152 MARHAttA Al.l.

fiN

rH A M L ifl 7
views o f others. The latter tie fin it ion would h aw important implications
for further Soviet political development, laroslavskii wanted to stamp out
criticism o f the f.c’s line, but applied a stricter definition o f *'bloc*' than The “ Bolshevik Leninist1’ Opposition and the
Softs, Although the ctx: iti nj2h did not settle on a definition for “ bloc” W orking Otass, 1928-1929
such a definition would continue 10 evolve and would be central to the
unfolding o f the Great Terror, In uj 2fi, Shliapnikov ,ind Medvedev refused A lek se i G u s e v
to acknowledge membership in a bloc, as they would again refuse to do
in 1915-1937. In 1937. however, the same fatal results applied to (hone who
resisted demonization o f themselves and their views as well as to those who
submitted to it.
I lie end o f the 1920$ lias gone down in Soviet history as the time o f rhe
’'gre.il break". In the economy, this break denoted the end o f the New
I'conomic Policy ( n e p ) and the move to "complete collectivization’* o f
agriculture and forced industrialization. In politics, it signified that tile
regime of Stalin's personal power was firmly established and that the trans­
formation of the ruling Communist Party into a docile instrument o f this
icgime had been completed. In social, or class, terms, these events meant
1he consolidation o f the party-state bureaucracy’s total domination o f all
vpheres o f social life. The result was the formation o f a system the essence
which then remained practically unchanged for more than six decades.
13us great social shift* which turned NfiP Russia into the land o f Stalinist
\iHi.dism" naturally could not tike place without a sharpening o f social
Hid political conflict, to which three main social forces were party: the
hnnvmcracy, the small proprietors, and the workers. In order to implement
1 In* Mrjiegy of the "great break", the bureaucracy had to subject the work­
ing people of both town and countryside to the imperatives o f "primitive
.......mu Lit km " o f state capital and, consequently, deprive them o f the pos­
sibility o f defending their interests from the state. In doing so, the bureau-
1114 y*s first aim was to prevent any political articulation o f spontaneous
hal protest, In other words, the regime needed above all to destroy those
I<4dM11.. 11 groups that could have become mouthpieces o f social discontent.
I lie nmmmnist leadership's primary political enemy at the end o f the
IV'in w.in the left communist opposition that had taken shape within the
fuling party itself. Its largest w in g was the “ Bolshevik Leninists” headed
(■1 I m isty; a smaller hui more radical contingent, the “ lXrcists" (D em o­
t i ng < cnualists), was led by Timofei Sapronov and Vladimir Smirnov,
In nr.* about 8,000 oppositionists were expelled by decision o f rhe
liM. ' Mill party congress, and their leaders exiled. Uoth opposition groups
 A I I KS L I C i l J S l - V
•54
then wont underground, hecommg in essence independent political orga­
nizations with their own centres and networks, o f local cells.
This separation from the ruling party, which coincided with the cri­
sis o f Ni-:e and the start o f the “ great break T\ brought about fundamental
changes in the make-up o f the communist opposition and the character
o f its activity. A significant group o f its old cadres, not wanting to break
with the Communist party and interpreting the leadership's new course
as the fulfilment o f their main demands (acceleration o f industri ill nation t
struggle with the kulaks), argued for reconciliation with the party's “ gen­
eral line'* and an end to “ fractional" activity. The underground, on the
other hand, was made up o f ‘'irreconcilable5' elements, who did not see
industrialization and collectivization as ends in themselves: for them* ques­
tions o f "workers* democracy*’ and the position o f the working people in
the “ proletarian state” had much greater significance, And it was precisely
these questions that came to the forefront o f the opposition groups’ activ­
ity in 1928-1929.
In these years, Soviet workers* living conditions were consistently dete­
riorating, and their rights being consistently eroded. At the end o f 1927. a
reform o f the wage scale was implemented, and many skills and qualifica­
tions were thereby administratively downgraded and wages cut.' At the
same time a general review o f output norms and piece rates was under­
taken, writh the norms being raised and the rates reduced. A party directive
laid down that norms should be based on “ the maximum technically possi­
ble” output, which meant intensification o f labour to its limits without any
materia] compensation.1 Similar aims were served by the introduction o f
the seven-hour day in various branches o f industry. This measure, widely
proclaimed by party bodies as a great victory for the working people, in
reality brought a sharp increase in the physical burden placed on workers:
those who tended three lathes would be given tour or five instead, and
night shifts were introduced, Price increases* in spite o f more acute food
shortages; the increase in rents implemented in and the retention o f
I. W o rk e r s w e re assign ed b y n i c j p j r y 1 0 o n t o f seven te en d iffe re n t tar lilT b a n d *. w hu-lr
w e r e used to Siit w j p c k-vcli. U n d e r [lie rct’o riu , m a n y w f i r k c n w e r e unilaterally
- w it h o u t ne^ntialiOFl - p lace d iti I w r thrill" b n m K
i. I n fo r m a tio n <iv|Mrtment o f the C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e i>f th e v u r(l» )t “ O k h ix ic 1
it o g a k h l u in p a n i i p o ZAkliurlieiiiiu k o lle k tiv n y k h (lo|'< ivo nn ',’ l S e p , l y iS , R. u s m j h
S tale A r c h i v e o f S o c i o - P o l i t i c * I H ii t o r y . M o s c o w | R . u w m k i i g o siitiarttvciin yi a r k h iv
sd ts ia rn o -p rtlic ich ftk o i tstorii, hereafter n a s p i | , fond 17. o p is‘ 32, d e lo 154, liil y,
I t l l :. “ iif H . S H K V t K T . l i N l N I S T ” U l T O S I T I O N ANI> I H W O R K I N G C:J A S S
*5 5
a portion o f workers’ wages in a state fund for ‘'industrial loans’': all these
measures amounted to cuts in real wages.
At the beginning o f tyitf* in the course o f negotiations 011 collective
agreements, the Politburo issued a directive that norms and piece rates
should not be fixed for the whole year, but be reviewed ill rite course o f
“ day-to-day w o r k " J Thus, the industry management bodies were given the
right to cut workers’ wages whenever they saw fit. ‘1‘lie collective agree­
ments. the import o f which had already been significantly undermined by
compulsory state arbitration, finally lost any meaning and became empty
formalities. At the same time, the drive for labour intensification contin­
ued, without any corresponding increase in wages, A target was set o f rais­
ing labour productivity by [7.5 per cent in the financial year 1928-1929.
while a s per cent limit was imposed on increases in nominal wages in
the same period. Overexert ion in pursuit o f the new, higher norms caused
exhaustion and illness among workers,4
The party-state’s policies naturally gave rise to worker protests, which
took the form ot both active and passive resistance. I11 January 1929. Prtiwia
{the newspaper of the party's Central Com mittee (cc)) noted in a lead­
ing article that a "fall-olTm l a b o u r discipline” at the factories had become
a “ mass phenomenon'’ in which whole layers o f the working class were
involved; ir also complained that the workers did not understand the “ aims
o f socialist rationalization” / Such calls to strengthen labour discipline were
.mswered by workers (in anonymous notes handed in at mass meetings):
“ Wet the working class, wril| observe discipline in production when we are
not being put under pressure by some other class, that is —management, orT
in other words, the Communist Party.”*
I.arge quantities o f reports o f growing dissent among workers were sent
to the centre from local party bodies. The party’s Vyborg, Leningrad, dis­
trict committee, for example, noted: "As a result o f their deteriorating
nn>od. workers are displaying a critical attitude to industrial management
bodied, trade unions, and co-operatives accompanied by pessimism,
I'ttltthunt decision of 1^1*, m;asvi, I. 17, op. J t d, I |ti,
liilonmitoi) tiilHlrp^rtnii'iK of [he organization ,nul diMrihiilion department of die
Mhimow comm nice of [tie VKl'(h)p"O iij^rocmtakh rabtH'lliklf', Apr, Central
Archive of Social Movement* of Moscow jTsent ral H nyi jrkhiv ohdli'llt^tveiuiykh dvi-
dionii norodii Motkvy, hereafter f sAnuM|hf„ j. (>pp n, d. 737, I. ij,
t’Mi'i/.i. Jan. n/iy.
* liilorniJtioii su)>dc]>;irtnieiit of the organization and (li;lrilnition of tlie
MtMCrtw comrnittcf of the vnr(l>)r "O poluicllokikli njslrocitihkli rabochikh 1 slu-
/ i u s h d n k l i " M a y -Jim . i«>iy, T\An(»M. f. 3, op. 11. d, 737, I. 27.
 Ai.i-:KSi:i e; u s i l v M IH " u m . S H L V I K M-NIN1ST1' OIT< JSl l Jt >N A N I> I H K W O R K I N G irl.ASS 157

by passive protest (expressed in absences from mass meeting* and indif­ viously1* - this was under conditions which ensured that anti-government
ference to workers’ organizations |i,e., trade unions and factory com m it­ agitation on wages* working conditions, and the regime in the factories
tees]), and in some plates by active protest, in the form o f iiatitinfit |strikes would get a hearing among the working class. Whereas the opposition had
iti which the workers attended their workplaces bui did not start work or up until 1927 preferred to present its case to the party leadership, primarily
slowed it down to virtually nill/*T tn lact the “ fall-oil’ o f labour discipline” 011 “ big political issues" and only within party fora, now it decided to turn
and the growth o f a mood o f protest among workers were accompanied in directly to that class in whose interests it declared itself to be acting. At the
many places by strikes, o f which the otiPU* counted a total o f 1.559 in iy2tt- time o f the fifteenth party congress in December 1927, opposition leaflets
iy2y,v Although most o f these actions occurred spontaneously, a tendency had already appeared in Moscow factories, in which the "wholesale review
towards workers’ self-organization was also evident: in a whole series ol o f output norms and indiscriminate cutting of piece rates" were subject
eases* strikes were preceded by preparatory activity. Strikers tried to join to sharp criticism, and demands were raised for an end to the “ arbitrary
up with those at other enterprises and even t o co-ordinate their activities power of the foremen and industrial managers'*.14
across industrial sectors. On R Ju ly iy2y, for example, the <Jtii,u arrested In the autumn o f 1928, rhe opposition published an eighteen-point plat­
participants in an illegal meeting o f ra 3(way workers.10 form devoted especially to the “ worker q u e stio n ".T h ro u g h o u t the whole
The protests against the intensified exploitation, wage cuts, increase Nfip period, Soviet workers’ interests have never before been suhject to the
in consumer goods prices, and shortage of products led some workers to sort o f frenzied attack mounted this year by the trade union, party, and
political conclusions that could not fail to cause anxiety in the party-state industrial bureaucracy"* the LJolshevik l.eninists wrote, The opposition­
bodies. A secret report by the party a s Information Department recorded ists urged a decisive struggle against the state's attempt to scrap collec­
accusation* against the state's power including, "you make us work like at tive agreements and thereby “ openly sanction the abolition o f workers’
Ford, but you pay like in C hina J...J everything that we won before lias rights1”. They demanded that wages be raised in strict correspondence with
been taken away” , "just wail until the workers grab those who deserve increases in labour productivity and not be allowed to fall behind it. The
it by the throat” * and so fort!).11 In the Ivanovo industrial region north­ platform proposed to include in collective agreements a clause on wage
east o f Moscow, party officials noted ihe spread o f ' lanti-Soviet" moods increases in the com ing year that would compensate for the increase in
among workers, expressed in a particular way: 4'The Communists can't consumer goods prices (10 per cent), and raise wages by an additional 5 per
pilot the ship o f state. TheyVe driving the country to ruin with their pol­ cent, "T h e opposition categorically rejects the bureaucrats’ objection that
icy. The revolution has come to naught. It+s time to overthrow the IJolshe- there are no funds from which to pay for an increase in workers' wages1’*
vik regime, *1* the platform stated. "Punds can be raised by means o f decisive cuts m the
Thus, when the communist opposition turned its attention to the bloated apparatus o f the soviets, trade unions, and party< and by a corre­
"w orker question” — which had not figured among its main priorities pre­ sponding redirection o f public funds.11'11 The oppositionists declared that

( ’ l t d in Llhcrni.icv, Pitriykir rubivhic, p, J J , 111 lyiK, Karl R.itlek admitted d m previously rlie opposition had experienced “ iiu icci-
7-
H. T h e a c r o n y m b y w h i c h i k - S o v i e t s e c u r i t y s c r v u - c w j s k n o w n (rt.»m L y i2 l o h j.h It noil ibou t the worker question, i d c c i f i o n about tu rning to the (jc lo r i f t . |...|
w a s a l s o r e f e r r e d t o b y l i s p r e v i o u s n a i l l f , t h e ( T l i e k a , o r e a r l i e r J t r o r l y i l l , tJli* t i l 'l l , Otlr indecision was ciu $cd p.irdy by enir reluctanc? to break with Z i i l i w i f v i ^ s hut
.dso partly by our o w n vjcill.Ltion .iinl failure 10 understand ihe smtaijon” : (’ N a J o
y- E x t r j ] H » l j t c i l fr t.n n r e p o r t * i n “ S iH 'tts h rtrtM w h r e w o * ', v o l s VI A n d v i l .

10, Information department ol (he Central C u in t m ttc c ol llic Vkp(b). “ O kliode koLlo Jm l u i l l l l ' do konlsa. (Is: pignut k odliomu nioskovikoiim rovAiislnhu)4’, BfJASM, f.
povornoi k,im pjriii‘\ 17 D e c . lyJ#, wimpi. t. I7 » L^- H* 71 " 7 £: intornii op. 1, d. i j , I. 2.
tiou subdl'pairiiiiciit o f the organization J i i i i distrilmtioii tk'pjrtnien! o f the M o w o w 14- ' “O d n o ii: rm h ik h r.izrto^hsii V imhoehem voproic. C.) hlizhaichei kampanii
co m m ittee o f tile VKr(h). " O tijvirocniinkli r,lbtnhikh j d iiztijslu ilik h ". J11I, kluiehcniia koltlojjovorov” . ly& j. rsAUPM, f. }, op. n , J . 440, It, 72-ft?; information
T'AOT>m. f. .1, tip. 11, d. 7JS7. 1. 12 ; C h e rn ia tv , m iw tkit, p. 3H0. department o f the VKl'(h), " O kliodc kokfoyovoruol 17 D ec. 192H,

11. Information drpjrUTieiK o f i l i f l ’ n ilrjIC n m r a ittL -c o f die vKv(b), “ O klltule i ito^-iV Ik f. 17, op. 32. d. t S 4 , 1. 7 1 ; (. $26 . op- I, *k I3Jh t- 4 J .
k;)iiipjiiii |iu Eikltiidit-niiu koltcktivnykli d o g u v o ro v” . Sep. i y ; S , h c a s h . f. 17, op 11, H- l eaflet entitled ‘ ‘Tovarisliclii r i b w h i c ! " , N o v . li*iK. W.Asn, I. Jjfi. op. 1. d, IJJ, II. 43,
4,f»j k c ahn leaflet c n l i l l d " K o v w m etileiism partii, ko vscm nh(HLliiitr, Uee. lya-K.
d. 154,1. iS-
12. C u e d in t ^ o i s n u n , W o rk er R r t i s M m 1 ttn d e r S t a b t t p , n j . f 17, op. 7 1 , d. [o6,1. I,
 AI.liKM l ousrv
15*
the ruling bureaucracy, while '‘economizing" on workers. was lavishing
money on itself: “ T he expenditure on the party apparatus is 120 million
Lillies, and on the trade union apparatus 250-300 million. |„.J IJy promot­
ing genuine activism by the masses, these nut goings u n he reduced many
times over. Warty arid trade union work must be rooted in the masses, not
amonj» paid officials. |...] The o c ; p u apparatus costs more than 100 mil­
lion rubles. [,..| That part o f it that is used against the opposition, and to
"observe1 workers and the unemployed, should be done away w ith."1*
In their proclamations, articles* and speeches at factory meetings and
underground gatherings, the Holshevik Leninists argued that the increase
in administrative and economic pressure on working people stemmed from
the ruling bureaucracy's desire to make them pay for the c o n flu e n c e s o f
an economic crisis caused by the political leadership. While the living stan­
dards o f industrial workers and lower categories o f clerical staff fell, that
could not be said o f the privileged groups, Lor example, in the autumn o f
1928 a significant increase in rents was applied to those with low incomes,
while it almost completely bypassed those with high earnings.17 At the
same timeT the Politburo ordered a 20 per cent increase in the salaries o f
party members who held senior positions,1* “ Mow completely they must be
beholden to the interests o f the bureaucratic apparatus, and alien to work­
ers* interests, to take such decisions!" concluded the bulletin o f the Uolshe-
vik Leninists’ Moscow organization.1''
The oppositionists* shift to active agitation in the factories, their sharp
criticism o f the government’s social and economic policies, and their denun­
ciations o f bureaucratic privilege and inequality all served to strengthen
rheir position among workers. If workers had previously been indiffer­
ent to the internal party conflicts, considering that these did not nlVect
them, they now began to express sympathy with the opposition. I11 secret
reports on the mood in the factories, party organizations noted statements
by workers such as: “ die opposition was right to say that {the govern­
ment) are putting the squeeze cm workers"; “ they’ ve expelled jfrom the
partyl all those who stood tip for the working class” ; and “ the <:ifu has sent
Trotsky and the other oppositionists to Siberia, It reminds you o f the
old times. T h ey did it under [Tsar| Nicholas |u|. they do just the same
Hi, liiu llrtttt’ vjipo zrtfii ( M o s c o w ), Sep. f. j2ft, op. 1. J . l j j . I. 2,S-
17 . J b i t L , 1. 2* .
lH. Resolution ut’ llK Ptiliibuio o f the l > t n n l C o m m itte e ot the V M h( b ) . “ O partmaksi-
m u m c " luiASPi, f. 17. op. 1. «L 7QS. II. J-4 -
IV, itiirMWtfir' ttppvzitfii (M o sc o w ), C k i. iy iS f nt;Asn, f, 3Jrt, op. I, J- 13,1 . 1- 2A.
TI M : “ t t O U t f l F V I K I ILNINIVl " O l'l'O S n iflN A N E J t ill- W f l H K I N C C l A S S I$9
under Stalin, so that they can keep the working class under pressure.” 2"
In October 1928 .1 worker from Ivanovo-Voznesensk wrote to an opposi­
tionist acquaintance, who had been exiled: " N o w I understand thai what
you said was absolutely right. Your words —when you said that there is no
bread, that they are rationing it, that there are queues for everything and
shortages everywhere —have come true. It's bad. Workers are being boxed
in, made to do the work o f three. N ow I'm cursing, because I was blind
then, and couldn't see, didn't realize, that you were telling us the truth.
And we couldn’t defend you, we couldn't understand/'21 There were many
non-party workers who collaborated with the oppositionists in distributing
proclamations* and who helped them to hide from cxiPU agents. The party’s
Moscow committee received reports o f workers’ resistance to the confisca­
tion o f opposition leaflets*—
The cc's journal, bolshevik, asserted that at the factories the opposition
were “ not only nnabEe to carry their resolutions at a single mass meet­
ing. but also unable to get even a handful o f votes in their favour” s> Hut
the reality was ijuite different. In a secret report 011 the results o f the col­
lective agreement campaign o f 1927-1928, the c c information department
noted: “ At several workplaces |the opposition| were successful, mobilizing
.1 significant group o f workers. In some cases they took the lead at factory
mass meetings, where their representatives took the chair (Kauehuk [rub­
ber goods| factory fin Moscow]). There were instances in which meetings
accepted the oppositionists’ resolutions and those proposed by the party
cell were defeated."2* During a campaign to renew' the collective agree­
ments this happened again. Workers at a number o f factories and indi­
vidual workshops once more —and in some cases unanimously —voted for
depart mem ol tin* Cfitirjil C o m m itte e o f ihe VKr(b), llO Idiotic i itojyllib
kuinpauii jhj zakliucheuiiu kollcktivnykli d o g o v o r o v " Sep. tyiN, IttiAHj'l, f. 17. op.
il. H4. L 1 5 : information suhWep^rrjtU’ ftl o f the o rg itii»ii< in and distribution
ilc p i r m i n n o f the lOiinrnliiT o f the vKj*(b), “ O iiAsirurjiiiikl) iKspariiinyltli
rjboirhikh v s v u ? l s rciJicJiiuim XV p A r w ' r a h " . T j AOUm , I. j , op, Ji. il, 44a. t. JX;
^.LUlMlUr^ o l n o t e i in ai meetings o f thf unemployed tor the pt-dod D t t . H JI7-
Apr. ibid., [. JiS-
::i. Itu illrlfH ' tp p tiz itiii ( M o « o w ) , O c t. M>iH. m w i 'l . I, )iA, op. 1, d, 1 3 3 , 1. 40,
FiitorniiUioti n ib d i'p irlin cm o f the organ i7_at ion and distribution depart 111 cut ot tlir
M o v c u w co m m itte e o f die VKP(b), “ O t J d ' n y e ru itro fiiiia *rcnti rabtH fiikfi". i i Sep.
ly-ili. TsAc)1>M. f. j . op. n , cl, I. 1^6.
-■1 flttfjftmfr, ly2S, N u , s, p. fio.
'4 In formation department ol (he C e n tral C o m m itte e o f die VKI*(b). “ O khodcri ito^akh
k;impann po ZAkluichciiiui k o l id t i v n y k li ituj'tfvorov", Sep. WiASPi. f, 17, op. 31,
d. I. 25.
 A l l KSI t fiU SH V
Ifk )
opposition resolutions directed against the policy o f industrial manage­
ment and the govern mem. The cjO in fori nation department reported, for
example; ' ‘Ac a general mass meeting o f workers at j Moscow garment fac­
tory! Moskvoshvei, parly members who spoke Lip agamst the opposition­
ists were denied the floor, with shouts o f ‘ Enough lie*!1 The meeting voted
for an addendum to the collective agreement that had been proposed by
the oppositionists/'** T h e ogpu reported to the Politburo that, at a series o f
workplaces, groups o f employees who came into conflict with the manage­
ment expressed support s'for the general line o f the opposition" seeing it as
“ the only defender o f the workers” .46
Once the oppositionists started systematic work among the indus­
trial proletariat, they found that their propaganda evoked a considerable
response. “ There are broad possibilities for us in the working class, despite
the fear and repression” , the Bolshevik Leninists' all-Kussian centre stated
in an information report in April iy2fj, "W e have not yet drawn in all thost
who can be involved/' The same document said that there were almost no
supporters o f the Stalinist policy among workers, while on the other hand
there were strong '‘ left-wing*' and “ right-wing*' moods, It also mentioned
organized groups with “ foggy ideology” whose members were being con­
vinced to co-operate with the opposition. In view o f its lark o f propagan­
dists, funds, and literature, the underground opposition leadership asked
its comrades living in exile to prepare popular pamphlets for workers and
material for reading groups,*7
The success o f the opposition's activity around the "worker question"
gave it the opportunity to organize significant numbers o f working people.
By leading the spontaneous workers* movement under conditions o f a deep
social crisisk peasant uprisings, worrit* about food shortages in the eiiie\,
and general dissatisfaction with the ruling regime, the tiolshcvik Leninists,
who in 1 928-1 h a d maintained a fairly wide network o f underground
cells, could have become a serious political force. IJut the masses could have
been mobilized only on the basis o f a concrete platform with clear indica-
25. Information department o f rhe C e n tra l C o m m itte e o f die v k f ( 1>)," O Idiotic
mivorimi 17 l > « . nwS. liu'd., II,
>6. “ SVti'vrjc/rrjiija vol. v : p„ 66$.
T}. A l l - U n i o n C e n tre of Buklicvik Leninists, “ tnform ataionnjij ivotlk.r\ 2SAjtl.
Central A rch ive at'th e fed e ral SirciitHy S c r v ir e o f the K u s s u n Feder.iiioii, M n w im
ITsentraPuyj arlthjv I'cdcrjl'tiui shizliby b w o ^ s i i i w l i Kossiiskot tederatsii, l i e r r j l l - 1
I S A l.S B KJ ] , f. i , o p . 7 , J . J J O , II.
m i: " hoi siikvik Len in ist ” opposition a n d m i. w okkinc class 161
tions o f how it could be realized. The liolshcvik Leninists’ main weakness
was their lack o f any clear and convincing programme o f action.
W hile advancing once again the demand for the expansion o f "w o rk ­
ers* democracy" in the party, trade unions, and soviets, the oppositionists
failed to explain how this might be achieved, given that, as they them­
selves admitted, the bureaucracy exercised complete domination over all
these institutions and came down heavily 011 any manifestation o f indepen­
dent initiative. The calls for democratization o f public life and proposals
for its implementation made in the liolshevik Leninists' main document,
their platform for the fifteenth congress, were thus addressed to that same
bureaucracy. An analogous situation prevailed with regard to their agi­
tation on the “ worker question": having exposed the administrative and
economic pressure on the working class and presented a list o f measures
to improve its situation, the opposition limited itself to general calls for
struggle against attacks 011 workers’ rights, without specifying the meth­
ods that might be used. People reading the opposition’s leaflets, and shar­
ing the critical views expressed in them, could well have concluded that
only one activity was required o f thorn: support for the opposition's rep­
resentatives at mass meetings and the insertion o f amendments into col­
lective agreements and other resolutions. And yet even i f factory meetings
passed resolutions drafted by the oppositionists, or made protests against
the government’s social and economic policies, til is could not produce any
practical results, since the real power was concentrated in another sphere
entirely: in the hands o f the party and state bod ies the factory manage­
ments, and the uopu .
Workers recognized this fact and had no illusions about the effective­
ness of participating in various types o f official meetings. The ‘"surveys o f
the political situation in the ussw”t drawn up each month by the oofu for
the Soviet leadership, continuously referred to workers’ "passive attitude1'
lo these meetings, which were often abandoned due to poor attendance.
D ue comment recorded was: “ What's the point in us going to these meet­
ings and sounding oft1? Things won’t be done our way, in any case/'-*
Many workers viewed the tactics o f the opposition„ who put great faith
111 these meetings, in a similar light. In the information report o f the Uol-
shevik Leninists’ All-U nion Centre, it was noted: “ A m ong workers who
I1U1-
sympathize with us* there is often a mood of: 'Y o u ’re good people, but its
I'jjy,
•iS, 'V V ifr iT i/ ifu iw j-ffcu frfro’ ', v o l . V I: p . f i io .
102
pointless putting yourselves about this way. You won’t be able to do
anything’ ” "*'’'
The opposition leaders explained this parados —the underground oppo­
sition1^ reliance on legal and exclusively reformist methods ot w orking-
class struggle - in terms o f the "proletarian character” o f tile Soviet state.
Trotsky admitted: "A worker, proceeding from his life experience, eolild
well cotne to the conclusion that power is already out ot the hands ot the
working class, that the ‘triangle’5" holds sway in the workplace, that criti­
cism is banned, that the apparatus is all-powerful in the party, and that
behind the hack ofSoviet organizations the bureaucrats give the orders, and
so un.h,JI Such conclusions, in Trotsky’s opinion, would be mistaken - tor
the power had only slipped from the hands ol the working class “ to some
extent; a very limited extent, very far from a decisive extent*1.*3 Trotsky
did not allow for a minute that the functions o f a ruling class could pass
to the party-state bureaucracy: this was not provided for in his schematic
conception o f class struggle with its strict dichotomy ' proletariat/bour­
geoisie’ ', If the power did not belong to private proprietors, he reasoned,
this meant that it belonged to the working class. The Trotskyist opposition
leaders were not troubled by the obvious contradiction between the well-
established fact that the working population had no rights and their own
assertions that “ proletarian dictatorship” had been preserved in the u s s k .
For them, the key to the question o f the class character o f the regime was
the concentration o f the means o f production in the hands of the state and
the existence o f a monopoly o f foreign trade.
From the conception o f the Soviet state’s ^proletarian character" flowed
the conviction that workers bad to fight for their rights and interests
only within the framework o f official structures, which needed not to be
rejected or destroyed but to be changed from within. The Trotskyist lead­
ers were frightened by the prospect ol workers’ protests growing into open
political confrontation with the state power and the ruling party. In a let­
ter o f May iy£B, Trotsky emphasized that workers' reactions to the bureau-
’ 9. At! U nio n O u t r e o f Holslievik L c n m iu t . ■‘ InlormiHSUXinjia svoilkj"* J> Apr. iy2y<
UA HH ki, f i . op. 7 r J . jfo, 11.
jo. I ht1 wtri.mpleM w j^ ilie name l<> die informal im nAycm eiit body tlu i crxasccd .it
e very workplace, rtwtipnsill^ the ilirector, the chairman ol I fit' lacinry (trjd c union)
CoiDiiiLlk-t. ami llle SftTCiary o f die party ccll- Usually, dlv three j i t e d ;iml ijMike in
complete LiiDniniily,
|L L . P . T ro lsk y. " N j iiovuin e lj p e ” , D e c. t y i l , H M ' l , I. ,12^, tip. i t ii.
jli T rolsky, J f y W w tsffti. p. Alt-
J3. Wr'frft'fcw* {fri^VAreYftfi'-frtiirpijirJ, i y ^ , N o . 5. pp. lo -ir
A IF-K Si; I CJUStV H IE "iJO I.SIIFV IK L L N I N I V l ” o m > s m O N A N D T f ll:. W O R K IN G C L A SS
cratic policy o f the state leadership might Surpass the boundaries beyond
which we consider them forbidden, i.e., the boundaries o f the Ilolshevik
party and the proletarian dictatorship” . Under these conditions, he argued*
the opposition's duty would be to come to the party’s aid by resisting such
tendencies among the working class ill the most decisive manner.*4
The Bolshevik Leninist leaders, apprehensive o f a radicalization o f the
workers’ movement so excessive as to undermine the Communist party
regime - which seemed to them to be the only form that the proletarian
dictatorship could take —viewed tactics o f working-class struggle, such as
strike action, with great caution. They admitted ilic possibility, in the most
extreme circumstances, o f strikes with economic demands, but categori­
cally opposed political strikes directed against the “ workers’” state. The
opposition's principled position on this issue was formulated by Mikhail
Okudzhava, Vasilii Kossior, and Khristian Kakovskii in this way: "T h e
opposition’s duty is to channel the demands o f the working class into trade
union and party legality, and to draw the class away from methods o f strug­
gle such as, for example, strikes, which damage industry and the state and,
consequently, workers themselves."**
I‘ he Trotskyist leaders categorically rejected the perspective o f orga­
nising discontented workers in a new political party in opposition to the
( ’omnnmist party. Equally, they were alarmed by any manifestation o f dis­
satisfaction with (he system o f one-party rule. In the spring o f iy2tt, in a
letter to Lev Sosnovskii about a dispute over pay cuts at an industrial enter­
prise in Kremencbug. eastern Ukraine, an oppositionist from the town
wrote: “ Various unhealthy tendencies have been awoken in connection
wiih the dispute. For example, when a campaign was launched against the
opposition. |r..[ rumours began to spread that the opposition would orga­
nize :i new party. And workers responded: ‘ O K , let them organize it and
(hen we will see which party really stands for the working class. Because
this [(^ouiuiLtuistj party is certainly not taking our side.’ Such disagreeable
chords cart be heard among workers fairly often.” ** Indeed, the tnamfes-
laiioii o f such moods, “ disagreeable" for the Trotskyists, was not unusual;
mui ilar expressions o f opinion, approving the idea o f forming an opposition
M tlLintititiii from letter from V. S m irn o v to T . K h o r c fh k o , ft O c t . i ^ H . hcaspi , tl
of». iHd. iri, I. ;;6; by (-,!>. Trotsky to iln-^tli coiijjrrss o f thr C o m in te rn ,
Jijn l. fr (>p„ I. d. 17s, I. K.
I. t. IfiuU ctrn’ vpfnm itiii (b&rshtvikov-U'HintfnO* No. P- J- also Jeiler from 1 ,
SniMiovskn CO A b r jtiu k u , 5 O c t . tyiH, miASPI, op. I, tl. H i, !L. ,*17-150,
l*i I v l M i t m s k i i . J' R a zj'rum levoi opjvozitsii v vshh” p, i K i .
■1
1^4 AI-tiltSH CUSliV
workers’ party, were also noted by party bodies in Moscow.*7 IJut* in spite
o f the fact tlut the opposition had itself actually become an independent
political organization, the B o l s h e v i k Leninists, continued to regard them­
selves as .1 “ fraction o f the Communist parry", to count on their imminent
return to a somehow "reform ed” ruling party* and to reject firmly the
“ bourgeois” idea of multi-partyism.
This strictly reformist orientation was not shaken even by recognition
o f workers* negative attitudes to the party cells. Thus, in a letter to one o f
his comrades in exile, Sosnovskii explained that the party workplace orga­
nizations were distrusted and in no way regarded as a vanguard. “ On the
contrary, a communist, in the non-party w orkers eyes, is either the boss
or the boss’s henchman." Sosnovskii described an incident, at the time
o f the fifteenth party congress, when he was approached by a non-party
worker, sympathetic to the opposition, who was held in high regard in the
workforce at the big Moscow factory where he worked. This worker asked
the advice o f Sosnovskii and other oppositionists about the invitation he
had received to join the party during the mass “ October enrolment” . The
worker pm the following question: “ If he joined the party now, then he
would risk losing the trust o f the worker masses, for those masses look at
those who join up these days and think: ‘So they've got bored o f being at
the lathe, they'd rather walk around with a briefcase.’ Would it be any use
to the opposition* i f he joined the party and lost the trust ol the working
masses?’* The oppositionists answered in the positive - and, according to
Sosnovskii, were absolutely right to do so, since the opposition's overall
approach was to work only through party structures,354
This stance also underpinned the opposition leaders’ ambiguous attitude
to doing political work outside the party. On the one hand, they considered
tt necessary to win support among non-party workers but, on the other,
they warned leaders o f underground opposition groups about prioritizing
this task — although at the same time they admitted that such efforts were
more productive than attempts to influence party cells.** The very concept
o f "workers’ democracy’’, under whose banner the communist opposition
37, liifurmilioil subitepartiliem o f t lie i>r^Jima(inii and rlntnbuliorl department ot i h f
M o s c o w com malice o f the VKP(b), “ t * iijsiiuniiiakti bt'sp jrliinykh rabodllkli v s v i n i
& rcsheniiaFin x v jurt*"cztia". t s a o l » m , f. op. 11, d. 440, I. JH.
3H. L etter from I.. SoKiouskii t o .Miraiuskn. } Oi'[, ttt;ASii, I. j i * . o p . I, J . i t 2 , 1L
U7 -J'# -
jy. ' T i s r u i k (o v a ru h e lu m n h n r h in t ‘ k<tt!innini^tJill'1, M.ir. |i#2*j, pcA.sn. I. jj/i, oj>, 1. d.
itfv, II„ 3-j,
T il l; "llO l.SH IiV IK I T i N I N m ’’ OPPOSITION AND TIIH W O RKIN G C LASS
appealed to the working people, was itself quite ambiguous and ill defined,
Trotsky openly declared that it did not mean the return o f “ all rights'*
to the working people, as that would signify the restoration o f bourgeois
democracy, i.e.* capitalism. He considered democracy acceptable only it
it did not breach the “ systematization o f all social relations" within the
framework o f the Communist party dictatorship. The freedom o f workers’
organizations under “ their own state” was, according to Trotsky, unneces­
sary and even harmful,4" in other words, workers were called upon not to
fight for liberation from the dictatorship that ruled over them, but only for
the replacement o f bad dictators with good ones.
]n the-straregy o f liolshevik Leninism, workers’ struggles were assigned
the role o f an auxiliary lever o f influence on the party, aimed at reforming
it. Uut in light o f the party’s transformation, by the end o f the n/ios, into
W a vertically organized structure o f the bureaucratic state apparatus, totally
F subordinate to a small group o f leaders, hopes o f its “ self-reform" were
I completely utopian, Usually naive was the oppositions reliance 011 legal
I forms o f struggle; under conditions iu which totalitarianism was taking
I shape and all social organizations being turned into adjuncts o f the state,
I channelling workers’ struggles "into legality" - that is, constraining them
I within the framework o f bureaucratized official structures — could only
I mean wittingly taking them to defeat. The opposition s fear o f standing
I out against the party-state system as a whole fenced in its activists, disori-
I ented its potential supporters, and blocked the effective development ot its
I struggle.
1 A section o f the liolshevik Leninists recognized the problems caused by
B the ambiguous and contradictory character o f the opposition programme
I and tactics as early as the second half o f 192ft, This came about not least
I because new people with fresh ideas were joining the underground oppo-
fl s» ion groups. In the spring o f 1929 the leadership o f the Trotskyist uuder-
I ground noted: “ For the past year we have experienced a significant inflow
I o f party members, who previously had 110 connection with us and even
) lought against us, A significant part o f the opposition’s work should be
shifted on to these comrades* shoulders* since there are already very few
ivmaining o f the old cadres who were expelled (from the pirtyj.*’41 The
new underground activists were mostly workers, attracted to the opposition
■ bv us actions in workplaces where before the fifteenth congress its cells had
H I>| lU nH tiat\>p}w zitsii { W i l t r i ’ikitv-lfn itiisfv), njiy, N o . $. }»|X 1 2 -13.
■ 11 All U nio n C e n tre ot" llo h b evik Leninists, "Inforuiju io m iaiji svod kar'. 15 Aj>r, lt/ly,
■ I sA l :S » V i , fr 2, U p . 7, d t f . II-
■ l
 A I I-. K S III CUSI-LV
been weak or non-existent.4* Among those who had been ex pellet! from
the party for opposition activity in Lite KJ27 and curly KJ2H, 46,9 per cent
had been blue-collar workers, compared to peasants, who constituted H.J1
per cetu, and white-collar workers (sfozlumticttfc), who were jy.7 per cent.w
Itut by ry2y the situation had changed: workers from industrial enterprises
now comprised the overwhelming majority o f the Bolshevik Leninists in
Moscow.14 A similar tendency is evident in 1929 in Chelyabinsk in the
southern Urals from a list o f people arrested for membership o f a "Trotsky­
ist group” : 90 per cent were blue-collar workers.4*
Kepresent.itives o f this younger generation o f oppositionists ~ people
who had rallied to the opposition during a wave o f working-class unrest —
expressed, with growing clarity, doubts about Trotsky's political ideas and
their theoretical basis. In September 1928 Karl Radek, who both continued
a wide-ranging correspondence with those in exile ami received informa­
tion from those “ at liberty" —and was therefore well aware o f the political
moods in opposition circles - noted In a letter that a “ significant section o f
workers and youth” in the opposition ranks found the refusal o f the liol-
shevik Leninist leaders to consider founding a new party as an alternative
to the Communist party difficult to understand,**
In the underground groups o f Holshevik Leninists and the exile colo­
nies, an intensive process o f reconsideration o f the movement's theory and
practice began. As a result o f the discussion, the oppositionists in the village
o f Kolpashevo, in Tomsk province, western Siberia, for example, came to
the conclusion that the Soviet state had a non-proletarian character.'17 The
majority in the exile colony at Achinsk, in Krasnoiarsk province, south­
ern Siberia, called on the opposition to abandon its hopes for the reform o f
the party-state apparatus that was hostile to the working class, and to take
4J. "Svoilkii 0pp0ZitMc>IHk0&0' (M')iUJi o ilrlaltTilOMJ uppo/il^ii f j lUil'-oktiabr' tyjJt ('."t
ucAsri. I* j.ypr op, t, d. i j j , II. 6 o-fa_
4,1. I; LirosUi^kh, “ Sixib ihiiicJiic *sp|n^itsiS 113 plemimc " h K K VKi^h)", Ap r. njjfc,.
w : a ’iK
ii , f. #y, »p. 3, ii, M . II. 14-15.
44. L.itt^ opposit ioiiists, idciin lK 'J b y vutt members d the Institute o f M a rx*E n ge ls*
t.fnin m (Ik archives o f the Institute jn d o f the M c w o w cniDniiilcc o f ilic Vkl'fb).
lyj?> KtJASl'U I'. 17, op. 7 1 , d, 1 i7 „ tl.
45- I.ist o f persons having bt'en part o f 3 group o f Trolskyiles in C liclu b in s k , iijiH/ I W u -
meiiMtion C e n tre for the M odern H istory o f C tid 'ijb in % k oblast' |Tsi'iitr d nkm licii-
nusii novc-Hha istorii t rhelijbmskoi obtasii, h i j m c Ih i|. f 7$. op. 1, d. ste , ]|. 7$-lt.s,
46. Letter from K, K;tdek to the colony o f c m Its in Kolpaslievo, Sep. lyiJi, MrASPI, f jjtf,
njv I, (I. 7*J. 1. i.
47. L ctttr from M . (lolodets to K . R j d e k , jt M.it\ 1 ^ , h C A S M , f. J l 6 r op. I . d. 100, I.
if
1 HI' “ j i O I S H I V I K l E-NINISl” O P P O S I T I O N A N D T H R W H B K l N t i C-l A S S 16 7
a stand for its destruction and replacement by the “ self-active organiza­
tion o f the popular masses". In the exile colony in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, a
jiroup coalesced that called for rhe opposition to reorient mainly towards
the working-class strike movement; they characterized Trotsky's position
011 strikes as “ betrayal o f the working class" 4,1
The radicalization o f the Siberian and Central Asian exile colonies
which were constantly replenished by fresh waves o f arrests - directly
reflected the political evolution o f those ” ai liberty’*. The new exiles were
predominantly young workers, who* in contrast to the veteran opposition­
ists, were nut inclined to consider the party-state power as “ their own*1.
One ^moderate'* Trotskyist wrote in the spring o f ayiy: " T h e new people
arriving in exile All me with horror. These are people* in 110 way linked
to the Com munist Party, who had some incidental involvement with the
Komsomol [Young Communist L e a g u e w h o rejoice in every failure o f
Soviet power —absolutely anti-Soviet elements
Radek, in a letter to his exiled comrade tleazar Solmsev, with reference
to the “ layer o f workers supporting the opposition” , wrote; "W e fought
for the reform o f the party. They don't give a damn about the party.1"50
In direct contradiction to the opposition leaders, the Holshcvik Leninists'
more radical w in g did not want to continue to confine the struggle to pro­
paganda for internal party reform, and advocated more active conflict with
the regime. At the end o f iy2y a group o f activists o f the Moscow Bolshevik
I ertiiust underground circulated a document m which (hey rejected the
thesis o f the “ working-class*’ essence o f the Soviet state and - in opposition
to the (Trotskyist) reformism that “ had failed the test” - called for Soviet
workers to liberate Ebemud ves by revolutionary means.*’
There is further evidence o f the mood o f the “ radicals” in a letter of U
fuly ty2y from Radek to the oppositionist Mariia Sakhuovskaia. Radek
described a conversation he had had. in Tomsk in March o f the same year,
with a Moscow worker who had been sent into exile:
T<> my 4 |ii c * ii n n , “ Wlur attitude should the opposition take to possible h r c a d
i u>th it] die towns?", [ received the answer: "The opposilion should lead
I e lt c r Iron) t , U n it to K r K . i d c k , s p r i n g j y i y , RCWH, I", op. I. d. yS* I. 7 1 ; letter
Mom A . A k o p o v to K . K j i l c k , s p rin g n ji y . hc. a m 'I, f. op, t, (L u j , I. y,
iv L etter Iroiti I. K a r p e l ' ro K , k a d e k . ip r in ^ j y j y , m^vpr, f, l i f t . op . t. d. t4y, L s.
Hi i I rtter fro m K. R a d e k to E . S o l w s c v , H Ati(>. iy 2 y . ftC A S M . f. op, I, J . AH, l. $a.
H.i MK i^rj*,ii]iz;itstolinot p<wtiniovk.c vciprtjsa. ( I h m J l l ' i l l f ? " U r c , i y l y . T iA F5B Hi-, f. 2.
Lip 7. d, i q . II. H^-IOi.
 TEII: “ hlll.SHELVtK I UN'INIS'l" I WUSItlON AM) TliH WOKKINt; CLASS
AitKSliE tiUSHV
Khnstian Kakovskii* in a letter that compared the situation o f the Soviet
th e m ." T o T lit 1 q u e s tio n , " U r u l e r w h a t slo g a n s? ", th e a n s w e r “ l> o w n w it h
opposition with the conditions under which the political opponents o f
t h is n w m t i i L ' i i t ! " T o t h f q u e s tio n . “A n d w l u i 4ih m i( ilie A ltitu d e to th e
tsarist autocracy had worked, noted: “ The Hulshevifc, trade unionist, or
p tM vjint m o v e m e n t? '', I wan to ld , “ W e m u st s u p p o rt it ” A n d w h e n f sh o u te d ,
worker pursued by the old regime could fall back on various guarantees
“ Y o u 're prepared m t h r o w o u t a w o rk e rs ' g o v e rn m e n t!",. a n o th e r M o s c o w
against its arbitrary power: in the first place legal ones, and in the second
w o rk e r, w h o had com e io v is it me d u r in g In*, h o lid a y s, in to n e d th o u g h t*
place everyday phenomena in the private capitalist economy. Those put out
l i i l l y : “ T h e r m s th e snag, T h e r e 's n o w a y th a t th a t's j w o r k e r s 1' ^ t v t r i u i i e f i t . ”
I o f one factory or other workplace on account ot their political beliefs could
A chasm literally opened up ill front o f me. These arguments by two worker
go and find work at another, lint nowr a liolshevik or non-party worker
oppositionists - neither selected by me. one a simple, politically inexperi­
accused o f having an independent caste o f mind, under conditions o f a
enced person, the other with a standard political education —can’t have been
socialist economy in which the tendency tor leadership misuse ot power
nude by coincidence. Three days After this conversation I met a Moscow
is present, faces the most unenviable fate."** In ly iS - iy iy the liolshevik
student oppositionist on the street; lie was on his way to his placc of exile.
Leninists faced an enemy much more formidable than the one the Bolshe­
H e d ffm e d th e o p p o s itio n 's a im s in e x a c tly th e sam e w a y.w
viks had lud to deal with before the revolution. The authoritarian tsarist
regime had been replaced by a totalitarian state that aimed at unlimited
However, the underground groups o f Bolshevik Leninists did not succeed
control over all spheres o f social life. All guarantees tor dissidents, be (bey
in making the transition to such decisive action. As ea rly us the autumn
“ legal" or “ everyday” had been done away with.
o f nj^K, the C o m mu tiist party Politburo, concerned at the level o f opposi­
tion agitation in the workplaces, took, the decision to speed up its efforts to I
# In the struggle o f the communist opposition o f the iy20s, Soviet history
extirpate the underground groups. In a letter to all provincial and repub­
{ witnessed the last attempt at organized political resistance to the onset of
lican party committees, the c;t: secretary. Viacheslav Molotov, referred to
M totalitarianism, This struggle took place under conditions in which social
“ new attempts, to revitalize’' the opposition* and emphasized: “ Under­
1 contradictions were sharpening; in particular, there was an antagonism
ground anti-party and anti-Soviet groups, especially those that introduce
T between the working class and the state, which sought to turn workers
demoralization into the working class, must be subject to the most deci­
|W into objects o f super-esploiution, deprived o f any rights whatsoever. The
sive measures o f revolutionary repression,"51 The c:pu, having received
13 drawing together o f the opposition with active sections o f the working
corresponding instructions, unleashed their whole arsenal o f repressive
jjj class, 011 the basis o f agitation on questions ot vital everyday importance
methods: a massive wave o f searches o f the homes o f those suspected o f
| for workers, opened up the possibility o f unity between the opposition's
sympathy with the opposition; surveillance; the deployment o f agt'nts pn>-
I struggle and the spontaneous class protests, lint the liolshevik Leninists
twateurs. The number o f arrests rose sharply. And although in some work­
■ were not able to take full advantage o f this possibility. The “ tops" o f the
places the workers tried to obstruct the arrest o f the liolshevik Leninists, or
I opposition, who were historically linked to the ruling bureaucracy,. could
demanded their release,*4 the series of operations against the underground
I not completely break with it, And the younger generation o f oppositionists
opposition undertaken by the Chekists in u>2y led to its almost complete
* who in principle were ready to take the side o f the working class against
annihilation*
' 1 lie “ workers' state** —were not allowed the time to complete the break in
practice.
l etier In m i K . K j i k ' k to M . S j k l i n o v ? k j i j , lyay. b <;a s w . f. jjrt, n]i, i. J . ft;. L
HY
Xl. " V s e m k r ji k u m l n l h uhlatfkoinant, T sK il.iufcumpjrui, ^Lilikoilum VM'(h)“ . ±| Sep.

I
iv.iJf. h<;asi*i, f. 17, up j. d. 70ft, 1. n.
iUttHrtwr' i*p}wzitiii (MoSt’ow), Sep. m>j«. jk,asi>i, f. 17, op, j. J, i ^ r I. jy; io Oct. hmS,
I. J7; Hlnforriiai%»onnoc pn'tuo oppoitiismminjio tseiitr.-T, Mar, 1- 97: niton na­
tion subtle part men t ut llit or£ariLZJLtimi and distribution department ol'ihe Mowd-w ■ u Eecter I'roin Kh. lUkuvskii (ftE. ^reobra/heitskii. 14 May lyiN, lu^si'i, f, jyi, op. I,
committcc of die VKi'{b). u() iijstrm'illi.tkll rjbochikli i slu^hashchikli", JliL.
H it M.s. i, 5-
IvU>1>m, f. 3. op. 11, d. 7Jt7.1. 2S.