RIAO - Order and Consultation

Reference Infrastructure
Access Offer (RIAO) of

Ooredoo Q.S.C. (CRA
2015/11/25B)
Consultation following Ooredoo request for

review
Non-Economic Terms and Conditions
Response Document
CRA 2016/06/22A
June 22, 2016
Table of Contents
1 Background ......................................................................................................... 4
2 On the Questions raised in the Consultation ................................................... 4
2.1 Safety and Security of the Network (Annex 9 of the RIAO) ..................................... 4
2.1.1 Ooredoo’s request .....................................................................................................4
2.1.2 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD ..........................................................5
2.1.3 Responses of the SPs ...............................................................................................5
2.1.3.1 Ooredoo .....................................................................................................................5
2.1.3.2 Vodafone ...................................................................................................................5
2.1.4 CRA’s comments and decision ..................................................................................5
2.2 Technical Standards (Annex 8 of the RIAO) ................................................................ 6
2.2.2 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD ..........................................................7
2.2.3 Responses of the SPs ...............................................................................................7
2.2.3.1 Ooredoo .....................................................................................................................7
2.2.3.2 Vodafone ...................................................................................................................8
2.2.4 CRA’s consideration and decision .............................................................................9
2.3 Service Level Guarantees (Annex 7 of the RIAO) ...................................................... 10
2.3.1 Ooredoo’s request ...................................................................................................10
2.3.2 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD ........................................................10
2.3.3 Responses of the SPs .............................................................................................11
2.3.3.1 Ooredoo ...................................................................................................................11
2.3.3.2 Vodafone .................................................................................................................12
2.3.4 CRA’s comments and decision ................................................................................13
2.4 Duct Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo in existing Ducts (Annex 1 of the RIAO) ....... 14
2.4.3.1 Ooredoo ...................................................................................................................14
2.4.3.2 Vodafone .................................................................................................................15
2.4.4 CRA’s consideration and decision ...........................................................................15
2.5 Lease Termination (Annex 1 of the RIAO) ................................................................. 15
2.5.3.1 Ooredoo ...................................................................................................................16
2.5.3.2 Vodafone .................................................................................................................16
2.6 Access to new ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses) ............................ 17
2.6.3.1 Ooredoo ...................................................................................................................19
2.6.3.2 Vodafone .................................................................................................................20
2.7 Access to leased ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses) ........................ 21
2.7.3.1 Ooredoo ...................................................................................................................21
2.7.3.2 Vodafone .................................................................................................................22
3 On the Clarifications discussed in the Consultation ..................................... 22
3.1 Clarification on Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One 2.6) ................... 22
3.1.2.1 Ooredoo ...................................................................................................................23
3.1.2.2 Vodafone .................................................................................................................23
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3.2 Clarification on the availability of the RIAO ........................................................... 23
3.2.2.1 Ooredoo ...................................................................................................................24
3.2.2.2 Vodafone .................................................................................................................24
3.3 Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One Clause 2.5)................................ 24
3.3.1 CRA’s considerations ..............................................................................................24
3.3.2.1 Ooredoo ...................................................................................................................25
3.3.2.2 Vodafone .................................................................................................................25
4 General Comments submitted by the Respondents ...................................... 25
4.1 Ooredoo Main General Comments ............................................................................. 25
4.1.1 Consultation on Economic Terms and Conditions. .................................................25
4.1.2 CRA’s comments .....................................................................................................26
4.2 Qnbn Main General Comments .................................................................................. 26
4.2.1 No Legal Basis for the Consultation. .......................................................................26
4.2.2 CRA’s comments .....................................................................................................26
4.2.3 Discrimination ..........................................................................................................26
4.2.4 CRA’s comments .....................................................................................................27
4.2.5 Abuse of process .....................................................................................................27
4.2.6 CRA’s comments .....................................................................................................27
4.2.7 CRA's Consultation Supports Ooredoo's Anti-competitive Strategy of Delay ........ 27
4.2.8 CRA’s comments .....................................................................................................28
4.2.9 Qnbn Application Article 5.1(b) RIAO ................................................................... 28
4.2.10 CRA’s comments .....................................................................................................28
4.3 Vodafone Main General Comments............................................................................ 28
4.3.1 The legal basis of the CRA to issue the Consultation Document is flawed and
unlawful ................................................................................................................ 28
4.3.2 CRA’s comments .....................................................................................................28
4.3.3 The CRA has acted in a non-transparent and discriminatory way in favour of
Ooredoo ............................................................................................................... 28
4.3.4 CRA’s comments .....................................................................................................29
4.3.5 The merits of the CRA’s approach and its implications for investment
incentives and competition ................................................................................... 29
4.3.6 CRA’s comments .....................................................................................................29
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1 Background
1. Pursuant to Article (18) and (25) 2 of the Telecommunications law, Article (51)
of the Executive By-Law and the License for the Provision of Public Fixed
Telecommunications Networks and Services issued to Ooredoo Q.S.C.
(Access Provider) Annexure F, Article (4), the Dominant Service Provider
(DSP) has to publish a Reference Offer. In the Notice and Orders Designation
of Ooredoo Q.S.C. and Vodafone Qatar Q.S.C. as Dominant Service Providers
in specified relevant markets, dated May 9, 2016 (cf. CRARAC 09/05/2016 A),
Ooredoo has been designated DSP in several wholesale markets, including
Relevant Market 8 in which the Duct services belong.
2. On November 25, 2015, CRA issued an Order approving the RIAO of Ooredoo
(re. CRA 2015/11/25, in the following the RIAO Order), along with the RIAO
Documents approved by CRA (re. CRA 2015/11/25B) and the Response
Document to the latest Consultation (re. CRA 2015/11/25A).
3. On April 10, 2016, Ooredoo submitted a request to review the Non-Economic
Terms and Conditions of the Approved RIAO. The CRA was of the view that
Ooredoo’s request to review the Approved RIAO was acceptable according to
the process set in Article 5 of the Approved RIAO dated November 25, 2015.
4. On June 26, 2016, the CRA issued a Consultation (CRARAC 2016/06/26) to
the Service Providers (SPs) on Ooredoo’s requested changes.
5. On June 12, 2016, Ooredoo, Qnbn and Vodafone submitted their responses.
6. This Response Document provides CRA’s analysis of the SPs’ responses and
our decisions.
7. Please note that this document needs to be read in conjunction with the Order
CRA 2016/06/22 revising the RIAO Documents (re. CRA 2016/06/22B).
2 On the Questions raised in the Consultation

2.1 Safety and Security of the Network (Annex 9 of the RIAO)
8. This issue is related to the timeline for Ooredoo to grant approval for safety and
security work permits.
9. According to Annex 9 of the Approved RIAO, Section 3 [emphasis added]
(a), Ooredoo shall complete the issue of all relevant permits and paper works and
grant approval within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt of the relevant forms.
2.1.1 Ooredoo’s request

10. Ooredoo states as follows
The CRA has sought to make changes to the Ooredoo technical standards and
longstanding field proven practices, without appropriate justification. E.g. Ooredoo
requires 48 hours to grant approvals for safety and security work permits; however
the CRA appears to have assumed wrongly that Ooredoo had agreed 24 hours,
and sought to force a major change to Ooredoo's internal governance framework
and processes.
Ooredoo cannot accept the CRA forcing significant changes to Ooredoo's internal
operating and governance structures, processes and procedures without
legitimate justification. Ooredoo had stated that the procedures apply equitably to
all staff and contractors and there would be no scope for discriminatory treatment
of an OLO, and therefore the CRA's attempt to change Ooredoo's internal
processes is unnecessary and unwarranted.
11. Accordingly, Ooredoo requested CRA change the timeline to grant approval for
safety and security work to two (2) business days, which is the timeline
internally applied to Ooredoo staff and subcontractors.
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2.1.2 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD
12. The CRA stated
A regulator is entitled to change processes and procedures of a DSP. The role of a
Regulator is to move the DSPs towards efficiency, with the ultimate scope to
benefit the final customers in both quality of the services and price reductions.
The CRA recognizes that the current timeline is neither consistent with the other
timelines included in the Approved RIAO nor necessarily clear, as:
 The Approved RIAO defines any other timeline in business days, which ensure
the certainty of the deadlines, and
 The current timeline of twenty-four (24) hours may lead to dispute between
Ooredoo and the OLO. For example, interpretation of the current timeline could
be needed if a request for work permits expires on public holiday or in non-
working hours.
The use of business days as unit of measure for the timeline in subject would
avoid the above issues.
Accordingly, the CRA would be minded to accept Ooredoo’s request and
change to two (2) business days the timeline to grant approval of the work
permits.
2.1.3 Responses of the SPs
2.1.3.1 Ooredoo
13. Ooredoo concurs with CRA considerations to change to two (2) business days
the timeline to grant approval of the work permits.
14. According to Ooredoo, the procedures apply equitably to all staff and
contractors and there would be no scope for discriminatory treatment of an
OLO, and therefore the CRA’s attempt to change Ooredoo’s internal processes
is unnecessary and unwarranted.
15. On CRA’s considerations that a regulator is entitled to change processes and
procedures of a DSP, stating
the CRA fails to explain the legal basis for such direct action from a regulatory
authority in an attempt to drive efficiency. Ooredoo would disagree with the CRA
assertion. The CRA should also be minded that the safety and security processes
and procedures apply to all of Ooredoo’s services, even those for which Ooredoo
is not dominant, and therefore the CRA assertion that it can exert direct
intervention to change internal procedures on a DSP must be taken with caution.
2.1.3.2 Vodafone
16. Vodafone shares CRA’s view that the regulator is indeed entitled to change
processes and procedures of a DSP.
17. Vodafone does not agree with the CRA’s rational for accepting Ooredoo’s
request to change the timeline for approving safety and security work to two (2)
business days, from 24 hours as it currently stands in the RIAO.
18. Specifically, Vodafone states
If the CRA’s concern with the current timeline is simply because it uses hours
instead of business days which is not consistent with the other timelines in the
approved RIAO, then the CRA should simply change the timeline to one (1)
business day. Vodafone Qatar therefore submits that following the CRA’s rational
around consistency, the timeframe should be changed to one (1) business day.
Neither the CRA nor Ooredoo have provided sufficient rational as to why the
timeline should be any different from the current timeline in the RIAO.
2.1.4 CRA’s comments and decision

19. The CRA maintains that it has the power of CRA to change Ooredoo’s
proposed WROs terms and conditions.
This power is grounded on – among others on:
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19.1 Article 25 of the Law, stating that a DSP shall comply – among others -
with any requirements related to the content of a WRO;
19.2 Article 51 of the Executive By-Law, which confirms the above.
20. Specifically, on the changes to the timeline to grant approval of the work
permits, the CRA is of the view that the responses of the SPs are not sufficient
to change CRA’s position as expressed in the Consultation Document.
21. Accordingly, the CRA has now decided to change to two (2) business days
the timeline to grant approval of the work permits.
2.2 Technical Standards (Annex 8 of the RIAO)
22. This is related to the technical standards applicable to the Approved RIAO.
23. The approved RIAO limits, and includes, the Technical Standards only to those
strictly necessary for the implementation of the RIAO. The CRA has modified
some Technical Standards proposed by Ooredoo, which must be met by
Ooredoo subject to a verification of technical feasibility.
24. Accordingly, any Technical Standards other than those included in Annex 8
cannot be imposed on the OLO.

25. Ooredoo stated as follows
The CRA has not fully explained how diverting away from the Ooredoo technical
standards would be in conformity with Ooredoo's rights under the
Telecommunications law to deny interconnection and access where Ooredoo
believes there are issues around network safety and integrity.
The CRA cites the example in its correspondence with Ooredoo, of how one more
cable in a JRC12 could harm Ooredoo's network in the short or in the long term.
However, the reality is that what the CRA has proposed is the insertion of an extra
hole in the JRC12, in addition to the maximum defined in the standard, and not
just an extra fiber. In those circumstances, can the CRA demonstrate that the
extra hole will not cause any structural damage to the JRC12 over the next 25
years?
Ooredoo committed in our consultation response, as well as during discussions
with the CRA, that it will apply the Ooredoo technical standards in a non-
discriminatory manner. Therefore the need for the CRA to intervene and force
activities in violation of the Ooredoo technical standards would appear to be
unwarranted.
If the CRA seeks to impose any condition which deviates from the Ooredoo
technical standards, then the CRA must be held accountable if damage does
occur. This liability must continue for the long-term.
The CRA is also denying Ooredoo's rights to enforce its technical standards.
Ooredoo has always claimed that Annex 8 includes only the main guidelines, and
this has been accepted by CRA (See Annex 8, 1.1 (b) in the RIAO version
published by CRA) and the detailed standards are contained in the CD provided to
all contractors in Qatar to abide by without any discrimination.
Ooredoo had suggested, if the CRA desires, that Ooredoo can simply include the
details that are within the CD as part of Annex 8 and be provided to a potential
OLO at the beginning of negotiations. Whilst that would make the RIAO more
bulky, it would resolve the primary concern of the CRA that the OLO may not have
full sight of the technical standards upon contract execution.
26. Accordingly, Ooredoo requested CRA to replace the current Annex 8 by a
general statement that the OLO and Ooredoo shall negotiate the Technical
Standards when concluding a final agreement based on the RIAO, whereas the
current technical standards of Ooredoo would form the base line..
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27. The CRA stated
A Regulator can change Technical Standards, which are often characterized by a
degree of discretion, which may be to the OLO’s disadvantage. The intervention of
the Regulator is justified to avoid this. The Technical Standards of the Approved
RIAO are aimed to facilitate the access to Ooredoo’s Ducts and to grant the safety
and security of Ooredoo’s network.
Therefore, the Approved RIAO introduced changes to Ooredoo’s Technical
Standards under the condition that changes must be technically feasible (cf. Order
CRA 2015/11/25, clause xv). The CRA was clear, that it is upon Ooredoo to
demonstrate that the amended Technical Standards cause structural damages to
Ooredoo’s network.
Nevertheless, the CRA recognizes that the Ducts of Ooredoo must be
safeguarded because of their strategic relevance not only for Ooredoo, but also for
future development of the competition on the Telecommunication Markets.
Accordingly, the CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo’s request to replace the
current Annex 8 by a general statement that the OLO and Ooredoo shall negotiate
the Technical Standards when concluding a final agreement based on the RIAO,
whereas the current Ooredoo technical standards of Ooredoo would form the base
line.
This is under the pre-condition that that Ooredoo shall:
 Consistently comply with the non-discrimination principle. Therefore, if Ooredoo
is already applying or will apply the Technical Standards itself, then the
Technical Standards shall be applied for the OLO as well;
 Fully disclose to the OLO the base line Technical Standards before negotiating
an Agreement based on the RIAO;
 Submit the base line Technical Standards to the CRA;
 Deliver the agreed Technical Standards to the CRA.
 Further, Ooredoo shall not change unilaterally the Technical Standards after an
agreement based on RIAO is signed but shall apply for the mechanism of the
review of the Agreement as set in the Main Body of the Approved.
The CRA has received evidence that Ooredoo did not respect its own Technical
Standard, limiting the number of cables installable in the Ducts to six cables.
Conforming to section above the Technical Standard of the six cables is not
valid anymore for the implementation of the RIAO.
For the avoidance of doubt, that Technical Standard shall not affect the Approach
to determining and allocating Available Capacity (cf. section 3.2, Annex 1 of the
Approved RIAO).
The CRA may intervene if Ooredoo and the OLOs did not reach an Agreement on
the Technical Standards.
2.2.3.1 Ooredoo
28. Ooredoo states
the CRA had not fully explained how diverting away from the Ooredoo technical
standards would be in conformity with Ooredoo's rights under the
Telecommunications law to deny interconnection and access where Ooredoo
believes there are issues around network safety and integrity.
… Again Ooredoo is not aware of a regulatory authority seeking to make changes
to long-standing technical standards. The Ooredoo technical standards have been
developed over many years, long before there were any other licensees in the
market or a regulatory body. The CRA appears to suggest these technical
standards have been somehow manipulated to disadvantage an OLO, which is
simply not correct.
The CRA also appears to want to change the Ooredoo Technical standards and
then states that it is upon Ooredoo to demonstrate that the amended Technical
Standards cause structural damages to Ooredoo’s network. Ooredoo finds this to
be contradictory in the extreme: the CRA forces changes to the long-standing
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technical standards without any assessment of the implications of such action, and
throws the responsibility, and costs of doing so onto Ooredoo. Ooredoo is keen to
safeguard the interest of its stakeholders and the integrity of its significant
investment in the network. Ooredoo has provided assurances to CRA that such
standards shall apply without any discrimination to OLOs and Ooredoo.
Nevertheless, the CRA recognizes that the Ducts of Ooredoo must be
safeguarded because of their strategic relevance not only for Ooredoo, but also for
future development of the competition on the Telecommunication Markets and the
CRA is therefore minded to accept Ooredoo's request to replace the current
Annex 8 by a general statement that the OLO and Ooredoo shall negotiate
the Technical Standards when concluding a final agreement based on the
RIAO, whereas the current Ooredoo technical standards of Ooredoo would
form the base line.
The CRA however places a number of pre-conditions: 1) Ooredoo will apply the
standard non-discriminatory; 2) Ooredoo will submit final copy with CRA; 3)
Ooredoo will not unilaterally change them; and 4) The technical standard limiting
cables to six will not be allowed.
Whilst Ooredoo agrees with most of these pre-conditions, the denial of the CRA to
limit the number of cables to 6 cables will have significant operational and financial
implications.
The limit of 6 cables has been introduced specifically to ensure the fiber cables
can be appropriately maintained. When a fiber cable gets damaged, it will need to
be pulled out and a replacement placed in the duct. Where there are more than 6
fiber cables in the duct, the possibilities of the cables becoming twisted together
increases. ….
Due to maintenance purposes, it is important to have the cables loose in the
conduit. The longer the conduit, the less cables you will be able to run and pull
them through easily and the more space may be required. In ducts where there is
not a rope, rodding may be required, which requires additional space.
In cases where there are more than 6 cables, it would mean that additional
lubrication will need to be added to the duct and additional specific equipment
used to pull the cables without any guarantee that no damage would occur to the
other cables. Clearly that would add additional costs, and time for Ooredoo.
If the CRA insisted on removing the limitation of 6 cables, then Ooredoo would
need to (i) be directly compensated by an OLO for consequential loss as Ooredoo
customers might be disconnected and for all additional maintenance activities
undertaken in the shared ducts, even when that maintenance was for Ooredoo
cables, as the additional costs and time are accrued due to the OLO (and the
CRA’s decision to remove the 6 cable limit); and (ii) absolved of all liabilities for
any damage and service disruption that may occur with the increase in cables and
such liability to be passed either onto OLO or CRA.
The concern the CRA appears to raise, is that Ooredoo may have inserted more
than 6 cables in a duct. The fact is that Ooredoo typically follows the Technical
Standards – in cases where it cannot follow the standards because of operational
reasons, it bears the additional risks including financial costs for doing so.
This cannot be achieved by an OLO. For to do so, it would mean that additional
processes would need to be introduced within the RIAO with the OLO required to
directly contribute to the additional costs incurred in maintenance activities
resulting from more than 6 cables as we have detailed above, as well as sharing
any applicable liabilities for damage and/or service disruption. These costs should
be apportioned to the OLO directly outside of RAS. In any case, as we mention,
Ooredoo itself will be bounded by the technical standards.
2.2.3.2 Vodafone
29. Vodafone is strongly opposed to the removal of the Annex 8 Technical
Standards in the RIAO.
30. Vodafone states
Ooredoo has provided no new information in its request to justify an amendment of
the RIAO. There are therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to revisit at this
point its Order and to weaken further the RIAO and delay its implementation.
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Vodafone Qatar is extremely concerned and surprised by the CRA’s acceptance of
Ooredoo’s proposal. Taking the technical guidelines out and replacing them with
the wording recommended is a huge step backwards as it opens up yet another
avenue for gaming and delay by Ooredoo.
Technical Guidelines include critical elements, such as duct capacity calculations
and constraints, facilities hosting, duct infrastructure upgrades and joint box
technical rules, necessary for the use of the regulated service and to enable
deployment of fibre by an access seeker. Those are contentious matters.
Without Annex 8, the RIAO cannot work. … The CRA made the right decision in its
Order.
Failure to agree on the technical standards will once again end up with the CRA
and the CRA will need to make a binding decision on the parties. By finalising the
RIAO with the technical guidelines as they stand, the CRA already made that
decision and there is no need to start the circle again.
Furthermore this is also inconsistent with the CRA’s clarification on the
Acceptance Procedures, whereby the CRA clarifies that the OLO should be able to
sign up to the RIAO without any further negotiations, as it should be. The very
purpose for reference offers is to indeed protect OLOs from prolonged negotiation
periods with the DSP which has a vested interest in delaying access.
The CRA should not be led to believe that the industry is starting from scratch. To
the contrary, a duct access agreement has been in place between Qnbn and
Ooredoo since April 2012 and some deployments using Ooredoo’s ducts have
taken place. There is therefore ample experience with duct access and the
underpinning technical standards necessary for smooth deployments.
Furthermore Vodafone Qatar submits that the Technical Standards provided in the
RIAO are what is needed for the purposes of the RIAO. Ooredoo’s own Technical
Standards are not all relevant for the service. Vodafone Qatar also notes that
Ooredoo only cites the example of how more cables in the JRC12 could harm
Ooredoo’s network in the short or long term.
Vodafone Qatar submits that where Ooredoo believes the Technical Standards
would cause harm to its network, it should have provided alternative solutions in
the Technical guidelines which would minimise the risk of harm to its network
rather than requesting to remove the whole Annex.
In any case Vodafone Qatar believes that Ooredoo’s concerns are already
addressed in the RIAO under Annex 8, Articles 7.1.b, which provides that the OLO
may upgrade the existing JRC-12 by rebuilding the Joint Box with the required
extra depth or as a JRC-14 and Article 8.1(a) which provides that the OLO may
upgrade the Duct route by adding more Ducts.
2.2.4 CRA’s consideration and decision

31. In the CD, the CRA was minded to accept Ooredoo’s request on Annex 8,
under certain preconditions, which included Ooredoo’s acceptance of the
invalidity of the limit in the number of cables installable in the Ducts (six cables)
(re. section 2.2.2 above).
32. The CRA is of the view that Ooredoo’s response is of concern as Ooredoo is
unclear in terms of acceptance of the preconditions, which may open future
disputes with the OLOs.
33. The CRA notes that Ooredoo generically states that it “agrees with most of
these pre-conditions”, without providing any indications of which preconditions
have been accepted and which are not.
34. Furthermore, we note that on the “six-cable limit” Ooredoo criticizes CRA’s
decision and alludes to future issues related to it, including the possibility to act
against the OLO for damages, etc.
35. According to the above, the CRA is now very concerned and hence considers it
prudent to review its position on the acceptance of Ooredoo’s request on
Annex 8.
36. This is supported by the response of Vodafone and by the general comments
provided by Qnbn (Re. section 4.3 below).
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37. Given the above, the CRA confirms the Annex 8 of the RIAO as approved with
the RIAO Order.
38. The RIAO Order and related Response Document (Re. CRA 2015/11/25 A)
include the justifications for changes to Ooredoo’s Technical Standard.
2.3 Service Level Guarantees (Annex 7 of the RIAO)
39. Service Level Guarantees set out the Service Levels that Ooredoo must meet
in the performance of its obligations in relation to the ordering and provisioning
processes and the Service Credits payable by Ooredoo to the OLO for any
failure to meet those Service Levels.
40. The CRA clarified that only the timelines of the Service Levels are under
consultation. The current end-to-end KPIs are confirmed, along with the current
Service Credits.

41. Ooredoo stated
The CRA has failed to justify and provide quantitative evidence on why it has
sought to decrease the SLA times and increase the service credit values from
those proposed by Ooredoo. The CRA has arbitrarily used averages of optional
tasks with no justification or evidence. It would have been more appropriate to
leave the SLAs as are defined in the IAA, as these have been discussed and
agreed by experts over a substantial period of time. The CRA or parties could then
seek amendments when sufficient data is available to justify changes to the initial
SLAs.
42. According to the above, Ooredoo requested CRA to link the Service Credits to
the Service Levels, but to put them on hold “until 100 Route Access Requests
(RAR) have been managed by Ooredoo, in order to derive revised SLAs based
on such analysis”.

43. The CRA stated
The CRA has fully explained its approach and decision on the Service Level
Guarantees (cf. clause xvi of the RIAO Order).A number of alternatives were
considered as the basis for service level targets and to enable service credit
payments that are needed to incentivize delivery to agreed standards. Options
include targets for every task, or a target for an end-to-end process. Targets might
be for the average of many processes or tasks. Each option has advantages and
disadvantages, including complexity versus simplicity or on the level of incentive
that each provides.
The CRA decided that each individual end-to-end process is measured against a
target time, to avoid the problem of using an average where a big delay on one
process may cause acute problems for the OLO but is compensated for by slightly
below-target delivery for all others. As each process is likely to have options that
do not happen every time, the true end to end time is not fixed. Only some
requests require an update with further information. A “worst case” process time
has every possible option and clarification, but this should be an unrealistic target
– it should be easily met as this ‘worst case’ time should be unusual.
Accordingly, the CRA defined a probability for some of the tasks (where they are
avoidable) and so this provides a more typical average target time for the end-to-
end process.
Service credits were set based on whether the service is delivered to the resulting
typical average target time, and credits are paid if delivered above this time, with
progressive payments if significantly above target.
The CRA notes that SPs have not provided relevant data on the Service Levels,
leaving the CRA without information. As consequence, the CRA had to rely on an
international benchmark to take its decision.
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Conscious of the above, the CRA stated, “CRA may review the timelines and the
probabilities after one year from the implementation of an agreement based on the
RIAO on the basis of the reports on Quality of Services Ooredoo shall deliver to
CRA” (cf. clause xvi of the RIAO Order).
Therefore, Ooredoo’s request to review the matter at the light of relevant data is
consistent with the position of the CRA as expressed in the RIAO Order.
Accordingly to the above, CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo’s request to put the
payment of the Penalties on hold “until 100 Route Access Requests (RAR) have
been managed by Ooredoo, in order to derive revised SLAs based on such
analysis”.
The above acceptance is subject to the following conditions:
 Ooredoo must submit robust and granular data on the actual time needed to
manage the above 100 RARs, providing evidence of sources and systems from
where the data have been extracted;
 The submission shall be accompanied by a report of an Independent Auditor,
attesting the veracity of the above information. The Auditor shall also provide a
report with the tests performed to audit the data (i.e. checks on systems,
measures on field, etc.);
 Data submitted must be reported in the RAS of Ooredoo and attributed to the
relevant products;
 The RAS of Ooredoo must unequivocally show that the timeline (and hence,
the cost per unit) of the processes implemented for the OLOs are non-
discriminatory and that the same cost per unit for comparable activities is also
attributed to the Retail Arms.
The CRA will consult separately on the updated Service Levels, after Ooredoo has
made its submission.
With reference to the Orders managed by Ooredoo before the above review, the
Penalties – if any - shall be calculated retrospectively according to the SLAs set by
CRA after the above review.
2.3.3.1 Ooredoo
44. Ooredoo states
the CRA has failed to justify and provide quantitative evidence on why it has
sought to decrease the SLA times and increase the service credit values from
those proposed by Ooredoo. The CRA has arbitrarily used averages of optional
tasks with no justification or evidence.
The CRA states that it defined a probability for some of the tasks (where they are
end process, however without actually describing how those probabilities were
derived or tested.
The CRA also states that the service credits were set based on whether the
service is delivered to the resulting typical average target time, and credits are
paid if delivered above this time, with progressive payments if significantly above
target, with claims that service providers have not provided relevant data on the
Service Levels, leaving the CRA without information. The CRA claims it is as
consequence that the CRA had to rely on an international benchmark to take its
decision.
However, the CRA could not reveal the international benchmark it claims to have
carried out, or acknowledge that the data as collated under the IAA is not relevant
as all of the access requests to date have not had an RFS date and consequently
did not have corresponding SLAs. The CRA has nevertheless had the SLAs as
contained within the IAA and the CRA has not provided any evidence of why those
are not appropriate. By no means can International Benchmarks be used in this
context as conditions might be drastically different in the countries considered in
the said benchmark and in Qatar.
Nevertheless, the CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo's request to put the payment
of the Penalties on hold "until 100 Route Access Requests (RAR) have been
managed by Ooredoo, in order to derive revised SLAs based on such analysis".
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Again the CRA places a number of pre-conditions:
 Ooredoo must submit robust and granular data on the actual time needed to
manage the above 100 RARs, which needs to be accompanied by a report of
an Independent Auditor;
 Data submitted must be reported in the RAS of Ooredoo and attributed to the
relevant products; and
 The RAS must unequivocally show that the timeline (and hence, the cost per
unit) of the processes implemented for the OLOs are non-discriminatory and
that the same cost per unit for comparable activities is also attributed to the
Retail Arms.
Ooredoo believes the CRA is seeking to place unnecessary cost onto
Ooredoo. The use of an independent auditor is simply unnecessary. The time
needed to manage the RAR will be self-evident from the information that the
process will produce. The CRA states at 49.2 that the Auditor is required to
perform "tests" to audit the data. This may not be possible if the data is manually
captured. The type of nature of the test have not been defined by the CRA. If the
CRA seeks to pursue with an independent auditor, Ooredoo would recommend the
CRA choose and pay for such auditor.
It is not clear to Ooredoo what the CRA means by the statement that the data
submitted must be reported in the RAS of Ooredoo and attributed to the relevant
products. The CRA is aware that the RAS does not provide the granularity
required, and is not designed to, or expected to, provide that level of detail. The
CRA will be aware that almost all Accounting separation and Regulatory
Accounting statements produced globally do not go into the level of detail that the
CRA seeks.
The RAS cannot show the timelines of the processes, for to do so, it would no
longer be a regulatory accounting system but more an Activity Based Cost
Accounting system, which is neither its purpose nor scope.
Furthermore, it is also not clear what is meant by robust and granular in CRA’s
statement “49.1: ‘Ooredoo to submit robust and granular data on the actual time
needed to manage the above 100 RAR’s”.
The CRA makes a statement at 49.3 that “The data submitted must be reported in
RAS and attributed to the RAS products”: …
At 49.4, the CRA makes the statement: “The RAS must unequivocally show that
the timeline (and hence the cost per unit) of the processes implement for the
OLO’s are non-discriminatory and that the same cost per unit for comparable
activities is also attributed to the Retail arm”.
The CRA is erroneously making the assumption that the costs of internal and
external ordering/provisioning/installing etc. must be the same. This can never be
the same as explained at earlier meetings with the CRA.
E.g. for internal provisioning, no fax confirming the order is sent and the Wholesale
department are not involved and no internal billing is required. The CRA will be
aware that Ooredoo is an integrated entity.
Ooredoo believes the data that will be produced as a result of the 100 RARs will
be sufficient to determine appropriate SLAs and will in any case have more
rational than the CRA’s current approach which has been the arbitrary reduction of
the data contained within the Infrastructure Access Agreement.
2.3.3.2 Vodafone
45. Vodafone states
Vodafone Qatar is strongly opposed to any softening and waiver of Service Levels
and Penalties. Ooredoo has provided no new information in its request to justify an
amendment of the Order. There are therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to
revisit at this point its Order and to weaken further the RIAO and delay its
implementation.
The approved Service Levels and Penalties are already weak and far from
comprehensive (e.g. they do not cover provisioning process). In the best case
scenario, an OLO can submit a Provisioning Request some 58 business days after
having submitted an AAR.
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The preliminary decision of the CRA to accept Ooredoo’s approach to review and
set Service Levels based the performance of Ooredoo in managing the first 100
AAR is fundamentally flawed. It has obvious perverse incentives on Ooredoo
which would be rewarded for being inefficient. The CRA also seems to ignore the
fact that Ooredoo’s network, including its FTTH access network is already largely
in place and therefore Ooredoo will only have marginal needs for new duct access,
except in greenfield areas. Hence even if one was to assume no discriminatory
treatment, the impact on access seekers will be far greater and discriminatory.
Service Levels and Penalties should be set at levels that incentivise good
performance and provide adequate financial compensation to access seekers in
the case of breaches. Where such performance is poor and not in line with
industry requirements, regulators are increasingly steeping in and setting
wholesale quality standards and targets in addition to Service Levels such as
Ofcom in the UK.1
The proposal of the CRA also defies any common sense as this would result in
putting in the market place a regulated access offer weaker than the commercial
agreement between Qnbn and Ooredoo which Vodafone Qatar understands
includes Service Levels and Penalties. The proposal also suggests that the
learnings from the use of duct access by QNBN have not been captured in the
RIAO.

46. The CRA notes that the RIAO Order already envisaged a review of the SLAs
after one year from the implementation of an agreement based on the RIAO on
the basis of the reports on Quality of Services (Re. clause xvi of the RIAO
Order).
47. That provision was included to have SLAs based on information related to the
RIAO processes, which are news and different from the IAA processes.
48. The CRA is aware that a DSP should be provided with a stimulus to efficiency
and efficacy. However, as first step, the CRA would be satisfied to have SLAs
based on time currently needed to perform the processes.
49. The CRA notes that the SLAs are not put on hold: as per preconditions set by
CRA to accept Ooredoo’s request, penalties for the Orders managed before
the review of the SLA shall be applied retrospectively according to the reviewed
SLAs.
50. Hence the CRA confirms the acceptance of Ooredoo’s request to review the
SLAs when 100 Route Access Requests (RAR) have been managed by
Ooredoo, in order to derive revised SLAs based on such analysis”.
51. The CRA also confirms all the preconditions listed in the CD. This means that
51.1 Ooredoo must submit robust and granular data on the actual time needed
to manage the RARs, providing evidence of sources and systems from
51.2 The submission shall be accompanied by a report of an Independent
Auditor, attesting the veracity of the above information. The Auditor shall
also provide a report with the tests performed to audit the data (i.e.
checks on systems, measures on field, etc.). The CRA would be happy to
appoint the Auditor and participate in the tests – including visit to
Ooredoo premises and monitoring of the time needed to manage the
Orders - if Ooredoo prefers this solution;
51.3 Data submitted must be reported in the RAS of Ooredoo and attributed to
the relevant products. Further clarification may be provided on this
requirement during the RAS implementation process.
1 Ofcom, 2016, Making communications work for everyone: Initial conclusions from the Strategic Review of Digital
Communications
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51.4 Ooredoo must demonstrate that the process implemented for the OLOs
are non-discriminatory and that the same cost per unit for comparable
activities is also attributed to the Retail Arms. The cost attribution must be
shown in Ooredoo’s RAS starting with RAS 2016.
52. The CRA will consult separately on the updated Service Levels, if Ooredoo has
made a submission fulfilling the above mentioned criteria.
53. With reference to the Orders managed by Ooredoo before the above review,
the Penalties – if any - shall be applied retrospectively according to the SLAs
set by CRA after the above review.
2.4 Duct Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo in existing Ducts (Annex 1 of

the RIAO)
54. The Duct Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo in existing Ducts affects the
calculation of the Available Capacity for the OLO (cf. Annex 1, section 3.2).
55. The higher is the Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo the lower is the Available
Capacity for the OLO.
56. According to the Approve RIAO, Ooredoo can reserve to itself:
56.1 In relation to used Ducts, 15% of the usable capacity;
56.2 In relation to empty Ducts, 30% of the usable capacity.
57. In both the cases above, the reservation is valid for a period of two (2) years
from the date of the relevant Access Request.

58. Ooredoo stated
The CRA has limited the amount of space in existing ducts that can be reserved
by Ooredoo. The CRA claims that Ooredoo can only book 15% of the available
space, irrespective of the need of Ooredoo for such duct space in its own ducts.
Ooredoo is not willing to provide capacity to an OLO if that means that Ooredoo
itself is denied access to the use of its own facilities. This would imply that
Ooredoo would need to engage in new investments and bear the risks that entail
such investment.
It would be most unusual for Ooredoo to have invested significant sums in duct
infrastructure to meet its long-term needs (30 years+) and be forced to provide
access to such investment to OLOs, to the extent that Ooredoo may not have the
duct capacity to meet its own needs. Such a situation would mean that Ooredoo
would have to invest again in additional infrastructure to meet its own needs, whilst
an OLO could utilize such duct space without the necessary investment.
Ooredoo is of the view that it should have the right to reserve to its self:
 In relation to used Ducts, 20% of the usable capacity;
 In relation to empty Ducts, 33% of the usable capacity.

59. The CRA stated
According to available information Ooredoo’s Duct filling grade is, on average,
around 50%.
Therefore the number of Access Requests rejected for space unavailability should
be very low and hence the Changes requested by Ooredoo are of a limited
magnitude.
According to the above, the CRA would be minded to accept Ooredoo’s request.
2.4.3.1 Ooredoo
60. Ooredoo agrees with the CRA position.
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2.4.3.2 Vodafone
61. Vodafone states
Vodafone Qatar remains strongly opposed to any amendment to the reserved duct
capacity space regardless of the magnitude of the change. Ooredoo has provided
no new information in its request to justify an amendment of the Order. There are
therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to revisit at this point its Order and to
weaken further the RIAO and delay its implementation.
Furthermore Vodafone Qatar seeks clarity on what the CRA means by “Ooredoo’s
duct filling grade is on average around 50%”.
Vodafone Qatar considers that the use of average does not give an accurate
picture as there may be areas heavily congested in the access network (due for
example to remaining copper) which are compensated, on average, by very low
usage in other areas.
Vodafone Qatar has unfortunately not been afforded the opportunity to request
any ducts from Ooredoo since obtaining the fixed license in April 2010. Vodafone
Qatar therefore cannot provide the CRA with the percentage of Access Requests
refused because of lack of available capacity.

62. The CRA notes that the SPs have not provided any further information useful to
change CRA’s position as expressed in the CD.
63. Hence, the CRA confirms the position as expressed in the CD.
64. According to the above Ooredoo has the right to reserve to its self:
 In relation to used Ducts, 20% of the usable capacity;
 In relation to empty Ducts, 33% of the usable capacity.
2.5 Lease Termination (Annex 1 of the RIAO)
65. The issue is on section 4.8, Annex 1 of the RIAO, providing for the Lease
Termination process.
66. According to the Approved RIAO, where access to Ooredoo’s Network
Elements has been terminated, Ooredoo shall stop charging for such elements
upon the completion of recovery of OLO’s network elements or – in the event
that the removal is not feasible – from the date of this non-feasible decision
being made.

67. Ooredoo stated
The CRA sought to impose discriminatory provisions on Ooredoo where an OLO
has fiber in Ooredoo's ducts, but terminates its lease of the duct route, but for
whatever reason cannot retrieve its fiber. In those circumstances, the CRA
suggested that Ooredoo does not get paid for the fiber, even though the fiber is
owned by the OLO and is utilizing duct space.
In this case, Ooredoo's assets are being occupied by an OLO; Ooredoo cannot
utilize itself or provide that duct space to another OLO, yet it must continue to bear
the costs of the OLO's fiber in its ducts.
To avoid the discrimination, Ooredoo suggests that:
 Either the OLO removes the cable without harming the infrastructure, or
 The OLO has to continue paying rental of the used space in the ducts.
In addition, Ooredoo proposes to let the parties agree on alternative options in the
access agreement, including the transfer of assets.

68. The CRA stated
In relation to Ooredoo’s request on the OLO to continue paying rental:
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The CRA would consider Ooredoo’s request if Ooredoo could demonstrate that
the same treatment applies to unused Ooredoo’s cable.
To this end, Ooredoo has to provide evidence from the Regulatory Accounting
System (RAS) that unused Ooredoo’s cables are charged with the cost of Ducts.
This means that the Ducts must be transferred in to Ooredoo products based on
drivers built including the unused cables;
If Ooredoo demonstrates the above, the CRA proposes to change section 4.8.e,
Annex 1 of the Approved RIAO as follows
“Where access to Ooredoo’s Network Elements has been terminated pursuant to
this clause 4.8(a), Ooredoo shall stop charging for such access upon completion
of recovery of OLO’s network elements or, in the event that removal is not feasible
for example due to adverse risk of damage to other elements, then the OLO has to
continue paying rental of the used space in the ducts”;
In relation to Ooredoo’s request on leaving the parties agree on “alternative
options in the access agreement”, including the transfer of the Lease
Terminated:
 The CRA notes that the parties have already the possibility to agree on
terms and conditions different from those included in the Approved RIAO;
 However, to facilitate an agreement between Ooredoo and the OLO, the
CRA is available to amend the section 4.8, Annex 1, inserting a new
clause 4.8.f stating,
“In addition to the above arrangements, the parties may agree
on alternative options in the access agreement, including the
transfer of the Lease Terminated”.
2.5.3.1 Ooredoo
69. Ooredoo states
The CRA states that on the request that an OLO continues to pay for unused fiber
in the ducts, Ooredoo must demonstrate that the same treatment applies to
unused Ooredoo's cable.
At paragraph 62 of the consultation, the CRA states that: “Ooredoo to stop
charging for network where removal is not feasible”.
As part of RAS, how should the costs associated with such stranded assets be
treated and where should it’s cost recovery come from?
On the proposal from the CRA that Ooredoo needs to demonstrate that the same
treatment applies to unused Ooredoo cables, the CRA is aware that the RAS is in
accordance to the CRA Order, a fully allocated, historic cost model.
In RAS today, duct infrastructure costs are apportioned to the cable occupying the
space, where used or otherwise. In this case these costs are ultimately transferred
to the corresponding products where cost recovery can be assessed.
Notwithstanding the above, Ooredoo believes given that the instances of an OLO
not being able to retrieve its cables from the Ooredoo ducts for network safety or
integrity reasons, will be minor and hopefully represent what will be an insignificant
quantity, it is more appropriate for the OLO to simply transfer that asset to
Ooredoo without cost (or a nominal value for accounting purposes).
The alternative would be to consider the quality of the cable, its opportunity cost,
potential value and determine a rate. Given that such a process will consume
considerable time, effort and resources of external consultants, the net benefit is
likely to be negative for both parties.
2.5.3.2 Vodafone
70. Vodafone states
Vodafone Qatar is strongly opposed to any amendment to the Leased Termination
Clause as Ooredoo has provided no new information in its request to justify an
amendment of the RIAO. There are therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to
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revisit at this point its Order and to weaken further the RIAO and delay its
implementation.
Furthermore, neither Ooredoo nor the CRA have considered the possibility that it
might be difficult if not impossible to remove the fibre, especially where Ooredoo
might have copper cables already in the ducts, and the possibility that there might
be some tangling in the ducts which could potentially harm the remaining cables if
the OLO tried to remove its fibre.
As the CRA has noted itself, Ooredoo has not provided any evidence to support its
request to continue charging the OLO where the lease is terminated. In any case
proper consultation will be necessary to address the implications regarding the fair
allocation of duct cost to cables and hence duct pricing.
Vodafone Qatar is also baffled by the CRA’s willingness to go the extra mile for
Ooredoo by recommending suggested amendments to the RIAO on Parties rights
to agree on alternative options in the access agreement. This does not add any
value to the RIAO.

71. The CRA noted that Ooredoo has failed to provide the information requested
by CRA to change the RIAO.
72. In fact, Ooredoo has not submitted any relevant information useful to prove that
the Retail Arms are charged with the cost of ducts occupied by unused cables.
73. It would be discriminatory to allow Ooredoo to recover from the OLO the cost of
the ducts used by stranded assets if the same treatment is not applied to
Ooredoo Retail Arms.
74. On Vodafone comments, the CRA notes that a fair and long consultation on
duct pricing has been already held by the CRA, with all SPs allowed to submit
their comments on it.
75. However, the CRA does recognize that if the OLO cannot remove the cables or
other equipment, Ooredoo’s space availability is reduced.
76. To compensate Ooredoo for that, the CRA is of the view that the property of
the non-removable assets shall be transferred to Ooredoo without cost or at a
nominal value for accounting purposes.
77. section 4.8, Annex 1, has been changed according to the above.
2.6 Access to new ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses)
78. The CRA has mandated access to all Ducts of Ooredoo, regardless when they
were built.

79. According to Ooredoo, the RIAO should not allow Access to the Ducts built
after the signature of the IAA (New Ducts), made in April 2012.
80. Ooredoo submitted:
The CRA have consistently attempted to force Ooredoo into providing access to
new ducts, initially claiming it was legally the right approach and then claiming that
under the current framework, the CRA cannot distinguish between existing and
new ducts.
By doing so, the CRA denies rights that have been granted to Ooredoo under the
Telecommunications Law.
Ooredoo had made clear in its submission and on numerous occasions that it has
no obligations to invest for competitors, a principle which the CRA has agreed in
the consultation response document. Yet the CRA has not explained on what legal
basis Ooredoo is obliged to offer access to new ducts. The reference by the CRA
to market dominance is subordinate to the rights and obligations under the primary
legislation that is the Telecommunications law. There is nothing in the
Telecommunications law that obliges Ooredoo to invest on behalf of competitors
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and provide access to such investment (especially without long term commitment
and assurance on investment returns). The CRA's reference to Article 43(5)
regarding abuse of dominance does not extend to investing in scarce resources
and providing access to those scarce resources, but only to existing assets (note
Article 112 of the Executive By-law is clear that access to telecommunications
network facilities only extends to existing facilities). Ooredoo invests in duct
infrastructure for the long term, for 25 to 30 years, in the knowledge that such
investment is both costly and time consuming.
QNBN had agreed in April 2012, through execution of the IAA that it did not seek
to jointly invest with Ooredoo in new duct infrastructure. QNBN had de facto
agreed that Ooredoo will only invest for itself, and would therefore be granted the
right to reserve 100% of capacity within such new ducts. Therefore, Ooredoo
planned and dimensioned the network for its own future needs.
Furthermore, the CRA itself issued a Regulation entitled Passive Civil
Telecommunications Infrastructure Access Regulation, dated 28 June 2015, which
had as a central principal the provision of incentives for investment in new
infrastructure. It does therefore seem odd that the CRA now seeks to do the
opposite of what it had in mind with the said Regulation. This concept and indeed
the reference to the Regulation has been included by the CRA in the RIAO it
published in its website for publication by Ooredoo, at 4.3 (b) of the main body.
Whilst discussions have taken place in respect of new ducts, Ooredoo retains its
rights to deny access to new ducts (or infrastructure), unless it believes the risks
are equally shared and Ooredoo is fairly compensated, and assured that doing so
will not damage its ability to meet its own long-term needs for the use of such
infrastructure.
Therefore, Ooredoo requests for reservation of 100% of capacity thin the New
Ducts.

81. The CRA stated
Article 43(5) of the Telecommunication Law provides to CRA the legal basis for
Ooredoo obligation to grant access to all Ducts, regardless when they have been
built. Further legal basis is provided for by the MDDD Order (cf. Notice and Order
ICTRA 2011/10/31 dated October 31, 2011) that has designated Ooredoo DSP in
the Relevant Market of the Access to the Civil Infrastructure.
That Relevant Market includes all Ducts, but does not differentiate the Ducts by
the date they were built (or will be build).
The CRA also notes that Ooredoo references to the IAA and to QNBN is
irrelevant;
Ooredoo is obliged to offer access to the Ducts not only to QNBN but to any SPs;
Therefore, the CRA cannot accept Ooredoo’s request because this would imply
that SPs, which were not party of the IAA, are prevented to access the New Ducts.
In addition, the CRA does not find Ooredoo’s reference to the Access Regulation
valid:
 The Access Regulation has the scope to incentivize the investment in new
infrastructure but within a specific framework and conditions;
 In particular, clause 10.1 of the Access Regulation provides for co-investment
in new infrastructure;
 Actually, the CRA is not aware of any co-investment offer made by Ooredoo to
the OLOs consistently with the provisions of the Access Regulation;
 From the date of that offer, the CRA may consider to introduce the category of
New Ducts, including the Ducts for which Ooredoo made an offer for co-
investment that was refused by the OLOs operating in Qatar at the time of the
Offer.
According to the above, the CRA is minded to reject Ooredoo’s request.
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2.6.3.1 Ooredoo
82. Ooredoo states
The CRA does not accept Ooredoo's request to only provide access to ducts prior
to IAA, because it claims this would imply that SPs, which were not party of the
IAA, are prevented to access the New Ducts.
Ooredoo believes the CRA’s rationale and even the reference to legal provisions
to be incorrect.
Ooredoo had made clear in its submission and on numerous occasions that it has
the previous consultation response document. Yet the CRA has failed to explain
on what legal basis Ooredoo is obliged to offer access to new ducts. The
reference by the CRA to market dominance is subordinate to the rights and
obligations under the primary legislation that is the Telecommunications Law.
There is nothing in the Telecommunications Law that obliges Ooredoo to invest on
behalf of competitors and provide access to such investment (especially without
long term commitment and assurance on investment returns).
The CRA claims that Article 43(5) of the Telecommunication Law provides to CRA
the legal basis for Ooredoo’s obligation to grant access to all Ducts, regardless
when they have been built. Ooredoo has granted access to ducts built prior to April
2012, therefore, it can hardly be possible for Ooredoo to monopolize the use of
scarce facilities. Article 43(5) does not extend to investing in scarce resources and
providing access to those scarce resources, but only to existing assets. Ooredoo
invests in duct infrastructure for the long term, for 25 to 30 years, in the knowledge
that such investment is both costly and time consuming.
Ooredoo would like to remind the CRA that during the IAA negotiations, QNBN
stated that it is not interested in investing in ducts with Ooredoo after the effective
date of the IAA and therefore agreed to allow Ooredoo to book 100% of the
capacity of new ducts. Consequently Ooredoo designed the relevant ducts and
invested only for itself. Ooredoo notes also that VFQ officially informed CRA at
that time that QNBN shall negotiate access to Ooredoo's ducts on its behalf.
Article 112 of the Executive By-Law is clear that obligations for access to facilities
only extend to existing facilities. The demarcation point for existing facilities was
actually the date the Executive By-Law was promulgated – i.e. 2009. Ooredoo had
in fact conferred a benefit beyond its obligations to provide access to ducts built
from 2009 to 2012 within the IAA.
In addition, when the IAA was signed in 2012, the premise was that QNBN would
be the Service Provider offering access to passive infrastructure to other
licensees.
The governmental policy and industry expectations were that QNBN would deploy
new duct infrastructure which would allow licensees to gain access to areas
previous unserved while access to served areas would be through Ooredoo’s
existing duct network. Ooredoo’s investment rationale for new infrastructure from
the signature of the IAA was to ensure it catered for its needs and not for other
licensees as the latter would rely on QNBN for access. Today, the CRA is
penalizing Ooredoo for QNBN’s failure to deploy such infrastructure and in fact
indirectly requesting Ooredoo to take over a role QNBN has failed to fulfil.
The CRA also claims that legal basis is provided for by the MDDD Order (cf.
Notice and Order ICTRA 2011/10/31 dated October 31, 2011) that has designated
Ooredoo DSP in the Relevant Market of the Access to the Civil Infrastructure. That
Relevant Market includes all Ducts, but does not differentiate the Ducts by the
date they were built (or will be build). The CRA will agree that the MDDD Order is
subordinate to the primary legislation, which is the Telecommunications Law and
the Executive By-Law, and therefore the CRA’s rationale cannot stand.
If Ooredoo were to offer access to new ducts, it would need an OLO to share the
risks and for Ooredoo to be appropriately and fairly compensated and assured that
doing so will not damage its ability to meet its own long-term needs for the use of
such infrastructure. Furthermore, access to newly deployed Ooredoo assets
removes the need for the OLO to invest. Subsequent competitive pricing
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pressures due to cherry picking of opportunities will put the recovery of those
assets at risk – i.e. a higher risk associated with the investment. In other telecom
jurisdictions this higher risk has been recognised. Corresponding compensations
mechanisms include: higher WACC against those assets/network, delay in
opening these assets to competition etc. The recognition that the incumbent does
not invest on behalf on its competitors is recognised in the UK, where BT charged
the OLO for new investments.
2.6.3.2 Vodafone
83. Vodafone states
In its Order dated 25 November 2015, the CRA, after a lengthy and inclusive
consultation process, confirmed that access to existing and new duct should be
mandated. If Ooredoo disagreed with this conclusion to should have appealed the
Order. As explained above it is not appropriate to re-open this issue on the basis
of Article 5.1 of the RIAO.
Notwithstanding the above, Vodafone Qatar concurs with the reasoning of the
CRA to reject Ooredoo’s request. The position and arguments developed by
Ooredoo only illustrates Ooredoo’s unwillingness to offer access to its network on
a regulated basis.
Vodafone Qatar was not privy to the IAA negotiations between QNBN and
Ooredoo and should not be discriminated against. Furthermore the CRA is
absolutely correct with its argument that the obligations of DSP to offer access to
ducts do not distinguish between ducts built before April 2012 and ducts built after
that date.
Vodafone Qatar is willing to invest in fixed infrastructure; however duplication of
infrastructure such as ducts on a large scale is neither technically nor
economically feasible. It is not feasible for each licensed service provider to dig up
the roads. When Vodafone Qatar started to build some of its ducts, one of the
requirements from the Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning (“MMUP”) was
for Vodafone Qatar to show that it would have extra capacity to share with other
users before permits were given. Vodafone Qatar assumes that Ooredoo would
have had the same requirement from the MMUP, hence they cannot claim 100%
capacity in any new ducts.
The duties of the CRA at Article 2 of the Telecommunications Law are clear and
include the promotion of the telecommunications sector, enhancing its
performance and encouraging sustainable investment. Further Chapter 5 of
Telecommunications Law empowers the CRA to set the rights, obligations and
terms of access. The CRA is therefore empowered by the Telecommunications
Law to grant access to Ooredoo’s ducts. Further mandating access to Ooredoo’s
existing and new ducts by virtue of its market dominance is fully consistent with
the duties of the CRA and the efficient operation of the market. This is also in line
with international best practices, such as in Spain and Portugal for example.
Taking literally Ooredoo’s line of reasoning would mean that the CRA cannot
mandate access to any ‘new’ network elements of Ooredoo. In an industry
characterised by rapid technological changes and frequent upgrade of network
equipment this would mean that the CRA cannot mandate bitstream access on the
fibre network Ooredoo has deployed since 2012 despite Ooredoo’s dominance.
Ooredoo’s logic is contrary to the principle of access regulation enshrined in the
Telecommunications Law.
Further, duct access prices can be set such that they adequately reflect
investment risk and reasonable cost, including a return of capital employed.
For the above reasons, Vodafone Qatar agrees with the CRA’s position to reject
Ooredoo’s proposal.

84. Ooredoo did not provide additional arguments on this topic.
85. In addition to the considerations expressed in the CD (Re. section 2.6.2
above), the CRA notes that:
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85.1 Ooredoo has not be asked to invest for the OLOs but has mandated
Ooredoo to share space in ducts, only if this is available;
85.2 The reference to BT (OpenReach) is not relevant. OpenReach is a
provider of passive infrastructure. Accordingly, OpenReach portfolio (PIA)
includes the Offer for building New Duct where needed by the SPs. Of
course, OpenReach charge adequately for this service. Indeed Ooredoo
is not asked to build new duct for the OLO but to share with them space
in the duct if available;
85.3 Ooredoo’s interpretation of the Law and of Executive by-Law is clearly
flawed. As also noted by Vodafone, following Ooredoo’s reasoning, the
CRA would not have the power to mandate interconnection to Ooredoo
4G network or access to the Fiber Access Network because they were
built after the promulgation of the Executive By-Law.
86. According to the above, the CRA rejects Ooredoo’s request for change and
confirms the RIAO as approved with the RIAO Order.
2.7 Access to leased ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses)
87. This pertains to whether OLOs have access to ducts leased by Ooredoo.
88. The CRA has mandated access to not only to ducts owned by Ooredoo, but
also to ducts leased by Ooredoo.
89. The scope was to facilitate the access to Ducts owned by Developers but
leased and/or managed by Ooredoo that may prevent the OLO to access these
Ducts.

90. Ooredoo stated:
Whilst the wording within the RIAO may not be entirely clear, the CRA stated in its
consultation response document that access to leased ducts only arises where
Ooredoo has acquired 100% of all available ducts from developers. It is therefore
necessary for the CRA to ensure the RIAO is clear in asserting that Ooredoo is
only required to provide access to ducts leased by Ooredoo, only where 100% of
developer's ducts are leased by Ooredoo.
91. Ooredoo asked the CRA to ensure the RIAO is clear in asserting the above.

92. The CRA stated
It is our view that Ooredoo has to grant access to leased ducts only if the
Developer has no further available capacity to be rented to the OLO.
Accordingly, the access to the Ducts leased by Ooredoo is granted to the OLO:
 if Ooredoo has acquired 100% of all available Ducts from the Developer, or
 if the Developer could not meet the request of the OLO because Ooredoo has
leased a relevant part of the Ducts. In this case, the rules of the RIAO apply,
specifically for the calculation of the Available Capacity.
This is also the case if Ooredoo effectively manages the duct network.
If the Developer can meet the request of the OLO, ducts leased by Ooredoo shall
not be accessed by the OLO.
The CRA is minded to change Annex 3 and related clauses according to the
above.
2.7.3.1 Ooredoo
93. Ooredoo states
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The CRA states that in its view Ooredoo has to grant access to leased ducts only
if the Developer has no further available capacity to be rented to the OLO. If the
Developer could not meet the request of the OLO because Ooredoo has leased a
relevant part of the Ducts, the rules of the RIAO apply, specifically for the
calculation of the Available Capacity. If the Developer can meet the request of the
OLO, ducts leased by Ooredoo shall not be accessed by the OLO.
However, the CRA includes a confusing statement that Ooredoo has to provide
access to the ducts if Ooredoo effectively manages the duct network.
Ooredoo would state that where Ooredoo has leased access to 100% developer
ducts then Ooredoo should be obliged to provide access to those ducts where
feasible and space is available, provided Ooredoo receives the acceptance of the
developer for sharing the ducts with a third party.
Where Ooredoo has leased a proportion and other OLOs have leased other
portions, it would be discriminatory to claim that because there is no further
capacity, Ooredoo must provide access to its leased ducts, but no such
consideration be provided to the other OLO that may actually have leased a much
larger proportion.
2.7.3.2 Vodafone
94. Vodafone states
The CRA was very clear in its RIAO Order that “Ooredoo is obliged to offer access
not only to owned Ducts but also owned, leased and/or operated by Ooredoo
regardless the diameters” (para (i) page4.
Ooredoo previously has acknowledged this by offering duct access under its 2012
IAA commercial terms and conditions.
This is yet again another area where the CRA is minded to significantly depart
from the 25 November 2015 Order without having articulated any rationale and
evidence on why it has now come to a different view. Vodafone Qatar does not
support amending of the RIAO and the RIAO Order in this respect as there is no
new evidence or rationale provided by either the CRA or Ooredoo.
The CRA should be mindful of the situation at the Pearl where duct access has not
been effective.

95. The CRA is of the view that the changes in subject are not a depart from the
Approved RIAO but only needed clarifications.
96. The Respondents do not provide additional relevant reasons to modify CRA’s
position as expressed in the CD.
97. According to the above, the CRA has changed the RIAO to clarify that the
access to the Ducts leased by Ooredoo is granted to the OLO:
97.1 if Ooredoo has acquired 100% of all available Ducts from the Developer,
or
97.2 Ooredoo effectively manages the duct network
97.3 if the Developer could not meet the request of the OLO because Ooredoo
has leased a relevant part of the Ducts. In this case, the rules of the RIAO
apply, including for the calculation of the Available Capacity.
3 On the Clarifications discussed in the Consultation

3.1 Clarification on Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One 2.6)
98. The issue is on whether a negotiation to amend the terms and conditions of the
RIAO is mandatory.

99. The CRA stated;
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Clause 2.6 of the Main Body – Part One provides for (emphasis added)
Conditions amending the terms and conditions of the RIAO can be negotiated, but
are subject to approval by CRA. In case there is no agreement between Ooredoo
and the OLO within the stated timeframes, the case shall be referred to CRA who
will rule on behalf of the parties in accordance with Article 61 of the
Telecommunications Law and with Article 47 of the Executive By-Law.
From a regulatory perspective, a Regulated Wholesale Reference Offer:
 Sets the terms and conditions on which the DSP is obliged to enter into an
Agreement with the Access OLO;
 Includes balanced and non-discriminatory terms and conditions approved by
the Regulator to facilitate the signature of Agreements for the provisions of
regulated wholesale products;
 Has the scope to prevent abusive behaviors of the DSP, which may include a
delay on the finalization of an Agreement based on the Regulated Reference
Offer.
This Clause 2.6 does not make negotiation on terms and conditions of the RIAO
mandatory. Negotiations can occur, but shall not change the spirit and balance of
the Reference Offer.
,,, if an OLO is willing to sign an agreement based on the terms and conditions of
the RIAO, the OLO is not obliged to enter into negotiations on the Reference Offer
Terms and Conditions.
In this case, the Access Provider (specifically for the RIAO - Ooredoo) shall sign
the Agreement and refrain to propose changes to the RIAO.
3.1.2.1 Ooredoo
100. Ooredoo states
Ooredoo would agree, however where the OLO requires additional, different
services, SLAs or where required a financial guarantee is required, then
negotiations would be required.
3.1.2.2 Vodafone
101. Vodafone states
Vodafone Qatar welcomes the CRA’s clarification on this issue, however the
wording of the RIAO is still not clear on this. As Vodafone Qatar has previously
advised during the initial consultation process on reference offers, it should be
clear in the RIAO that once the RIAO is approved/ordered by the CRA, the OLO
can simply send a signed copy of the RIAO to Ooredoo and start ordering the
services (subject of course to meeting licencing requirements) without being at the
mercy of further delaying tactics from the incumbent. This is what reference offers
are supposed to achieve.
It is also not helpful that the CRA in the RIAO order gave Ooredoo three months to
make the agreement available to OLO’s. The CRA needs to be clear and precise
in its Order and leave no room for Ooredoo to play incumbent games.

102. Both the respondents agrees with CRA’s position.
103. CRA clarifies that the Access Provider cannot unilaterally impose further
conditions on the Access Seeker, wishing to take services under the Reference
Offer. This means that the Access Provider can e.g. not unilaterally require any
financial guarantee.
3.2 Clarification on the availability of the RIAO

104. The issue is whether the Reference Offer needs to be published by the Access
Provider, so that an OLO can sign an Agreement based on it.
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105. The CRA stated that;
According to concerns raised, the CRA understands that Ooredoo is of the view
that until it publishes the Reference Offer on its website, the Reference Offer is not
available to the OLOs.
The regulatory framework does not make the publication of a Reference Offer on a
Service Provider’s website a precondition for it entering into force.
For clarification, Reference Offers enter in force and are available to the OLOs
from the time the CRA has approved them, as for any Order issued by CRA. The
Approved Wholesale Reference Offers are available on the CRA’s webpage.
Service Providers are obligated to publish the Reference Offers on their website
(cf. Article 51 of the Executive By-Law). However, this is not a prerequisite for the
Reference Offers to enter in legal force and effect. Failure to publish in the manner
prescribed will place a Service Provider in breach of applicable law and of the
Order pertaining the relevant Reference Offer (in the case of the RIAO CRA order
2015/11/25).
According to the above, the CRA clarifies that the RIAO and the other Reference
Offers approved by CRA are all available for the OLOs from the time the CRA has
approved them. Hence, an Access Provider is not entitled to delay the signature of
an agreement based on the RIAO arguing that the RIAO has not been published
on its website. Such an argument would be simply an admission of non-
compliance with the regulatory framework and the obligations as per the Order
CRA 2015/11/25. For the avoidance of any doubt, this applies to Vodafone’s
approved RIO.
3.2.2.1 Ooredoo
106. Ooredoo did not provide comments on this issue.
3.2.2.2 Vodafone
The above understanding of the CRA has always been Vodafone Qatar’s
understanding as well which is why Vodafone Qatar sent its Acceptance Notice for the
RIAO even if Ooredoo had not published its RIAO on its website.

108. Given the responses of the SPs, the CRA confirms its position as expressed in
the CD
109. Hence, the CRA clarifies that a WRO approved by the CRA is available upon
issuance by the CRA.
3.3 Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One Clause 2.5)

110. This pertains to the Acceptance Notice.
3.3.1 CRA’s considerations

111. The CRA stated:
One of the key features of a Reference Offer is to ensure clear processes and
ease of contracting. The CRA got aware of concerns in this regards, specifically in
clauses 2.5 and 2.6 and therefore wished to amend some of the stipulations as
they are potentially open-ended and not necessarily efficient.
Clause 2.5 of the Reference Offers shall be amended as follows (emphasis added)
Notwithstanding the provisions in clause 3, [Access Provider] will notify the OLO
within ten (10) business days of whether it finds the Acceptance Notice conforming
or non-conforming under clause 3.1 and provide reason if the Notice is found
non-conforming.
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If [Access Provider] fails to notify the OLO within the above-mentioned ten
(10) business days, the Acceptance Notice is deemed conforming.
Except to the extent Ooredoo finds the Acceptance Notice to be non-conforming
under clause 3.1, and subject to clause 3, Ooredoo and the OLO will, following
submission by the OLO of the Acceptance Notice, use their reasonable endeavors
to complete discussions to conclude an Agreement within sixty (60) Days of the
receipt of the Acceptance Notice.
If the OLO wishes to enter into an Agreement based on the [Reference Offer]
approved by the CRA “as is”, OLO will send a signed version of the
Agreement to [Access Provider], which the [Access Provider] will
countersign without any undue delay.
3.3.2.1 Ooredoo
112. Ooredoo did not provide comments on this issue.
3.3.2.2 Vodafone
Vodafone Qatar has always been of the view that as soon as the RIAO is finalised
by the CRA, the OLO should be able to sign the RIAO and send it to Ooredoo for
signature and start with the ordering processes under the RIAO. Submissions
have been made to that effect during the consultation process on the RIAO.
Vodafone Qatar supports the CRA’s Amendments.

114. Given the responses of the SPs, the CRA confirms its position as expressed in
the CD and amends Clause 2.5.
4 General Comments submitted by the Respondents
4.1 Ooredoo Main General Comments
4.1.1 Consultation on Economic Terms and Conditions.

115. Ooredoo states that:
As stated in the introductory section of the CRA consultation document, on 04 May
2016 Ooredoo submitted to the CRA a request to review the Economic Terms and
Conditions of the Approved RIAO.
In this request Ooredoo submitted elaborated cost models with detailed calculation
of the cost of duct access, area access request and route access request services.
Based on these calculations Ooredoo proposed the appropriate level of wholesale
charges for these services and had the expectation that this request would have
been integral to this very consultation.
However, the CRA in the consultation asserts that it needs additional quantitative
and qualitative evidence to start a proceeding on economic terms and conditions
and indicates that these should be addressed in separate letter to Ooredoo.
Ooredoo considers the evidence submitted as a part of the above mentioned
request to be comprehensive. Ooredoo also notes that to date Ooredoo has not
received any letter from the CRA in this respect and the CRA has not responded
to the Ooredoo’s suggestions to hold personal meeting in order to review and
address any CRA’s questions regarding the submitted cost models and calculation
of the charges for wholesale duct services.
We provide further details in Section 3.
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4.1.2 CRA’s comments
116. This is a separate matter, which the CRA address separately.
4.2 Qnbn Main General Comments
4.2.1 No Legal Basis for the Consultation.

117. Qnbn states that:
… It is legally inconceivable for the CRA to entertain an application by Ooredoo in
accordance with Article 5 of the Approved RIAO dated 25 November 2015 if
Ooredoo is not prepared to abide by all the other provisions of the RIAO and make
duct access immediately available to OLO's. The legalities of the CRA acceding to
an Ooredoo application under Article 5 without at the same time insisting that
Ooredoo respect all the other terms of service offering under the RIAO are, at best
suspect, and, at worst, beyond reasonable legal application. The CRA is in effect
accepting the operation of a provision of the RIAO to accommodate Ooredoo
without being unequivocal as to the applicability of the remainder of the RIAO to
the marketplace. Surely, Article 5 was designed to address requested
amendments which may arise from time to time during the currency of the RIAO.
Instead the CRA has forestalled the application of all other RIAO provisions to deal
uniquely with Ooredoo's request.
Qnbn respectfully submits that the proper legal approach was for the CRA to give
full effect to the RIAO so that OLO's could execute and move forward and then
invite Ooredoo to submit an Article 5 request. Parceling out Article 5 for application
without applying all other provisions is unlawful. After all, article 5.2 requires
Ooredoo to continue to provide services and the CRA should have ordered
accordingly as a lawful condition to entertaining Ooredoo's request for a further
Consultation.

118. The legal basis for the consultation is article 5 of the RIAO, as Qnbn
acknowledges in the second part of the above response.
119. The CRA has the obligation to evaluate a request for review coming from any
SPs and to proceed with a Consultation if the request is found acceptable.
120. Indeed the CRA notes that the request for review the wholesale charges
submitted by Ooredoo has been rejected, demonstrating that CRA is not prone
to the Incumbent as Qnbn is trying to argue.
121. On the opportunity of this Consultation, the CRA notes that this is relevant also
to clarify and provide guidance on the interpretation of key clauses of the RIAO
which are impeding the signature of the Agreements based on the approved
RIAO (Re. Section 3 above).
4.2.3 Discrimination
122. Qnbn states
Setting aside the above noted legalities it is worth assessing whether Ooredoo's
request merited policy consideration and, if so, whether such consideration by the
CRA amounts to it engaging in blatant discriminatory practice. A review of the
public record on the RIAO clearly indicates that the matters raised by Ooredoo in
this current Consultation were matters raised earlier in the proceedings. Not only
did all parties have the opportunity to address the matters raised previously, the
CRA had ample opportunity to assess the merits of the various positions. On what
basis, policy, or otherwise, is Ooredoo permitted to raise previous arguments
which did not prevail in its favor. On what basis, policy or otherwise, does the CRA
justify rehearing previous arguments raised by the DSP on which it was not
successful. Qnbn has raised multiple issues of substance upon which it did not
prevail in the ultimate disposition. The CRA is engaging in the worse form of
discrimination if it is prepared to rehear issues raised by the DSP and not rehear
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issues of equal importance to other service providers. Why is the DSP entitled to
preferential treatment; all at the expense and discrimination of other service
providers? Why was Ooredoo not required by the CRA to provide services as
required by the specific provisions (article 5.2) of the RIAO? Qnbn respectfully
submits that the CRA is setting an unfortunate precedent if it is to blatantly engage
in undue discrimination in favor of the Dominant Service Provider when it had the
ability to require Ooredoo to make the RIAO available pending the Consultation.

123. All SPs are entitled to ask for a review of the RIAO under article 5. Accordingly,
the CRA does not see any discrimination.
124. The CRA also notes that the Consultation has not suspended the validity of the
RIAO pending the Consultation.
4.2.5 Abuse of process

125. Qnbn states
In 2014 the CRA announced a 'new day' had arrived in regulating the
telecommunications industry with a paradigm shift away from retail scrutiny with a
new emphasis upon wholesale services and the introduction of Reference Offers.
We are now in June of 2016 and Qnbn is of the view that the marketplace is no
closer to having Ooredoo offer the marketplace a viable duct access arrangement.
On 25 November 2015 the CRA issued its Order and Direction for Ooredoo to
offer the RIAO to the marketplace. It was not until 10 April 2016 that Ooredoo
requested a review of the Non-economic Terms and Conditions and 4 May 2016
that Ooredoo requested a review of the Economic Terms and Conditions.
On 26 May 2016 the CRA issued this present Consultation which addresses
matters previously the subject of extensive submissions and adjudication. Clearly
Ooredoo was given the opportunity to file its own version of an RIAO; stakeholders
were involved in extensive submissions on every aspect of the terms and
conditions; and Ooredoo was given extensive opportunity to reply and make its
views known. Qnbn respectfully submits that for the CRA to issue this present
Consultation on matters already argued and adjudicated 5 months after its 25
November 2015 Order and Direction is an abuse of process. Given that Qnbn has
commented on these matters extensively in the initial proceedings it does not
propose making further submissions in an unnecessary and abusive process other
than incorporating by reference its previous comments.

126. The CRA notes Qnbn comments.
4.2.7 CRA's Consultation Supports Ooredoo's Anti-competitive Strategy of Delay

127. Qnbn states
As the CRA is well aware Ooredoo has engaged in anti-competitive conduct in the
past to forestall access to its duct infrastructure. The CRA should bear the
following in mind:
 An initial suspension of the IAA for 6 months by the DSP, the finding of anti-
competitive conduct by the CRA for such suspension and the subsequent half-
hearted compliance with the IAA;
 A subsequent suspension of the IAA which is ongoing despite Interim Orders to
reinstate services;
 Failure of the DSP to provide access to QDC in accordance with a CRA
Decision and Order;
 Failure of the CRA to address access to Developers such as specifically
requested of Lusail;
 Failure of the DSP to introduce an RIAO for duct access as specifically ordered
by the CRA for a specified date.
Surely the CRA realizes that all of Ooredoo's requests for re hearings and reviews
are part of a designed strategy to delay duct access and fixed line competition for
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as long as possible. "Delay" is part of any 'tool kit' employed by a DSP engaged in
anti-competitive conduct. By agreeing processes and Consultations which only
serve to delay a duct access service the CRA is acceding to Ooredoo's anti-
competitive delay tactics. Every day of delay for fixed line competition is a good
day for the Dominant Service Provider.

128. The CRA notes Qnbn comments.
129. However, the CRA’s has an obligation to deal with reasonable request for
review of the RIAO.
4.2.9 Qnbn Application Article 5.1(b) RIAO

130. Qnbn requests
that the CRA, pursuant to article 5.1(b). amend article 2.3 of the RIAO reinstating
Qnbn's right to continue duct access arrangements with Ooredoo under the IAA. If
the CRA wishes to be viewed as acting fairly amongst all stakeholders and not
uniquely in preference of the DSP it will accede in favor of
this reasonable request.

131. The CRA notes that Qnbn is not obliged to move to the RIAO.
132. However, the CRA is of the view that is not efficient to have two different
“offers” in place for the same products.
133. Accordingly, the CRA is not minded to amend Article 2.3 of the RIAO.
4.3 Vodafone Main General Comments
4.3.1 The legal basis of the CRA to issue the Consultation Document is flawed and
unlawful
The legal basis of the CRA to issue the Consultation Document is flawed and
unlawful. Article 5.1 of the RIAO can only operate once an agreement is in place
and services under the agreement are provided. This is not the case as Ooredoo
has refused to sign an agreement consistent with the Order despite Vodafone
Qatar’s valid requests. As the reading of Article 5 of the RIAO in its entirety makes
plain Article 5.1 is intended to address issues that may arise in the context of the
operation of the RIAO.

135. The CRA is of the view that article 5 of the RIAO is applicable regardless the
signature of an agreement.
4.3.3 The CRA has acted in a non-transparent and discriminatory way in favour of
Ooredoo
The CRA has acted in a non-transparent and discriminatory way in favour of
Ooredoo contrary to Article 6 of the Telecommunications Law which provides that
the CRA must exercise its powers in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner.
The CRA has failed to act transparently by refusing to provide to Vodafone Qatar
the two requests made by Ooredoo on the basis of which the CRA has decided to
issue this Consultation Document. The CRA has also discriminated in favour of
Ooredoo by affording Ooredoo the possibility to make further submissions on
matters already consulted upon and adjudicated by the CRA through the issuance
of the Order. Ooredoo had the opportunity to appeal the Order but chose not to.
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Further the CRA discriminated against Vodafone Qatar by failing to seek to
enforce its Order despite the repeated requests made by Vodafone Qatar.

137. All SPs have the right to submit a request to review the RIAO hence
Vodafone’s allegations are groundless.
138. The request for review submitted by Ooredoo was almost integrally included in
the CD, omitting part for confidentiality reasons. The CRA acted transparently,
providing the SPs with all the relevant information to respond to the
Consultation.
4.3.5 The merits of the CRA’s approach and its implications for investment
incentives and competition
Vodafone Qatar submits that this latest decision and the manner in which it has
been made is not consistent with the mandate of the CRA to act in a transparent
and non-discriminatory manner as prescribed in Article 6 of the
Telecommunications Law No. (34) of 2006 and raises serious concerns regarding
the willingness and ability of the CRA to regulate the local market and effectively
address the market power of Ooredoo which it inherited from its previous position
as a publicly owned monopolist.
This perpetuates uncertainty in the market and carries important implications for
the broader industry and economy in terms of fostering investment and
competition in fixed markets, an area identified by the CRA as in clear need of
greater competition. Paradoxically and contrary to the CRA’s policy to focus
regulation on wholesale markets, Ooredoo’s monopoly in fixed markets remains
unchallenged some ten (10) years after the enactment of the Telecommunications
Law because the lack of wholesale regulated access to key fixed infrastructure of
Ooredoo that the CRA is required to implement and enforce as per its mandate.
There are no regulated access products in place despite Ooredoo’s market share
well in excess of 90% in fixed markets. This is out of step with international
practice. Such action further damages the mandate and reputation of the CRA and
erodes investor confidence in the legal and regulatory framework on which
Vodafone Qatar’s mobile and fixed licenses were issued and the industry is
intended to operate.
The CRA started consultation on the reference offer in June 2013 and the RIAO
was only finalised in November 2015. This has been a lengthy consultation
spanning over two years which gave all stakeholders an opportunity to express
their views and make submissions to the CRA. To reopen the process at this stage
after the CRA has issued an Order on this issue is a huge step backwards.
Vodafone Qatar submits that the CRA should enforce its Order rather than re-open
the process.
This development also compromises the reference offer processes for leased lines
and bitstream/VULA recently announced by the CRA. The apparent lack of
willingness of the CRA to enforce its orders on Ooredoo discourages Ooredoo
from genuine participation in such processes and weakens the credibility of other
similar processes. This stands only to exacerbate existing market imbalances,
further entrench Ooredoo’s dominance and impair competition and market
development to the determinant of consumers.

140. The CRA switch to Wholesale Regulation dated July 2014 (Re. Policy
Statement Regulating for the Future) and provided the Market with clear
indication on CRA’s view.
141. With the Policy Regulating for the Future, the CRA clearly moved towards a
service competition model, which is needed to provide competition in the Fixed
Market. Consistently, the CRA has recently started proceedings for active
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wholesale reference offers for Wholesale Broadband Access and Wholesale
Leased Lines.
142. According to the above, the Wholesale Regulation is moving forward. The CRA
reminds to Vodafone that in other jurisdictions, the Regulators needed time to
enforce a wholesale regime and, in some cases, had to go through extreme
remedies for granting access to the access network of the incumbent (e.g. the
OpenReach case).
143. The CRA ensures its commitments on the Wholesale Regulation, being
conscious that this is not always a straight forward task.
*** End of Document ***
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Ooredoo Qatar Regulatory Management
[NON-CONFIDENTIAL]
Consultation on Reference Infrastructure

Access Offer for Duct of Ooredoo
CRA Reference: CRA/RAC-E/057/2016
Ooredoo Reference: [OQ/Ref-4555/2016-06]
[JUNE 12, 2016]

Contents
1. Introduction and executive summary ................................................................................ 3

2. Consultation response to specific elements ...................................................................... 4
3. Expected consultation on Economic Terms and Conditions ............................................ 13
Ooredoo Response to the Consultation on Reference Infrastructure Access Offer of Ooredoo ducts – NON-
CONFIDENTIAL
1. Introduction and executive summary

Consultation on Non-Economic Terms and Conditions
1.1 Ooredoo thanks the Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) for the
opportunity to comment on the consultation on Reference Infrastructure Access
Offer of Ooredoo ducts (RIAO) published by the CRA on 26 May 2016.
1.2 There are a number of elements of the RIAO which require amendment to make
the offer practical and relevant, as well as protect and safeguard Ooredoo’s
network.
1.3 Ooredoo is pleased that the CRA is minded to agree to many of the changes
proposed. There are a few where the CRA appears to disagree, which Ooredoo
takes the opportunity to respond to herein.
Consultation on Economic Terms and Conditions
1.4 As stated in the introductory section of the CRA consultation document, on 04 May
2016 Ooredoo submitted to the CRA a request to review the Economic Terms and
Conditions of the Approved RIAO.
1.5 In this request Ooredoo submitted elaborated cost models with detailed
calculation of the cost of duct access, area access request and route access request
services. Based on these calculations Ooredoo proposed the appropriate level of
wholesale charges for these services and had the expectation that this request
would have been integral to this very consultation.
1.6 However, the CRA in the consultation asserts that it needs additional quantitative
and qualitative evidence to start a proceeding on economic terms and conditions
and indicates that these should be addressed in separate letter to Ooredoo.
1.7 Ooredoo considers the evidence submitted as a part of the above mentioned
request to be comprehensive. Ooredoo also notes that to date Ooredoo has not
received any letter from the CRA in this respect and the CRA has not responded to
the Ooredoo’s suggestions to hold personal meeting in order to review and
address any CRA’s questions regarding the submitted cost models and calculation
of the charges for wholesale duct services.
OQ/Ref-4555/2016-06 Page 3 of 16 June 12, 2016

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1.8 We provide further details in Section 3.
2. Consultation response to specific elements

Safety and Security of the Network (Annex 9 of the RIAO)
2.1 The CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo's request and change to two (2) business
days the timeline to grant approval of the work permits. Ooredoo would oncur
with the CRA and believes this to be the right decision.
2.2 The CRA had originally sought to make changes to the Ooredoo Safety and Security
procedures and long-standing field proven practices, without appropriate
justification. E.g. Ooredoo requires 48 hours to grant approvals for safety and
security work permits; however the CRA appears to have assumed wrongly that
Ooredoo had agreed 24 hours, and sought to force a major change to Ooredoo’s
internal governance framework and processes.
2.3 Ooredoo had stated that the CRA should not be forcing changes to Ooredoo’s
internal operating and governance structures, processes and procedures without
legitimate justification. Ooredoo had stated that the procedures apply equitably to
all staff and contractors and there would be no scope for discriminatory treatment
of an OLO, and therefore the CRA’s attempt to change Ooredoo’s internal
processes is unnecessary and unwarranted.
2.4 The CRA claims that a regulator is entitled to change processes and procedures of
a DSP, claiming that the role of a Regulator is to move the DSPs towards efficiency,
with the ultimate scope to benefit the final customers in both quality of the
services and price reductions.
2.5 However the CRA fails to explain the legal basis for such direct action from a
regulatory authority in an attempt to drive efficiency. Ooredoo would disagree
with the CRA assertion. The CRA should also be minded that the safety and
security processes and procedures apply to all of Ooredoo’s services, even those
for which Ooredoo is not dominant, and therefore the CRA assertion that it can
exert direct intervention to change internal procedures on a DSP must be taken
with caution.

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Technical Standards (Annex 8 of the RIAO)
2.6 Ooredoo had stated that the CRA had not fully explained how diverting away from
the Ooredoo technical standards would be in conformity with Ooredoo's rights
under the Telecommunications law to deny interconnection and access where
Ooredoo believes there are issues around network safety and integrity.
2.7 Ooredoo believes the CRA has not addressed this specific point raised by Ooredoo,
however it states: “A Regulator can change Technical Standards, which are often
characterized by a degree of discretion, which may be to the OLO’s disadvantage.
The intervention of the Regulator is justified to avoid this”. Again Ooredoo is not
aware of a regulatory authority seeking to make changes to long-standing
technical standards. The Ooredoo technical standards have been developed over
many years, long before there were any other licensees in the market or a
regulatory body. The CRA appears to suggest these technical standards have been
somehow manipulated to disadvantage an OLO, which is simply not correct.
2.8 The CRA also appears to want to change the Ooredoo Technical standards and
then states that it is upon Ooredoo to demonstrate that the amended Technical
Standards cause structural damages to Ooredoo’s network. Ooredoo finds this to
be contradictory in the extreme: the CRA forces changes to the long-standing
technical standards without any assessment of the implications of such action, and
throws the responsibility, and costs of doing so onto Ooredoo. Ooredoo is keen to
safeguard the interest of its stakeholders and the integrity of its significant
investment in the network. Ooredoo has provided assurances to CRA that such
standards shall apply without any discrimination to OLOs and Ooredoo.
2.9 Nevertheless, the CRA recognizes that the Ducts of Ooredoo must be safeguarded
because of their strategic relevance not only for Ooredoo, but also for future
development of the competition on the Telecommunication Markets and the CRA
is therefore minded to accept Ooredoo's request to replace the current Annex 8
by a general statement that the OLO and Ooredoo shall negotiate the Technical
current Ooredoo technical standards of Ooredoo would form the base line.
2.10 The CRA however places a number of pre-conditions:
2.10.1 Ooredoo will apply the standard non-discriminatory;
2.10.2 Ooredoo will submit final copy with CRA;

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2.10.3 Ooredoo will not unilaterally change them; and
2.10.4 The technical standard limiting cables to six will not be allowed.
2.11 Whilst Ooredoo agrees with most of these pre-conditions, the denial of the CRA
to limit the number of cables to 6 cables will have significant operational and
financial implications.
2.12 The limit of 6 cables has been introduced specifically to ensure the fiber cables can
be appropriately maintained. When a fiber cable gets damaged, it will need to be
pulled out and a replacement placed in the duct. Where there are more than 6
fiber cables in the duct, the possibilities of the cables becoming twisted together
increases. With such twisting action together with large spans of duct length, the
tension exerted on existing cables will increase to such an extent that those
existing cables could be damaged. In other cases, the twisting action will result in
significant friction being generated between the existing cables and the pulled
cable, such that these other cables may well get damaged also.
2.13 Due to maintenance purposes, it is important to have the cables loose in the
conduit. The longer the conduit, the less cables you will be able to run and pull
them through easily and the more space may be required. In ducts where there is
not a rope, rodding may be required, which requires additional space.
2.14 In cases where there are more than 6 cables, it would mean that additional
lubrication will need to be added to the duct and additional specific equipment
used to pull the cables without any guarantee that no damage would occur to the
other cables. Clearly that would add additional costs, and time for Ooredoo. If the
CRA insisted on removing the limitation of 6 cables, then Ooredoo would need to
(i) be directly compensated by an OLO for consequential loss as Ooredoo
customers might be disconnected and for all additional maintenance activities
undertaken in the shared ducts, even when that maintenance was for Ooredoo
cables, as the additional costs and time are accrued due to the OLO (and the CRA’s
decision to remove the 6 cable limit); and (ii) absolved of all liabilities for any
damage and service disruption that may occur with the increase in cables and such
liability to be passed either onto OLO or CRA.
2.15 The concern the CRA appears to raise, is that Ooredoo may have inserted more
than 6 cables in a duct. The fact is that Ooredoo typically follows the Technical
Standards – in cases where it cannot follow the standards because of operational
reasons, it bears the additional risks including financial costs for doing so. This

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cannot be achieved by an OLO. For to do so, it would mean that additional

processes would need to be introduced within the RIAO with the OLO required to
directly contribute to the additional costs incurred in maintenance activities
resulting from more than 6 cables as we have detailed above, as well as sharing
any applicable liabilities for damage and/or service disruption. These costs should
be apportioned to the OLO directly outside of RAS. In any case, as we mention,
Ooredoo itself will be bounded by the technical standards.
Service Level Guarantees (Annex 7 of the RIAO)
2.16 Ooredoo had stated that the CRA has failed to justify and provide quantitative
evidence on why it has sought to decrease the SLA times and increase the service
credit values from those proposed by Ooredoo. The CRA has arbitrarily used
averages of optional tasks with no justification or evidence.
2.17 The CRA states that it defined a probability for some of the tasks (where they are
end process, however without actually describing how those probabilities were
derived or tested.
2.18 The CRA also states that the service credits were set based on whether the service
is delivered to the resulting typical average target time, and credits are paid if
delivered above this time, with progressive payments if significantly above target,
with claims that service providers have not provided relevant data on the Service
Levels, leaving the CRA without information. The CRA claims it is as consequence
that the CRA had to rely on an international benchmark to take its decision.
2.19 However, the CRA could not reveal the international benchmark it claims to have
carried out, or acknowledge that the data as collated under the IAA is not relevant
as all of the access requests to date have not had an RFS date and consequently
did not have corresponding SLAs. The CRA has nevertheless had the SLAs as
contained within the IAA and the CRA has not provided any evidence of why those
are not appropriate. By no means can International Benchmarks be used in this
context as conditions might be drastically different in the countries considered in
the said benchmark and in Qatar.
2.20 Nevertheless, the CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo's request to put the payment
of the Penalties on hold "until 100 Route Access Requests (RAR) have been
managed by Ooredoo, in order to derive revised SLAs based on such analysis".

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2.21 Again the CRA places a number of pre-conditions:
2.21.1 Ooredoo must submit robust and granular data on the actual time needed to manage
the above 100 RARs, which needs to be accompanied by a report of an Independent
Auditor;
2.21.2 Data submitted must be reported in the RAS of Ooredoo and attributed to the
relevant products; and
2.21.3 The RAS must unequivocally show that the timeline (and hence, the cost per unit) of
the processes implemented for the OLOs are non-discriminatory and that the same
cost per unit for comparable activities is also attributed to the Retail Arms.
2.22 Ooredoo believes the CRA is seeking to place unnecessary cost onto Ooredoo.
The use of an independent auditor is simply unnecessary. The time needed to
manage the RAR will be self-evident from the information that the process will
produce. The CRA states at 49.2 that the Auditor is required to perform "tests" to
audit the data. This may not be possible if the data is manually captured. The type
of nature of the test have not been defined by the CRA. If the CRA seeks to pursue
with an independent auditor, Ooredoo would recommend the CRA choose and pay
for such auditor.
2.23 It is not clear to Ooredoo what the CRA means by the statement that the data
submitted must be reported in the RAS of Ooredoo and attributed to the relevant
products. The CRA is aware that the RAS does not provide the granularity required,
and is not designed to, or expected to, provide that level of detail. The CRA will be
aware that almost all Accounting separation and Regulatory Accounting
statements produced globally do not go into the level of detail that the CRA seeks.
The RAS cannot show the timelines of the processes, for to do so, it would no
longer be a regulatory accounting system but more an Activity Based Cost
Accounting system, which is neither its purpose nor scope.
2.24 Furthermore, it is also not clear what is meant by robust and granular in CRA’s
statement “49.1: ‘Ooredoo to submit robust and granular data on the actual time
needed to manage the above 100 RAR’s”.
2.25 The CRA makes a statement at 49.3 that “The data submitted must be reported in
RAS and attributed to the RAS products”:
2.25.1 These requirement for RAS should be consulted upon and not contained within a
consultation on RIAO non-economic terms.

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2.25.2 This can be done if it conforms to the existing cost allocation approaches within RAS.
Ooredoo has stated to the CRA that RAS will not contain process level costing of
Ooredoo’s business, as per international best practice. Such cost apportionments are
today captured within the activity time-analysis regime within RAS.
2.26 At 49.4, the CRA makes the statement: “The RAS must unequivocally show that the
timeline (and hence the cost per unit) of the processes implement for the OLO’s are
non-discriminatory and that the same cost per unit for comparable activities is also
attributed to the Retail arm”. The CRA is erroneously making the assumption that
the costs of internal and external ordering/provisioning/installing etc. must be the
same. This can never be the same as explained at earlier meetings with the CRA.
E.g. for internal provisioning, no fax confirming the order is sent and the Wholesale
department are not involved and no internal billing is required. The CRA will be
aware that Ooredoo is an integrated entity.
2.27 Ooredoo believes the data that will be produced as a result of the 100 RARs will be
sufficient to determine appropriate SLAs and will in any case have more rational
than the CRA’s current approach which has been the arbitrary reduction of the
data contained within the Infrastructure Access Agreement.
Duct Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo in existing Ducts (Annex 1 of the RIAO)
2.28 CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo's request: in relation to used Ducts, 20% of the
usable capacity; in relation to empty Ducts, 33% of the usable capacity.
2.29 Ooredoo agrees with the CRA position.
Lease Termination (Annex 1 of the RIAO)
2.30 The CRA states that on the request that an OLO continues to pay for unused fiber
in the ducts, Ooredoo must demonstrate that the same treatment applies to
unused Ooredoo's cable.
2.31 At paragraph 62 of the consultation, the CRA states that: “Ooredoo to stop
charging for network where removal is not feasible”. As part of RAS, how should
the costs associated with such stranded assets be treated and where should it’s
cost recovery come from?
2.32 On the proposal from the CRA that Ooredoo needs to demonstrate that the same
treatment applies to unused Ooredoo cables, the CRA is aware that the RAS is in

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accordance to the CRA Order, a fully allocated, historic cost model. In RAS today,
duct infrastructure costs are apportioned to the cable occupying the space, where
used or otherwise. In this case these costs are ultimately transferred to the
corresponding products where cost recovery can be assessed.
2.33 Notwithstanding the above, Ooredoo believes given that the instances of an OLO
not being able to retrieve its cables from the Ooredoo ducts for network safety or
integrity reasons, will be minor and hopefully represent what will be an
insignificant quantity, it is more appropriate for the OLO to simply transfer that
asset to Ooredoo without cost (or a nominal value for accounting purposes).
2.34 The alternative would be to consider the quality of the cable, its opportunity cost,
potential value and determine a rate. Given that such a process will consume
considerable time, effort and resources of external consultants, the net benefit is
likely to be negative for both parties.
Access to new ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses)
2.35 The CRA does not accept Ooredoo's request to only provide access to ducts prior
to IAA, because it claims this would imply that SPs, which were not party of the
IAA, are prevented to access the New Ducts.
2.36 Ooredoo believes the CRA’s rationale and even the reference to legal provisions
to be incorrect.
2.37 Ooredoo had made clear in its submission and on numerous occasions that it has
the previous consultation response document. Yet the CRA has failed to explain on
what legal basis Ooredoo is obliged to offer access to new ducts. The reference by
the CRA to market dominance is subordinate to the rights and obligations under
the primary legislation that is the Telecommunications Law. There is nothing in the
Telecommunications Law that obliges Ooredoo to invest on behalf of competitors
and provide access to such investment (especially without long term commitment
and assurance on investment returns).
2.38 The CRA claims that Article 43(5) of the Telecommunication Law provides to CRA
the legal basis for Ooredoo’s obligation to grant access to all Ducts, regardless
when they have been built. Ooredoo has granted access to ducts built prior to April
2012, therefore, it can hardly be possible for Ooredoo to monopolize the use of
scarce facilities. Article 43(5) does not extend to investing in scarce resources and

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providing access to those scarce resources, but only to existing assets. Ooredoo
invests in duct infrastructure for the long term, for 25 to 30 years, in the
knowledge that such investment is both costly and time consuming.
2.39 Ooredoo would like to remind the CRA that during the IAA negotiations, QNBN
stated that it is not interested in investing in ducts with Ooredoo after the
effective date of the IAA and therefore agreed to allow Ooredoo to book 100% of
the capacity of new ducts. Consequently Ooredoo designed the relevant ducts and
invested only for itself. Ooredoo notes also that VFQ officially informed CRA at that
time that QNBN shall negotiate access to Ooredoo's ducts on its behalf.
2.40 Article 112 of the Executive By-Law is clear that obligations for access to facilities
only extend to existing facilities. The demarcation point for existing facilities was
actually the date the Executive By-Law was promulgated – i.e. 2009. Ooredoo had
in fact conferred a benefit beyond its obligations to provide access to ducts built
from 2009 to 2012 within the IAA.
2.41 In addition, when the IAA was signed in 2012, the premise was that QNBN would
be the Service Provider offering access to passive infrastructure to other licensees.
The governmental policy and industry expectations were that QNBN would deploy
new duct infrastructure which would allow licensees to gain access to areas
previous unserved while access to served areas would be through Ooredoo’s
existing duct network. Ooredoo’s investment rationale for new infrastructure from
the signature of the IAA was to ensure it catered for its needs and not for other
licensees as the latter would rely on QNBN for access. Today, the CRA is penalising
Ooredoo for QNBN’s failure to deploy such infrastructure and in fact indirectly
requesting Ooredoo to take over a role QNBN has failed to fulfil.
2.42 The CRA also claims that legal basis is provided for by the MDDD Order (cf. Notice
and Order ICTRA 2011/10/31 dated October 31, 2011) that has designated
Ooredoo DSP in the Relevant Market of the Access to the Civil Infrastructure. That
Relevant Market includes all Ducts, but does not differentiate the Ducts by the
date they were built (or will be build). The CRA will agree that the MDDD Order is
subordinate to the primary legislation, which is the Telecommunications Law and
the Executive By-Law, and therefore the CRA’s rationale cannot stand.
2.43 If Ooredoo were to offer access to new ducts, it would need an OLO to share the
risks and for Ooredoo to be appropriately and fairly compensated and assured that
doing so will not damage its ability to meet its own long-term needs for the use of
such infrastructure.

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2.44 Furthermore, access to newly deployed Ooredoo assets removes the need for the
OLO to invest. Subsequent competitive pricing pressures due to cherry picking of
opportunities will put the recovery of those assets at risk – i.e. a higher risk
associated with the investment. In other telecom jurisdictions this higher risk has
been recognised. Corresponding compensations mechanisms include: higher
WACC against those assets/network, delay in opening these assets to competition
etc. The recognition that the incumbent does not invest on behalf on its
competitors is recognised in the UK, where BT charged the OLO for new
investments.
Access to leased ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses)
2.45 The CRA states that in its view Ooredoo has to grant access to leased ducts only if
the Developer has no further available capacity to be rented to the OLO. If the
Developer could not meet the request of the OLO because Ooredoo has leased a
relevant part of the Ducts, the rules of the RIAO apply, specifically for the
calculation of the Available Capacity. If the Developer can meet the request of the
OLO, ducts leased by Ooredoo shall not be accessed by the OLO.
2.46 However, the CRA includes a confusing statement that Ooredoo has to provide
access to the ducts if Ooredoo effectively manages the duct network.
2.47 Ooredoo would state that where Ooredoo has leased access to 100% developer
ducts then Ooredoo should be obliged to provide access to those ducts where
feasible and space is available, provided Ooredoo receives the acceptance of the
developer for sharing the ducts with a third party.
2.48 Where Ooredoo has leased a proportion and other OLOs have leased other
portions, it would be discriminatory to claim that because there is no further
capacity, Ooredoo must provide access to its leased ducts, but no such
consideration be provided to the other OLO that may actually have leased a much
larger proportion.
Clarifications
2.49 The CRA seeks to provide clarifications on a clause 2.6 of the Main Body – Part
One.
2.50 The CRA states that if an OLO is willing to sign an agreement based on the terms
and conditions of the RIAO, the OLO is not obliged to enter into negotiations on

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the Reference Offer Terms and Conditions and Ooredoo must sign such
agreement.
2.51 Ooredoo would agree, however where the OLO requires additional, different
services, SLAs or where required a financial guarantee is required, then
negotiations would be required.
3. Expected consultation on Economic Terms and Conditions

3.1 On 04 May 2016, Ooredoo sent a formal request to the CRA to amend the
wholesale charges related to the provision of the duct access services as proposed
by the CRA in the Wholesale Charges Order and in RIAO Order (Request).
3.2 The submission listed specific modifications of the economic terms requested by
Ooredoo and provided comprehensive substantiations for these modifications.
3.3 Ooredoo supplemented the request with detailed calculations that served to
support individual wholesale charges proposed within that request by Ooredoo.
3.4 Ooredoo also proposed a meeting with the CRA in order to clarify any potential
queries that the CRA might have regarding this submission. To date, the CRA has
not responded to this request.
3.5 Ooredoo still expects that the meeting with the CRA to discuss the proposed
wholesale charges and to address any related CRA queries will take place and that
the CRA will proceed with the consultation of the Economic Terms and Conditions
in the same fashion as it has done with the non-economic terms and conditions of
the RIAO.
3.6 Ooredoo below, summarizes its request for the amendment of the economic
terms and conditions.
Area Access Request (AAR) and Route Access Request (RAR) Fees
3.7 As a fair compensation to Ooredoo, the CRA had suggested the introduction of
Route Access Request (RAR) fees and had suggested a figure of QAR 15,000
initially. The CRA has subsequently changed its mind regarding this fee, but has
failed to explain how the costs relating to the resources that Ooredoo will dedicate

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to process the RAR from the initial request to the end of the RAR process, shall be
recovered.
3.8 The CRA is therefore denying Ooredoo the ability to recover its costs. Furthermore,
the CRA is well aware that the extent and scope of work required under an Area
Access Request (AAR) is significantly different from the one needed for a RAR, and
the statement made by the CRA earlier that the defined AAR fee covers all cost of
Ooredoo is incorrect and misleading.
3.9 In the absence of a detailed understanding of what factors have been considered
by the CRA in arriving at the figures it had proposed, Ooredoo submitted, in the
attachments to the Request, detailed calculations of the costs incurred in the
processing of an AAR and RAR based on a comprehensive mapping and cost
analysis of individual activities required to complete the end-to-end AAR and RAR
processes as defined within the CRA’s RIAO. Ooredoo believes this information
provides the right framework for the formulation of appropriate charges for AAR
and RAR, and which will guarantee that Ooredoo recovers the costs incurred from
the start to the end of an access process.
The AAR charge
3.10 Article 2.3 (j) of RIAO stipulates that: “Within fifteen (15) days of an acceptance of
the AAR, Ooredoo shall provide copies of maps, GIS information and network data
that the OLO can use to define specific network element and route requests that
comply with the definitions and data used within Ooredoo’s own network design
and operations to be completed.” For an OLO to be able to specify a RAR as per
above conditions, Ooredoo has to produce and provide the OLO with network
information in the form of Shape files and XML files.
3.11 Based on the RIAO requirements, Ooredoo has estimated the costs of an AAR by
mapping step by step the process activities and quantifying the effort and related
costs required to complete each step of the AAR process. In the attachment to the
Request Ooredoo submitted a cost model with detailed calculations of these costs.
3.12 As reflected by the cost model there are fixed and variable costs incurred in the
AAR process. Ooredoo therefore calculated the total cost of AAR under the
assumption that 100 duct segments are processed within one AAR. Ooredoo also
provided the estimate of the incremental cost per additional 100 duct segments
that will be factored in the calculation of the final price for a given AAR reflecting
its actual scope.

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3.13 Ooredoo therefore proposed that the final price of each AAR will be calculated at
the time an AAR is received by Ooredoo from the OLO, which shall be in
accordance with the submitted cost model, duly reflecting fixed and variable cost
components incurred by Ooredoo when processing the AAR.
The RAR charge
3.14 Ooredoo submitted its Route Access Request (RAR) cost calculation model that
provided an overview of all the individual steps performed by Ooredoo when the
Route Access Request is processed, and identified the costs incurred by Ooredoo in
each of these steps. The cost model also provides the explanations of how costs
are calculated for each process step.
3.15 Similarly as in the case of AAR, there are fixed and variable costs incurred in
processing the RAR.
3.16 Ooredoo proposed that the final price of each RAR is calculated at the time a
RAR is received by Ooredoo from the OLO, in accordance with the submitted
model, duly reflecting fixed and variable cost components incurred by Ooredoo
with respect to the actual scope of a RAR.
Duct Access Charges
3.17 Ooredoo continues to assert that the duct access fee of 12dhs/cm2/ per linear
meter within the Wholesale Charges order is below cost and consequently has not
been agreed by Ooredoo. The CRA’s approach to use the total duct capacity to
derive unit costs contradicts with technical standards being applied for the cable
rollout and would deny actual cost recovery.
3.18 Therefore instead of using the CRA’s proposed theoretically and what amounts to
a practically incorrect assumption of the full duct space utilization, Ooredoo
proposes to use a forward looking cost modelling approach which reflects the
principle of actual duct utilization, and which seeks to guarantee actual cost
recovery.
3.19 Ooredoo submitted its Duct access cost calculation model which provides the
calculations for duct access costs over the horizon of the next five years (2016-
2020) under specific assumptions on the volume of this service and related costs.

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3.20 Presently, Ooredoo has no visibility regarding the actual volume of demand for
duct access by an OLO for use of the Ooredoo duct access service, as per RIAO, in
the forecast time frame.
3.21 The volumes of future duct access rental used in the cost model thus represent
Ooredoo’s assumptions only. Ooredoo therefore proposes that duct access cost
calculation be revisited and the charges reassessed on an annual basis to reflect
actual volumes of the service used by the OLOs and forecasted volume for this
services as provided by OLOs to Ooredoo upon concluding the duct access
agreement(s) and on regular basis thereafter.
3.22 The duct access cost model adopts the cost structure as per the RAS 2014 and
outlines the assumptions for the evolution of the costs for each cost category.
3.23 As an outcome of the cost model, Ooredoo proposes two alternative solutions to
the duct access wholesale charge:
3.23.1 Five-year glide path for charges from 2016 till 2021. The minimum billing increment is
3 cm2/m/month.
3.23.2 A fixed charge for the time period 2016 – 2021. The minimum billing increment is 3
cm2/m/month.
3.24 Ooredoo believes that either approach will guarantee the relevant cost recovery
(subject to annual revisions of the costs and volumes of the services).
Summary, consultation process and expectations
3.25 Ooredoo expects the CRA to open discussions on the above cost calculations for
AAR, RAR and duct access service with Ooredoo to address any further
clarifications as required by the CRA.
3.26 Ooredoo’s expectation is that the CRA will in sequel proceed with a consultation
on economic terms and conditions in line with the expectation that the
amendments and supportive evidence will be duly considered by the CRA and
reflected in the final wholesale duct access service charges accordingly.

~jWl tiDPJI ~ ti,!;hiiJ1 E6;J1&J1
Qatar National Broadband Network
June 12, 2016 Ref: 2016/Reg/PB/6-602
Mr. Mohammed AI Mannai

President
Communications Regulatory Authority
P.O. Box 23264, AI Nassr Tower
Doha, Qatar
Dear Mohammed,
Subject: (1) Consultation on RIAO for Ducts of Ooredoo: Non-economic Terms and Conditions and (2)
Qnbn Application article 5.1(b) RIAO
At the outset Qnbn wishes to express its profound concern and disappointment with this latest
Consultation on the RIAO to be issued by Ooredoo and we take little pleasure in participating in a never
ending process on the issue of access to Ooredoo ducts. From a substantive perspective Qnbn is of the
view that the CRA's current Consultation is:
• Unlawful
• Discriminatory
• An abuse of process
• Supports Ooredoo' s anti-competitive strategy of delaying access to its duct infrastructure.
Qnbn proposes to address each of the above substantive failings associated with this Consultation. In
addition Qnbn submits the below noted formal application pursuant to article 5.1(b) of the RIAO.
No Legal Basis for the Consultation
On 25 November 2015 the CRA directed Ooredoo to 'publish the RIAO on its web site and, w ithin 3
months, to send to the CRA and make available to OLO' s the agreement implementing the approved RIAO'.
No part of this Direction, especially making available to OLO's the specific RIAO approved by the CRA has
taken place on the part of Ooredoo. In this current Consultation the CRA clarifies that web site publication
is not a pre requisite . Further, an OLO is entitled to sign the RIAO approved by the CRA without the
obligation of entering into negotiations. This most recent clarification has not precipitated an offer by
Ooredoo to the OLO's to offer duct access in accordance with the Directed RIAO.
It is legally inconceivable for the CRA to entertain an application by Ooredoo in accordance w ith Article 5 of
the Approved RIAO dated 25 November 2015 if Ooredoo is not prepared to abide by all the other
provisions of the RIAO and make duct access immediately available to OLO' s. The legalities of the CRA
acceding to an Ooredoo application under Article 5 without at the same time insisting that Ooredoo
respect all the other terms of service offering under the RIAO are, at best suspect, and, at worst, beyond
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reasonable legal application . The CRA is in effect accepting the operation of a provision of the RIAO to
accommodate Ooredoo without being unequivocal as to the applicability of the remainder of the RIAO to
the marketplace. Surely, Article 5 was designed to address requested amendments which may arise from
time to time during the currency of the RIAO. Instead the CRA has forestalled the application of all other
RIAO provisions to deal uniquely with Ooredoo's request. Qnbn respectfully submits that the proper legal
approach was for the CRA to give full effect to the RIAO so that OlO's could execute and move forward and
then invite Ooredoo to submit an Article 5 request. Parceling out Article 5 for application without applying
all other provisions is unlawful. After all, article 5.2 requires Ooredoo to continue to provide services and
the CRA should have ordered accordingly as a lawful condition to entertaining Ooredoo's request for a
further Consultation.
Discrimination
Setting aside the above noted legalities it is worth assessing whether Ooredoo's request merited policy
consideration and, if so, whether such consideration by the CRA amounts to it engaging in blatant
discriminatory practice. A review of the public record on the RIAO clearly indicates that the matters raised
by Ooredoo in this current Consultation were matters raised earlier in the proceedings. Not only did all
parties have the opportunity to address the matters raised previously, the CRA had ample opportunity to
assess the merits of the various positions. On what basis, policy, or otherwise, is Ooredoo permitted to
raise previous arguments which did not prevail in its favor. On what basis, policy or otherwise, does the
CRA justify rehearing previous arguments raised by the DSP on which it was not successful. Qnbn has
raised multiple issues of substance upon which it did not prevail in the ultimate disposition. The CRA is
engaging in the worse form of discrimination if it is prepared to rehear issues raised by the DSP and not
rehear issues of equal importance to other service providers. Why is the DSP entitled to preferential
treatment; all at the expense and discrimination of other service providers? Why was Ooredoo not
required by the CRA to provide services as required by the specific provisions (article 5.2) of the RIAO?
Qnbn respectfully submits that the CRA is setting an unfortunate precedent if it is to blatantly engage in
undue discrimination in favor of the Dominant Service Provider when it had the ability to require Ooredoo
to make the RIAO available pending the Consultation.
Abuse of Process
In 2014 the CRA announced a 'new day' had arrived in regulating the telecommunications industry with a
paradigm shift away from retail scrutiny with a new emphasis upon wholesale services and the
introduction of Reference Offers. We are now in June of 2016 and Qnbn is of the view that the
marketplace is no closer to having Ooredoo offer the marketplace a viable duct access arrangement.
On 25 November 2015 the CRA issued its Order and Direction for Ooredoo to offer the RIAO to the
marketplace. It was not until 10 April 2016 that Ooredoo requested a review of the Non-economic Terms
and Conditions and 4 May 2016 that Ooredoo requested a review of the Economic Terms and Conditions.
On 26 May 2016 the CRA issued this present Consultation which addresses matters previously the subject
of extensive submissions and adjudication . Clearly Ooredoo was given the opportunity to file its own
version of an RIAO; stakeholders were involved in extensive submissions on every aspect of the terms and
conditions; and Ooredoo was given extensive opportunity to reply and make its views known. Qnbn
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respectfully submits that for the CRA to issue this present Consultation on matters already argued and
adjudicated 5 months after its 25 November 2015 Order and Direction is an abuse of process. Given that
Qnbn has commented on these matters extensively in the initial proceedings it does not propose making
further submissions in an unnecessary and abusive process other than incorporating by reference its
previous comments .
CRA's Consultation Supports Ooredoo's Anti-competitive Strategy of Delay
As the CRA is well aware Ooredoo has engaged in anti-competitive conduct in the past to forestall access
to its duct infrastructure. The CRA should bear the following in mind:
• An initial suspension of the IAA for 6 months by the DSP, the finding of anti-competitive conduct by
the CRA for such suspension and the subsequent halfhearted compliance with the IAA;
• A subsequent suspension of the IAA which is ongoing despite Interim Orders to reinstate services;
• Failure of the DSP to provide access to QDC in accordance with a CRA Decision and Order;
• Failure of the CRA to address access to Developers such as specifically requested of Lusail;
• Failure of the DSP to introduce an RIAO for duct access as specifically ordered by the CRA for a
specified date.
Surely the CRA realizes that all of Ooredoo' s requests for re hearings and reviews are part of a designed
strategy to delay duct access and fixed line competition for as long as possible. "Delay" is part of any 'tool
kit' employed by a DSP engaged in anti-competitive conduct. By agreeing processes and Consultations
which only serve to delay a duct access service the CRA is acceding to Ooredoo's anti-competitive delay
tactics. Every day of delay for fixed line competition is a good day for the Dominant Service Provider.
Qnbn Application Article 5.1(b) RIAO
Qnbn has been forthright since viewing the Ooredoo RIAO that it considers the commercially negotiated
IAA Agreement superior in most respects to the proposed RIAO. Given this latest Consultation it is clear
that the RIAO has evolved into a document which is unnecessarily cumbersome, bureaucratic, process
deficient and unfavorable from an access seeker perspective. Until the latest version of the RIAO Qnbn
always retained the right not to conclude an arrangement under the RIAO but rather retain the IAA as its
basis for accessing Ooredoo ducts. Given that the CRA is disposed to revisiting Ooredoo issues, Qnbn
formally requests that the CRA, pursuant to article 5.1(b). amend article 2.3 ofthe RIAO reinstating Qnbn's
right to continue duct access arrangements with Ooredoo under the IAA. If the CRA wishes to be viewed as
acting fairly amongst all stakeholders and not uniquely in preference of the DSP it will accede in favor of
this reasonable request.
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Vodafone Qatar’s response to
CRA’s Reference Infrastructure Access Offer (RIAO) for duct of Ooredoo:
request for review Consultation Document and Clarifications1
12 June 2016
1
For any further information on this submission, please contact Dr Alexandre Serot, alexandre.serot@vodafone.com.
Introduction
1. Vodafone Qatar is deeply concerned and surprised to receive this Consultation Document which re-
opens the Reference Infrastructure Access Offer (‘RIAO’) process completed by an Order issued by
the Communications Regulatory Authority (‘CRA’) on 25 November 2015 (the ‘Order’). Vodafone
Qatar is surprised because instead of the CRA taking swift and decisive actions to enforce its Order
as requested by Vodafone Qatar, the CRA has decided to acquiesce to Ooredoo’s invalid requests to
weaken and delay further the implementation of duct access in Qatar. In doing so, the anti-
competitive effects of Ooredoo’s practices are perpetuated with entry into the fixed markets
effectively foreclosed and competition in mobile adversely impacted as Vodafone Qatar is
prevented from rolling out its own fixed infrastructure to support its transmission and backhaul
needs.
2. It is also not clear to Vodafone Qatar what the precise scope of this Consultation Document is as it
opens the potential for Ooredoo to seek to rewrite the entire RIAO and thereby undo a process that
started three years ago. Vodafone Qatar also fears that the approach taken by the CRA may create
scope for further unjustified legal challenges from Ooredoo leading to delays in implementing
regulated duct access in Qatar.
3. Vodafone Qatar is participating in this consultation under protest.
Vodafone’s Key Comments on the Consultation Document
4. The legal basis of the CRA to issue the Consultation Document is flawed and unlawful. Article 5.1
of the RIAO can only operate once an agreement is in place and services under the agreement are
provided. This is not the case as Ooredoo has refused to sign an agreement consistent with the
Order despite Vodafone Qatar’s valid requests.2 As the reading of Article 5 of the RIAO in its entirety
makes plain Article 5.1 is intended to address issues that may arise in the context of the operation
of the RIAO.
5. The CRA has acted in a non-transparent and discriminatory way in favour of Ooredoo contrary
to Article 6 of the Telecommunications Law which provides that the CRA must exercise its powers in
a transparent and non-discriminatory manner. The CRA has failed to act transparently by refusing to
provide to Vodafone Qatar the two requests made by Ooredoo on the basis of which the CRA has
decided to issue this Consultation Document.3 The CRA has also discriminated in favour of Ooredoo
by affording Ooredoo the possibility to make further submissions on matters already consulted
upon and adjudicated by the CRA through the issuance of the Order. Ooredoo had the opportunity
to appeal the Order but chose not to. Further the CRA discriminated against Vodafone Qatar by
failing to seek to enforce its Order despite the repeated requests made by Vodafone Qatar.4
6. In issuing this Consultation Document and proposing to weaken further the RIAO, the CRA is
acting against the furthering of the objectives assigned to it in Article 2 of the
2
See notably letter from Vodafone Qatar to Ooredoo dated 12 May 2016.
3
Letter dated31 May 2016 from the CRA to Vodafone Qatar responding to Vodafone Qatar letter dated 30 May 2016
4
Letters dated 18 May 2016 and 29 May 2016 from Vodafone Qatar to the CRA.
Page 2 of 16
Telecommunications Law and in Article 4 of Emir Resolution No 42 of 2014. Vodafone Qatar
refers in particular to the duties of the CRA to encourage competition, prevent anti-competitive
practices and ensure the orderly development and regulation of the sector. The CRA’s actions are
damaging to long term investment in the sector and competition.
7. The changes to the RIAO that the CRA is minded to make upon the request of Ooredoo will
weaken further the RAIO and make it unfit for purpose and unusable. The RIAO as ordered is
already far from best practice with cumbersome processes, uncertainty regarding access to duct
(e.g. no obligation to provide alternative routes) and lack of information on infrastructure
availability to enable efficient roll-out. Despite those shortcomings, Vodafone Qatar has been
prepared to start using the RIAO with the understanding that that it will be improved overtime.
Vodafone Qatar strongly objects to any changes requested by Ooredoo as they will delay
further the implementation and opens up the opportunity for gaming and delay by Ooredoo by
requiring further unnecessary negotiations prior to using the service. This is against the very
concept of reference offer. Further Ooredoo has provided no new information in its requests to
justify amending the RIAO. There are therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to revisit at this
point its Order. The matters raised by Ooredoo have either been raised previously and settled by
way of the Order from the CRA or could have been raised by Ooredoo in the consultation process.
The CRA has provided no proper rational and evidence to justify a reversal of its position and accept
the amendments requested by Ooredoo.
8. Vodafone Qatar is in particular concerned with the Technical Guidelines which covers
potentially contentious matters such as duct capacity calculations and constraints,
facilities hosting, duct infrastructure upgrades and joint box technical rules . Vodafone Qatar
understands that Qnbn has faced numerous issues with duct access under its IAA and would have
expected that the deficiencies of the April 2012 Interim Access Agreement between Qnbn and
Ooredoo (the ‘IAA’) to be fully addressed and the learnings reflected in the RIAO. The industry is not
starting from scratch contrary to what Ooredoo wants the CRA to believe: Ooredoo’s duct have
been accessed by Qnbn to deploy fibre. As a regulated offer, the RIAO should be clearly stronger
and better than a commercial agreement. A RIAO should leave no room for delaying tactics by the
regulated firm. The access seeker should be able to start ordering services without having to enter
into lengthy and unnecessary negotiations with the incumbent. The changes proposed by
Ooredoo will only serve to delay and frustrate duct access.
9 More generally, this development calls into question the willingness and ability of the CRA to
put in place a fair and reasonable access regime to enable competition in fixed and level the
playing field with an overwhelmingly dominant incumbent operator. This fundamentally
undermines and obstructs Vodafone Qatar’s effort to make significant progress towards building a
viable fixed line business. This development compromises the reference offer processes for leased
lines and bitstream/VULA recently announced by the CRA. The apparent lack of willingness of the
CRA to enforce its Orders on Ooredoo discourages Ooredoo from genuine participation in such
processes and weakens the credibility of other similar processes. This stands only to exacerbate
existing market imbalances, further entrench Ooredoo’s dominance and impair competition and
market development to the detriment of consumers.
Page 3 of 16
10 Vodafone Qatar’s view remains that the CRA should enforce its Order and to address any
teething issues that might occur, the CRA should establish a committee chaired by the CRA to
have an oversight for the operation and review of the operation of the RIAO. In the event that the
CRA decides otherwise, the CRA should reject the changes proposed by Ooredoo and ensure that
the wording of the RIAO and Order is free from legal ambiguity and very clear regarding entry into
force and commercial launch. Vodafone Qatar also recommends that the CRA set up a committee
chaired by the CRA to oversee the operation and review the operation of the RIAO.
The merits of the CRA’s approach and its implications for investment incentives and competition
11 Vodafone Qatar submits that this latest decision and the manner in which it has been made is not
consistent with the mandate of the CRA to act in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner as
prescribed in Article 6 of the Telecommunications Law No. (34) of 2006 and raises serious concerns
regarding the willingness and ability of the CRA to regulate the local market and effectively address
the market power of Ooredoo which it inherited from its previous position as a publicly owned
monopolist.
12 This perpetuates uncertainty in the market and carries important implications for the broader
industry and economy in terms of fostering investment and competition in fixed markets, an area
identified by the CRA as in clear need of greater competition5. Paradoxically and contrary to the
CRA’s policy to focus regulation on wholesale markets6, Ooredoo’s monopoly in fixed markets
remains unchallenged some ten (10) years after the enactment of the Telecommunications Law
because the lack of wholesale regulated access to key fixed infrastructure of Ooredoo that the CRA
is required to implement and enforce as per its mandate. There are no regulated access products in
place despite Ooredoo’s market share well in excess of 90% in fixed markets. This is out of step with
international practice.
13 Such action further damages the mandate and reputation of the CRA and erodes investor
confidence in the legal and regulatory framework on which Vodafone Qatar’s mobile and fixed
licenses were issued and the industry is intended to operate.
14 The CRA started consultation on the reference offer in June 2013 and the RIAO was only finalised in
November 2015. This has been a lengthy consultation spanning over two years which gave all
stakeholders an opportunity to express their views and make submissions to the CRA. To reopen the
process at this stage after the CRA has issued an Order on this issue is a huge step backwards.
Vodafone Qatar submits that the CRA should enforce its Order rather than re-open the process.
15 This development also compromises the reference offer processes for leased lines and
bitstream/VULA recently announced by the CRA. The apparent lack of willingness of the CRA to
enforce its orders on Ooredoo discourages Ooredoo from genuine participation in such processes
and weakens the credibility of other similar processes. This stands only to exacerbate existing
5
CRA, Market Definition and Dominance Designation in Qatar –Dominance assessment in Relevant Markets (Phase II)
Economic Analysis and Response Document dated 9 May 2016.
6
CRA, Policy Statement Regulating the future dated June 2014.
Page 4 of 16
market imbalances, further entrench Ooredoo’s dominance and impair competition and market
development to the determinant of consumers.
16 Article 2 of the Telecommunications Law No 34 of 2006 sets out the objectives of the Supreme
Council which are the following:
1. Promoting the telecommunications sector in order to consolidate national, social and

economic development;
2. Enhancing the telecommunications sector’s performance in the State of Qatar through
encouraging competition and fostering the use of telecommunications services;
3. Encouraging the introduction of advanced and innovative information and
telecommunications technologies to meet the needs of the customers and the public;
4. Increasing customer benefits and safeguarding their interests
5. Encouraging sustainable investment in the telecommunications sector
6. Relying, where possible, on market forces to safeguard the interest of customers and the
public;
7. Identifying and addressing anti-competitive practices in the telecommunications sector;
8. Establishing a fair, objective and transparent licensing regime for service providers;
9. Establishing a fair regime that meets the requirements of the competitive marketplace through
the implementation of interconnection between service providers and all the procedures
related thereto
10. Promoting universal service;
11. Establishing an effective approval regime for telecommunications equipment;
12. Ensuring that the regulation of the telecommunications sector remains in line with
international rules; and
13. Ensuring the orderly development and regulation of the telecommunications sector.
17 Vodafone Qatar submits that by reopening the RIAO for consultation the CRA is not furthering its
objectives listed above for the following reasons. The RIAO as finalised on 25 November was a step
in the right direction in terms of putting in place a wholesale access remedy for the fixed market
and would help the CRA in achieving its objective to encourage competition in the fixed market.
Although the current RIAO is not perfect, the proposed amendments takes it to a point where it will
be practically impossible to make it work and therefore competition in the fixed market will be
largely undermined. It goes without saying that introducing competition in the fixed market would
increase customer benefits and the RIAO is a prerequisite tool to enable competition in fixed
market. Vodafone Qatar is still willing to sign up to the RIAO as it currently stands and the CRA’s
sudden move to reopen it for consultation is directly delaying Vodafone Qatar’s access into the fixed
markets and the associated consumer benefits. Without fit for purpose wholesale access to enable
efficient investment in the fixed markets, Vodafone Qatar is prevented from deploying its fixed
infrastructure and from investing. This is not good for competition. The CRA should use all its
resources to enforce the wholesale access orders it has issued on the incumbent instead of
indulging the incumbent’s games every time the incumbent is not happy about being regulated.
Page 5 of 16
Legal basis and process
18 Vodafone Qatar submits that reopening the RIAO has no legal basis, therefore it is unlawful.
19 The CRA simply provides in paragraph 1 (3) of the consultation document that “It is of the view that
Ooredoo’s request to review the Approved RIAO is acceptable according to the process set in Article
5 of the Approved RIAO”. The CRA does not provide the reasons it finds the request to be
conforming. This is not in line with the CRA’s obligations to act in a transparent manner when
making decisions.
20 Article 5 of the RIAO provides the following:
“5.1 Ooredoo
(a) May amend this RIAO from time to time with the approval of CRA or
(b) Must amend the RIAO if directed by the CRA to do so in accordance with the
Applicable Regulatory Framework
5.2 CRA may give OLO and other industry stakeholders the opportunity to make
representations before giving its approval or instruction to Ooredoo. For the avoidance of
doubt, Ooredoo will continue to provide services to the OLO during such period.”
21 On 30 May 2016 Vodafone Qatar requested a copy of the actual requests made by Ooredoo to
understand the precise basis on which Ooredoo has made its request and on which the CRA now
purports to reopen the RIAO and the CRA declined to provide the same.
22 Ooredoo having refused to complete the acceptance process under the RIAO now appears to be
relying on Article 5.1 of the very same RIAO to amend the same. This is a flawed and invalid basis for
reopening the RIAO. The RIAO as currently drafted is not operational until the prescribed
acceptance process is completed.
23 Subsequent to the RIAO being published by the CRA, Vodafone Qatar sent an acceptance notice to
Ooredoo for the RIAO on 19 January 2016. Ooredoo responded to Vodafone Qatar’s letter on 01
February 2016 stating that they are happy to initiate discussions of duct sharing. Vodafone Qatar
and Ooredoo subsequently met to discuss the RIAO and Vodafone Qatar was surprised when
Ooredoo sent a commercial duct sharing agreement for review on 23 February 2016. The RIAO was
therefore never signed between Vodafone Qatar and Ooredoo.
24 Furthermore, Article 5.1 of the RIAO is intended to provide a mechanisms for reviewing the
workability of the RIAO and amending the same only once it is in place and being operated by the
parties as the reading of Article 5 in its entirety makes clear.
25 If Ooredoo took issue with any aspect of the RIAO Order, of which the RIAO formed an integral part,
the correct and appropriate channel for Ooredoo to challenge the RIAO Order was to appeal the
Order a final administrative decision of the CRA. Ooredoo had ample opportunity to formally appeal
the order within 60 days of the date of the Order but failed to do so. As such, the Order was
Page 6 of 16
unchallenged and remains valid. Vodafone Qatar reiterates its view that the CRA should swiftly and
decisively implement the Order and establish a committee chaired by the CRA to have oversight for
the operation and review of the operation of the RIAO in the form produced as an outcome of the
Order and consultation process undertaken
26 Vodafone Qatar further submits by reopening the RIAO for consultation, the CRA is conducting a
discriminatory process which is not in line with the Applicable Regulatory Framework. As
mentioned above, the consultation process for the RIAO already took a long time to finalise and
Ooredoo had legal avenues to pursue if they were not happy with the CRA’s final RIAO and Order
published on 25 November 2016.
27 The process is discriminatory in favour of Ooredoo who is afforded the opportunity to re-open
matters already adjudicated. The process is also discriminatory against Vodafone as the CRA is not
enforcing its Order against Ooredoo despite Vodafone Qatar’s requests to do so.
Vodafone Qatar comments on the proposed changes and clarifications
General comments
28 Vodafone Qatar comments are limited to the specific requests and/or clarifications sought by
Ooredoo. Our view remains that the CRA should enforce its Order and to address any teething
issues that might occur, the CRA should establish a committee chaired by the CRA to have an
oversight for the operation and review of the operation of the RIAO.
29 Vodafone Qatar would like to underline to the CRA that the very significant changes to the RIAO it is
minded to accept at the request of Ooredoo will weaken further the RIAO, delay its implementation
and support the continuation of the anti-competitive behaviour of Ooredoo to foreclose entry into
the fixed markets and entrench the dominance of Ooredoo. The RAIO is already far from best
practice with cumbersome processes, uncertainty regarding access to duct (e.g. no obligation to
provide alternative routes) and lack of information on infrastructure availability to enable efficient
roll-out. If anything, it needs to be made stronger. As it stands, if the CRA maintains its draft
position, the RIAO would become unfit for purpose and unusable.
30 Vodafone Qatar notes with concern that most of Ooredoo’s requests are premised by Ooredoo’s
issue regarding the CRA changing “Ooredoo’s longstanding practices”. Vodafone Qatar submits that
the very purpose of reference offers is for the CRA, after consultation with the industry, to have an
opportunity to make amendments to Ooredoo’s processes and procedures and not for Ooredoo to
impose its processes and procedures on everyone. This approach only illustrates the fundamental
issue that Ooredoo has with being regulated as a dominant operator.
22 Vodafone Qatar is strongly opposed to all the requests that Ooredoo is making as Ooredoo has
provided no new information in its requests to justify the amendment of the RIAO. There are
therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to revisit at this point its Order and to weaken further
the RIAO and delay its implementation. The matters raised by Ooredoo have either been raised
Page 7 of 16
previously and settle by way of order by the CRA or could have been raised by Ooredoo in the
consultation process.
Safety and Security of the Network (Annex 9 of the RIAO)
Ooredoo’s request and the CRA’s view
23 Ooredoo argues that the CRA has sought to make changes to Ooredoo’s technical standards and
longstanding field proven practices, without appropriate justification and cannot accept the CRA
forcing significant changes to Ooredoo’s internal operating and governance structures, processes
and procedures without legitimate justifications. Accordingly Ooredoo requests the CRA to change
the timeline to grant approval for safety and security work to two (2) business day, which
corresponds to the timeline applied internally to Ooredoo’s staff and contractors.
24 The CRA provides that it recognizes that the 24 hours timeline is neither consistent with the other
timelines included in the approved RIAO nor necessarily clear as the approved RIAO defined other
timelines in business days, accordingly the CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo’s request and change
the timeframe for granting approval for safety and security work to two (2) business days as
requested by Ooredoo.
Vodafone Qatar’s comments
25 Vodafone Qatar would like to reiterate CRA’s view that the regulator is indeed entitled to change
processes and procedures of a DSP. This is indeed part of the purpose of regulated agreements
such as reference offers to level the playing field between a DSP operator and access seekers and to
move the DSP towards efficiency by changing their processes and procedures.
26 Vodafone Qatar does not agree with the CRA’s rational for accepting Ooredoo’s request to change
the timeline for approving safety and security work to two (2) business days, from 24 hours as it
currently stands in the RIAO. If the CRA’s concern with the current timeline is simply because it uses
hours instead of business days which is not consistent with the other timelines in the approved
RIAO, then the CRA should simply change the timeline to one (1) business day. Vodafone Qatar
therefore submits that following the CRA’s rational around consistency, the timeframe should be
changed to one (1) business day. Neither the CRA nor Ooredoo have provided sufficient rational as
to why the timeline should be any different from the current timeline in the RIAO.
Technical Standards (Annex 8 of the RIAO)
Ooredoo’s request and CRA’s view
27 Ooredoo requests the CRA to replace the current Annex 8 by a general statement that the OLO and
Ooredoo shall negotiate the Technical Standards when concluding a final agreement based on the
Page 8 of 16
RIAO with the current technical standards of Ooredoo serving as base line to be provided in due
course.
27 The CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo’s request to replace the current Annex 8 by a general
statement that the OLO and Ooredoo shall negotiate the Technical Standards when concluding a
final agreement based on the RIAO with the current technical standards of Ooredoo forming the
base line. Furthermore the CRA indicates that it may intervene if Ooredoo and the OLOs do not
reach an agreement on the Technical Standards.
28 Vodafone Qatar is strongly opposed to the removal of the Annex 8 Technical Standards in the RIAO.
Ooredoo has provided no new information in its request to justify an amendment of the RIAO. There
are therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to revisit at this point its Order and to weaken further
the RIAO and delay its implementation.
29 Vodafone Qatar is extremely concerned and surprised by the CRA’s acceptance of Ooredoo’s
proposal. Taking the technical guidelines out and replacing them with the wording recommended
is a huge step backwards as it opens up yet another avenue for gaming and delay by Ooredoo.
Technical Guidelines include critical elements, such as duct capacity calculations and constraints,
facilities hosting, duct infrastructure upgrades and joint box technical rules, necessary for the use of
the regulated service and to enable deployment of fibre by an access seeker. Those are contentious
matters. Without Annex 8, the RIAO cannot work. Vodafone Qatar commands the work that the CRA
had undertaken to ensure it included Technical Standards in Annex 8 as part of the RIAO. Vodafone
cannot accept that those efforts been reversed simply because they are not to the liking of the
incumbent who controls and prevent entry into the market. The CRA made the right decision in its
Order.
30 Failure to agree on the technical standards will once again end up with the CRA and the CRA will
need to make a binding decision on the parties. By finalising the RIAO with the technical guidelines
as they stand, the CRA already made that decision and there is no need to start the circle again.
Furthermore this is also inconsistent with the CRA’s clarification on the Acceptance Procedures,
whereby the CRA clarifies that the OLO should be able to sign up to the RIAO without any further
negotiations, as it should be. The very purpose for reference offers is to indeed protect OLOs from
prolonged negotiation periods with the DSP which has a vested interest in delaying access.
31 The CRA should not be led to believe that the industry is starting from scratch. To the contrary, a
duct access agreement has been in place between Qnbn and Ooredoo since April 2012 and some
deployments using Ooredoo’s ducts have taken place. There is therefore ample experience with
duct access and the underpinning technical standards necessary for smooth deployments.
32 Furthermore Vodafone Qatar submits that the Technical Standards provided in the RIAO are what is
needed for the purposes of the RIAO. Ooredoo’s own Technical Standards are not all relevant for the
service. Vodafone Qatar also notes that Ooredoo only cites the example of how more cables in the
JRC12 could harm Ooredoo’s network in the short or long term. Vodafone Qatar submits that where
Ooredoo believes the Technical Standards would cause harm to its network, it should have provided
alternative solutions in the Technical guidelines which would minimise the risk of harm to its
network rather than requesting to remove the whole Annex.
33 In any case Vodafone Qatar believes that Ooredoo’s concerns are already addressed in the RIAO
under Annex 8, Articles 7.1.b, which provides that the OLO may upgrade the existing JRC-12 by
Page 9 of 16
rebuilding the Joint Box with the required extra depth or as a JRC-14 and Article 8.1(a) which
provides that the OLO may upgrade the Duct route by adding more Ducts.
Service Level Guarantees (Annex 7 of the RIAO)
34 In the Consultation Document, the CRA indicates that it is minded to accept Ooredoo’s proposal to
put the payment of penalties on hold until 100 Route Access Request (“RAA”) have been managed
by Ooredoo. The CRA also indicates that it intends to review the Service Levels at this point on the
basis of the actual performance of Ooredoo.
Vodafone Qatar Comments
35 Vodafone Qatar is strongly opposed to any softening and waiver of Service Levels and Penalties.
Ooredoo has provided no new information in its request to justify an amendment of the Order.
There are therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to revisit at this point its Order and to weaken
further the RIAO and delay its implementation.
36 The approved Service Levels and Penalties are already weak and far from comprehensive (e.g. they
do not cover provisioning process). In the best case scenario, an OLO can submit a Provisioning
Request some 58 business days after having submitted an AAR.
37 The preliminary decision of the CRA to accept Ooredoo’s approach to review and set Service Levels
based the performance of Ooredoo in managing the first 100 AAR is fundamentally flawed. It has
obvious perverse incentives on Ooredoo which would be rewarded for being inefficient. The CRA
also seems to ignore the fact that Ooredoo’s network, including its FTTH access network is already
largely in place and therefore Ooredoo will only have marginal needs for new duct access, except in
greenfields areas. Hence even if one was to assume no discriminatory treatment, the impact on
access seekers will be far greater and discriminatory.
38 Service Levels and Penalties should be set at levels that incentivise good performance and provide
adequate financial compensation to access seekers in the case of breaches. Where such
performance is poor and not in line with industry requirements, regulators are increasingly steeping
in and setting wholesale quality standards and targets in addition to Service Levels such as Ofcom
in the UK.7
39 The proposal of the CRA also defies any common sense as this would result in putting in the market
place a regulated access offer weaker than the commercial agreement between Qnbn and Ooredoo
which Vodafone Qatar understands includes Service Levels and Penalties. The proposal also
suggests that the learnings from the use of duct access by QNBN have not been captured in the
RIAO.
7
Ofcom, 2016, Making communications work for everyone: Initial conclusions from the Strategic Review of Digital
Communications.
Page 10 of 16
Duct Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo in existing Ducts (Annex 1 of the RIAO).
40 Ooredoo is of the view that it should have the right to reserve to itself for used ducts, 20% of the
usable capacity 33% of the usable capacity for empty ducts.
41 The CRA states that according to available information Ooredoo’s duct filling grade is, on average,
around 50%. Therefore, the CRA considers that the number of Access Requests that could be
rejected for space unavailability should be very low and hence the changes requested by Ooredoo
are of a limited magnitude. Accordingly, the CRA is be minded to accept Ooredoo’s request.
42 Vodafone Qatar remains strongly opposed to any amendment to the reserved duct capacity space
regardless of the magnitude of the change. Ooredoo has provided no new information in its request
to justify an amendment of the Order. There are therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to
revisit at this point its Order and to weaken further the RIAO and delay its implementation.
43 Furthermore Vodafone Qatar seeks clarity on what the CRA means by “Ooredoo’s duct filling grade
is on average around 50%”. Vodafone Qatar considers that the use of average does not give an
accurate picture as there may be areas heavily congested in the access network (due for example to
remaining copper) which are compensated, on average, by very low usage in other areas.
44 Vodafone Qatar has unfortunately not been afforded the opportunity to request any ducts from
Ooredoo since obtaining the fixed license in April 2010. Vodafone Qatar therefore cannot provide
the CRA with the percentage of Access Requests refused because of lack of available capacity.
Lease Termination (Annex 1 of the RIAO)
45 Ooredoo suggests that where access to Ooredoo’s Network Elements has been terminated, the
OLO should remove the cable without harming the infrastructure, or the OLO has to continue
paying rental of the used space in the ducts. In addition, Ooredoo proposes to let the parties agree
on alternative options in the access agreement, including transfer of assets.
46 The CRA states that it will consider Ooredoo’s request in relation to Ooredoo’s request for the OLO
to continue paying rent if Ooredoo could demonstrate that the same treatment applies to
Ooredoo’s unused cable. On Ooredoo’s request regarding leaving the parties to agree on
“alternative options in the access agreement”, including the transfer of the lease terminated, the
CRA notes that the parties have already the possibility to agree on terms and conditions different
Page 11 of 16
from those included in the RIAO. However to facilitate an agreement between Ooredoo and the
OLO the CRA is open to amend the section 4.8, Annex 1, by inserting a new clause 4.8.f.
47 Vodafone Qatar is strongly opposed to any amendment to the Leased Termination Clause as
Ooredoo has provided no new information in its request to justify an amendment of the RIAO. There
are therefore no objective grounds for the CRA to revisit at this point its Order and to weaken further
the RIAO and delay its implementation.
48 Furthermore, neither Ooredoo nor the CRA have considered the possibility that it might be difficult
if not impossible to remove the fibre, especially where Ooredoo might have copper cables already
in the ducts, and the possibility that there might be some tangling in the ducts which could
potentially harm the remaining cables if the OLO tried to remove its fibre.
49 As the CRA has noted itself, Ooredoo has not provided any evidence to support its request to
continue charging the OLO where the lease is terminated. In any case proper consultation will be
necessary to address the implications regarding the fair allocation of duct cost to cables and hence
duct pricing.
50 Vodafone Qatar is also baffled by the CRA’s willingness to go the extra mile for Ooredoo by
recommending suggested amendments to the RIAO on Parties rights to agree on alternative
options in the access agreement. This does not add any value to the RIAO.
Reservation of 100% capacity in new Ducts - Access to new ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related
clauses)
51 .
52 In the Consultation Document, the CRA indicates that it is minded to reject Ooredoo’s proposal to
restrict access to ducts built after the signature of the IAA in April 2012 between Ooredoo and
Qnbn. Ooredoo argued that being obliged to give access to ‘new’ ducts amounts to an obligation to
“invest on behalf of competitors and provide access to such investment”. Ooredoo also contends
that the CRA’s reference to Article 43(5) regarding abuse of dominance does not extend to
investing in scarce resources and providing access to those scarce resources. Ooredoo therefore
requests for reservation of 100% of capacity in the new ducts
53 The CRA states that the Telecommunications Law provides the legal basis for Ooredoo’s obligation
to grant access to all ducts regardless when they have been built. Ooredoo also has an obligation to
offer access to the ducts not only to QNBN but to any SPs, therefore the CRA cannot accept
Ooredoo’s request because this would imply that SPs, which were not party to the IAA, are
prevented to access the new ducts
Page 12 of 16
54 In its Order dated 25 November 2015, the CRA, after a lengthy and inclusive consultation process,
confirmed that access to existing and new duct should be mandated. If Ooredoo disagreed with this
conclusion to should have appealed the Order. As explained above it is not appropriate to re-open
this issue on the basis of Article 5.1 of the RIAO.
55 Notwithstanding the above, Vodafone Qatar concurs with the reasoning of the CRA to reject
Ooredoo’s request. The position and arguments developed by Ooredoo only illustrates Ooredoo’s
unwillingness to offer access to its network on a regulated basis.
56 Vodafone Qatar was not privy to the IAA negotiations between QNBN and Ooredoo and should not
be discriminated against. Furthermore the CRA is absolutely correct with its argument that the
obligations of DSP to offer access to ducts do not distinguish between ducts built before April 2012
and ducts built after that date.
57 Vodafone Qatar is willing to invest in fixed infrastructure; however duplication of infrastructure such
as ducts on a large scale is neither technically nor economically feasible. It is not feasible for each
licensed service provider to dig up the roads. When Vodafone Qatar started to build some of its
ducts, one of the requirements from the Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning (“MMUP”)
was for Vodafone Qatar to show that it would have extra capacity to share with other users before
permits were given. Vodafone Qatar assumes that Ooredoo would have had the same requirement
from the MMUP, hence they cannot claim 100% capacity in any new ducts.
58 The duties of the CRA at Article 2 of the Telecommunications Law are clear and include the
promotion of the telecommunications sector, enhancing its performance and encouraging
sustainable investment. Further Chapter 5 of Telecommunications Law empowers the CRA to set
the rights, obligations and terms of access. The CRA is therefore empowered by the
Telecommunications Law to grant access to Ooredoo’s ducts. Further mandating access to
Ooredoo’s existing and new ducts by virtue of its market dominance is fully consistent with the
duties of the CRA and the efficient operation of the market. This is also in line with international
best practices, such as in Spain and Portugal for example.
59 Taking literally Ooredoo’s line of reasoning would mean that the CRA cannot mandate access to
any ‘new’ network elements of Ooredoo. In an industry characterised by rapid technological
changes and frequent upgrade of network equipment this would mean that the CRA cannot
mandate bistream access on the fibre network Ooredoo has deployed since 2012 despite
Ooredoo’s dominance. Ooredoo’s logic is contrary to the principle of access regulation enshrined in
the Telecommunications Law.
60 Further, duct access prices can be set such that they adequately reflect investment risk and
reasonable cost, including a return of capital employed.
61 For the above reasons, Vodafone Qatar agrees with the CRA’s position to reject Ooredoo’s proposal.
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Access to leased ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses)
Ooredoo’s request and the CRA’s View
62 Ooredoo requests that the CRA’s wording in the RIAO clarifies that “Ooredoo is only required
to provide access to ducts leased by Ooredoo only where 100% of the developer’s ducts are
leased by Ooredoo”.
63 In the Consultation Document, the CRA states at para 82-83 that: “it is [its] view that Ooredoo has to
grant access to leased ducts only if the Developer has no further available capacity to be rented to
the OLO. Accordingly , the access to the Ducts leased by Ooredoo is granted to the OLO:
(a) if Ooredoo has acquired 100% of all available Ducts from the Developer, or
(b) if the Developer could not meet the request of the OLO because Ooredoo has leased a
relevant part of the Ducts. In this case, the rules of the RIAO apply, specifically for the
calculation of the Available Capacity.
(c) This is also the case if Ooredoo effectively manages the duct network.
If the Developer can meet the request of the OLO, ducts leased by Ooredoo shall not be accessed
by the OLO, therefore the CRA is minded to change Annex 3 and related clauses to the above.”
Vodafone Qatar’s Comments
64 The CRA was very clear in its RIAO Order that “Ooredoo is obliged to offer access not only to
owned Ducts but also owned, leased and/or operated by Ooredoo regardless the diameters” (para
(i) page4. Ooredoo previously has acknowledged this by offering duct access under its 2012 IAA
commercial terms and conditions.
65 This is yet again another area where the CRA is minded to significantly depart from the 25
November 2015 Order without having articulated any rationale and evidence on why it has now
come to a different view. Vodafone Qatar does not support amending of the RIAO and the RIAO
Order in this respect as there is no new evidence or rationale provided by either the CRA or
Ooredoo.
66 The CRA should be mindful of the situation at the Pearl where duct access has not been effective.
The CRA’s Clarification on Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One 2.6)
The CRA’s View
Page 14 of 16
67 The CRA clarifies that if an OLO is willing to sign an agreement based on the terms and conditions
of the RIAO, the OLO is not obliged to enter into negotiations on the reference offer terms and
conditions. In this case the Access Provider, shall sign the agreement and refrain to propose
changes to the RIAO.
68 Vodafone Qatar welcomes the CRA’s clarification on this issue, however the wording of the RIAO is
still not clear on this. As Vodafone Qatar has previously advised during the initial consultation
process on reference offers, it should be clear in the RIAO that once the RIAO is approved/ordered
by the CRA, the OLO can simply send a signed copy of the RIAO to Ooredoo and start ordering the
services (subject of course to meeting licencing requirements) without being at the mercy of
further delaying tactics from the incumbent. This is what reference offers are supposed to achieve.
69 It is also not helpful that the CRA in the RIAO order gave Ooredoo three months to make the
agreement available to OLO’s. The CRA needs to be clear and precise in its Order and leave no room
for Ooredoo to play incumbent games.
The CRA’s Clarification on the availability of the RIAO
The CRA’s View
70 The CRA clarifies that the RIAO and the other reference offers approved by CRA are all available for
the OLOs from the time the CRA has approved them. Hence, an Access Provider is not entitled to
delay the signature of an agreement based on the RIAO arguing that the RIAO has not been
published on its website. In other word, publication is not a pre-requisite for entry into force of a
reference offer.
71 The above understanding of the CRA has always been Vodafone Qatar’s understanding as well
which is why Vodafone Qatar sent its Acceptance Notice for the RIAO even if Ooredoo had not
published its RIAO on its website.
72 In Vodafone Qatar’s opinion, this illustrates the imperative for the CRA to be very diligent in
ensuring that the wording of wholesale access orders is free from legal ambiguity and very clear
regarding entry into force and commercial launch.
Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One Clause 2.5)
The CRA’s View
74 The CRA suggests amendments to clause 2.5 in order to address open ended and inefficient
wording. The CRA clarifies the wording on the Acceptance Procedures, regarding the Acceptance
Page 15 of 16
Notice and the OLO’s willingness to enter into an Agreement based on the RIAO approved by the
CRA without the need to have any further negotiations with Ooredoo.
75 Vodafone Qatar has always been of the view that as soon as the RIAO is finalised by the CRA, the
OLO should be able to sign the RIAO and send it to Ooredoo for signature and start with the
ordering processes under the RIAO. Submissions have been made to that effect during the
consultation process on the RIAO. Vodafone Qatar supports the CRA’s Amendments.
76 In Vodafone Qatar’s opinion, this illustrates the imperative for the CRA to be very diligent in
ensuring that the wording of wholesale access orders is free from legal ambiguity and very clear
regarding entry into force and commercial launch.
END
Page 16 of 16
Reference Infrastructure
Access Offer (RIAO) for Duct of
Ooredoo: request for review
Consultation Document
and Clarifications
Closing date is June, 12 2016
CRARAC 2016/06/26
June 26, 2016
Table of Contents
1 Background ................................................................................................................... 3
2 Instructions for responding to this consultation ........................................................ 3
2.1 Consultation Procedures ........................................................................................ 3
2.2 Publication of comments ........................................................................................ 3
3 Ooredoo’s request for review ....................................................................................... 4
3.1 Safety and Security of the Network (Annex 9 of the RIAO) ..................................... 4
3.1.2 CRA’s considerations ................................................................................................5
3.1.3 Question ....................................................................................................................5
3.2 Technical Standards (Annex 8 of the RIAO) ........................................................... 5
3.2.3 Question ....................................................................................................................7
3.3 Service Level Guarantees (Annex 7 of the RIAO)................................................... 7
3.4 Ooredoo’s request .................................................................................................. 7
3.4.2 Question ....................................................................................................................8
3.5 Duct Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo in existing Ducts (Annex 1 of the RIAO) ........ 8
3.5.2 CRA’s consideration ..................................................................................................9
3.5.3 Question ....................................................................................................................9
3.6 Lease Termination (Annex 1 of the RIAO) .............................................................. 9
3.6.2 CRA’s considerations ..............................................................................................10
3.6.3 Question ..................................................................................................................10
3.7 Access to new ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses) ......................... 10
3.7.2 CRA’s position .........................................................................................................11
3.7.3 Question ..................................................................................................................12
3.8 Access to leased ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses)...................... 12
3.8.2 CRA’s position .........................................................................................................12
3.8.3 Question ..................................................................................................................13
4 Clarifications................................................................................................................ 13
4.1 Clarification on Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One 2.6) ................... 13
4.2 Clarification on the availability of the RIAO ........................................................... 14
5 Additional items for Review ........................................................................................ 14
5.1 Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One Clause 2.5)................................ 14
5.1.1 CRA’s reasoning ......................................................................................................14
5.1.2 Question ..................................................................................................................15
List of Questions ..................................................................................................... 16
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1 Background
1. Pursuant to Article (18) and (25) 2 of the Telecommunications law, Article (51)
of the Executive By-Law and the License for the Provision of Public Fixed
Telecommunications Networks and Services issued to Ooredoo Q.S.C.
(Access Provider) Annexure F, Article (4), the Dominant Service Provider
(DSP) has to publish a Reference Offer. In the Notice and Orders Designation
of Ooredoo Q.S.C. and Vodafone Qatar Q.S.C. as Dominant Service Providers
in specified relevant markets, dated May 9, 2016 (cf. CRARAC 09/05/2016 A),
Ooredoo has been designated DSP in several wholesale markets, including
Market 8 in which the Duct services belong.
2. On November 25, 2015, CRA issued an Order approving the RIAO of Ooredoo
(re. CRA 2015/11/25), along with the RIAO Documents approved by CRA (re.
CRA 2015/11/25B) and the Response Document to the latest Consultation (re.
CRA 2015/11/25A).
3. On April 10, 2016, Ooredoo submitted a request to review the Non-Economic
Terms and Conditions of the Approved RIAO. The CRA is of the view that
Ooredoo’s request to review the Approved RIAO is acceptable according to the
process set in Article 5 of the Approved RIAO dated November 25, 2015.
4. On May 4, 2016, 2016, Ooredoo submitted a request to review the Economic
Terms and Conditions of the Approved RIAO. The CRA found that Ooredoo’s
requests for review the Wholesale Charges required additional quantitative and
qualitative evidence in order to start a proceeding to review the above Orders.
This is detailed in a separate letter to Ooredoo.
5. Accordingly, with this Consultation Document (CD), the CRA opens a
proceeding to review some of the Non-Economic Terms and Conditions
included in the above mentioned Orders CRA 2015/11/25.
6. With this Consultation, the CRA is seeking inputs from the SPs to decide on the
content of the Request for review submitted by Ooredoo.
2 Instructions for responding to this consultation

2.1 Consultation Procedures
7. In keeping with open and transparent regulatory processes, the CRA herewith
consults on the amendments proposed by Ooredoo to the RIAO and on
additional amendments CRA views as beneficial to the Reference Offer
Process.
8. SPs are invited to provide their views and comments on the consultation
questions. Furthermore, SPs may provide CRA with a redline version of the
RIAO Document.
9. The CRA asks that, to the extent possible, submissions to be supported by
relevant evidence. Any submissions received in response to this Consultation
Document (CD) will be carefully considered by the CRA. Nothing included in
this CD is final or binding. However, the CRA is under no obligation to adopt or
implement any comments or proposals submitted.
10. Comments shall be submitted by email to raconsultation@cra.gov.qa before
the date stated on the front cover. The subject reference in the email shall be
stated as Consultation on “Reference Infrastructure Access Offer of Ooredoo –
Request for Review”. It is not necessary to provide a hard copy in addition to
the soft copy sent by email.
2.2 Publication of comments

11. In the interests of transparency and public accountability, the CRA intends to
publish the submissions to this consultation on its website at www.cra.qa.
3/16
12. All submissions will be processed and treated as non-confidential unless
confidential treatment of all or parts of a response has been requested.
13. In order to claim confidentiality for information in submissions that stakeholders
regard as business secrets or otherwise confidential, stakeholders must
provide a non-confidential version of such documents in which the information
considered confidential is blacked out. This “blackened out” portion/s should be
contained in square brackets. From the non-confidential version it has to be
clear where information has been deleted. To understand where redactions
have been made, stakeholders must add indications such as “business secret”,
“confidential” or “confidential information”.
14. A comprehensive justification must be provided for each and every part of the
submission required to be treated as confidential. Furthermore, confidentiality
cannot be claimed for the entire or whole sections of the document as it is
normally possible to protect confidential information with limited redactions.
15. While the Authority will endeavour to respect the wishes of respondents, in all
instances the decision to publish responses in full, in part or not at all remains
at the sole discretion of the CRA. By making submissions to the Authority in
this consultation, respondents will be deemed to have waived all copyright that
may apply to intellectual property contained therein.
16. For more clarification concerning the consultation process, please contact
Francesco Massone (fmassone@cra.gov.qa).
3 Ooredoo’s request for review

3.1 Safety and Security of the Network (Annex 9 of the RIAO)
17. This is related to the timeline for Ooredoo to grant approval for safety and
security work permits.
18. According to Annex 9 of the Approved RIAO, Section 3,
(a), Ooredoo shall complete the issue of all relevant permits and paper
works and grant approval within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt of the
relevant forms.

The CRA has sought to make changes to the Ooredoo technical
standards and longstanding field proven practices, without appropriate
justification. E.g. Ooredoo requires 48 hours to grant approvals for
safety and security work permits; however the CRA appears to have
assumed wrongly that Ooredoo had agreed 24 hours, and sought to
force a major change to Ooredoo's internal governance framework and
processes.
Ooredoo cannot accept the CRA forcing significant changes to
Ooredoo's internal operating and governance structures, processes and
procedures without legitimate justification. Ooredoo had stated that the
procedures apply equitably to all staff and contractors and there would
be no scope for discriminatory treatment of an OLO, and therefore the
CRA's attempt to change Ooredoo's internal processes is unnecessary
and unwarranted.
20. Accordingly, Ooredoo requests CRA change the timeline to grant approval for
safety and security work to two (2) business day, which is the timeline
internally applied to Ooredoo staff and subcontractors.
4/16
21. A regulator is entitled to change processes and procedures of a DSP. The role
of a Regulator is to move the DSPs towards efficiency, with the ultimate scope
to benefit the final customers in both quality of the services and price
reductions.
22. The CRA recognizes that the current timeline is neither consistent with the
other timelines included in the Approved RIAO nor necessarily clear, as:
22.1 the Approved RIAO defines any other timeline in business days, which ensure
the certainty of the deadlines, and
22.2 the current timeline of twenty-four (24) hours may lead to dispute between
Ooredoo and the OLO. For example, interpretation of the current timeline could
be needed if a request for work permits expires on public holiday or in non-
working hours.
23. The use of business days as unit of measure for the timeline in subject would
avoid the above issues.
24. Accordingly, the CRA would be minded to accept Ooredoo’s request and
change to two (2) business days the timeline to grant approval of the work
permits.
3.1.3 Question
Question 1 We ask for reasoned comments.
3.2 Technical Standards (Annex 8 of the RIAO)

25. This is related to the technical standards applicable to the Approved RIAO.
26. The approved RIAO limits, and includes, the Technical Standards only to those
strictly necessary for the implementation of the RIAO. The CRA has modified
some Technical Standards proposed by Ooredoo, which must be met by
Ooredoo subject to a verification of technical feasibility. Accordingly, any
Technical Standards other than those included in Annex 8 can not be imposed
on the OLO.

The CRA has not fully explained how diverting away from the Ooredoo
technical standards would be in conformity with Ooredoo's rights under
the Telecommunications law to deny interconnection and access where
Ooredoo believes there are issues around network safety and integrity.
The CRA cites the example in its correspondence with Ooredoo, of how
one more cable in a JRC12 could harm Ooredoo's network in the short
or in the long term.
However, the reality is that what the CRA has proposed is the insertion
of an extra hole in the JRC12, in addition to the maximum defined in the
standard, and not just an extra fiber. In those circumstances, can the
CRA demonstrate that the extra hole will not cause any structural
damage to the JRC12 over the next 25 years?
Ooredoo committed in our consultation response, as well as during
discussions with the CRA, that it will apply the Ooredoo technical
standards in a non-discriminatory manner. Therefore the need for the
CRA to intervene and force activities in violation of the Ooredoo
technical standards would appear to be unwarranted.
If the CRA seeks to impose any condition which deviates from the
Ooredoo technical standards, then the CRA must be held accountable if
damage does occur. This liability must continue for the long-term.
5/16
The CRA is also denying Ooredoo's rights to enforce its technical
standards. Ooredoo has always claimed that Annex 8 includes only the
main guidelines, and this has been accepted by CRA (See Annex 8, 1.1
(b) in the RIAO version published by CRA) and the detailed standards
are contained in the CD provided to all contractors in Qatar to abide by
without any discrimination.
Ooredoo had suggested, if the CRA desires, that Ooredoo can simply
include the details that are within the CD as part of Annex 8 and be
provided to a potential OLO at the beginning of negotiations. Whilst that
would make the RIAO more bulky, it would resolve the primary concern
of the CRA that the OLO may not have full sight of the technical
standards upon contract execution.
28. Accordingly, Ooredoo requests CRA to replace the current Annex 8 by a
general statement that the OLO and Ooredoo shall negotiate the Technical
current technical standards of Ooredoo would form the base line.

29. A Regulator can change Technical Standards, which are often characterized by
a degree of discretion, which may be to the OLO’s disadvantage. The
intervention of the Regulator is justified to avoid this.
30. The Technical Standards of the Approved RIAO are aimed to facilitate the
access to Ooredoo’s Ducts and to grant the safety and security of Ooredoo’s
network.
31. Therefore, the Approved RIAO introduced changes to Ooredoo’s Technical
Standards under the condition that changes must be technically feasible (cf.
Order CRA 2015/11/25, clause xv). The CRA was clear, that it is upon Ooredoo
to demonstrate that the amended Technical Standards cause structural
damages to Ooredoo’s network.
32. Nevertheless, the CRA recognizes that the Ducts of Ooredoo must be
safeguarded because of their strategic relevance not only for Ooredoo, but also
for future development of the competition on the Telecommunication Markets.
33. Accordingly, the CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo’s request to replace the
current Annex 8 by a general statement that the OLO and Ooredoo shall
negotiate the Technical Standards when concluding a final agreement based
on the RIAO, whereas the current Ooredoo technical standards of Ooredoo
would form the base line.
34. This is under the pre-condition that that Ooredoo shall:
34.1 Consistently comply with the non-discrimination principle. Therefore, if Ooredoo
is already applying or will apply the Technical Standards itself, then the
Technical Standards shall be applied for the OLO as well;
34.2 Fully disclose to the OLO the base line Technical Standards before negotiating
an Agreement based on the RIAO;
34.3 Submit the base line Technical Standards to the CRA;
34.4 Deliver the agreed Technical Standards to the CRA.
34.5 Further, Ooredoo shall not change unilaterally the Technical Standards after an
agreement based on RIAO is signed but shall apply for the mechanism of the
review of the Agreement as set in the Main Body of the Approved.
35. The CRA has received evidence that Ooredoo did not respect its own
Technical Standard, limiting the number of cables installable in the Ducts to six
cables. Conforming to section 34.1 above the Technical Standard of the six
cables is not valid anymore for the implementation of the RIAO.
For the avoidance of doubt, that Technical Standard shall not affect the
Approach to determining and allocating Available Capacity (cf. section 3.2,
Annex 1 of the Approved RIAO).
6/16
36. The CRA may intervene if Ooredoo and the OLOs did not reach an Agreement
on the Technical Standards.
3.2.3 Question
3.3 Service Level Guarantees (Annex 7 of the RIAO)

37. Service Level Guarantees set out the Service Levels that Ooredoo must meet
in the performance of its obligations in relation to the ordering and provisioning
processes and the Service Credits payable by Ooredoo to the OLO for any
failure to meet those Service Levels.
38. The CRA clarifies that only the timelines of the Service Levels are under
consultation. The current end-to-end KPIs are confirmed, along with the current
Service Credits.
3.4 Ooredoo’s request

39. Ooredoo is of the view that CRA
The CRA has failed to justify and provide quantitative evidence on why
it has sought to decrease the SLA times and increase the service credit
values from those proposed by Ooredoo. The CRA has arbitrarily used
averages of optional tasks with no justification or evidence.
It would have been more appropriate to leave the SLAs as are defined
in the IAA, as these have been discussed and agreed by experts over a
substantial period of time.
The CRA or parties could then seek amendments when sufficient data
is available to justify changes to the initial SLAs.
40. Ooredoo requests CRA to link the Service Credits to the Service Levels, but to
put them on hold “until 100 Route Access Requests (RAR) have been
managed by Ooredoo, in order to derive revised SLAs based on such
analysis”.

41. The CRA has fully explained its approach and decision on the Service Level
Guarantees (cf. clause xvi of the RIAO Order).
42. A number of alternatives were considered as the basis for service level targets
and to enable service credit payments that are needed to incentivize delivery to
agreed standards. Options include targets for every task, or a target for an end-
to-end process. Targets might be for the average of many processes or tasks.
Each option has advantages and disadvantages, including complexity versus
simplicity or on the level of incentive that each provides.
The CRA decided that each individual end-to-end process is measured against
a target time, to avoid the problem of using an average where a big delay on
one process may cause acute problems for the OLO but is compensated for by
slightly below-target delivery for all others. As each process is likely to have
options that do not happen every time, the true end to end time is not fixed.
Only some requests require an update with further information. A “worst case”
process time has every possible option and clarification, but this should be an
unrealistic target – it should be easily met as this ‘worst case’ time should be
unusual.
43. Accordingly, the CRA defined a probability for some of the tasks (where they
are avoidable) and so this provides a more typical average target time for the
end-to-end process.
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44. Service credits were set based on whether the service is delivered to the
resulting typical average target time, and credits are paid if delivered above this
time, with progressive payments if significantly above target.
45. The CRA notes that SPs have not provided relevant data on the Service
Levels, leaving the CRA without information. As consequence, the CRA had to
rely on an international benchmark to take its decision.
46. Conscious of the above, the CRA stated, “CRA may review the timelines and
the probabilities after one year from the implementation of an agreement based
on the RIAO on the basis of the reports on Quality of Services Ooredoo shall
deliver to CRA” (cf. clause xvi of the RIAO Order).
47. Therefore, Ooredoo’s request to review the matter at the light of relevant data
is consistent with the position of the CRA as expressed in the RIAO Order.
48. Accordingly to the above, CRA is minded to accept Ooredoo’s request to put
the payment of the Penalties on hold “until 100 Route Access Requests (RAR)
have been managed by Ooredoo, in order to derive revised SLAs based on
such analysis”.
49. The above acceptance is subject to the following conditions:
49.1 Ooredoo must submit robust and granular data on the actual time needed to
manage the above 100 RARs, providing evidence of sources and systems from
49.2 The submission shall be accompanied by a report of an Independent Auditor,
attesting the veracity of the above information. The Auditor shall also provide a
report with the tests performed to audit the data (i.e. checks on systems,
measures on field, etc.);
49.3 Data submitted must be reported in the RAS of Ooredoo and attributed to the
relevant products;
49.4 The RAS of Ooredoo must unequivocally show that the timeline (and hence,
the cost per unit) of the processes implemented for the OLOs are non-
discriminatory and that the same cost per unit for comparable activities is also
attributed to the Retail Arms.
50. The CRA will consult separately on the updated Service Levels. After Ooredoo
has made its submission.
51. With reference to the Orders managed by Ooredoo before the above review,
the Penalties – if any - shall be calculated retrospectively according to the
SLAs set by CRA after the above review.
3.4.2 Question
3.5 Duct Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo in existing Ducts (Annex 1 of

the RIAO)
52. The Duct Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo in existing Ducts affects the
calculation of the Available Capacity for the OLO (cf. Annex 1, section 3.2).
53. The higher is the Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo the lower is the Available
Capacity for the OLO.
54. According to the Approve RIAO, Ooredoo can reserve to itself:
55. In both the cases above, the reservation is valid for a period of two (2) years
from the date of the relevant Access Request.

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The CRA has limited the amount of space in existing ducts that can be
reserved by Ooredoo. The CRA claims that Ooredoo can only book
15% of the available space, irrespective of the need of Ooredoo for
such duct space in its own ducts. Ooredoo is not willing to provide
capacity to an OLO if that means that Ooredoo itself is denied access to
the use of its own facilities. This would imply that Ooredoo would need
to engage in new investments and bear the risks that entail such
investment.
It would be most unusual for Ooredoo to have invested significant sums
in duct infrastructure to meet its long-term needs (30 years+) and be
forced to provide access to such investment to OLOs, to the extent that
Ooredoo may not have the duct capacity to meet its own needs. Such a
situation would mean that Ooredoo would have to invest again in
additional infrastructure to meet its own needs, whilst an OLO could
utilize such duct space without the necessary investment.
57. Ooredoo is of the view that it should have the right to reserve to its self:
3.5.2 CRA’s consideration

58. According to available information Ooredoo’s Duct filling grade is, on average,
around 50%.
59. Therefore the number of Access Requests rejected for space unavailability
should be very low and hence the Changes requested by Ooredoo are of a
limited magnitude.
60. According to the above, the CRA would be minded to accept Ooredoo’s
request.
3.5.3 Question
Question 4 We ask for reasoned comments. To support CRA’s decision, respondents are
invited to provide the CRA with the percentage of Access Requests refused
because of not available capacity and other information useful to take an
informed decision of this issue.
3.6 Lease Termination (Annex 1 of the RIAO)

61. The issue is on section 4.8, Annex 1 of the RIAO, providing for the Lease
Termination process.
62. According to the Approved RIAO, where access to Ooredoo’s Network
Elements has been terminated, Ooredoo shall stop charging for such elements
upon the completion of recovery of OLO’s network elements or – in the event
that the removal is not feasible – from the date of this non-feasible decision
being made.

The CRA sought to impose discriminatory provisions on Ooredoo where
an OLO has fiber in Ooredoo's ducts, but terminates its lease of the
duct route, but for whatever reason cannot retrieve its fiber. In those
circumstances, the CRA suggested that Ooredoo does not get paid for
the fiber, even though the fiber is owned by the OLO and is utilizing
duct space.
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In this case, Ooredoo's assets are being occupied by an OLO; Ooredoo
cannot utilize itself or provide that duct space to another OLO, yet it
must continue to bear the costs of the OLO's fiber in its ducts.
64. To avoid the discrimination, Ooredoo suggests that:
64.1 Either the OLO removes the cable without harming the infrastructure, or
64.2 The OLO has to continue paying rental of the used space in the ducts.
65. In addition, Ooredoo proposes to let the parties agree on alternative options in
the access agreement, including the transfer of assets.

66. In relation to Ooredoo’s request on the OLO to continue paying rental:
66.1 The CRA would consider Ooredoo’s request if Ooredoo could demonstrate that
the same treatment applies to unused Ooredoo’s cable.
66.2 To this end, Ooredoo has to provide evidence from the Regulatory Accounting
System (RAS), that unused Ooredoo’s cables are charged with the cost of
Ducts. This means that the Ducts must be transferred in to Ooredoo products
based on drivers built including the unused cables;
66.3 If Ooredoo demonstrates the above, the CRA proposes to change section
4.8.e, Annex 1 of the Approved RIAO as follows
“Where access to Ooredoo’s Network Elements has been
terminated pursuant to this clause 4.8(a), Ooredoo shall stop
charging for such access upon completion of recovery of OLO’s
network elements or, in the event that removal is not feasible for
example due to adverse risk of damage to other elements, then
the OLO has to continue paying rental of the used space in the
ducts”;
67. In relation to Ooredoo’s request on leaving the parties agree on “alternative
options in the access agreement”, including the transfer of the Lease
Terminated:
67.1 The CRA notes that the parties have already the possibility to agree on terms
and conditions different from those included in the Approved RIAO;
67.2 However, to facilitate an agreement between Ooredoo and the OLO, the CRA
is available to amend the section 4.8, Annex 1, inserting a new clause 4.8.f
stating,
“In addition to the above arrangements, the parties may agree
on alternative options in the access agreement, including the
transfer of the Lease Terminated”.
3.6.3 Question
3.7 Access to new ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses)
68. The CRA has mandated access to all Ducts of Ooredoo, regardless when they
were built.

69. According to Ooredoo, the RIAO should not allow Access to the Ducts built
after the signature of the IAA (New Ducts), made in April 2012.
70. Ooredoo submits:
The CRA have consistently attempted to force Ooredoo into

providing access to new ducts, initially claiming it was legally the
right approach and then claiming that under the current
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framework, the CRA cannot distinguish between existing and
new ducts.
By doing so, the CRA denies rights that have been granted to
Ooredoo under the Telecommunications Law.
Ooredoo had made clear in its submission and on numerous
occasions that it has no obligations to invest for competitors, a
principle which the CRA has agreed in the consultation
response document. Yet the CRA has not explained on what
legal basis Ooredoo is obliged to offer access to new ducts. The
reference by the CRA to market dominance is subordinate to the
rights and obligations under the primary legislation that is the
Telecommunications law. There is nothing in the
Telecommunications law that obliges Ooredoo to invest on
behalf of competitors and provide access to such investment
(especially without long term commitment and assurance on
investment returns). The CRA's reference to Article 43(5)
regarding abuse of dominance does not extend to investing in
scarce resources and providing access to those scarce
resources, but only to existing assets (note Article 112 of the
Executive By-law is clear that access to telecommunications
network facilities only extends to existing facilities). Ooredoo
invests in duct infrastructure for the long term, for 25 to 30
years, in the knowledge that such investment is both costly and
time consuming.
QNBN had agreed in April 2012, through execution of the IAA
that it did not seek to jointly invest with Ooredoo in new duct
infrastructure. QNBN had de facto agreed that Ooredoo will only
invest for itself, and would therefore be granted the right to
reserve 100% of capacity within such new ducts. Therefore,
Ooredoo planned and dimensioned the network for its own
future needs.
Furthermore, the CRA itself issued a Regulation entitled Passive
Civil Telecommunications Infrastructure Access Regulation,
dated 28 June 2015, which had as a central principal the
provision of incentives for investment in new infrastructure. It
does therefore seem odd that the CRA now seeks to do the
opposite of what it had in mind with the said Regulation. This
concept and indeed the reference to the Regulation has been
included by the CRA in the RIAO it published in its website for
publication by Ooredoo, at 4.3 (b) of the main body.
Whilst discussions have taken place in respect of new ducts,
Ooredoo retains its rights to deny access to new ducts (or
infrastructure), unless it believes the risks are equally shared
and Ooredoo is fairly compensated, and assured that doing so
will not damage its ability to meet its own long-term needs for
the use of such infrastructure.
71. Therefore, Ooredoo requests for reservation of 100% of capacity thin the New
Ducts.

72. Article 43(5) of the Telecommunication Law provides to CRA the legal basis for
Ooredoo obligation to grant access to all Ducts, regardless when they have
been built. Further legal basis is provided for by the MDDD Order (cf. Notice
and Order ICTRA 2011/10/31 dated October 31, 2011) that has designated
Ooredoo DSP in the Relevant Market of the Access to the Civil Infrastructure.
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73. That Relevant Market includes all Ducts, but does not differentiate the Ducts by
the date they were built (or will be build).
74. The CRA also notes that Ooredoo references to the IAA and to QNBN is
irrelevant;
74.1 Ooredoo is obliged to offer access to the Ducts not only to QNBN but to any
SPs;
74.2 Therefore, the CRA cannot accept Ooredoo’s request because this would imply
that SPs, which were not party of the IAA, are prevented to access the New
Ducts.
75. In addition, the CRA does not find Ooredoo’s reference to the Access
Regulation valid:
(a) The Access Regulation has the scope to incentivize the investment
in new infrastructure but within a specific framework and conditions;
(b) In particular, clause 10.1 of the Access Regulation provides for co-
investment in new infrastructure;
(c) Actually, the CRA is not aware of any co-investment offer made by
Ooredoo to the OLOs consistently with the provisions of the Access
Regulation;
(d) From the date of that offer, the CRA may consider to introduce the
category of New Ducts, including the Ducts for which Ooredoo
made an offer for co-investment that was refused by the OLOs
operating in Qatar at the time of the Offer.
76. According to the above, the CRA is minded to reject Ooredoo’s request.
3.7.3 Question
3.8 Access to leased ducts (Annex 3 of the RIAO and related clauses)
77. This pertains to whether OLOs have access to ducts leased by Ooredoo.
78. The CRA has mandated access to not only to ducts owned by Ooredoo, but
also to ducts leased by Ooredoo.
79. The scope was to facilitate the access to Ducts owned by Developers but
leased and/or managed by Ooredoo that may prevent the OLO to access these
Ducts.

Whilst the wording within the RIAO may not be entirely clear, the CRA
stated in its consultation response document that access to leased
ducts only arises where Ooredoo has acquired 100% of all available
ducts from developers. It is therefore necessary for the CRA to ensure
the RIAO is clear in asserting that Ooredoo is only required to provide
access to ducts leased by Ooredoo, only where 100% of developer's
ducts are leased by Ooredoo.
81. Ooredoo asks the CRA to ensure the RIAO is clear in asserting the above.

82. It is our view that Ooredoo has to grant access to leased ducts only if the
Developer has no further available capacity to be rented to the OLO.
83. Accordingly, the access to the Ducts leased by Ooredoo is granted to the OLO:
(a) if Ooredoo has acquired 100% of all available Ducts from the
Developer, or
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(b) if the Developer could not meet the request of the OLO because
Ooredoo has leased a relevant part of the Ducts. In this case, the
rules of the RIAO apply, specifically for the calculation of the
Available Capacity.
(c) This is also the case if Ooredoo effectively manages the duct
network.
84. If the Developer can meet the request of the OLO, ducts leased by Ooredoo
shall not be accessed by the OLO.
85. The CRA is minded to change Annex 3 and related clauses according to the
above.
3.8.3 Question
4 Clarifications
86. A concern has been raised regarding the interpretation of the negotiation
process included in the Main Body – Part 1, clause 2.6. The CRA wishes to
provide clarifications on this clause to prevent an abuse of this clause that may
lead to delay in the finalization of Agreements based on Wholesale Reference
Offers approved by the CRA.
4.1 Clarification on Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One 2.6)

87. The issue is on whether a negotiation to amend the terms and conditions of the
RIAO is mandatory.
88. Clause 2.6 of the Main Body – Part One provides for (emphasis added)
Conditions amending the terms and conditions of the RIAO can be
negotiated, but are subject to approval by CRA. In case there is no
agreement between Ooredoo and the OLO within the stated
timeframes, the case shall be referred to CRA who will rule on behalf of
the parties in accordance with Article 61 of the Telecommunications
Law and with Article 47 of the Executive By-Law.
89. From a regulatory perspective, a Regulated Wholesale Reference Offer:
89.1 Sets the terms and conditions on which the DSP is obliged to enter into an
Agreement with the Access OLO;
89.2 Includes balanced and non-discriminatory terms and conditions approved by
the Regulator to facilitate the signature of Agreements for the provisions of
regulated wholesale products;
89.3 Has the scope to prevent abusive behaviors of the DSP, which may include a
delay on the finalization of an Agreement based on the Regulated Reference
Offer.
90. This Clause 2.6 does not make negotiation on terms and conditions of the
RIAO mandatory. Negotiations can occur, but shall not change the spirit and
balance of the Reference Offer.
91. According to the above, the CRA wishes to clarify that if an OLO is willing to
sign an agreement based on the terms and conditions of the RIAO, the OLO is
not obliged to enter into negotiations on the Reference Offer Terms and
Conditions.
In this case, the Access Provider (specifically for the RIAO - Ooredoo) shall
sign the Agreement and refrain to propose changes to the RIAO.
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4.2 Clarification on the availability of the RIAO
92. The issue is whether the Reference Offer needs to be published by the Access
Provider, so that an OLO can sign an Agreement based on it.
93. According to concerns raised, the CRA understands that Ooredoo is of the
view that until it publishes the Reference Offer on its website, the Reference
Offer is not available to the OLOs.
94. The regulatory framework does not make the publication of a Reference Offer
on a Service Provider’s website a precondition for it entering into force.
95. For clarification, Reference Offers enter in force and are available to the OLOs
from the time the CRA has approved them, as for any Order issued by CRA.
The Approved Wholesale Reference Offers are available on the CRA’s
webpage.
96. Service Providers are obligated to publish the Reference Offers on their
website (cf. Article 51 of the Executive By-Law). However, this is not a
prerequisite for the Reference Offers to enter in legal force and effect. Failure
to publish in the manner prescribed will place a Service Provider in breach of
applicable law and of the Order pertaining the relevant Reference Offer (in the
case of the RIAO CRA order 2015/11/25).
97. According to the above, the CRA clarifies that the RIAO and the other
Reference Offers approved by CRA are all available for the OLOs from the time
the CRA has approved them. Hence, an Access Provider is not entitled to
delay the signature of an agreement based on the RIAO arguing that the RIAO
has not been published on its website. Such an argument would be simply an
admission of non-compliance with the regulatory framework and the obligations
as per the Order CRA 2015/11/25. For the avoidance of any doubt, this applies
to Vodafone’s approved RIO.
5 Additional items for Review

98. The CRA wishes to review some stipulations of the Reference Offers in respect
of which CRA has recently received complaints and/or where specific concerns
have been raised recently.
5.1 Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One Clause 2.5)

99. This pertains to the Acceptance Notice.

100. One of the key features of a Reference Offer is to ensure clear processes and
ease of contracting. The CRA got aware of concerns in this regards,
specifically in clauses 2.5 and 2.6 and therefore wished to amend some of the
stipulations as they are potentially open-ended and not necessarily efficient.
101. Clause 2.5 of the Reference Offers shall be amended as follows (emphasis
added)
Notwithstanding the provisions in clause 3, [Access Provider] will notify
the OLO within ten (10) business days of whether it finds the
Acceptance Notice conforming or non-conforming under clause 3.1 and
provide reason if the Notice is found non-conforming.
If [Access Provider] fails to notify the OLO within the above-
mentioned ten (10) business days, the Acceptance Notice is
deemed conforming.
Except to the extent Ooredoo finds the Acceptance Notice to be non-
conforming under clause 3.1, and subject to clause 3, Ooredoo and the
OLO will, following submission by the OLO of the Acceptance Notice,
use their reasonable endeavors to complete discussions to conclude an
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Agreement within sixty (60) Days of the receipt of the Acceptance
Notice.
If the OLO wishes to enter into an Agreement based on the
[Reference Offer] approved by the CRA “as is”, OLO will send a
signed version of the Agreement to [Access Provider], which the
[Access Provider] will countersign without any undue delay.
5.1.2 Question
Question 8 What are the Respondents views and comments to the proposed amendment
of clause 2.5? What alternative would they suggest?
15/16
List of Questions
Question 1 We ask for reasoned comments. 5
Question 4 We ask for reasoned comments. To support CRA’s decision,
respondents are invited to provide the CRA with the percentage of
Access Requests refused because of not available capacity and
other information useful to take an informed decision of this issue. 9
Question 8 What are the Respondents views and comments to the proposed
amendment of clause 2.5? What alternative would they suggest? 15
*** End of Document ***
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RIAO - Order and Consultation

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Reference Infrastructure

Access Offer (RIAO) of

Consultation following Ooredoo request for

Non-Economic Terms and Conditions

2 On the Questions raised in the Consultation

2.1.1 Ooredoo’s request

2.1.3 Responses of the SPs

2.1.4 CRA’s comments and decision

2.2 Technical Standards (Annex 8 of the RIAO)

2.2.1 Ooredoo’s request

2.2.3 Responses of the SPs

2.2.4 CRA’s consideration and decision

2.3 Service Level Guarantees (Annex 7 of the RIAO)

2.3.1 Ooredoo’s request

2.3.2 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD

2.3.3 Responses of the SPs

2.3.4 CRA’s comments and decision

2.4 Duct Capacity Reserved to Ooredoo in existing Ducts (Annex 1 of

2.4.1 Ooredoo’s request

2.4.2 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD

2.4.3 Responses of the SPs

2.4.4 CRA’s consideration and decision

2.5 Lease Termination (Annex 1 of the RIAO)

2.5.1 Ooredoo’s request

2.5.2 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD

2.5.3 Responses of the SPs

2.5.4 CRA’s consideration and decision

2.6.1 Ooredoo’s request

2.6.2 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD

2.6.4 CRA’s consideration and decision

2.7.1 Ooredoo’s request

2.7.2 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD

2.7.3 Responses of the SPs

2.7.4 CRA’s consideration and decision

3 On the Clarifications discussed in the Consultation

3.1.1 CRA’s considerations as expressed in the CD

3.1.2 Responses of the SPs

3.1.3 CRA’s comments and decision

3.2 Clarification on the availability of the RIAO

3.2.2 Responses of the SPs

3.2.3 CRA’s comments and decision

3.3 Acceptance Procedures (Main Body – Part One Clause 2.5)

3.3.1 CRA’s considerations

3.3.2 Responses of the SPs

3.3.3 CRA’s comments and decision

4 General Comments submitted by the Respondents

4.1 Ooredoo Main General Comments

4.1.1 Consultation on Economic Terms and Conditions.

4.2 Qnbn Main General Comments

4.2.1 No Legal Basis for the Consultation.

4.2.2 CRA’s comments

4.2.4 CRA’s comments

4.2.5 Abuse of process

4.2.6 CRA’s comments

4.2.7 CRA's Consultation Supports Ooredoo's Anti-competitive Strategy of Delay

4.2.8 CRA’s comments

4.2.9 Qnbn Application Article 5.1(b) RIAO

4.2.10 CRA’s comments

4.3 Vodafone Main General Comments

4.3.2 CRA’s comments

4.3.4 CRA’s comments

4.3.6 CRA’s comments

*** End of Document ***

Consultation on Reference Infrastructure

* End of Document *