʼ, Cameron, Av. & Garnsey, P., Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 13,
The Late Empire, A.D. 337-425 (Cambridge, 1998), pp.116-7.
15 Socrates Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History (trans. A.C. Zenos: Buffalo NY, 1890), 6.6; Sozomen, Ecclesiastical
History (trans. E. Walford: London, 1855), 8.6.
16 Sodini (1994), pp.56-69.
17 Socr., 6.6; Soz., 8.4.
18 Socr., 6.6.; Soz., (8.6) borrows heavily from the slightly earlier Socrates.

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Claudian on the matter is surprising considering his hostility to Eutropius, but this owes more to the

fact that both Tribigild and Gainas were approaching Constantinople when Claudian wrote his In

Eutropium II than any similarities in agenda to Sozomen or Socrates. 19 Furthermore, it would seem

unusual that Gainas would be appointed by the imperial government to command forces against a

member of his own family, especially if that family's record for loyalty were so evidently

questionable.20 While an alliance of convenience certainly emerged after the revolt, it was probably

not possible before.

Settlement of barbarians in Roman lands: the Scirii and the Goths

[Bellona to Tribigild:] "Go then, busy thyself with the plough, cleave the
soil, bid thy followers lay aside their swords and sweat oʼer the harrow. The
Gruthingi will make good farmers and will plant their vines in due season.21

In the extract above, Claudianʼs goddess of war cruelly emasculates Tribigild in a

fictionalized rationalization of the 399 revolt. Though heavily rhetorical, it throws up some

interesting points. The physical settlement of the Goths after their defeat in 386 in Phrygia was not

an unusual step, but that they were settled at the heart of the state itself was an exceptional

development; indeed this remains the outstanding feature about the 399 revolt. An earlier wave of

Goths was checked by Gratian in 380, and subsequently settled in the frontier regions of Pannonia

II, Savia and Valeria.22 The Goths who would fall under Alaricʼs command settled in the Balkans in

382 and 397.23 After 399 there was extensive barbarian settlement in Thrace and the wider Lower

Danube region.24 But all of these came after the initial experiment of the Goths being settled in

Phrygia.

The terms by which the Goths settled in Phrygia are not known, though modern some commentators

19 J. Long, Claudianʼs In Eutropium: Or, How, When and Why to Slander a Eunuch (Chapel Hill NC, 1996), p.151.
20 Seen in both Sozomen (8.4) and Socrates (6.6), Heather (1988), p.159.
21 Claud., In Eutr. II.195.
22 J. Curran, ʻFrom Jovian to Theodosiusʼ, Cameron, Av. & Garnsey, P., Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 13
(Cambridge, 1998), p.102.
23 Heather (1988) p.160.
24 Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae, 19.11.1; Zos. 4.10.1, 4.35.5.

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generally suggest a settlement involving agricultural labour. 25 Claudian evidently saw the Goths in

Phrygia as farm workers, and recognised that the Goths were few in number. 26 Zosimus, in

describing the initial assault of Odotheus and his Goths across the Danube, suggests that after the

apparent massacre (recorded in all the sources) the remaining Gothic prisoners were set free. 27 This

last could simply be a very general kind of liberty, or could just exclude slavery from the varied

fates defeated barbarians could expect. No other sources mention any details concerning the Goths

from their defeat in 386 until the first signs of revolt in 399.

However, we do have more knowledge about the terms of settlement of a similar group, the Hunnic

Scirii, who were settled in Bithynia in 409, again a region at the heart of the Roman state, and fairly

removed from the frontier.28 The Codex Theodosianus (5.6.3) alludes to the conditions of their

settlement, in which they were to be treated as coloni, though granted to any landowner in Bithynia

wishing to allay "the shortage of farm produce [e.g. labour]" (5.6.3.1) apparent in the province. 29 It

would seem the Scirii, like the Goths under Alaric mentioned earlier, were detached from their units

and broken up to destroy any cohesion.30 This would suggest that the Scirii were destined to become

free farmers attached for a specified period (two years). Furthermore, according to the terms of the

settlement treaty for the Scirii recorded in the Codex Theodosianus, they were omitted from military

service for twenty years (5.6.3.1).

Returning to the original point at hand, the evidence from the revolt of 399 would suggest that the

Goths under Tribigild had not been separated from each other, and that in a broader sense their

circumstances prior to the revolt were very different from the later Scirii example. Firstly, they were

25 M. Speidel, ʻA Latin gravestone of AD 390 from Sebaste/Phrygiaʼ in M. Speidel, Roman Army Studies Vol.1
(Amsterdam, 1984), p.388.
26 Claud. In Eutr. II.220-1.
27 Zos. 4.39.5.
28 G. Bowersock, P. Brown, O. Grabar, Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World (London, 1999), p.335.
29 The Code will be abbreviated to C.Th. hereonin.
30 Heather (1988) p.161.

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very successful very quickly in the first days of their revolt. Our sources stress that the Goths were

able to capture cities and this is confirmed by Zosimusʼ account: "So it happened that, without

anyone to oppose him, Tribigildus captured every city, killing all the inhabitants and soldiers"

(5.15.2). Special emphasis is placed by Zosimus on the fact that the Goths under Tribigild entered

cities and killed both citizens and soldiers, a point echoed poetically by Claudian:

The Barbarian burst in upon those cities so peaceful, so easy of capture.

There was no hope of safety, no chance of escape. Long and peaceful ages
had made the crumbling stones of their battlements to fall.31

The above quote highlights an important aspect of this particular revolt, that these barbarians are

seemingly skilled in siege warfare, or certainly have some experience of it. In a way this is an

anomaly amongst the peoples who enter the Roman Empire, as barbarians were noted for not being

able to take walled cities.32 The most sensible conclusion to draw from this is that the Goths had

served in a unit of the Roman army which had undertaken sieges.

While we know that the revolt attracted growing numbers of discontented farmers, slaves and

doubtless some Goths amongst them, the speed of the successes suggests that the Goths who came

to form the core of the revolt were closely associated for some of the thirteen years of settlement.

How else could they have achieved so much had they spent more than a decade apart? Furthermore

it would seem that the Goths were also armed, whereas the Scirii were explicitly not so, except for

military service. We know that Tribigildʼs "Getic squadron" was a cavalry unit when it had attacked

the Empire, so the Goths certainly had professional military experience. 33 Indeed, in the revolt itself,

we hear that Tribigild was held up in Pamphylia, "where he struck rough roads completely

unsuitable for his cavalry."34 In agreeing to these strong claims for an armed revolt, we can discount

the idea that the revolt was essentially banditry or general civil discontent, in contradiction to what

31 In Eutr. II.274-8
32 P. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire (Chatham, 2005), p.302.
33 In Eutr. II.175 and H. Elton (1996), p.94.
34 Zos. 5.15.5; emphasis added by author.

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Claudian has Eutropius say: "ʼTwas some poor troop of wandering brigands." 35 That the Goths of

Tribigild were armed, when they were not on campaign, goes against what as come before. For

instance, some Goths which Theodosius had defeated in 383 were settled in Thrace, Macedonia and

the region south of the Danube: "Tame and submissive, they entrust their persons and arms to us,

whether the Emperor wants to employ them as farmers or as soldiers." 36 Thus the settlement of the

Scirii is unlike that of the Goths in Phrygia: the Goths lived in close proximity for some time prior

to the revolt, had extensive military experience (probably in Roman service), and were certainly

armed. But how had this set of circumstances, where an armed group of potential enemies was

stationed at the heart of the Roman state, come about?

While historically the Romans had of course been settling conquered or retired soldiers in their state

prior to the battle of Adrianople (378), the dual threats of manpower shortages and a large hostile

force on the frontier which the aftermath of the battle created would clearly have been enough to

make the possibility of armed barbarians in Roman service and inside Roman territory a reality. For

the Phrygia settlement, the barbarians were being stationed away from the frontier, but still in a

militarized (eg. armed) capacity. While their poliorcetic knowledge places them at some time on

campaign with the main Roman army, in peace they would certainly have acted as a garrison unit.

Therefore the Goths were stationed in the region as a garrison unit: this would certainly explain the

title of Comes given to Tribigild. Indeed, though the sources inaccurately say that the Goths were

settled as farmers, as the evidence suggests these men were almost certainly soldiers.

Their role as guard units or military police is reinforced when considering that their base, the city of

Nakoleia,37 was astride the strategic roads crossing the Anatolian landmass. In his study of the

Negev, Ariel Lewin suggested that ʻIllyrianʼ units (not necessarily from Illyria), an elite group of

35 In Eutr. II.304-309
36 Themistius, Orations, 34.22; emphasis added by author.
37 Ecclesiatical History, 11.8.

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cavalry, were stationed in peacetime to guard the main arterial roads through the region bordering

the Arab desert.38 Returning to Phrygia, a tombstone from the city of Sebaste records the names

Buranus and Ursinianus, both names common in the Lower and Middle Danube, who were

stationed in the city during the time of the Gothic presence in the region. 39 It seems that these

individuals were stationed in the city of Sebaste to guard the military roads through the region, as

was common elsewhere in the region.40 Another tombstone, again from Sebaste, again mentioning

another Ursinianus as a member of a lightly-armed cavalry unit, supports this too. 41 If the Goths

were largely a cavalry unit, as appears to be the case, there is certainly a precedent for mounted

units being sited away from frontiers. Elite cavalry units in the East mentioned in the Notita

Dignitatum (c.395) were stationed not on the frontiers but in Phoenicia, removed from the main

theatres of combat.42 There are thus parallel cases and ample reason for the Goths to be stationed in

Nakoleia as cavalrymen.

It is furthermore feasible to suggest that the barbarians would have been billeted in the town,

solving questions about their accommodation.43 This would explain how "[...] so many gates open to

thee [Tribigild] their undefended gates."44 The question of whether the status of these men should be

understood as limitanei, dedicatii or even coloni (fulfilling a primarily agricultural function) cannot

easily be answered, but in a way it is not a pressing concern to categorise them: as already pointed

out, the settlement/garrisoning of armed barbarians in Roman land was a novelty in its own right. In

terms of their treatment within the context of the Roman army, Elton would have us believe that

these men would not have been treated any differently from their Roman colleagues.45

38 Ariel Lewin, ʻLimitanei and comitatenses in the Near East from Diocletian to Valensʼ in Y. Le Bohec, Catherine
Wolff (eds.), LʼArmée romaine de Dioclétien à Valentinien Ier (Lyon, 2004), p.234.
39 M. Speidel, (1984), pp.381-8.
40 C. Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire: Soldiers, Administration and Public Order (Oxford, 2011), p.212.
41 W. H. Buckler, W. M. Calder, C. W. M. Cox, ʻAsia Minor, 1924. III. --Monuments from Central Phrygiaʼ, JRS Vol.
16 (1926), pp. 92-3.
42 Lewin (2004), p.227.
43 Goffart (1980), p.123.
44 Claud. In Eutr. II.210-211.
45 Elton (1992), p.133.

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Why revolt?

The next question to ask is why the Goths revolted. There are several hypotheses from

modern commentators which regretfully only view the revolt as an isolated incident of negligible

importance, to be understood through the prism of high politics in Constantinople. 46 The idea that

Tribigild revolted because he was jealous of Alaricʼs rapidly accruing wealth is plausible, 47 but does

not account for the compliance of the Goths at Nakoleia, or for the fact that the revolt was

underway before Tribigild appeared on the scene. 48 Certainly the revolt was not part of an effort by

Tribigild to influence Constantinopolitan politics, and we have already discounted the connection

prior to the revolt between Tribigild and Gainas.

To try to answer this question, it is worth reviewing what we already know about the Goths. They

certainly performed a military function in Phrygia, and had their base at Nakoleia. They were

effective at taking cities, and were capable of defeating an imperial army. As far as we can tell the

Goths were stationed in Phrygia from their defeat in 386 until the revolt. Therefore the reasons for

their revolt are to be found in their environment as well as the events leading up to 399.

In 397/8 the eunuch Eutropius, who was later to be toppled by Gainas, led a Roman force against

the Huns who had been terrorizing Phrygia, Cappadocia and Syria. 49 Eutropius was concerned about

the impact of these raids on the wider East, and had ordered the cities there to build defences in

light of the new internal security threat (C.Th.15.1.34). While this particular expedition was a

success and helped to temporarily buttress Eutropiusʼ position, it is possible that certain elements of

that Roman force would have been dissatisfied with the rewards they had received as a result of

46 Heather (2005), p.215, neglects to mention Tribigild entirely.

47 Claud. In Eutr. II.177-180, 211-219.
48 G. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376-584 (Cambridge 2007), p.200.
49 J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops: Army, Church and State in the age of Arcadius and Chrystostom
(Oxford, 1992), p.97.

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their victory.50 The importance in late antique cultures of gift-giving was critical, and "in Germanic

society in particular [...], lordship was often equated with the giving of gold." 51 Eutropius, perhaps

flushed with his recent victory, did not see to the needs of the Goths who had fought for him in the

East. "[I]t is hardly credible that the armies would have made no protest and would have fought as

well as they did, if they had suffered such a cut." 52 Maintaining the loyalty of soldiers was

fundamental in late Roman armies, and this was achieved through the granting of donatives,

exemption from civic duties and other benefits. 53 Feasibly, the Goths of Nakoleia could have

numbered among those who had not received what was expected.

In part this thesis is strengthened by the lack of any contrary evidence, but also because it suites the

scheme of developments in the revolt and aligns with what we know about Gothic activities and

presence in the Roman Empire. This last relates to the final section of this study, which will look at

a comparable set of circumstances involving a Gothic settlement, this time in Aquitaine in the

Western Empire.

Barbarian farmers and soldiers in East and West

The importance of what has been established has relevance to the settlement of barbarians in

the Western Empire as well. Specifically, it serves well to look at the settlement of Walliaʼs Goths in

Gaul in 418/9.54 There are problems with this comparative approach, not least of which is that while

Tribigild certainly led a revolt, Walliaʼs Goths remained contented farmers for a few years before

their expansion into what would become to Kingdom of Toulouse. Additionally, the Phrygian Goths

were defeated in battle; this was not the case for their Aquitainian counterparts. But there are also

practical parallels to draw from the Eastern example which can aid out understanding of the

50 On the importance of donatives: A.D. Lee, ʻWarfare and Stateʼ in P. Sabin, H. van Wees, M. Whitby (eds.), The
Cambridge history of Greek and Roman warfare (vol.2), (Cambridge, 2007), p.385.
51 Heather (1991), p.114.
52 A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284-602: A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey (Oxford, 1964),
p.284.
53 Lee (2007), p.385.
54 Halsall (2007), p.228 n.42 for primary sources.

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Western development, and vice-versa. It is worth remembering throughout this section that the

arguments made for and against sensible parallels between the situation in Phrygia in 399 and

Aquitaine in 418/9 are crippled by lack of evidence. The aim here is not to establish a dogma of

settlement trends, but to point out how the deficiencies in our knowledge of one settlement may be

compensated by our knowledge of another.

In 418 a large body of Goths was settled north of the Garonne river in Aquitania II. 55 The Goths had

been tied to the service of Constantius, and were ordered, though perhaps not against their will, to

settle the region.56 The question of why Constantius saw Aquitaine as a suitable region is one which

has troubled scholars since E.A. Thompsonʼs pioneering 1956 article. 57 Thompson concluded that

the creation of a buffer against the restless Bagaudae58 who rose up in the early 410s in Armorica,

just north of Aquitaine, was the principle motivation. They may simply have been treated as

veterans.59 It is possible they were settled away from the sea to avoid a barbarian seaborne threat,

which could affect Gallic and Italian shipping.60 A teleological analysis of the Goths in Aquitaine,

which looks at the original settlement from the founding of the Kingdom of Toulouse backwards in

time is possible but largely misleading.61

As Halsall notes, all of these theories have merits.62 Like these other commentators, he also notes

the novelty of this way of dealing with barbarians inside the Roman Empire. While Tribigildʼs

Goths would seem to supersede any such claim, having been settled nineteen years earlier, there are

striking similarities to the two cases. The central location of Phrygia in Anatolia helps promote the

55 Halsall (2007), pp.228-9.

56 R. van Dam, Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul (London, 1985), p.38.
57 E. A. Thompson, ʻThe Settlement of the Barbarians in Southern Gaulʼ, JRS Vol.46 (1956), pp.65-75.
58 A murky band of peasant militia who periodically appear across the later Western Empire: van Dam (1985), pp.36-7.
59 H. Sivan, ʻOn foederati, hospitalitas and the settlement of the Goths in 418 A.D.ʼ, American Journal of Philology
Vol.108, No.4 (1987), p.770.
60 V. Burns, ʻThe Visigothic Settlement in Aquitania: Imperial Motivesʼ, Historia Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte Bd.41,
H.3 (1992), p.370.
61 Followed in Goffart (1980), p.117. Halsall (2007) is generally critical of a teleological approach.
62 Halsall (2007), p.229.

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idea of containment of the Goths; using Burnsʼ argument, we could say that its landlocked nature

would have put the minds of Constantinopolitan officials at ease. In practical terms, the Goths in

Phrygia were unlikely to threaten any ports or shipping routes. Although this is not the place to

open a debate on the peculiar phenomena and specific functioning of late antique Phrygian society,

the area had been home to several heresies (Montanism, Novatianism) which had doubtless

appeared as part of societal dynamics present in the region. 63 This would account not only as a

factor conducive to revolt, but also explain how the ranks of Tribigildʼs army were swelled by

rebels and runaway slaves soon after hostilities began. Late Roman Gaul was a place where local

dynasts and isolated powerbases held sway, removed from central authority and maintaining a

degree of independence.64 Much like neighbouring Isauria, and indeed probably large swathes of

sparse Anatolia, Phrygia was home to bandits and highwaymen. 65 Aquitaine too, in part to due large

areas of relative isolation, certainly played host to groups of rebels. 66 Furthermore Thompson has

already informed us of the problems with the Bagaudae just north of Aquitaine. Returning to

Phrygia, the problem was not confined to the years around 399: Justinian created a new official to

deal especially with banditry in Phrygia and neighbouring regions in 535.67

Now that the differences and parallels are known, we can turn to the application of this knowledge.

The settlements of the Goths in Phrygia and Aquitaine both pose essentially the same question to

modern commentators, namely why the Imperial authorities chose these two regions in the first

place. A more general consideration which has garnered less attention is also the most obvious, that

for Constantius in the West and Theodosius in the East the considerations were related to manpower

and military potential. Without wishing to oversimplify the issue, there were several stark realities

63 A.P. Kazhdan, A-M.M. Talbot, A. Cutler, T.E. Gregory, N.P. Ševčenko (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium
(Oxford, 1991), ʻPhrygiaʼ, p.1671.
64 van Dam (1985), p.19
65 N. Lenski, ʻAssimilation and Revolt in the Territory of Isauria, from the 1st Century BC to the 6th Century ADʼ,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient Vol.42, No.4 (1999), p.419.
66 van Dam (1985), pp.16-18.
67 Justinian, Novels 145 (trans. S.P. Scott: Cincinnati OH, 1932).

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facing these two Romans in their reigns. For Constantius, his army was simply too small and

indispensable elsewhere to garrison a region like Aquitaine, whose security concerns were

secondary both to the porous frontiers in Alsace and the dense cityscape of Italy. 68 In the East

Theodosius need only have looked to the Lower Danube and seen the fallout of Adrianople to

consider opening a new avenue of Roman strategy in settling armed barbarians inside his state,

perhaps replacing in role and function the men lost at the catastrophe of 376. While evidence for

manpower shortages are less clear in Aquitaine, we know that in the East, the arrival of the defeated

Scirii in 410 was welcomed by landlords keen on more labourers in Bithynia. More generally,

landlords of agricultural estates would surely not have wanted their tenants to be recruited into a

Roman army short on troops, whether in East or West. By installing large numbers of people into a

region, these fears were addressed by both providing other potential recruits in the form of the

Goths in Aquitaine, or providing the security directly, in the form of the Phrygian Goths.69

Conclusion

Clearly a revised consensus is necessary for the story of the Goths settled in 386 in Phrygia.

Firstly, the credibility of the sources on the affair have emerged as less than complete, sometimes

offering contradictory evidence where there need not be any. Comparisons with the Bithynian

settlement are helpful in proving what did not happen in Phrygia. The novelty of this policy from

the Imperial governmentʼs perspective need not be stated again, and the same is the case for the

Aquitainian case. Contrary to the rhetoric of the era and the assumptions of some modern

commentators, the Goths were not settled as farmers, but as highway policemen and occasional

campaign units. There are strong reasons to believe that the revolt was the result of the latest of

these campaigns (the most obvious being Eutropiusʼ), though other triggers, if present, remain

absent from historical records.

68 Burns (1992), p.366.

69 Halsall (2007), p.147.

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The revolt which began in 399, and which came to be commanded by Tribigild, remains an event of

significant importance but which today receives minimal attention. By contrast the comparable

settlement in Aquitaine of Walliaʼs Goths has been well-researched. By combining reasonable

conclusions from these two cases, a broader thesis on the settlement of these groups of barbarians

emerges. Both Constantius and Theodosius faced difficult choices in their respective eras. In

electing to pursue a new way of dealing with the barbarians, they were adapting existing policies in

order to extract the best possible option for the Roman Empire.

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