Professional Documents
Culture Documents
UNIVERSITY
BHOPAL
INTRODUCTION
ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY VAKIL
PAYMENT MADE BY
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DEBT
CONCLUSION:
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Introduction
Various reasons have been expressed for supporting the existence of the law relating
to the limitation of actions. The more important ones are
1. That long document claims are more of cruelty than justice claims.
2. That those who go to sleep over their rights and claims should not be assisted by
courts in recovering their property.
3. Defendant may loose lose the evidence to disprove the stale claim.
All these reason are there. But there are circumstances where things become
out of hand and it is not reasonably possible to do them within the limits. This
project tends to analyze such conditions where the period of limitation can be
extended.
(1) Where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is
prescribed by this Act-
(a) The suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent or
his agent; or
(b) The knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is
concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or
(c) The suit or application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; or
(d) Where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant
has been fraudulently concealed from him. The period of limitation shall not begin to
run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could,
with reasonable diligence, has discovered it, or in the case of concealed document,
until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed
document or compelling its production:
Provided that nothing in this Section shall enable any suit to be instituted or application
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to be made to recover or enforce any charge against or set aside any transaction
affecting, any property which-
(I) In the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person
who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know, or have
reason to believe, that any fraud had been committed, or
(ii) In the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration subsequently
to the transaction in which the mistake was made, by a person who did not know, or
have reason to believe, that any mistake had been comitted
(iii) In the case of a concealed document, has been purchased for valuable
consideration by a person who was not a party to the concealment and, did not at the
time of purchase know, or have reason to believe, that the document had been
concealed.
(2) Where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of a
decree or order within the period of limitation, the court may, on the application of the
judgment-creditor made after the expiry of the said period extend the period for
execution of the decree or order:
Provided that such application is made within one year from the date of the discovery
of the fraud or the cessation of force, as the case may be.
This Section is based on the principle that whereby the remedy is given on the
ground of fraud, the right of the party is not affected by lapse of time. It applies to
every sort of action which is affected by the Act. This Section is an enabling provision
which postpones the starting point of limitation of suits and applications. It does not
apply to appeals.
In order to attract the applicability of this sub section four circumstances must concur:
There must have been a fraud.
That fraud must have deprived the claimant or his predecessors in the title of the
estate.
The fraud must have been concealed.
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The concealment further must have been such that it could not with reasonable
diligence have been discovered sooner than it was in fact discovered, and, of
course such discovery must have been within the twelve years, i.e. the statutory
period, before the commencement of this action.
Shortly put, if the plaintiff desires to invoke the aid of this Section he must establish
that there has been fraud and that by means of such fraud he has been kept away from
the knowledge of his right to sue or of the title whereon it is founded.1
The theory underlying Section 17(1) (b) is that every person is presumed to know
his own legal rights and title to his property, etc. if he does not take to know of them,
the time for filing a suit or application based on such a title or a right is not prevented
from running against him. The only exception to this rule is –When such a person is
prevented from knowing about such a title or right by the fraud of the opposite party.2
Though the word fraud is not defined, hence we take the literal meaning. The basic
intention should be to deceive the other party. If the non compliance of the duty is due
to other reasons like negligence, without the intention to deceive, then it would not be
a fraud, though the breach can be punished by law. There should be an actual and
active fraud, something intentional and deliberately done. Concealed fraud means a
case of designed fraud, by which a party, knowing to whom the right belongs,
conceals the circumstances giving that right, and by means of such concealment
enables himself to enter and hold the property. For instance where an insolvent
deliberately omits to give information as to his property.
In Raneegunje Coal Association Ltd. V Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.3, it was
observed
That a person should have been kept from certain knowledge by means of fraud.
There must be actual fraud in the means adopted to keep the person out of knowledge,
and to my mind entirely a misuse of words to say that, merely because defendants did
not furnish the particulars which they ought to have done under the contract there was
fraud. As stated in Polock’s Law of Fraud :
“Fraud may be described for most usual purposes, as the procuring of advantage to
1
S.S Gulan Ghouse v. S.S.A.M. Kamisul AIR 1971 SC 2184
2
Dhani Ram v. Mohd. Usman AIR 1974 Del 89
3
AIR 1929 Bom 119
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one self, or furthering some purpose of one’s own by causing a person with whom one
deals to act upon a false belief.”
The provision applies only where the mistake is an essential ingredient of the cause
of action, where the statement of claims set out the mistakes and its consequences and
pays for the relief from the consequences. So in the case where the statement of claims
set out that the sums became due and only a smaller amount was paid and the prayer is
for an account to ascertain the sum still due and for payment of them when so
ascertained, held that this action is not for relief from the consequences of a mistake
within the meaning of this Section. This Section only applies to suits and applications
for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the Act. If there is a mistake, it is
provided that the limitation would start from the date mistake is noticed. It is a mistake
of law and can be said to be noticed from the date when the provision is declared to be
invalid.
Also the suit or application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake 4 for eg in
cases where money has been paid or a contract has been entered into due to the
mistake and the action is for repayment of money or rescission of contract.
It means then when such document is concealed in the case of any suit or
application, necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant the period of
limitation does not begin to rum until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means
of producing the concealed document or compelling its production.
4
Richardson and Cruddas v. H. Mundhra AIR 1973 Cal 119
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This Section does not enable any suit to be instituted or application has to made to
recover or enforce any charge against or set aside any transaction affecting, any
property which has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was
not a party to the concealment and did not at the time of purchase know, or have
reason to believe that the document has been concealed or a person who was not a
party to fraud and had no reason to belief that fraud was done. Same is in the case of
mistake.
Hence this Section is only against the guilty party, his agent or a person claiming
under him except for a bona fide purchaser.
Subsection (2)
It is new and has been enacted with a view to incorporate the principle contained in
the proviso to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to the power of the
courts to order execution after the period of limitation. But the benefit of this sub
Section is however made available only if the application for the extension is made
within one year from the date of discovery of the fraud or cessation of force, as the
case may be.
This Section provides that where a judgment- debtor has, by fraud or force,
prevented the execution of a decree or order within the period of limitation the Court
may, on the application of the judgment- creditor made, after the expiry of the said
period extend the period for execution of the decree.
It is incumbent on the plaintiff seeking the benefit of this Section to distinctly allege
the particular fraud or mistake by which he has been kept from the knowledge of his
right to suit against the defendant, specifically and with detailed particulars.5Once this
is established, and then the onus will shift to the other side to prove that the influence
of the fraud has ceased to operate or that the plaintiff could have with reasonable
diligence discovered the fraud.
5
Chintamani v Krishna Prasad Singh, AIR 1960 Ori 75
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Starting point of limitation
(1) Where before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in
respect or any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such
property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such
property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derived his title or
liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the
acknowledgment was so signed.
(2) Where the writing containing thee acknowledgement is undated, oral evidence may
be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received.
(b) The word "signed" means signed either personally or by an agent duly Authorized
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in this behalf ; and
(c) An application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an
application in respect of any property or right.
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permits an acknowledgement to be made by the party against whom such property or
right is claimed, but also by any person through whom he derives his title or liability.
3. The said statement is made with an intention to acknowledge the said jural
relationship.
In L.C Mills v. Aluminum Corpn. Of India 10, it was held that “generally speaking
a liberal construction of the statement in question should be given. That the course
does not mean that where a statement is made without intending to admit the existence
of jural relationship, such intention should be fastened on the person making the
statement by ab involved and far- fetched reasoning. ”
Hence, though it is a general principle of the interpretation of statutes of Limitation
that such Statutes being in derogation of the right to sue, exceptions of the Statutes,
must be construed liberally, but it does not mean that where statement is made without
intending to admit the existence of a jural relationship, it could be fastened on the
maker.
Such acknowledgement of the jural relationship must be of a present subsisting
liability and not of a past one
It must be made before the expiry of the period of limitation.
The very opening words of the Section indicate that an acknowledgement to be valid
must relate to the time when the right was still enforceable. In other words, the
statement on which a plea of acknowledgement is based must relate to a present
subsisting liability.11
It now stands well settled that:
That the expression “prescribed period” employed in sub- Section (1) of the Section
does not refer exclusively to the period prescribed by the Schedule but indicates that it
means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
Thus for example, the day on which the acknowledgement is made will have to be
excluded in computing the period of limitation.12
This Section lays down that the fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the
time when the acknowledgement was so signed and not from the date from which the
payment was deferred. It does not confer any title or right on the person whose right is
acknowledged but merely extends the limitation.13 An assurance can be construed to
10
AIR 1971 SC 1482
11
S.F.Mazda v. Durga Prasad AIR 1961 SC 1236
12
Vinayak v. Kasabai, AIR 1984 Bom 237
13
Parasram v. Punamchand AIR 1942 Nag 102
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be an acknowledgement if it is with the words “will receive due consideration”, hence
meaning that there is an implied acknowledgement of the liability to pay.
An acknowledgment made by a person standing in a fiduciary relationship in his own interest and
to his own advantage is vitiated. However, whether the acknowledgement has been vitiated for
any satisfactory reason as for example, where it has been made by a person standing in a
fiduciary relation with the person concerned in a question of fact and has to be decided on the
face of each case. It is the finding of such a question which will decide the validity of an
acknowledgment in a case and not any hypothetical or abstract considerations
Thus, where a balance sheet acknowledging the debt is otherwise found to have been
authenticated with the law will not avail the creditor if the acknowledgment is colorable 14
admissions are made during the actual progress of litigation 15.
Acknowledgment by Vakil
In ordinary course of his duties, a pleader has authority to bind his client by admissions of fact
provide such admission are made while the litigation is in progress. Because admission by a
pleader is treated as admission by client unless client can dispute that he did not give any
authority to Vakil to make such admission. Thus signature of the pleader on the endorsement in
the recording a consent decree is sufficient to comply with the requirement of section 18.
Similarly, an admission in letter written by a pleader on behalf of the client is acknowledgment 16
It is apparent from the language of the section that the acknowledgment has to be by the party or
person against whom the right is claimed. Where the debt is sought to be recovered both against
the principal debtor as well as the surety the acknowledgment by the surety did not save the
limitation as against the principal debtor.
14
Babulal v, Official Liquidator AIR 1968 Raj 214
15
Chagganlal V. BonderdL air 1934 Bom 186
16
Arumuga V. Ramandhan AIR 1920 Mad 742
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It cannot be controverter that the joint tenants or tenants-in-common as such, have no implied
authority, in absence of a contract to the contrary to act for all. A co-owner as such, has no
authority, by any acknowledgment of liability or payment of interest or principal.
17
In Parasuram V. Parushottaman and Co a division bench held that keeping in view the
fiduciary relationship in cases where acknowledgment is to a partnership of which the
acknowledger is a partner, it would only be proper that express consent of the other co-heirs is
also obtained in making the acknowledgment and so indicated in the same.
Acknowledgment under this section does not confer any right or title on the person whose right is
acknowledged but merely extends limitation. Hence a document whereby a person acknowledges
his liability is not registrable under Section 17.
Acknowledgment under this section and stamp act is two distinct things. Under limitation Act it
is merely that of a liability in respect of any property, that pre supposes the pre existence of the
property or right, the acknowledgment under the stamp act is an evidence of the debt it self, there
is no inhibition in regard to time as far as the acknowledgement under the stamp act is concerned.
Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given about
the time when it was signed but it prescribes that subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, oral evidence of this contents shall not be received in other words, oral evidence may
be given about the date, about the contents of the documents is excluded.
Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration
of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly
17
AIR 1977 Ker 132
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authorized in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when
payment was made:
Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January,1928,
an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the hand-writing of, or in a writing signed by
the person making the payment.
(a) Where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgage, the receipt of the rent of
produce of such land is deemed to be a payment;
(b) "Debt" does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court.
The law of limitation is partly intended to promote diligence on the part of creditors in the
matter of recovery of their debt. The conscession made in favour of creditors by the provisions
of section 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act are intended to express the view of the legislature
that a creditor will not be considered wanting in such diligence in bringing this suit and he will
not be penalized by the bar of limitation if he had been diligent enough to get in the
handwriting of the debtor to evidence an acknowledgement of the fact of the part payment
within the period of limitations18
The principle underlying the section of the Act is that a payment on account of a debt or of
interest should a fresh start of limitation for a suit for debts and where the same debt is
evidenced by writing gave the creditor some excuse for further delay in suing, or was
sufficient new proof of the original debt to make it safe to entertain an action upon it at a later
date than would otherwise have been desirable19
18
Govindasami Pillai v. Desaigoundan AIR 1921 Mad 704.
19
Radha Krishna v. Anoop Chand AIR 1973 MP 248.
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Essentials of the section:
The payment must be made within the prescribed period of limitation and
It must be acknowledge by some form of writing either in the handwriting of the
payer himself or signed by him.
A plain reading of section indicates that this section applies only to a suit for a debt or
legacy or to the case of a mortgage with possession20
Where the acknowledgement is not in conformity with the provision of this section,
the plaintiff would not be entitled to a fresh period of limitation from the date of
payment.
Debt
This section contemplates debts of all kinds, whether secured or unsecured.21 This
section will cover all the claims to recover mortgage amount under Section 68 of the
Transfer of property Act. But the debt does not include money payable under a decree
or order of a court.
To constitute payment under this section it is not necessary that money should actually
pass between the debtor and the creditor. It was held in the of Maber v. Maber, any
fact which would prove a plea of payment of interest in an Action brought to recover it
would be a payment sufficient to bar the limitation Act. This would mean that under
this section which permits a new starting point of time when interest on a debt is paid
by a person liable to pay the debt or by his agent, does not specify any particular mode
or form of payment and therefore there are many modes in which payment may be
made. Moreover section does not say anything at all about the origin of the money
with which payment is to be made, which would mean that it is not necessary that the
money with which payment is being made or even part payment is made belongs to
the debtor who authorizes such payment. It is settled legal position that a mere
20
Abdullahv. Ishaq Mohd. AIR 1939 Lah 212
21
Azizur Rahman v. Upendra Nath AIR 1938 Cal 129.
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payment of any part of the debt is a sufficient acknowledgement of liability under this
section so as to extend the period of limitation. Similarly part payment of interest
which is payable is acceptable under this section. There is no distinction in the section
as to the payment of interest and a payment of principal, it is clear from the language
of the section that it applies to any payment on account of a debt by the debtor without
any distinction as to whether the payment was made towards principal or towards
interest.
The words under this section are wide enough to cover property liability also apart for
the person who is personally liable under his covenant or promise to pay the debt.
Moreover this section cover the Legal representative and in case of a debt charged on
land the person who derived title from him, which implies that the person which can
be rendered liable for the debt by the creditors, that is, the person against whom the
debt can be enforced.
In the case of Askaam Sowkar v. Venkataswami, it was held that the purchaser of the
equity of redemption was a person liable to pay he mortgage debt within the meaning
of this section and that, thought he was under no personal liability to pay the mortgage
debt still he did make a payment of interest as such. Such payment gave a fresh period
of limitation for enforcing the mortgage.
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Agent Duly Authorized
Payment made by
22
Chandra Kanta v. Behari Lal AIR 1919 Cal 7
23
AIR 1951 Mad 307(1)
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This section expressly provides that in order to avail the provisions of this section it is
essential that the payment must be made before the expiration of the prescribed period.
In Firm Kamta Prasad Jagannat Prasad v. Gulzarilal, it was held that the correct
interpretation is that the acknowledgement or payment should have been made before
the claim had become time barred and that is prescribed period, which is computed
according with the provision of the Limitation Act. The fresh period of limitation must
be computed from the time when payment was made and not from the date upon
which payment was endorsed, because section says payment must be made within
prescribed period of time and not that the acknowledgment should also be made
within that period.
Merely entering a fictitious payment cannot possibly amount to payment itself as,
what the statute of Limitation requires is a payment or at least something which is
tantamount to a payment. If a cheque is delivered to a payee by way of payment and is
received as such by him, it operates as payment and is an extinguishment to that extent
of the debt; though this is no doubt subject to a condition subsequent that if upon due
presentation the cheque is not paid the original debt revives25
24
1881 ILR 6 CAL 340
25
Kedarnath v. Dinabandhu Shah AIR 1916 Cal 580
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Where the mortgaged land is in the possession of
the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of
such land shall be deemed to be a payment.
This lays down that where the mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee
the receipt of the rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment for the
purpose of this section, mortgagee should be in possession of the whole or a portion of
the mortgaged property. Which may even be an indirect possession It has been held in
Girdharilal V. Ranoo Raghoji, that where the plaintiff have been claiming to have
been in possession of the property in despite as vendees and nit in their capacity as
mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of the land mortgaged could not deemed
to be payment for the purpose of this section. This section does not apply to a suit for
redemption of mortgage.
A mortgagor who has lost all interest in the mortgaged property cannot by payment of
interest or principal within the meaning of this section bind the person on whom the
interest has devolved.
26
AIR 1981 Mad 338
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Pleading and Proof
To claim exemption under this section the plaintiff must plead and prove not only
that there was a payment of interest on a debt or payment of the principal, but that
such payment had been acknowledged in writing in the manner contemplated by
section. The plea of limitation by itself without security of facts cannot to be a defense
bona fide, so as to resist an application for winding up.
Conclusion:
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS:-
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