(75)

CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE INC., EDUARDO R. JABLA, CENTENNIAL MARITIME SERVICES

& M/T ACUSHNET, Petitioners
vs.
EMERITO E. SALES, Respondent

DOCTRINE

Further, if, as CTI argues, Sales' refusal for surgery was a breach of duty, then CTI should have
immediately stopped the medical treatment of Sales. From the facts, Sales refused to undergo
surgery as early as July 2006. Yet, CTI continued observing and treating Sales conservatively
through physical rehabilitation. CTI had several opportunities to notify Sales, during his treatment
and physical therapy sessions, that not resorting to surgery is a breach and would forfeit his
disability benefits. Further, if Sales had indeed abandoned treatment, CTI would not have issued a
disability assessment in September 2006 because Sales had not completed his treatment. The
foregoing factual incidents do not convince this Court that CTI considered Sales to have breached
his duty.

The special clauses on CBAs must prevail over the standard terms and benefits formulated by the
POEA-SEC.   The seafarer will always have the minimum rights as per the POEA-SEC, but to the
18

extent a CBA gives better benefits, these terms will override the POEA-SEC terms. This is so
because a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions
must be endeavored in favor of the laborer. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the
State to give maximum aid and full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.

Facts:

Respondent Sales work as a Pumpman on board M/V Acushnet for nine (9) months under
Centennial Transmarine, Inc. (CTI), a local manning agency. In April 2006, while transferring the
portable pump to the main deck, he slipped and hit the floor. Although in pain from the fall, Sales
ignored it and continued with his work, which included carrying heavy objects. However, the pain on
his lower back persisted. On May 5, 2006, Sales reported that he was suffering from lower back
pain. Upon examination, Sales was initially diagnosed to be suffering from "acute traumatic lumbago
with ischialgia right leg",   and was recommended for medical repatriation to the Philippines for
5

further evaluation and medical treatment.

After his repatriation, Sales was referred to CTI's company-designated physician and underwent
magnetic resonance imaging test (MRI) showed that he was suffering from "degenerative changes of
the lumbar spine and was recommended for surgery. He refused, instead began his "conservative"
treatment with the company-designated physician.

During his treatment, Sales sought for a second opinion of his medical condition and Sales was
assessed with disability grading "8", describing it as "partial permanent disability." Sales' physician
advised that "[h]e requires constant physical therapy/rehabilitation and may require surgery in the
future if his pain symptoms [worsen]. He is totally UNFIT TO WORK as a Seaman."
the company-designated physician advised Sales to undergo surgery, which is a more "definitive
treatment", but Sales, again, refused. The company-designated physician issued Sales' disability
assessment with "GRADE 11."

Sales filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) claiming entitlement
to permanent and total disability benefits, attorney's fees, and moral and exemplary damages. Sales
argues that he remained unfit for sea duty for more than 120 days. He lost his capacity to obtain
employment as seaman; that he was not able to get any employment due to his conditions. Sales
also claims that he should be compensated for disability benefits under the provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) because he sustained his injuries from an accident on board
the vessel.

Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Sales. NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the LA.
NLRC held that there was no evidence of Sales' accident and that the latter failed to elaborate the
incidents of the accident that caused his medical injury.

ISSUE

Whether or not the injury of Sales is compensable

RULING

YES. t is undisputed that Sales has been in the employ of CTI since February 2000. Sales' condition
could have developed over the years he was working as seaman for CTI. Sales' job as pumpman
entailed manual labor, and his lower back pain could have manifested only during his tour of duty in
May 2006. While there may be no records on Sales' accident, facts concerning the nature of his
work, the longevity of his service with CTI and his persistent back pains on board the vessel and
subsequent repatriation due to such back pain, sufficiently establish that his condition is attributable
to his work and, as such, entitles him to compensation. The company-designated physician also
found Sales' condition to be work-related.

Further, if, as CTI argues, Sales' refusal for surgery was a breach of duty, then CTI should have
immediately stopped the medical treatment of Sales. From the facts, Sales refused to undergo
surgery as early as July 2006. Yet, CTI continued observing and treating Sales conservatively
through physical rehabilitation. CTI had several opportunities to notify Sales, during his treatment
and physical therapy sessions, that not resorting to surgery is a breach and would forfeit his
disability benefits. Further, if Sales had indeed abandoned treatment, CTI would not have issued a
disability assessment in September 2006 because Sales had not completed his treatment. The
foregoing factual incidents do not convince this Court that CTI considered Sales to have breached
his duty.

As discussed and following the provisions of the POEA-SEC,   the disability shall not be measured
17

or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which
sickness allowance is paid. The disability gradings as provided in the POEA-SEC must prevail.

Sales' 1/3rd loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk was rooted from a work-related injury. Hence,
the provisions of the CBA will apply. This Court cannot subscribe to CTI's position that only
permanent disabilities resulting from an accident will be covered by the CBA. The special clauses on
CBAs must prevail over the standard terms and benefits formulated by the POEA-SEC.   The18

seafarer will always have the minimum rights as per the POEA-SEC, but to the extent a CBA gives
better benefits, these terms will override the POEA-SEC terms. This is so because a contract of
labor is so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavored in
favor of the laborer. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid
and full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
(76)

MECO MANNING & CREWING SERVICES, INC. and CAPT. IGMEDIO G. SORRERA, Petitioners
vs.
CONSTANTINO R. CUYOS, Respondent

DOCTRINE:

It is settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just and valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal
was illegal.   For this purpose, the employer must present substantial evidence to prove the legality
19

of an employee's dismissal.   "Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence

20

which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."

Section 17(D) of the POEA-SEC clearly shows that it is only the second notice or the notice of
dismissal which may be dispensed with under exceptional circumstances - the first written notice
could never be dispensed with. The seafarer-employee should always be furnished with the written
notice informing him of the charges against him and the date, time, and place of the formal
investigation.

FACTS:

On March 10, 2008, Cuyos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and claims for salaries and other
benefits for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, damages, and attorney's fees against
International Crew Services, Ltd. (ICS). Constantino alleged that on December 11, 2007, MECO, for
and on behalf of its principal, ICS, hired him as the Second Marine Engineer of the vessel "M/V
Crown Princess." The employment was for a period of eight months commencing on December 10,
2007. Constantino claimed that the ship's Chief Engineer, Francisco G. Vera, Jr. (Vera), mistreated
him during his short stay on board the "M/V Crown Princess." He recounted that on December 13,
2007, Vera started shouting at him whenever he would ask questions concerning the engine
operations of the vessel; and that on January 9, 2008, he was attending to the freshwater generator
when, all of a sudden, Vera slapped his hand and kept on shouting at him allegedly because he was
not doing his work properly. In February, he was relived as challenged Vera to a fight and went back
to Manila. Vera, however claimed that it was very Vera who was very rude to him.

MECO Manning claimed that Constantino's dismissal was valid. Petitioners claimed that
Constantino's dismissal was necessitated by reason of his unsatisfactory performance evaluation,
violation of his contract of employment as he violated the provisions on insubordination and
inefficiency, his angry and provocative utterances and his attempt to physically assault his superior.
Thus, Constantino's dismissal was for a just cause and was resorted to in order to protect and
maintain the peace of the vessel and the safety of its crew. In support of their allegations is a letter
signed by Vera and attested by two witnesses.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. The
NLRC concurred with the Labor Arbiter's observation that Constantino committed serious
misconduct and willful disobedience when he disobeyed the lawful orders of his superior officer,
when he challenged his superior officer to a fistfight, and when he attempted to assault his superior
officer. CA reversed finding that the petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to prove that
Constantino's dismissal was made for a valid and justifiable cause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Constantino Cuyos was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

YES. Petitioners failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that Constantino's dismissal was grounded
on just and valid causes. It is settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily
mean that the dismissal was illegal.   For this purpose, the employer must present substantial
19

evidence to prove the legality of an employee's dismissal.   "Substantial evidence is defined as such
20

amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion."

In particular, while the facsimile messages and decklog extract mentioned the incidents on January
2, 2008, and January 17, 2008, no reference was made to Constatino's alleged threats and attempts
to harm Vera on January 5, 2008. This is significant because if the facsimile messages and the
decklog extract indeed contain the true reproduction of the relevant entries in the ship's logbook
regarding Constantino's offenses, which is what the petitioners would want the Court to believe, then
it only follows that the reason the January 5, 2008 incident was not mentioned in the decklog extract,
is because no entry regarding such incident exists in the ship's logbook. The lack of any entry
relating to the January 5, 2008 incident consequently creates doubt that the January 6, 2008 letter-
report was merely executed to manufacture or supply events which did not occur.

In fine, the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioners to establish the validity of the dismissal
are either unreliable or plainly insufficient to prove that Constantino is guilty of insubordination and
serious misconduct. 

In this case, the petitioners admit that they did not furnish Constantino with any written notice prior to
his dismissal and that this is justified under Section 17(D) of the POEA-SEC. However, Section
17(D) is inapplicable to this case because the alleged offenses by Constantino have not been
established by substantial evidence. Assuming for the sake of argument that the aforesaid
infractions have been duly shown, Section 17(D) would still be inapplicable because Capt. Kolidas
failed to conduct the required investigation under Section 17(8). Finally, it is clear from Section 17
that it is only the second notice or the notice of dismissal which may be dispensed with under
exceptional circumstances - the first written notice could never be dispensed with. The seafarer-
employee should always be furnished with the written notice informing him of the charges against
him and the date, time, and place of the formal investigation. Very clearly, the petitioners failed to
afford Constantino with procedural due process prior to his termination.
(77)

DANILO L. PACIO, PETITIONER, v. DOHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC.,

DOHLE (IOM) LIMITED, AND/OR MANOLO T. GACUTAN, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE:

The petitioner's refusal to cooperate, his decision not to mention to the respondents
that he was questioning the latter's medical findings and seeking recourse with his own
physician, and his belated filing of the complaint which was actuated almost a full year
after the medical checkup with the respondents prompt the Court to find that there is a
palpable lack of good faith in the petitioner's handling of the claim, especially as the
same contravenes the POEA SEC.

While the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed to be work-
related, the seafarer or the claimant must still show a reasonable connection between
the nature of work on board the vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated. Thus,
the burden is placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.

FACTS:
Dohle-Philman Manning Agency hired Danilo L. Pacio (petitioner) to work as an Able
Seaman. Tthe petitioner underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and
it was disclosed that he had been suffering from hypertension. Despite this revelation,
he was certified fit for sea duty, though he was made to sign an undertaking where he
acknowledged that he was given appropriate advice and medication for his pre-existing
hypertension. The petitioner was also asked to give the following declarations: (1) That
he shall religiously take his medications as advised and diligently follow the doctor's
advice; failure to do so will warrant the termination of his contract subject to the
discretion of the agency/principal/employer; and (2) that in the event of a disabling
sickness resulting from his hypertension, said ailment shall be deemed preexisting and
non-compensable; consequently, no claim can be made against the company/employer.

Five months later after his departure and commencement of employment, the petitioner
complained of high blood pressure and dizziness, prompting his referral to a medical
facility in Romania.8 The Romanian physicians declared him unfit for sea duties and
recommended his repatriation. As a result, he was repatriated and underwent medical
evaluation. The evaluation stated that petitioner’s condition was not work-related.

After almost a year, petitioner expressed his desire to be hired again as "he feels strong
enough to work." He stressed that if the respondents would deny his reemployment, he
should be compensated for the long years of service he had rendered for them. The
respondents denied these claims for alleged lack of basis.

Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision against the respondents which the NLRC
affirmed. The CA reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

RULING:

NO. The petitioner failed to comply with the outlined, statutory process for a valid
disability claim, despite the respondents' efforts to adhere to the same. The records
show that the company-designated physician was in fact able to give an
assessment39 of the petitioner's illness within the allotted time, contrary to the
petitioner's allegations that the respondents did not give a full report as to his
condition. The records reveal that the petitioner had refused to go back to the
company-designated physician for further tests and instead spent almost one year out
of the respondents' sights before filing the complaint. After declaring a finding that the
petitioner was unfit for duty for approximately four months, the medical report stated
that the petitioner was asked to come back on January 10, 2013 for re-evaluation,
however, the respondents did not hear from him afterwards.

The petitioner's refusal to cooperate, his decision not to mention to the respondents
that he was questioning the latter's medical findings and seeking recourse with his own
physician, and his belated filing of the complaint which was actuated almost a full year
after the medical checkup with the respondents prompt the Court to find that there is a
palpable lack of good faith in the petitioner's handling of the claim, especially as the
same contravenes the POEA SEC.

Crucially, the duty to secure the opinion of a third doctor belongs to the employee
asking for disability benefits, and he or she must actively or expressly request for
it.44 In the case at bar, the petitioner did not make use of this remedy since, at the pain
of reiteration, he immediately filed the complaint without even informing the
respondents as to his physician's contrary findings. As a consequence, despite the
divergence in opinion between the company physician and the petitioner's own, the
parties were not able to address the same due to the lack of knowledge of the
respondents and the lack of action on the part of the petitioner, which should stand as
another reason to deny the latter's claim.

While the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed to be work-
related, the seafarer or the claimant must still show a reasonable connection between
the nature of work on board the vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated. Thus,
the burden is placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.
(78)

DIGITEL EMPLOYEES UNION, PETITIONER, v. DIGITAL TELECOMS

PHILIPPINES, INC., RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE:

Licardo's authority to sign the verification and certification was also given after the
petition had been filed. It cannot therefore be said that Licardo was absolutely bereft of
authority to sign the petition, considering that he is the president of DEU and the DEU
board subsequently ratified his act. The substantive issues raised in this case, and the
implications they have for the livelihood of DIGITEL's workers, compel this Court, in the
name of justice, to relax the rules and allow DEU's petition to be tried on the merits. If
justice is to be done to the workers of DIGITEL, they must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of their cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. For, it is far better to dispose of a case on the merits which
is a primordial end rather than on a technicality, if it be the case that may result in
injustice.39 On the other hand, if DIGITEL is fully confident that the facts and the law
are on its side, it should not have any qualms in presenting its case before the
appellate court.

FACTS:

By virtue of a certification election, [DEU] became the exclusive bargaining agent of all
rank and file employees of [DIGITEL] in 1994. However, no CBA was forged between
[DIGITEL] and [DEU]. Some [DEU] members abandoned their employment with
[DIGITEL]. [DEU] later became dormant. Ten (10) years thereafter [DIGITEL] received
from Arceo Rafael A. Esplana (Esplana), who identified himself as President of [DEU], a
letter containing the list of officers, CBA proposals and ground rules. [DIGITEL] was
reluctant to negotiate with [DEU] and demanded that the latter show compliance with
the provisions of [DEUj's Constitution and By-laws on union membership and election of
officers.

On 14 March 2005, [DIGITEL] filed a petition with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
seeking cancellation of [DEU]'s registration on the grounds: 1) failure to file the
required reports from 1994-2004; 2) misrepresentation of its alleged officers; 3)
membership of [DEU] is composed of rank and file, supervisory and managerial
employees; and 4) substantial number of [DEU] members are not [DIGITEL]
employees.

In July 2005, the Secretary of Labor directed [DIGITEL] to commence the CBA
negotiation with [DEU], DIGITEL moved for reconsideration on the contention that the
pendency of the petition for cancellation of [DEU]'s certificate of registration but it was
denied.
CA upheld the Secretary of Labor's Order for [DIGITEL] to commence CBA negotiations
with [DEU] and emphasized that the pendency of a petition for the cancellation of a
union's registration does not bar the holding of negotiations for a CBA.

Meanwhile, most of DIGITEL's rank-and-file employees accepted DIGITEL's redundancy

benefit package7 and were re-hired as PLDT contractuals working on DIGITEL's network
and performing essentially the same functions they had as regular employees of
DIGITEL.8 86 DEU members refused to be re-hired as PLDT contractuals. 9

On March 13, 2013, DEU moved for a writ of execution to compel DIGITEL to
commence collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiations with DEU.
In response, DIGITEL filed a Manifestation on March 26, 2013 stating that it can no
longer initiate CBA negotiations because all of the employees in the bargaining unit
represented by DEU, i.e., the rank-and-file employees of DIGITEL, have been
terminated

An Order dated July 30, 2013, a decision was made by the SOLE declaring that the
Redundancy program undertaken by [DIGITEL] which resulted in the termination of the
herein eighty-six (86) union members is valid.

DEU then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which ordered the submission of
DEU's and DIGITEL's addresses, as well as the resolution authorizing the DEU President
to sign and file the petition for certiorari on behalf of DEU.

DIGITEL asseverates that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in

DEU's petition for certiorari is defective, because the board resolution it submitted in its
Compliance before the CA is dated December 15, 2014, while the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping in DEU's petition for certiorari was executed on
October 20, 2014. According to DIGITEL, this could only mean that the signatory of the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping had no authority to sign the same
in behalf of DEU at the time the petition was filed. Since the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping in DEU's petition for certiorari was defective, the
petition should be dismissed

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari was proper.

RULING:

YES. In denying the petition for failure to submit the data required in its Resolution
dated November 15, 2014, the CA relied merely on the Case Management Information
System report to the effect that the data have not yet been submitted as of January 7,
2015. However, it cannot be denied that the appellate court received DEU's
Compliance, for it noted the same without action in its Resolution dated March 11,
2015. 
Moreover, The Court finds the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
DEU's petition for certiorari to be substantially compliant with the Rules of Court. The
petition was signed by Licardo as President of DEU. Licardo's authority to sign the
verification and certification was also given after the petition had been filed. It cannot
therefore be said that Licardo was absolutely bereft of authority to sign the petition,
considering that he is the president of DEU and the DEU board subsequently ratified his
act. The substantive issues raised in this case, and the implications they have for the
livelihood of DIGITEL's workers, compel this Court, in the name of justice, to relax the
rules and allow DEU's petition to be tried on the merits. If justice is to be done to the
workers of DIGITEL, they must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of their cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. For, it is far
better to dispose of a case on the merits which is a primordial end rather than on a
technicality, if it be the case that may result in injustice. 39 On the other hand, if
DIGITEL is fully confident that the facts and the law are on its side, it should not have
any qualms in presenting its case before the appellate court.
(79)

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner

vs.
ANTONIO P. MAGNO, JR. and MELCHOR L. OCAMPO, JR., Respondents

DOCTRINE:

An order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment
the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court
without fear of refunding what he had received. The start of the computation of the backwages
should be on the day following the last day when the dismissed employee was paid backwages, and
end on the date that a higher court reversed the LA's ruling of illegal dismissal. The date of reversal
should be the end date, and not the date of the ultimate finality of such reversal.

FACTS:

Ocampo alleged that he was hired by Coca-Cola on 1 May 1988. During the course of his
employment he was rewarded with promotions and incentives until he reached the position of District
Sales Supervisor. On the other hand, Magno was employed on 15 December 1988. His last position
was as Territory Sales Manager. In 2007, complainants-appellees were meted a suspension for one
month because of the charge that two (2) hauler trucks whose operation is under Ocampo' s district
and Magno' s territory, were found to be distributing soon-to-expire products in Manila, which is
outside of his dealership area.

In 2008, Ocampo and Magno was terminated. Coca-cola claimed that Magno and Ocampo who
were charged with engaging in fictitious sales transactions and violation of the "no encroachment"
policy; were placed on preventive suspension and dismissed from service in accordance with the
provisions of Sections 10 and 12, Rule 005-85 of the CCBPI Rules in relation to Article 282 of the
Labor Code on loss of trust and confidence.

Magno and Ocampo used the facilities of Cabanatuan Sales Office to buy company products at
discounted rates, only to dispose them outside their territory. Coca-cola served a Notice to Explain
and Preventive Suspension to Magno and Ocampo in 2007.

In his letter of explanation, Magno argued that the company did not incur any losses, instead he
prevented the same when he was able to sell and dispose of the soon-to-expire products stored in
the warehouse. Ocampo, on the other hand, admitted that the plan to dispose of the stocks in the
manner that they did was a strategy devised by Magno in order to protect the interest of the
company.

Administrative hearings were conducted, wherein both of them did not appear.

Antonio Magno, Jr. (Magno) and Melchor Ocampo, Jr. (Ocampo) filed a complaint for illegal
suspension and money claims before the Labor Arbiter. Labor Arbiter declared Coca-cola guilty of
illegally suspending and dismissing Magno and Ocampo and ordered payment of salaries and
benefits for the one month suspension. The LA also ordered reinstatement, as well as payment to
both Magno and Ocampo of their respective backwages, transportation benefits, cellphone benefits,
incremental increase, and annual incentive pay. The LA also awarded payment of moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Coca-cola appealed before the NLRC. NLRC ruled that
Magno and Ocampo were legally dismissed, but their suspension was illegal. However, it ordered
that Magno and Ocampo are entitled to the salaries or wages plus all other benefits to which they
should have been normally entitled to had they been immediately reinstated, either actual or in the
payroll. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Magno and Ocampo are entitled to their accrued basic pay and other benefits.

RULING:

YES. Article 294  of the Labor Code further provides: "x x x An employee who is unjustly dismissed
72

from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement." Our jurisprudence has been consistent as to what should constitute accrued
backwages. "the base figure to be used in the computation of backwages due to the
employee should include not just the basic salary, but also the regular allowances that he had
been receiving, such as the emergency living allowances and the 13th month pay mandated
under the law."

Subject to submission of proof of receipt of benefits at the time of their dismissal, Magno' s and
Ocampo' s accrued backwages should include their basic salary as well as the allowances and
benefits that they have been receiving at the time of their dismissal. In accordance with the claims
previously put forward by Magno and Ocampo, accrued backwages may include, but are not limited
to, allowances and benefits such as transportation benefits, cellphone allowance, 13th month pay,
sick leave, and vacation leave in the amounts at the time of their dismissal. 

An order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment
the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court
without fear of refunding what he had received. The start of the computation of the backwages
should be on the day following the last day when the dismissed employee was paid backwages, and
end on the date that a higher court reversed the LA's ruling of illegal dismissal. The date of reversal
should be the end date, and not the date of the ultimate finality of such reversal.
(80)

REY BEN P. MADRIO, PETITIONER, v. ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE:

It is well-settled that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are not
bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. 41 However, when
it comes to admitting documents as evidence in labor cases, it is nonetheless required
that there be some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of
documents.

FACTS:

Petitioner was formerly the Area Sales Manager of AFC from May 1, 2008 until he
tendered his resignation in November 2015, 5 which, however, was not shown to have
been approved by the company. At that time, he also requested for the payment of
several monetary benefits,6 but the same remained unheeded. Petitioner filed a
complaint7 against AFC for the payment of several monetary benefits. Among others,
petitioner claimed8 that he was entitled to separation benefits pursuant to AFC's
retirement/separation policy. As proof, petitioner attached an unsigned and
unauthenticated typewritten copy of the Retirement Plan.

AFC categorically denied that the Retirement Plan is the retirement/separation policy it
had for its employees.15 In any event, it argued that it would be unreasonable for it to
pay separation benefits to an employee who was solely responsible in causing the
company a whopping financial loss attributed to his gross negligence in the handling of
uncollected receivables. It further stressed that petitioner was given the chance to
redeem himself by assisting AFC to recover said amount from the defaulting customer
but he just unceremoniously left the company without obtaining any clearance or
permission from the management.

LA ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered AFC to pay him his monetary claims,
inclusive of separation benefits. NLRC affirmed with modification the LA's ruling by
reducing the amount of the separation benefits. CA partially set aside the NLRC ruling
insofar as the award of separation benefits to petitioner was concerned.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Retirement Plan is admissible in evidence.

2. Whether or not Madrio is entitled to separation pay.

RULING:

1. YES. It is well-settled that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC,
are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of
cases.41 However, when it comes to admitting documents as evidence in labor cases, it
is nonetheless required that there be some proof of authenticity or reliability as
condition for the admission of documents.

The circumstances of this case show that there is actually some proof of authenticity or
reliability that the copy of the Retirement Plan attached to petitioner's position paper
reflects AFC's retirement/separation policy. This is because: (a) AFC never denied
having an existing company policy wherein separation benefits are given to its qualified
employees; (b) AFC, which is presumed to have custody of the relevant documents
covering its company policies, never submitted the "true" copy of its Retirement Plan
despite being given the opportunity to do so; and (c) as petitioner pointed out, the
"eight (8)-page [copy of the Retirement Plan] is too technical, verbose and
comprehensive to be simply attributed as a fake." 45 Hence, these circumstances lend
"some proof of authenticity or reliability" to the document presented by petitioner

2. NO. The separation benefits under the AFC's company policy is not the separation
pay contemplated under the labor code,46 but rather, a special benefit given by the
company only to upstanding employees who have satisfied certain conditions. In this
case, petitioner only submitted a copy of the Retirement Plan as proof of his
entitlement to the separation benefits claimed. However, the said document only
proves what the retirement/separation policy of AFC is. It does not, in any way,
demonstrate that the conditions for entitlement had already been met by the employee.

Moreover, petitioner's claim for separation benefits appears to be premature. It is

undisputed that petitioner left the company while his separation benefits were still
being processed and yet to be approved by the Retirement Committee pursuant to the
"company's normal operating procedure."
(81)

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., AND/OR FURTRANS DENIZCILIK TICARET VE

SANAYI AS, PETITIONERS, v. RAYMOND F. BERNARDO, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE:

For compensability, the seafarer is still burdened to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a reasonable proof
of work connection, not direct causal relation is required.

According to statistics, gout is more prevalent in older men. 31 Considering respondent's age at the time
of diagnosis and the fact that he was only in his second year of being a seafarer, it is less probable
that his condition was work-related.

FACTS:

Raymond F. Bernardo (respondent), then 37 years old, was hired as a messboy by petitioners covered
by an Employment Contract duly approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) for a period of nine months. Respondent was a seaman since 2010 and it was his first contract
with petitioners.

While working onboard the vessel, he experienced ankle joint pain. He was brought to a portside
medical facility in Morocco and was diagnosed with "Artitis eotosa". Respondent was medically
repatriated and was referred to the company-designated physician in Metropolitan Medical Center. His
initial diagnosis was for gouty arthritis. On June 29, 2012, Dr. Cruz-Balbon (Dr. Cruz-Balbon), a
company-designated physician, issued a document explaining the diagnosis as a metabolic disorder
secondary to defect in purine metabolism and/or high purine diet that is not work-related. 8 Later, Dr.
Cruz-Balbon certified that the respondent's illness is "Post Infectious Arthritis: Gouty Arthritis."

For several months, respondent was under the medical care and supervision of and rehabilitation
therapy by the company-designated physician. However, Respondent claimed that petitioners stopped
the treatment despite the fact that his gouty arthritis has not been fully treated.

Because of this, respondent consulted Dr. Renato P. Runas (Dr. Runas), an orthopedic specialist. He
opined that respondent is "permanently unfit to return to duty as a seafarer in whatever capacity with
a permanent disability."

Respondent filed a case against petitioners alleging that he is entitled to permanent total disability
benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Petitioners, on the other hand,
claimed that gouty arthritis is not a work-related condition. Hence, respondent is not entitled to the
disability benefits under the POEA-SEC.

LA rendered a decision in favor of respondent holding that respondent's meals while onboard the ship
was the source or at least contributed to the occurrence of gouty arthritis, hence, it is a work-related
illness. NLRC reversed. CA reversed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not gouty arthritis is a work-related condition and is therefore compensable.

RULING:
NO. While the law disputably presumes an illness to be work-related, nevertheless, there is no similar
presumption of compensability accorded to a seafarer. Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC enumerates the
conditions for an occupational disease (and non-listed illness) to be compensable, namely: (1) the
seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of
the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a period of
exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious
negligence on the part of the seafarer. For compensability, the seafarer is still burdened to present
substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the
disease and only a reasonable proof of work connection, not direct causal relation is required.

According to statistics, gout is more prevalent in older men. 31 Considering respondent's age at the time
of diagnosis and the fact that he was only in his second year of being a seafarer, it is less probable
that his condition was work-related.
(82)

SKYWAY O & M CORPORATION, PETITIONER, v. WILFREDO M. REINANTE, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE:

Though not on the same plane as that of a permanent employee, a probationary employee enjoys
security of tenure. The services of a probationary employee may be terminated for any of the
following: (1) a just cause; (2) an authorized cause; and (3) failure to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with the reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.

It must be stressed that the employee's waiver or quitclaim cannot prevent the employee from
demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled, and from filing an illegal dismissal case. Waivers or
quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor, and are frowned upon for being contrary to public policy.
Unless it can be shown that the person executing the waiver voluntarily did so, with full understanding
of its contents, and with reasonable and credible consideration, the same is not a valid and binding
undertaking. The burden is with the employer to prove that the waiver or quitclaim was voluntarily
executed.

FACTS:

Petitioner Skyway O & M Corporation (Skyway) hired Wilfredo as Intelligence Officer for a fixed period
of 5 months. Thereafter, Skyway renewed his services and appointed him as a probationary employee.
Wilfredo took a vacation leave and filed an application for sick leave upon the advice of his physician
due to hypertension. However, Skyway disapproved his application for vacation leave and directed him
to report for work to discuss his on-the-job performance and continued absence without proper
authority.

On May 21, 2009, Wilfredo received a pre-termination notice for supposedly failing to meet the pre-
performance standards of the company based on the Performance Appraisal Report. On his last day as
probationary employee, Wilfredo was dismissed. Based on the termination letter, his performance
during the probationary period starting November 26, 2008 to April 2009 was below average.

Meanwhile, Wilfredo filed administrative complaints against Augusto, assailing the latter's authority to
assess his performance, as well as against Skyway for hiring and promoting unqualified security
officers. The parties eventually entered into a compromise agreement/amicable settlement wherein
Wilfredo agreed not to file any case against Skyway and to withdraw the administrative cases he had
filed against its security officers. Notwithstanding demand, TSMSD failed to comply with the terms and
conditions of the compromise agreement prompting Wilfredo to file a complaint for constructive
dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees.

Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Wilfredo. NLRC affirmed. CA also affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Wilfredo was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

YES. LA, NLRC and the CA uniformly found that Wilfredo was illegally dismissed. Factual findings of
quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and
even finality by this Court, more so when they coincide with those of the LA. Such factual findings are
given more weight when affirmed by the CA.
A probationary employee is one who is placed on trial by an employer, during which the latter
determines whether or not the former is qualified for permanent employment. 28 The essence of a
probationary period of employment lies primordially in the purpose and objective of both the employer
and employee during such period. Though not on the same plane as that of a permanent employee, a
probationary employee enjoys security of tenure. The services of a probationary employee may be
terminated for any of the following: (1) a just cause; (2) an authorized cause; and (3) failure to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards prescribed by the
employer.

Further, It must be stressed that the employee's waiver or quitclaim cannot prevent the employee
from demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled, and from filing an illegal dismissal case.
Waivers or quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor, and are frowned upon for being contrary to public
policy. Unless it can be shown that the person executing the waiver voluntarily did so, with full
understanding of its contents, and with reasonable and credible consideration, the same is not a valid
and binding undertaking. The burden is with the employer to prove that the waiver or quitclaim was
voluntarily executed.
(83)

RUEL L. GUADALQUIVER, PETITIONER, v. SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISE,

INC., MISSISSAUGA ENTERPRISES, INC. AND/OR MS. ANTONIETTE A.
GUERRERO, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE:

While a seafarer has the right: to seek the opinion of other doctors, such right may be
availed of on the presumption that the company-designated doctor had already issued
a definite declaration on the condition of the seafarer, and the seafarer finds it
disagreeable.

The period of 120 days from repatriation is the duration within which the employer is to
determine the fitness of the seafarer to work or to ascertain the degree of his disability;
in such case where the seafarer remains in need of medical attention, the 120-day
period may be extended to a maximum period of 240 days within which the company-
designated doctor must make a definite declaration on the fitness to work or the degree
of the disability of the seafarer. A seafarer is thus considered permanently and totally
disabled when so declared by the company-designated doctor within the period of 120
or 240 days, as the case may be; or after the lapse of 240 days without any declaration
being issued by the company-designated physician.

FACTS:

Sea Power Shipping Enterprise, Inc. (Sea Power), in behalf of its principal, Mississauga
Enterprises, Inc. (Mississauga), employed petitioner as Able Seaman to work aboard
the vessel M/V Dimi for 9 months, which was extended for 2 months. Petitioner alleged
that his work involved strenuous manual work of pushing, pulling, lifting and/or
carrying heavy objects. He narrated that in November 2012, after lifting a heavy jar of
paint on the vessel, he felt a "click" followed by pain on his lower back. He consulted a
doctor in Egypt who diagnosed him with osteoarthritis.

On September 19, 2013, petitioner was medically repatriated and immediately went to
the company-designated doctor and diagnosed him with lumbo-sacral muscle strain but
there was no indication that surgery was needed. He advised him to undergo physical
therapy. After great improvement, petitioner unjustifiably failed to report back to the
company-designated physician. The doctor gave petitioner his final diagnosis of
disability Grade 11.

Meanwhile, petitioner admitted having consulted his physician-of-choice because his

condition did not improve. The physician declared him unfit to work at his previous
occupation.

Petitioner filed complaint for payment of disability benefits. Respondents contended

that petitioner committed medical abandonment when he did not return for his physical
therapy session with the company-designated doctor. They also maintained that
petitioner was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits because the
company-designated doctor only found him to have suffered from Grade 11 disability.

LA ruled in favor of the petitioner which the NLRC affirmed. But CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not abandonment of medical treatment precludes the petitioner in claiming

disability benefits.

RULING:

YES. The period of 120 days from repatriation is the duration within which the employer
is to determine the fitness of the seafarer to work or to ascertain the degree of his
disability; in such case where the seafarer remains in need of medical attention, the
120-day period may be extended to a maximum period of 240 days within which the
company-designated doctor must make a definite declaration on the fitness to work or
the degree of the disability of the seafarer. A seafarer is thus considered permanently
and totally disabled when so declared by the company-designated doctor within the
period of 120 or 240 days, as the case may be; or after the lapse of 240 days without
any declaration being issued by the company-designated physician.

Petitioner was on the 162nd day of treatment when he absconded, and the company-
designated doctor has not yet issued his definite declaration on petitioner's condition for
the apparent reason that petitioner was still under treatment and the maximum period
of 240 days to issue the certification had not yet lapsed.

Also, when he filed his disability case, only 193 days had lapsed. This only means that
there were remaining days for the company-designated doctor to issue his assessment
on petitioner's condition. However, without waiting for such declaration and/or the
lapse of the 240-day period, petitioner prematurely filed this suit even if his cause of
action had not yet accrued.

Moreover, the opinion of petitioner's personal doctor cannot be given credence since it
did not give petitioner the necessary cause of action he lacked when he filed the
complaint. Indeed., while a seafarer has the right: to seek the opinion of other doctors,
such right may be availed of on the presumption that the company-designated doctor
had already issued a definite declaration on the condition of the seafarer, and the
seafarer finds it disagreeable. Given the lack of certification from the company-
designated doctor, petitioner cannot rely on the assessment made by his own doctor.
(84)

DANILO A. LERONA, PETITIONER, v. SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES,

INC. AND/OR NEDA MARITIME AGENCY CO., LTD., AND/OR MS. ANTONETTE A.
GUERRERO, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE:

A "fit to work" declaration in the PEME is not a conclusive proof that a seafarer is free
from any disease prior to his/her deployment. 

The 2000 POEA-SEC,39 Section 20(E) of which provides that deliberate concealment by

a seafarer of a pre-existing medical condition in his PEME constitutes fraudulent
misrepresentation which shall disqualify him from any disability compensation and
benefits.

FACTS:

Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. employed petitioner Danilo A. Lerona on behalf of
respondent Neda Maritime Agency Co., Ltd. to work as a fitter on board M/V Penelope.
After months onboard the vessel, he felt severe chest pains and dizziness. He was
repatriated and was examined by respondent’s physicians. He undergone several tests
and medications, however, before final assessment, he absconded. Unknown to
respondents, petitioner consulted an independent physician which declared him (1)
permanently unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity; (2) his illness is
considered work aggravated/related; and (3) he is not expected to land gainful
employment given his medical background.

Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of disability benefits, reimbursement of medical

expenses and attorney's fees against respondents. Respondents averred that petitioner
was declared fit for sea duty by their company-designated physician, hence, he is not
entitled to any disability benefit. Further, petitioner failed to disclose that he has
hypertension during his PEME. The concealment of his pre-existing condition disqualifies
him from any compensation and benefit.

LA ruled in favor of petitioner. NLRC affirmed. CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING:

NO. This is because he committed fraudulent misrepresentation.

The 2000 POEA-SEC,39 Section 20(E) of which provides that deliberate concealment by
a seafarer of a pre-existing medical condition in his PEME constitutes fraudulent
misrepresentation which shall disqualify him from any disability compensation and
benefits.

Petitioner did not indicate in the appropriate box in his PEME form that he has
hypertension, although he had been taking Norvasc as maintenance medicine for two
years. He only disclosed his pre-existing medical condition after he was repatriated to
the Philippines. For knowingly concealing his hypertension during the PEME, petitioner
committed fraudulent misrepresentation which unconditionally bars his right to receive
any disability compensation from respondents.

Even if petitioner’s misrepresentation would be disregarded, there is no showing that

petitioner's hypertension impaired the functioning of any of his vital organs, resulting in
permanent disability. Moreover, petitioner did not submit any of the enumerated
medical test results.

Finally, A "fit to work" declaration in the PEME is not a conclusive proof that a seafarer
is free from any disease prior to his/her deployment. When petitioner chose not to show
up at the appointed date of consultation, effectively preventing Dr. Gonzales from
making a fitness or disability assessment, he breached his duty under the 2000 POEA-
SEC. Without any final assessment from the company-designated physician, petitioner's
claim for permanent total disability benefits must fail.
(85)

MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC., MARLOW NAVIGATION NETHERLANDS B.V., AND

CAPTAIN LEOPOLDO C. TENORIO, PETITIONERS, v. PRIMO D. QUIJANO, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE:

Liver abscess, cholecystitis with cholelithiasis, and panophthalmitis, while not specifically listed as such
under Section 32 of the 2010 POEA SEC, these nonetheless fall under the categories "abdomen" and
"eyes." On the other hand, the fact that Quijano was also diagnosed as having diabetes mellitus is of
no moment since the incidence of a listed occupational disease, whether or not associated with a non-
listed ailment, is enough basis for compensation. 40 Besides, Section 20 (A) (4) thereof explicitly
establishes a disputable presumption that a non-listed illness is work-related, and the burden rests
upon the employer to overcome the statutory presumption.

FACTS:

Quijano was hired as Cook by petitioner Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., for its principal Marlow
Navigation Netherlands for a period of six months. His contract was renewed, however, it did not
materialize due to his confinement where his independent physician diagnosed him to be suffering
from liver abscess, cholecystitis with cholelithiasis, diabetes mellitus, type II, and panophthalmitis,
right.

Claiming that his illnesses were acquired during his last employment and that petitioners refused to
grant his request for medical assistance, he filed against the latter a complaint for disability benefits,
sickness allowance, medical reimbursement, damages, and attorney's fees.

Quijano alleged that due to hostile working conditions on board M/V Katharina Schepers, he
experienced body weakness, easy fatigability, poor eye sight, and severe low back pain, which he
reported to the Chief Officer and Captain.13 He was relieved from his post with his contract cut short to
5 1/2 months. Quijano added that upon repatriation, he attempted to report for post-employment
medical examination and treatment but was unjustly refused, prompting him to seek medical attention
at his own expense. Considering that his illnesses rendered him incapable of resuming work that
resulted in his total and permanent disability, he filed the complaint.

Office of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA) found Quijano entitled to total and permanent
disability benefits which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Quijano is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING:

YES. Quijano was able to substantially prove his entitlement to total and permanent disability benefits,
considering that: (a) he was medically repatriated on January 30, 2014 and reported to petitioners'
office within the mandated three (3)-day period for post-medical examination; (b) he was suffering
from liver abscess, cholecystitis with cholelithiasis, diabetes mellitus, type II, and panophthalmitis,
which were deemed work-related illnesses being listed occupational diseases under the 2010 POEA-
SEC; and (c) there was non-compliance by the company-designated physician of the required final and
definite assessment within the 120/240-day treatment period resulting in the ipso jure grant to the
seafarer of permanent and total disability benefits.
Liver abscess, cholecystitis with cholelithiasis, and panophthalmitis, while not specifically listed as such
under Section 32 of the 2010 POEA SEC, these nonetheless fall under the categories "abdomen" and
"eyes." On the other hand, the fact that Quijano was also diagnosed as having diabetes mellitus is of
no moment since the incidence of a listed occupational disease, whether or not associated with a non-
listed ailment, is enough basis for compensation. 40 Besides, Section 20 (A) (4) thereof explicitly
establishes a disputable presumption that a non-listed illness is work-related, and the burden rests
upon the employer to overcome the statutory presumption, which petitioners failed to discharge.
(86)

AUGORIO A. DELA ROSA, PETITIONER, v. ABS-CBN CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE:

In this case, no valid second notice was given to petitioner because while the
memorandum dated September 1, 2015 informed him that he was sanctioned with the
penalty of dismissal for his serious misconduct, the same was not effected considering
the expiration of his purported fixed-term employment contract. Consequently, for not
having been furnished the second notice, which purpose is to inform the employee of
his or her termination from employment, 62 petitioner's right to procedural due process
was violated.

Jurisprudence provides that in cases where the dismissals are for a just cause but are
procedurally infirm, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee
for violation of his statutory rights. 63 The rationale is that the employer should not be
compelled to continue employing a person who is admittedly guilty of misfeasance or
malfeasance and whose continued employment is patently inimical to the
employer,64 as in this case.

FACTS:

In 2002,4 petitioner was hired by respondent ABS-CBN Corporation as a video editor.

He was allegedly rehired6 repeatedly and continuously for the same position, under
purported fixed-term contracts.

An incident which happened where petitioner was intoxicated and placed his hands
inside a female co-worker's pants and touched her buttocks, led to administrative
hearings. In 2015, he was dismissed. Petitioner filed a complaint 18 for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of holiday pay, non-payment of salary/wages, 13th month pay,
separation pay, and night shift differential, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees against respondent.

Respondent averred that petitioner was engaged only for a fixed period and his
employment automatically ceased on the end date. It also claimed that even if
petitioner's employment had not yet expired, the latter was dismissed for a just cause
for having been found guilty of serious misconduct in: (a) reporting for work while
intoxicated; and (b) committing lascivious acts against a female co-worker.

LA found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed the LA's Decision.
CA reversed.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

NO. While petitioner is considered regular employee, and not a fixed-term employee,
the respondent had a just cause in terminating petitioner's employment as the latter
committed serious misconduct against a female co-worker.

He tried to hug and kiss a female co-worker, then placed his hands inside her pants and
touched her buttocks. These acts constitute serious misconduct. However, despite the
existence of a just cause, respondent failed to observe the proper procedure in
terminating petitioner's employment.

In this case, no valid second notice was given to petitioner because while the
memorandum dated September 1, 2015 informed him that he was sanctioned with the
penalty of dismissal for his serious misconduct, the same was not effected considering
the expiration of his purported fixed-term employment contract. Consequently, for not
having been furnished the second notice, which purpose is to inform the employee of
his or her termination from employment, 62 petitioner's right to procedural due process
was violated.

Jurisprudence provides that in cases where the dismissals are for a just cause but are
procedurally infirm, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee
for violation of his statutory rights. 63 The rationale is that the employer should not be
compelled to continue employing a person who is admittedly guilty of misfeasance or
malfeasance and whose continued employment is patently inimical to the
employer,64 as in this case.