W16538

PATANJALI TAKES ON INDUSTRY GIANTS1

Sandeep Puri, Adrija Ajeya, and Jupanjot Singh Chugh wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do
not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names
and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.

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Copyright © 2016, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2016-08-31

Patanjali will shut the “gate” in Colgate. The birds in Nestlé’s nest (logo) will also fly away.
—Baba Ramdev2

In April 2016, Baba Ramdev, the yoga guru who started Patanjali Ayurved Limited (Patanjali), declared
that his company’s revenue would exceed that of Colgate-Palmolive (Colgate) India by the end of the year
and would overtake Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL) in India in three years. Patanjali’s revenue grew
125–150 per cent during fiscal year (FY)2015/16 to reach ₹45–50 billion3 from ₹20 billion in FY2014/15.
As a manufacturer and marketer of a wide range of products, such as flour, biscuits, noodles, spices, honey,
and toothpaste, Patanjali aimed to grow 100–125 per cent annually over the next three years. It also
considered exploring international expansion to support its high growth targets.4

Patanjali rapidly emerged as a threat to companies such as Colgate, HUL, Procter & Gamble Co., Emami
Limited (Emami), Dabur India Private Limited (Dabur), and The Himalaya Drug Company (Himalaya) in
India. These companies launched new herbal brands and rejuvenated their old ones as an investment in
brand-building, consistent with the recent industry trend of introducing high-value, premium, mass-market
products. Patanjali’s sudden success made industry observers wonder if it would rewrite Indian industry
rules or fade away into oblivion.5 Could Patanjali aggressively expand into more categories while
maintaining sustainable growth?

COMPANY BACKGROUND

Two people were closely associated with Patanjali: Ramdev and Acharya Balakrishna. Ramdev was born
Ramakrishna Yadav in a village in Haryana, India, into a humble background. Since childhood, he had
shown a strong inclination towards yoga. He pursued formal education up to the eighth standard (the eighth
grade), after which time he joined a gurukul (yogic institute) to become acquainted with different techniques
of yoga and ayurveda. Ramdev’s initial association with Balakrishna dated back to 1995, when they co-
founded the Divya Yoga Mandir (temple). Balakrishna took inspiration from ayurveda and decided to
combine it with the latest technologies, which paved the way for the establishment of Patanjali in 2006.
The company’s administration was led by Ramdev and Balakrishna. Ramdev held no stake in the company;

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Balakrishna held a 92 per cent stake; and Sarvan and Sunita Poddar, who had donated their land in the
United Kingdom to the Patanjali trust there, held the remaining 8 per cent stake. The company’s reported
revenue of more than ₹20 billion for FY2014/15 was achieved in less than a decade.6 In FY2016/17,
Patanjali was planning to start concentrating on e-commerce and exports. It was planning to target countries
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada for exports.7

Patanjali Food Park

Under the Mega Food Park Scheme of the Ministry of Food-Processing Industries of the Government of
India, Patanjali formed a Food and Herbal Park in Haridwar in 2010. The park aimed to propel the rural
economy in accordance with the ministry’s Vision 2015 plan. The plan aimed to increase the processing of
perishable items in the country to 20 per cent by 2015. The purpose of this project was to help build a
sustainable farm-to-fork value chain for all agricultural products.

MARKETING MIX

Patanjali’s marketing strategies disregarded traditional norms. Most companies conducted market research
before launching new products, whereas Patanjali launched products in multiple categories with no external
market research. The company followed an umbrella branding strategy, with Patanjali as the umbrella brand
for all sub-brands.8

Product Portfolio

Patanjali’s product portfolio started with an aloe vera gel that was promoted in Ramdev’s yoga camps.
Eventually, the product line grew. Patanjali had more than 400 stock keeping units. Patanjali started
operating in four major categories—ayurvedic health products, food products, skin-care and home-care
products, and juices.9 Patanjali’s largest-selling product was cow’s ghee (clarified butter), followed by Dant
Kanti toothpaste and Kesh Kanti shampoo (see Exhibit 1). Because of its economical pricing, Patanjali
captured market share from fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) giants operating in various categories,
primarily honey, ghee, and ayurvedic medicines. Patanjali also introduced premium personal-care products
under the Soundarya label to directly compete with companies such as Maybelline LLC and L’Oréal S.A.10

Pricing

Patanjali priced its products competitively at 15–20 per cent less than other industry leaders (see Exhibit
2). This low-pricing strategy created demand for Patanjali products in the early stages and provided an edge
over competitors. The company sourced raw materials directly from farmers, and hence, eliminated
intermediaries and their margins, which ensured better profitability and lower costs for consumers. The
company used mass customization to create economies of scale for low-priced Patanjali products.11

Place

Rather than using traditional distribution networks, Patanjali chose the franchise model to sell its products.
Patanjali outlets were classified as Patanjali Chikitsalaya (dispensaries), Patanjali Arogya Kendra (health
centres), and Swadesi Kendra (centres that sold only Indian-made goods). Patanjali Chikitsalaya and
Patanjali Arogya Kendra were ayurveda clinics where ayurvedic doctors prescribed ayurvedic medicines

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to patients. By the end of 2015, Patanjali had approximately 5,000 franchise stores, and retailers reported
an average daily turnover of ₹25,000 with a profit margin of 15–20 per cent.12 Patanjali products were
available in 17,000 retail stores, on the Patanjali website, and on several online platforms such as ZopNow
and BigBasket.13

Patanjali’s website contained information about existing stores and downloadable application forms for
opening Patanjali mega stores. Mega stores were targeted for A-class cities, required an investment of
approximately ₹5–6 million, and a minimum of 279–465 square metres of shop space. The first Patanjali
mega store opened in Nagpur in October 2015. In comparison, dispensaries and health centres only required
an investment of approximately ₹0.6–1.2 million and shop space of 32.5–93 square metres.

Promotion

At the end of FY2014/15, Patanjali spent very little on advertising and sales promotion in comparison to
other FMCG companies that were spending 12–15 per cent of sales. When it came to advertising and
promotions, Patanjali initially relied heavily on Ramdev’s endorsement and promotions at his yoga camps.
Although word of mouth played a large role in the popularity of Patanjali products, in 2015, the company
also started investing heavily in mass media marketing such as television commercials. According to a
report by the Broadcasting Audience Research Council, in November 21–25, 2015, Patanjali surpassed Fair
and Lovely and Cadbury as the brand with the most broadcasted television commercial.14

Patanjali’s content marketing was one of its greatest strengths. It focused on educating people about the
products and creating willing consumers. This, along with quality products and an effective distribution
network, helped Patanjali gain traction in the market. Ramdev kept genuine, content-based marketing as
the core of Patanjali’s promotion strategy.15

Patanjali entered into a partnership with Future Retail Group to increase brand visibility across a broad
range of consumers.16 To cater to the ever-growing market and combat competition, in December 2015,
Patanjali allocated ₹3 billion to advertising while working with reputed creative agencies such as DDB
Mudra and McCann. Patanjali also released a set of television commercials featuring renowned wrestler
Sushil Kumar and veteran actress Hema Malini in the same year.17

Packaging

Patanjali collaborated with TetraPak International S.A. to create contemporary product packaging. Many
of the products had packaging designs similar to the market leader of the category being targeted.

MAJOR PLAYERS IN THE FMCG MARKET

In February 2016, Patanjali’s share of the toothpaste market stood at 4.5 per cent. It was expected to grow
further and cut into Colgate’s earnings by 4–10 per cent by 2019.18 Patanjali faced competition from not
only established FMCG players but also newer herbal/ayurveda companies. Some of Patanjali’s major
competitors included HUL, Colgate, Dabur, Emami, Himalaya, and Khadi Gram Udyog.

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HUL

As of March 2015, Unilever, a Anglo-Dutch Company, owned HUL with a 67 per cent stake. The revenue
it recorded in FY2014/15 was ₹301.7 billion. The product portfolio of HUL included categories such as
food and beverages, cleaning agents, personal care items, and water purifiers. It covered as many as 20
categories, and over 700 million Indian consumers used its products. Three of its brands were featured in
the top five of The Economic Times Brand Equity most trusted brands in 2013.19

In order to combat Patanjali’s pure ayurvedic line of products, HUL planned to revive Lever Ayush, its
forgotten line of ayurvedic products. HUL described this range of products as holistic medicines and
remedies using natural and ayurvedic ingredients to treat skin, hair, and respiratory issues.20 In December
2015, HUL also acquired Indulekha, a brand formerly owned by Mosons Group, to align with its natural
and therapeutic positioning.21

Colgate

An American multinational company headquartered in New York, Colgate introduced its first toothpaste in
1873 and had since then established itself as a leading player in the tooth-care segment alongside Procter
& Gamble Co. The company recorded revenue of ₹40.15 billion in FY2014/15.22

Colgate’s volume growth was affected by Patanjali’s Dant Kaanti toothpaste. In January 2016, Colgate
reported its worst sales growth in 44 quarters. India Infoline predicted that by 2020, several multinationals
including Colgate would lose as much as 3–8 per cent market share to Patanjali. In response, Colgate started
aggressively investing in Colgate Active Salt-Neem toothpaste, which operated in the herbal space. It also
planned to introduce more products in the same space.23

Dabur

Dabur was recognized as the world’s largest ayurvedic and natural health-care company. Its product
portfolio consisted of five of its flagship brands namely Dabur, Vatika, Hajmola, Real, and Fem. It recorded
a profit of ₹10.65 billion in FY2014/15.24

Dabur’s offerings were quite similar to Patanjali’s. Two of its products, Dabur Honey and Chyawanprash,
were most affected by the introduction of Patanjali’s products. Dabur, too, planned to revamp its portfolio
by adding new categories and modernizing its ayurvedic product line; Dabur planned to launch products in
the women’s health-care and baby-care segments. Dabur also planned to add flavours to its existing range
of tonics, primarily Ashokarishta. Dabur’s core strategy was to appeal to modern consumers.25

Emami

Emami operated in hair-care, skin-care and ayurvedic health-care segments. Its brand, Navratna Oil, was
the leading player in the cooling-oil segment. It recorded revenue of ₹22.17 billion in FY2014/15.26
Emami’s director, Harsh Agarwal, planned to make acquisitions to strengthen his company’s position in
the herbal category. Emami acquired the brand Kesh King in 2014. It planned to look for more brands in
the herbal space—some of them located in South India.27

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Himalaya

Himalaya was one of the leading ayurvedic health-care companies in India. It recorded sales of around
₹14.5 billion in FY2014/15. One of its flagship products, Neem face wash was a market leader in the face
wash segment. The company competed in the personal-care and health-care spaces. Himalaya launched a
line of wellness products ranging from anti-hair-loss creams to pills for sporting fitness; however, the new
product range failed to gain traction. Despite this, Himalaya grew at a rate of 25 per cent across categories
such as face wash, toothpaste, and shampoo.28

Khadi Gram Udyog

Gramudyog Ashram manufactured hand-woven fabrics and herbal personal-care products. There were
initial talks of Patanjali taking over the research and development as well as marketing of Khadi Gram
Udyog products. Ramdev aimed to integrate Khadi Gram Udyog products with those of Patanjali; however,
this bid failed as the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Ministry rejected the proposal.

Companies such as Godrej Consumer Goods also entered the herbal products segment and launched
products such as neem mosquito coil, natural soaps, and coconut oil crème hair colour. In addition to the
market share challenges posed by Patanjali products, many FMCG leaders also lost top-level executives to
Patanjali.29

THE INDIAN FMCG CONSUMER

Increasing urbanization, disposable income, economic growth, and aspirations had changed the Indian
consumer spectrum, with educated young professionals leading the shift towards consumer sophistication.
The vast rural population was also becoming more sophisticated. With market liberalization, increasing
consumerism, and more foreign stakeholders bringing their global portfolio to Indian markets, consumers
rapidly evolved and became more demanding.30

Indian consumers were among the most confident in the world, with urban consumers accounting for the
majority of the FMCG market.31 Although the rural market was small, it was expected to lead growth in the
industry, especially from the emerging hinterlands of Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, and
Jharkhand. These states were likely to act as buffers against declining sales, and companies competed for
their business.32

Urban consumers seemed to prefer buying FMCG products from dispensaries rather than from local grocery
stores. FMCG value growth was 12 per cent in drugstores but only 7–9 per cent in other store types. Also,
Indian consumers became more aware of prices than they were in the past, and they seemed to be more
loyal to brands that lowered prices during hard times. In 2013, when Indian consumers made sacrifices to
balance budgets during inflation, brands that were able to absorb price increases grew, whereas companies
that steeply increased product prices saw negative growth.

Because Indian consumers sought to improve their lifestyle, health, and overall wellness, foods such as
olive oils, dairy products, and sugar substitutes were among the fastest growing categories. In the organized
FMCG market, India had among the lowest per-capita consumption in the world, which indicated huge
potential for growth.

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ROADBLOCKS

In March 2016, the Food Safety and Drug Administration Department of Lucknow found a package of
Patanjali aawla murabba (gooseberry fruit preserves) with the manufacturing date listed as October 20,
2016, and the expiry date as October 19, 2017.33

The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India issued a notice to Patanjali on atta noodles that it
launched without required approvals in November 2015. The company contended that it had the necessary
approvals as a part of the license it obtained to manufacture pasta.34

Patanjali was involved in another controversy when a Tamil Nadu-based Muslim organization—Tamil
Nadu Thowheed Muslim Jamat—issued a fatwa against Patanjali for having cow’s urine as a major
ingredient in cosmetics, medicines, and food products, which was considered wrong in Islam.35 In response
to this, Balakrishna clarified that out of 300 product offerings, only five contained cow’s urine, and the
ingredient was clearly listed on the packaging.36

The rise of other ayurvedic competitors such as Sri Ravishankar’s Sri Ayurveda was a potential threat to
Patanjali’s growth. Ravishankar had 370 million followers in March 2016, which was five times that of
Ramdev. Moreover, the prospect of an FMCG empire had also attracted other spiritual gurus such as
Sadhguru Jaggi Vasudev, Guru Ram Rahim, and Aurobindo Ashram to the Ayurveda space.37

In 2016, Patanjali’s marketing campaign started focusing on the fact that their products were Indian-made.
It approached retailers with the message that Patanjali products aligned with Mahatma Gandhi’s dream of
promoting Indian-made goods. Patanjali’s advertisements also carried the same message; however, various
analysts and companies described this strategy as short-sighted because many competitors were Indian
companies that manufactured their products in India.

Patanjali was criticized for appearing to be hypocritical. Ramdev ran a campaign against junk food, asking
his followers to shun processed food in favour of fresh fruits and vegetables. However, Patanjali introduced
its own line of junk food, such as noodles and packaged fruit juices, soon after the campaign.38

Many companies would normally pay retailers for prime space to increase the visibility of their products in
the retail stores. Analysts questioned Patanjali’s distribution strategy, which focused on low margins and
high volume, as opposed to acquiring prime space in stores.39

THE WAY FORWARD

Patanjali planned to become the biggest packaged consumer goods company in India by 2020. Its aim was
to reach out to consumers by expanding through general and modern trade. It was expected to continue
directly attacking established FMCG giants, which could explain its partnership with Future Retail.

In FY2016/17, Patanjali planned to start concentrating on exports. Patanjali Ayurveda targeted established
multinationals. The problems encountered with the Food Safety and Drug Administration Department of
Lucknow and the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India had the potential to impact Patanjali’s brand
image. Under these circumstances, would it be possible for Patanjali to sustain its growth to meet its
audacious goals? Or would Patanjali’s aggressive entry into more categories likely lead to unsustainable
growth?

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EXHIBIT 1: SELECTED FINANCIALS FOR PATANJALI (₹ BILLION)

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Net Revenue 3.17 4.50 8.41 11.84 20.00
Operating Profit 1.54 0.75 0.55 0.68 3.00
Source: Manu Balachandran, “Yoga Guru Ramdev’s Patanjali Is in a Four-Front Battle with India’s Consumer Goods Giants,”
Quartz India, February 2, 2016, accessed February 8, 2016, http://qz.com/606630/how-baba-ramdevs-patanjali-is-winning-a-
big-battle-against-global-fmcg-companies-in-india/.

EXHIBIT 2: PATANJALI’S PRODUCT PORTFOLIO AND THE CORRESPONDING MARKET SHARE

Product Market-Share (%)

Ghee (Clarified Butter) 33
Honey 35
Ayurvedic Medicines 35
Oral Care 4-5
Chocolates 4
Detergents 4
Noodles 4

Source: India Equity Research, “Patanjali Ayurved Visit Note Report,” Money Control, October 1, 2015, accessed February
15, 2016, www.moneycontrol.com/currency/reports/patanjali-ayurved-visit-note-report-oct-01-2015-edelweiss-securities-
94869.html

EXHIBIT 3: PRICE DIFFERENCE (PATANJALI VERSUS COMPETITOR’S PRODUCTS)

Price
Patanjali Competitor
Difference (₹)
Patanjali Dabur India Private Limited
Price Price
Product Product
(₹) (₹)
Special Chyawanprash 115 Dabur Chyawanprash 160 45
Pineapple Juice 85 Dabur Real Juice 99 14
Patanjali Honey 135 Dabur Honey 199 64
Patanjali Hindustan Unilever Limited
Saundarya Face Wash 60 Pears Face Wash 80 20
Detergent Powder Popular 13 Rin Detergent 19 6
Super Dish Wash Bar 10 Vim Dish Wash Bar 15 5
Dant Kanti Toothpaste 68 Pepsodent Germi Check 84 16
Patanjali Procter & Gamble Co.
Patanjali Detergent Powder with Herbs 48 Tide Detergent Powder 85 37
Ariel Detergent 187 139
Head and Shoulders Anti-Dandruff
Kesh Kanti Anti-Dandruff Shampoo 110 159 49
Shampoo
Patanjali Himalaya Herbals
Patanjali Saundarya Face Wash Himalaya Neem Face Wash
60 70 10
(60 ml) (50 ml)
Patanjali Colgate-Palmolive
Dant Kanti Toothpaste 35 Colgate Strong Teeth Toothpaste 44 9
Patanjali Emami
Patanjali Boro Safe (50ml) 40 Emami Boro Plus(80 ml) 90 50
Patanjali Kesh Kanti Hair Oil 130 Emami Kesh King Hair Oil 136 6

Note: ml = millilitres.
Source: Compiled by authors from market visits (Prices are for the packs of same size, if not indicated).

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ENDNOTES
1
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives
presented in this case are not necessarily those of Patanjali or any of its employees.
2
Agencies, Patanjali Will Shut the Gate in Colgate, Make Nestle's Bird Disappear: Baba Ramdev, The Economic Times,
April 28, 2016, accessed April 29, 2016, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/cons-products/fmcg/patanjali-will-
shut-the-gate-in-colgate-make-nestles-bird-disappear-baba-ramdev/articleshow/52024817.cms.
3
₹ = INR = Indian rupee; all currency amounts are in ₹ unless otherwise specified; US$1 = ₹66.35 on April 1, 2016.
4
Sapna Agarwal, “Patanjali Beats Sector Slump, Revenue More than Doubles: Religare Report,” Live Mint, April 13, 2016,
accessed April 15, 2016, www.livemint.com/Companies/pbMiVOlhFoLTcKaH4L92XP/Patanjali-beats-sector-slump-revenue-
more-than-doubles-Rel.html.
5
Kiran Kabtta Somvanshi, “Patanjali’s Success May Lead to a FMCG Rejig,” The Economic Times, April 16, 2016, accessed
April 17, 2016, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/patanjalis-success-may-lead-to-a-fmcg-
rejig/articleshow/51803252.cms.
6
Simplus Information Services, “10 Stunning Facts about Baba Ramdev’s Patanjali Ayurveda,” Yahoo Finance, August 28,
2015, accessed February 15, 2016, https://in.finance.yahoo.com/news/10-stunning-facts-baba-ramdev-053501185.html;
“About,” Patanjali Ayurved Limited, accessed June 17, 2016, www.patanjaliayurved.org/about.html; Anirvan Ghosh, “Baba
Ramdev’s Business Empire Soars, With His Own Rising Profile,” The Huffington Post, January 13, 2015, accessed February
28, 2016, www.huffingtonpost.in/2015/01/13/ramdev-consumer-products-_n_6460760.html.
7
PTI, “Patanjali to Invest Rs 1,000 Crore on Expansion: Baba Ramdev,” November 29, 2015, accessed March 1, 2016,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/cons-products/fmcg/patanjali-to-invest-rs-1000-crore-on-expansion-baba-
ramdev/articleshow/49968039.cms?prtpage=1.
8
Namrata Singh and Partha Sinha, “The Man Who Owns 94% of Patanjali Ayurved,” The Times of India, April 30, 2016,
accessed April 30, 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/The-man-who-owns-94-of-Patanjali-
Ayurved/articleshow/52047722.cms?.
9
Ibid.
10
John Sarkar, “Patanjali to Open Stores in Premium Segments to Take On Big Brands,” The Times of India, April 18, 2016,
accessed May 2, 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Patanjali-to-open-stores-in-premium-
segments-to-take-on-big-brands/articleshow/51871163.cms.
11
Suman Layak and Rajiv Singh, “Desi Bustle V/s MNC Muscle: How Ramdev’s Patanjali Is Setting Trend for HUL,” Brand
Equity, November 23, 2015, accessed February 27, 2016, http://brandequity.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/business-
of-brands/desi-bustle-v/s-mnc-muscle-how-ramdevs-patanjali-is-setting-trend-for-hul/49881600; Mrinalini Pandey, “Mass
Customization: The Success Story of Baba Ramdev,” IndianMBA.Com, June 8, 2008, accessed February 15, 2016,
www.indianmba.com/Faculty_Column/FC851/fc851.html.
12
Mrinalini Pandey, op. cit.
13
“Home Page,” Patanjali Ayurved Limited, accessed February 29, 2016, http://patanjaliayurved.net/; Manu Balachandran,
“Yoga Guru Ramdev’s Patanjali Is in a Four-Front Battle With India’s Consumer Goods Giants,” Quartz India, February 2,
2016, accessed March 2, 2016, http://qz.com/606630/how-baba-ramdevs-patanjali-is-winning-a-big-battle-against-global-
fmcg-companies-in-india/.
14
Viveat Susan Pinto, “Patanjali Noodles Riding on Ramdev’s Marketing,” Business Standard, September 5, 2015,
accessed January 17, 2016, www.business-standard.com/article/companies/patanjali-noodles-riding-on-ramdev-s-
marketing-115090500022_1.html; Sounak Mitra and Vidhi Choudhary, “Ramdev’s Patanjali Eyes a Bigger Bite of Consumer
Goods Pie with Ad Blitz,” Live Mint, December 3, 2015, accessed February 26, 2016,
www.livemint.com/Consumer/oKVPvRa7eiYtmk5blgMw7K/Ramdevs-Patanjali-eyes-a-bigger-bite-of-consumer-goods-
pie.html; Vasudha Venugopal, “Baba Ramdev's Patanjali Ayurved Ltd Becomes India's Biggest FMCG Advertiser this Week;
Outnumbers Cadbury, Parle,” The Economic Times, February 6, 2016, accessed February 25, 2016,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-02-06/news/70397663_1_news-channels-broadcast-audience-research-
council-baba-ramdev.
15
“Baba Ramdev, Patanjali and the Art of Content Marketing,” September 7, 2015, accessed February 15, 2016,
http://withstartups.com/baba-ramdev-patanjali-art-content-marketing/.
16
Varun Jain, “Patanjali Enters Big Retail with Future Group Tie-Up,” The Economic Times, October 10, 2015, accessed
March 1, 2016, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/cons-products/fmcg/patanjali-enters-big-retail-with-future-
group-tie-up/articleshow/49285002.cms.
17
Madhuwanti Saha, “Patanjali Ayurved's Bitter Pill for MNC's,” Exchange 4 Media, February 9, 2016, accessed March 1,
2016, www.exchange4media.com/advertising/patanjali-ayurveds-bitter-pill-for-mncs_63288.html.
18
Partha Sinha, “Patanjali Eats into Colgate’s Toothpaste Market Share,” The Times of India, January 26, 2016, accessed
March 2, 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Patanjali-eats-into-Colgates-toothpaste-market-
share/articleshow/50764540.cms.
19
Harish Manwani, “HUL at 75: Earning the Love and Respect of India,” April 4, 2008, accessed March 2, 2016,
www.hul.co.in/Images/agm_speech_2008_hul-at-75-earning-the-love-and-respect-of-india_tcm1255-434438_en.pdf; “HUL
Brands Top Brand Equity’s 2013 Most Trusted Brands Survey,” Hindustan Unilever Limited, December 18, 2013, accessed
March 2, 2016, www.hul.co.in/news/news-and-features/2013/hul-brands-top-brand-equitys-2013-most-trusted-brands-
survey.html.

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20
“Lever Ayush Therapy,” Hindustan Unilever Limited, accessed February 28, 2016, www.hul.co.in/brands/our-brands/lever-
ayush-therapy.html.
21
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