Philippine Political Law: Isagani Cruz

PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW
By
ISAGANI A CRUZ
Associate Justice
(1986-1994)
Supreme Court of the Philippines
CARLO L. CRUZ
Professorial Lecturer
College of Law, Lyceum of the Philippines University
College of Law, University of the Philippines
Bar Review Lecturer

Jurists Bar Review Center
College of Law, Lyceum of the Philippines University
UP Law Center
2014 Edition
FOREWORD
ON FEBRUARY22, 1986, after almost thirteen years of

oppression and repression, the light at the end of the
tunnel glowed fitfully but hopefully to signal the advent
of a new liberation for the Filipino people. That was the
day Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
General Fidel V. Ramos, burrowed themselves at Camp
Crame and proclaimed their defiance of President Mar-
cos, whom they accused of rigging the election held on
February 7, 1986. The real winner, they said, was Cora-
zon C. Aquino, the unassuming widow who had
launched a charismatic campaign against the Marcos
regime and received throughout the land a response
that can only be described as phenomenal. Marcos was
asked to respect the mandate of the electorate and step
down in favor of the legitimate choiceof the people.
The announcement stunned, then electrified, the
nation. Before long, a crowd of civilians from all walks of
life-the rich mingling with the slum-dwellers, children
in the care of grandparents, nuns and housewives hold-
ing vigil with doctors and jeepney drivers, students
pitching makeshift tents with their professors, every
single one of them sharing a commonobsession for free-
dom-gathered in front of the military camp to give
support and protection to the men inside. The military
was no less affected and inspired. Generals began de-
fecting with their men to the endangered citadel. The
onlookers were at first alarmed, then thrilled, when
several helicopters landed, not to fight, as it turned out,
but to pledge their support for the outnumbered rebels.
Soon millions had massed at the gates of Camp Crame
and the nearby Camp Aguinaldo, to form a human
shield and buffer against the expected onslaughts of the
iii
Toward this end, she created a Constitutional Com-
mission which undertook the framing of a new charter
"truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Fili-
pino people." The draft charter, hammered out for more
than four months, was submitted to the electorate in a
plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, and was ratified
with a comfortable margin, due largely to a desire for
stability and normal government rather than to the
intrinsic merits of the document.
It is this Constitution of 1987 that will serve as the
basis of the eighth revision of this book on the political
structure of the Republic of the Philippines. If there
were these many revisions before, it was because the old
Constitution changed with the fickle whims and designs
of the deposed dictator. It is hoped that this time, there
will be more permanence in the new Constitution, and it
w:i.11 remain, as it ought to be, "firm and immovable, like
a mountain amidst the strife of storms or a rock in the
ocean amidst the ranging of the waves."
In a way then, this book is beginning again, not
with a mere revision but with a first edition.
ISAGANI A. CRUZ
May 3, 1987
v
... and
for SALLY
beautiful and beloved
... from the blessed and bountiful beyond.
vii
more assertive of its independence and role as "not only
the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the con-
science of the government."
Important new decisions on executive privilege, as
invoked against the legislative prerogative of investiga-
tion, the President's appointment, control, diplomatic and
military powers, and the Legislature's exercise of its law-
making and non-legislative powers, including its power of
impeachment, are also discussed in this edition.
Principles pertinent to the Constitutional Commis-
sions, as either promulgated or clarified by the Supreme
Court, are likewise presented along with segments on
the greater participation of the people in our democratic
government, as intended in our Constitution.
The undersigned has written these changes in this
book with every intention of remaining consistent with,
if not absolutely faithful to, the views of the author, his
teacher and idol, as expressed and discussed by him
during his final years. It is hoped that the reader would
consider this new edition as a continuation of the au-
thor's legacy of masterful mentorship in the field of Phil-
ippine Political Law, which he started in his first edition
of this book almost forty years ago.
That first edition was dedicated by the author to
his children. He there, and then, expressed his hope that
they will help burnish the nation's future with their in-
violate ideals, their unflappable faith, and their not im-
possible dreams. That dedication is retained in this edi-
tion as his continuing prayer for his offspring, and, in
turn, as their affirmation, made with profound grati-
tude, that, as to the hopes their father held for them
when they were young, all is well.
CARLO L. CRUZ
October 11, 2013
ix
PRAYER
delivered on July 23, 1986
at the Constitutional Commission
by
J.B. LAUREL, Jr.
Commissioner
Almighty God, even as the eagle flies at will in the in-
finite reaches of the skies, let our vision soar untrammeled as
we seek that radiant future we hope to ensure for our people
in the Constitution we are writing.
Let it be a future where all persons are born free, rel-
ishing their rights but always with deference to the rights of
others and recognizing authority as long as its highest com-
mitment is to the strengthening and defense ofliberty.
Grant that the spirit of freedom shall always reign in
our land, touching one and all like a benediction and igniting
that divine spark in every human being that can make him,
indeed, slightly "lower than angels" in this imperfect world.
Grant us courage, that we may face up to the powerful
and defend those who are weak and oppressed.
Grant us wisdom, that we may distinguish between
what is right and what is just, for they are not always the
same.
Grant us candor, that we may be true to ourselves and
so not be false to others.
Grant us strength when we are assailed by despair, or
self-doubt, or temptation.
And finally, Lord, grant the new Constitution grace and
beauty oflanguage, so that generations from now, when all of
us here are gone, our people will still be moving reverently to
the cadence of its thoughts.
Bless us all, Eternal Spirit, and keep us free, forever and
ever.
Amen.
xi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Chapter 1
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Scope of the Study............................................................................... 1

Necessity for the Study 1
Basis of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. 2
Background of the Study 3
Chapter 2
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PIDLIPPINES
Outstanding Features 13
The Supremacy of the Constitution 16
Prospects of the Constitution 16
Chapter 3
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
Definition 17
Elements 18
People
(1) , .. : 21
Territory
(2) 22
(3) Government 33
A. Functions 33
B. Doctrine of Parens Patriae 37
C. De Jure and De Facto Governments 40
D. Government of the Philippines 42
E. Administration 42
(4) Sovereignty 43
Act of State 47
xiii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Chapter 7
DELEGATION OF POWERS
Permissible Delegation 162

(1) Tariff Powers 162
(2) Emergency Powers .. . .. . .. 163
(3) Delegation to the People 171
(4) Delegation to Local Governments 172
(5) Delegation to Administrative Bodies 173
Tests ofDelegation 175
(1) The Completeness Test 176
(2) The Sufficient Standard Test 178
The Pelaez Case 182
Chapter 8
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
The Senate : 186

(1) Composition 186
(2) Qualifications 187
Term 196
The House of Representatives 200
(1) Composition 200
(A) The District Representatives 201
(B) The Party-list Representatives 205
(3) Term 222
Election 225
Salaries 226
Parliamentary Immunities 227
(1) Privilege from Arrest 228
(2) Privilege of Speech and Debate 229
Conflict of Interest 233
Incompatible and Forbidden Offices 233
Inhibitions and Disqualifications 236
Sessions 239
Officers 241
Quon1m 241
Discipline of Members 243
Journals 245
xv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Executive Privilege 366

Presidential Immunity 376
Chapter 11
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
The Appointing Power 389

(1) The Removal Power 407.
The Control Power 409
The "Take-Care" Clause 419
The Military Power 421
(1) Command of the Armed Forces 424
(2) Habeas Corpus 434
(3) Martial Law 438
(4) Limitations on the Military Powers 439
The Pardoning Power 443
(1) Definitions 444
(2) Limitations 444
(3) Kinds of Pardon 445
(4) Effects of Pardon 448
(5) Distinctions 453
(6) Amnesty 453
The Borrowing Power 455
The Diplomatic Power 457
The Budgetary Power 462
The Informing Power 463
Other Powers 464
Resume 464
Chapter 12
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Independence of the Judiciary 467

Judicial Power 468
Jurisdiction 474
Appointments 4 74
(2) The Judicial and Bar Council................................. 476
Fiscal Autonomy 481
Composition of the Supreme Court 485
xvii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
(1) Exceptions 621

Security of Tenure 624
Partisan Political Activity 629
Self-organization 634
Temporary Employees 636
Objectives of the Civil Service 638
Oath 641
Disqualifications 641
Standardization of Compensation 646
Double Compensation 647 .
Chapter 15
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Composition and Qualifications 652

Powers and Functions 654
(I) Enforcement of Election Laws 654
(2) Decision of Election Contests 681
(3) Decision of Administrative Questions 689
(4) Deputization of Law-Enforcement Agencies 690
(5) Registration of Political Parties 691
(6) Improvement of Elections 700
Election Period 701
Party System 702
Funds , 704
Judicial Review 705
Chapter 16
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Composition and Qualifications 709

Powers and Functions 710
Prohibited Exemptions 725
Report 727
Chapter 17
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Impeachment 730
xix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Priority Measures 833

Sequestration 834
Salaries 835
APPENDICES
A. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 837

B. The 1973 Constitution 917
C. Ordinance Appended to the Constitution Apportioning
the Members of the Batasang Pambansa to the Differ-
ent Provinces with their Component Cities, Highly
Urbanized Cities, and the Districts of Metropolitan
Manila 956
D. The 1935 Constitution 959
--oOo--
xxi
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Abainza v. Arellano, G.R. No. 181644, December 8, 2008,

573 SCRA 332 662
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056,
September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1 160, 177, 178, 179
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251 275, 290, 729
Abanilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 142347, Au-
gust 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 87 721
Abayon v. COMELEC and Raul Daza, G.R. No. 181295,
April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 473 663
Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010,
612 SCRA 375 214
Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 164 SCRA 651.. 252
ABC Party List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193256, March
22, 2011, 646 SCRA 93 698
Abella v. Larrazabal, G.R. Nos. 87721-30 & 88004,
December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 509 658
Abella vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100710, September 3,
1991, 201 SCRA 253 664
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, October 15, 2008,
569 SCRA 59 : 765
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Phil. Multi-Media
Inc., G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009, 576
SCRA 262 129, 520, 524
Abueva v. Wood, 45 Phil. 612 144
Abundo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013,
688 SCRA 149 223
ACCFA v. Federation of Labor Unions, 30 SCRA 649 35
Achacoso v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991,
195 SCRA 235 621
Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 234
Adolfo v. CFI ofZambales, G.R. No. L-30650, July 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 166 460
xxiii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16,

2010, 612 SCRA 761 699
Atienza v. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005,
458 SCRA 385 503
Atizado v. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633
SCRA 105 273
Atizado v. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633
SCRA 105 108
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA
477 158, 206, 209, 215, 473, 696
Atty. De Vera v. Judge Layague, 395 Phil. 253 (2000) 780
Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780 390
Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 150, 242
Aytona v. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1.. 146, 405
Azarcon v. Sandiganhayan, G.R. No. 116033,
February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747 752
Aznar v. HRET, G.R. No. 65000, January 9, 1990 254
Bacolod City Water District v. Bayona, G.R. No. 168780,

November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 518 610
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8,
2008, 573 SCRA 290 204, 538
Balaba v. People, G.R. No. 169519, July 17, 2009, 593
SCRA 210 754
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December
13, 2011, 662 SCRA 312 434
Balbastro v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 171481,
June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 729 778
Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v. Pacana,
G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 196 75
BANATv. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7,
2009, 595 SCRA 477 263, 281, 677, 678
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009,
586 SCRA 210 214
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009,
592 SCRA 294 208, 212, 697
Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010,
618 SCRA 488 384
xxvii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Besa v. PNB, 33 SCRA 330 622

Betoy v. Board of Directors, National Power Corporation,
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA
420 363, 393, 628
Bibas v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 172580, July 23, 2008,
559 SCRA 591 730
Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154 392
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78 420
Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008,
554 SCRA 755 605, 680
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4,
1994, 235 SCRA 103 754
Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 288
Boncalon v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 171812, December 24,
2008, 575 SCRA 449 778
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 255
Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aldan, G.R.
No. 196870, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 555 473
Borja v. People, G.R. No. 164298, April 30, 2008,
553 SCRA 250 610
Borlongan v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 167234, February
27, 2006, 483 SCRA 405 780
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 1.. 575
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 146 723
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 80767, April 22, 1991, 196
SCRA 176 615
Brillante v. Puyat-Reyes, House Electoral Tribunal
Case No. 31 (1988) 188, 216
Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 600
British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583,
August 20, 562 SCRA 511 320, 546
British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583,
April 15, 2009, 585 SCRA 36 320
Buac v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 800, 810 (2004) 341
Buehs v. Bacatan, A.C. No. 6674, June 30, 2009,
591 SCRA 217 563
Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175895, 12
April 2007, 520 SCRA 79'/ 779
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-
802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718 385
xxix
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 374 246

Casibang v. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642 140
Casing v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 192334, June 13, 2012,
672 SCRA 500 766
Casino Labor Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
141020, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 323 610
Castillo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187231, June 22, 2010,
621 SCRA 499 553, 684
Castriciones v. Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 65731, September 28, 1989
(Minute Resolution) 437
Castro v. Deloria, G.R. No. 163586, January 27, 2009,
577 SCRA 20 530
Castro, Jr., et al. v. Castaneda and Liceralde, 111 Phil.
765 (1961) 766
Cavite Crusade for Good Government v. Cajigal,
422 Phil. 1, 9 (2001) 795
Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163776,
April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23 666, 668
Cayetano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193846,
April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 561... 604, 686, 687, 707
Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359 179
Cesa v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166658, April 30, 2008,
553 SCRA 357 778
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008,
545 SCRA 441 517
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242,
July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579 477, 519, 532
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Govern-
ment, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299
SCRA 744 370
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250,
July 9, 2002, 433 Phil. 506, 534 (2002), 384
SCRA 152 299, 371
Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs, G.R. No. 178759, August 11, 2008, 561
SCRA 710 548
China National Machinery & Equipment Corporation
v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7,
2012, fififi RC:RA 189 .. .,..... .. ........ ., . 50, 51, 52, 58, 66, 458
Chua-Qua v. Ciave, G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990,
189 SCRA 117 87
xxxi
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Commission on Elections v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186616,

November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 167 152, 282, 472
Commission on Elections v. Espanol, G.R. Nos. 149164-
73, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 554, 565 679
Commissioner oflnternal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,
240 SCRA 368 (1995) 639
Commissioner oflnternal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 107135, February 23, 1999, 303 SCRA 508 312
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eastern Telecom-
munications Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 163835, 7 July
2010, 624 SCRA 340 323
Commissioner oflnternal Revenue v. General Foods
(Phils.), Inc., 401 SCRA 545 547
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine
American Accident Insurance Company, Inc.,
453 SCRA 668 548
Connally v. Scudder, 160 N.E. 655 134
Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 140656, September 13,
2007, 533 SCRA 205 501, 506
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 603
SCRA 621 104
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit,
181 SCRA 495 522
Cornejov. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188, 193-194 (1920) 729
Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242,
July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 563 730, 749
Corpus v. Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965,
13 SCRA 591 629
Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance
Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012, 670
SCRA 343 521
CREBA v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
183409, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295 537, 538
Crespo v. Mogul, No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151
SCRA 462 767
Cruz v, Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 175, 176
Cua v. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582 605
Cuenco v. Fernan, A.C. No. 3135, February 17,
1988, 158 SCRA 29 : 738
Culanag v. Director of Prisons, 20 SCRA 1123 446
Cunanan v. Tan, 5 SCRA 1. ,. 265
Custodio v. Senate President, 42 O.G. 1243 14 7, 509
xxxiii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009,

579 SCRA 521 298, 300
De Leon v. Carpio, 178 SCRA 457 418
Delos Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
223 SCRA 1. 51, 61, 62, 63
Delos Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 622, 624
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001,
February 13, 1996, 253 SCRA 559 344
Delector v. Ogayan, 123 SCRA 774 636
Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903,
May 15, 1989, 173 SCRA 409, 419 753
Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 311, 525
Dept. of Education v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 107
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon v. Franciso, G.R. No.
172553, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 439 776
Deputy Ombudsman v. Abugan, G.R. No. 168892,
March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 34 778
Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152318,
April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 150 52, 58
Dimagiba v. Espartero, G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012,
676 SCRA 420 650, 777
Dimaporo v. COMELEC, 544 SCRA 381 259
Dimayuga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174763,
April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 220 687
Dino v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4, 2009, 607
SCRA 251 679
Dinsay v. Cioco, 264 SCRA 703 (1996) 780
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 US 203 85
Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,
G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 213 170, 383
Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003,
397 SCRA 56 385
Domino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015,
July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546 189, 664
Dra. Baylon v. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau,
442 Phil. 217 (2002) 584
Drillon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 410
Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36, 49 (1915) 272
Duenas v. HRET, G.R. No. 185401, July 21, 2009,
593 SCRA 316 254
Duenas v. HRET, G.R. No. 191550, May 4, 2010,
620 SCRA 78 254
xxxv
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, Mar. 2, 2001,

353 SCRA 452 352
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001,
353 SCRA452 376, 767
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, April 3, 2001,
406 Phil. 1 (2001), 356 SCRA 108 152, 472
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006,
492 SCRA 1 86
Estrella v. COMELEC, _G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004,
429 SCRA 789 606, 653
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
247 Phil. 387, 394 (1988) 538
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1.. 85
Executive Judge Basilia v. Judge Becamon, 487
Phil. 490 (2004) 780
Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,
G.R. No. 164171, March 1, 2006, 482 SCRA 673 175
Ex-Parte Levitt, 303 U.S. 633 506, 508
Ex-Parte Milligan, 4 Wall, 127, L.Ed., 297 428, 435
Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940 (1997) 771

Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16,
1998, 295 SCRA 470 278, 776
Facura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166495,
February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 427 778, 779, 780
Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals,
477 SCRA 49 547
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503 282
Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals, 217 SCRA 298 72, 75
Federation of Free Farmers v. CA, G.R. No. L-41222,
November 13, 1985 587
Federico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 199612,
January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 134 661
Feliciano v. Aranez, G.R. No. 165641, August 25, 2010,
629 SCRA 103 723
Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, 464 Phil. 439 236
Feria v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 122954,
February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 525........................................ 4::l7
Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179695
and 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782 660, 676
xxxvii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 120295

& 123755, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727, G.R. No.
87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245 658
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., G.R. No. L-6060,
September 30, 1950 63
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No.
124295, October 23, 2001, 368 SCRA 36 561
Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013,
691 SCRA 196 363
Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010,
612 SCRA 308 362, 505
Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 192791, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579 501, 598
Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, June 20, 1997,

274 SCRA 540 587
Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22,
2011, 643 SCRA 631 685
Galero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151121, July 21,
2008, 559 SCRA 11 778
Galicto v. Aquino, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012,
667 SCRA 150 158, 386, 498, 520
Gallardo-Corre v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30,
2001, 350 SCRA 568 583
Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579,
June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690 123
Gamogamo v. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corpora-
tion, G.R. No. 141707, May 7, 2002, 431 Phil. 510,
381 SCRA 742 617
Ganaden v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 169359-61, June 1,
2011, 650 SCRA 76 765
Garcea v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510 316
Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
'75025, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 356 450
Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120 54
Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 85, 110
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584,
April 2, 200!), fi83 SCRA 119 491, G22
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554,
July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 750 119, 237, 425, 429, 543, 544
Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 520 309
xxxix
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June

19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481 602, 639, 665
Grino v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 91602,
194 SCRA 458 622
GSIS v. Group Management Corporation, G.R. No.
167000, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 279 80
GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G.R.
No. 170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622 635
GSIS v. Villaviza, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010,
625 SCRA 669 635
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 515
Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006,
498 SCRA 671 119, 299, 433
Guerrero v. COMELEC, 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000) 257
Guevara v. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269 689
Guevara v. Gimenez, 6 SCRA 813 715
Guevara v. Inocentes, G.R. No. L-25577, March 15, 1966,
18 SCRA 379 268, 400
Guiao v. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018 (1954) 766
Guingona v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846,
May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 448 519
Gumaru v. Quirino State College, G.R. No. 164196, June
22, 2007, 525 SCRA 412 583
Gunsi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168792, February 23,
2009, 580 SCRA 70 495, 501, 658
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 198 .... 653, 743, 744, 747
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No.
193459, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 804 744
Hacienda Luisita Incorporated.v, Luisita Industrial

Park Corporation, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011,
653 SCRA 154 148, 496, 520, 522
Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, November 22,
2011, 660 SCRA 525 530, 734
Hagad v. Gazo Dadole, 321 Phil. 604 (1995) 626, 775, 776
Halley v. Printwell, Inc., G.R. No. 157549, May 30, 2011,
649 .SCRA 116 574
Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 542 (2003) 765
xli
TABLE OF CASES
Page
In Re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 139

In Re Torres, G.R. No. 122338, Dec. 29, 1996 447
In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, A.M. No.
05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 1 76, 555
In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 771 738
In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Pay-
ment of All Court and Sheriff's Fees, A.M. No.
12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012, 688 SCRA i.. 483, 555
In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess
Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. Nos. 163619-20, November
17, 2005, 475 SCRA 290, 303 189
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo
and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of Francis
Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533,
September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678 377, 433
Infante v. Prov. Warden, 92 Phil. 310 446
Ingles v. Mutuc, 135 Phil. 177 (1968) 624
Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171. 409
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No.
175241, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 523 505
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
338 SCRA 81. 430, 471, 515
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil.
618, 634 (2000) 539
Inting v. Tanodbayan, 97 SCRA 494 789
Jacob v. Puno, 131 SCRA 144 418

Jacct v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008, 572
SCRA 295 218, 802
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474,
June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 530 257
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474,
October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1 257, 659, 668
Jamero v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140929, May 26, 2005,
459 SCRA 113 554
Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088,
January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331 189, 218
Jardiel v. COMELEC, 124 SCRA 650 678, 788
xliii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 105111

& 105384, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297 658, 665
Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989,
176 SCRA 664
Lacson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-16261, Dec. 28, 1951 655
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 165399 and
165475, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 142 770
Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740 402
Lacson v. Roque, 91 Phil. 456 : 381
Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 93 (2001),
357 SCRA 756 441
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 416
Lahm v. Mayor, A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012, 666
SCRA 1 563
Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 473 712
Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160 328, 809, 813
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Arceo, G.R. No. 158270,
July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 85 583
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182431,
November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 285 76
Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006,
507 SCRA 114 680
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 150, 436
Lan taco, Sr. v. Llamas, 195 Phil. 325, 334 (1981) 796
Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236 (2000) 770
Lastimosa v. Vasquez, 313 Phil. 358 (1995) 776
Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 382, 522
Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372, 378 (1946) 554
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 43, 45
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary
of Budget, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670
SCRA 373 155, 493
Lawyers League v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986 41
Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc., G.R. No.
150470, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 75 581
Layug v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192984,
February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 135 264, 682, 687, 698
Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097, 5 June 2009,
588 SCRA 285 582
Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 168 tlL!M ::!91.. 254
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 176951, November 18, 2008, 571 SCRA 263 197, 249
xlv
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 502 348

Loomis v. Jackson, 6W, Va. 613 819
Loong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93986,
December 22, 1992, 216 SCRA 760 658
Lopez v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 269 402
Lopez v. Delos Reyes, 55 Phil. 170 301
Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 428
Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396,
August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 62 764
Lorenzo v. Lopez, A.M. No. 2006-02-SC, October 15,
2007, 536SCRA ll 563
Lozada v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012,
670 SCRA 545 376
Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 515
Luciano v. Mariano, 148-B Phil. 178 (1971) 753
Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 402
Luison v. Garcia, 101 Phil. 1218 705
Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, 433
SCRA 119 322
Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 192
SCRA 51 (1990) 534
Lyons v. United States of America, 104 Phil. 593 64
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 246, 820, 824

Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. 157013, July 10, 2003,
453 Phil. 586 (2003), 405 SCRA 614 221, 290
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 239 ..... 132, 256, 343, 4 79, 580
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010,
635 SCRA 783 132, 256, 340, 343, 344, 479
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 46
Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993) 560
Macias v. Commission on Elections, 3 SCRA 1 203
Madarangv. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112314,
March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 525 752
Madriaga v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
192377. July 25, 2012, 677 8r-R.A sso 495, 501
Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011,
655 SCRA 4 76 24, 37, 81, 99
Magarang v. Jardin, Sr., 386 Phil. 273, 284 (2000) 795
xlvii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, No. L-77210,

September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 464 4 73
Marcos v. ChiefofStaff, 89 Phil, 246 (1951) 237, 544
Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995) 257
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 382
Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011,
657 SCRA 414 539
Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995,
242 SCRA 211 203
Maribago Bluewater Beach Resort v. Dual, G.R. No.
180660, July 20, 2010, 625 SCRA 147 112
Marohomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No. 169918, February 27,
2008, 547 SCRA 98 : 778
Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 189034, January 12, 2010,
610 SCRA 53 656
Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002,
429 SCRA 554 401, 520
Matute v. Hernandez, 66 Phil. 68 714
Medina v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 176478,
February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 684 770
Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16,
2005, 451 SCRA 476 769
Mendoza v. Court of First Instance, 65 SCRA 96 574
Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108 628
Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999,
367 Phil. 132 (1999) 801, 803
Mercury Drug Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 75662, September 15, 1989,
177 SCRA 580 112
Merritt v. Gov't. of the Phil. Islands, 34 Phil. 311 61, 78
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado,
G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 88 766
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tobias, G.R.
No. 177780, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 165 154
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 104
Miguel v. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035,
July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 560 753
Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005,
455 SCRA 397 96
Mlnlsterio v. City of Cebu, 40 SCH.A 464 61
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999,
311 SCRA 617 661, 666
xlix
TABLE OF CASES
Page
National Electrification Administration v. Morales, G.R.

No. 154200, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 79 60, 68, 610, 720
National Housing Authority v. City of Iloilo, G.R. No.
172267, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 237 324
National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 609
National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 609
Nava v. National Bureau of Investigation, Regional
Office No. XI, Davao City, G.R. No. 134509,
April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 377 767
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011,
648 SCRA 400 202
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010,
612 SCRA 131 202
Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012,
673 SCRA 618 98
Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29,
2013, 689 SCRA 385 304, 311, 312
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, March
25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77 154, 198, 298, 369, 375
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, September
4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152 197, 298, 304, 372, 457
New Frontier Mines v. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502 587
NHMFC v. Abayari, G.R. No. 166508, October 2,
2009, 602 SCRA 242 720
Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11,
2009, 578 SCRA 438 458, 557
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759,
August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649 221
Nicos Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
206 SCRA 127 571, 572
Nieves v. Blanco, G.R. No. 190422, June 19, 2012,
673 SCRA 638 640
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
152 SCRA 284 585
Noblejas v. Salas, 67 SCRA 4 7 417
Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405 151
Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26,
2010. 625 SCRA 472 581
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 526
li
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No.

167711, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA 327 771
Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero, G.R. No.
168718, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 106 769
Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, G.R. No.
165416, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 253 768, 771
Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, G.R. No.
177580, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 747 771
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez,
G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010, 625
SCRA 299 753, 762, 768, 769, 774
Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No.
175573, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 140 777, 779
Office of the Ombudsman v. Santiago, G.R. No.
161098, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 305 768, 769
Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, G.R. No.
168309, January 29, 2008, 543 SCRA 46 730
Office of the President v. Cataquiz, G.R. No.
183445, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 681 572
Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 427, 528
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172224,
January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 544 777
Ombudsman v. Pelino, G.R. No. 179261, April 18,
2008, 552 SCRA 203 776
Ombudsman v. Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January
31, 2011, 641 SCRA 148 760, 794
Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 252 111
Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 354
Phil. 948 (1998), 293 SCRA 141.. 271, 383
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993,
224 SCRA 792 36, 83, 127
Orap v. Sandiganbayan, 139 SCRA 252 754, 769, 790
Orosa v. Roa, 527 Phil. 347, 353-354 (2006) 418
Osmeii.a v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 188818,
May 31, 2011, 649 SCRA 654 724
Osmeiia v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993,
220 SCRA 703 722, 727
Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 147, 230, 244
Oxales v. United Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No.
152991, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 26 112
liii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344 (1997) 455

People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 709
People v. Fernandez, CA-G.R. No. L-1128 (1945) 316
People v. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173 549
People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011,
645 SCRA 590 108
People v. Lagman, 38 O.G. 1676 93
People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20,
2011, 654 SCRA 188 108, 273
People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30,
2013, 689 SCRA 715 108, 273
People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 678 521
People v. Pacificador, 406 Phil. 774, 782 (2001) 791
People v. Patriarca, 395 Phil.690 (2000) 455
People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 837 1, 46
People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 550
People v. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440 805
People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 105
People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 179
People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581 445
People v. Sandiganbayan, 451 SCRA 413 751
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394,
January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 205 756
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164185, July 23,
2008, 559 SCRA 449 645
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, Sep-
tember 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 489 751
People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10,
2009, 599 SCRA 20 108, 273
People v. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984,
130 SCRA 465 563
Peoplev. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 171, 173, 176, 180, 507, 521
People v. Zosa, 38 O.G. 1676 93
PEPSICO, Inc. v. Lacanilao, 524 Phil. 147 (2006) 583
Peralta v. Auditor General, 148 Phil. 261 (1971) 648
Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30 702
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285 .44, 45
Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106,
1115-1116 (1999) 257
Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil. 552 585
Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 672 585
PERT/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. v. Vinuya, G.R.
No. 197528, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 284 273
lv
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R.
No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506 155, 311, 312
Philippine Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 189767, July
3, 2012, 675 SCRA 513 364
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, G.R. No. 178030,
December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 644 323
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529,
29 April 2010, 619 SCRA 585 582
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. v.
Takenaka Corporation, G.R. No. 180245, July
4, 2012, 675 SCRA 674 503
Philippine International Trading Corporation v.
Commission on Audit, 461 Phil. 737 (2003) 724
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No.
105371 November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 203 247, 286
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,
247 Phil. 641 (1988] 113
Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No.
157279, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 307 520, 522
Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators,
259 Phil. 650, 655-656 (1989) 72
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement v. Virgilio
E. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010, 623
SCRA 244 112
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
169752, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 112 273
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 132561, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 336 520
Phillips Seafood [Philippines] Corporation v. Board
ofinvestments, G.R. No. 175787, February 4,
2009, 578 SCRA 113 412
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudica-
tion Division, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012,
677 SCRA 408 313, 385, 421, 462
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 262 U.S. 390 104
Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19,
2000, 336 SCRA 201 493
lvii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Querubin v. Regional Cluster Director, Legal and

Adjudication Office, COA Regional Office VI,
Pavia, Iloilo City, G.R. No. 159299, July 7,
2004, 433 SCRA 769 724
Quezon City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA
496 323
Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012,
675 SCRA 642 103
Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 98 Phil. 705 644, 651
Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189698, February 22, 2010, 613 SCRA 385 632
Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments,
177 SCRA 259 , 398
Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, February
15, 2008, 545 SCRA 635 659
Radaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177135,

October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 223 495, 501
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 172476-99,
September 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 505 766
Ramos v. Ramos, 447 Phil. 114 (2003) 583
Rapsing v. Ables, G.R. No. 171855, October 15,
2012, 684 SCRA 195 544
Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 390 Phil. 917 (2000) 765
Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 460 71
Rayo v. Metropolitan Bank, G.R. No. 165142,
December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 571.. 522
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3,
2009, 606 SCRA 598 98
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Ap-
praised Value of the Properties Purchased by
the retired Chief7Associate Justices of the Su-
preme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31,
2012, 678 SCRA 1 158, 483
Re: Complaint against the Honorable Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona dated September 14, 2011
filed by Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation,
A.M. No. 12-6-10-SC, June 13, 2012, 672
SCRA62 732
Re: Request of Jose M. Alejandrino, 672 SCRA 27 796
lix
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Republic v. Investa Corporation, G.R. No. 135466,
May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 29 755
Republic v. National Labor Relations Commission,
263 SCRA 290 79
Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470 61
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), 525 Phil.
804 (2006) 538
Republic v . Sandiganbayan, 182 SCRA 911 64
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478,
November 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 212 63
Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 553
Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 66, 78
Resolution dated May 2, 1989, cited in Re: Request
for Copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabili-
ties and Net Worth (SALN) and Personal
Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court and Officers of the
Judiciary, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012,
672 SCRA 27 798
Review Center Association of the Philippines v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180046, April
2, 2009, 583 SCRA 428 270, 383
Reyes v. Commission or. Audit, G.R. No. 125129,
March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 512, 516 604
Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013 193, 257, 260, 682, 800
Reyes v. Lim, G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003,
408 SCRA 560 554
Reyna v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219,
February 8, 2011, 642 SCRA 210 724
Riel v. Wright, 49 Phil. 195 153, 713
Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 254
Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603 165, 167
Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,
November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 84 377, 378, 433
Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009,
583 SCRA 396 299, 581
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 294 (2004) 791
Romulo v: Yniguez, 141 SCRA 263 149, 743
Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, September
10, 2009, 599 SCRA 09 705
Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18,
2010, 613 SCRA 233 378
lxi
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v.

Martinez, G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008,
547 SCRA 416 408
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 143, 512, 824
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085,
February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656 387
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February
19, 2008, 546 SCRA 303 765
Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March
19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106 328, 813, 825
Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294 63
Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
155618, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 611 688
Santos v. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749, February 8,
2007, 515 SCRA 97 768
Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281 64
Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 396
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 SCRA 495 175
Scott v. Inciong, 68 SCRA 4 73 542
Scoty's Dep't. Store v. Micaller, 99 Phil. 762 428
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
357 SCRA 441 547
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No.
180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1 551
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808,
October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 354 521
Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067, March
27, 1998, 288 SCRA 328 753
Serna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16,
2008, 558 SCRA 700 205
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F. 2d 725, 162 U.S. App.
D.C. 183 371
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006,
488 SCRA 1.. 299, 303, 367, 371, 372
491,493,512,514
Seneres v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178678, April 16,
2009, 585 SCRA 557 210, 631
Serrano v . Ambassador Hotel, G-.R No. 197008,
February 11, 2013, 690 SCRA 226 583
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R.
No. 167614, March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254 37, 273
lxiii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Spouses Serfino v. Far East Bank and Trust Company,

Inc., G.R. No. 171845, October 10, 2012, 683
SCRA 380 : 558
Springer v. Gov't. of the Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189 134, 527
SSS Employees Assn. v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686 634
Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. v. Municipality of
Cainta, G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 44 4 73
Sta. Maria v. Ubay, A.M. No. 595-CFI, December
11, 1978, 87 SCRA 179 4 73
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, G.R.
No. 167173, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456 299, 300
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 56
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,
G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 473 507
Suanes v. Disbursing Officer of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 254
Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co. v. CA, 110 SCRA 241 521
Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295 (1941) 676
Sumulong v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 44 7
Sunga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125629, March 25,
1998, 288 SCRA 76 664
Suplico v. National Economic Development Authority,
G.R. No. 178830, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 329 496
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 49, 56
Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., 511 Phil. 56 (2005) 563

Taganas v. Emulsan, G.R. No. 146980, September
2, 2003., 410 SCRA 237 581
Tagolino v. HRET and Lucy Torres, G.R. No.
202202, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574 661
Tagum Doctors Enterprises v. Apsay, G.R. No.
81188, August SCRA 4 71, 489 717
Talabon v. Warden, 44 O.G. 4326 571
Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
196804, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 197 659, 661, 664
Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169888,
November 11, 2008, 570 SCRA 622, 632 753
Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, October 18,
1990, 190 BCRA 086 528, b~~
Tariada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574 (1997),
272 SCRA 18 81, 144, 471, 493, 539
I.xv
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Tilendo v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165975, Septem-

ber 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 331... 760, 762
Tileston v. Ullmann, 318 U.S. 446 507
Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 204, 280
Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 511, 822
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 247, 276, 285, 286, 320
Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946) 234
Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18,
2008, 574 SCRA 817 508
Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 (1912) 663
Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 79
Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011,
656 SCRA 486 754
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 5 428
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013, 681 SCRA 27 639
Trade and Investment.Development Corporation of
the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigilio, G.R. No.
176343, September 18, 2012, 681 SCRA 27 611
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo, G.R.
No. 185571, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 359 412
Tria v. Sto. Tomas, 276 Phil. 923 (1991) 624
Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
166038, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 415 781
Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 NJ 31.. 85
Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,
511 Phil. 510 (2005) 582
u
Ugdoracion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851,
April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 231.. 658
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 177
U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332 42
U.S. v, Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 57, 66
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 367, 464
U.S. v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 275
TT$ v, Pons, 34 Phil. 729 215
lJ.S. v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 64
Ugdoracion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179851,
April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 231.. 658
lxvii
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on

Elections, 396 Phil. 419, 424-425 (2000) 676
Vilando v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149,
August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17 192, 505
Vilas v. City of Manila, 229 U.S. 345 46
Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 188630, February
23, 2011, 644 SCRA 358 753
Villasenor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700,
March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658 753
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 91
Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 379, 411
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, 520 SCRA 166 258
Vios v. Pantangco, G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009,
578 SCRA 129 582
Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191.. 108
w
Western Mindanao Power Corporation v. Commissioner
oflnternal Revenue, G.R. No. 181136, June 13,
2012, 672 SCRA 350 324, 548
Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South, 640,
641; 126 Ala., 268 584
Wood's Appeal, 79 Pa 59 819
Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation,

474 SCRA 258 548
Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 427
Yap v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562,
April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 154 718
Yap v. Thenamaris Ship's Management, G.R. No.
179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369 273
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 92
Ynchausti v. Wright, 47 Phil. 886 712
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 175, 181, 545
Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 381
lxix
Chapter 1
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Scope of the Study
POLITICAL LAW is that branch of public law which

deals with the organization and operations of the gov-
ernmental organs of the State and defines the relations
of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.1
In the present law curriculum prescribed by the Su-
preme Court, Political Law embraces Constitutional
Law I and II, Administrative Law, the Law of Public
Officers, Election Law and the Law on Municipal Corpo-
rations.
Constitutional Law I, which is the particular sub-
ject of this work, is a study of the structure and powers
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It
also deals with certain basic concepts of Political Law,
such as the nature of the State, the supremacy of the
Constitution, the separation of powers, and the rule of
the majority.
Necessity for the Study
The inclusion of Political Law as a required subject

in the law course is only one of the reasons for its study.
' People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887.
1
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 3
preted in the light of their understanding in the country

of origin.
Background of the Study
The inhabitants of the Philippines originally con-

sisted of disparate tribes scattered throughout its more
than seven thousand islands. These tribes were gener-
ally free and were each governed by a system of laws
promulgated by the daiu or a council of elders. Except
when they fell under the. sway of a foreign power, like
the Madjapahit and Sri-Vishayan empires, these tribes
were bound mainly, if not only, by commercial ties.
The discovery of the Philippines by Magellan in
1521 brought the people of the territory under the com-
mon rule of Spain. This rule lasted for more than three
hundred years, during which the abuses of the govern-
ment and the friars gradually developeda sense of unity
among the natives. Rizal and the other propagandists
were later to ignite the spirit of nationalism that was to
fuel the Philippine Revolution.
Started by the fiery Bonifacio and won under the
able generalship of Emilio Aguinaldo, the Philippine
Revolution finally ended Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippines. On June 12, 1898, Philippine independence
was proclaimed; and on January 21, 1899, the First
Philippine Republic was established with Aguinaldo as
its President. The Malolos Constitution, under which
the new government was established, was the first de-
mocratic constitution ever to be promulgated in the
whole of Asia. Significantly, it established a parliamen-
tary system, but with the President and not the Prime
Minister as head of the government.
was established in the Philippine Islands, with William

Howard Taft as the first governor.
By virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Philip-
pine Assembly was created in 1907 to sit with the Phil-
ippine Commission in a bicameral legislature. Sergio
Osmefia was initially and successively elected Speaker
of the Philippine Assembly until its dissolution in 1916.
In that year was promulgated the Philippine Autonomy
Act, popularly known as the Jones Law, which estab-
lished inter alia a Philippine Legislature consisting of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. Manuel L. Que-
zon and Sergio Osmefia were elected President and
Speaker, respectively.
The Jones Law continued until 1935, when it was
supplanted by the Tydings-McDuffieAct, which author-
ized the establishment of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Toward this end, a Constitutional Conven-
tion framed the Constitution of 1935, which was ratified
on May 14 of that year and led to the inauguration of
the Commonwealth Government on November 15, 1935.
Quezon was the first President, with Osmefia as Vice-
President.
The Tydings-McDuffieAct promised independence
to the Filipinos if they could prove their capacity for
democratic government during a ten-year transition
period. As it turned out, they were to demonstrate this
competence not only in the councils of peace but also in
the barricades of World War II, and no less gallantly in
the Second Republic of the Philippines headed by Presi-
dent Jose P. Laurel during the Japanese occupation of
our country.
Accordingly,on July 4, 1946, the United States for-
mally withdrew it sovereignty over the Philippines.
President Manuel A. Roxas thereupon asserted the
Subsequently, in the Habeas Corpus Cases,5 the Su-

preme Court unanimously upheld the proclamation of
martial law by the President of the Philippines.
On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law. However, he
retained what he called his "standby legislative powers"
under several decrees he had promulgated earlier, prin-
cipally the National Security Code and the Public Order
Act.
In 1985, to seek a "fresh mandate" from the people,
President Marcos submitted a questionable resignation
that was to be effective on the tenth day following the
proclamation of the winners in the "snap" election to be
called by the legislature on the strength of such resigna-
tion. The election was challenged in the case of Philip-
pine Bar Association v. Commission on Elections" on the
ground inter alia that the vacancy contemplated in Arti-
cle VII, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution which would
justify the call of a special presidential election before
the expiration of President Marcos's term in 1987 was
supposed to occur before and not after the said election.
Predictably, the then Supreme Court denied the petition
and sustained the resignation and the call.
The election was held on February 7, 1986, as
scheduled, and resulted, amid charges of wholesale ir-
regularities committed by the ruling party, in the proc-
lamation of Marcos and his running-mate, Arturo Tolen-
tino, as President-elect and Vice-President-elect of the
Philippines, respectively. This was followed by a mas-
sive outcry from the people who felt that the real win-
ners were the Opposition candidates.
5
Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).
"G.R. No. 72915, Dec. 20, 1985, 140 SCRA 453.
Gloria Macapagal Arroyotook the oath the same day as

his constitutional successor.
Estrada lost no time in challenging before the Su-
preme Court Arroyo's right to succeed him, claiming
that he had neither resigned nor abandoned his office,
and that he left Malaca:fiangonly to appease the demon-
strators who clamored for his resignation. The Court
dismissed his petition, ruling that his public statements
made upon and the circumstances leading to his depar-
ture from Malacafiang clearly showed that he had re-
signed. Accordingly, it considered his presidency as
"now in the past tense" and Arroyo's ascendancy to the
Presidency as lawful.
Within months after Arroyo's assumption into of-
fice, Estrada was arrested for plunder amidst the noisy
objections of thousands of his sympathizers who waged
still another people power protest. The attempt of said
protesters to storm Malacafiang and the violencewhich
erupted in the process prompted Arroyo to declare a
state of rebellion. Notwithstanding said protests,
Estrada was eventually tried and convicted by the
Sandiganbayan, only to be later pardoned by Arroyo.
During her first term, Arroyo also faced but quickly
quelled the Oakwood Mutiny mounted by disgruntled
military officerson corruption issues.
She sought another term in 2004, reneging on an
earlier promise that she would not do so. She was pro-
claimed the winner of said election, notwithstanding
allegations of widespread cheating or electoral fraud.
These charges hounded her for most of her second term.
Street protests particularly escalated after the release of
the mfamous Garci 'l'apes, which included her alleged
telephone conversations with a former COMELECCom-
missioner, to whom she had purportedly given explicit
as a public functionary but more as a rejection of the

Arroyo regime or, at least, as an affirmation of the con-
tinuing popularity of his mother, who passed away only
months before the 2010 elections.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 13
sectors and represented diverse persuasions, which is

probably one reason why they could not meet their
deadline and were able to approve the final draft of
their handiwork only on October 15, 1986. By resolution
of the Commission, it was recommended to the Presi-
dent that the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution be
scheduled, not within sixty days as originally provided,
but within three months, to give the people more oppor-
tunity to study it. Accordingly,the plebiscite was sched-
uled and held on February 2, 1987.
The campaign for the ratification of the proposed
Constitution was led by President Aquino herself, whose
main argument was that it would restrict the powers of
the Presidency as provided for in the Freedom Constitu-
tion. Opposition to the draft, while spirited, was largely
disorganized and consequently ineffective. Many people,
while doubtful about some of its provisions and espe-
cially of its length, which made it seem like a codifica-
tion, nevertheless approved the proposed Constitution
in the end because they felt it would provide the stabil-
ity the country sorely needed at the time. When the
votes were tallied, it appeared that 76.29% of the elec-
torate had voted to ratify, with only 22.74% against.
Outstanding Features
The new Constitution consists of eighteen articles

and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973, on which it was largely based. Many of
the original provisions of the 1935, particularly those
pertaining to the legislative and the executive depart-
merits, have hP.P.n rnRtorP.cl hP.C'.l'lllRP. of the rnvival of the
bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the strictly
presidential system. The independence of the judiciary
has been strengthened, with new provisions for ap-
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 15
constitution-making and less personal vainglory, let

alone distrust of the legislature.
What is worse is the inclusion of certain topics that
certainly, by any criterion, have no place in a Constitu-
tion. Among these are sports, love, drugs, and even ad-
vertising; and there is also mention of "the rhythm and
harmony of nature." But what is even worse than all
this is the tortuous language of some of its provisions,
like the followingmasterpiece of circumlocution in Arti-
cle XVI, Section 10:
"The State shall provide the policy environment for the
full development of Filipino capability and the emergence of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspira-
tions of the nation and the balanced flow of information into,
out of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy that
respects the freedom of speech and of the press."
Excuse me?
One wonders, given the long-windedness of the pre-
sent Constitution, if the people had really read and un-
derstood it when they voted to ratify it.
Even so, it should be remembered that, as its pro-
ponents repeatedly argued during the campaign for its
ratification, its real and main function was to replace
the Freedom Constitution, which was a revolutionary
constitution, and so pave the way for stability and nor-
mality under a regular Constitution duly approved by
the people. Now that that function has been more or less
achieved,we may take a second more critical look at the
Constitution of 1987, this time with a view to its
amendment or revision under its Article XVII, in a less
tense and more amiable atmosphere.
1
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 16.
Chapter 3
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
Definition
",THE STAT~ is a community of persons, more or less

numerous, permanently occupyinga fixed territory, and
possessed of an independent government organized for
political ends to which the great body of inhabitants
render habitual obedience."
The term -,;y;.#p];J,~ is used interchangeably with
State, e.g., the United Nations or the family of nations,
which actually consists of states and not nations. This is
a mistake as the two concepts have different connota-
tions. Hackworth observes that "the term nation,
strictly speaking, as evidenced by its etymology (nasci,
to be born), indicates a relation of birth or origin and
implies a common race, usually characterized by com-
munity of language and customs." The State is a legal
concept, while the nation is only a racial or ethnic con-
cept.2
Thus understood, a nation may comprise several
states; for example, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
Jordan, Algeria and Libya, among others, while each a
separate state, all belong to the Arab nation. On the
other hand, it is also possible for a single state to be
made up of more than one nation, as in the case of the
1
Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 41.
2
Digest of International Law (1943), V· 47; Oruz, International
Law, 20.
17
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE 19
Domain between the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front,
which would have paved the way for the conversion of
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), sought to be
established under said proposed Agreement purportedly
as an "expanded version" of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao, into a state."
Thus, said proposed Agreement was to acknowl-
edge the "birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be ac-
cepted as 'Bangsamoros.' It defined 'Bangsamoro people'
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and
its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, includ-
ing their spouses."
It further specified the "territory of the Bang-
samoro homeland," described therein "as the land mass
as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial
domains, including the aerial domain and the atmos-
pheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-
Palawan geographic region.'' Significantly, it indicated
that "the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its 'internal waters,' defined as extend-
ing fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE
area; that the BJE shall also have 'territorial waters,'
which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up
to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP)
south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and
that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
'Central Government' (used interchangeably with RP)
s See The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the

Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, Ibid.
BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bear-

ing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protec-
tion, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ances-
tral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM
and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. govern-
ment on any foreign affairs matter affecting them."
The Supreme Court went on to state that the BJE

"is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the
status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the MontevideoConven-
tion, namely, a permanent population, a defined terri-
tory, a government, and a capacity to enter into rela-
tions with other states." The Court further stressed that
the proposed Agreement "cannot be reconciled with the
present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific pro-
visions but the very concept underlying them, namely,
the associative relationship envisioned between the
GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence."
There are some writers who suggest two additional
elements, to wit, recognition and possession of a suffi-
cient degree of civilization. As these have not been gen-
erally accepted, we shall confine this study to the four
elements first mentioned.
(1) People
People refers simply to the inhabitants of the Rt.At.A.

While there is no legal requirement as to their
number, it is generally agreed that they must be nu-
merous enough to be self-sufficing and to defend them-
external waters, which make up the maritime and flu-

uial domain, and the air space above the land and wa-
ters, which is called the aerial domain;
Article I of the Constitution provides as follows:
"NATIONAL TERRITORY
"The national territory comprises the Philippine archi-

pelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and
all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipel-
ago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines."
The above provision is a substantial reproduction of

Article I of the 1973 Constitution with only a few minor
changes.
Departing from the method employed in the 1935
Constitution, which described the national territory by
reference to the pertinent treaties concluded by the
United States during its regime in this country, the
present rule now physically lists the components of our
territory and so de-emphasizes recollections of our colo-
nial past. The article has deleted reference to the terri-
tories we claim "by historic right or legal title," but this
does not mean an outright or formal abandonment of
such claim, which was best left to a judicial body capa-
ble of passing judgment over the issue."
At any rate, it has been pointed out that "the defi-
nition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Phil-
ippine Archipelago" as provided for in Section 2 of Re-
public Act No. 5446 "is without prejudice to the delinea-
7
Res. of the Constitutional Commission,July 10, 1986.
In 1984, the Philippines ratified the United Na-

tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
which, among others, "prescribes the water-land ratio,
length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States
like the Philippines." Consistent with the Philippines'
obligations under said agreement, Congress amended
RA 3046 by enacting Republic Act No. 9522, which, it
was believed, would make RA 3046 "compliant" with the
provisions of UNCLOS III insofar as the determination
of the "water-land ratio, length, and contour of base-
lines" of our archipelago is concerned. Accordingly, "RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as 're-
gimes of islands' whose islands generate their own ap-
plicable maritime zones."
The petitioners in Magallona challenged "the con-
stitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds,
namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime terri-
tory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state's
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the
country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Phil-
ippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country's nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provi-
sions.
The petitioners further contended that "RA 9522's
treatment of the KIG as 'regime of islands' not only re-
sults in the loss of a large maritime area but also preju-
dices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To but-
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contraven-

ing the country's nuclear-free policy, and damaging ma-
rine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions," and that said law "unconstitutionally 'con-
verts' internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea
lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight,"
the Supreme Court had this to say -
"As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522,
petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally 'converts'
internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting
these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage un-
der UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate
that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine inter-
nal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in viola-
tion of the Constitution.
''Whether referred to as Philippine 'internal waters' un-
der Article I of the Constitution or as 'archipelagic waters' un-
der UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sov-
ereignty over the body of water lying landward of the base-
lines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath. [UNCLOS III, Article 49]
''Article 49
"Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space

over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil
"l. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State ex-
tends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archi-
pelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from
the coast.
"2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over
the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and sub-
soil, and the resources contained therein.
"3. xx x x
"4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
established in this Part shall not in other respects affect
THE CONCEPI' OF THE STATE 29
under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own mari-

time zones, placing the waters between islands separated by
more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States' territorial sov-
ereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States
under UNCLOS III."t
The Supreme Court likewise rejected the petition-

ers' arguments on "territorial diminution," i.e., the loss
of our claims to territories under the Treaty of Paris or
Sabah as a result of RA 9522's adherence to the UN-
CLOS Ill's framework on the so-called "regime of is-
lands" with its inclusion of the Scarborough Shoal and
the KIG as parts of our "regime of islands." Thus -
"Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the

Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, ad-
verse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would
have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III.
First, Article 47 (3) ofUNCLOS III requires that '[t]he drawing
of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago.' Second, Ar-
ticle 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that 'the length of the base-
lines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,' save for three per
cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up
to 125 nautical miles.
"Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sov-
ereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable dis-
tance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,
such that any straight baseline loped around them from the
nearest basepoint will inevitably 'depart to an appreciable ex-
tent from the general configuration of the archipelago.' xxx.
"Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress' decision to clas-
sify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as 'Regime[s] of Is-
lands' under t.hA Republic of t.hA Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State's res-
ponsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any 'naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above wa-
the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States
to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up
to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached
to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III."
Finally, the Supreme Court explained in Magallona

that ''baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by
UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific base-
points along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geo-
graphic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UN-
CLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be
any clearer:
"'Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territo-

rial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf.-The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continen-
tal shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn
in accordance with article 47.'
"Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory

mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest
of the international community of the scope of the mari-
time space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exer-
cise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in
the exclusive economiczone (Article 56) and continental
shelf (Article 77).
(3) Government
Government is the agency or instrumentality

through which the wiJl of the State is formulated, ex-
pressed and realized. 12
From the viewpoint of international law, no par-
ticular form of government is prescribed, provided only
that the government is able to represent the State in its
dealings with other States. Our Constitution, however,
requires our government to be democratic and republi- ·
can.
It has been said that "the State is an ideal person,
invisible, intangible, immutable and existing only in
contemplation of law; the government is an agent and,
within the sphere of its agency, it is a perfect represen-
tative, but outside of that it is a lawless usurpation.?"
The mandate of the government from the State is to
promote the welfare of the people. Accordingly, what-
ever good is done by the government is attributed to the
State but every harm inflicted on the people is imputed
not to the State but to the government alone. Such in-
jury may justify the replacement of the government by
revolution, theoretically at the behest of the State, in a
developmentknown as direct State action. 14
A. Functions
The government performs two kinds of functions, to

wit, the constituent and the ministrant.
"Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270.

'" Ibid.
"Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 3rd ed., 6-7, op. cit.
cerned only with the basic function of maintaining peace

and order.
To our Supreme Court, however, the distinction be-
tween constituent and ministrant functions is not rele-
vant in our jurisdiction. In PVTA v. CIR16 it reiterated
the ruling in ACCFA v. Federation of Labor Unions"
that such distinction has been blurred because of the
repudiation of the laissez faire policy in the Constitu-
tion.
"The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the

heeds of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief
Justice, who took note, speaking of the reconstituted Agricul-
tural Credit Administration, that functions of that sort 'may
not be strictly what President Wilson described as 'constituent'
(as distinguished from 'ministrant'), such as those relating to
the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those
regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political du-
ties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and for-
eign relations. Under this traditional classification, such con-
stituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress
and prosperity of the people-these latter functions being min-
istrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the gov-
ernment.' Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: The
growing complexities of modern society, however, have ren-
dered this traditional classification of the functions of gov-
ernment quite unrealistic not to say obsolete. The areas which
used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which
the government was called upon to enter optionally and only
because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be ab-
sorbed within activities that the government must undertake
in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else, the
16
65 SCRA 416.
11
30 SCRA649.
(on the policy of full public disclosures." and XIII (on

Social Justice and Human Rights)28 of the Constitution,
are not self-executing provisions of the Constitution.29
They have been invariably considered as "not sources of
enforceable rights't" and serve merely as "guides in for-
mulating and interpreting implementing legislation.?"
B. Doctrine of Parens Patriae
One of the important tasks of the government is to

act for the State as parens patriae, or guardian of the
rights of the people. In the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Monte de Piedad, 32 contributions
were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief
of the victims of an earthquake but part of the money
was never distributed and instead deposited with the
defendant bank. In an action for its recovery filed later
by the government, the defendant questioned the com-
petence of the plaintiff, contending that the suit could
be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries them-
selves or by their heirs. The Supreme Court rejected
this view and upheld the right of the government to file
the case for the State as parens patriae in representa-
tion of the legitimate claimants.
27
The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, GR
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
2•
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614,
March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254.
an Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. COA, G.R.
No. 178160, February 26, 2009, 580 SCRA 295.
·10 Bureau of Fisheries v. Commission on Audit, U.K No.
169815, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 134.
" Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011, 655
SCRA 476.
'12 35 Phil. 728.
sion program by the Movie and Television Review and

Classification Board. He invoked, among other grounds,
his freedoms of speech and religion, claiming that said
suspension constitute~ censorship. The Supreme Court,
after finding that the petitioner had uttered expletives
in the course of said program, which was regularly aired
during prime time, or at a time when children could
actually view the same, rejected his contentions, stat-
ing--
"As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions

to the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case
constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unpro-
tected speech, created by the necessity of protecting the wel-
fare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioner's utter-
ances can be subjected to restraint or regulation. x x x.
"Petitioner's offensive and obscene language uttered in a
television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to
the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the
welfare of children and the State's mandate to protect and care
for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and com-
pelling government interest in regulating petitioner's utter-
ances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986."
In De la Cruz u. Gracia,35 the Supreme Court al-

lowed the registration of an illegitimate child using the
surname of his deceased father, declaring that it is "the
policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children x x x. The State as
parens patriae affords special protection to children
from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to their development."
35
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648.
It has been held in a number of cases that the Sec-

ond Republic of the Philippines was a de facto govern-
ment of paramount force, having been established by
the Japanese belligerent during the occupation of the
Philippines in World War II. The characteristics of this
kind of de facto government are:
"(l) Its existence is maintained by active military
power within the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government.
"(2) During its existence, it must necessarily be
obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts
of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do
not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful gov-
ernment. Actual governments of this sort are estab-
lished over districts differing greatly in extent and con-
ditions. They are usually administered by military au-
thority, supported more or less directly by military
force.?"
By contrast, the Supreme Court unanimously held
in Lawyers League for a Better Philippines u. Corazon C.
Aquino" that "the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquinowhich is in effectivecontrol of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a dejure government. Moreover,the community
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government."
"'Ibid.
"" G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.
The administration runs the government, as a machin-

ist operates his machine. Thus, we speak of the Aquino
administration as directing the affairs of the Govern-
ment of the Philippines for a given time, after which
another administration may be called upon by the peo-
ple to take over. Administration is transitional whereas
the government is permanent.
(4) Sovereignty
Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable

power inherent in a State by which that State is gov-
erned."
There are two kinds of sovereignty, to wit, legal and
political. Legal sovereignty is the authority which has
the power to issue final commands whereas political
sovereignty is the power behind the legal sovereign, or
the sum of the influences that operate upon it. In our
country, the Congress is the legal sovereign, while the
different sectors that mold public opinion make up the
political sovereign.
Sovereignty may also be internal or external. Inter-
nal sovereignty refers to the power of the State to con-
trol its domestic affairs. External sovereignty, which is
the power of the State to direct its relations with other
States, is also known as independence.
Sovereignty is permanent, exclusive, comprehen-
sive, absolute, indivisible, inalienable and imprescripti-
ble.44
By virtue of these characteristics, sovereignty is not
deemed suspended although acts of sovereignty cannot
'" Garner, Political Science and Government, 238, 170.

44
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856.
Furthermore, the rule does not apply to the law on

treason although decidedly political in character. As
Justice Felicisimo Feria put it in Laurel v. Misa/"
l
"Since the preservation of the allegiance of the obligation
of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his govern-
ment or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action
but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has
no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to re-
peal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential
for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants
to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and
give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such ac-
tion is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service
or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the
safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount
to practically transferring temporarily to the occupant their al-
legiance to the titular government or sovereignty."
As for judicial decisions, the same are valid during

the occupation and even beyond except those of a politi-
cal complexion, which are automatically annulled upon
the restoration of the legitimate authority. Thus, a per-
son convicted of treason against the Japanese Imperial
Forces was, after the occupation, entitled to be released
on the ground that the sentence imposed on him for his
political offense had ceased to be valid." But if the con-
viction was for a non-political offense like, say, defama-
tion, the sentence would not be affected by the termina-
tion of the occupation.
Where there is a change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign are not merely suspended
but abrogated. As they regulate the relations between
the ruler and the ruled, these laws fall to the ground
'° Supra.
50
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, supra.
which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force

until abrogated or changed by the new ruler."
Act of State
An act of State is an act done by the sovereign

power of a country, or by its delegate, within the limits
of the power vested in him. An act of State cannot be
questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in a
court of law. 54
With particular reference to Political Law, an act of
State is an act done by the political departments of the
government and not subject to judicial review. An illus-
tration is the decision of the President, in the exercise of
his diplomatic power, to extend recognition to a newly-
established foreign State or government.
54
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 44.
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY 49
The doctrine is also available to foreign States inso-

far as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the
local State.3 The added basis in this case is the principle
of the sovereign equality of States, under which one
State cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation
of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do
so would "unduly vex the peace of nations.?'
This does not mean though that the foreign state
would at all times be immune from all suits filed
against it before courts of a host or local state. Accord-
ingly, it has been ruled that such foreign states may be
sued in the host state if engaged regularly therein in a
business or trade or, even if not so engaged, on the basis
of its contracts in the host state which may be consid-
ered as purely commercial,private and proprietary acts,
but not with respect to its contracts entered into by it as
governmental or sovereignacts. Thus -
"The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone

further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of
a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at
all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relation-
ships between sovereign states, brought about by their increas-
ing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive applica-
tion of the doctrine. xxx As it stands now, the application of the
doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign
or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state
immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and pro-
prietary acts (jure gestionis).
"Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it
is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved -
whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental,
as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in United States
of America v. Ruiz (221 Phil. 179 (1985)]-
"Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312.

4
De Haberv. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.B. 171.
vate acts or actsjure gestionis. xxx The restrictive theory came

about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of
governmental functions."
\
As will be discussed later, in the context of the ap-

plicability of the principle of state immunity to a State
in relation to claims filed against it by its citizens or
inhabitants or in connectionwith the actions of its gov-
ernment within its territory, not all acts Jure imperii
may exempt a State from suit, as in the case of its exer-
cise of its power of eminent domain, when done without
payment of just compensation.7
Moreover, it has likewise been ruled that not any
agency of a foreign state may properly invoke the lat-
ter's sovereign immunity to ward off suits against it. In
German Agency for Technical Cooperation v. Court of
Appeals, the petitioner moved to dismiss a complaint for
illegal dismissal filed against it before the National
Labor Relations Commission,contending that the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it, as it was "the im-
plementing agency of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Gennany" and "its acts were undertaken in
the discharge of the governmental functions and sover-
eign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany." The Supreme Court rejected these conten-
tions stating that the petitioner did not present ade-
quate evidence to establish that it enjoys the immunity
from suit generally accorded to its parent country, the
' Holy See v. Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, 1 December 1994, 238
SCRA 524, 535, cited in China National Machinery & Equipment
Corporation v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, 665
SCRA 189.
7
See Delos Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA
1, cited in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 185685,
February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36.
The Court, addressing the factual circumstances

invoked by the petitioner in support of its claim of sov-
ereign immunity, added -
'
"Clearly, it was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking,
and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility Study was
conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exer-
cise of sovereign functions by the Chinese government, but was
plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view
to securing this commercial enterprise. xxx. The use of the
term 'state corporation' to refer to CNMEG was only descrip-
tive of its nature as a government-owned and/or -controlled
corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did
not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the perform-
ance of the latter's sovereign functions. xxx. Thus, despite peti-
tioner's claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance
to Northrail because the bank was mandated by the Chinese
government, and not because of any motivation to do business in
the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the
Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction. Admit-
tedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM
Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract
Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the
Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal na-
ture of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertak-
ing, nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the North-
rail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or pro-
prietary in character. Thus, piecing together the content and
tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Under-
standing dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang's letter dated 1
October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire
of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a
purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of
its business. Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs
governmental functions, such claim does not automatically vest
it with immunity. This view finds support in Malong v. Philip-
pine National · Railways, in which this Court held that
'(i)mmunity from suit is determined by the character of the ob-
jects for which the entity was organized.' [222 Phil 381, 384
(1985)]"
"Petitioners were being sued as officers of the United

States Government. As they have acted on behalf of that gov-
ernment, and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that is respon-
sible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it
is proved that claimarits have a right to the payment of dam-
ages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petition-
ers in their personal capacity but by the United States Gov-
ernment as their principal. This will require that government
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, uiz., the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages
awarded, thus making the action a suit against that govern-
ment without its consent."
In University of the Philippines v. Dizon,12 the Su-

preme Court stated that an award against the peti-
tioner for moral and actual damages (including attor-
ney's fees) would require an appropriation by Congress
considering that "such monetary liabilities were not
covered by the 'appropriations earmarked for said pro-
ject,"' which was the subject of the suit and the conse-
quent award.
By contrast, the Supreme Court held as not against
the State an action instituted against the Secretary of
National Defense, also in his official capacity, for pay-
ment of an architect's professional fees for which an
appropriation had already been made by the govern-
ment. 13 The reason was that as far as the State itself
was concerned, it had already discharged its obligation;
clearly, what the complainant wanted only was the
actual payment of the amount already set aside, which
payment was now the sole responsibility of the defen-
dant. The action was therefore properly filed against
12
G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.
ta Ruiz v. Cabahug, 54 O.G. 351.
It is understood, of course, that where a public offi-

cer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury
caused by him is his own personal liability and cannot
be imputed to the State. Thus, in Festejo v. Fernando, 16
the Director of Public Works took over without authority
property belonging to the plaintiff and constructed
thereon a public irrigation canal. The Supreme Court
held that the action for the recovery of the land or its
value was properly filed against the defendant in his
personal capacity and was therefore not covered by the
doctrine of State immunity.
In U.S.A. v. Guinto, 17 the Supreme Court declared:
"The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they

have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers
or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of
evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily
dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable
to the United States of America, which has not given its con-
sent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held
answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself
is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must sat-
isfy the judgment.
x x x
"But even as we are certain that the individual petition-
ers in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their offi-
cial functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R.
No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case
deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened
to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the de-
fendants were really discharging their official duties or had ac-
tually exceeded their authority when the incident in question
occurred. Lacking this information, the Court cannot directly
decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the
lower court oo it may uoeona and rocolvo the conflicting olaims
'"50 O.G. 1556.

" 182 SCRA 644.
Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria, 20 the "executive

endorsements" (of the Certification executed by the Eco-
nomic and CommercialOfficeof the Embassy of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China on the purported sovereign im-
' .
munity of the petitioner) made by the Office of the So-
licitor General and of the Office of the Government Cor-
porate Counsel, clarifying that it is only the Department
of Foreign Affairs which has the authority to make a
determination of immunity from suit, although, in said
case, the Court declared that it would not be "precluded
from making an inquiry into the intrinsic correctness of
such certification."
Waiver of Immunity
Although the doctrine of State immunity is some-

times called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty," it
must be observed in fairness that the State does not
often avail itself of this rule to take undue advantage of
parties that may have legitimate claims against it. The
principle fortunately has a built-in qualification: the
State may, if it so desires, divest itself of its sovereign
immunity and thereby voluntarily open itself to suit. In
fine, the State may be sued if it gives its consent.
It is gratifying that the exception appears now to
be the general policy, with the result that the filing of
suits against the State has become less difficult than
before.
Forms of Consent
The consent of the State to be sued may be given

expressly or impliedly. Express consent may Le uiani-
'0 G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 189.

ment for injuries he had sustained when his motorcycle

collidedwith a government ambulance."
The express consent of the State to be sued must be
embodied in a duly enacted statute and may not be
given by a mere counsel of the government, as held in
Republic u. Purisima. 24 In this case, the waiver made by
the lawyer for the Rice and Corn Administration, an
agency of the government, was held by the Supreme
Court as not binding upon the State. Incidentally, under
Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure,
where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines,
service of summons must be made on the Solicitor Gen-
eral. 25
Worthy of note in this connection is the case of
Amigable u. Cuenca, 26 where the question raised was the
right of the plaintiff to sue the government for recovery
of the value of her property which had been converted
into public streets without payment to her of just com-
pensation. Although it was shown that she had not pre-
viously filed her claim with the Auditor General as
normally required, the Supreme Court decided in her
favor, reiterating the following pronouncement in the
earlier case of Ministerio u. City of Cebu/"
23
Merritt v. Government of the Phil. Is., 34 Phil. 311.
2'
78 SCRA 470.
25
Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
150768 and 160176, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 422, cited in Repub-
lic of the .Philippines v. Domingo, G.R. No. 175299, September 14,
2011, 657 SCRA 621.
26
43 SCRA 360, See also Delos Santos v. Intermediate Appel-
late Court, G.R. 71998-99, June 2, 1993, 223 SCRA 1.
27
40 SCRA 464, see also Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA
212, Delos Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 1.
area, where private property is to be taken in expropria-

tion without just compensation being paid, the defense
of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owners.29
'·
As stressed by the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan." "the doctrine of sovereign immunity
cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim
for compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedingsbeing first resorted to of the plaintiffs' prop-
erty."
In Santiago v. Republic, 31 the plaintiff sued the gov-
ernment for revocation of a donation on the ground of
failure of the defendant to comply with the stipulated
conditions. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of
its consent to be sued. The Supreme Court denied the
motion, holding that the suit could prosper because it
did not involve a money claim against the State. As
what the plaintiff was seeking was the return only of
the properties donated, he did not even need to file his
claim first with the Commission on Audit under the
provisionsof C.A.No. 327.
Manifestly based on equitable grounds is the rule
that when the State itself files a complaint, the defen-
dant is entitled to file a counterclaim against it. A case
in point is Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,32 where
it was held that the government impliedly allowed itself
to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for
2"
See Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, G.R. No. 185685,
February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36, citing Delos Santos v. Intermedi-
ate Appellate Court, supra.
an G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 212, 231.
at 8'7 SCRA 294.
'12 G.R. No. L-6060, Sept. 30, 1950.
ity. Governmental contracts do not result in implied

waiver of the immunity of the State from suit.
The private respondent in this case had claimed
that the United States, through its Engineering Com-
mand in the U.S. Navy, had entered into a contract with
it for the repair of wharves in Subic Bay and should
therefore be required to comply with the agreement or
pay damages. The United States moved to dismiss, in-
voking its non-suability, but the claim was denied by
the lower court on the basis of the Lyons Case. In this
petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court sustained the
immunity of the petitioner from suit, declaring through
Justice VicenteAbad Santos:
"The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State

from being sued in the courts of another State without its con-
sent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are con-
stantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of
States have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to actsjure
imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now
the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other
States in Western Europe.
***
"The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have de-
scended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is de-
voted to the defense of both the United States and the Philip-
from such a basic concept, is that public funds cannot be the

object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability ad-
judged. Thus, in the recent case of Commissioner of Public
Highways u. San Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was re-
stated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: The universal rule
that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution' and that the power of courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropri-
ated by law."
But the foregoingdoctrine was not applied in Phil-

ippine National Bank v. Pabalan, 41 where a writ of exe-
cution was issued against the Philippine Virginia To-
bacco Administration, pursuant to which its funds on
deposit with the petitioner were garnished. On the con-
tention that such funds were public in character and
therefore could not be garnished, the Supreme Court
declared:
"This is not the first time petitioner raised that issue. It

did so before in Philippine National Bank u. Court of Indus-
trial Relations, decided only last January. It did not meet with
success, this Court ruling in accordance with the two previous
cases of National Shipyard and Steel Corporation and Manila
Hotel Company, that funds of public corporations which can
sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. As res-
pondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is like-
-tt 83 SCRA 595.

"Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and

distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and
be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and
its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. However, be-
fore execution may He had, a claim for payment of the judg-
ment award must first be filed with the COA. Under Com-
monwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No.
1445, it is the COAwhich has primary jurisdiction to examine,
audit and settle 'all debts and claims of any sort' due from or
owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money
claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No.
6758, their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, sub-
ject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to
this Court."
In University of the Philippines v. Dizon." the Su-

preme Court, in emphasizing the fundamental rule that
government properties are not subject to levy and exe-
cution, made the followingclarifications -
"However, notwithstanding the rule that government

properties are not subject to levy and execution unless other-
wise provided for by statute (Republic u. Palacio, 23 SCRA 899
1968; Commissioner of Public Highways u. San Diego, supra)
or municipal ordinance (Municipality of Makati u. Court of Ap-
peals, 190 SCRA 206 1990), the Court has, in various in-
stances, distinguished between government funds and proper-
ties for public use and those not held for public use. Thus, in
Viuda de Tan Toco u. Municipal Council of Iloilo (49 Phil 52
1926), the Court ruled that 'where property of a municipal or
other public corporation is sought to be subjected to execution
to satisfy judgments recovered against such corporation, the
question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be
determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held.' The
following can be culled from Viuda de Tan Toco u. Municipal
Council of lloilo:
"G.R. No. 171182,August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.

If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suabil-

ity is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is
suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless
of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations,
for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of
the State when they are engaged in governmental func-
tions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in
the performance of such functions because their charter
provides that they can sue and be sued.
In Bermoy v. Philippine Normal College," suit was
filed by the personnel of the defendant corporation for
recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The
defendant moved to dismiss, contending that the action
was against the State inasmuch as the college was a
public agency engaged in a governmental function, to
wit, the education of the youth. The Supreme Court did
not consider this argument decisive. The important
thing was that the charter of the college provided that it
could sue and be sued, which meant that, even assum-
ing that the function involved was public, the State had
thereby waived its immunity. A similar ruling was made
in Arcega v. Court of Appeals, 46 involving the Central
Bank, Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan" involving the National
Power Corporation, and Philippine National Railways v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.48
This test is obviously not available in the case of
the unincorporated agency as there would be no charter
to consult. Since it has no separate juridical personality,
any suit filed against it is necessarily an action against
·"' G.R. No. L-8670, May 18, 1951:i.

'6 66 SCRA 229.
" 110 SCRA 460.
" 217 SCRA 401.
governmental functions but also, as a sideline, or inci-

dentally, in proprietary enterprises. This doctrine was
first announced in Bureau of Printing u. Bureau of
Printing Employees Association, 52 where the Supreme
Court stated as follows:
"The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government

created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the
direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is 'charged with the execution of all printing
and binding, including work incidental to those processes, re-
quired by the National Government and such other work of the
same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake .. .' (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate
existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the Gen-
eral Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs
of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and, obvi-
ously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary
profit.
***
" ... Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to
undertake private binding jobs, it cannot be pretended that it
is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional
work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary
in character, there is no showing that the employees perform-
ing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from
those employed in its general governmental functions. * * *
"Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any cor-
porate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot
be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or
proceeding against it, ifit were to produce any effect, would ac-
tually be a suit, action or proceeding against the government
itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be
sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (Soo
Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation
''' 1 SCRA 340.

The non-suability of the Bureau of Customs was af-

firmed in the case of Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals. 54
In Shell Philippines Exploration B. V v. Jalos,55 the
petitioner invoked tha doctrine of state immunity in
asking for the dismissal of a complaint against it, claim-
ing that it should be considered an agent of the Republic
of the Philippines by reason of its appointment by the
latter as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum op-
erations in a certain area, and that said operations were
under the full control and supervision of the State. The
Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that
these facts do not mean that it had become the State's
'"agent' within the meaning of the law." The Court con-
sidered the petitioner to be but "a service contractor for
the exploration and development of one of the country's
natural gas reserves."
Exemption from Legal Requirements
When the State litigates, either directly or through

its authorized officers, it is not required to put up a
bond for damages, or an appeal bond, since it can be
assumed that it is always solvent.56
In Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation v. Pacana,57
the Supreme Court clarified that this exemption does
not, as a general rule, apply to government-owned or
controlled corporations because they have legal person-
alities distinct from their shareholders. Thus, "while a
GOCC's majority stockholder, the State, will always be
presumed solvent, the presumption does not necessarily
"' 217 SCRA 298.

"'' G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010, 630 SCRA 399.
'" Araneta v. Catmaitan, 101 Phil. 323.
57
G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 196.
also not chargeable against it except when it has ex-

pressly stipulated to pay it or when interest is allowed
by an act of the legislature or in eminent domain cases
where damages sustained by the owner take the form of
interest at the legal rate.62 It has also been held that
statutes of limitation do not run against the State
unless the contrary is expressly provided by law, al-
though this rule is not observed where the State is en-
gaged in private business."
In Republic v. Garcia, 64 it was held that the govern-
ment could not be assessed one-half of the fees paid to
the commissioner who determined the just compensa-
tion for the property under expropriation.
Suability vs. Liability
The mere fact that the State is suable does not mean
that it is liable; or to put it another way, waiver of immu-
nity by the State does not mean concessionof its liability.
As already explained, suability is the result of the express
or implied consent of the State to be sued. Liability, on the
other hand, is determined after hearing on the basis of the
relevant laws and the established facts. When, therefore,
the State allows itself to be sued, all it does in effect is to
give the other party an opportunity to prove, ifit can, that
the State is liable. The State, in many cases, may be su-
able but not liable.
Indeed, in University of the Philippines v. Dizon,65
the Supreme Court, citing Municipality of San Fer-
62
Arasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252.
~~ Gov't. of the Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad, supra.
"76 SCRA 47.
ss G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.
be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to

show that the defendant was not acting in its govern-
mental capacity when the injury was committed or that
the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law:
Failing this, the claim~nt cannot recover.
In one case,68 for example, a claim for recovery of
damages against a provincial government failed when it
was shown that the injury complained of occurredin con-
nection with the repair of streets then being undertaken
by the defendant through its regular agents. This was
clearly a governmental function. By contrast, a municipal-
ity was held liable in another case for forciblyand illegally
ejecting a lessee from certain fishponds belonging to the
former in its proprietary capacity.69 In the case of Torio v.
Fontanilla, 70 the Supreme Court held a municipality liable
for a tort committed in connectionwith the celebration of
a town fiesta, which was considered a proprietary func-
tion.
In University of the Philippines v. Dizon." the Su-
preme Court, citing the earlier case of Republic v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Commission,72 explained that the
"funds of the UP are government funds that are public
in character. They include the income accruing from the
use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent
only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be
validly made the subject of the RTC's writ of execution
or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against
the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was
68
Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte, G.R. No. L-10659, Jan.
31, 1958.
69
Mun. of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184.
10
85 SCRA 599.
1'
G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, 679 SCRA 54.
" 263 SCRA 290.
Chapter 5
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE

POLICIES
ARTICLE II of the Constitution is entitled "Declaration

of Principles and State Policies." This article is intended
to lay down the rules underlying our system of govern-
ment and must therefore be adhered to in the conduct of
public affairs and the resolution of public issues. The
present article is an enlargement and, in some sections,
a modification of the original provisions found also in
Article II of the 1973 Constitution. The purpose is to
emphasize and articulate more unequivocally the objec-
tives and limitations of governmental action in pursuit
of the general goals announced in the Preamble. There
may have been some "overkill" though, as the number of
sections has increased from only ten in the 1973 Consti-
tution to twenty eight in the present charter, many of
which appear to be but meaningless platitudes on sub-
jects considered significant, perhaps, only by those who
insisted on their inclusion.
The foregoing notwithstanding, or despite the per-
ceived or seeming importance of many of the principles
and policies announced in Article II, and as previously
observed, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
most of its provisions are to be considered as "mere leg-
islative guides, which absent enabling legislation, do not
embody enforceable constitutional rights.": Thus, to
I
Magallona v . Ermita, G.Il No. 187107, July 16, 2011, 655
SCRA 476; see also Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18.
81
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 83
stitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing

importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obli-
gation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would pot be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come - generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.m
Section 28 (on the policy of public disclosure) has
likewise been similarly treated by the Supreme Court,
which has stated that its effectivity "need not await the
passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for 'reasonable
safeguards."' According to the Court, the government
cannot "point to the absence of an implementing legisla-
tion as an excuse in not effectingsuch policy."
Preamble
The Preamble to the Constitution reads as follows:

"We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspi-
rations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the bless-
ings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and
a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do
ordain and promulgate this Constitution."
Unlike in the 1935 Constitution, the above Pream-

ble is couched not in the third person but in the first. It
• Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA

792.
' The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
F'uNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 85
Court has described our nation as "Christian," perhaps,

in affirmation of the reality that the vast majority of the
Filipino people believe in an "Almighty God." It has
even "hailed" the Philippines as "the bastion of Christi -
anity in Asia," which "boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos or
93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million - adher-
ing to the teachings of Jesus Christ."
Certain sectors find this change to be inconsistent
with the policy of separation of church and state, which
is characterized as inviolable in Article Il,9 and the es-
tablishment clause, 10 found in the Bill of Rights, which
has been interpreted to restrain the government from
composing prayers for public school children," or from
requiring them to read verses from the Bible,12 or even
from allowing public school teachers to distribute copies
of Bibles during class hours.13 In addition, there are
those who maintain that the presence of the phrase
"Almighty God" in the Preamble somehow lessens the
significance of the provisions of Article VI, Section 29 (2)
of the Constitution, which prohibits appropriations for
sectarian purposes."
On the other hand, the Constitution grants tax ex-
emptions to religious institutions, 15 and allows optional
religious instruction in our public schools" and even full
'People v. Bosi, G.R. No. 193665, June 25, 2012, 674 SCRA
411.
'Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.
' Constitution, Article II, Section 6.
'0 Ibid., Article III, Section 5.
"Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1.

12
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 US 203.
"' Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 NJ 31.
"See Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201.
" Constitution, Articles VI, Section 28 (3).
"Ibid., Article XIV, Section 3 (3).
"With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of

the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation
of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no
basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner
took advantage of her ~position to court her student. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and
academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that
the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know.
But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is
not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of
the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal
pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary so-
cial mores."19
The new Preamble is rather wordy and suggests at

the outset what one might expect in the text of the Con-
stitution in terms of style and content. Even now we
must prepare against a very "talkative" Constitution.
Republicanism
Section 1 of Article II provides: "The Philippines is

a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates
from them."
It is to be noted that the Constitution now describes
the Philippines as not only a republican but also a de-
mocratic State. Democracy is essentially government by
the people.
In this connection, the Supreme Court has re-
marked that "the 1987 Constitution accords to the citi-
zens a greater participation in the affairs of govern-
ment. Indeed, it provides for people's initiative, the right
to information on matters of public concern (including
the right to know the state of hea lth of t.hP.ir President),
'" Chua-Qua v. Clave, G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990, 189
SCRA 117.
departments and other government offices, and repre-

sentatives from non-governmental organizations within
the regions for purposes of administrative decentraliza-
tion to strengthen the, autonomy of the units therein
and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region shall be provided
for by the President.27 The organic act for each autono-
mous region shall be enacted with the assistance and
participation of a regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.28 The
independent economic and planning agency headed by
the President shall consult with the appropriate public
agencies, various private sectors, and local government
units, for purposes of recommending to Congress, and
implementing continuing integrated and coordinated
programs and policies for national development." The
Congress may create a consultative body to advise the
President on policies affecting indigenous cultural com-
munities, the majority of the members of which shall
come from the communities." Moreover, sectoral repre-
sentation is provided for in the House of Representa-
tives and in local legislative bodies, under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of Section 5 of Article VI and Section 9 of
Article X, respectively, of the Constitution.
This reproduction of the original principle in the
1935 Constitution establishes the democratic and repre-
sentative nature of our government and proclaims our
hostility to autocratic or totalitarian regimes. Thus, the
people are declared supreme. It is affirmed that every
27
Id., Article X, Section 14.
28
Id., Article X, Section 18.
20
Id., Article XII, Section 9.
' ° Id., Article XVI, Section 12.
a mere plurality, which may not necessarily be a major-

ity of the total votes cast. It is thus possible at times for
the smaller number to prevail over the majority, as in a
three-cornered election where the winner gets 40,000
votes as against 60,000,. votes cast more or less equally
for the other two candidates. This may also occur in,
say, the suspension or expulsion of a member of the
Congress, which requires the concurrence of two-thirds
of the members of the House to which he belongs." In
the Sandiganbayan, the dissent of one member will pre-
vent a decision of the other two members of the division
as a unanimous vote is required for such decision. The
lone individual is in fact "a majority of one" when pro-
tected by the bill of rights."
All this is justified because the law so provides and
ours is "a government of laws and not of men." The as-
cendancy of the law is axiomatic in a republic and must
be recognized by every public official no matter how
exalted. No person is above the law; all must bow to its
majesty. Every officialact must be based upon and con-
form to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the
act must be rejected.
Indeed, nobility of intention is insufficient to vali-
date an unauthorized act, as illustrated in the cele-
brated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, 36 where it was
conceded that the mayor of Manila had been motivated
by his desire to protect the morals and health of the
people when he "deported" one hundred seventy prosti-
tutes from Manila to Davao. The Supreme Court had
nevertheless no choice except to condemn his act, there
being no showing that it had been authorized by any
=ta., Art. VI, Sec. 16(2).

"" P.D. No. 1606.
as 39 Phil. 778.
may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal military
or civil service."
This provision is based upon the inherent right of
every State to existence and self-preservation. By virtue
of this right, a State may take up all necessary action,
including the use of armed force, to repel any threat to
its security.
To this end, it is provided in Article XVI, Section 4,
of the Constitution that the armed forces of the Philip-
pines shall "be composed of a citizen armed force which
shall undergo military training and serve, as may be
provided by law." The pertinent law is C.A. No. 1, oth-
erwise known as the National Defense Act.
In People v. Lagman and People v. Zosa,38 the ac-
cused were charged with and convicted of refusal to
register for military training as required by the above-
mentioned statute. On appeal, Zosa argued that he was
fatherless and had a mother and eight brothers to sup-
port, while Lagman alleged that he had a father to sup-
port, had no military leanings, and did not wish to kill
or be killed; and both claimed that the statute was un-
constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed their con-
viction, holding that the law in question was based on
the aforecited constitutional principle.
''The National Defense Law, in so far as it established

compulsory military service, does not go against this constitu-
tional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State
cannot ha performed except through an army. To leave the or-
ganization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to
•• 38 O.G. 1676.
Peace and Order
Section 5 provides rather pompously:
"Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the pro-

tection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the peo-
ple of the blessings of democracy."
This was probably inspired by the American Decla-

ration of Independence or some high school commence-
ment address. In any case, it speaks for itself -
needlessly, it would seem - as these are implicit in a
welfare state, which is what we are repeatedly told the
Constitution is establishing.
The Incorporation Clause
Section 2 provides: "The Philippines renounces war

as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equal-
ity, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all na-
tions."
Every State is, by reason of its membership in the
family of nations, bound by the generally accepted prin-
ciples of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of its own laws. This is known as the
doctrine of incorporation. By virtue thereof, and par-
ticularly since it is expressly affirmed in our Constitu-
tion, our Supreme Court has applied the rules of inter-
national J.aw in the decision of a number of cases not-
withstanding that such rules had not been previously
converted to statutory enactments.
FvNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 97
mission trying him, contending that the Philippines was

not covered by the Hague Convention under which he
was being prosecuted, since the Philippines was not a
signatory to this agreement. The Supreme Court re-,
jected this argument, holding that we were bound by
that convention because it embodied generally accepted
principles of international law binding upon all States.
Among the grounds invoked by the Supreme Court
in Agustin v. Edu,42 which was a challenge against the
constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction requiring
early warning devices for all motor vehicles, was our
adherence to general accepted principles of interna-
tional law. Thus -
"The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition

must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The peti-
tion itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed
Letter of Instruction: '[Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Conven-
tion on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Or-
ganization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.
No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for
the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * *' It cannot
be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: 'The Philippines * * * adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land * * * .' The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not
for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had
pledged its word. The concept of pacta sunt seruanda stands in
the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with
the principle of international morality."
Indeed, generally accepted principles of interna-

tional law can be relied upon even for purposes of inter-
'" Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979).

nents of the law of the land, how is the problem re-

solved?
46
This question was raised in Ichong v. Hernandez,
where the petitioner asked for the invalidation of the
Retail Trade Nationalization Act on the ground, among
others, that it contravened several treaties concluded by
us which, under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a gen-
erally accepted principle of international law should be
observed by us in good faith. The Supreme Court said it
saw no conflict. However,even assuming that there was,
it was the statute that should be upheld because it rep-
resented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent, could not be bargained away or surrendered
through the medium of a treaty.
Municipal law was also upheld as against interna-
tional law in Gonzales v. Hechanova, 47 on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers, and in In re Gar-
cia, 48 under the rule-making powers of the Supreme
Court.
It will be recalled that among the issues raised by
the petitioners in Magallona v. Ermita'" was the neces-
sity for the passage of RA 9522, which provided for new
baselines for our archipelago, considering the permis-
sive text of UNCLOS III, on which said law was based.
The Supreme Court found this contention of the peti-
tioners as "plausible" but just the same ruled in favor of
the law, stressing that it would actually be more benefi-
cial for the Philippines to have "internationally accepted
baselines" or baselines compliant with the provisions of
UNCLOS III. Thus -
46
101 Phil. 1155.
'1 9 SCRA 230 (1963).
•• 2 SCRA 984 (1961).
'" G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476.
It is interesting to note that, in the same case, the

Supreme Court, in distinguishing between treaties and
executive agreements, stated that "a treaty has greater
'dignity' than an executive agreement, because its con-
stitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having
behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and
the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agree-
ment, takes precedence over any prior statutory enact-
ment.?"
The renunciation of war as an instrument of na-
tional policy is itself a generally accepted principle now
categorically expressed in the United Nations Charter.
The view that the war here eschewed is an offensiveand
not a defensive war finds support in the reworded provi-
sion of Article VI, Section 23(1), which empowers the
Congress to declare not war but "the existence of a state
of war" presumably commenced or provoked by the en-
emy State.
The last clause of Section 2 is an addition to the
original provision in the 1935 Constitution and is a
mere stylistic embellishment of our commitment to the
law of nations.
Section 2 must be read with another section in this
Article, which provides as follows:
"Sec. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign

policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount con-
sideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self-determination."
and with Section 8, declaring that:
"Ibid.
FuNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 103
The first is Section 12, which reads: "The State rec-

ognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social insti-
tution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother, and.
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and.
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the aid and support of the Gov-
ernment."
Kindred ties are especially close in the Philippines,
making the family a fundamental and important factor
in the enhancement of the nation. The theory is that the
better the home, the better the nation; and also that the
strength of the family lies in the correct upbringing of
its children. Proper recognition is therefore given to the
complementary roles of the parents and the government
in the rearing of the youth for the principal purposes
mentioned, to wit, civic efficiency and the development
of moral character.
Accordingly, it has been observed that the "family
is the basic and the most important institution of soci-
ety. It is in the family where children are born and
molded either to become useful citizens of the country or
troublemakers in the community.?"
Significantly, the new provision declares that the
State "shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception," which seems to sug-
gest a policy against abortion. This, however, must be
equated with the equal protection due the mother. It
should also be observed that in recognizing the sanctity
of the family life, the provision is not closing the door on
"' Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No 176556, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 642.
dardize the thinking of the children, who, according to

the court, were not "mere creatures of the State."
On the other hand, there is nothing that inhibits
the government from prescribing or prohibiting certain
courses in the various school curricula intended to im-
prove the education of the students. The legislature now
requires the teaching of the novels of Rizal for the pur-
pose of inculcating in the pupils the virtues and ideals of
our national hero, and may prohibit certain subjects
that are pernicious per se, such as, say, the techniques
of picking pockets.
In People v. Ritter, 59 an alien who had enticed Fili-
pino children with money and then sexually abused
them was expelled from the country, conformably to the
commitment of the State "to defend the right of children
to assistance and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development."
Accordingly, our Supreme Court has consistently
deplored the commission of incestuous rape, declaring
that "our moral fiber must have truly deteriorated with
fathers raping their own children. For a Christian na-
tion like ours, such bestial act should never be tolerated.
Some would argue that for the sake of the family the
child must forgive her father-tormentor. But in the eyes
of the law, a crime is a crime and justice dictates that
fathers who rape their children deserve no place in our
society.t'"
It will be recalled that in the Cabanas Case,61 the
conflicting claims of a mother and an uncle of a child to
59
194 SCRA 690 (1991).
60
People v. Bosi, G.R. No. 193665, June 25, 2012, 674 SCRA
411.
'' 268 U.S. 510.
Even optional religious instruction has been expanded

under the new Constitution as an added measure for the
improvement of the morals of the youth.
In Department of Education u. San Diego,62 the is-
sue was the validity of a rule laid down by the petitioner
prohibiting any student from taking the National Medi-
cal Admission Test (NMAT)if he had earlier failed it
three successive times. In sustaining the rule, the Su-
preme Court observed in part:
"The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke

the right to quality education as a guaranty of the Constitu-
tion: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed
the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to
say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
''No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in
the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or
occupation. The only inference is that he is probably better, not
for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest.
"In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster;
in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be out-
standing. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to
quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and
the sharpening of his latent talents towards what may even be
a brilliant future.
"We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes,
of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers
who should have studied banking and teachers who could be
better as merchants.
"It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to
regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the
student to the course for which he ls best suited as determined
by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be
62
180 SCRA 533 (1989).
as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a

child," declaring that the "appellant may be confined in
an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordancewith Sec. 5lofRepublic Act No. 9344."
Moreover, Republic Act No. 9262 has been enacted
to protect women and children from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.
It is not amiss to remark in this connection that
most of our more prominent leaders in the past were
young men whose youth belied their competence and
responsibility in the discharge of the significant tasks
that history assigned to them during the more crucial
periods of our national existence. Among them were
Rizal, who died at thirty-five; Bonifacio,who was thirty-
three when the Revolution broke out; Aguinaldo, who
became the first President of the Philippines when he
was only thirty; Sergio Osmefia, who was twenty-nine
when he was chosen Speaker of the Philippine Assem-
bly; and Wenceslao Q. Vinzons, whose brilliant if brief
public career began when he was elected to the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1934 at the age of twenty-five.
Women
Article II, Section 14, provides that "the State shall

recognizethe role of women in nation-building and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men." The reverse order follows the polite
phraseology of "ladies and gentlemen" and "ladies first"
and does not suggest a social upheaval, much less an
overturning of the tradition conferring upon the man
the position of head of the family, administrator of the
conjugal funds and other similar capacities. This provi-
sion will need implementation by the legislature, which,
The plight of the millions of our impoverished

masses is best told in the story of the ditch-digger, who
was asked why he was digging ditches. His reply: "I dig
the ditch to earn the money to buy the food to give me
strength to dig the ditch."
To him and countless other Filipinos, life is but an
unending cycle of drudgery and toil, a ceaseless struggle
for survival for the elemental right to just exist instead
of truly living. Want is a constant companion. Oppres-
sion is always close by. As for those interests intended
to enhance the joy of living, these are total strangers.
One cannot enjoy the sunset when he must worry about
the oil to light the lamp when the darkness closes in.
To alleviate the plight of these forgotten men, to
give those with less privileges in life more privileges in
law, in the words of President Ramon Magsaysay, our
government has assiduously, if not always successfully,
pursued the policy of social justice enshrined in both the
old and the new Constitutions.
Accordingly,it was held in one case" that:
"As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and

the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice,
the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compli-
ance (with the Workmen's Compensation Act). Social justice in
this case is not equality but protection."
The foregoing observations notwithstanding, the

Supreme Court has made it clear that "laws which have
for their object the preservation and maintenance of
social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and
the underprivileged. They apply with equal force to
those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable po-
68
Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 611 (1980).
In one case, the petitioner invoked social justice as

a ground for rejecting the respondent's efforts to relo-
cate her. The Supreme Court said -
I.
"For sure, the NHA's order of relocating petitioner to her
assigned lot and demolishing her property on account of her re-
fusal to vacate was consistent with the law's fundamental ob-
jective of promoting social justice in the manner that will inure
to the common good. xxx It is also worth noting that peti-
tioner's continued refusal to leave the subject property has
hindered the development of the entire area. Indeed, petitioner
cannot invoke the social justice clause at the expense of the
commonwelfare.?"
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,73

the Supreme Court likewise emphasized that -
"The policy of social justice is not intended to counte-

nance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the un-
derprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it cer-
tainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is
an imperative of every humane society but only when the re-
cipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social
justice cannot be permitted to be [the] refuge of scoundrels any
more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of
the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if
their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not sim-
ply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our
Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have
proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have
tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own
character."
72
Maglakas v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 138823,
September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA379.
'" 247 Phil. 641 (1988], cited in Duque v. Veloso, G.R. No.
196201, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA676.
F'vNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 115
Apparently not satisfied with the above provisions,

the framers have also provided for a new and separate
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, with
subtopics on Labor, Agrarian and Natural Resources Re-
form, Urban Land Reform and Housing, Health,
Women, People's Organizations, and Human Rights.
In sustaining the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, the Supreme Court concluded its opinion in Asso-
ciation of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. u.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform 75 in the followingwords:
"By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles
to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to
clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now
glimpse the day when he will be released not only from want
but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from
his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last, his
servitude will be ended forever. At last, the farm on which he
toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of Mother Earth
that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of
living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now
can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling fu-
ture. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his
insecurities and dark resentments and 'rebuild in it the music
and the dream."'
Separation of Church and State
Section 6 reiterates that "the separation of Church

and State shall be inviolable." This is a reproduction of
Article XV, Section 15, of the 1973 Constitution.
The separation of Church and State was originally,
and quite adequately, expressed in the bill of rights pro-
viding that "no law shall be made respecting an estab-
lislunent uf religion or prohibiting the free exercise
"175 SCRA 343 (1989).

ecclesiastical affairs," including a church's disconnection

of its ties with another entity.76
The wall of separation between Church and State is
not a wall of hostility. The State in fact recognizes the
beneficent influence of religion in the enrichment of the
nation's life. "In so far as it instills into the mind the
purest principles of morality," so said Justice Laurel,
"the influence of religion is deeply felt and highly appre-
ciated" by the State. Thus -
''When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Con-

stitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to es-
tablish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general
welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the bless-
ings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and de-
mocracy,' they thereby manifested their intense religious na-
ture and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of relig-
ion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to re-
ligious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to reli-
gious purposes. Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest,
preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium. Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed. Thursday
and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day,
and Sundays are made legal holidays because of the secular
idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral re-
sults. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and big-
amy; and certain crimes against religious worship are consid-
ered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state.?"
'" United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford

United Church of Christ, Inc., G.R. No. 171905, June 20, 2012, 674
SCRA 92, citing Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 417 (1955);
Taruc v. Bishop De la Cruz, 493 Phil. 293 (2005).
77
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201.
law at his command, and to employ them in the manner

he may deem most effectual.'?"
This military power of the President has been in-
terpreted to include the power to prevent, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, military personnel from testifying in
legislative inquiries,79 and to confirm, mitigate and re-
mit sentences of erring military personnel."
Local Autonomy
The policy of local autonomy, which was not specifi-

cally mentioned in the 1935 Constitution but was digni-
fied into a constitutional principle by the 1973 charter is
affirmed in Section 25, which provides: "The State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments."
This principle is fleshed out in Article X, entitled
"Local Government" and the Local Government Code.
The strengthening of local governments is based
upon the Jeffersonian view that "municipal corporations
are the small republics from which the great one derives
its strength." The belief is shared in this country that
vitalization of the local·government unit will enable its
inhabitants to develop their resources and thereby con-
tribute to the progress of the whole nation. More impor-
tantly, they will acquire a deepened sense of involve-
ment that will encourage them to participate more ac-
tively in the direction of public affairs as members of the
body politic.
1"
Kulayan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA
482.
79
Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498
SCRA671.
"0 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30,
2012, 677 SCRA 750.
sions of Article XII of the Constitution, namely, Section

10, which basically gives to Congress the discretion to
reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments; Sec-
tion 11, which reserves.franchises for public utilities to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associa-
tions organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is ownedby such
citizens; Section 12, which calls upon the State to pro-
mote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt meas-
ures that help them make competitive; and Section 13,
under which the State shall pursue a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity. All of these provisions are founded on the
need to "conserve and develop our patrimony," as speci-
fied in the Preamble.
In Espina u. Zamora,82 the petitioners challenged
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8762, otherwise
known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000,
which allowed foreigners to engage in retail trade in our
country. The petitioners contended that its basic provi-
sions violated the aforecited constitutional policies.The
Supreme Court rejected the challenge, declaring, as
follows-
"But, as the Court explained in Tafiada v. Angara, the

provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declara-
tions of principles and state policies, are not self-executing.
Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a
cause of action in the courts.
"The Court further explained in Taiiada that Article XII
of Lhe 1987 Cu111;LiLuLiu11 lays duwu Lhe ideals uf economic na-
tionalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified
"2 G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010, 631 SCRA 17.
elusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such

policy.
"Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Lib-
eralization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners' right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it can-
not be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos'
right to property and to due process oflaw. Filipinos continue
to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to
which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign
investors.
"Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to
inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly
violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no
showing that the law has contravened any constitutional man-
date. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of
R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail
trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete
and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has
provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that
business. Thus -
"First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business
subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only na-
tionals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in
countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be al-
lowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified
foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain re-
tailing activities outside their accredited stores through the
use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales repre-
sentatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari
stores and such other similar retailing activities.
"In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade
liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small
and medium enterprises since its implementation about a dec-
ade ago."
In seeming contrast, the Supreme Court, in Gam-

boa v. Finance Secretary." in interpreting Section 11 of
Article X.11, which reserves franchises for public utilities
.., G.R. No. 1765'79,June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690.

This patriotic stance of the Supreme Court was fur-

ther emphasized when it later declared -
"Since the constitµtional requirement of at least 60 per-

cent Filipino ownership'applies not only to voting control of the
corporation but also to the beneficial ownership of the corpora-
tion, it is therefore imperative that such requirement apply
uniformly and across the board to all classes of shares, regard-
less of nomenclature and category, comprising the capital of a
corporation. Under the Corporation Code, capital stock consists
of all classes of shares issued to stockholders, that is, common
shares as well as preferred shares, which may have different
rights, privileges or restrictions as stated in the articles of in-
corporation.
"The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the
development of an economy'effectively controlled' by Filipinos.
Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly
reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Phil-
ippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments
Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations
at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs
to Filipinos. The FIA's implementing rules explain that '[f]or
stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or
Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the
required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the
stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential.' In
effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpreta-
tion that the term 'capital' in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with
full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to
vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial
ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corpora-
tion.
"Any other construction of the term 'capital' in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution contravenes the letter and
intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning of the term
'capital' openly invites alien domination of economic activities
reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals. Therefore, re-
spondents' interpretation will ultimately result in handing
over effective control of our national economy to foreigners in
"Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them."
"Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecologyin accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature."
"Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to education, sci-
ence and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patri-
otism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote
total human liberation and development."
"Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development."
"Sec. 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental,
community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the
welfare of the nation."
"Sec. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of commu-
nication and information in nation-building."
"Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to op-
portunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law."
"Sec. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integ-
rity in the public service and take positive and effective meas-
ures against graft and corruption."
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
Sections 15 (on the people's right to health) and 16

(on their right to a balanced and healthful ecology) have,
as earlier noted, been acknowledged by the Supreme
Court as special provisions which "need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind.?"
'" Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224
SCRA 792; see also MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 90.
ties between the BJE and the national government, the

act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status
which, in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive
to national unity." The Court clarified that "indigenous
peoples situated within states do not have a general
right to independence or secession from those states
under international law, but they do have rights
amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination."
It is to be noted that Section 12 of Article XVI of the
Constitution provides that Congress may create a consul-
tative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the
members of which shall comefrom such communities.
As previously noted, Section 23 appears to be an af-
firmation of the ever-growing importance of non-
governmental organizations in our democracy.
In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Phil.
Multi-Media Inc.,88 the Supreme Court remarked that
the "must-carry rule" imposed by the National Tele-
communications Commission and the legislative fran-
chises granted in favor of the parties in said case "are in
consonance with state policies enshrined in the Consti-
tution," including Sections 17 (on the promotion of sci-
ence and technology) and 24 (on the vital role of commu-
nication in nation-building). It would therefore appear
that our Supreme Court has somehow found some use
for these provisions.
Section 17 speaks of promoting "total human lib-
eration and development," whatever this may mean.
RR G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 262.

Chapter 6
SEPARATION OF POWERS
THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION of powers was

modified under the 1973 Constitution with the estab-
lishment of a semi-parliamentary government that
made the legislature subordinate in many respects to
the President, who was even vested with the ultimate
power of dissolving it. Under the new Constitution, the
traditional concept of the doctrine has been restored,
but with several significant modifications.
The three major departments of the government
have been maintained, and so have the three constitu-
tional commissions established earlier under the past
charters. Other independent bodies have been created.
By and large, the separation of the principal powers has
been preserved. The judiciary, regarded as the weakest
of the three branches, has been considerably strength-
ened with the conferment on it of additional and impor-
tant powers. In the case of the political departments,
one will observe a lessening of the powers of the execu-
tive and a corresponding increase in the authority of the
legislature, inspired presumably by our experiences
under the Marcos authoritarianism.
Worthy of special interest is the revival of the Com-
mission on Appointments as a check upon the appoint-
ing power in general and the creation of the Judicial
and Bar Council to ensure better selection of the mem-
bers of the judiciary. The Electoral Tribunals have also
been restored (but with a modified membership) to act
131
SEPARATION OF POWERS 133
Purposes
The doctrine of separation of powers is intended to

prevent a concentratio:ro.of authority in one person or
group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error
or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republi-
can institutions. More specifically, according to Justice
Laurel, the doctrine is intended to secure action, to fore-
stall over-action, to prevent despotism and to obtain
efficiency.3
The principle of separation of powers ordains that
each of the three great branches of government has ex-
elusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere."
To achieve these purposes, the legislature is gener-
ally limited to the enactment of laws and may not en-
force or apply them; the executive to the enforcement of
laws and may not enact or apply them; and the judiciary
to the application of laws and may not enact or enforce
them.5
Indeed, it has been ruled that "courts cannot limit
the application or coverage of a law, nor can it impose
conditions not provided therein." "Todo so," according to
the Supreme Court, "constitutes judicial legislation."
"Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 67.

4
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936),
cited in Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves, G.R. No.
181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.
'See Bengzon v. Driluu, G.R. Nu. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208
SCRA 133.
e Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 173425, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA

566.
powers of government may not at all times be contained

with mathematical precision in water-tight compart-
ments because of their ambiguous nature, e.g., the
power of appointment, which can rightfully be exercised
by each department over its own administrative person-
nel. But more importantly, it is often necessary for cer-
tain powers to be reposed in more than one department,
so that they may better collaborate with and, in the
process, checkeach other for the public good.
An illustration of such coordination is the enact-
ment of the general appropriations law, which begins
with the preparation by the President of the budget,
which becomesthe basis of the bill adopted by the Con-
gress and subsequently submitted by it to the President,
who may then approve it." Another is the grant of am-
nesty by the President which requires the concurrence
of a majority of all the members of the Congress." To
take a third example, the Commission on Elections does
not alone deputize law-enforcement agencies and in-
strumentalities of the government for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections but does so with the consent of the President.12
Checks and Balances
'What makes the doctrine of separation of powers

especially workable is the corollary system of checks
and balances, by means of which one department is
allowed to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives
or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the
other departments. The exercise of this authority is not
in Constitution, Art. VI, Secs. 25, 27.

II
Ibid., Art. VI, Sec. 19.
12
Id., Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(4).
other departments. The correct view is that when the

Supreme Court mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body,
what it is upholding is not its own supremacy but the
supremacy of the Constitution."
In the determination of whether a given power has
been validly exercised by a particular department, the
test applied is not necessarily or always the nature of
the power. The first criterion-and the safest-is
whether or not the power in question, regardless of its
nature, has been constitutionally conferred upon the
department claiming its exercise. The grant being as-
certained, the exerciseof the power is sustained.
The conferment of power is usually done expressly,
as in the vesture of the legislative power in the Con-
gress, 21 the executive power in the President" and the
judicial power in the Supreme Court and such lower
courts as may be established by law.23 As may be readily
noticed, there is no problem as to the validity of the
discharge of these powers because they naturally per-
tain to the agenciesin which they have been reposed.
But this is not always the case. To illustrate, the
power to impeach, which is essentially executive, and
the power to try and decide impeachment cases, which
is essentially judicial, are expressly lodged in the Con-
gress," as so too is the power of investigation,25 which is
more executive or judicial than legislative. These powers
20
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.
21
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1.
22
Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. 1.
"' Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
=ta.. Art. XI, Sec. 3.
'" Id., Art. VI, Sec. 21.
hardly be effective if the Congress did not possess the

implied authority to punish witnesses for contumacy.
Mention must also be made of those powers which
although not specifically granted by the Constitution
either expressly or by implication may be justified as
inherent or incidental. Thus, the President, as head of
the government, may independently of constitutional or
statutory authority deport undesirable aliens as an "act
of State,"33 even as the Congress can punish any person
who impugns its integrity without proof.34 The courts,
for their part, may claim the contempt power inherent
in the judiciary.35
Justiciable and Political Questions
Assuming then that the proper repository of the

power in question has been ascertained on the basis of a
valid constitutional grant, is the power of the judiciary to
review officialaction terminated? Not necessarily,because
it could be that the act in question had not been per-
formed in accordancewith the rules laid down by the Con-
stitution.
If, say, there is no compliance with a voting re-
quirement prescribed by the fundamental law, as where
a statute granting a tax exemption is enacted by less
than a majority of all the members of the Congress,36 or
when an appointee of the President does not possess the
prescribed qualifications, the courts will have jurisdic-
tion to intervene. The questions involved here are justi-
ciable. The judiciary in such cases would not be en-
"" In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41.

"' In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595.
"" Ibid.
''" Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 28(1).
cise of the same. In Gonzales v. Office of the President,38

the Supreme Court, in nullifying the removal by the
President of a Deputy Ombudsman, relied on the delib-
erations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
constitutional grounds for impeachment in defining
"betrayal of public trust" and explained -
"The Constitutional Commission eventually found it rea-

sonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to re-
fer to 'acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute
gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of
power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross
exercise of discretionary powers.' In other words, acts that
should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant re-
moval from office may be less than criminal but must be at-
tended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the
other grounds for impeachment.
"A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not
impeachable officers. However, by providing for their removal
from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment,
the legislature could not have intended to redefine constitu-
tional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, trea-
son, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as
betrayal of public trust, and apply them less stringently.
Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of im-
peachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official
wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain
true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor from office.Hence, the fact that the grounds
for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the
removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor
the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not
suddenly 'overreach' to cover acts that are not vicious or ma-
levolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeach-
ment."
as G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614.

"The term 'political question' connotes what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be de-
cided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.' It is con-
cerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of
a particular measure."
In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections." it was

held:
"Political questions are neatly associated with the wis-

dom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of
the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the con-
tested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of
the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Con-
stitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act
or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to pro-
pose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question.
Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President
would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides
how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or
the authority assumed was valid or not.
"We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in
pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of
the President's authority to propose amendments and the regu-
larity of the procedure adopted for submission of proposals to
the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear
Descartes fallacy or vicious circle. Is it not that the people
themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority
and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the
present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that consti-
tutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of
course-who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
" 73 SCRA 333 (1976).

nor-General,45 to call a special election though this duty

was imposed on him by law in mandatory language. The
Court held in both cases that the powers involved were
discretionary in the executive and therefore not subject .·
to judicial compulsion.A similar conclusionwas reached
in In re Dick,46 where the Supreme Court interpreted
also as discretionary the power of the Governor-General
to ascertain the necessity for the expulsion of an alien
for the protection of the national interest.
Indeed, in the earlier case of In Re Patterson,47 the
Court announced that the Governor-General could act
"without interference on the part of the judicial power"
accordingto the doctrine of separation of powers, stating
that "the greater part of modern laws, notwithstanding
these objections, have sanctioned the maxim that the
expulsion of foreigners is a political measure and that
the executive power may expel without appeal any per-
son whose presence tends to disturb the public peace.
The privilege of the foreigners to enter the territory of a
State for the purpose of traveling through or remaining
therein being recognized on principle, we must also rec-
ognize the right of the State under exceptional circum-
stances to limit this privilege upon the ground of public
policy, and in all cases preserve the obligations of the
foreigner to subject himself to the provisions of the local
law concerning his entry into and his presence in the
territory of each State."
"Under these circumstances, the Government exercising

in a sovereign and efficacious manner this attribute of execu-
tive power, has authorized an administrative officer to prevent
the entrance into the country of persons from abroad whom he
"' 16 Phil. 366.

46
Supra.
11
1 Phil. 93.
President of the Philippines, in the exercise of his politi-

cal prerogatives, that the people had acquiesced in or
accepted the 1973 Constitution. In De la Llana v. Com-
mission on Elections, 51 the Supreme Court refused to
restrain the holding of 'a referendum, ruling that the
calling thereof lay in the exclusive discretion of Presi-
dent Marcos.
In Custodio v. Senate President, 52 where a taxpayer
challenged the validity of a provision in the general
appropriations law that compensated the members of
the Congress for services supposedly rendered by them
during the Japanese Occupation, it was held that the
question submitted was political, affecting as it did the
wisdom or propriety of the law. Hence, the only remedy
available to the petitioner was a resort not to the courts
but to the bar of public opinion. When the Senate in
Alejandrina v. Quezon53 and the House of Representa-
tives in Osmetia v. Pendatun" suspended a member for
disorderly behavior, the Supreme Court refused to inter-
fere even if in the former case it declared that the sus-
pension was illegal "because the seat remains filled but
the occupant is silenced."
In Vera v. Avelino, 55 three senators-elect who had
been prevented from taking their oaths of officeby reso-
1 ution of the Senate went to the Supreme Court and
alleged that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction
over contests relating to their election, returns and
qualifications. Again, the Supreme Court refused to
intervene, holding that the case was not a "contest," and
OJ 82 SCRA 30 (1978).
"' 42 O.G. 1243.
'"146 Phil. 83.
""109 Phil. 863.

"' 77 Phil. 192.
Pambansa was held by the Supreme Court to be a poli-

tical question resolubleonly by the sovereignelectorate.
In De Castro u. Committee on Justice, 60 the Su-
preme Court was asked' to reverse a decision of the res-
pondent dismissing impeachment charges against
President Marcos after deliberating thereon for only six
hours and to compel the said committee to give due
course to such charges. The petition for certiorari and
mandamus was dismissed, on the ground inter alia that
the issues raised were political in nature and could be
resolved only by the legislators themselves in the exer-
cise of their discretion. The Court ruled that the dis-
missal of the charges was "within the ambit of the pow-
ers vested exclusively in the Batasan by express provi-
sion of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and it is
not within the competence of this Court to inquire
whether in the exercise of said powers the Batasan
acted wisely." Later, when in Romulo u. Yniguez." the
petitioners asked for the recall of the impeachment reso-
lution so it could be considered directly by the Batasang
Pambansa, the Court, citing its ruling in the antecedent
case, dismissed the petition on the ground of separation
of powers, in addition to other reasons to be discussed in
detail in Chapter 17.
It must be noted that the Constitution now re-
quires the proper Committee of the House of Represen-
tatives to submit its report on an impeachment com-
plaint, together with its corresponding resolution, to the
House within sixty days from its referral to the same,
and said resolution shall be calendared for considera-
tion by the House within ten session days from its re-
so G.R. No. 71688, Sept. 10, 1985.

"' Infra.
Garcia, 67 where the Supreme Court asserted the right to

inquire into the factual basis of the suspension and to
annul the same if it appeared from its own investiga-
tions that the grounds invoked by the President were
not actually existing. In a complete about-face, however,
this decision was itself later abandoned in Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile,68 where the original rule announced in
the Barcelon and Montenegro Cases was reinstated to
make the questioned power once again discretionary in
the President. It is no longer so, however, under Article
VII, Section 18, of the present Constitution, to be dis-
cussed in Chapter 11.
It was also held in Noblejas v. Teehanhee" that the
administrative investigation of an executive official
should be undertaken by the President of the Philip-
pines and not the Supreme Court even if it was provided
by law that such officialhad the rank and privileges of a
judge of the court of first instance. Neither may the
Supreme Court be compelled by law to act as a mere
board of arbitrators, an essentially executive body, par-
ticularly because whatever decisions it might make in
the discharge of its administrative functions would ul-
timately have to be reviewed by the same members in
the exercise of their judicial powers." Section 12 of Arti-
cle VIII of the Constitution provides that the "Members
of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions."
Conversely, powers that belong to the judiciary
may not be assumed by other departments, as when, in
61
42 SCRA 448 (1971).
•• 121 SCRA 472 (1983).
sn 23 SCRA 405 (1968).
'0 Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Trans. Co., 57 Phil. 825.
mentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused

on the 'thou shalt not's' of the Constitution directed against the
exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however,
courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can
do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumen-
tality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry
with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political thicket."
In Article VII, Section 18, it is expressly provided

that "the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or the extension thereof." There is no doubt of the au-
thority of the Supreme Court in this specific case. The
question is, in the absence of similar specific authoriza-
tion in other cases, to what extent may the exercise of
discretion by the political departments be reviewed and
if warranted reversed by the courts?
If, say, a notorious criminal is extended an absolute
pardon, or the Congress of the Philippines enacts a law
which is obviouslyimpractical or unwise, may these acts
of the political departments be annulled by the Supreme
Court on the ground that they were committed with
grave abuse of discretion? For example, may the Su-
preme Court now reverse the doctrine in the case of Riel
u. Wright,74 where it inhibited itself from ruling on the
claimed excessive number of employees hired by the
Philippine Legislature after the adjournment of the
session, holding that this was an internal matter under
the exelusive j urisdiction of the legislators?
·., 49 Phil. 194.

propounded to him in the course of a legislative inquiry.

The Court declared that "there being a legitimate claim
of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt or-
der suffers from constitutional infirmity."
On the other hand, in Lawyers Against Monopoly
and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management, 77
the Supreme Court rejected a challenge against the
constitutionality of the Priority DevelopmentAssistance
Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act 9206 or
the General Appropriations Act for 2004. Finding that
the proper procedure appeared to have been followedin
the promulgation of said law and noting that the peti-
tioners had not adequately established that said law
constituted an "encroachment on executive power" by
enabling legislators to propose and choose the projects
for which said fund is to be used, the Court held -
"Tojustify the nullification of the law or its implementa-
tion, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful,
breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because 'to invalidate [a law] based on xx x baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legisla-
ture that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.'
This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by
the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by
the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the dis-
charge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act
must be struck down.
"The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. LAMP
would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality of the
PDAF's enforcement based on the absence of express provision
in the GAAallocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373; see also
11
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113888, August 19, 1994, 235

SCRA 506.
ciple and thus unconstitutional." The Court also de-

clared that said PDAF Article, "insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individu-
ally exercise the power of appropriation which - as
settled in Philconsa - is lodged in Congress.?"
Among the issues raised by the private respondent
in Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary" was
the assumption by the Supreme Court of jurisdiction
over the petitions questioning the constitutionality of
certain Executive Orders issued by the President con-
sidering that there were no "ongoingproceedings"before
any board or tribunal which would have warranted its
exercise its power ofjudicial review under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The Court upheld its jurisdiction, ex-
plaining as follows-
"UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that
there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or
before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial,
or ministerial functions. UCPB insists that the Court exercises
appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues of constitutionality
or validity oflaws and presidential orders.
"But, as the Court previously held, where there are seri-
ous allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution, it be-
comes not only the right but the duty of the Court to look into
such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy
of the Constitution. Moreover, where the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court
has the discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure."
78
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November
19, 2013.
"'G.R. Nos. 147036-37,April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA49.
same, on the strength of the principle of separation of

powers, stressing its judicial independence and fiscal
autonomy, and citing its "unique circumstances," declar-
ing that the 'judicial branch, as a whole, should work in
the discharge of its constitutional functions free of re-
straints and influence from the other branches, save
only for those imposed by the Constitution itself.?"
"2 A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1.

DELEGATION OF POWERS 161
observation that the delegation of legislative power has

becomethe rule and its non-delegationthe exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task
of government and the 'growing inability of the legisla-
ture to cope directly with the many problems demanding
its attention. The growth of society has ramified its ac-
tivities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has be-
come necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence, let alone the interest and the
time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not
to say specific,solutions.
One such problem, to take an example, is the regu-
lation of common carriers. This task requires the deter-
mination of such intricate matters as the routes to be
serviced by such carriers, the number of them to be al-
lowed in each route, the conveniencesthey should offer
the passengers, the fare they may charge, the type of
vehicles they should use, and other myriad details that
the legislature may not have the time, expertise and
interest to prescribe.
Given these shortcomings, the Congress may then
create an administrative body like the Land Transpor-
tation Franchising and Regulatory Board and empower
it to promulgate the needed rules and regulations, sub-
ject only to certain statutory limitations or broad poli-
cies pre-determined by the legislature itself.
Such a device as applied to a hundred other similar
cases can relieve the Congress of many problems that
are better left to be solved by more capable entities and
at the same time enable it to tackle the more serious
In AKBAYAN u. Aquino,3 the Supreme Court clari-

fied that the subject of this constitutional provision "is
not the power to negotiate treaties and international
agreements, but the power l
to fix tariff rates, import and
export quotas, and other taxes," and, accordingly, should
not be considered as a source of the power of the Presi-
dent to negotiate international trade agreements.
(2) Emergency Powers
"Sec. 23(2). In times of war or other national emer-

gency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may pre-
scribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolu-
tion of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon its next ad-
journment."
In times of war or other national emergency, it is

not likely that a quorum can be convened in the Con-
gress to enable it to do business. Assuming such quo-
rum, there is still the divisiveness and delay inherent in
the lawmaking process that may hamper effective solu-
tion of the problems caused by the emergency. Such
problems, needless to say, must be solved within the
shortest possible time to prevent them from aggravating
the difficultiesof the nation.
To this end, the Congress may authorize the Presi-
dent to exercise emergency powers. This authority may
then be discharged by him with more dispatch and deci-
siveness than can be expected from the Congress itself
dealing with the crisis.
"G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 468.

' Constitution, Article VI.
worst crisis, the Congress may choose to hold on to its

legislative powers and validly refuse to delegate it; or,
should it decide to do so, limit its duration and termi-
nate it even before the end of the emergency. The emer-
gency does not automatically confer emergency powers
on the President. According to Chief Justice Paras,
"emergency itself cannot and should not create power."
By the same token, the mere continuance of the emer-
gency does not necessarily continue the President's
emergencypowers if they have been granted to him for
a shorter period.
In every case, to prevent the delegation from being
a total surrender of legislative authority, it must be
subject to the restrictions to be prescribed by the Con-
gress. The specific requirement of the Constitution is
that the President may be authorized to exercise powers
"necessary and proper" only for the purpose of carrying
out a national policy declared not by him but by the
Congress.Any act of the President that is not in keeping
with this national policy can be challenged as beyond
the scopeof his delegated authority.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 6 the petition-
ers questioned the exercise by President Quirino of
emergency powers previously vested in President Que-
zon and successively exercised by Presidents Osmefia
and Roxas. At stake was the validity of certain executive
orders promulgated by President Quirino providing
specificallyfor the appropriation of public funds in the
operation of the national government and the conduct of
the 1949 elections, the control of exports, and the regu-
lation of the rentals of residential lots and buildings. In
"Second Emergency Powers Cases, Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil.

603.
6
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.
"It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Com-

monwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress
met in regular session on May 25, 1948, and that Executive
Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without author-
ity of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress in-
stead of the first special session which preceded it as the point
of expiration of the Act, we think we are giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special
session, the Congress may 'consider general legislation or only
such subjects as he (President) may designate.' (Section 9, Ar-
ticle VI of the Constitution) In a regular session, the power of
the Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the
limitations imposed by the organic law."
Despite this decision, President Quirino continued·

exercising emergency powers, promulgating two execu-
tive orders appropriating public funds for public works
and the relief of typhoon victims. These acts were chal-
lenged in the second Emergency Powers Cases,7 where
the additional circumstance appeared that the Congress
had passed House Bill No. 727 repealing all Emergency
Powers Acts except that this measure had been vetoed
by the President. On this point, the Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Paras, made the following pro-
nouncement:
"As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitu-

tional provision, it has to be assumed that the National As-
sembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be con-
tended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such
step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers dele-
gated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitu-
tionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if
the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his
veto. This eventuality had in fact taken place when the Presi-
dent disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency
Powers Acts. 'l'he situation will make the Congress and the
President or either the principal authority to determine the in-
7
Supra.
resume its legislative powers. It would also permit

rather than prevent the anomalous situation envisioned
by Justice Tuason thus:
"More anomalous than the exercise of legislative func-

tions by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed
exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two leg-
islative bodies operating over the same field, legislating con-
currently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's
actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as
suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be
renewed after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be
eliminated. Congress by a two-thirds vote could repeal execu-
tive orders promulgated by the President during congressional
recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same man-
ner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter.
This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances, it mate-
rialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best in-
terests of the country as they saw them, a former President
promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after
he bad vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and
the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on ex-
port control after Congress had refused to approve the meas-
ure."
Section 17 of Article XII of the Constitution pro-

vides -
"In times of national emergency, when the public interest

so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or di-
rect the operation of any privately owned public utility or busi-
ness affected with public interest."
In David v. Arroyo,8 the Supreme Court declared

that, while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, he may uuL invoke this provision Lu
authorize him during the emergency "to temporarily
'G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.

(3) Delegation to the People
Accordingto Cooley,"the prevailing doctrine in the

courts appears to be, that, except in those cases where,
by the Constitution, the·people have expressly reserved
to themselves a power of decision, the function of legis-
lation cannot be exercised by them, even to the extent of
accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for
their consideration. The people have voluntarily surren-
dered that power when they adopted the Constitution.
The government of the state is democratic, but it is a
representative democracy, and in passing general laws
the people act only through their representatives in the
legislature. Such reference of the law to the people at
large for acceptance or rejection is plain surrender of the
law-making power.'?"
But in People u. Vera, 11 our Supreme Court ob-
served that "courts have also sustained the delegation of
legislative power to the people at large," although it was
quick to add that "some authorities maintain that this
may not be done."
A referendum is traditionally defined as a method
of submitting an important legislative measure to a
direct vote of the whole people.12 It differs from the
plebiscite in that the questions submitted in the latter
are intended to work more permanent changes in the
political structure, like a proposal to amend the Consti-
tution. According to Strong, "the term plebiscite means
literally decree of the people. The plebiscite is a device
to obtain a direct popular vote on a matter of political
° Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. 238-242.

1
11
65 Phil. 56.
12
Black, 1146.
scribe local regulations, according to immemorial prac-

tice, subject, of course, to the interposition of the supe-
rior in cases of necessity.'?"
Accordingly,the power of eminent domain and, un-
der the general welfare clause, the police power have
been expressly delegated by the legislature to the local
lawmaking bodies.17 The power of taxation is, however,
derived by them directly from the Constitution, subject
only to limitations that may be imposed by the Con-
gress."
(5) Delegation to Administrative Bodies
The reasons given earlier for the delegation of legis-

lative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of special-
ized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
"powerof subordinate legislation,"as it is called. Thus -
"In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmefia, G.R.

Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in
Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commis-
sion, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court
had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of pow-
ers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits,
of the principle of 'subordinate legislation,' not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern gov-
ernments. Accordingly,with the growing complexity of modern
16
People v. Vera, supra.
17
See Francia v. Municipality ofMeycauayan, G.R. No. 170432,
March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 53; Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R.
No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92.
1"
Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 5; City of Iriga v. Camarines Sur
III Electric Cooperative, G.R. No. 192945, September 5, 2012.
operation of a law. Such contingent regulations also

have the force and effect of law.
A case in point is Cruz u. Youngberg.21 The law in-
volved here prohibited the entry into the country of for-
eign cattle, which had been determined by the Philip-
pine Legislature as the cause of a rinderpest epidemic
that had killed many of the local livestock. The same
law, however, authorized the Governor-General to lift
the prohibition, with the consent of the presiding offi-
cers of the lawmaking body, if he should ascertain after
a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any
threat of contagion from imported cattle.
For an administrative regulation to be valid, its
promulgation must be authorized by the legislature, it
must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature, it must be promulgated in accordance with
the prescribed procedure, and it must be reasonable.22
Tests of Delegation
'
Assuming that the delegation of legislative power
comes under any of the permissible exceptions, there is
still the question of whether or not the delegation has
been validly made. To be valid, the delegation itself
must be circumscribed by legislative restrictions, not a
"roving commission" that will give the delegate unlim-
ited legislative authority. It must not be a delegation
"running riot" and "not canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.?" Otherwise, the delegation is
21
56 Phil. 234.
22
See Iilxecutive Secretary v, Oouthwing Heavy Industries, G.n.
No. 164171, March 1, 2006, 482 SCRA 673, and Cruz, Philippine
Administrative Law, 2007 edition, pages 50-81.
23
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. US, 295 US 495, Concurring Opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Cardozo; Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 669.
If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its en-
forcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will
then have been given the opportunity to step into· the
shoes of the legislature and to exercise a discretion es-
sentially legislative in order to repair the omissions.
This is invalid delegation.
Thus, in United States v. Ang Tang Ho, 27 a law au-
thorized the Governor-General "whenever, for any
cause, conditions arise resulting in extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate,
with the consent of the Council of State, temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the pur-
poses of this Act." Pursuant to this authorization, he
issued regulations fixing ceiling prices for the said cere-
als. The appellant, who was being prosecuted for selling
above the said ceiling prices, challenged the law on the
ground that it constituted an invalid delegation of legis-
lative power for failure to conform to the completeness
test. The Supreme Court sustained his contention, de-
claring as follows:
"By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules

and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Gover-
nor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or
define under what conditions or for what reasons the Gover-
nor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may
be issued for any cause and leaves the question of what is any
cause to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legisla-
ture does not also define what is an extraordinary increase in
the price of palay, rice, or other cereal. That is also left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The law does not specify or
define what such temporary and emergency measures shall
Collector uf Customs, No. 30783, August 27, 1929, b3 Phil. ::S!:14 et

seq., cited in Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056,
168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1,
115-116.
21
43 Phil. 1.
The sufficient standard is usually indicated in the

law delegating legislative power. To illustrate, the Blue
Sky Law required the National Treasurer to cancel cer-
tificates for the sale ,of speculative securities whenever
necessary in the "public interest."?' The Supreme Court
has considered the "optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs" as being
"infused with public interest.':" Under R.A. No. 51, the
President of the Philippines was authorized to reorgan-
ize government-owned or controlled corporations for the
purpose of promoting "simplicity, economy and effi-
ciency" in their operations." C.A. No. 548 empowered
the Director of Public Works to promulgate traffic rules
in the light of the "public welfare.?" Other accepted
standards are "justice and equity," "the sense and ex-
perience of men," and "national security."
But even if the law itself does not expressly pin-
point the standard, the courts will bend over backward
to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the stat-
ute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity. Thus, in
Hirabayashi v. United States, 35 the petitioner challenged
a regulation establishing curfew hours for Niseis, or
American citizens of Japanese ancestry, during World
War IL One of his claims was that the rule was based on
invalidly delegated legislative power, there being no
sufficient standard mentioned in the pertinent law to
limit the delegate's discretion. The U.S. Supreme Court
115-116, cited in Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves,

G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.
"' People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328.
32
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, Ibid.
,., Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359.
"' Calalang v. Williams, supra.
"" 320 U.S. 99.
clause, the law was held to be an invalid delegation of

legislative power for lack of a sufficient standard.
"The Probation Act was not to be effective immediately.

Its effectivity was mdde to depend upon an act to be done by
the provincial boards of the provinces, that of appropriating
funds for the salary of a probation officer. If the provincial
board makes the appropriation, the Probation Act is applicable
in that province; if it does not make the appropriation, the law
is not applicable therein. For purposes of the Probation Act,
the provincial boards may thus be regarded as administrative
bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act shall
take effect in their respective provinces. However, the law does
not lay down any rule or standard to guide the provincial
boards in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted to them is a roving commission which enables the pro-
vincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. The applicability
and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the
hands of the provincial boards with no standard or rule to
guide them. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to
them."
In Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,38 the Court

noted:
''We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable man-

ner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed
in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that
the seized property shall 'be distributed to charitable institu-
tions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the Na-
tional Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of cara-
baos.' The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reason-
able guidelines, ur LeLLe1 still, the liruitatious that the said offi-
cers must observe when they make their distribution. There is
:JR 148 SCRA 659.

law: (a) be complete in itself-it must set forth therein the pol-
icy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the dele-
gate-and (b) to fix a standard-the limits of which are suffi-
ciently determinate or determinable-to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence
of every law, and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also-and this is
worse-to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nul-
lifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
"Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of
the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does
not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently pre-
cise to avoid the evil effects above referred to."
Accordingly,in Bureau of Customs Employees Asso-

ciation v. Teves,41 the Supreme Court similarly ruled
that "two tests determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test," in finding that both tests "were
fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as evident from the
aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover,
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the incen-
tives due to District Collection Offices. While it is ap-
parent that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides
that '[t]he allocation, distribution and release of the dis-
trict reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and
regulations of the Revenue Performance and Evaluation
Board,' Section 7 (a) of R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates
"G.R. No. 181704,December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589.

Chapter 8
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

~.·
THE NEW CONSTITUTION has revived the Congress

of the Philippines, which was replaced during the Mar-
cos regime with the Batasang Pambansa. The name of
that legislature is tainted and disgraced, which is
probably one reason why it was not retained to desig-
nate the new legislature. The old Congress under the
Commonwealth Constitution, for all its rather question-
able record, was never a rubber-stamp of the President,
at least not in the servile way the Batasang Pambansa
was to Marcos. The adoption of the former name of the
lawmaking body will resurrect memories of freer days
when the Congress was a peer of the other two depart-
ments and in some respects even more powerful than
either of them.
The new Congress represents a return to bica-
meralism after our recent experiment with unicameral-
ism, which was established by the 1973 Constitution
and, in fact, also initially provided for in the 1935 Con-
stitution before it was amended in 1940. The Malolos
Congress was also unicameral, and so too was the Taft
Commission during the early years of the American
regime. The Philippine Bill of 1902, however, provided
for a legislature consisting of a Philippine Assembly and
the Philippine Commission, which under the Jones Law
were replaced by the House of Representatives and the
Senate, respectively. The Philippine Legislature, as it
was called, was the pattern of the Congress of the Phil-
185
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 187
the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be pro-

vided by law."
By providing for a membership elected at large by
the entire electorate, this rule intends to make the Se-
nate a training ground for national leaders and possibly
a springboard to the Presidency. The feeling is that the
senator, having a national rather than only a district
constituency, will have a broader outlook of the prob-
lems of the country instead of being restricted by paro-
chial viewpoints and narrow interests. With such a per-
spective, the Senate is likely to be more circumspect and
broad-minded than the House of Representatives.
(2) Qualifications
The qualifications for membership in the Senate

are laid down in Section 3 as follows:
"No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a regis-
tered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less. than
two years immediately preceding the day of the election."
Accordingto Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitu-

tion, "natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birt]i without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens."
The age qualification is fixed at 35 and must be
poRRP.RsP.n on thP. day of the elections, that is, when the
polls are opened and the votes are cast, and not on the
day of the proclamation of the winners by the board of
canvassers. This nullifies the ruling in the case of
main (animus manendii.":" Domicile, according to the

Supreme Court, denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some
other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of
intention and circumstances. In the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind,
namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domi-
cile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains
until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but
one residence or domicile at a time. If one wishes to
successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demon-
strate an actual removal or an actual change of domi-
cile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one, and defi-
nite acts which correspond with the purpose." Without
clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three
requirements, the domicile of origin continues.12
Applying the foregoing criteria, the Supreme Court
disqualified, on the ground of failure to complywith the
residence requirement, a candidate who sought to es-
tablish his residence with his voter registration records,
a marriage certificate, water bills and a deed of sale
covering property in the place where he sought to be
elected. In rejecting his evidence on his alleged resi-
dence, the Supreme Court noted-
"The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail

to convince us that Noble successfully effected a change of
"'Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, Janu-

ary 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331.
" Domino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015, July
19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546, 369 Phil. 798, 818 (1999).
'2 In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess
Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. Nos. 163619-20, November 17, 2005, 475

SCRA 290, 303.
"From the foregoing, we find that Noble's alleged change

of domicile was effected solely for the purpose of qualifying as a
candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In To-
rayno, Sr. u. Commission on Elections, we held that the one-
year residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders
'from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain.' Establishing residence in a
community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats
the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the
community. Thus, we find Noble disqualified from running as
municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007
elections.?"
In Limbona u. COMELEC,14 the Court likewise de-

clared that a candidate is presumed to have changed her
domicileupon her marriage, or by operation oflaw, con-
sistent with the provisions of Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code to the effect that spouses shall have a sin-
gle family domicile, unless one of them maintains a
separate residence.
Residence is in any part of the Philippines, like in
the case of the party-list representative member of the
House of Representatives, and unlike in the case of the
district representative member of the House of Repre-
sentatives, who must reside in the district where he is
running.
In Mitra u. COMELEC, 15 the Supreme Court ex-
plained the underlying reasons behind the residence
qualification in this manner -
ta Pundaodaya v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179313, September 17,

2009, 600 SCRA 178.
'' G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 391; ooo also
Limbona v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009, 604
SCRA240.
"'G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744; October
19, 2010, 633 SCRA 580.
In Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,17 the Su-

preme Court declared that a candidate who takes his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executes an Affi-
davit of Renunciation of his American citizenship under
the provisions of the Republic Act No. 9225, but thereaf-
ter continues using his American passport, is to be con-
sidered as having recanted his oath of renunciation of
his foreign citizenship and shall therefore be ineligible
to run for elective office as he thereby reverts to his
status as a dual citizen.
They are also exclusive under the principle of ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, with the result that it
is not competent for Congress to provide by mere legis-
lation for additional qualifications no matter how rele-
vant they may be. For example, a statutory requirement
of a college degree as an added qualification for mem-
bership in the Congress would be unconstitutional.
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, which required
all candidates for public office, whether appointed or
elected, both in the national or local government, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, was, upon petition of a
Senator, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board, 18 as follows-
"Accordingly, Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is

hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitu-
tion is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act
shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the dis-
charge of their defined functions, the three departments of
11
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013; see also Reyes v. Commis-
sion on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013.
'" G.R. No. 157870,November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410.
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of

candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua
non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-
elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the
proviso that '[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory
drug test.' Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add an-
other qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or
not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is
to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as
getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume of-
fice for non-compliancewith the drug-testing requirement.
"It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly
state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the
drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered
mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones
shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering
to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office,it stands to reason that the adverse
consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around
the election and the assumption of public office of the candi-
dates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature
of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning
and effect whatsoever.
"While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture,
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by
its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 syn-
chronized elections and the candidates running in that elec-
toral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems
it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its va-
lidity as an implementing issuance.
"It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that tho
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the
qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run
for and serve as senator."
It is for this reason that the Senate has been de-

scribed as a "continuing" institution, "as it is not dis-
solved as an entity with each national election or change
in the compositionof its members. However, in the con-
duct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Con-
gress acts separately and independently of the Senate of
the Congress before it. Accordingly, all pending matters
and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress
are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished mat-
ters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the
first time.''"
This is consistent with the general characterization
of Congress as "not a continuing body,"particularly with
respect to the passage of bills. Accordingly, in League of
Cities of the Philippines u. COMELEC,20 it was ruled
that the "unapproved cityhood bills filed during the n1h
Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the ad-
journment of the n'h Congress. All the hearings and
deliberations conducted during the n'h Congress on
unapproved bills also became worthless upon the ad-
journment of the n'h Congress." Said deliberations on
unapproved bills do not even "qualify as extrinsic aids in
construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses."
It should be noted though that it has been ruled
that the Senate's power to punish for contempt in the
exercise of its power to conduct inquiries in aid of legis-
10
Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, De-
cember 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 170; Neri v. Senate Committee on Ac-
countability of Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008,
564 SCRA 152.
'0 G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008, 571 SCRA 263.
stitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority

of Senators to 'constitute a quorum to do business.' Ap-
plying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the
Senate under the 19&_7 Constitution is not a continuing
body because less than majority of the Senators con-
tinue into the next Congress. The consequence is that
the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Sen-
ate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators."
The continuity of the life of the Senate is intended
to encourage the maintenance of Senate policies as well
as guarantee that there will be experienced members
who can help and train newcomers in the discharge of
their duties.
It should be noted, however, that as desirable as
experience may be, the Constitution specifically pro-
vides in Article VI, Section 4, that:
"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continu-
ity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
The Constitution seems to be wary of elective offi-

cials who stay too long in office, probably because they
may entrench themselves in power to the exclusion of
other aspirants for their office and perhaps also create
or maintain the political dynasties discouraged and
eschewed in Article II as a matter of state policy. The
senator can serve no more than twelve consecutive
years, after which he must seek greener pastures (per-
haps in the Presidency) or just lie down to pasture.
The term of the members of the Congress of the
Philippines under the old Constitution began on the
thirtieth day of December next following their election
in November. Inasmuch as the election date has been
"SEC. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be

composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legis-
lative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number .of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, re-
gional and sectoral parties or organizations.
"(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total membership of the House of
Representatives. For three consecutive terms after the ratifica-
tion of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, in-
digenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
"(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
"(4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legisla-
tive districts based on the standards provided in this section."
(A) The District Representatives
Two hundred members were originally provided for

in the House of Representatives to be directly elected
from the various legislative districts created by the Or-
dinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. The terri-
tory was divided into thirteen regions, in turn compris-
ing two hundred districts apportioned among the prov-
inces, cities and Metropolitan Manila in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants and on the
basis of a uniform and progressiveratio.
This initial apportionment shall be subject to ad-
justment by the Congress within three years after the
return of every enumeration to make the representation
islands need not comply with the 2,000 square meter

contiguous territory requirement under the Local Gov-
ernment Code.
Macias v. Commission on Elections" is the author-
ity for the view that the validity of a legislative appor-
tionment measure is a justiciable question, involving as
it does certain requirements the interpretation of which
does not call for the exercise of legislative discretion.
The Supreme Court in fact annulled the challenged law
in that case when it was shown that the apportionment
was not based on the number of the inhabitants in the
various representative districts. The Supreme Court
noted that some big provinces were given less represen-
tatives than certain relatively smaller ones, e.g., Cebu
got seven while Rizal with a bigger population then got
only four.
In Hererra v. COMELEC, 28 the Supreme Court
clarified that the basis for "districting is the number of
inhabitants" of a province or a city, and not the number
of its registered voters.
It should be noted that the 250,000minimum popu-
lation requirement for the establishment of legislative
districts under Section 5 (3) applies only to cities," and
not to provinces," although the Local Government Code
provides for a minimum population of 250,000 as an
alternative requirement for the establishment of a prov-
ince."
21
3 SCRA 1.
28
G.R. No. 131499, November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 336.
"M:iri1mo v. C;OMF.T.F.r., CTR No 118577 March 7, 1995, 242
SCRA 211.
30
Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010, 617
SCRA 623.
"' Section 461.
In Aldaba v. COMELEC,37 a law creating a legisla-

tive district was annulled after a finding that it was
based on mere demographic projections.
It must be pointed out as w·en that a law, the Mus-
lim Mindanao Autonomy Act, authorizing the govern-
ment of the AutonomousRegion of Muslim Mindanao to
create provinces and cities has been considered as un-
constitutional because the power to create them inher-
ently involves the power to create legislative districts,
which only Congress possesses. It may, however, be
authorized by law to create municipalities and baran-
gays."
(B) The Party-list Representatives
The House of Representatives is composednot only

of the regular district representatives but also of the
party-list representatives as provided for in the 1987
Constitution. The party-list representatives shall consti-
tute 20% of the total membership of the body, including
such representatives.
The rules for the selection of the party-list repre-
sentatives are embodied in R.A. No. 7941, which was
enforced for the first time in the elections held in 1998.
Section 2 of this law provides, among others, for the
promotion of "proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, re-
gional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organi-
"G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010, 611 SCRA 137.

38
Serna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008, 558
SCRA 700.
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cul-

tural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas work-
ers. The sectors that lack 'well-defined political constituencies'
include professionals,the elderly, women, and the youth.
"5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or or-
ganizations that represent the 'marginalized and underrepre-
sented' must belong to the 'marginalized and underrepre-
sented' sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack 'well-
defined political constituencies' must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the 'marginalized and underrepresented,' or
that represent those who lack 'well-defined political constitu-
encies,' either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fidemembers of such parties or organizations.
"6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organiza-
tions shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified."
In said case, the Court stressed that "the party-list

system is intended to democratize political power by
giving political parties that cannot win in legislative
district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives." It explained that it is "not synony-
mous with that of the sectoral representation."
The law provides that not later than 90 days before
election day, any political party, organization or coali-
tion may file a verified petition through its president or
secretary for its participation in the party-list system,
attaching a copy of its constitution, by laws, platform,
and list of officers,and such other relevant information
as may be required by the Commission on Elections.
The petition shall be published in at least 2 news-
papers of general circulation and, after due notice and
hearing, be resolved within 15 days and in no case later
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack 'well-defined political
constituencies' include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.''"
Upon registration, the political group shall submit
to the COMELECnot later than 45 days before the elec-
tion at least 5 names from which its representatives
may be chosen in case it obtains the required number of
votes. Under the law, the names of the party-list nomi-
nees shall not be shown on the certified list of partici-
pants in the party-list system to be distributed by the
COMELEC among all the precincts. It has been ruled
though that it is the COMELEC'sconstitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups.43
Only persons who have given their consent in writ-
ing may be named as party-list candidates, and in one
list only. Persons who lost in the immediately preceding
election are ineligible. It should be stressed in this re-
gard that, as previously noted, "a party-list nominee
must be a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sec-
toral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee, one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a
track record of advocacy for such sector.?" Section 9 of
RA 7941 provides that a nominee of the youth sector
'"Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, Id.

"' Bantay Republic Act v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, May 4,
2007, 523 SCRA 1.
14
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, supra.
In Lokin u. COMELEC,48 the Supreme Court an-

nulled an additional ground allowed by the COMELEC
for the substitution by a registered party of its nomi-
nees, per Section 13 ,of its Resolution No. 7804, to wit,
when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." It
stressed that Section 8 of RA 7941 "enumerates only
three instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose
name has been submitted to the COMELEC." The Court
considered said additional ground as ultra uires stating
that the implementing rules and regulations of the
COMELEC "should not override, supplant, or modify
the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consis-
tent with the law they intend to carry out."
At any rate, it is established that the COMELEC
has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leader-
ship and the nomination of party-list representatives.49
Every voter shall be entitled to 2 votes: the first for
the candidate for member of the House of Representa-
tives in his legislative district and the second for the
party, organization or coalition he wants represented in
the House of Representatives.
The participants in the party-list system shall be
ranked according to the number of votes they received,
with those getting at least 2% of the total votes cast for
the system being entitled to one seat each. None of them
shall have more than 3 seats each.
The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the par-
ticipants, rank them according to the number of votes
received, and allocate party list representatives propor-
•• G.R. No. 180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385.

'"Lokin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193808, June 26,
2012, 674 SCRA 538.
"3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats af-
ter allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to
the party-list organizations including those that received less
than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the
additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the
available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distrib-
uted to the parties in a second round of seat allocation accord-
ing to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21
April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
"4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat
cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the
Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require
absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-
settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the
Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution."
As explained by the Supreme Court in its first

BANAT ruling, the so-calledtwo step procedure for the
determination of the entitlement of the parties to addi-
tional seats initially entails the computation of the per-
centage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party
by the total number of votes cast for party-list candi-
dates. There are thereafter two steps in the second
round of seat allocation - First, the percentage is mul-
tiplied by the remaining available seats, which is the
difference between the maximum seats reserved under
the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the
two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corre-
sponds to a party's share in the remaining available
seats. Second, one party-list seat is assigned to each of
same rights, privileges and duties as the district representa-

tive. It is the party-list representatives who are 'elected' into
office,not their parties or organizations. Once elected, both the
district representatives and the party-list representatives are
treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative
rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the
making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative dis-
tricts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limita-
tion of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdic-
tion to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after
their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all
intents and purposes, 'elected members' of the House of Repre-
sentatives although the entity directly voted upon was their
party."
(2) Qualifications
Where applicable, the same observations earlier

made regarding the qualifications of the Senators are
repeated for the following qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives:
"SEC. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Phil-
ippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election."
In addition, the party-list representative must be a

bona fide member of the party he seeks to represent at
least ninety days before election day. As previously
noted, to be a bona fide nominee of a sectoral party, one
must either "belong to the sector represented, or have a
track record of advocacy for such sector.?" The youth
"'Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commissionon Elections, supra.

Makati residence and a transfer to a new residence in Manila,

with intention to reside in the latter place permanently, par-
ticularly in the light of the fact that she continued to maintain
her house, conduct her business, and perform her religious and
civil obligations in Makati. Granting that she may have moved
to Manila to vote in the plebiscite, such move, at best, was only
temporary, she having retained the animus reuertendi, the de-
sire to return to her Makati residence."
Under the provisions of RepublicAct No. 9225, oth-

erwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, natural-born Filipino citizens
who have been, or intend to be, naturalized in a foreign
country, shall, upon taking the oath of allegiance pre-
scribed in Section 3 thereof, be deemed to have re-
acquired, or shall retain, their Philippine citizenship.59
They shall thereafter be "deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditionsof this Act.?"
The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below eighteen years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this
Act shall likewise be deemed citizens of the Philip-
• 61
pmes.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizen-
ship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippine
and subject to certain conditions. Accordingly, those
intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Con-
stitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other
existing laws. On the other hand, those seeking elective
ns Section 3.
'0 Section 2.
61
Section 4.
makes a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all

foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath shall be qualified for election, or
appointment, to any Fonstitutional office.
It bears both reiteration and emphasis that Mem-
bers of the House of Representatives must be natural-
born citizens not only at the time of their election but
during their entire tenure. Being a continuing require-
ment, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of
it may still question the same at any time, notwith-
standing the prescriptive period set by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal for the filing of elec-
toral protests, which would not "apply to disqualification
based on citizenship, because qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be pos-
sessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire ten-
ure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his
title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the
1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House
of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not
only at the time of their election but during their entire
tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails
a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question
the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period
notwithstanding.?" The Supreme Court clarified though
that, in assailing one's citizenship, or the source thereof,
proper proceedings should be filed in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. "Clearly, un-
der law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may ques-
tion the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
en Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30,

2009, 594 SCRA 434.
shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and

sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.68
In Nicolas-Lewis, v. COMELEC, 69 where the afore-
cited constitutional provisions were interpreted, the
Supreme Court, in a 13-0 vote, upheld the right to be
registered as a voter of a dual citizen who was then con-
cededly a non-resident of the Philippines. Citing its
earlier ruling in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 70 where it
upheld the right of non-resident Filipinos to vote under
the provisions of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003, the Court declared that "there is no provision in
the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring
'duals' to actually establish residence and physically
stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in im-
plicit acknowledgment that 'duals' are most likely non-
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A.
9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims,
in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all over-
seas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions,
are qualified to vote." In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court relied on its earlier statement in Macalintal
where it pronounced that "Section 2 of Article V of the
Constitution is an exception to the residency require-
ment found in Section 1 of the same Article."
It must be noted, however, that said Section 2 pro-
vides for a system of absentee voting only for qualified
Filipinos abroad. It appears clear that only those Filipi-
•• Ibid., Section 5 (2).

en G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649.
'0 G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 453 Phil. 586, 405 SCRA 614.
only, or a total of nine consecutiveyears. The reason for

the difference is not explained. Considering that the
members of the House of Representatives are generally
younger than the members of the Senate, one would
imagine that the former should be allowed to stay
longer in officeor at least as long as the latter.
The Supreme Court has summarized in Abundo v.
COMELEC12 the rules in connection with the consecu-
tiveness of terms and involuntary interruptions thereof
in connection with the application of the rules on term
limits for elective officers both under the Constitution
and pertinent laws. Thus -
"l. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective po-

sition and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to
the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be
treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject con-
stitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr. [G.R. No.
133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157 (1998)]). If the offi-
cial runs again for the same position he held prior to his as-
sumption of the higher office, then his succession to said posi-
tion is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary
severance or interruption (Montebon v. Commission on Elec-
tions [G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008, 551 SCRA 50 (2008)).
"2. An elective official, who has served for three con-
secutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for
what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall elec-
tion, had an interruption in the continuity of the official's ser-
vice. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the
3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (A.dormeo v.
Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002,
376 SCRA 90 (2002)] and Socrates v. Commission on Elections
[CTR Nn. lfi4fil?.; November 12, 2002, ~91 8CRA 457]).
72
G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 149.
Election
As previously remarked, elections for the Congress

of the Philippines were held on the second Monday of
May, 1987. The next elections, conformablyto the Tran-
sitory Provisions, were held in 1992,for all the members
of the Congress, followedby another election three years
later in 1995, for the entire membership of the House of
Representatives and twelve members of the Senate.
Every three years thereafter, all the members of the
House of Representatives and one-half of the Senate
were up for election, or re-election if still allowed.
Under the 1973 Constitution, vacancies in the Ba-
tasang Pambansa were supposed to be filled by special
election called by the Commission on Elections. That
rule has been replaced by the followingprovision, which
is reproduced from the Commonwealth Constitution:
"Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the

House of Representatives, a special election may be called to
fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term."
Such special election shall however not be neces-

sary if the vacancy pertained to a seat occupied by a
party-list representative, in which case, the same would
be filled by the next representative from the list of
nominees in the order submitted to the Commission on
Elections by the same party, organization, or coalition,
who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is
exhausted, the party, organization or coalition shall
submit additional nominees.73
'" Republic Act No. 7941, Section 16.

tures, including allowances, shall be published annually

for the information of the people.
Reduction of the salaries of the members of the
Congress is not prohibited by the Constitution. If any
increase is to be made, the same cannot be effective
during the term of the members of the Congress, includ-
ing the Senators, who have approved such increase.
In Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez,15
the petitioner questioned the constitutionality of Repub-
lic Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective offi-
cials of both houses (of Congress)." It is significant that
the law provided that the retirement benefits would be
immediately available upon its approval. It claimed that
its provision on retirement gratuity was "an attempt to
circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of sala-
ries of the members of Congress during their term of
office,contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14
of the (1935) Constitution." The Court sustained the
petition and declared the law unconstitutional. It noted
that the retirement benefits were "immediately avail-
able thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Arti-
cle VI, Section 14 of the Constitution."
Parliamentary Immunities
"Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Repre-

sentatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
"G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965, 15 SCRA 479.

period from its initial convening until its final adjourn-

ment.
(2) Privilege of Speech and Debate
There are two requirements that must concur in or-

der that the privilege of speech and debate can be
availed of by the member of the Congress. The first is
that the remarks must be made while the legislature or
the legislative committee is functioning, that is, in ses-
sion; and the second is that they must be made in con-
nection with the discharge of official duties. These con-
ditions were first laid down in the leading case of Coffin
v. Coffin, 76 where the privilege was denied a legislator
who uttered slanderous remarks in the course of a pri-
vate conversationwith a constituent during a lull in the
session,
Applyingthe rule announced in that case, our own
Supreme Court declared in Jimenez v. Cabangbang"
that the privilege could not be invoked by a legislator
who had allegedly maligned the plaintiff in an open
letter to the President of the Philippines coursed
through and published in the newspapers. The finding
was that he had written the letter at a time when the
Congress was in recess and in his private capacity only.
It is important to note that this privilege is not ab-
solute although it is usually so called. The rule provides
that the legislator may not be questioned "in any other
place," which means that he may be called to account
for his remarks by his own colleagues in the Congress
itself and, when warranted, punished for "disorderly
behavior."
76
4 Mass. 1.
11
17 SCRA 876.
her, would not be considered for the position of Chief

Justice." The Court boldly chided but nevertheless
meekly exonerated her. It declared that "basic constitu-
tional consideration .dictates this kind of disposition."
Thus-
"The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the

language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her
speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of
decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent
that her statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating
that she wanted 'to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,' and calling
the Court a 'Supreme Court of idiots.' xxx.
"A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily
show that her statements were expressions of personal anger
and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the
pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamen-
tary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to
ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and
its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a
privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that
represents them.
"To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to
her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive
personalities. xxx.
"The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disci-
plinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise
would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part
towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal cir-
cumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing
so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitu-
tional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
Conflict of Interest
The followingis a new provision intended to ensure

the probity and objectivity of the members of Congress:
"Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of

Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest
that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which
they are authors."
There are some persons who may be tempted to run

for Congress not because of a desire to serve the people
but precisely for the protection or even enhancement of
their own interests. By requiring them to make known
at the outset their financial and business connections or
investments, it is hoped that their potential for self-
aggrandizement will be reduced and they will be pre-
vented from using their official positions for ulterior
purposes. In some countries, businessmen are required
to unload their stockholdings as these might affect their
official acts or at least lead to suspicion of chicanery or
impropriety in the discharge of their duties in the gov-
ernment.
Incompatible and Forbidden Offices
"Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Repre-

sentatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corpora-
tions or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any officewhich may
have been created or the emolumeuts thereof increased <luring
the term for which he was elected."
Adaza then qualified as member of the lawmaking body,

whereupon Pacana assumed the governorship as statu-
tory successor. Adaza challenged Pacana's takeover,
contending that under the parliamentary system a legis-
lator could concurrently serve as governor; hence, there
was no vacancy in the governorship that Pacana could
fill. Through Justice Escolin, the Court unanimously
rejected this argument and held that Adaza automati-
cally forfeited the governorship the moment he took his
oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
But not every other office or employment is to be
regarded as incompatible with the legislative position.
For example, membership in the Electoral Tribunals is
permitted by the Constitution itself. Moreover, if it can
be shown that the second office is an extension of the
legislative position or is in aid of legislative duties, the
holding thereof will not result in the loss of the legisla-
tor's seat in the Congress.
Accordingly,the chairmen of the Senate and House
committees on education retain their seats in Congress
while sitting concurrently as ex officio members in the
U.P. Board of Regents. Legislators who serve as treaty
negotiators under the President of the Philippines con-
tinue to sit in the Congress, where they can better work
for the approval of the treaty and the passage of the
needed implementing legislation.
In Liban v. Gordori." the Supreme Court declared
that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine Na-
tional Red Cross [PNRC], despite its having been cre-
ated by a special law, is not to be considered a govern-
ment office or an office in a government-owned or con-
trolled corporation for purposes of the prohibition under
"" G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA 68.
disqualifications have been much simplified with the

followingrewritten provision in the new charter.
"Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Repre-

'
sentatives may personally appear as counsel before any court '
of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial

and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, in-
cluding any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuni-
ary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of
his office."
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before

all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or
jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the re-
vived Electoral Tribunals and to all administrative bod-
ies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts mar-
tial and military tribunals, being administrative agen-
cies, are included.
It must be noted though that the General Court
Martial has been characterized by the Supreme Court
as "a court within the strictest sense of the word and
acts as a criminal court.?" Accordingly, "a court-martial
case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is·
a 'court' akin to any other courts.'?"
The purpose of the disqualification is to prevent the
legislator from exerting undue influence, deliberately or
05
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30,
2012, 677 SCRA 750.
sn Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 89
Phil, 246 (1951).
Legislators are prohibited from being financially

interested in any contract with the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, includ-
ing government-owned or controlled corporations, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by any of
these during their term of office, because of the influ-
ence they can easily exercise in obtaining these conces-
sions. The idea is to prevent abuses from being commit-
ted by the members of the Congress to the prejudice of
the public welfare and particularly of legitimate con-
tractors with the government who otherwise might be
placed at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the legis-
lator.
It should be noted, though, that not every transac-
tion with the government is barred by this provision.
The contracts referred to here are those involving "fi-
nancial interest," that is, contracts from which the legis-
lator expects to derive some profit at the expense of the
government. An illustration is a contract for public
works or the sale of office equipment or supplies to the
government. By contrast, it cannot be said that the leg-
islator will profit financially from a contract of carriage
with a government airline since it is the carrier that will
benefit from the passenger's fare.
The last sentence restores an inhibition originally
imposed by the 1935 Constitution. Although this provi-
sion has never been judicially interpreted, it may be
surmised that the rule shall apply to the case, say, of a
congressman expediting the collectionof a civil servant's
retirement check for a stipulated fee.
Sessions
The new rule on the legislative sessions is as fol-

lows:
It is to be recalled that, in Araneta v. Dinglasan,

the Supreme Court distinguished between the regular
and special sessions of Congress. Thus, in a special ses-
sion, the Congress II\ay consider "general legislation or
only such subjects as the President may designate." In a
regular session, "the power of the Congress is not cir-
cumscribed except by limitations imposed by organic
law.?"
Officers
"Sec. 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and
the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of
all its respective Members.
"Each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary."
The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the

House of Representatives do not have a fixed term and
may be replaced at any time at the pleasure of a major-
ity of all the members of their respective chambers. The
legislative heads in the presidential system are highly
political officers whose continued incumbency will de-
pend upon the partisan alignments of their colleagues.
Other officers usually chosen are the Senate Presi-
dent pro tempore, the Speaker pro tempore, the majority
and minority floor leaders, the chairmen of the various
standing and special committees, and the secretary and
the sergeant-at-arms, the last two being non-members
of the legislature.
Quorum
"A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
91
84 Phil. 368.
what it referred to as a "supermajority vote" of two-

thirds of all the Members of Congress for purposes of
amending or repealing the same, stating that said pro-
vision gave said law "the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution de-
mands." Thus -
"Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did

in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting re-
quirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.
9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the charac-
ter of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the
Constitution demands. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Consti-
tution provides that a 'majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business.' In other words, as long as majority of
the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are
present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct busi-
ness and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is
generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts. Thus, while
a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limi-
tation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the pas-
sage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it sig-
nificantly constricts the future legislators' room for action and
flexibility."
Discipline of Members
Article VI, Section 16(3) states:

"(3) Each House may determine the rules of its pro-
ceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days."
Rules of proceedings are needed for the orderly con-

duct of tho sessions of the Congress. Unless snoh r11 lP.i:;
violate fundamental or individual rights, they are
within the exclusive discretion of each House to formu-
late and interpret and may not be judicially reversed.
Journals
"(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings,

and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts
as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yetis
and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
"Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings."
Journals are a record of what is done and past in a

legislative assembly. They are useful not only for au-
thenticating the proceedings but also for the interpreta-
tion of laws through a study of the debates held thereon
and for informing the people of the official conduct of
their respective legislators.
It is for these purposes that the Constitution re-
quires that the journals be published from time to time
excepting such parts as may affect the national security,
which ought not to be divulged to the public in general.
The publication of the journals is in line with the right
to information on matters of public concern as guaran-
teed in Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution.
In U.S. v. Pons, 98 the Supreme Court refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative journals, which it
held to be conclusiveon the courts. "To inquire into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature," it
ruled, "when they are, as we have said, clear and ex-
plicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of
the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature."
98
34 Phil. 729; Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268.
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,

by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz. 615;
Mayor Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs.
Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960)).
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill-which
uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and formal-
dehyde'-is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the Presi-
dent (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Con-
gress and approved by the Executive-on which we cannot
speculate without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our demo-
cratic system-the remedy is by amendment or curative legis-
lation, not by judicial decree."
102
In the VAT Case, the Supreme Court emphasized
that "our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that
an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also its due enactment. Not even claims
that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been
obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been
'smuggled' in the printing of the bill have moved or per-
suaded us to look behind the proceedings of a co-equal
branch of the government."
Earlier, in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,103
the Supreme Court had-
102
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630.
102
227 SCRA 703.
It is to be noted that, in League of Cities of the Phil-

ippines v. COMELEC, 105 the Supreme Court observed
that the hearings and deliberations during a previous
Congress cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into
law in the next or subsequent Congresses.
At any rate, at the request of one-fifth of the Mem-
bers present, the yeas and nays on any question shall be
entered in the -Iournal.t" The Constitution likewise re-
quires the recording in the Journal of the votes with
respect to the consideration of bills on third reading, 107
the recording of the objections of the President when he
vetoes a bill as well as the votes cast by the Members of
each House in their reconsideration of a bill vetoed by
the President, 108 and the vote of each Member of the
House of Representatives regarding the Articles of Im-
peachment proposed by its Committee which hears an
impeachment complaint.l"
Adjournment
"(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress

shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than
three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting."
The above rule appeared in the Commonwealth

Constitution but was deleted from the 1973 charter
because the legislature established thereunder was uni-
cameral. It is now revived with the restoration of bicam-
eralism, which envisions collaboration and coordination
between the two chambers of the Congress.
10'
106
Constitution, Article VI, Section 16(4).
'01 Ibid., Article VI, Section 26 (2).
10"
Id., Article VI, Section 27 (1).
IO!l Id., Article XI, Section 3 (3).
The original provision in the Commonwealth Con-

stitution entitled only the parties having the largest and
second largest number of votes in the chamber to nomi-
nate three members each to the legislative seats. Now
such seats are apportioned among all the parties repre-
sented in each chamber, including the party-list mem-
bers. Thus, if there are three parties represented in the
Senate with thirteen, seven and four members, respec-
tively, the first shall have three of the legislative seats,
the second two and the third one.
The change introduced by the 1987 Constitution fa-
vors the multi-party system as against the two-party
system which the original rule sought to institutional-
ize.
The case of Taiiada u. Cuenco'" held that the right
to nominate to the legislative seats in the Electoral Tri-
bunals belonged to the majority and minority parties in
the chamber, not to the chamber itself or to the majority
party therein if the minority did not make its own
nomination. Presumably, the parties entitled to repre-
sentation in the Electoral Tribunals now are also enti-
tled to nominate their own representatives although the
above provision does not expressly say so. At any rate,
in the event that they should fail or refuse to do so,
would the body itself have the right to fill the vacancies
with representatives from such party? And in case the
representative chosen fails or refuses to assume his
seat, may the chamber then choose a member from an-
other party to fill the vacancy? The records of the Con-
stitutional Commission do not suggest any answer to
these questions.
"' Supra.
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the

Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully dis-
charge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators. I,
"To our mind, this is the overriding consideration-that

the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in
the highest interest as evidenced by its being expressly im-
posed by no less than the fundamental law.
"It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolu-
tions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would in-
volve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have
to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility would sur-
face again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more,
but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake.
Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators des-
ignated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal, Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively."
Although the Electoral Tribunals are predomi-

nantly legislative in membership and the provision cre-
ating them is found in Article VI on the Legislative De-
partment, it is not correct to say that they are mere
adjuncts of the Congress of the Philippines. In fact, in
the discharge of their constitutional duties, they are
independent of the legislature, and also of the other
departments for that matter.
Thus, in the early case of Angara u. Electoral Com-
mission, 113 it was held that the respondent body (prede-
cessor of U1e Electoral Tribunals) had the exclusive right
to prescribe its own rules of procedure, as against those
"" Supra.
of Congress was affirmed in Robles u. House of Repre-

sentatives Electoral Tribunal. 119
A different question was raised in Bondoc u.
Pineda, 120 to wit, whether the House of Representatives
could, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change its representative in the House of Rep-
resentatives Electoral Tribunal, presumably "to thwart
the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the
Tribunal."
While acknowledgingthe independence of the Tri-
bunal as the "sole judge" of election contests involving
the members of the House of Representatives, the Su-
preme Court assumed jurisdiction, precisely to protect
that independence. The decision penned by Justice
Carolina Gri:fio-Aquino declared:
"The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so

zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,
however, be a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle
and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judi-
cial) component of the Electoral Tribunal, to serve the interests
of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment
of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribu-
nal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc.
"To sanction such interference by the House of Repre-
sentatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of
the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Su-
preme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to
11"
181 SCRA 780.
120
201 SCRA 792.
Apparently consistent with the provisions of Sec-

tion 17 which states that the Electoral Tribunals shall
be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective "Mem-
bers," the Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that
the jurisdiction of an Electoral Tribunal begins once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office,for it is only after the occurrence of
these events that a candidate can be considered as ei-
ther a Member of the House of Representatives or a
Senator.122 The practical application of these rulings, at
least insofar as the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) is concerned, has been that it com-
mences to exercise such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of
the Commissionon Elections, which has initial jurisdic-
tion over said matters (pursuant to its general authority
to enforce and administer all election laws and decide
all questions affecting elections),123 upon the proclama-
tion of the winning candidate.124
122
Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1,
2009, 583 SCRA 1; Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106,
1115-1116 (1999); Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995);
Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, 520 SCRA 166, 179;
Aggabao v. COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405; Guerrero v.
COMELEC, 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 644
SCRA 761, 798-799; Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25,
2013.
12"
Constitution, Article IX-B, Sections 2(1) and 2(3); Jalosjos v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA
530.
"'Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra, see also Jalosjos
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192474, October 9, 2012, 683
SCRA 1; see also Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 130 Phil. 663,
672 (1968), where the Supreme Court made a general statement to
the effect that "after proclamation, the usual remedy of any party
aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest."
winner in the congressionalelections, the remedy of the

petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET."
In said case, the winning candidate was proclaimed on
May 14, 2004. While~the COMELEC ordered on July 2,
2004 the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of
the private respondent, it, however, lifted the same on
July 23, 2004 "on the ground that respondent Unico's
proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only
divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass
upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferredjurisdiction to another electoral
tribunal." It is significant that Congress convened that
year on July 26, 2004, or three days after the COME-
LEC declared it had lost jurisdiction over the case in
favor of the HRET, although the term of the proclaimed
winning candidate, or the private respondent, com-
menced at noon of June 30, 2004.
In Perez, the private respondent was proclaimed on
May 16, 1998, and took his oath of office the next day.
The Supreme Court dismissed this petition filed before
it on June 16, 1998, stating that, at the time of the filing
of the same, the private respondent was already a
Member of the House of Representatives. Accordingly,
the Court ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over
this particular electoral contest. It is significant that the
term of Members of the House of Representatives com-
mences at "noon on the thirtieth day of June next fol-
lowing their election."129 Thus, the oath taken by the
private respondent in this case on May 17, 1998 could
not have served to install him into office, considering
that, at that point, his predecessor's term had not yet
Constitution, Article VI, Section 7; see Dimaporo v. COME-

12"
LEC, 544 SCRA 381.

noon of the thirtieth day of June next following their

election, it would seem that said oath and assumption of
office clearly cannot be done prior to said date, as the
terms of the their predecessors would, before said time
and date, have not yet expired. Moreover, another ques-
tion arises - how can the House of Representatives
properly convene and validly hold an "open session"
when it would be only during said "open session" that
they all can validly take their "proper oaths?" Needless
to state, the presence of a quorum would be required for
a valid "open session" to be convened or held.132 Stated
otherwise, how can the newly-elected "Members" of the
House of Representatives constitute themselves into a
quorum when, upon the convening of Congress, they
would yet need to take their oaths of office, and it would
be only after they shall have properly established a quo-
rum can a valid "open session" be called for purposes of
enabling them to properly take their oaths as new
"Members"of the House of Representatives?
Moreover, as stressed by Justice Brion in his Dis-
senting Opinion in said case, the "majority's jurispru-
dential ruling is contrary to the HRET's rules; effec-
tively allows the filing of any election protest or a peti-
tion for quo warranto only after the· assumption to office
by the candidate on June 30 at the earliest" and "would
affect all future proclamations since they cannot be ear-
lier than 15 days counted from the June 30 constitu-
tional cut-off for the assumption to office of newly-
elected officials."He added -
"I submit on this point that the proclamation of the

winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the ju-
risdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the
winning candidate's election, returns, and qualifications. In
'"2 Ibid., Article VI, Section 16 (2).

It is worth noting that, in BANAT v. COMELEC,135

the Court declared that the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals can be invoked only after the winning candi-
dates have been proclt3-imed.
At any rate, as previously observed, in Lim-
kaichong v. COMELEC,1~6 the Supreme Court ruled that
the HRET would have jurisdiction over a petition for
disqualification based on citizenship filed against a
Member of the House of Representatives, as said quali-
fication is a continuing requirement and may be taken
cognizanceof by the HRET even if filed beyond the pre-
scribed prescriptive period for the institution of the
same. However, according to the Supreme Court, "it is
the State, through its representatives designated by
statute that may question the illegally or invalidly pro-
cured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter
that may be raised by private persons in an election
case involving the naturalized citizen's descendant." In
Vilando v. HRET, 137 the Supreme Court remarked that
"such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and
exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve
into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the
pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise
would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of
the father which, as already stated, is not permissible."
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
would obviouslynot have jurisdiction over the qualifica-
tions of candidates who have not been proclaimed as
winners, including nominees of winning parties in
party-list elections who have not qualified to represent
'"" G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.

'"" G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1.
"" 656 SCRA 17 (2011).
even if the thirty-day period has not yet expired, are

deemed by-passed under Article VII, Section 16.
In Daza v. Singson, 139 the petitioner questioned his
replacement in the .Cornmission on Appointments, in-
sisting that his designation thereto as a representative
of the Liberal Party was permanent and could not be
withdrawn. For his part, the respondent contended that
he could be validly named in the petitioner's place in
view of the political realignment in the House of Repre-
sentatives following the organization of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Filipino (LDP), to which he belonged.
Both invoked the earlier case of Cunanan v. Tan, 140
where the Supreme Court had held that the political
affiliations in the two Houses of Congress should be
reflected in their respective representations in the Com-
mission on Appointments. The petitioner claimed that
the formation of the LDP was a merely temporary de-
velopment whereas the respondent maintained that it
had permanently altered the political compositionof the
House of Representatives.
Ruling in favor of the respondent, the Supreme
Court declared inter alia:
"The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on
the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims, has not pro-
vided the permanent political realignment to justify the ques-
tioned reorganization. As he insists:
"(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced
majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed re-
organization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because
the LDP, not being a duly registered political party, is
not entitled to the 'rights and privileges granted by law
to political parties' (Sec. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore
cannot legally claim the right to be considered in deter-
'"0 Supra.
5 SCRA 1.
140
dergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely

cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.
"If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157
members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would
have to be denied representation in the Commission on Ap-
pointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal.
By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now
'history only,' should also be written off. The independents also
cannot be represented because they belong to no political
party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only-with
all of its seventeen members-to claim all the twelve seats of
the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appoint-
ments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tri-
bunal."
Organization
The followingprovision is also reproduced from the

Commonwealth Constitution:
"Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission
on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority
of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as
are herein conferred upon it."
This provision is based on the need to enable the

President to exercise his appointing power with dispatch
in coordination with the Commission on Appointments.
The rule that the Commission on Appointments can
meet only during the sessions of the Congress is the rea-
son why ad interim appointments are permitted under
the Constitution. These appointments are made during
the recess, subject to consideration later by the Com-
mission, for confirmation or rejection. Ad interim ap-
pointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
Chapter 9
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS
THE POWERSof the Congress may be classified gener-

ally into legislative and non-legislative. The legislative
power includes the specific powers of appropriation,
taxation, and expropriation. The non-legislative powers,
as previously mentioned, include the power to canvass
the presidential elections, to declare the existence of a
state of war, to give concurrence to treaties and amnes-
ties, to propose constitutional amendments, and to im-
peach.
These powers are expressly conferred by the Con-
stitution. From such express powers may be derived
some implied powers, such as the power to punish con-
tempt in legislative investigations. The Congress also
possesses inherent powers, such as the determination of
its rules of proceedings and the discipline of its mem-
bers.
Legislative Power in General
Legislative power is the power of lawmaking, the

framing and enactment of laws. This is effected through
the adoption of a bill, or a proposed or projected law,
which, once approved, becomes a statute. A statute is
"the written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed
according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law
of the state."
I
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 1581.
269
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 271
In Datu Michael Abas Kida u. Senate of the Philip-

pines.' the Supreme Court clarified that subsequent
laws that do not change or revise any provision in an
earlier law, and whjch merely fill in gaps or supplement
said earlier law, cannot be considered as amendments of
the latter.
In League of Cities of the Philippines u. COMELEC,1
the Supreme Court stressed that "the legislative body
possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil gov-
ernment. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine,
except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly
or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects,
and extends to matters of general concern or common
interest."
Accordingly, it has been ruled that the power to
grant immunity from prosecution has been acknowl-
edged as essentially a legislative prerogative. "The ex-
clusive power of Congress to define crimes and their
nature and to provide for their punishment concomi-
tantly carries the power to immunize certain persons
from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state
interests, among them, the solution and prosecution of
crimes with high political, social and economic impact.
In the exercise of this power, Congress possesses broad
discretion and can lay down the conditions and the ex-
tent of the immunity to be granted;"
6
G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270.
'G.R. No. 176951, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 150; see also
Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998); Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192,
212 (1946).
'Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 512 Phil. 590
(2005), cited in Quarto v. The Honorable Ombudsman Simeon
Marcelo, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 580, citing
Laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless

the contrary is provided. Statutes can be given retroac-
tive effect when the law itself so expressly provides; in
case of remedial statutes; in case of curative statutes; in
case of laws interpreting others; and in case of laws
creating new rights.13 In PERT/CPM Manpower Exponent
Co., Inc. v. Vinuya,14 the Supreme Court explained-
"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the con-

trary is provided. By its very nature, the amendment intro-
duced by R.A. 10022 - restoring a provision of R.A. 8042 de-
clared unconstitutional - cannot be given retroactive effect,
not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity
in the law, but because retroactive application will result in an
impairment of a right that had accrued to the respondents by
virtue of the Serrano ruling - entitlement to their salaries for
the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. All sta-
tutes are to be construed as having only a prospective applica-
tion, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
them a retrospective effect are expressly declared or are neces-
sarily implied from the language used. We thus see no reason
to nullify the application of the Serrano ruling in the present
case."
As previously noted, the Supreme Court affirmed in

· Atizado v. People" the retroactive application of Repub-
13
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007, 534
SCRA 112.
"G.R. No. 197528, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 284, citing
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March
24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254 and Yap v . Thenamaris Ship's Management,
G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369.
"' G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 105; see People
v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009, 599 SCRA 20; see
also People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA
188; People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013, 689
SCRA 715.
approved by the two chambers, a conferencecommittee

representing both Houses will draft a compromise
measure that, if ratified by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, will then be submitted to the President
for his consideration.'
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally ap-
proved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with
the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker,
and the Secretaries of their respective chambers, and
approvedby the President.16
Origin of Bills
The restoration of bicameralism has also revived

the followingprovision appearing in the 1935 Constitu-
tion:
"Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills

authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local applica-
tion, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments."
An appropriation bill is one the primary and spe-

cificpurpose of which is to authorize the release of funds
from the public treasury.17
A revenue bill is one that levies taxes and raises
funds for the government, 18 while a tariff bill specifies
the rates or duties to be imposed on imported articles.19
16
Cited in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No.
166715,August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
17
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410.
1•
U.S. v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566.
'"Black 4th rev. ed. 1628.
jected the challenge, holding that such consolidation

was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose
or concur with amendments to the version originated in
the House of Representatives. What the Constitution
simply means, according to the majority, is that the
initiative must comefrom the House of Representatives.
Prohibited Measures
There are certain measures that may not be passed

by the Congress owing to the nature of our government,
such as those impairing the doctrine of separation of
powers or providing for the appointment of elective offi-
cers. There are also specific prohibitions in the Bill of
Rights against the enactment of ex post facto laws, bills
of attainder, or laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts. Of this nature is the following provision, also i_n
Article VI, which was contained in the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution:
"Sec. 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility

shall be enacted."
The purpose of this provision is to preserve the re-

publican and democratic nature of our society by prohib-
iting the creation of privileged classes with special per-
quisites not available to the rest of the citizenry. The
stratification of our society will result in the violation of
Article II, Section 1, proclaiming that sovereignty re-
sides in the people as a whole without distinction as to
birth or lineage, unlike in monarchial regimes.
Another prohibition, this time more appropriate for
inclusion under the Judicial Department, is the follow-
ing section, also in Article VI:
The purposes of this rule are:

(1) To prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legisla-
tion. This is defined as "any act containing several sub-
jects dealing with unrelated matters representing di-
verse interests, the main object of such combination
being to unite the members of the legislature who favor
any one of the subjects in support of the whole act."
(2) To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legisla-
ture.
(3) To fairly apprise the people, through such pub-
lications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the
subjects of legislation that are being considered in order
that they may have the opportunity of being heard there-
on, by petition or otherwise,if they should so desire.24
Thus, in Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, 25 the
challenged law was entitled "An Act Creating the Mu-
nicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur"
when in fact the said municipality comprised not only
barrios in Lanao del Sur but also two municipalities to
be dismembered in the adjacent province of Cotabato.
Interestingly, even the congressman from Cotabato
voted in favor, only to discover later the prejudice to his
own province. In holding the law unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court, observed:
"The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is

not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the mem-
bers of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not ap-
prise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cota-
bato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory was being taken away from their towns and province
and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept
2'
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 172.
20
21 SCRA 496.
In BANAT v. COMELEC,28 the Supreme Court re-

marked that the "requirement is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The
title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents
and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an
act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the pre-
cise nature of the amendatory act need not be further
stated." Accordingly, the provisions of .the subject law
assailed in said case, RA 9369, which spoke of "poll
automation" but contained "substantial provisions deal-
ing with the manual canvassing of election returns,"
particularly, Sections 34 (on official watchers), 37 (on
Congress and the Commission on Elections acting as
National Boards of Canvassers), 38 (on pre-proclamation
cases) and 43 (on election offenses)thereof, were all con-
sidered by the Court as "germane to the subject matter
of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881,
among others."
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9164 enti-
tled "An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending Republic
Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Lo-
cal Government Code of 1991" was challenged on the
ground that, while its title announced that it pertained
to the synchronization of the elections for barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan officials, it likewise provided for
term limits for said officers. The Supreme Court, in re-
jecting the challenge, stated -
""G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.

the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election

propaganda." Accordingly,the Court held that "the as-
sailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Sec-
tion 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed germane to the
subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.
The title was worded broadly enough to include the
measures embodied in the assailed sections."
In any case, a title must not be "so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.?"
Formalities
Another limitation in Article VI is found in Section

26(2),which provides:
"(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law

unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to
its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and nays entered in the Journal."
As it was not required in the 1935 Constitution

that the bill should undergo the three readings on sepa-
rate days, the Congress did not consider it unlawful to
"2 82 CJS 365.

According to the VAT Case,35 the exception applies

to both the requirements of three readings on separate
days and the distribution of final copies of the bill before
its passage. As for the sufficiency of the ground for the
presidential certification, to wit, the "growing budget
deficit,"which the petitioners claimed did not partake of
a "public calamity or emergency," the Court made the
followingfeeble justification:
"The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of

the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Sec. 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying
the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under
Art. VI, Sec. 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of
presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away
with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should
elicit a different standard ofreview."
The third reading itself is limited to the casting of

the members' votes, usually after a brief explanation
thereof, if allowed by the rules, without further debate
on the measure. The yeas and nays are entered in the
journals as a permanent record of how each member
voted on particular issues, for the information especially
of their constituents.
Although not provided for in the Constitution, Con-
gress has established the so-called Conference Commit-
tee, composed of representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representatives, which is a "mechanism
for compromising differences" between their respective
versions of a bill or joint resolution. It has been ruled
"' Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 235

SCRA 630; Datu Michael Ahas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,
supra.
the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference

Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our
view,without warrant in fact and in law.?"
Approval of Bills t·
The rules on the approval of bills are found in Arti-

cle VI, Section 27, providing as follows:
"SEC. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,

before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsidera-
tion, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in
its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after
the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as
ifhe had signed it."
"(2) The President shall have the power to veto any par-
ticular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items which he does
not object."
The above section provides for three methods by

which a bill may become a law, to wit:
(1) When the President signs it;
(2) When the President vetoes it but theje o is
overridden by two-thirds vote of all the members of ach
House; and
~ ~ \,.
"" Ibid.
~a~ 0
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 28£
was held that the veto was ineffectual and that the ap-
proval of the item carried with it the approval of the
condition attached to it.
The last method is commonly mistaken to be some
kind of sanction for the indolence of the chief executive
but the fact is that it has a more practical purpose. This
method is employed whenever the President, while not
convinced of the necessity or validity of the measure
under consideration, is nonetheless unwilling to disap-
prove it. His reason may be fear of antagonizing certain
elements interested in its passage or his belief that the
final judgment on its constitutionality rests not with
him but with the judiciary.
An illustration of a bill approved through executive
inaction is the Bar Flunkers Bill, which President Quir-
ino refused to sign although he allowed it to lapse into
law. The Supreme Court subsequently declared it partly
unconstitutional. 40
It should be noted that the thirty-day period during
which the bill is supposed to be considered by the Presi-
dent is now counted from the date of its receipt by him.
This is a definite improvement upon the old rule, which
counted the period from the date of adjournment of the
Congress regardless of the date of the actual submission
of the measure to the President of the Philippines.
It has been ruled that "the requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the
cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and
the so-called rule on presentment." Thus, "every bill
passed by Congress must be presented to the President
for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to
'" In re Cunanan, infra.

"Concept and bases of congressional oversight

"'Broadly defined, the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Con-
gress to enhance its understanding of and in-
fluence ov& the implementation of legislation
it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Con-
gress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance
with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered,
(c) to eliminate executive waste and dishon-
esty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (e) to assess execu-
tive conformity with the congressional per-
ception of public interest.
"'The power of oversight has been held to be
intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. x x x x x x
xxx
"'Over the years, Congress has invoked its
oversight power with increased frequency to check
the perceived 'exponential accumulation of power'
by the executive branch. By the beginning of the
20"' century, Congress has delegated an enormous
amount of legislative authority to the executive
branch and the administrative agencies. Congress,
thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that
the administrative agencies perform their functions
within the authority delegated to them. x x x x xx
xxx
"Categories of congressional oversight functions
"'The acts done by Congress purportedly in

the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investiga-
tion and supervision.
'"a. Scrutiny
"'Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser in-
tensity and continuity of attention to administra-
come a law after the expiration of a certain period

of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively dis-
approve of the regulation in the meantime. Less
frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation ~will become law if Congress affirma-
tively approves it. ~ ~
"Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is u.
necessary to maintain the balance of power be-
tween the legislative and the executive branches of ~
government as it. offers lawmakers a way to dele- Pr;~
gate vast power to the executive branch or to inde- 11
pendent agencies while retaining the option to can- 0
eel particular exercise of such power without hav-
ing to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law.
They contend that this arrangement promotes de-
mocratic accountability as it provides legislative
check on the activities of unelected administrative
agencies. One proponent thus explains:
"'It is too late to debate the merits of this
delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded
in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the
complexities of modern government have often led
Congress-whether by actual or perceived neces-
sity-to legislate by declaring broad policy goals
and general statutory standards, leaving the choice
of policy options to the discretion of an executive of-
ficer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but
leaves their implementation to the judgment of
parties who may or may not have participated in or
agreed with the development of those aims. Conse-
quently, absent safeguards, in many instances the
reverse of our constitutional scheme could be ef-
fected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes.
One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to
enact new legislation or to change existing law. But
without some means of overseeing post enactment
activities of the executive branch, Congress would
be unable to determine whether its policies have
been implemented in accordance with legislative
intent and thus whether legislative intervention is
irrJ..~r4 ·m~·
appropriate.
~ l
(. ~ A..w.,. r. - . ..4- l
z . ~-oi;,,j- ~~
gated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that

these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of
the Commissionon Elections.
"With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional over-
sight is not uncon>stitutionalper se, meaning, it neither neces-
sarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances in-
herent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch.
"However, to forestall the danger of congressional en-
croachment 'beyond the legislative sphere,' the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may
not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legisla-
tive power, it must follow the 'single, finely wrought and ex-
haustively considered, procedures' specified under the Consti-
tution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and pre-
sentment.
''Thus, any post-enactment congressionalmeasure such as
this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particu-
lar, congressionaloversight must be confinedto the following:
"(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power
of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments
to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on
any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation and
"(2) investigation and monitoring of the imple-
mentation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid oflegislation.
"Any action or step beyond that will undermine the sepa-
ration of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.
"Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the
President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
'right' or 'power' to approve or disapprove such regulations be-
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected'."
This "power of inquiry" is granted not only to the

Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to
any of their respective committees.44
It has already been remarked that the power of leg-
islative investigation may be implied from the express
power of legislation and does not itself have to be ex-
pressly granted. If the above rule has been incorporated
in the Constitution, it was not so much to authorize as
in fact to limit the conduct oflegislative inquiries.
The reason is that in the past this power was much
abused by some legislators who used it for illegitimate
ends or to browbeat or intimidate witnesses, usually for
grandstanding purposes only. There were also times
when the subject of the inquiry was purely private in
nature and therefore outside the scope of the powers of
the Congress.
To correct these excesses, it is now provided that
the legislative inquiry must be in aid of legislation,
whether it be under consideration already or still to be
drafted. Moreover,the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries are likewise required to be
respected. Furthermore, the conduct of the investigation
must be strictly in conformity with the rules of proce-
dure that must have been published in advance for the
information and protection of the witnesses.
In Garcillano u. House of Representatiues,45 the Su-
preme Court stressed that the "Senate cannot be al-
lowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
44
Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504
SCRA 704.
"G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 170.
{Ly~f dtN iJdo-
mation of a sensitive character" and which would not

serve to automatically exempt executive officials from
the duty to discloseinformation by the mere fact of their
being executive officials," the "fiscal autonomy and con-
stitutional independence of the -Iudiciary.?" the sub
Judice rule, "which restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging
the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the ad-
ministration of justice.?" the right to privacy,51 which,
however, may not be properly invoked if the subject of
the legislative inquiry pertains to the witness' discharge
of his official functions, and the right to self-
incrimination. 52 In Gudani v. Senga,53 the Court de-
clared that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may
validly prohibit a general from appearing in a legislative
inquiry, although the legislature would not be "pre-
cluded from seeking judicial relief to compel his atten-
dance."
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 54 the
petitioners sought to restrain the respondent from m-
vestigating their participation in the alleged misuse of
48
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA
1; AKBAYANv. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA
468; Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152; Chavez v. Pub-
lic Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 534 (2002), 384 SCRA 152.
"Senate v. Ermita, supra.
so Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, 583
SCRA 396.
"' Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504
SCRA 704.
" Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions and Currencies, G.R. No. 167173, December
27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456.
"G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 671.
"' 203 SCRA 767.
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS . 301
Failure or refusal to attend a legitimate legislative

investigation or contumacy of the witness may be pun-
ished as legislative contempt. The punishment that may
be meted out includes imprisonment. Thus, in the fa-
mous case of Arna~lt v. Nazareno, 58 the petitioner was
ordered incarcerated by the Senate until such time as he
decided to answer certain relevant questions put to him
in connection with the investigation of a government
transaction.
It was also held in this case that the questions that
may be raised in a legislative investigation do not neces-
sarily have to be relevant to any pending legislation,
provided only that they are relevant to the subject mat-
ter of the investigation being conducted. Such investiga-
tion may result in the submission of proposed legislation
based upon the findings of the investigating committee.
How long may a private individual be imprisoned
by the legislature for contempt? The old rule announced
in Lopez v. De las Reyes59 was that the punishment could
last only for the duration of the session when the con-
tempt was committed. In the Arnault Case, however, the
Supreme Court held that the offender could be impris-
oned indefinitely by the Senate, it being a continuing
body, provided that the punishment did not become so
long as to violate due process. As for the House of Rep-
resentatives, the same decision declared that the im-
prisonment could last not only during the session when
the offense was committed but until the final adjourn-
ment of the body. This rule is presumably still valid and
may be applied, unless changed, to the present Con-
gress.
+tua.
"" 55 Phil. 170.
declares that: 'No money shall be paid out of the Treasury ex-
cept in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.' This cons-
titutional edict requires that the GAAbe purposeful, deliber-
ate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations. Assuch, the
requirement unqer Section 20 of R.A. No. 8439 that the
amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta benefits were to be
appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must
be purposefully, deliberately, and precisely included in the
GAA. The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not ma-
terialize as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439,
but must initially be proposed by the officials of the DOST as
the concerne<lagency for submission to and consideration by
Congress. That process is what complies with the constitu-
tional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of
the benefits because the GAA did not mirror every provision of
law that referred to it as the source of funding. It is worthy to
note that the DOST itself acknowledged the absolute need for
the appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte,
Jr. would not have needed to request the OP for the express
authority to use the savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits."
While ''law" as here used may refer to constitu-

tional appropriations like the grant of a P300,000.00
salary to the President, it is more often supposed to
denote statutes enacted by the lawmaking body. Funds
are always needed for the support of public projects;
money is the motive force and lubricant of the machin-
ery of government. Hence, the power of the purse is one
of the most important prerogatives of the Congress.
(1) Appropriation Defined
An appropriation measure may be defined as a

statute the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury,
e.g., the public works act and the general appropriations
act. A law creating an office and providing funds there-
for is not an appropriation law since the main purpose is
not to appropriate funds but to create the office.
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS 30'
from the treasury any amount in excess of one millior

pesos.
(3) Constitµtional Limitations
In addition to these extra-constitutional require·

ments, the Constitution lists down several specific limi-
tations on the power of appropriation of the Congress.
The first is that all appropriation bills should origi-
nate in the House of Representatives, for reasons al-
ready discussed.
The second is the following provision, which was
thought necessary in view of the many abuses commit-
ted in the past in the use of discretionary funds. In
many cases, these funds were spent for personal pur-
poses, or at least unnecessary or excessive public pur-
poses, to the prejudice and often without even the
knowledgeof the public.
"(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular of-
ficials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be sup-
ported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines
as may be prescribed by law.""'
The Congress is called upon to pass the necessary

legislation providing for the proper guidelines to make
this new and salutary limitation effective.
In the case of special appropriations, it is provided
in Article VI, Section 25(4), that:
"A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose

for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actu-
ally available as certified to by the National Treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein."
&1 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

the measure that authorizes the release of public funds

in accordance with Article VI, Section 29(1). ·
"(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the

general appropriations bill unless it relates specificallyto some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enact-
ment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates."
This is a verbatim reproduction of Article VI, Sec-

tion 19(2), of the 1935 Constitution. The purpose is to
prevent "riders" or irrelevant provisions that are in-
cluded in the general appropriations bill to ensure their
approval.
In Garcia v. Mata, certain provisions dealing with
66
the activation and retirement of reserve officers of the

Armed Forces were incorporated in the General Appro-
priations Act for 1956. The Supreme Court, in annulling
these provisions, declared:
"A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails

to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item
therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very
first clause of paragraph 11 itself, which reads:
'After the approval of this Act, and when there is no
emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for
more than two years during any period of the consecutive
years.'
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While
R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Gov-
ernment for the fiscal year 1956-1967,the said paragraph 11
refers to the fundamental government policy matters of the
calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of re-
serve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy con-
tinue throughout the entire paragraph.
"" 65 SCRA 520.

Taken from the 1973 Constitution, this provision

was inspired by an expose made by Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, who charged that several millions of pesos had
been transferred from
~ the executive department to. the
House of Representatives, presumably to augment the
allowances of some of its members during an election
campaign.
This provision prohibits one department from
transferring some of its funds to another department
and thereby make it beholden to the former to the det-
riment of the doctrine of separation of powers. Such
transfers are also unsystematic, besides in effect disre-
garding the will of the legislature that enacted the ap-
propriation measure.
Applying the above provision, the Supreme Court
declared in Demetria v. Alba67 through Justice Fernan:
"Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-

extends the privilege granted under said Section 16(5). It em-
powers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds fron:
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive De-
partment to any program, project or activity of any depart-
ment, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as tc
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually saving,
in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether 01
not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item tc
which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitu-
tional infirmities render the provision in question null anc
void."
67
148 SCRA 208; Philippine Constitution Association v
Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994; Sanchez v. COA, G.R
No. 127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471; Nazareth v. Villar, G.R
No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385.
reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the

authority granted to the DOST by the Executive Secre-
tary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was
legal and valid but, in so far as the use of agency's sav-
ings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was
reenacted in 2001, the authority granted on the use of
savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding
year."
Insofar as Congress is concerned, "the individual
members of Congress may only determine the necessity
of the realignment of savings in the allotments for their
operating expenses because they are in the best position
to know whether there are savings available in some
items and whether there are deficiencies in other items
of their operating expenses that need augmentation.
However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives who shall approve the
realignment.?"
The issue in Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudica-
tion Division 72 was the legality of the President's trans-
fer of the funds appropriated by Congress for the Presi-
dential Anti-Graft Commission [PAGC]in favor of the
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Af-
fairs - Investigative and Adjudication Division (IAD-
ODESLA),to which was transferred the functions of the
PAGCafter its abolition. The Supreme Court considered
said allocation of funds as lawful. Thus -
"Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is

(sic)shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appro-
priated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010 an-
nual budget, no separate or added funding of such a consider-
71
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra.
12
G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA408.
Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President,

the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly
sourced from the President's own office budget without com-
mitting any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpa-
tion of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the
President simply allocates the existing funds previously appro-
priated by Congress for his office."
(4) Appropriations for Sectarian Purposes
Whether the appropriation be general or specific, it

must conform to the prohibition against the use of pub-
lic funds or property for sectarian purposes. This is pro-
vided for in Article VI, Section 29(2), which runs in full
as follows:
"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,

applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, bene-
fit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian in-
stitution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or sup-
port of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minis-
ter, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any pe-
nal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."
This provision must be read with Article III, Sec-

tion 5, on religious freedom, and Article II, Section 6, on
the separation of Church and State. Its purpose is to
further bolster this principle and emphasize the neu-
trality of the State in ecclesiasticalmatters.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the above
prohibition is applicable only where the appropriation is
intended purposely to benefit a religious institution. In
Aglipay u. Ruiz, 73 the Philippine government authorized
a special stamp issue on the occasion of the observance
in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Con-
"'64 Phil. 201.

paid from public funds if they serve the government in a

non-ecclesiastical capacity. Thus, some priests who
served as members of the Constitutional Commission
were paid per diems from public funds for services ren-
dered by them not ;s ecclesiasticsbut as public officers.
Finally, it should be stressed that by specific per-
mission in the Constitution, and as an exception to the
above-stated rule, it is provided in Article XIV, Section
3(3),that:
"At the option expressed in writing by the parents or

guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their chil-
dren or wards in public elementary and high schools within the
regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by
the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or
wards belong, without additional cost to the Government."
(5) Automatic Re-appropriation
"If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed
by the Congress.'?"
Under the 1935 Constitution, the general appro-

priations act had a duration of only one fiscal year.
Hence, if the Congress failed to enact a new general
appropriations act for the incoming fiscal year, the en-
tire government was theoretically paralyzed since no
money could be paid out of the Treasury "except in pur-
suance of an appropriation made by law." The President
of the Philippines therefore had to call back the Con-
gress in special session and keep it in session until it
1"
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 25(7).
The Power of Taxation
The power of taxation is inherent in the State and

is generally vested in the legislature. Its exercise is,
however,restricted by the followingrules:
"(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.

The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.?"
In addition to the limitations set forth in this provi-

sion, tax laws must be for a public purpose. Accordingly,
a tax may not be levied for the purpose of paying the
corporate debts of a private corporation on the pretext
that it is intended to ensure the stability of the fertilizer
industry in the country.79
Uniformity in taxation means that persons or
things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. It is distinguished from equality in taxation
in that the latter requires the tax imposed to be deter-
mined on the basis of the value of the property. The
present Constitution adds that the rule of taxation shall
also be equitable, which means that the tax burden
must be imposed according to the taxpayer's capacity to
pay.
According to Delegate Artemio M. Lobrin of the
1971 Constitutional Convention,"progressive taxation is
one which tends to accelerate instead of arrest economic
growth. Furthermore, to be progressive, the tax system
should be suited to the social conditions of the people.''"
=iu«, Art. VI, Sec. 28(1).

79
Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No.
166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.
811
Montejo, The New Constitution, 128.
ready embraced in the generic term "churches" under

the 1935 Charter. The addition is a token of the recogni-
tion by the Constitution of the Muslim elements in our
nation.
In Angeles University Foundation v. City of Ange-
les,84 the petitioner, invoking the tax exemption in favor
of educational institutions granted under Republic Act
No. 6055, claimed that it should not be made to pay
building permit fees. Said law provided that non-stock,
non-profit educational foundations shall be "exempt
from the payment of all taxes, import duties, assess-
ments, and other charges imposed by the Government
on all income derived from or property, real or personal,
used exclusively for the educational activities of the
Foundation." The Supreme Court rejected said conten-
tion, stressing that "since building permit fees are not
charges on property, they are not impositions from
which petitioner is exempt."
In Lladoc u. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 85 a
donation of Pl0,000.00 was accepted by a parish priest
for the construction of a church. The BIR sought to im-
pose a donee's tax upon his successor, who protested,
invoking the constitutional exemption from taxation of
religious institutions. The Supreme Court sustained the
BIR, holding that the tax imposed was an excise tax, a
tax levied not upon the church itself but upon the parish
priest for the exercise by him of the privilege of receiv-
ing the donation. The taxes covered by the constitu-
tional exemption are real estate taxes or ad valorem
taxes imposed on the property itself.
"G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 359.

"'' 14 SCRA 292.
voting. The above provision requires an absolute major-

ity of the entire membership of the Congress·because a
tax exemption represents a withholding of the power to
tax and consequent loss of revenue to the government.
~ '
An example of a law providing for a tax exemption
is Section 234(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code, which states that properties owned
by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real
property tax. BB It should be noted that Congress has the
power to grant tax exemptions over and above the power
of the local government's delegated power to tax." A
claim for a tax refund under a statute partakes of the
nature of a tax exemption." Likewise, under Presiden-
tial Decree No. 1922, P.D. No. 2013 and Republic Act
No. 7279, the National Housing Authority is exempt
from the payment of any and all fees and taxes of any
kind, whether local or general. Accordingly, it is not
subject to the deposit requirement under Section 267 of
R.A. No. 7160 with respect to court actions assailing the
validity of any delinquency sale at public auction of real
property (for non-payment of realty taxes). "NHA cannot
be declared delinquent in the payment of real property
88
See City of Pasig v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
185023, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 271; Manila International Air-
port Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 163072, April 2, 2009, 583
SCRA 234; Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. CBAA,
G.R. No. 178030, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 644; PAGCOR v.
BIR, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011, 645 SCRA 338.
89
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunica-
tions, Inc., G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 169; Quezon
City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 166408, Octo-
ber 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 496.
90
CIR v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
163835, 7 July 2010, 624 SCRA 340.
Finally, it is established that "there is no vested

right in a tax exemption, more so when the· latest ex-
pression of legislative intent renders its continuance
doubtful. Being a mere
~ statutory privilege, a tax exemp-
tion may be modified or withdrawn at will by the grant-
ing authority A tax exemption cannot be grounded upon
the continued existence of a statute which precludes its
change or repeal. No law is irrepealable. Congress, in
the legitimate exercise of its lawmaking powers, can
enact a law withdrawing a tax exemption just as effica-
ciously as it may grant the same under Section 28(4) of
Article VI of the Constitution.?"
The Power of Concurrence
The Constitution requires the concurrence of the

Congress to an amnesty and to a treaty.
Article VII, Section 19, authorizes the President to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the members of the Congress. The basis of the majority
is not the membership of each House, it would appear,
but the membership of the legislature as a whole.
It is also specifically provided in Article VII, Sec-
tion 21, that "no treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate."
The War Powers
"Sec. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of

both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war."
"" Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 168584, October 15, 2007, 536
SCRA 193.
Referendum and Initiative
In line with the conferment of legislative power di-

rectly on the people,~·Section 32 provides as follows:
"Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, pro-

vide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the excep-
tions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the regis-
tration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legisla-
tive district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters thereof."
Initiative is generally defined as the power of the

people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at the polls, independent of the legislative assem-
bly.96 It is the right of a group of citizens to introduce a
matter for legislation either to the legislature or directly
to the voters. 97
Referendum is understood to be the right reserved
to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which
has been passed by a legislative body and which in most
cases would without action on the part of the electors
become a law.98 It is defined as a method of submitting
an important legislative measure to a direct vote of the
whole people, the submission of a law passed by the
legislature for their approval or rejection.99
Independently of the foregoing general definitions
of said concepts, Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6735
now defines initiative as "the power of the people to
as Black, p. 923.
"'Webster, Col. Ed., 752.
"" Black, 1446.
na Sibal, Phil. Legal Encyclopedia, p. 845.
The referendum may be of two classes, namely, ref-

erendum on statutes, which refers to a petition to ap-
prove or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and referendum on local law, which refers to a
petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordi-
nance enacted by regional assemblies and local legisla-
tive bodies.l"
To exercise the power of initiative or referendum,
at least ten per centum of the total number of the regis-
tered voters, of which every legislative district is repre-
sented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and
register the same with the Commission on Elections.
Said petition is defined as the written instrument con-
taining the proposition, which is the measure proposed
by the voters, and the required number of signatories. It
shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to
the Commission.106
A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolu-
tion or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of
an autonomous region, province or city is deemed val-
idly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least
ten per centum of the registered voters in the province
or city, of which every legislative district must be repre-
sented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein; provided, however, that if the province or
city is composed only of one legislative district, then at
least each municipality in a province or each barangay
in a city should be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein.?" A referendum
of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality
'0" Sections 3 (c.L)and (c.2).

ms Section 5 (a), in relation to Sections 3 (0 and (d).
101
Section 5 (d).
Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is

approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said na-
tional law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall
become effective fift~en days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by
the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspa-
per of general circulation in the Philippines. However, if
the majority vote is not obtained, the national law
sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full
force and effect.l" A national or local initiative proposi-
tion approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen days
after certification and proclamation by the Commis-
sion.!"
Section 10 of the law prohibits petitions embracing
more than one subject from being submitted to the elec-
torate and provides that statutes involving emergency
measures, the enactment of which is specifically vested
in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to
referendum until ninety days after its effectivity.
Under Section 11, any duly accredited people's or-
ganization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a
summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill
that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by
the legislature. The procedure to be followed on the ini-
tiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of Representatives
except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence
over the pending legislative measures on the commit-
tee.
112
Section 9 (a).
"" Section 9 (c).
thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Com-

mission on Elections.!"
If the proposition is approved by a majority bf the
votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen days after certifica-
tion by the Commissionas if affirmative action thereon
had been made by the local legislative body and local
executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.:"
The power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year. Initiative shall extend only to
subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of
the local legislative bodies to enact. If at any time before
the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall
adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative
shall be cancelled. However, those against such action
may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner
provided under the law.120
Any proposition or ordinance or resolution ap-
proved through the system of initiative and referendum
as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or
amended, by the local legislative body concerned within
six months from the date therefrom, and may be
amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative
body within three years thereafter by a vote of three-
fourths of all its members: provided, however, that in
case of barangays, the period shall be one year after the
expiration of the first six months.121
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 of the
law, which states that the power of initiative and refer-
endum may be exercised by all registered voters of the
118
Section 13 (h).
119
Section 14.
120
Section 15 (a), (b) and (c).
121
Section 16.
Chapter 10
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT was debased by

Ferdinand E. Marcos who converted it into a seat of un-
limited power and unbelievable corruption. In 1986,
after almost thirteen years of absolute and tyrannical
rule, he was deposed by an outraged and indignant citi-
zenry. He deserves the scorn of history. Even so, his
oppressive regime has taught us many lessons on liberty
which were useful in the redrafting of the new article on
the Executive Department. Indeed, the main motivation
of the framers in the writing of Article VII was to pre-
vent the recurrence of another despot like the discred-
ited ex-dictator.
Executive Power
Article VII, Section 1, reproduces the original rule

in the 1935 Constitution that:
"The executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines."
Executive power is briefly described as the power to

enforce and administer the laws, but it is actually more
than this. In the exercise of this power, the President of
the Philippines assumes a plenitude of authority, and
the corresponding awesome responsibility, that make
1
The 1935 Constitution vested executive power in "a President
of the Philippines."
335
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 337
who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without

having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Phil-
ippine citizenship.2 He is distinguished from the· natu-
ralized citizen, who, acquires his Philippine citizenship
after birth by any of the modes allowed by law.
As previously observed, under the provisions of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,3
natural-born Filipino citizens who have been, or intend
to be, naturalized in a foreign country, shall, upon tak-
ing the oath of allegiance prescribed in said law be
deemed to have re-acquired, or shall retain their Philip-
pine citizenship, upon taking said oath. Those seeking
elective or appointive public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candi-
dacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer au-
thorized to administer an oath. It must be noted that,
upon taking said second oath, the citizen ceases to be a
dual citizen.4
Registration as a voter connotes, of course, posses-
sion of the qualifications for suffrage as enumerated in
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
The literacy qualification is now expressly required
because it is not deemed embraced in the suffrage quali-
fication. The present Constitution not only does not
require ability to read and write but in fact prohibits its
imposition as a qualification for voting."
2
Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2.
"Republic Act No. 9225.
4
See discussion in Chapter 8.
"Ibid.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-

President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed
to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates
of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than
thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certifi-
cates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Represen-
tatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon deter-
mination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
"The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
"The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the can-
vassing of the certificates.
"The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali-
fications of the President or Vice-President, and may promul-
gate its rules for the purpose."
As the canvass is regarded merely as a ministerial

function, the Congress shall not have the power to in-
quire into or decide questions of alleged irregularities in
the conduct of the elections. These are matters appro-
priate for an election contest. Normally, as long as the
election returns are duly certified and appear to be au-
thentic, the Congress shall have no duty but to canvass
the same and to proclaim as elected the person receiving
the highest number of votes.
When the Congress meets to canvass the presiden-
tial election returns, it does not need the call to a special
session by the President under Article VI, Section 15, as
the canvass is mandated and called by the Constitution
itself.
the Supreme Court in Buac v. COMELEC,8 "in contra-

vention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,"
which provides that the "Members of the Supreme Court
and of other courts established by law shall not be des-
ignated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or ad-
ministrative functions."
Citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections," the Su-
preme Court explained that this portion of Section 4
designating it as the sole judge of all presidential and
vice-presidential election contests "is an innovation of
the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions to designate any tribunal to be the
sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests,
has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas, as 'not (being) justiciable' controversies or dis-
putes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June
1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, 'An Act Constitut-
ing an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to
Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of
the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the
Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same.' Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be
the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent
adoption of the parliamentary form of government un-
der the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonethe-
less, would now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution." Ac-
cordingly, "unquestionably, the overarching framework
• 465 Phil. 800.

s 424 SCRA 277 (2004).
power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the pre-

sent Constitution.
"With the explicit provision, the present Constitution
has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with lat-
ter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task
of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded
by the PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allo-
cated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless,
distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
"If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members· of
the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals
would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section
12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first
to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in
Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme
Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tri-
bunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the
same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII,
which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the
PET, from the same prohibition.
''We have previously declared that the PET is not simply
an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Consti-
tution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that '[a] power
without the means to use it is a nullity.' The vehicle for the ex-
ercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and spe-
cifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners dur-
ing the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the
PET. Thus, a microscopicview, like the petitioner's, should not
constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial
power.?'"
'0 Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783; see also Macalintal v.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011, 651
SCRA239.
"In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the

electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of Sena-
tor, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such
for the term for which she was elected. These are givens which
are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the Constitu-
tion that public office is a public trust, and public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people and
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.xx x.
"The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May
1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides
with the last three years of the term of the President elected in
the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be
Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in
the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992
elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protes-
tant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at
the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her 'de-
termination to protect and pursue the public interest involved
in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.' Such
abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the in-
stant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would
serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncer-
tainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election,
thereby enhancing the all-too crucial political stability of the
nation during this period of national recovery."
This ruling was affirmed in a vice-presidential elec-

tion contest where the protestant ran for and won a seat
in the Senate during the pendency of her aforesaid ac-
tion before the PET.13
Term
The term of the President (and the Vice-President)

is fixed by Section 4 as follows:
'" Legarda v. de Castro, P.E.T. Case No. 003, January 18, 2008,
542 SCRA 125.
The term of the President is fixed at only six years,

but it was extended by a few months in the case of
President Aquino. Although her term began on Febru-
ary 25, 1986, it was provided in Article XVIII, Section 5,
that "the six-year ter'm of the incumbent President mid
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby ex-
tended to noon of June 30, 1992." The next regular elec-
tion for the President and Vice-President was held on
the second Monday of that year.
The question of whether or not the President can
run for another term after other persons shall have
served in his former office has yet to be settled by the
Supreme Court. One view is that the President can be
re-elected provided this is not done immediately follow-
ing his first term. Others contend that he is forever dis-
qualified because Section 4 provides that "the President
shall not be eligiblefor any re-election."
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who succeeded President
Estrada on January 20, 2001, was therefore eligible for
election in her own right because she had not served
more than four years by the end of her predecessor's
term, which expired on June 30, 2004. If her unexpired
term exceeded that period, she would not have been
"qualified for election to the same officeat any time."
Estrada, on the other hand, was elected President
in 1998 and served only for, or resigned from office af-
ter, less than three years. This notwithstanding, he ran
for President again in 2010 and almost won.
In Pormento v. Estrada, 14 the petitioner sought to
disqualify Estrada from participating in the 2010 presi-
dential election, on the basis of this constitutional provi-
,. G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010, 629 SCRA 530.

The Vice-President
The new Constitution retains the office of the Vice-

President who shall, with the President, be elected .di-
rectly by the people, for the same term of six years, and
may be removed also only through the process of im-
peachment. His qualifications are the same as those of
the President. The Vice-President is eligible for the posi-
tion of member of the Cabinet and when appointed as
such does not need confirmation by the Commissionon
Appointments. This is intended to prevent him from
becoming, as mere presidential standby, "a superfluous
Excellency'' with nothing more to do than pray for a
vacancy in the Presidency. Nevertheless, he may not
demand such appointment nor may he, conversely, be
compelledto accept it.
The new provisions on the office of the Vice-
President are as follows:
"Sec. 4. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have

the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with
and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed
from office in the same manner as the President.
"The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation."
"Sec. 4(2) No Vice-President shall serve for more than
two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected."
"Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the officeof the
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume officeupon confirmation by a majority vote of all
the Members of both Houses of Congress voting separately."
"If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-

President-elect shall act as President until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
"If at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become perma-
nently disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall become Presi-
dent.
''Where no President and Vice-President shall have been
chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice-
President shall have been chosen and qualified.
"The Congress shall by law provide for the manner in
which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a
President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of
death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials men-
tioned in the next preceding paragraph."
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
case of death, permanent disability, removal from office,or res-
ignation of both the President and Vice-President, the Presi-
dent of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall then act as President until
the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.
"The Congress shall by law provide who shall serve as
President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation
of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or
the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and
be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifica-
tions as the Acting President."
The cases contemplated in the first section are: (1)

death or permanent disability of the President-elect; (2)
failure to elect the President, as where the canvass of
the presidential elections has not yet been completed, or
where for one reason or another the presidential elec-
dency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume
the presidency as soon as the disability appears; (3) he ex-
pressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as their President; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference
is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the presi-
dent which he has given up, and (5) he called on his supporters
to join him in the promotion of a national spirit of reconcilia-
tion and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconcilia-
tion and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up
the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory,
his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense."
Estrada also argued that the respondent could not

have replaced him either in an acting capacity because
the determination of the President's inability to dis-
charge the powers and functions of his office should be
made by the Congress pursuant to the procedure laid
down in Section 11 of Article VII. The Court held that
he had not been replaced on that ground; and anyway,
the Senate and the House of Representatives had, by
resolution, formally recognized Gloria Macapagal Ar-
royo as the constitutional successor of Joseph Estrada
by reason of his resignation as President of the Philip-
pines.
The following additional rules on presidential dis-
ability were originally embodied in a statute" only but
have now been transferred to the Constitution:
"Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives his written declaration that he is unable to dis-
"B.P. 231.
"Sec. 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clockin the morn-

ing of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call and within seven days en-
act a law calling for i special election to elect a President and.a
Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor
later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling
such special election shall be deemed certified under para-
graph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third reading by the Con-
gress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged
against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from
the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be sus-
pended nor the special election postponed. No special election
shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election."
Oath of Office
The taking of the oath of office by the President-

elect marks his formal assumption of his duties. The
prescribed oath is provided for as follows:
"Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their of-
fice, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President
shall take the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faith-
fully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President
(or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines,
preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service
of the Nation. So help me God."
"(In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)"
The oath is not a source of substantive power but is

merely intended to deepen the sense of responsibility of
the President and ensure a more conscientious dis-
charge of his office.Nevertheless, it has been invoked as
a justification for presidential action, as when President
The "emoluments" which they may not receive dur-

ing their tenure from the government or any other
source (that is, private) refers to any compensation re-
ceived for services rendered or from possession of an
office."Emolument" has been defined as "the profit aris-
ing from officeor employment; that which is received as
compensation for services, or which is annexed to the
possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites; ad-
vantage, gain, public or private." "The gain, profit or
advantage which is contemplated in the definition or
significance of the word 'emolument,' as applied to pub-
lic officers, clearly comprehends, a gain, profit, or ad-
vantage which is pecuniary in character.?" This means
that the President cannot accept other employment
elsewhere, whether in the government or in the private
sector, and must confine himself to the duties of his
office, although in the case of the Vice-President, he
may be appointed to the Cabinet. It is submitted,
though, that the Vice-President may not receive addi-
tional compensation in the second capacity because of
the absolute prohibition in the above provision.
The followinginhibitions are also provided by Sec-
tion 13:
"The President, Vice-President, the Members of the

Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless oth-
erwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, par-
ticipate in any business, or be financially interested in any con-
tract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
19
Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d.
897, 901; 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767, cited in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965, 15
SCRA479.
violative of Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution,

invoked Article IX-B, Section 7, allowing the holding of
multiple positions by the appointive official if "allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position."
~·
In declaring the executive order unconstitutional,
the Court declared through Chief Justice Fernan:
"In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Arti-

cle VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-Bof the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of posi-
tions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant sec-
retaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than two (2) positions in the government and government
corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Con-
stitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise pro-
vided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
"The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical
consequences that will result from a strict application of the
prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the op-
erations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members
would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity,
by reason of their primary positions or by virtue oflegislation.
"As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts or
those required by the primary functions of the executive offi-
cial concerned do not fall within the definition of 'any other of-
fice' within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.
With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of
legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in gov-
ernment-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidi-
aries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical consequences
are more apparent than real. Being head of an executive de-
partment is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, re-
quiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and exper-
tise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department
head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to
his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded
"The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-

officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control
and Inspection Board, thus: 'An examination of section 2 of the
questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman
and members of the-Board to qualify they need only be desig-
nated by the respective department heads. With the exception
of the representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio.
In order to be designated they must already be holding posi-
tions in the offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance,
one who does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of
Customs, cannot, under the act, be designated a representative
from that office. The same is true with respect to the represen-
tatives from the other offices.No new appointments are neces-
sary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so
designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to
those already performed under their original appointments.'
"The term 'primary' used to describe 'functions' refers to
the order of importance and thus means chief or principal
function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may re-
fer to the plural. The additional duties must not only be closely
related to, but must be required by the official's primary func-
tions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's
primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget
sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary
of Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of
the Maritime Industry Authority and the Civil Aeronautics
Board.
"If the functions required to be performed are merely in-
cidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or oth-
erwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such
additional functions would fall under the purview of 'any other
office' prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be the
Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same
rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet offi-
cial management functions and/or monetary compensation,
such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations and their sub-
sidiaries."
multiple offices,as well as incompatibleoffices,refers to the hold-

ing of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or des-
ignation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article
VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To 'hold' ah office
means to 'possess ortoccupy'the same, or 'to be in possession and
administration,' which implies nothing less than the actual dis-
charge of the functions and duties of the office."
For virtually the same reasons, the Supreme Court

also nullified in Funa v. Agra24 the designation of the
respondent as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General, stressing
that it "was of no moment that Agra's designation (as
Acting Secretary of Justice) was in an acting or tempo-
rary capacity." Thus -
"The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being

held by one official must be construed as to apply to all ap-
pointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary,
for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section
13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants.
"According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma [G.R.
Nos. 83896 and 83815, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317], the
only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section
3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a
member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive of-
ficials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the officials' offices. In
this regard, the decision in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma
adverted to the resolution issued on August 1, 1991 in Civil
Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, whereby the Court
held that the phrase 'the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants' found in Section 13, referred only to the
"G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, 691 SCRA 196.

"As can be gleaned from the foregoing enumeration, the

restructuring of the electric power industry inherently involves
the participation of various government agencies. In Civil Lib-
erties, this Court explained that mandating additional 'duties
and functions to Cabinet members which are not inconsistent
with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments
by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their
respective executive offices, is a practice long-recognized in
many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of
efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among
the different officesin the Executive Branch in the discharge of
its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws af-
fecting national interest and general welfare and delivering
basic services to the people.
"The production and supply of energy is undoubtedly one
of national interest and is a basic commodity expected by the
people. This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the res-
pective members of the Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the
NPB, valid.
"This Court is not unmindful, however, that Section 48 of
the EPIRA is not categorical in proclaiming that the concerned
Cabinet secretaries compose the NPB Board only in an ex-
officio capacity. It is only in Section 52 creating the Power Sec-
tor Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM)
that they are so designated in an ex-officio capacity. x x x.
"Nonetheless, this Court agrees with the contention of
the Solicitor General that the constitutional prohibition was
not violated, considering that the concerned Cabinet secretar-
ies were merely imposed additional duties and their posts in
the NPB do not constitute 'any other office'within the contem-
plation of the constitutional prohibition.
"The delegation of the said officials to the respective
Board of Directors were (sic) designation by Congress of addi-
tional functions and duties to the officials concerned, i.e., they
were designated as members of the Board of Directors. Desig-
nation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by
law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment of
additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an
appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to re-
exercise of his powers as the Chief Executive, consistent

with the principle of separation of powers.26
Defined simply as "the power of the Government to
withhold information, from the public, the courts, and
the Congress?" or as "the right of the President and
high-level executive branch officers to withhold informa-
tion from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the pub-
lic,"28 executive privilege has been the subject of many
rulings of the Supreme Court covering demands made
upon the executive department for the disclosure · of
information, as pressed by both individuals and institu-
tions, like Congress.
Thus, executive privilege has generally been con-
strued to refer to the so-called informer's privilege, or
the privilege of the Government not to disclose the iden-
tity of a person or persons who furnish information on
violations of law to officers charged with the enforce-
ment of that law; the privilege accorded to presidential
communications, which are presumed privileged with-
out distinguishing between those which involve matters
of national security and those which do not, the ration-
ale for the privilege being that "a frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare
of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essen-
tial to protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power;" the deliberative process privilege, which
26
See Almonte v. Vasquez, 314 Phil. 150 (1995); see also U.S. v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), cited in Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1.
27
B. Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investi-
gatory Power, 47 Cal. L. Rev. 3, cited in Senate v. Ermita, supra.
•• M. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In
Nixon's Shadow (83 Minn. L. Rev. 1069), also cited in Senate v.
Ermita, supra.
ability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate

investigating authority.31 Moreover, "the privilege ac-
corded to presidential communications is not absolute,
one significant qualification being that 'the Executive
cannot, any more than the other branches of govern-
ment, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield
its officials and employees from investigations by the
proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing.' This qualification applies whether the
privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial
trial or a congressionalinvestigation conducted in aid of
legislation.?"
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presi-
dential communications privilege applies to documents
in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional
materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As a conse-
quence, congressional or judicial negation of the presi-
dential communications privilege is always subject to
greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process
privilege .33
The deliberative process privilege confers such upon
the documents covered by the same, "not on the need to
protect national security but, on the obvious realization
that officials will not communicate candidly among
themselves if each remark is a potential item of discov-
ery and front page news, the objective of the privilege
being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.?"
'" Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Offi-

cers, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77.
"AKBAYAN v. Aquino, supra.
'" Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Offi-
cers, supra.
"' AKBAYAN v. Aquino, supra.
in closed-doorCabinet meetings,39 and matters affecting

national security and public order."
As stressed by the Supreme Court, "executive privi-
lege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or
the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types
of information of a sensitive character. While executive
privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may
be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to jus-
tify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably
absent is any recognition that executive officials are
exempt from the duty to disclose information by the
mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the ex-
traordinary character of the exemptions indicates that
the presumption inclines heavily against executive se-
crecy and in favor of disclosure."! Accordingly,to reiter-
ate, in AKBAYAN v. Aquino." the Court, citing Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, 43 declared that "the Executive cannot, any more
than the other branches of government, invoke a gen-
eral confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and
employees from investigations by the proper govern-
mental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing."
This qualification applies whether the privilege is being
invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congres-
sional investigation conducted in aid of legislation."
"When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves there-
39 Id.
'° Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9,
2002, 433 Phil. 506, 384 SCRA 152.
., Senate v. Ermita, supra.
'2 G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 468.
"' 498 F.2d 725, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 183.

"AKBAYAN v. Aquino, supra., citing Arnault v. Nazareno, 87
Phil. 29, 46 (1950).
first secure the consent of the President prior to appearing be-

fore Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appear-
ance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by
the President. ·
"The proviso d:llowingthe President to give its [sic] con-
sent means nothing more than that the President may reverse
a prohibition which already exists by virtue ofE.0. 464.
"Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is
the determination by a head of office, authorized by the Presi-
dent under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such of-
ficial is in possession of information that is covered by execu-
tive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for
the official's not showing up in the legislative investigation.
"In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to
justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be con-
strued as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a
head of office authorized by the President, has determined that
the requested information is privileged, and that the President
has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, how-
ever, even without mentioning the term 'executive privilege,'
amounts to an implied claim that the information is being
withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the Presi-
dent, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an im-
plied claim of privilege.
"The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Ex-
ecutive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon illustrates
the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O.
464. It reads:
' 'In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the
Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at
10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials of the Executive
Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to
attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant
to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled 'Ensuring Obser-
vance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To
The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights
Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of
Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other Purposes.'
Said officials have not secured the required consent from the
President.'
in those instances where exemption from disclosure is neces-

sary to the discharge of highly important executive responsi-
bilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on
the fact that certain information must, as a matter of neces-
sity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation
to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest
in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
"In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege,
the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power
to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Execu-
tive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is
'By order of the President', which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the ex-
ecutive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not au-
thorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even
less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case
where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence.
Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this
score."
Significantly, the Supreme Court made further

clarifications in Neri v. Senate Committee on Account-
ability of Public Officers,49 as follows -
"Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly

invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by
the head of the department which has control over the matter.
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a
'precise and certain reason' for preserving their confidentiality.
"The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secre-
tary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal
claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that 'this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege
as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly.' Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the
'"G.R. No. 180643,March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77.

preme Court dismissed his petition, holding in part as

follows:
''We now come to the immunity that can be claimed by

petitioner as a non-sitting president. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries
the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immu-
nity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any deci-
sion of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with the post-tenure immunity from li-
ability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity as an in-
oculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The
rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the.
State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such
but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser."
In fact, present jurisprudence reveals a "judicial

disinclination to expand the privilege, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication
of a right.''" This modern trend was applied in the case
of U.S. v. Nixon and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, where it was
held that the immunity of the President from civil dam-
ages covered only officialacts, a rule reiterated in Clin-
ton v. Jones, where the petitioner was an incumbent
president.
At any rate, the Supreme Court has ruled that
"pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the
President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can
be held liable for affront against the petitioner's rights
to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evi-
"' See Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, No-

vember 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 84, citing Estrada v. Desierto, supra.; In
the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of
Habeas Data in Favor of Francis Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
183533, September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678.
Accordingly, in David u. Arroyo,54 the Court de-

clared that "it is not proper to implead President Arroyo
as respondent." This, however, "does not mean that the
President is not accopntable to anyone. Like any other
official, he remains accountable to the people but he
may be removed from office only in the mode provided
by law and that is by impeachment."
,,., G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 433 Phil. 506; see Kilosbayan
v. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 353.
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 381
v. cu: that "all executive authority is thus vested in

him." These pronouncements were in keeping with the
rule announced in Myers v. United States, 3 where Chief
Justice Taft held that. "the words of Sec. 2 followingthe
general grant of executive power under Sec. 1 were ei-
ther an enumeration and emphasis of specific functions
of the Executive, not all inclusive, or were limitations
upon the general grant of executive power." The U.S.
Supreme Court cited with approval Alexander Hamil-
ton's opinion that "the enumeration (of specific execu-
tive powers) ought therefore to be considered as in-
tended merely to specify the principal articles implied in
the definition of power, leaving the rest to flow from the
general grant of that power."
But these views have been reconsidered in favor of
a stricter interpretation of executive power. In Lacson v.
Roque' and Mondano v. Silvosa,5 for example, our Su-
preme Court held that the President's power of general
supervision over local governments could be exercised
by him only "as may be provided by law" in accordance
with the constitutional limitation. In the famous Steel
Seizure Case,6 President Truman's takeover of the steel
mills to continue their operations while the steel work-
ers were on strike was declared illegal in the absence of
a specific constitutional or statutory authority. The ar-
gument offered was that the clause vesting in the Presi-
dent the executive power "constitutes a grant of all ex-
ecutive power of which the Government is capable." The
U.S. Supreme Court, by a vote of 6 to 3, did not agree.
"If that be true," Justice Black wryly commented, "it is
2
67 Phil. 62.
" 272 U.S. 52.
• 92 Phil. 456.
' 92 Phil. 456.
"Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579.
President" or by force of his enumerated powers under

the laws, that has control over all matters pertaining to
the disposition of government property including s~-
questered assets und~r the administration of the Presi-
dential Commissionon Good Government. "Surely," said
the Supreme Court, "such control is neither legislative
nor judicial."
In Ople v. Torres." the Supreme Court declared
"void, as a usurpation of legislative power," Administra-
tive Order No. 308, which provided for the adoption of a
national identification system "even in the absence of an
enabling legislation."
It will be recalled that, in David u. Arroyo,11 the
Court pronounced that, although the President may call
out the armed forces and declare a state of emergency,
he may not, without a law authorizing him to do so,
exercise emergency powers under Article XII, Section
17, which authorizes the State, during a national emer-
gency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. That authorization was eventually con-
ferred upon the President when Republic Acts Nos.
3902, 7477 and 7582 were passed by Congress.12
It has likewise been ruled that the President may
not amend by Executive Order the functions of the
Commission on Higher Education, as conferred upon it
by law, without prior legislative authority.13 Indeed, the
'° G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 354 Phil. 948, 293 SCRA 141.
11
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.
12
See Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,
G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 213.
13
Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 428.
In Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary

for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Divi-
sion, 18 the Court upheld the President's abolition of the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and his
transfer of its functions to the Office of the Deputy Ex-
ecutive Secretary For Legal Affairs (ODESLA) under
the Officeof the President, stressing that the President
has continuing authority to reorganize the Executive
Department under Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III of
E.O. 292.19 "Clearly,"said the Court, "the abolition of the
PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division spe-
cially created within the ODESLAis properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing 'dele-
gated legislative authority to reorganize' his own office
pursuant to E.O. 292."20
To stress that the President's authority to reorgan-
ize his office was subject to the strictures provided for
under the law, the Court even explained the distinctions
between his basic authority to reorganize the Office of
the President Proper, and his general power to reorgan-
ize the Officeof the President. Thus -
"However, the President's power to reorganize the Office

of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) ofEO 292 should
be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the Presi-
dent can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abo-
lishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring func-
tions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31
(2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize of-
"G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 408.

19
Buk.lodng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802,
July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718; Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283,
February 6, 2003, 397 SCRA 56.
20
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division, supra.
of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel

groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
does not mean that she has no such authority. As Chief
Executive, the Presid~nt has the general responsibility
to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief,
she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress
rebellion and lawless violence.?" Moreover, it has also
been ruled that "the President's authority to declare a
state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength
from her Commander-in-Chief powers.?" Likewise, in
Quarto u. The Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, 25
it was pronounced that "while the legislature is the
source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to
implement is lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose
the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a
constituent part of the process and is essentially an
executive function."
It is clear, however, that the President does not
have the authority to promulgate decrees. According to
the Supreme Court in David v. Arroyo,26 where it de-
clared as unconstitutional President Arroyo's Proclama-
tion 1017 which authorized her to issue decrees, "legisla-
tive power is peculiarly within the province of the Legis-
lature" and "neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion
""' The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the

Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
24
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February
3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
25
Quarto v. the Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, G.R.
No. 169042, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 580, citing Mapa, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 783.
26
Supra.
The Appointing Power
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by

the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. It has
likewise been defined as the "act of designation by the
appointing officer, body or board, to whom that power
has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise
the functions of a given office.'?" Although intrinsically
executive and therefore pertaining mainly to the Presi-
dent, the appointing power may be exercised by the
legislature and by the judiciary, as well as the Constitu-
tional Commissions, over their own respective person-
nel.
An appointment may be made verbally but is usu-
ally done in writing through what is called the commis-
sion. The commission is the written evidence of an ap-
pointment.
The Constitution vests the appointing power in the
President as follows:
"Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the

consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose ap-
pointments are vested in him in this Constitution; He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose ap-
pointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
"The President shall have the power to make appoint-
ments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
21
Appari v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231, citing Mechem.
lection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting ap-

pointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall sur-
render the office once he is called to do so by the appointing
authority. Therefore, his term of office is not fixed but endures
at the pleasure of t:!J.e appointing authority. His separation
from the service does not import removal but merely the expi-
ration of his term - a mode of termination of officialrelations
that falls outside the coverage of the constitutional provision
on security of tenure since no removal from officeis involved. x
xx.
"Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office
is to minimize the appointing authority's opportunity to ap-
point a majority of the members of a collegial body. It is also
intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. A
staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibi-
tion, direct or indirect, against the issuance of an acting or
temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to is-
sue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative
Code grants.
"Ramon P. Binamira v. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr., involving
the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), is an example of how
this Court has recognized the validity of temporary appoint-
ments in vacancies in offices whose holders are appointed on
staggered basis. Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 189, (the
charter of the PTA, as amended by P.D. No. 564 and P.D. No.
1400), the members of the PTA's governing body are all presi-
dential appointees whose terms of office are also staggered.
This notwithstanding, the Court sustained the temporary
character of the appointment extended by the President in fa-
vor of the PTA General Manager, even if the law also fixes his
term of officeat six years unless sooner removed for cause. In-
terestingly, even a staggered term of office does not ensure
that at no instance will the appointing authority appoint all
the members of a body whose members are appointed on stag-
gered basis. x x x.
"Given the wide latitude of the President's appointing
authority (and the strict construction against any limitation on
or qualification of this power), the prohibition on the President
from issuing an acting appointment must either be specific, or
there must be a clear repugnancy between the nature of the of-
fice and the temporary appointment. No such limitation on the
President's appointing power appears to be clearly deducible
A designation connotes an imposition of additional

duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the
public service by virtue of an earlier appointment." It
does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant
upon the person so designated the right to claim the
salary attached to the position. Without an appoint-
ment, a designation does not entitle the officerto receive
the salary of the position. The legal basis of an em-
ployee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a
duly issued and approved appointment to the position,
and not a mere designation.32
Both the temporary appointment and the designa-
tion are not subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Such confirmation, if given errone-
ously, will not make the incumbent a permanent ap-
pointee."
The Supreme Court discussed the nature of an act-
ing appointment in Pimentel u. Ermita. 34 Thus -
"The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is

its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill
an office for a limited time until the appointment of a perma-
nent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occu-
pied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a de-
partment secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an
alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
"Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the Presi-
dent the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecre-
tary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether tempo-
"' National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit, 481

Phil. 279, 294 (2004).
"' Betoy v. Board of Directors, National Power Corporation,
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA 420.
"" Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692.
"'G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587.
There are now six categories of officials who are

subject to the appointing power of the President, viz.:
(1) The heads of the executive departments.·
(2) Ambassadors, other public ministers and con-
suls.
(3) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain.
(4) Those other officers whose appointments are
vested in him by the Constitution.
(5) All other officers of the government whose ap-
pointments are not provided for by law.
(6) Those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint.
The President of the Philippines under the 1935
Constitution was empowered to appoint "officers of the
army from the rank of colonel and of the navy and air
force from the rank of captain or cornmander.?" The
rank was raised to brigadier-general or commodore in
the 1973 charter. 36
It must be pointed out though that appointments
and promotions from the rank of captain and higher in
the Philippine Coast Guard no longer require confirma-
tion by the Commission on Appointments in view of its
transfer from the Department of National Defense to,
eventually, the Department of Transportation and
Communication, for which reason, it is now to be con-
sidered a civilian agency," although, for purposes of
disciplining its officers and personnel, it remains a com-
ponent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. There-
''" Art. VII, Sec. 10(3).

:m Art. VII, Sec. 12.
"' Soriano III v. Lista, 399 SCRA 437.
"In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed

out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to ex-
clude presidential appointments from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices
expressly mentioned if! the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sen-
tence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word 'alone' after the word
'President' in providing that Congress may by law vest the ap-
pointment oflower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power
to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized
by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in
the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VIL
"Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked offi-
cers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the
President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments
of the government. In short, the word 'alone' in the third sen-
tence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a lit-
eral import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII
of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light
of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And this redun-
dancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential ap-
pointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commissionon Appointments.
"Coming now to the immediate question before the Court,
it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the Commission
on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already
pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes 'heads of bu-
reaus' among those officers whose appointments, need the con-
sent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitu-
tion, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
'heads of bureaus' from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.''"
"' See also Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254.

As to officers lower in rank, the Congress may al-

low their appointments to be made by the President
alone, the courts, and the heads of departments, agen-
cies, commissions and~ boards. "Officerslower in rank".
as here used, should not be understood as referring to
petty or unimportant officers but those below the rank
of or subordinate to those in whom the power of ap-
pointment is vested.50
As under the Commonwealth Constitution, the Pre-
sident's appointing power is once again subject to check
by the Commission on Appointments, which was abol-
ished by the 1973 charter. Consequently, the distinc-
tions between the regular and ad interim appointments,
and the applicable jurisprudence thereon, have also
been revived.
The usual steps in the appointing process are the
nomination, which is made by the President; the con-
firmation, which is the prerogative of the Commission
on Appointments; and the issuance of the commission,
also done by the President. This is where the appoint-
ment is regular. On the other hand, in the case of the ad
interim appointment, the appointment comes before the
confirmation,which is made by the Commissionwhen it
reconvenes followingthe legislative recess. The nomina-
tion of the regular appointee is made and approved dur-
ing the session, when the Commission on Appointments
is authorized to meet. But the ad interim appointment
is made during the recess and becomes effective then,
subject to confirmation or rejection later, during the
next legislative session.
The distinction between the regular and ad interim
appointments are the following:
50
Black, Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., 128.
gress had in mind either the regular or special session, and not
simply the regular one as contended by petitioner."
In Matibag v. Benipayo, 52 the Supreme Court clari-

fied that "an ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commissionon Appoint-
ments does not alter its permanent character. The Con-
stitution itself makes an ad interim appointment per-
manent in character by making it effective until disap-
proved by the Commissionon Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress." However, when the ad
interim appointment lapses by inaction of the Commis-
sion on Appointments, as when it fails or refuses to act
on the same until the next adjournment of Congress, it
would not constitute a term of office. The period from
the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time
it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an expired term."
The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent
a hiatus in the discharge of official duties. Obviously,
the public office would be immobilized to the prejudice
of the people if the President had to wait for the Con-
gress and the Commission on Appointments to recon-
vene before he could fill a vacancy occurring during the
recess.
The President's power of appointment may also be
limited by the Congress through its power to prescribe
qualifications for public office. The judiciary for its part
may annul an appointment made by the President if the
"' G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 429 Phil. 554; see also
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. IAC, 140 SCRA 22.
"' Fetalino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191890, De-
cember 4, 2012, 686 SCRA 813.
As earlier noted, the Supreme Court upheld in

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines"
the authority of the President to appoint officers-in-
charge for elective positions for purposes of temporarily
filling the posts left v~cant by said elective officials from
the expiration of their terms up to the conduct of the
regular elections. The basis for said authority was Re-
public Act No. 10153, the law which provided for the
synchronization of the elections for the regional gov-
ernment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Min-
danao with the regular elections.
The Court stated that, even if said law had not ex-
pressly provided for the President's authority to appoint
said officers-in-charge,he would still nevertheless pos-
sess the power to appoint them as Section 16 vests in
him as well the power to appoint officials whose ap-
pointments are not otherwise provided for by law. "In
other words, where there are offices which have to be
filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling
them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the
President to fill the office by appointment. Any limita-
tion on or qualification to the exercise of the President's
appointment power should be strictly construed and
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized."
Against the contention that this power of the Presi-
dent to appoint said officers-in-charge, who would be
occupyingelective offices, breaches Section 16 of Article
X of the Constitution, which grants the President the
mere power of general supervision over autonomous
regions, the Court explained that it saw "no incompati-
bility between the President's power of supervision over
local governments and autonomous regions, and the
"' G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, 677 SCRA 200.
"Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next

presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a Presi-
dent or Acting President shall not make appointments except
temporary appointments to executivepositions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety."
The obvious purpose of the above is to prevent the

use, or abuse, of the appointing power for the purpose of
enlisting political support in exchange for some appoint-
ive officein the government. This will also prevent the
"midnight appointments" that may otherwise be issued
by an outgoing President, as happened in the case of
Aytona v. Castillo, 58 which involved the validity of Presi-
dent DiosdadoMacapagal's Administrative Order No. 2,
issued on December 31, 1961, recalling, withdrawing,
and cancelling all (350) ad interim appointments made
by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, (the date
when Macapagal was proclaimed elected by the Con-
gress), including several ad interim appointments made
by outgoing President Carlos P. Garcia on December 29,
1961, or one day before the expiration of his term. In
providing for the dismissal of the petition, the Court
declared that "under the circumstances above described,
what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves
that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Ad-
ministrative Order No. 2, cancelling such 'midnight' or
'last-minute' appointments." It did point out though that
"Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia

ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December 30, 1961.
But it is commonsense to believe that after the proclamation of
the election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a
'care-taker' administration. He was duty bound to prepare for
the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President,
"'4SCRA 1.
"Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to

submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint
one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of
the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to
the President after the vacancy occurs, because. that shortens
the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President
to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be uncon-
scionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively
and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted
under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the ap-
pointment."
(1) The Removal Power
From the express power of appointment, the Presi-

dent derives the implied power of removal. However, it
is not correct to say that all officials appointed by him
are also removable by him since the Constitution pre-
scribes certain methods for the separation from the pub-
lic service of some such officers. For example, the mem-
bers of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional
Commissions,although appointed by the President, may
be removed only by impeachment in accordance with
Article XI. Judges of inferior courts, likewise appointed
by the President, are subject to the disciplinary author-
ity of, and may be removed only by, the Supreme
Court." Moreover, the Ombudsman, who shall also be
appointed by the President under the Constitution,61
may be removed only by impeachment.62 Insofar as the
Deputy Ombudsmen are concerned though, the Presi-
dent's authority to appoint them" includes, by necessary
6° Constitution, Article VIII, Sections 9 and 11.

61
Ibid., Article XI, Section 9.
62
Id., Article XI, Section 2.
"" Constitution, Article XI, Section 9.
denied him relief, holding that there was no removal

here but a mere expiration of the term of office. Justice
Roberto Concepcionexplained in his concurring opinion: .
~
"In the case at bar, the term of respondent Alajar as Vice-
Mayor of the City of Roxas is not fixed by law. However, the
latter, in effect, vests in the President the power to fix such
term. When, in November 1955, petitioner Alba was designated
as Acting Vice-Mayor of said City, the term of respondent Alba
was thereby fixed implicitly by the President, in the exercise of
his aforementioned authority. Thus, the term of office of Alajar
expired and his right to hold office was extinguished, with the
same legal effect as if the term had been fixed by Congress it-
self. In other words, Alajar was not removed from office, for 'to
remove an officer is to oust him from office before the expiration
of his term.' (Manalang v. Quitoriano, et al., 50 Off. Gaz.,
2515). Alajar merely lost the right to hold the office of Vice-
Mayor of the City of Roxas by expiration of his term as such."
But it would be different if the law provided that a

member of the classified civil service could be "removed
at pleasure" as this would contravene the constitutional
rule that "no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law.68
At any rate, a removal presupposes a forcible and
permanent separation of the incumbent from office be-
fore the expiration of his term.69
The Control Power
"The President shall have control of all the executive

departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed?"
•• Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(3).

"" Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171.
7°
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17.
tions that may limit his freedom of control over them.

From the purely legal standpoint, however, the mem-
bers of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the dispo-
sition of the President since they are merely his alter
~- '
ego.
As the Supreme Court put it in Villena v. Secretary
of the Interior, 74 "without minimizing the importance of
the heads of various departments, their personality is in
reality but the projection of that of the President." Ac-
cordingly, their acts "performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive."
This principle, generally known as the doctrine of
qualified political agency, was acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in Manubay v. Garilao" where it de-
clared that a further appeal from a decision of a cabinet
secretary may be taken to the Office of the President
before resorting to judicial action, to be consistent with
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Thus-
"Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, depart-

ment secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President
and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless
disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an ag-
grieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary
need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari
directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said
secretary. Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP
was consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. A party aggrieved by an order of an administra-
tive officialshould first appeal to the higher administrative au-
thority before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case,
"67 Phil. 451.

"G.R. No. 140717,April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 134.
grounds, and not the doctrine of qualified political

agency. It explained -
"The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially pos-

tulates that the heads of the various executive departments
are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken
by such heads in the performance of their official duties are
deemed the acts cf the President unless the President himself
should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of
the fact that in our presidential form of government, all execu-
tive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive;
that the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple execu-
tive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are per-
formed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has
been adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that
the President cannot be expected to personally perform the
multifarious functions of the executive office.
"But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not
be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP
despite some of its members being themselves the appointees
of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of Presiden-
tial Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Re-
public Act No. 8494, the five ex officio members were the Secre-
tary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Gov-
ernor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General
of the National Economic and Development Authority, and the
Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board,
while the four other members of the Board were the three from
the private sector (at least one of whom should come from the
export community), who were elected by the ex officio members
of the Board for a term of not more than two consecutive years,
and the President of TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-
Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their
office or function, not because of their direct appointment to
the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the
President, that sat them in the Board.
"Under the circumstances, when the members of the
Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002 reorganization,
they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of
be invalid if it limits the exercise of his power or with-

draws it altogether from the President.
In Araneta v. Gatmaitan" for example, the Con-
gress authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natu-
ral Resources to promulgate rules and regulations con-
cerning trawl fishing. When President Magsaysay di-
rectly exercised this authority, his act was challenged on
the ground that the power in question had been. con-
ferred not on him but on the aforementioned Cabinet
member. The Supreme Court did not agree, holding as
follows:
"If under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natu-

ral Resources has authority to regulate or ban fishing by trawl,
then the President of the Philippines may exercise the same
power and authority because of the following:(a) The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, pursuant to Section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitu-
tion; (b) Executive Orders may be issued by the President un-
der Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code 'governing
the general performance of duties by public employees or dis-
posing of issues of general concern'; and (c) Under Section 74 of
the Revised Administrative Code, 'All executive functions of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be di-
rectly under the Executive Department, subject to the supervi-
sion and control of the President of the Philippines in matters
of general policy."
In Gascon u. Arroyo, 81 the Supreme Court held that

the Executive Secretary had the authority to enter into
the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS-CBNBroad-
casting Corporation as he was acting on behalf of the
President of the Philippines who had the power to nego-
tiate such agreement. The agreement was therefore
binding on the Republic of the Philippines.
RO 101 Phil. 328.

"1 178 SCRA 582.
It should be noted, however, that the power of con-

trol is exercisable by the President over the acts of his
subordinates and not necessarily over the subordinate
himself or, as the Supreme Court put it in Ang-Angco v.
Castillo, 85 not "over the actor or agent himself of the
act." In this case, the President of the Philippines had
assumed direct jurisdiction over a member of the classi-
fied Civil Service against whom administrative charges
had been filed by the Commissioner of Customs. In hold-
ing this act of the President to be unlawful, the Su-
preme Court declared:
"Let us now take up the power of control given to the

President by the Constitution over all officers and employees in
the executive department which is now invoked by respondents
as justification to override the specific provisions of the Civil
Service Act. This power of control is couched in general terms
for it does not set in specific manner its extent and scope. Yet,
this Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra, had already
occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean 'the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter,' to distinguish it from the power of supervision over
municipal governments, but the decision does not go to the ex-
tent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in
the executive department. Apparently, the power merely ap-
plies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate
and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only
means that the President may set aside the judgment or action
taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties."
86
In Noblejas v. Salas, a provincial fiscal directed by
the Secretary of Justice to file informations against five
persons added a sixth accused on his own authority. The
Supreme Court reversed his action, holding that he
'"9 SCRA 619 (1963).

SG 67 SCRA 47 (1975).
not a quasi-judicial body. Its preliminary investigation

of a case is therefore not a quasi-judicial proceeding."
In Kulayan v. Tan,91 the Supreme Court affirmed
that, "as a civilian agency of the government, the police,
through the NAPOLCOM,properly comes within, and is
subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control."
The "Take-Care" Clause
The power to take care that the laws be faithfully

executed makes the President a dominant figure in the
administration of the government. The energy or indif-
ference with which he discharges this power will deter-
mine the measure of his success as Law Enforcer.
The law he is supposed to enforce includes the Con-
stitution itself, statutes, judicial decisions, administra-
tive rules and regulations and municipal ordinances, as
well as treaties entered into by our government.
It has been suggested that the President is not un-
der obligation to enforce a law which in his belief is un-
constitutional because it would create no rights and
confer no duties, being totally null and void. The better
view is that it is not for him to determine the validity of
a law since this is a question exclusively addressed to
the judiciary. Hence, until and unless a law is declared
unconstitutional, the President has a duty to execute it
regardless of his doubts on its validity. A contrary opin-
ion would allow him not only to negate the will of the
legislature but also to encroach upon the prerogatives of
the judiciary.
'0 Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 188056,
January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 109.

m G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA 482.
The Court added -

"The President's power to conduct investigations to en-
sure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It
flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution un-
der Article VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has the authority to directly assume the func-
tions of the executive department. Invoking this authority, the
President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports
of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate ac-
tion."
This ruling has since been affirmed in Pichay v. Of-

fice of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Investigative and Adjudication Division, 93 where the
Court stressed that the "obligation to see to it that laws
are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding
power in the President to conduct investigations into the
conduct of officials and employees in the executive de-
partment."
In PCGG Chairman v. Jacobi,94 the Court further
stressed that a "necessary component of the Executive's
power to faithfully execute the laws of the land is the
State's self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its
penal laws." This responsibility, according to the Court,
is primarily lodged with the Department of Justice, as
the principal law agency of the government.
The Military Power
Tremendous and extraordinary authority is reposed

in the President by the following provision in Article
VU:
"" G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 408.
•• G.R. No. 155996, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 20.
To begin with, this section bolsters the principle

announcedin Article II, Section 3, that "civilian author-
ity is, at all times, supreme over the military." By mak-
ing the President the 4
commander-in-chief of all the
armed forces, the Constitution lessens the danger of a
military take-over of the government in violation of its
republican nature.
The military establishment is the strongest single
institution in the country and could easily employ its
physical force to wrest power from the civilian authori-
ties. The threat of such domination would be present in
fact even if the civil and military authorities were made
only equal. It is important that the military be subordi-
nated to the President so he can keep it in check when-
ever it is tempted to impose its will upon the govern-
ment.
There is some hazard, to be sure, in entrusting fi-
nal military decisions to a civilian President without
much background in military matters. The danger be-
comes especially marked in times of war or when the
President happens to be opinionated or is unwilling to
defer to the recommendations of his more knowledge-
able military advisers. The counter-argument is that
such a situation, although not impossible, would be
unlikely, given the sense of responsibility that can be
expected from any person elevated to the position of
President. More importantly, it was felt that the need
for preserving our democratic institutions against a
military coup d'etat was worth the calculated risk the
Constitution was taking.
It should be noted that although the President is
made the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces, he
will be so only if there are armed forces to command.
These forces will be raised by the Congress in the exer-
Courts martial were described in Ruffy v. Chief of

Sta{f5 as agencies of executive character which may be
convened by the President independently of legislation
and by virtue only ef his constitutional function as
commander-in-chief. These courts do not pertain to the
judiciary and are utilized by him in properly command-
ing and enforcing discipline in the armed forces. Thus -
"Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and

one of the authorities 'for the ordering of courts martial has
been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the
President as Commander in Chief, independently of legisla-
tion.' (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p.
49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judici-
ary. The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the
provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide
for the government of the army, excepting military offenses
from the civil jurisdiction, and making the President Com-
mander in Chief, observes as follows: 'These provisions show
that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and pun-
ishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and
now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do so
is given without any connection between it and the 3d Article
of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely
independent of each other.'
''Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government,
it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive de-
partment; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by Congress for the President as
Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized military representa-
tives."
However, in Garcia u. Executive Secretary,96 the Su-

preme Court clarified that the "general court martial is
"' 75 Phil. 875.

,,r, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 750.
tried. The Supreme Court, citing the earlier case of Ya-

mashita v. Styer, 99 which upheld the jurisdiction of mili-
tary commissions over war criminals, declared that the
promulgation of the challenged order was "an exercise
by the President of his powers as commander-in-chief of
all our armed forces."
100
In Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, the Su-
preme Court upheld the power of the President to create
military tribunals authorized to try not only military
personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil
courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the
"open court" theory observed in the United States. In
the case of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,101
however, the Aquino decision was reversed and it was
held in part, through Justice Gancayco:
"Due process of law demands that in all criminal prose-

cutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his
liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.
(In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948]; Sections 1 and 14(2],Article
III, 1987 Constitution.) There appears to be no substantial
change from the corresponding provisions of the 1973 Consti-
tution. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the
Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process. A mili-
tary commission or tribunal, by whatever name they are called,
are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. As ex-
plained by Justice Teehankee in his separate dissenting opin-
ion -
"'x xx Civilians like (the petitioner) placed on trial
for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by
judicial process.
"'Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclu-
sively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts
•• 75 Phil. 563 (1977).

1"0
63 SCRA 546 (1975).
IOI 150 SCRA 144 (1987).
"The late Justice Black x x x added that '(A) Court

Martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice
but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of
the over-all mechanism by which military discipline is
preserved and cthat ex-servicemen should be given 'the
benefits of a civilian court trial when they are actually
civilians x x x. Free countries of the world have tried to
restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction
deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline
among troops in active service.'
"Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive
Department of the Government and are simply instrumentali-
ties of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the
President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly com-
manding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein,
and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized mili-
tary representatives. (Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875
[1946]) Following the principle of separation of powers under-
lying the existing constitutional organization of the Govern-
ment of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting
the laws (as when an individual should be considered to have
violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. (Kop-
pel [Phil.], Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496, 515 [1946]).It is not, and
it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through
the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the
land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so
today and as they did during the period of the martial law in
the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise juris-
diction over civilians for offenses committed by them and
which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. (Ex-parte
Milligan, supra.) To have it otherwise would be a violation of
the constitutional right to due process of the civilian con-
cerned."
In the Garcia case, the Court emphasized that the

"courts" referred to in Olaguer were military commis-
sions created during martial law while the General
Court Martial was created under Commonwealth Act
No. 408, "and remains a valid entity."105
""' Garcia v. Executive Secretary, supra.

laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promul-

gated by me personally or upon my direction" and "as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution"
declared a "National Emergency." The Court ruled that,
while the call made By her upon the Armed Forces to
suppress lawful violence, as well as her proclamation of
a state of national emergency, can be considered as
valid, her reliance on the provisions of Section 1 7 of
Article XII of the Constitution, which allows the State,
during times of national emergency, to temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned pub-
lic utility or business affected with public interest for
purposes of her proclamation of a state of national
emergencywas misplaced. The Court declared -
"Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can

declare a state of national emergency, however, without legis-
lation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. The President
cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist war-
ranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or busi-
ness affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when
such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that should be taken
over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exer-
cise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in
the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress."
Incidentally, the Court clarified in David that the

President "cannot call the military to enforce or imple-
ment certain laws, such as customs laws, laws govern-
ing family and property relations, laws on obligations
and contracts and the like." He can only order the mili-
tary to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress
lawless violence.
cerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as

well as any defenses against the same - whether
grounded on executive privilege, national security or
similar concerns - would be accorded due judicial
evaluation. All the constitutional considerations perti-
nent to either branch of government may be raised, as-
sessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And
once the courts speak with finality, both branches of
government have no option but to complywith the deci-
sion of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to
their liking or disfavor."!"
In Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyot" the Supreme
Court, citing Gonzales v. Abaya,113 declared that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief,can be held respon-
sible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and en-
forced disappearances in the context of amparo proceed-
ings'" on the basis of the doctrine of command responsi-
bility, the requisites of which are "a. the existence of a
superior-subordinate relationship between the accused
as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his sub-
ordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know
that the crime was about to be or had been committed;
and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and rea-
sonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish
the perpetrators thereof." According to the Court, the
President, being the commander-in-chief of all the
armed forces, is to be considered as necessarily possess-
111
Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, 498
SCRA 671.
112
G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 84; see also
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of
Habeas Data in Favor of Francis Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
183533, September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678.
""G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 445.
114
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC.
awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf. It is a

high prerogative common law writ of ancient origin the
great object of which is the liberation of those who may
be in prison without sufficient cause."!"
' that what is permitted to be
It should be stressed
suspended by the President is not the writ itself but its
privilege.
"Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not suspend the writ itself, but only its
privilege. This means that when the court receives an
application for the writ, and it finds the petition in
proper form, it will issue the writ as a matter of course,
i.e., the court will issue an order commanding the pro-
duction before the court of the person allegedly de-
tained, at a time and place stated in the order, and re-
quiring the true cause of his detention to be shown to
the court. If the return to the writ shows that the person
in custody was apprehended and detained in areas
where the privilege of the writ has been suspended or
for crimes mentioned in the executive proclamation, the
court will suspend further proceedings in the action."?"
The Supreme Court decidedly has the power to an-
nul the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus if the same is not based on either of the two
grounds stated in the Constitution, to wit, "invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it."
In 1951, President Quirino based his suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on "sedition"
and "imminent danger of insurrection or rebellion." Ifhe
had not added the latter ground, which was listed in the
m Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. II, 499.

111
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 131.
Philippines by force, as claimed by the President, de-

cided to uphold the suspension.
In Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 121 however, the Su-
preme Court reversed, the Lansang decision and revived
the Montenegro doctrine, reiterating that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a politi-
cal question to be resolved solely by the President. For-
tunately, though, this ruling has been abrogated by
Section 18, which has expressly constitutionalized the
Lansang doctrine.
It should also be noted that under Article III, Sec-
tion 13, "the right to bail shall not be impaired even if
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended."
"The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose
origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint and as the best and efficient defense
of personal freedom."?" It may therefore not be availed
of by police officersunder investigation and subjected to
a "restrictive custody order" issued by their superiors,
limiting their physical movements and liberty to leave
their camps. Accordingto the Supreme Court, consider-
ing that they are not, by reason of their restrictive cus-
tody status, actually detained or imprisoned, their
"minimal restraint" is "beyond the ambit of habeas cor-
pus. ,,12a
121
121 SCRA 472 (1983).
122
Feria v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 122954, February
15, 2000, 325 SCRA 525, 533; Sombong v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996, 252 SCRA 663, 673; Castriciones
v. Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines, G.R. No. 65731,
September 28, 1989 (Minute Resolution); Mizuaki Takenouchi v.
Cristi, G.R. No. 82232, July 25, 1988 (Minute Resolution).
1"1
Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007, 536
SCRA290.
police power, by necessity actually existing or reasona-

bly presumed. During times of disorder as will lead to a
call upon the military for assistance, necessity naturally
demands the commissionof acts which in more tranquil
times are not demand~d and thus in fact those in au-
thority may control the individual in his property in
ways which they could not legally do at other times. But
the principle still holds good that necessity, and neces-
sity alone, will justify an infringement upon private
rights of persons and property."?"
It is significant that while the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged in David statements made before the Sen-
ate Committee on Justice to the effect that "(a) arrests
and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies
and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential
Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the
President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a
valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus," it nevertheless ruled that "to be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's exer-
cise oflegislative power by issuing decrees."
(4) Limitations on the Military Powers
To settle once and for all the extent of the Presi-

dent's military powers,. the new Constitution has pro-
vided for the followingsignificant changes in the origi-
nal authority of the commander-in-chief.
'"' Willoughby, 2nd ed., Sec. 1056, pp. 1591-92; see David v. Ar-
royo, supra.
According to the Supreme Court, "it is evident that

under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Con-
gress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of ha"
beas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequen-
tially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President
has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
the Congress can maintain the same based on its own
evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that
the President does not have. Consequently, although the
Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power
to review the sufficiencyof the factual basis of the proc-
lamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit
that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to de-
fend the Constitution through such review should the
Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The consti-
tutional validity of the President's proclamation of mar-
tial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is
first a political question in the hands of Congress before
it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court."126
Moreover, "while it is true that the Court may inquire
into the factual bases for the President's exercise of
(these powers),127 it would generally defer to her judg-
ment on the matter. Unless it is shown that such de-
termination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
the Court will accord respect to the President's judg-
ment."'"
12"
Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, 668
SCRA504.
127
Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 93 (2001), 357 SCRA 756.
12•
Ampatuan v. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011, 651
SCRA228.
The Pardoning Power
The pardoning power is provided for in Article VII

as follows:
"Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as other-

wise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and for-
feitures, after convictionby final judgment.
"He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress."
Executive clemencyis granted for the purpose of re-

lieving the harshness of the law or correcting mistakes
in the administration of justice. For example, a person
already serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment
may be extended a pardon if it is subsequently discov-
ered that he is innocent. Under our Revised Penal Code,
the judge may in his decision make a recommendation
for the pardon of the convict if warranted by the circum-
stances of the commission of the offense, as where the
accused is found guilty of killing her father for raping
her.
The exercise of the pardoning power is discretion-
ary in the President and may not be controlled by the
legislature or reversed by the courts, save only when it
contravenes the limitations discussed below. Thus, it is
incompetent for the Congress to condition the grant of a
pardon by the President upon a previous clearance or
approval by a board of pardons. Neither would it be
justified for the judiciary to order the grant of a pardon
in favor, say, of a reformed criminal.
election offense. Hence, several persons convicted of

having committed on that day the crime of, say, quali-
fied theft as punished under the Revised Penal Code
could be validly pardoned without the necessity of a
favorable recommendation from the Commission on
Elections.
(3) Pardon can be granted only after convictionby
final judgment.
In People v. Salle, 131 a conditional pardon extended
to the prisoner while his appeal was still pending before
the Supreme Court was held to be invalid but, in view of
the special circumstances of the case, he was given 30
days to withdraw his appeal to make his convictionfinal
and the pardon effective.
In addition to the foregoing constitutional limita-
tions, a pardon cannot be extended to a person convicted
of legislative contempt, as this would violate the doc-
trine of separation of powers, or of civil contempt since
this would involve the benefit not of the State itself but
of the private litigant whose rights have been violated
by the contemner.
Pardon cannot also be extended for the purpose of
absolving the pardonee of civil liability, including judi-
cial costs, since, again, the interest that is remitted does
not belong to the State but to the private litigant. Par-
don also will not restore offices forfeited.
(3) Kinds of Pardon
Pardon may be classified into absolute or condi-
tional and plenary or partial. An absolute pardon is one
extended without any strings attached, so to speak,
whereas a conditional pardon is one under which the
"" 250 SCRA 581.

134
In Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol, the
petitioner accepted a pardon subject to the condition
that he would not thereafter commit a violation of the
penal laws of the Philippines. He was later convictedby
the municipal court of the crime of usurpation of public
functions but the case was provisionally dismissed for
lack of witnesses when he appealed it to the court of
first instance. Ordered administratively reincarcerated
by the President of the Philippines for violation of his
conditional pardon, he filed a petition for habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court denied it, holding that "mere com-
mission, not necessarily conviction by the court, of any
other crime, is enough in order that the petitioner may
be deemed to have violated the condition of his parole or
pardon. Determination of violation of such condition
rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief
Executive and the courts will not interfere by way of
review with any of his findings."
The Supreme Court did not consider in this case
that the ascertainment of whether or not an offensehas
been committed is not an executive but a judicial func-
tion and that a person cannot be deemed to have com-
mitted a criminal offense unless he is convicted thereof
by a court of justice. The executive can only allege the
commission of an offense; it is for the judiciary to de-
clare such commissionin the form of a conviction.
Espuelas was nevertheless later affirmed in Sumu-
long v. Gonzales, iss with Justices Cruz and Paras dis-
senting.!"
1"4
108 Phil. 353.
'"5 152 SCRA 272.
135
The doctrine was later reiterated in In re the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, G.R. No. 122338, Dec.
29, 1996.
"The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador

cases, and several others, show the unmistakable application
of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland, whose sweeping gen-
eralizations to this day continue to hold sway in our jurispru-
dence despite the fact that much of its relevance has been
downplayed by later American decisions.
* * *
"Such generalities have not been universally accepted,
recognized or approved. The modern trend of authorities now
rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case (reputed
to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been
made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more
realistic approach.
* * *
"Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime.
These are 'historical' facts which, despite the public manifesta-
tion of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, 'ordinary,
prudent men will take into account in their subsequent deal-
ings with the actor.'
"Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual
from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to
all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the per-
son's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost repu-
tation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be con-
stantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character
and purpose of the privilege.
"Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive lan-
guage of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the
commonly-heldopinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore
a convicted felon to public officenecessarily relinquished or for-
feited by reason of the conviction although such pardon un-
doubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that of-
fice."
not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the con-
viction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penal-
ties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil
rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it
cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and
fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for
appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of
the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not gener-
ally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender
has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back
wages.
"But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the in-
nocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes
him a new man and as innocent, as if he had not been found
guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon
because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon re-
lieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal
act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation
and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
"In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively
liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the ser-
vice. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the
charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which
he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court
was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but
on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed
to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial
court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a
public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary
reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bol-
stered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement
by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and
the Civil Service Commission.
''The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in ef-
fect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the adminis-
trative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and or-
dered his separation from the service. This can be inferred
from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from
the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstate-
ment, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon.
This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be rein-
(5) Distinctions
Pardon must be distinguished from parole in that

the latter involves only a release of the convict from
imprisonment but not a restoration of his liberty. The
parolee is still in the custody of the law although no
longer under confinement, unlike the pardonee whose
sentence is condoned, subject only to reinstatement in
case of violation of the condition that may have been
attached to the pardon.
A parole must also be distinguished from probation
in that the former is executive whereas the latter is
judicial. Moreover,parole presupposes the prior service
of part of the sentence whereas probation may be
granted before actual service of sentence.
(6) Amnesty
As previously observed, the pardoning power may

not be limited by the legislature nor may the President's
discretion in its exercise be reviewed by the judiciary.
But when it comes to amnesty, the Constitution it-
self provides that it can be granted by the President
only with the concurrence of the Congress. This concur-
rence must be given by a majority of all the members of
the Congress.
It was the rule before that admission of guilt was
not necessary to the enjoyment of amnesty, upon the
theory that amnesty looks backward and obliterates not
only the penalty but the offense itself. In the case of
Vera v. People of the Philippines'" however, this doctrine
was reversed. The present rule requires a previous ad-
mission of guilt since a person would not need the bene-
"0 7 SCRA 152 (1963).

before the law precisely as though he had committed no

offense.141
Accordingly,it has been ruled that "amnesty com-
monly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their trea-
son or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness
which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another,
who have offended,by some breach, the law of nations.
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliter-
ates the offense with which he is charged, that the per-
son released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed. no offense.":" "Pardon," on
the other hand, "is granted by the Chief Executive and
as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take
no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial no-
tics."!"
A grant of amnesty shall cover only such offenses
as may be specified in the proclamation providing for
the same.144
The Borrowing Power

"Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee for-
eign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
"' Burdick v. United States, 235 U.S. 476.

'" People v. Patriarca, 395 Phil. 690 (2000).
143
People v. Casida, 336 Phil. 344 (1997), cited in Magdalo Para
sa Pagbabago v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190793, June 19,
2012, 673 SCRA 651.
144
Kapunan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 148213-17, March
13, 2009, 581 SCRA 42.
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally

been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that
the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Mone-
tary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report
of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans,
does not diminish the executive nature of the power.'?"
The Diplomatic Power
As head of State, the President is supposed to be

the spokesman of the nation on external affairs. In this
capacity, he may deal with foreign states and govern-
ments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplo-
matic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations.
The conduct of external affairs, accordingto Jeffer-
son, "is executive altogether." Chief Justice Marshall de-
scribed the President of the United States as "the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole
representative with foreign nations."
It has already been noted that the President of the
Philippines is empowered to appoint ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls. No less important, he is
also vested with the power to conclude treaties, except
that, conformablyto the usual rule:
"Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be

valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate."
Interestingly, the records of the Constitutional

Commission show that the phrase "international
agreement" was not intended to include the executive
agreement, which apparently can still be concluded by
"" Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, 564

SCRA 152.
agreement that becomes binding through executive ac-

tion. On the other hand, executive agreements con-
cluded by the President 'sometimes take the form of
exchange of notes and at other times that of more for-
•
mal documents denominated 'agreements' or 'protocols."'
Moreover-
"Under international law, there is no difference between

treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding ef-
fects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the nego-
tiating functionaries have remained within their powers. Nei-
ther, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates
the Constitution. Authorities are, however, agreed that one is
distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the con-
currence-requirement aspect. As has been observed by US con-
stitutional scholars, a treaty has greater 'dignity' than an ex-
ecutive agreement, because its constitutional efficacyis beyond
doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President,
the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an execu-
tive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory en-
actment."
It is significant that the Court further declared in

said case that "treaties and international agreements
actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encom-
passing and absolute nature of sovereignty." Thus -
"To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-surrender

agreement cannot be predicated on the postulate that some of
its provisions constitute a virtual abdication of its sovereignty.
Almost every time a state enters into an international agree-
ment, it voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty. The Con-
stitution, as drafted, did not envision a reclusive Philippines
isolated from the rest of the world. It even adheres, as earlier
stated, to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
By their nature, treaties and international agreements actu-
ally have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and
absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations
may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state
power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of

the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is
within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate os, having secured its consent for its ratifi-
cation, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to rat-
ify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step
that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached
by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no juris-
diction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the per-
formance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot is-
sue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is
beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the
Senate."
Indeed, the treaty-making power is exclusiveto the

President. Congress, while possessing vast legislative
powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotia-
tions. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the
treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of nego-
tiations attendant to its conclusion.Moreover, it is not
even Congress as a whole that has been given the au-
thority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-
making powerof the President, but only the Senate.155
Treaties and other international agreements con-
cluded by the President are also subject to check by the
Supreme Court, which has the power to declare them
unconstitutional.?"
tsn AKBAYANv. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558
SCRA468.
tss Constitution, Art. VIII, Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a).
The Informing Power
"Sec. 23. The President shall address the Congress at

the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it
at any other time."
Although couched in mandatory language, the first

sentence of this provision does not as a rule impose a
compellable duty on the President. In his discretion, he
may or may not give information to the legislature, al-
though he will usually choose to do so for practical rea-
sons. For one thing, he will want to maintain the good-
will of the Congress and so will not deny its request for
information if its release will not in his belief prejudice
the public interest. For another, the requested informa-
tion may be needed as the basis of the legislation he is
recommending and he knows that lacking such basis the
legislature would be justified in not acting on his pro-
posals.
When President Washington withheld from the U.S.
Congress requested information relating to the negotia-
tion of a treaty, the legislators did not press the issue.
But when President Nixon refused to release information
concerning the Watergate scandal, claiming what he
called "executiveprivilege," the U.S. Supreme Court held
his refusal invalid, declaring in part as follows:
"x x x neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor

the need for confidentiality of high-level communications,
without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presiden-
tial privilege of immunity from judicial process under all cir-
cumstances. The President's need for complete candor and ob-
jectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts.
However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, un-
differentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of
such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises.
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensi-
"xxx the President is not a Gulliver immobilized by ten

thousand tiny cords, nor even a Prometheus chained to a rock
of frustration. He is, rather, a kind of magnificent lion who can
roam widely and do great deeds so long as he does not try to
break loose from his broad reservation. Our pluralistic system
of restraints is designed to keep him from going out of bounds,
not to paralyze him in the field that has been reserved for his
use. He will feel few checks upon his power if he uses that
power as he should. This may well be the final definition of the
strong and successful President: the one who knows just far as
he can go in the direction he wants to go. Ifhe cannot judge the
limits of his power, he cannot call upon its strength. If he can-
not sense the possible, he will exhaust himself attempting the
impossible. The power of the Presidency moves as a mighty
host only with the grain of morality and liberty."!"
mo The American Presidency, Rev. Ed., pp. 68-69.

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 467
me as a judge." There can be no other alternative if our

ideal is, as it should always be, the preservation of a
free society under the aegis of just and humane laws
applied without fear or favor.
'
Independence of the Judiciary
To maintain the independence of the judiciary, the

following safeguards have been embodied in the Consti-
tution:
(1) The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It
cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the
manner of its meetings be changed by mere legislation.1
(2) The members of the Supreme Court may not
be removed except by impeachment."
(3) The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its
minimum original and appellate jurisdiction as pre-
scribed in Article VIII, Section 5, of the Constitution.3
(4) The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may not be increased by law without its advice
and concurrence.4
(5) Appointees to the judiciary are now nominated
by the Judicial and Bar Council and no longer subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.5
(6) The Supreme Court now has administrative
supervision over all lower courts and their personnel."
' Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1).

'Ibid., Art. XI, Sec. 2.
3
Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
4
Id., Art. VI, Sec. 30.
O
Id., Art. VIJI, Sec. 9.
• Id., Art. VIII, Sec. 6.
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice

to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumen-
tality of the Government."
Accordingto the above provision, the judicial power

shall be vested not only in the Supreme Court but in
such lower courts as may be established by law. "Lower
courts" as here used is to be understood as referring to
all other courts below the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court is the only constitutional court, all the lower
courts being of statutory creation.
The different lower courts under the Judiciary Re-
organization Law are the Court of Appeals, the regional
trial courts, the metropolitan trial courts, the municipal
trial courts, and the municipal circuit trial courts. Not
included in the reorganization were the Court of Tax
Appeals although it is also a court of justice and the
special statutory court known as the Sandiganbayan, as
well as the Sharia courts for the Muslims. Together with
the Supreme Court, the aforementioned tribunals make
up the judicial department of our government.
As the Constitution speaks only of one Supreme
Court, it is not competent for the legislature to create
even a temporary Supreme Court to sit in special cases.
In Vargas v. Rilloraza," Section 20 of the People's Court
Act provided that whenever the Supreme Court had to
hear collaboration cases, the members thereof who were
disqualified because they had also participated in the
Occupation government would be temporarily replaced
by ad hoc members to be designated by the President of
the Philippines from either the Court of Appeals or the
"80 Phil. 297.

lights even at the risk of antagonizing the other de-

partments. On the other hand, a timorous judiciary will
probably cling to the conventions and in the interest of
harmony, or perhaps its own convenience and security,
choosenot to rush in wbere angels fear to tread.
Interpreting the expanded definition of judicial
power, the Supreme Court declared in the IBP Case:"
''When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or sub-
ject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifi-
cations or conditions or limitations have been met or the limi-
tations respected, is justiciable-the problem being one of va-
lidity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit con-
stitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When po-
litical questions are involved, the Constitution limits the de-
termination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the official whose action is being questioned."
17
The following observations in Daza u. Singson are
relevant:
"The issue presented to the Supreme Court is justiciable
rather than political where it involves the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitu-
tion. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still
come within the Court's powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article VIII, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instru-
mentality of the government."
In Taiiada u. Angara, 18 which was a petition to an-

nul the Senate concurrence to the World Trade Organi-
ts Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81.

11
180 SCRA 496.
'" 272 SCRA 18.
the part of any branch or instrumentality of govern-

ment, judicial power may be exercised "where there are
serious allegations that a law has infringed the Consti-
tution," in which case,/'it becomesnot only the right but
the duty of the Court to look into such allegations and,
when warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitu-
tion.?" Verily, this duty includes the power to set aside
acts of government, even if not tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdic-
tion.21
It must further be noted that judicial power in-
cludes the power of the courts "to alter, modify, or set
aside their decisions before they becomefinal and unal-
terable.?" It covers as well the continuing authority of
the Supreme Court to enforce its final decisions because
the execution of its decisions is but an integral part of
its adjudicative function. Accordingly, it may issue a
writ of continuing mandamus to ensure compliance with
its decision."
20
Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos.
147036-37, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 49.
21
See Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 203766, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 477.
22
Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, No. L-77210, Sep-
tember 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 464, 470, cited in Spouses Francisco and
Merced Rabat v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 158755, June
18, 2012, 673 SCRA 383; see also Sta. Lucia Realty & Development,
Inc. v. Municipality of Pasig, G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011, 652
SCRA 44; Caguioa v. Aucena, A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012,
673 SCRA 352; Salvador v. Serrano, A.M. No. P-06-2104 (Formerly
OCA LP.I. No. 02-1484-P), January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 55, 69-70;
Sta. Maria v, Ubay, A.M. No. 595-CFI, DecP.mher 11, 1978, 87 SCRA
179, 187; Legaspi Towers 300 v. Muer, G.R. No. 170783, June 18,
2012, 673 SCRA 453.
"' MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos.
171947-48, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 90; see also Boracay Foun-
"Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges

of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confir-
mation.
"For the lower courts, the President shall issue the ap-
pointments within ninety days from the submission of the list."
The reason for requiring at least three nominees for

every vacancy is to give the President enough leeway in
the exercise of his discretion when he makes his ap-
pointment. If the nominee were limited to only one, the
appointment would in effect be made by the Judicial
and Bar Council,with the President performing only the
mechanical act of formalizing the commission.
(1) Qualifications
It is required by the new Constitution that every

member of the judiciary "be a person of proven compe-
tence, integrity, probity, and independence."26 This gen-
eral qualification is intended to improve the quality of
the judiciary by admitting thereto only deserving per-
sons who can dispense justice wisely and impartially.
The specific qualifications for the collegiate courts
are laid down by the followingprovision:
"Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of
the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Su-
preme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or en-
gaged in the practice oflaw in the Philippines."
These qualifications, having been enumerated in an

exclusive manner, may not be reduced or increased by
=tu«, Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3).

"Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby

created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of
law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a represen-
tative of the private sector.
"(2) The regular members of the Council shall be ap-
pointed by the President for a term of four years with the con-
sent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve
for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired
Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sec-
tor for one year.
"(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secre-
tary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its pro-
ceedings.
"(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive
such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget
the appropriations for the Council.
"(5) The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise
such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may as-
sign to it."
The Supreme Court clarified in Chavez v. Judicial

and Bar Council" that the Congress may have only one
representative in the JBC, and not two representatives,
or one from each House, with each having only one-half
vote.
A rotational scheme similar to that of the Senate
and the Constitutional Commissions is provided for the
Council, with the original regular appointees being
given staggered terms of four, three, two and one year
"G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579.

prevent impairment of this same goal and discontinue a

notorious practice before, it is now also provided that:
"Sec. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of

other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions."
It will be recalled that this was the provision in-

voked by the petitioner in Macalintal v. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal." who maintained that the "respon-
dent exercises quasi-judicial power" and that its mem-
bers consequently violate the proscription in Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution." The Supreme Court
rejected these contentions. It said -
"The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Sec-

tion 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the
power 'shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.' Consistent with our
presidential system of government, the function of 'dealing
with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts in-
volving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demand-
able and enforceable' is apportioned to courts of justice. With
the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was ex-
panded to include 'the duty of the courts of justice to settle ac-
tual controversies involving rights which are legally demand-
able and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or ex-
cess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumenta-
lity of the Government.'
"The power was expanded, but it remained absolute. The
set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes
the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power.
"At the barangay and municipal levels, original and ex-
clusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the mu-
28
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783, and
June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 239.
would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section

12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first
to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in
Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme
Court Justices shall sit. in the Senate and House Electoral Tri-
bunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the
same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII,
which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the
PET, from the same prohibition.
"We have previously declared that the PET is not simply
an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Consti-
tution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that '[a] power
without the means to use it, is a nullity.' The vehicle for the
exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and
specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners
during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is
the PET. Thus, a microscopicview, like the petitioner's, should
not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial
power."
Fiscal Autonomy
As previously discussed, the power of appropriation

is limited by the following new provision, which is in-
tended to strengthen the independence of the judiciary.
To remove the courts from the mercy and caprice, not to
say vindictiveness, of the legislature when it considers
the general appropriations bill, it is provided that:
"Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Ap-

propriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the leg-
islature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly re-
leased."
Any law which provides for an exemption from said fees

(as, for instance, in favor of government-owned or con-
trolled corporations and local government units) would
be "constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court's
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independ-'
ence.?"
In Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Ap-
praised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,82 the
Court was requested by the Commission on Audit to
"determine the proper formula to be used in computing
the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and
several AssociateJustices of the Supreme Court have to
pay to acquire the government properties they used
during their tenure." The request was made after a find-
ing by the Commission of "underpayment" with respect
to the three vehicles purchased by a retired Chief Jus-
tice, and the vehicles and other personal properties,
including a television set, acquired by four other Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court, upon their retirement. The
Court, relying on the recommendations of its Office of
Administrative Services, confirmed the in-house compu-
tation of the appraisal value made by its Property
Division, and declared that the authority of the Com-
mission on Audit to conduct post-audit examinations on
constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy under
Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution "must be
read not only in the light of the Court's fiscal autonomy,
"' Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for Payment of Legal
Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 193, at 209,
cited in In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of
All Court and Sheriff's Fees, A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012,
688SCRA 1.
"2 A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1.
Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her

judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court
from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not
enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts
may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of
their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While,
as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control
the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of in-
terference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judici-
ary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-
equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to per-
form its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to
command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority
to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over
the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a viola-
tion of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative
autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and
is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant
of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII."
Composition of the Supreme Court
The Commonwealth Constitution fixed the mem-

bership of the Supreme Court at eleven, unless other-
wise provided by law, but the 1973 Constitution in-
creased it to a maximum of fifteen, which could not be
reduced or increased by mere legislation. There was a
plan in the Constitutional Commission to restore the
original composition of only eleven, but in the end the
maximum was retained at fifteen, to enable the Court to
cope more effectivelywith its mounting backlog of cases.
To this same end, it may now meet not only en bane but
in two, three or five divisions, and any vacancy in the
Court must be filled within ninety days from its occur-
rence.
The number of members of the full Court and of the
divisions, which is fixed by the Constitution and may
not be changed by statute, is provided for as follows:
hibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being

equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Su-
preme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to ·the end of the President's or
Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court."
It is to be noted that, in said case, the Court like-

wise stressed that Section 15, Article VII of the Consti-
tution "does not apply as well to all other appointments
in the Judiciary."
(1) En Banc Cases
The new rules in Section 4 on en bane cases are as

follows:
"(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en bane, and all other cases which
under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en bane, in-
cluding those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, in-
structions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actu-
ally took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon."
Whereas the old rules on the declaration of uncon-

stitutionality covered only the "treaty or law" under the
1935 Constitution and the "treaty, executive agreement
or law" under the 1973 Charter, the new Constitution
includes the treaty, international or executive agree-
ment, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instructions, ordinance, and other regulations.
At any rate, in Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of

the Philippines,37 the Supreme Court stressed that the
fact that its previous decision "was based on a slim vote
of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making
our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of
how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of
the majority of the members of the en bane who actually
took part in the deliberations of the case, a decision
garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court en bane and must be re-
spected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in
any position to speculate that, based on the voting, 'the
probability exists that their motion for reconsideration
may be granted."'
(2) Division Cases
The rules on the decision of cases by division have

been reworded in the same section to read as follows:
"(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be de-
cided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the is-
sues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the re-
quired number i.s not obtained, the case shall be decided en
bane: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en bane or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en bane."
Where the necessary vote cannot be had in division,

the case shall be referred to the Court en bane and de-
cided in accordance with its own rules. The same action
shall be taken where a doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court en bane or in division is sought to be
"' G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, 677 SCRA 200.
These requisites are the following:39

(1) There must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) The question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party;
(3) The constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) The decision of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case it-
self.40
(1) Actual Case

An actual case or controversyinvolves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims sus-
ceptible of judicial resolution. The case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other simi-
lar considerations not cognizableby a court of justice.
There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence.
"A 'controversy' must be one that is appropriate for
judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is thus
distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypo-
thetical or abstract character or from one that is aca-
demic or moot. The controversy must be definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substan-
tial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree that is conclusivein character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Where there is such a con-
as Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392.

·10See Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1; see also Garcia v. Execu-
tive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 119.
tutional transgression involving the expenditure of pub-

lic funds." It said that a "finding of unconstitutionality
would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of
public funds which, [n turn, [would] cause injury or
hardship to taxpayers.?"
In Senate v. Ermita,44 the Court proceeded to re-
solve the petitions questioning the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 464, which allowed President Ar-
royo's subordinates not to appear before Congress in
connection with its legislative inquiries, despite the
absence of any showing that she had actually invoked it
or prohibited them from participating in said legislative
investigations. The Court found the "assertion that the
President has not withheld her consent or prohibited
the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in
determining the existence of an actual case or contro-
versy insofar as E.0. 464 is concerned."
In Pimentel v. Aguirre,45 the Supreme Court, citing
Taiiada v. Angara,46 where it held that "when an act of
the legislative department is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy be-
comesthe duty of this Court," went further and declared
that "by the mere enactment of the questioned law or
the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said
to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without
any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty."
'"Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of

Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670
SCRA373.
"Supra.
'" G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 201.
•• 272 SCRA 18 (1997).
Congress of the Philippines was abolished. The Supreme

Court thereupon dismissed the petition, holding that it
had already becomemoot and academic.
Indeed, in Madriaga u. China Banking Corpora-
tion, 50 the Court declared that "judicial power presup-
poses actual controversies, the very antithesis of moot-
ness. Where there is no more live subject of controversy,
the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling
or make any pronouncement. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction on the ground of mootness."
Accordingly,in Radaza u. Court of Appeals,51 the
Court ruled that there would no longer be any purpose
in determining the lawfulness of a preventive suspen-
sion if the preventive suspension period had already
prescribed. For the same reason, the expiration of the
term generally renders an election protest moot and
academic.52
In Garcillano u. House of Representatiues,53 the
Court dismissed the petition filed for purposes of prohib-
iting the respondents from playing the "tape recordings
and from including the same in their committee report."
It noted that "the recordings were already played in the
House and heard by its members" and that there is also
"the widely publicized fact that the committee reports
on the 'Hello Garci' inquiry were completed and submit-
ted to the House in plenary by the respondent commit-
tees. Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcil-
so G.R. No. 192377, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 560.

" G.R. No. 177135, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 223.
"'Sales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174668, September 12, 2007,
533 SCRA 173; see also Gunsi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168792, Feb-
ruary 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 70.
"' G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 170.
of the Government., noting that said law had by then

already been "all but superseded" by Section 5 of Repub-
lic Act No. 9700. "Thus, for all intents and purposes, the
stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no
longer an available option under existing law. The ques-
tion of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a
moot issue." It added that it "would be speculative for
this Court to assume that the legislature will enact an-
other law providing for a similar stock option."
Sana v. Career Executive Service Boarii" was a pe-
tition questioning the constitutionality of certain ap-
pointments made by President Arroyo on June 10, 2010,
or shortly before the expiration of her term, on the basis
of her Executive Order No. 883, which granted the rank
of CESO III or higher to officers and employees occupy-
ing legal positions in the government executive service
who have obtained graduate degrees in law and success-
fully passed the bar examinations. Said Executive Order
was supported by the Career Executive Service Board,
per its Resolution No. 870, where it expressed its find-
ing that no legal impediment existed for the President
to vest CESO rank to executive officials during the peri-
ods covered by the constitutional ban on midnight ap-
pointments and the statutory ban on pre-election ap-
pointments. The Court dismissed said petition when it
found that, at the time of the filing of the same, Presi-
dent Benigno Aquino III had already issued Executive
Order No. 3 expressly revoking his predecessor's Execu-
tive Order No. 883. "EO 883 and CESB Resolution No.
870 having ceased to have any force and effect, the
Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the petition
and pass upon these issuances' validity. To do so would
transgress the requirement of case and controversy as
'" G.R. No. 192926, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 130.
of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of
and as a restraint upon the future." 60
In Javier v. Commission on Elections." the peti-

tioner "was gunned down in cold blood and in broad
daylight." The respondent therefore asked for the dis-
missal of the case on the ground that it had become
moot and academic. The Court rejected this plea. It
said-
"It is not as simple as that. Several lives have been lost

in connection with this case, including that of the petitioner
himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of
suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned through
a confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep
silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied."
The Court, after discussing the merits of the peti-

tion, concludedas follows-
"Since this case began in 1984, many significant devel-

opments have taken place, not the least significant of which
was the February revolution of 'people power' that dislodged
the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for
this captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of
bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive
is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared
with the 'pomp of power' he had before enjoyed. Even the Bata-
sang Pambansa itself has been abolished, 'an iniquitous vestige
of the previous regime' discontinued by the Freedom Constitu-
tion. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without rea-
son, to send the records of this case to the archives and say the
case is finished and the book is closed.
"But not yet.
"Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen
hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he
dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly si-
"° Javier v. Commission on Elections, 144 SCRA 194.

=tu«
"WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this

case that were it not for the supervening events that have le-
gally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have
been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections
dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution."
Accordingly,it has since been pronounced that the

"moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving
a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Con-
stitution; second, the exceptional character of the situa-
tion and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.62
In Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit,
63
the Court proceeded to resolve the challenge against the

constitutionality of the respondent's appointment as
Chairman of the Commissionon Audit, notwithstanding
his subsequent resignation and the appointment of his
successor, considering that the petition falls "within the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case,
since it asserts at least four exceptions to the rnootness
rule."
•• David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409,

171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA
161; see also Madriaga v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
192377, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 560; Constantino v. People, G.R.
No. 140656, September 13, 2007; Radaza v. Courf of Appeals, G.R.
No. 177135, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 223; Gunsi v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 168792, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 70.
"" G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579.
The Court likewise found certain issues raised in

Garcillano u. House of Representaticee" as of "transcen-
dental and paramount importance not only to the public
but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be re-
solvedfor the guidance' of all."
Cases involving the construction and operation of
the country's international airports have also been con-
sidered by the Supreme Court as being of "transcenden-
tal importance" and would merit its exercise of its judi-
cial power. It is for this reason that in Philippine Inter-
national Air Terminals Co., Inc. u. Takenaka Corpora-
tion" the Court saw "it fit to relax the rules in this case
to arrive at a full settlement of the parties' claims and
avoidfurther delay in the administration of justice."
In Atienza u. Villarosa, 68 the Supreme Court ruled
on the lawfulness of the respondent governor's purchase
orders and termination of casual employments despite
the expiration of his term, stating that "even in cases
where supervening events had made the cases moot, the
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitu-
tional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and the public. In this case, there
is compellingreason for the Court to resolve the issues
presented in order to clarify the scope of the respective
powers of the Governor and Vice-Governor under the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code of
1991."
It is the so-called doctrine of capable of repetition
yet evading review upon which the Court relied in re-
60
Supra.
07
G.R. No. 180245, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 674; see also Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. Nos.
155001, 155547 & 155661, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 612.
ss G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005, 458 SCRA 385.
In Limkaichong v. Comelec,74 Supreme Court em-

phasized that "citizenship, being a continuing require-
ment for Members of the House of Representatives" may
be questioned at anytime.
<
"For this reason, the Court
deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the mer-
its. This position finds support in the rule that courts
will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if
it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. The ques-
tion on Limkaichong's citizenship is likely to recur if she
would run again, as she did run, for public office,hence,
capable of repetition."
In Antolin v. Domondon,75 which was a suit to com-
pel the Board of Accountancy to allow the petitioner to
review her examination papers, the Supreme Court
stated that "any citizen may challenge any attempt to
obstruct the exercise of his or her right to information
and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since
every citizen possesses the inherent right to be informed
by the mere fact of citizenship, we find that petitioner's
belated passing of the CPA Board Exams does not
automatically mean that her interest in the Examina-
tion Papers has become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly,
the constitutional question presented, in view of the
likelihood that the issues in this case will be repeated,
warrants review."
A similar ruling was made by the Court in Magdalo
76
Para sa Pagbabago v. Commission on Elections, where
the petitioner challenged the rejection by the respon-
"G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1, citing Inte-

------grated_Bar_of_th_e Philiypi_ne~. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February
24, 2010, 613 SCRA 518, 523; Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 18474ff,-----
February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308; see also Vilando v. HRET, G.R.
Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17.
"G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 163.
16
G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 651.
have the legal personality to raise the constitutional

question.
In Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. u. Cuenca,8°
the Supreme Court explained that "it is fundamental
(
that the courts are established in order to afford reliefs

to persons whose rights or property interests have been
invaded or violated, or are threatened with invasion by
others' conduct or acts, and to give relief only at the
instance of such persons. The jurisdiction of a court of
law or equity may not be invoked by or for an individual
whose rights have not been breached." Indeed, "locus
standi, which is a mere procedural technicality, has
been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.?"
In Tileston u. Ullmann, a physician questioned the
82
constitutionality of a law prohibiting the use of contra-

ceptives, upon the ground that it might prove dangerous
to the life or health of some of his patients whose physi-
cal condition would not enable them to bear the rigors of
childbirth. The court dismissed the challenge, holding
that the patients of the physician and not the physician
himself were the proper parties.
In People u. Vera, 83 it was held that the Government
of the Philippines was a proper party to challenge the
constitutionality of the Probation Act because, more
"" G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 473, citing 59 Am
Jur 2d, Parties,§ 30.
"' Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. The Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007, 531 SCRA 583 .
•• 318 U.S. 446.
"" G.R. No. L-16263, July 26, 1960.
cised by another. "For a quo warranto petition to be

successful, the private person suing must show a clear
right to the contested office.In fact, not even a mere
preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a
modicum oflegal ground to proceed with the action."
The issue in Paguia u. Office of the President87 was
the power of Congress to limit the President's preroga-
tive to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifi-
cations despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress'
role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commis-
sion on Appointments' confirmation of nominees. The
Court dismissed said petition, which was filed by a citi-
zen and a taxpayer, "for lack of a case or controversy
grounded on petitioner's lack of capacity to sue and
mootness."
The rule before was that an ordinary taxpayer did
not have the proper party personality to question the
legality of an appropriation law since his interest in the
sum appropriated was not substantial enough. Thus, in
Custodio u. Senate President, 88 a challenge by an ordi-
nary taxpayer to the validity of a law granting backpay
to members of Congress for the period corresponding to
the Japanese Occupation was dismissed as having been
commencedby one who was not a proper party.
Since the first Emergency Powers Cases,89 however,
the rule has been changed and it is now permissible for
an ordinary taxpayer, or a group of taxpayers, to raise
the question of the validity of an appropriation law. As
the Supreme Court put it, "The transcendental impor-
tance to the public of these cases demands that they be
'' G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010, 621 SCRA 600.
RR 42 O.G. 243.
au Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.

the Constitution.94 Thus, a taxpayer who claims that the

issuance by the Commissionon Audit of its Circular No.
89-299 "has led to the dissipation of public funds
through numerous irregularities in government finan-
cial transactions" was considered as possessing the
"standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would
be adversely affectedby the illegal use of public money.?"
It bears stressing though that the Supreme Court
has declared that it "retains discretion whether or not to
allow a taxpayer's suit.?" Being a mere procedural tech-
nicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived
by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.97
In Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 98 it was
held that a senator had the proper party personality to
seek the prohibition of a plebiscite for the ratification of
a proposed constitutional amendment. Legislators have
invariably been acknowledgedas proper parties in suits
involving claims that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as such.99 In The Prov-
ince of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Repub-
lic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Do-
main, 100 the Supreme Court pronounced that "any act of
the Executive that injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury
that can be questioned by legislators." The Court like-
94
Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, 392 Phil. 518 (2000);
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111544, 6 July 2004, 433 SCRA 424.
"" De la Llana v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
180989, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 176.
""The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, supra.
97
David v. Arroyo, supra.
"" 41 SCRA 702.
"" David v. Arroyo, supra.
'00 Supra.
tation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropri-

ates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions.
The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the
lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money suffi-
ciently clothes them ~th that personality to litigate the valid-
ity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as re-
gard taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not. For the present case, We deem it
sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the au-
thority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be
inquired into."
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 105 one of the issues

was the locus standi of the petitioner, an association of
citizens and taxpayers, to challenge a contract entered
into by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office with
a foreign corporation for the operation of a nationwide
lottery. The majority opinion penned by Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. declared:
"We find the instant petition to be of transcendental im-

portance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount
public interest and of a category even higher than those in-
volved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of
such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and
moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays
of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive ef-
fects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering
as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. The legal stand-
ing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the ex-
ercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside
the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take ad-
vantage of."
This ruling was reversed, however, in Kilosbayan v.

Morato, 106 on the ground that the petitioner had no sub-
stantial interest in the cuutract being challenged.
"'" 235 SCRA 630 (1994).

1()6246 SCRA 540 (1995).
In Lozada u. Commission on Elections, 110 the peti-

tioners were held without legal standing to demand the
filling of vacancies in the legislature because they had
only "a generalized interest" shared with the rest of the
citizenry. A similar ruling was rendered in Guazon v. De
Villa, m where "well-meaning citizens with only second-
hand knowledge of the events" were not considered
proper parties to challenge the saturation drives or
"zonas" being conducted by the military.
When in the IBP Case112 the petitioner questioned
the deployment of the Marines in Metro Manila to com-
bat criminality, the Supreme Court held through Justice
Kapunan:
"The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged

responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution.
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the
IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with stand-
ing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared
by other groups and the whole citizenry. The IBP has failed to
present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of
the case."
It has likewise been ruled that, although it may be

granted standing to assert the rights of their members,
"the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Phil-
ippines, or any member of the legal profession, of the
duty to preserve the rule oflaw does not suffice to clothe
it with standing.":"
110
120 SCRA 337 (1983).
111
181 SCRA 623 (1990).
naSupra.
11"
rectly injured by the House committees' actions and

charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his
standing to institute the petition for prohibition." Gar-
cillano's co-petitioners, who both alleged "an interest in
the execution of the laws," and an intervenor, who as-
serted his "constitutional right to due process," were
likewise acknowledged as proper parties in this case,
consideringthat the issues raised in their petitions were
"of transcendental and paramount importance not only
to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and
should be resolved for the guidance of all." Accordingto
the Court, they all satisfied "the requisite personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being
citizens of the Republic."
Indeed, it has been ruled that ordinary citizens
may be considered as clothed with locus standi and
would satisfy the requirement of personal interest when
the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 116
when the right to information is invoked,117 or when
freedomof expression, which has been considered as "an
issue of overarching significance to our society," is in-
volved.:" There mu.st be a showing though that the is-
sues raised by them are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early.:" When the issue concerns
a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citi-
zen and has an interest in the executionof the laws.?"
116
Francisco Jr. v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44.
111
AKBAYANv. Aquino, 562 SCRA 251 (2008).
11"
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008,
545 SCRA 441.
119
David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA
161.
120
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the

parties.!"
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council'" was a chal-
lenge against the conqtitutionality of the composition of
the Judicial and Bar Councilmade by a lawyer who had
withdrawn his nomination for the post of Chief Justice,
precisely because of his objections against the right of
Congress to have two representatives therein. The Su-
preme Court took cognizance of the petition, declaring
that, "while it is true that a 'personal stake' on the case
is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that
only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can
come to the Court and question the JBC composition for
being unconstitutional." The Court added -
"Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the

Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time,
armed with issues of transcendental importance to society. The
claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitu-
tional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judi-
cial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification oflegal blunders."
Voters may be considered as proper parties with re-

spect to the implementation of election laws provided
that "there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question."124 In Capalla u.
Commission on Elections,125 the Court, citing Guingona
v. Commission on Elections, 126 brushed aside technical
objections regarding the parties' locus standi in connec-
122
"3 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579.
"' David v. Arroyo, supra.

1"
G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012, 673 SCRA 1.
"6 G.R. No. 191846, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 448.
(1) In criminal cases, the constitutional question

can be raised at any time in the discretion of the court.
(2) In civil cases, the constitutional question can
be raised at any stags if it is necessary to the determi-
nation of the case itself.
(3) In every case, except where there is estoppel,
the constitutional question may be raised at any stage if
it involvesthe jurisdiction of the court.129
(4) Necessity of Deciding Constitutional

Question
The reason why courts will as much as possible

avoid the decision of a constitutional question can be
traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins upon each department a proper respect for the
acts of the other departments. Every law has in its favor
the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitu-
tional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and
purposes.:" In line with this policy, courts indulge the
presumption of constitutionality and go by the maxim
that "to doubt is to sustain." The theory is that, as the
joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a
law is supposed to have been carefully studied and de-
termined to be constitutional before it was finally en-
"' People v. Vera, supra; People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 678; Tijam

v . Sibonghanoy, 33 SCRA 29; Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co. v,
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51535, Dec. 14, 1981; Cosco Philippines
Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company, G.R. No. 179488,
April 23, 2012, 670 SCRA 343.
130
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 354.
In Zandueta v. De la Costa,136 the petitioner, an in-

cumbent judge, accepted an ad interim appointment to a
new court created under a law that had reorganized the
judiciary by abolishing some judgeships and creating
others. When his appointment was by-passed, he re-
turned to his former court in Manila but found that the
respondent had already been appointed thereto. Zan-
dueta thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against
De la Costa, arguing that he had not abandoned his old
court in Manila by his acceptance of the new court in
Palawan. One of his reasons was that the law creating
the latter court was unconstitutional because it violated
judicial security of tenure.
Although the constitutional question had been
raised squarely, the Supreme Court did not find it ne-
cessary to resolve it. One justification given was another
ground available to it for its decision, to wit, the com-
mon law principle of estoppel. Since under this rule, a
person cannot question the validity of a law under
which he had previously accepted benefits, the Supreme
Court held that Zandueta was estopped from impugning
the constitutionality of the judiciary reorganization law.
But when in 1955 a similar law was passed by Con-
gress and was also later assailed on the ground that it
violated judicial security of tenure, the Supreme Court
could not avoid ruling on the constitutional question
raised. The petitioners in this case,137 unlike Zandueta,
had not accepted new positions created by the law after
it had legislated them out of their former courts. The
principle of estoppel could therefore not be applied to
them, and the Supreme Court consequently had to de-
136
66 Phil. 115.
Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. L-7918, Jan. 18, 1955, 51
1'17
O.G. 147.
tial interest in raising the constitutional issue insofar as

the ether respondents are concerned."
In Demetria v. Alba, 140 the Supreme Court cited the
so-called "seven pillazs" of limitations of the power of
judicial review, as written by US Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 141 as follows:
"L The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of

legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last
resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest
and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the
thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
"2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitu-
tional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' ... 'It is
not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitu-
tional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case.'
"3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied.'
"4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional ques-
tion although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be dis-
posed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if
a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory con-
struction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its deci-
sion of a question under the Federal Constitution are fre-
quently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on
an independent state ground.
110
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 208 (Footnote
No. 4).
"' 297 U.S. 288 0936).
apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total

nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under
this view, the court in passing upon the question of con-
stitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply re-
fuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the
parties just as if such statute had no existence. The
court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding
the law, but the decision affects the parties only and
there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or
reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the
determination of other similar cases, but it does not
strike the statute from the statute books; it does not
repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The
parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but
no one else is bound.143
The orthodox view has been applied by our Su-
preme Court as early as in the case of Springer v. Gov-
ernment of the Philippine Islands. 144 In subsequent
cases, however, it was observed that a realistic approach
was eroding the general doctrine and that the actual
existence of a statute prior to its declaration of unconsti-
tutionality was an operative fact that might have conse-
quences which could not justly be ignored.
Thus, in Manila Motors Co. v. Flores'" the plaintiff
filed a complaint for the recovery of installments which
fell due in 1941. The defendant pleaded prescription,
thirteen years having elapsed since the due date. The
plaintiff argued that the prescriptive period had been
suspended by the Moratorium Law, but the defendants
143
Shepard v. Barren, 194 U.S. 553.
144
277 U.S. 189 .
... 99 Phil. 738.
case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the

accused in double jeopardy'" or would put in limbo the acts
done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it."150
In League of Cities of the Philippines u. COME-

151
LEC, the Court further explained -
"Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized

as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law,
prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a
matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the op-
erative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconsti-
tutional. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As
such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule
that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never
be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional
act. The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitution-
alizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doc-
trine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but
the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial dec-
laration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of eq-
uity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects
or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the
unconstitutional law itself.
"Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present
case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they
violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the
effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries
and supplies by the 'new cities' or their issuance of licenses or
execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effec-
tive. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for
they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of
these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of
Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, October 18, 1990, 190

14"
SCRA 686, citing Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, G.R. No.
L-37364, May 9, 1975, 63 SCRA 546.
150
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No. L-28113,
March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533.
'" G.R. No. 176951, August 24, 2010, 628 SCRA 819.
The Court further explained that the "term 'execu-

tive act' is broad enough to encompass decisions of ad-
ministrative bodies and agencies under the executive
department which are . subsequently revoked by the
agency in question or nullified by the Court." It said-
"A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Mag-

dangal B. Elma (Elma) as Chairman of the Presidential Com-
mission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presiden-
tial Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was declared unconstitu-
tional by this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma. In
said case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of
Elma to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible of-
fices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as Chairman of the
PCGG and as CPLC is, without a question, an executive act.
Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said ex-
ecutive act, certain acts or transactions were made in good
faith and in reliance of the appointment of Elma which cannot
just be set aside or invalidated by its subsequent invalidation."
"Evidently," said the Court, "the operative fact doc-

trine is not confined to statutes and rules and regula-
tions issued by the executive department that are ac-
corded the same status as that of a statute or those
which are quasi-legislative in nature."
"Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the

operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances like orders
and rules and regulations, said principle can nonetheless be
applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the
agencies under the executive department. This doctrine, in the
interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a
broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive
branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can
apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that
resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act
which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or or-
ders of the executive branch which were later nullified. This
Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must
be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free

to private individuals. Thus -
"It is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doc-

trine to the UCPB shares. Public funds, which were supposedly
given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to pri-
vate individuals based on statutory provisions that are found
to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety of
grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares may
not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit.
Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only
· be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government,
to the coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether will-
ingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and there-
. fore expect that their Government would take utmost care of
them and that they would be used no less than for public pur-
pose."
(1) Partial Unconstitutionality
Also in deference to the doctrine of separation of

powers, courts hesitate to declare a law totally unconsti-
tutional and, as long as it is possible, will salvage the
valid portions thereof in order to give effect to the legis-
lative will. Nevertheless, a declaration of partial uncon-
stitutionality will be valid only if two conditions concur,
to wit: first, that the legislature is willing to retain the
valid portions even if the rest of the statute is declared
illegal, and second, that the valid portions can stand
independently as a separate statute.
The legislative willingness to retain the valid por-
tions may be expressed in what is known as the separa-
bility clause. This usually provides that "if for any rea-
son any section or provision of this Act is declared inva-
lid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the Act shall
not be affected by such declaration." But even without
such separability clause, it has been held that if the
(1) Original Jurisdiction
"(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and over pe-
titions for certiorari., prohibition, mandamus, quo uiarranto,
and habeas corpus."
Under international law, diplomats, and even con-

suls to a lesser extent, are not subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of the receiving State, save in certain cases,
as when immunity is waived either expressly or impli-
edly. In such instances, the Supreme Court can and
probably should take cognizanceof the litigation in view
of possible international repercussions.
The petitions for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition
and quo warranto are special civil actions. The ques-
tions raised in the first three petitions are questions of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and, in the
fourth, the title of the respondent. The petition for ha-
beas corpus is a special proceeding.
Although jurisdiction in these matters is also con-
ferred concurrently on the Court of Appeals and the re-
gional trial courts in proper cases, the nature and im-
portance of the issues raised may warrant direct resort
to the Supreme Court.
When any tribunal, board, or officer exercisingjudi-
cial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate rem-
edy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition for certiorari in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and pray-
ing that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying
the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal,
by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the

forfeiture of his office or against an association which
acts as a corporation within the Philippines without
being legally incorporated or without lawful authority to
so act.!" '
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is de-
prived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.!"
The Supreme Court has more or less consistently
maintained though that its possession of original juris-
diction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, man-
damus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, which it
shares with lower courts, does not give to parties "the
complete liberty or discretion to file their petition in any
of these courts. In the absence of special reasons, they
cannot disregard the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts
in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower tribunals in the exercise of their original concur-
rent jurisdiction.'?"
Accordingly,in CREBA v. Secretary of Agrarian Re-
form, 166 the Court declared that "although this Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, pro-
1&1
Rule 66, Sec. 1, id.
164
Rule 102, Sec. 1, id.
11"'
Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA
127; Anillo v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R.
No. 157856, September 27, 2007, 534 SCRA 228; Freedom from Debt
Coalition v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, G.R.
No. 173044, December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 621.
166
G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295.
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.f"

A direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court shall be allowed only when there are
"special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in 'the petition"'" as, for instance,
"where the Court believes that resolving the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first in-
stance is of paramount importance and immediately
affects the social, economic,and moral well-being of the
people."172 Indeed, the Court has, on several occasions,
found compelling reasons to relax the rule on obser-
vance of this doctrine. For instance, in Pacoy v. Caji-
gal173 and Mari v. Gonzales,174 the Court chose not to
apply said doctrine strictly, since the issue involved in
said cases was doublejeopardy, "which is considered to
be one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of
an accused."
Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary'" is
noteworthy. In said case, the private respondent ques-
tioned the propriety of the petitions for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
the petitioners, assailing the constitutionality of various
Presidential Decrees and Executive Orders, on the
ground that there were no "ongoing proceedings" in any
tribunal or board or before any government officialexer-
110
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8,
2008, 573 SCRA 290, 296.
111
Ibid.
1•2
Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 199082, Septem-
ber 18, 2012, 681 SCRA 181.
11.1 G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 338.
111
G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011, 657 SCRA 414.
11"
G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 49; see also
Taiiada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574 (1997) and Integrated Bar of
the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 634 (2000).
statutory right entirely dependent upon the discretion

or policy of the lawmaking body. The Congress may
validly provide that the decisions of lower courts shall
be final and no longer appealable to the Supreme Court.
But this rule is not absolute. In the cases enumer-
ated in the above provision, an aggrieved party may, on
appeal or certiorari, question the judgments and decrees
of a lower court before the Supreme Court, which may
review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm the same. This
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is irreduci-
ble and may not be withdrawn from it by the Congress.
In Galano v. Cruz176 the petitioner was appealing
from a decision of the court of first instance dismissing
his quo warranto proceeding against a rival candidate
for municipal councilor on the legal ground of failure to
state a cause of action. The respondent contended that
the appeal should not have been given due course be-
cause Section 178 of the Revised Election Code allowed
appeals only in election contests involving provincial
and city elective officials, excluding municipal officials.
In rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court declared:
"In the past we had occasion to rule upon a similar point
of law. In the case of Marquez v. Prodigalidad, 46 Off. Gaz.,
Supp. No. 11, p. 204, we held that Section 178 of the Revised
Election Code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of First
Instance in election contests over the offices of Provincial Gov-
ernor, Members of the Provincial Board, City Councilors and
City Mayors, did not intend to prohibit or prevent the appeal to
the Supreme Court in protests involving purely questions of
law, that is to say, that protests involving other offices such as
municipal councilors may be appealed provided that only legal
questions are involved in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal
in the present case, involving as it does purely questions of
law, is proper."
11"
94 Phil. 230.
tion 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines

which provides that The National Assembly may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprison-
ment.'
''We think the petitioners are in, error. This error arose
from failure to perceive the nature of courts martial and the
sources of the authority for their creation.
"Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and
one of the authorities for the ordering of courts martial has
been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, independently of legisla-
tion, (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2nd Edition, p.
49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judici-
ary. The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the
provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide
for the government of the army, excepting military offenses
from the civil jurisdiction, and making the President Com-
mander-in-Chief, observes as follows: These provisions show
that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and pun-
ishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and
now practised by civilized nations, and that the power to do so
is given without any connection between it and the 3rd Article
of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United
States; and indeed that the two powers are entirely independ-
ent of each other.
"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government,
it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive de-
partment; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by Congress for the President as
Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized representatives."
However, the Court has since made the following

clarification in Garcia v. Executive Secretary'" -
"In the case of Ramon Ruffy Vii. Chief of Staff of the Phil-
ippine Army, 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word
'79 G.R. No. 198554,July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 750.

peal before the Supreme Court, unless the appellant is

.
mes t oppe.1183
As the Supreme Court is guaranteed appellate ju-

risdiction where the -case involves "only an error or
question of law," it is permissible for the Congress to
provide that mixed questions of fact and law shall be
decided finally by a lower court. Appealed cases involv-
ing mixed questions of fact and law are now under the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
The above provision also settles the question of the
competence of lower courts to decide constitutional
questions. The correct view is that they can, subject to
review by the Supreme Court. It is erroneous to suppose
that only the Supreme Court can decide these questions
because of the provision that no treaty, executive
agreement or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrenceof the majority of the members
who participated in the deliberation of the issues and
voted thereon. This rule prescribes only the procedure to
be observed when the Supreme Court has to decide a
constitutional question.184 It is not intended to confine
the power to the Supreme Court as this interpretation
would render meaningless the provision that this Court
has appellate jurisdiction over "final judgments and
decrees of lower courts in" among others, "all cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, in-
ternational or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or
regulation is in question."
Accordingly,it has been ruled that "RegionalTrial
Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider
'"" Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra.

••• Espiritu v. Fugoso, 81 Phil. 637; Ynot v. Intermediate Ap-
pellate Court, supra.
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies in-

volving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is clear that, in this case, the Supreme Court did

not consider the Court of Tax Appeals, created by Re-
public Act No. 1125, as a "regular" or "lower" court,
within the meaning of the phrase as used in Section 5(2)
of Article VIII of the Constitution. It should be noted
that, in the earlier case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. General Foods (Phils.), Inc., 189 the Court ac-
tually described the Court of Tax Appeals as a "quasi-
judicial body."
These rulings appear to be in conflict with the
Court's earlier pronouncements on the nature of the
Court of Tax Appeals. For instance, in Ursal v. Court of
Tax Appeals, 190 the Court categorized it as "a court, and
not a quasi-judicial body." In said case, the Supreme
Court said that "instead of being another superior ad-
ministrative agency, as was the former Board of Tax
Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals, as created by Repub-
lic Act No. 1125, is part of the judicial system." Indeed,
the Supreme Court, in Far East Bank and Trust Com-
pany v. Court of Appeals,191 citing Sea-Land Service, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,19'1. declared that the Court of Tax
Appeals is a special court exercising particular expertise
on the subject of tax. It has been acknowledged as a
highly specialized court dedicated exclusively to the
study and consideration of revenue-related problems, in
1""
401 SCRA 545.
1"11
101 Phil. 209.
tn r 477 SCRA 49.
,,.., 357 SCRA 441.
assign judges of inferior courts directly in the Supreme

Court and no longer in the executive authorities and
conditions the validity of any such assignment in excess
of six months upon the consent of the transferred judge.
This will minimize if not altogether eliminate the perni-
cious practice of the rigodon de jueces, or the transfer of
judges at will to suit the motivations of the chief execu-
tive.
Temporary assignments may be justified to arrange
for judges with clogged dockets to be assisted by their
less busy colleagues, or to provide for the replacement of
the regular judge who may not be expected to be impar-
tial in the decision of particular cases.
(4) Change of Venue or Place of Trial
"(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a

miscarriage of justice."
In the case of People v. Gutierrez, 196 the Supreme

Court ordered the transfer of a criminal case from a
court of first instance to a circuit criminal court else-
where because the witnesses for the prosecution were
unwilling to testify for fear of retaliation from the ac-
cused or their followers in the place where the offenses
were allegedly committed. When the trial of the case
was moved from Ilocos Sur to Baguio City, where the
atmosphere was less intimidating, the said witnesses
lost their inhibitions and gave the needed testimony
that led to the conviction of the defendants. It was the
consensus that such conviction would not have been
possible had the case been tried in the regular venue.
ms 39 SCRA 173.
doubts expressed before about the constitutionality of

the integrated bar, particularly in light of the right of
association, which includes the right not to join any
association. Compulsory membership therein was ex-
pressly sustained in In 're Edillon, 198 where a lawyer was
disbarred for refusal to pay his annual dues to the IBP.
Most significantly, the Supreme Court is author-
ized to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights.
Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the Su-
preme Court promulgated on October 24, 2007 the Am-
paro Rule199 "in light of the prevalence of extralegal kill-
ing and enforced disappearances. It was an exercise for
the first time of the Court's expanded power to promul-
gate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights,
which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Consti-
tution in response to the Filipino experience of the mar-
tial law regime."200
The rules must also provide for a simplified and in-
expensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
as a remedy against the worsening problem of delay in
the administration of justice. The requirement is a reit-
eration of the policy embodied in the new provision in
the Bill of Rights that "all persons shall have a right to
the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. "201
This same policy underlines the reglementary peri-
ods for deciding cases under Article VIII, Section 15.
1""
84 SCRA 554 (1978).
199
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC.
200
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906,
October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA l.
201
Art. III, Sec. 16.
preme Court in the present Rules of Court. To have done so, it

would have been a travesty of its rule-making power which, by
direct mandate of the Constitution, .is limited to matters refer-
ring to pleading, practice and procedure."
'
In Republic v. de la Cruz,203 it was held that Rule
108 of the Rules of Court authorizes correction only of
clerical errors and not matters affecting status or citi-
zenship as these involve substantive rights beyond the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
In Lim v. Zosa,204 however, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the ruling in Republic v. Yalencia'" allowing
changes in the birth entry regarding a person's citizen-
ship as long as adversary proceedings are held. ''Where
such a change is ordered, the Court will not be estab-
lishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectify-
ing an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized
by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides
only the procedure or mechanism for the proper en-
forcement of the substantive law embodied in Article
412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Consti-
tution."
In Castillo v. COMELEC,206 the Supreme Court
held that the -
"It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As

such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; nor
be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission of the
parties; nor conferred by any acquiescence of the court. The al-
location of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and cannot be
delegated to another office or agency of the Government. The
Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the
20"
118 SCRA 18 (1982).
20'
146 SCRA 366 (1986).
"" 141 SCRA 462 (1986).
206
G.R. No. 187231, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 499.
"The rule making power of this Court was expanded.

This Court for the first time was given the power to promul-
gate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of consti-
tutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time
the power to disapprpve rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Con-
stitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive."
In De Guzman v. People, 211 PD 1606 was challenged

on the ground inter alia, that it authorized the Sandi-
ganbayan to promulgate its own rules of procedure in
violation of the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court. It was held that this provision was not invalid
because such rules were subject to approval by the Su-
preme Court. The rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for
Payment of Legal Fees,212 the Supreme Court denied the
petitioner's claim of statutory exemption from the
payment of legal fees under Section 22 of Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court and stressed that "the payment of
legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated
211
119 SCRA 337 (1982).
212
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 193; see
also In Re: Exemption of the NPC from Payment of Filing/Docket
Fees, A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 1; In the
Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of All Court and
Sheriff's Fees, A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012, 668 SCRA 1;
Emnace v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 10, 22, cited in Bank of Com-
merce v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. Nos. 154470-71, Septem-
ber 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 521.
professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by

competent national authorities, shall be deemed compe-
tent to exercise said professions in the territory of the
Other, subject to the laws
l
and regulations of the latter."
The Court said -
"It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the

Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to
the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose ter-
ritory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section
1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof,
which have the force of law, require that before anyone can
practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first
successfully pass the required bar examinations."
The Court added -
"The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Re-

public of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not have
been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the rea-
son that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines,
the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being re-
served only to the Congress of the Philippines."
However, in Nicolas v. Romulo,216 the Court ex-

plained that a provision in the Visiting Forces Agree-
ment between the Philippines and the United States of
America allowing the transfer of custody of an accused
to a foreign power is not necessarily to provide for a
different rule of procedure for that accused, and would
not be violative of its exclusive power to adopt rules of
procedure for all courts in the Philippines. Thus -
""G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009, 578 SCRA 438.

sence of a law or a rule binding on the Court, it has no option

but to uphold the existing policy that recognizes the fiduciary
nature of banking. It likewise rejects the adoption of a judi-
cially-imposed rule giving third parties with unverified claims
against the deposit ~f another a better right over the deposit.
As current laws provide, the bank's contractual relations are
with its depositor, not with the third party; a bank is under ob-
ligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care and always to have in mind the fiduciary nature of its re-
lationship with them."
(6) Appointment of Court Personnel
"(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary

in accordance with the Civil Service Law."
This provision is an improvement on the original

rule, which empowered the Supreme Court to appoint
only its own officials and employees. Now the power
extends to all the officialsand employeesof the judiciary
itself, which is thus further removed from the influence
of the political departments, especially the President of
the Philippines.
Fittingly, appointments made by the Supreme
Court are, like all similar appointments made by the
other departments, required to be in accordance with
the Civil ServiceLaw.
(7) Administrative Supervision of Courts
"Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative

supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof."
This provisionis one of the most significant innova-

tions in the 1973 Constitution that have been retained
in the new Charter. The previous set-up placed the
power of administrative supervision over courts in the
Department of Justice, which determined such matters
and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally

sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges,
as it does, on judicial independence." Indeed, the "Om-
budsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges
and court personnel filed before it referred to the Su-
preme Court for determination as to whether an admin-
istrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should
hold true regardless of whether an administrative case
based on the act subject of the complaint before the Om-
budsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside
from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of
this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give
due respect for and recognition of the administrative
authority of the Court, because in determining whether
an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes
upon not only administrative liabilities but also admin-
istrative concerns."
This power of the Supreme Court has been charac-
terized as exclusive.221
In Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,222
the Supreme Court likewise made it clear that -
''No other entity or official of the Government, not the

prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not
any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial
order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pro-
nounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or ad-
ministrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or
order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone."
Thus, in Ampong v. Civil Service Commission,223 the

Court, while acknowledging the general administrative
221
Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA
127.
222
22"
G.R. No. 167916,August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293.
and court personnel,226 which, incidentally, may be held

accountable for their misconduct, regardless of whether
or not their actions are work-related,227 such as non-
payment of debts, for which they can be disciplined or
even dismissed.228 '
This power further includes the authority to disci-

pline a lawyer, as he "occupies what may be termed a
quasi-judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the
court, and like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the ends ofjustice."229 Thus, in Tadlip u. Atty.
Borres, Jr., 230 the Court stated that an "administrative
case against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity
as provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian
Reform - Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to
administrative cases against judges considering that he
is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government."
In Buehs u. Bacatan,231 the Court further held that a
lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law for
acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited Vol-
untary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Me-
diation Board. "Being part of the quasi-judicial system
of our government, he performs official functions that
are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present
controversy may be approximated to administrative
cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of
22"
Leave Division v. Heusdens, A.M. No. P-11-2927, December
13, 2011, 662 SCRA 126.
221
Lorenzo v. Lopez, A.M. No. 2006-02-SC, October 15, 2007,
536 SCRA 11.
22•
Campomanes v. Violon, A.M. No. P-11-2983, July 25, 2012,
677 SCRA 433.
229
People v. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449, July 16, 1984, 130
SCRA465.
230
511 Phil. 56 (2005).
2"1
A.C. No. 6674, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 217, cited in Lahm
v. Mayor, A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 1.
The members of the judiciary may be removed only

after. charges have been filed and proved against them
in a proper administrative proceeding conducted or or-
dered by the Supreme Court. The power to remove
judges has been transferred from the chief executive to
the Supreme Court which may now exercise it with the
concurrence of a majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations and voted on the issues in
the case.
"Judges oflower courts," as here used, includes jus-
tices of the Sandiganbayan. This rule casts much doubt
on the legality of the presidential decree making them
removable only by the legislature through the process of
impeachment.
In Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice,232 the Supreme
Court finally ruled on the constitutional question it was
able to avoid in the earlier case of Zandueta v. De la
Costa. 233 The question was whether or not a law abolish-
ing certain courts violated the incumbent judge's secu-
rity of tenure therein as guaranteed by the Charter. The
statute in issue was spared because the majority of the
justices were one vote short of the then required two-
thirds vote to declare it unconstitutional. In sustaining
the law, the Supreme Court distinguished between re-
moval from office and abolition of the office, and de-
clared:
"The power of Congress, under Section 1, Article VIII, of

the Constitution, to create, reorganize or even abolish courts
inferior to the Supreme Court is plenary. The security of ten-
ure is not a personal privilege of any particular judge; the right
of a judge to his full tenure is not dependent alone upon his
eoorl conduct, but also upon the contingency that the legisla-
aaa 51 O.G. 147.

'"" Supra.
faith. Justice Teehankee was the lone dissenter and

declared inter alia:
"I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in

the abolition of courts· and consequent ouster of the incumbent
judges.
"The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all in-
ferior courts, from the Court of Appeals down, has been vested
by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the ju-
diciary is to be strengthened, it should be left to clean its own
house upon complaint and with the cooperation of the ag-
grieved parties and after due process and hearing."
However, the doctrine announced in the Ocampo

and De la Liana cases has been rendered obsolete with
the adoption of the second paragraph in Section 2, pro-
viding that "no law shall be passed reorganizing the
judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members."
Besides removal, such other disciplinary measures
as suspension, fine, and reprimand can be meted out by
the Supreme Court on erring judges.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge In-

dar,236 the Supreme Court pronounced that -
"Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court

of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and spe-
cial courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on
grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct
that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the dis-
cipline oflawyers. In any of the foregoing instances, the admin-
istrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action
23•
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 24.
ture considerations of the same question and may even

be the basis of a new doctrine or ruling that will over-
turn the existing precedent. Justice Holmes, who was
known as "the Great Dissenter," penned many dissent-
ing opinions that were~ ultimately adopted as the major-
ity view of the U.S. Supreme Court.
A justice who takes no part or abstains must now
also explain his non-participation as it is not permitted
for a member to refuse to act except for valid reasons.
The requirement for previous consultation was
originally imposed only on the Supreme Court. It is now
applicable also to the Court of Appeals and other lower
collegiate courts like the Sandiganbayan and the Court
of Tax Appeals.
The certification is intended as an added guaranty
that the consultation requirement will be complied with
by the court.
In Limkaichong v. COMELEC,231 the Supreme
Court declared that an unpromulgated decision is no
decision at all. Thus -
"At the very least, it is part of the confidential internal

deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the
public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly
promulgated. Until such operative act occurs, there is really no
decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have al-
ready affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening
period from the time of signing until the promulgation of the
decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had
signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's
vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action."
2:n G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 434.
tioned, is not absolutely void. It is, therefore, merely

directory."239
In Bernabe v. Geraldez.i" the Supreme Court held
that this section merely requires that the decision ren-
dered makes clear why either party prevailed under the
applicablelaw to the established facts.
This rule is applicable only to a decision, which is
described as a judgment rendered after the presentation
of proof or on the basis of a stipulation of facts. Mere
orders are not covered since they dispose of only inci-
dents of the case, such as postponements of the trial.
The only exception is an order of dismissal on the mer-
its.
The ends of this rule are not merely clarity and cer-
tainty. More importantly, it is intended to inform the
parties of the factual and legal considerations employed
to support the decision of the court. The judge cannot
simply say, "Judgment is rendered in favor of A and
against B," without more. He must justify his decision.
The parties are entitled to this. And if any of them is
dissatisfied with it, he can search for flaws in that deci-
sion and, if allowed by law, question them before a
higher court.241
Indeed, "the essential purpose of the constitutional
provisionis to require that a judicial decision be clear on
why a party has prevailed under the law as applied to
the facts as proved; the provision nowhere demands that
a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the is-
sues raised by the parties are necessary."242
239
Talabon v. Warden, 44 OG 4326.
'10 51 SCRA 369 (1973).
241
Nicos Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 127.
"2 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, Sep-
tember 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 602, cited in Re: Verified Complaint
ties incurred in the course of the construction of the

subject project." It considered said statement in the
Decision as "only a conclusion of fact and law that did
not comply with the constitutional and statutory pre-
scription."Thus - '
''The statement specified no detailed expenses or losses

constituting the P5,716,729.00 actual damages sustained by
Stern Builders in relation to the construction project or to
other pecuniary hardships. The omission of such expenses or
losses directly indicated that Stern Builders did not prove
them at all, which then contravened Article 2199, Civil Code,
the statutory basis for the award of actual damages, which en-
titled a person to an adequate compensation only for such pe-
cuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. As such,
the actual damages allowed by the RTC, being bereft of factual
support, were speculative and whimsical. Without the clear
and distinct findings of fact and law, the award amounted only
to an ipse dixit on the part of the RTC, and did not attain final-
ity."
In Chung v. Mondragon,246 the Court stressed that

so long as decisions are "complete, clear and concise,"
there would be "no breach of the constitutional mandate
that decisions must express clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which they are based." The Court
stressed that parties should not "mistake brevity for
levity."
Moreover,the Supreme Court has likewise interest-
ingly observed that "a trial or appellate judge may occa-
sionally view a party's memorandum or brief as worthy
of due consideration either entirely or partly. When he
does so, the judge may adopt and incorporate in his ad-
judication the memorandum or the parts of it he deems
suitable, and yet not bo guilty of tho accusation oflifting
246
failed to abide by what the Constitution directs.' What must

then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in the
early case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, the deci-
sion spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous
presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case
upon a stipulation of facts upon which its disposition is to be
based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, the
above decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following: 'Plaintiff-
appellant assigns as another error that the order appealed
from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law
on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on Section 12, Ar-
ticle VIII of the Constitution. The contention is untenable,
since these provisions have been held to refer only to decisions
on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving in-
cidental matters such as the one at bar."'
In justifying the use of the so-called minute resolu-

tion, the Supreme Court said in Borromeo u. Court of
Appealei"
"The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by

minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as
where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised
are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is sup-
ported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts
of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the
records that the petitions were filed merely to forestall the
early execution cf judgment and for non-compliance with the
rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a peti-
tion always gives the legal basis.
x x x
"The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions
all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions
and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, de-
pending on its evaluation, of a case."
"" 186 SCRA 1.

And neither does the rule apply to administrative

cases decided by the Supreme Court itself, as it held in
Prudential Bank v. Castro'" thus:
"No constitutibnal provision is disregarded in the Su-

preme Court's Minute Resolution denying a motion for recon-
sideration 'for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having
been previously duly considered and passed upon.' In an ad-
ministrative case, the constitutional mandate that 'no * * * mo-
tion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be * * *
denied without stating the legal basis therefor' is inapplicable.
And even if it were, said resolution stated the legal basis for
the denial, and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the consti-
tutional requirement. 'Lack of merit,' as a ground for denial, is
a legal basis."
The same case discussed the lack of certification as

follows:
"The challenge hurled against the Supreme Court's deci-

sion as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certifi-
cation by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a
member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of
basis. The certification requirement refers to decisions in judi-
cial, not administrative cases.
"From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the
Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by
any formal certification. Such certification would, in fact, be a
superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very na-
ture, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate
composition of the Supreme Court. The certification in AM No.
5-510-P entitled 'Apolinario de Sariguma v. Deputy Sheriff Pa-
sok,' is but an oversight.
"But· even if such a certification were required, it is be-
yond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision
were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signa-
tures of the members who actually took part in the delibera-
2M
158 SCRA 646.
It has been held, however, that the above provision

is not applicable to decisions of the Commission on Elec-
tions and of military tribunals, which are not courts of
justice.?" A similar ruling was made in Dadubo v. Civil
Service Commission. 2594
In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laeernai" the Supreme
Court held that Section 14 does not apply to decisions in
administrative proceedings, like those rendered by the
Office of the President, or the determinations of the
Secretary of Justice and prosecutors, who are not mem-
bers of the judiciary and do not even exercise quasi-
judicial functions.261 "Certainly, it would be error to hold
or even imply that decisions of executive departments or
administrative agencies are obliged to meet the re-
quirements under Section 14, Article VIII." Said deci-
sions are, however, still subject to the requirements of
due process and must therefore be "rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected" and
"in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered."262 Accordingly, "memoran-
dum decisions," which adopt by reference the findings
of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions
zss Buscayno v. Enrile, 102 SCRA 7; Mangca v. Commission on

Elections, 112 SCRA 273; Ruiz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
105324, March 11, 1993.
2'"
223 SCRA 747.
260
G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 613.
2•1
Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio, G.R. No. 186652, Octo-
ber 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 457, 463, citing Sps. Balangauan v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 184, cited in
Manila Electric Company v. Atilano, G.R. No. 166758, June 27, 2012,
675 SCRA 112.
"'' Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
·THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 581
Thus, the sub Judice rule restricts comments and

disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstruct-
ing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub
Judice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt
under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.266
The doctrine of res judicata provides that "a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies in all later suits on all points and mat-
ters determined in the former suit.'?"
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,
when a right or fact has been judicially tried and deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment
of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them.i" Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment
bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or ques-
tion already settled in a previous case.269
The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation
"where an appellate court has made a ruling on a ques-
tion on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the
lower court for further proceedings; the question settled
by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the
lower court and in any subsequent appeal. It means that
266
Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, 583
SCRA 396.
267
Taganas v. Emulsan, G.R. No. 146980, September 2, 2003,
410 SCRA 237, 241-242.
266
Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26, 2010,
625 SC:RA472, 480.
269
Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc., G.R. No.
150470, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 75, 106; City of Cebu v. Dedamo,
G.R. No. 172852, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 547.
The doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability

of judgment provides that once a judgment has become
final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an
~-
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modificationis attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as
what remains to be done is the purely ministerial en-
forcement or execution of the judgment.273 It has a two-
fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the admini-
stration of justice and, thus, procedurally, to make or-
derly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional
errors, which is precisely why courts exist.274 The only
exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judg-
ments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-
called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, (3) void judgments,275 and (4) whenever cir-
cumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
that render its execution unjust and inequitable.276
157643, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 132, 145; PEPSICO, Inc. v. La-
canilao, 524 Phil 147, 154-155 (2006), citing Ty v. Banco Filipino
Savings & Mortgage Bank, 511 Phil. 510, 520-521 (2005).
273
Vios v. Pantangco, G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009, su-
pra.; see also Ramos v. Ramos, 447 Phil. 114, 119 (2003) and Gal-
lardo-Corro v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001, 350
SCRA 568, 578, cited in Serrano v. Ambassador Hotel, G.R. No.
197003, February 11, 2013, 690 SCRA 226.
274
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Arceo, G.R. No. 158270,
July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 85
210
Mocorro v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008, 560
SCRA362.
"" Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164195, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 200, 214; see also Heirs of
Maura So v. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA
406, 418; Gumaru v. Quirino State College, G.R. No. 164196, June
omission in the record of action really had, but omitted

through inadvertence or mistake.279
Salaries of Judges ~
"Sec. 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the As-
sociate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased."
As previously observed, the prohibition against

diminution of the salaries of judges during their con-
tinuance in officeis one of the guarantees to their inde-
pendence. Without this provision, it would be possible
for the Congress to exert pressure on the members of
the judiciary by threatening their financial security
through reduction of their salaries.
In Perfecto v. Meer280 and Endencia v. David, 281 the
Supreme Court declared that the imposition of income
taxes on the salaries of judges was unconstitutional
because it would result in the reduction of their com-
pensation. But this rule was rendered invalid under
Article XV, Section 6, of the 1973 Constitution which
provided: "No salary or any form of emolument of any
public officer or employee, including constitutional offi-
cers, shall be exempt from the payment of income tax."
Significantly, this rule was deleted in the new Con-
stitution. Nevertheless, in Nitafan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,282 the Supreme Court held that the
salaries of judges, like those of other government func-
tionaries, should also be subject to incometax.
279
Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 672.
,RO 85 Phil. 552.
'"' 93 Phil. 696.
2"
152 SCRA 284.
tached to the record of the case or matter, served upon the par-
ties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution
has not been rendered or issued within said period.
"(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory
period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as
may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or
resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination,
without further delay."
The basis of the new rules was Article X, Section

11, of the 1973 Constitution which prescribed maximum
periods for the decision of cases by the various courts
and declared the effects of non-compliance. The provi-
sion was emasculated, however, with the decision of the
Supreme Court in Marcelino v. Cruz, 283 later affirmed in
two other cases.?" that it was merely directory, being
procedural in nature. That ruling is now reversed with
the description in the above provision of the applicable
periods for decision as "mandatory."
In Valdez v. Torres,285 the Supreme Court stressed
that "as a general principle, rules prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done, or certain pro-
ceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable
to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very na-
ture, these rules are regarded as mandatory." Accord-
ingly, it has been ruled that "a judge cannot choose his
deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without
an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide
2"''
121 SCRA 51 (1983).
,,,. New Frontier Mines v. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502; Federation of
Free Farmers v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41222, Nov. 13, 1985.
20"
Valdez v. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796, June 13, 2012, 672
SCRA 89, citing Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, June 20,
1997, 274 SCRA 540, 548-549; Valdez v. Ocumen, 106 Phil. 929, 933
(1960); Alvero v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 434 (1946).
mination within specified periods. Even when there is delay

and no decision or resolution is made within the prescribed pe-
riod, there is no automatic affirmance of the appealed decision.
The appellate court, therefore, cannot be faulted in not affirm-
ing the RTC's decision. While we do not tolerate delay in the
disposition of cases, we cannot dismiss appealed cases solely
because they had been pending in court for a long period, espe-
cially when the appeal is highly meritorious as in the present
case."
The maximum periods are twenty-four months for

the Supreme Court (increased from eighteen months
under the 1973 Charter), and, as before, twelve months
for the lower collegiate courts unless reduced by the
Supreme· Court and three months for the other lower
courts. This period shall start from the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself. The provision strictly re-
quires that if the period is exceeded, an explanation
must be made either by the Chief Justice or the presid-
ing judge in a certification to be served upon the parties.
The Supreme Court has held that the Sandiganba-
yan should decide its cases within 3 months because it
is a trial court like the regional trial courts and the mu-
nicipal trial courts. Regardless of that reason, the period
of 12 months prescribed by the Constitution for lower
collegiatecourt may be "further reduced by the Supreme
Court.'?"
It should be noted that, although decision within
the maximum period is now mandatory, failure to arrive
at the same will not divest the court of jurisdiction,
without prejudice to any responsibility that may attach
to the judge. The court must still resolve the case with-
200
Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan,
Nov. 28, 2001.
Annual Report
"Sec. 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days

from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, sub-
mit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the
operations and activities of the Judiciary."
The annual report required under this provision

can be the basis of appropriate legislation and govern-
ment policies intended to improve the administration of
justice and strengthen the independence of the judici-
ary.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 593
( 4) The chairmen and members of all of these

Commissions may not be removed from office except by
impeachment.4
(5) The chairmen and members of all of these
Commissions are given the fairly long term of seven
years.5
(6) The terms of office of the chairmen and mem-
bers of all of these Commissions are staggered in such a
way as to lessen the opportunity for appointment of the
majority of the body by the same President.6
Commissions may not be reappointed or appointed in an
acting capacity.7
(8) The salaries of the chairmen and members of
all of these Commissions are relatively high and may
not be decreased during their continuance in office.8
(9) The Commissions all enjoy fiscal autonomy.9
(10) Each Commission may promulgate its own
procedural rules."
Commissions are subject to certain disqualifications and
inhibitions calculated to strengthen their integrity."
(12) Finally, the Constitutional Commissions are
allowed to appoint their own officials and employees in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.12
'Id., Art. XI, Sec. 2.

• Id., Art. IX-B, C and D, Sec. 1(2).
"Id.
'Id.
<ta., Art. IX-A, Sec. 3; Art. XVIII, Sec. 17.
9
Id., Art. IX-A, Sec. 5.
w Id., Art. IX-A, Sec. 7.
11
12
their duties and, as well, to remove from them any

temptation to take advantage of their official positions
for selfish purposes.
Staggering of 'I'erms"
All members of the three Constitutional Commis-

sions, with the exception of the first appointees, are sup-
posed to serve for a term of seven years. However, they
will not vacate their officesat the same time because of
the system for the staggering of their terms provided for
in the Constitution."
Under this system, the original appointees were to
be given terms of three, five, and seven years, respec-
tively, so that a vacancy was supposed to occur every
two years and to be filled by subsequent appointees who
would serve the full term of seven years. 15
The object is to minimize the opportunity of the
President to appoint during his own term more than one
member or group of members in the Constitutional
Commissions and thereby bind the majority thereof to a
debt of gratitude and loyalty to him that might impair
their independence. It is also intended to ensure conti-
nuity of the body and its policies.
This system was borrowed from the old Constitu-
tion but is not expected to be as effective as the original
scheme. The President of the Philippines before had a
fixed term of only four years and was given an opportu-
nity to appoint, under normal circumstances, only one
member of the old Commission on Elections (where the
nine-year term of office was staggered at three-year
"Supra.
"' Constitution, Art. IX-B, C and D, Sec. 1(2).
to replace the chairman, Lopez Vito, who had died in

office.In light of this situation, it was held that the re-
appointment was not unconstitutional since De Vera
had not served the full 1termof nine years.
"In July, 1945, three Commissioners were appointed:
Jose Lopez Vito, as Chairman, for a term of nine years; Fran-
cisco Enage, as Member, for a term of six years; Vicente de
Vera, as Member, for a term of three years. Apparently, these
were considered as the first Commissioners appointed under
the Constitution. Under the interpretation above stated,
Vicente de Vera cannot be reappointed to succeed himself upon
the expiration of his term of three years because that would
preclude the appointment of a new member after such period of
three years, and would, furthermore, increase his term to
twelve years, since, as above indicated, upon the expiration of
his term, his successor must be appointed for nine years. But
the chairmanship of the Commission became vacant in 1947,
by the death of Chairman Jose Lopez Vito, and Commissioner
Vicente de Vera was promoted to occupy this vacancy for the
unexpired term of the former incumbent. There is nothing in
that promotion that is offensive to the Constitution for it does
not increase De Vera's term of office to more than nine years
nor does it preclude the appointment of a new member upon
the expiration of De Vera's first term of three years."
But in Republic v. Imperial, 18 the Supreme Court

made the statement that, once appointed, regardless of
the duration of his tenure, a member of the Commission
on Elections could no longer be reappointed because of
the express prohibition in the Constitution. Reviewing
the original appointments to the Commission on Elec-
tions, the Supreme Court said:
"We find that the terms of office of the first appointees

under the Constitution should be computed as follows:
•• Supra.
on February 2, 2008. On February 7, 2004, President

Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar as the third mem-
ber of the COAfor a term of seven years starting Febru-
ary 2, 2004. He was to serve as such until February 2,
2011. Upon Carague'sretirement on February 2, 2008,
and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commis-
sioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of the
COAfrom February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. On April
18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as
Chairman of the COA. His appointment was confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments on June 11, 2008.
As expressly provided for in his appointment papers,
Villar was to serve as Chairman of COA until the expi-
ration of his original term as COA Commissioner or on
February 2, 2011.
When his appointment as COA Chairman was chal-
lenged, he initially maintained that that his appoint-
ment as Chairman of the Commission gave him a fresh
term of seven years, and that he was, accordingly, enti-
tled to remain in officeas such until February 2, 2015.
In the meantime, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura was
appointed as COA Commissionerto serve the unexpired
term of Villar as Commissioner or up to February 2,
2011. Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar
resigned and vacated his position, and was replaced by
Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan.
Despite Villar's resignation, the Supreme Court
proceeded to rule on the petition and held -
"I. The appointment of members of any of the three

constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven
terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be
for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser
period is void and unconstitutional.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COJMMISSIONS 601
designated by President Corazon Aquino as its acting

chairman when the regular chairman assumed another
position in the government. The petitioner challenged
the designation, invoking the independence of the
Commission on Elections and specifically the prohibi-
tion against the appointment or designation of any
member in a temporary or acting capacity. The Supreme
Court agreed with him, observing inter alia as follows:
"A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms

essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause
need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its va-
lidity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of
the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the Presi-
dent of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason
she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted
such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its
withdrawal.
"It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the
respondent cannot be removed at will from her permanent po-
sition as Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however,
that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without
cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that
temporary position.
"The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar
is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the
void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the
respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at
all, did not call for presidential action. The situation could
have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elec-
tions themselves without the participation of the President,
however well meaning."
Pursuant to the policy underlying the rotational

scheme, it was held in Nacionalista Party v. Bautista"
that the Solicitor General could not be appointed acting
21
85 Phil. 101.
the powers vested in them by the Constitution or con-

ferred on them by law.
Proceedings
To ensure that proceedings in the Constitutional

Commissions will be held with dispatch, Section 7 of
Article IX-Aprovides:
"Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority

vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by
the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Con-
stitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Com-
mission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof."
It is to be recalled that the people are assured of a

speedy disposition of their cases not only in the courts of
justice but also in administrative bodies like the Consti-
tutional Commissions.23
Originally not expressly applied to the Civil Service
Commission, the standard rule now is that the deci-
sions, orders and rulings of the Constitutional Commis-
sion may be elevated to the Supreme Court in a petition
for certiorari. As held in Aratuc u. Commission on Elec-
24
tions, which was decided in 1979, this proceeding is
limited to issues involving grave abuse of discretion
resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction and does not
2"
Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. 16.
" 88 SCRA 251.
Procedure; or when the matter is one that only the

COMELEC En Banc may consider and act upon; or
when the Division is not authorized to take cognizance
of a matter; or when, the members of a Division unani-
mously vote to refer a matter to the COMELECEn Banc
without first deciding upon it;" or when the Resolution
sought to be set aside is a nullity. 30
The majority vote requirement in the above-quoted
provision, was interpreted by the Supreme Court in
1987 in Cua v. Commission on Elections" thus:
"For their part, the respondents insist that no decision

was reached by the First Division on August 10, 1987, because
the required unanimous vote was not obtained and there was
therefore nothing to be affirmed on appeal by the COMELEC
en bane and nothing to reconsider either. Additionally, they
argue that in any case no valid decision was reached by the
COMELEC en bane because only three votes were cast in favor
of the petitioner and these did not constitute a majority of the
body.
"After considering the issues and the arguments raised
by the parties, the Court holds that the 2-1 decision rendered
by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members
who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of
the five members who deliberated and voted thereon en bane
and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitu-
tional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of
the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him
now to assume his seat in the House of Representatives."
ae Khov. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.124033, September

25, 1997, 279 SCRA 463, 471-473; see also Repol v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 161418, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 321, cited in
Cagas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 194139, January 24,
2012,663 SCRA 645.
00
Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008, 554
SCRA 755.
"1 156 SCRA 582.
Chapter 14
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION was, as previ-

ously observed, only a statutory body under the 1935
Constitution. Realizing the need for insulating the civil
service from the evils of the spoils system, the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1971 decided to bolster this Com-
mission into a constitutional body. As retained by the
1987 Constitution, this improved status and the various
safeguards provided for the maintenance of its inde-
pendence are expected to make the new Civil Service
Commission a vigorous and non-partisan instrument for
the development of an efficient and honest civil service.
This civil service shall, it is hoped, be beholden to no
political patrons and loyal only to the people it is sworn
to serve.
Composition and Qualifications
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution on the com-

position of the Civil Service Commission are retained
substantially as follows:
"Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered

by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and
two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public ad-
ministration, and must not have been candidates for any elec-
tive position in the elections immediately preceding their ap-
pointment.
607
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 609
Scope of the Civil Service
Article IX-B, Section 2(1) declares that "the civil

service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumen-
talities, and agencies of the Government, including gov-
ernment-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters."
Corporations with original charters are those cre-
ated by special law, like the Government Service Insur-
ance System and the Social Security System. Corpora-
tions which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies,
like the Manila Hotel, are not within the coverage of the
civil service.
In National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 2 the Su-
preme Court held, with only Justice Vicente Abad San-
tos dissenting, that all government-owned or controlled
corporations, regardless of their manner of creation,
were covered by the civil service. But in National Ser-
vice Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commis-
sion, 3 it was held that under the 1987 Constitution the
government-owned or controlled corporations included
in the civil service are only those created by special law,
or granted legislative charters, and not organized under
the Corporation Code. Their subsidiaries, if organized
under the general corporationlaw, are not covered.
Under Republic Act No. 10149, a government-
owned or controlled corporation, or GOCC, refers to any
agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines di-
rectly or through its instrumentalities either wholly or,
2
134 SCRA 172.
" 168 SCRA 122.
antee foreign loans, in whole or in part, granted to any

domestic entity, enterprise or corporation organized or
licensed to engage in business in the Philippines, is
likewise subject to the authority of the Civil Service
Commission." '
The term GOCC includes government instrumen-
talities with corporate powers,12 or GICPs, and govern-
ment corporate entities (GCEs), which are instrumen-
talities or agencies of the government which are neither
corporations nor agencies integrated within the depart-
mental framework, but vested by law with special func-
tions or jurisdiction, endowedwith some if not all corpo-
rate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy usually through a charter, 13 and
government financial institutions, 14 or GFis, which refer
to financial institutions or corporations in which the
government directly or indirectly owns majority of the
capital stock and which are either (1) registered with or
directly supervised by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;
or (2) collecting or transacting funds or contributions
from the public and places them in financial instru-
ments or assets such as deposits, loans, bonds, and eq-
uity." Among the GICPs are the Manila International
Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Metro-
politan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Laguna
Lake Development Authority, the Philippine Fisheries
Development Authority, the Bases Conversion and De-
" Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Phil-

ippines v. Manalang-Demigilio, G.R. No. 176343, September 18,
2012, 681 SCRA 27.
12
Republic Act No. 10149, Section 3(o).
'" Ibid., Section 3(n).
r u., Section 3(o).
"' Id., Section 3(m).
THE CML SERVICE COMMISSION 613
the fact that it cannot be considered as either a stock

(because it is not authorized to declare dividends) or a
non-stock (because it does not have members) corpora-
tion but also because,1 while it "may have passed the
first condition of commongood,"it "failed the second one
- economicviability." The Court explained-
"Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of the

PRA was not for economic or commercial activities. Neither
was it created to compete in the market place considering that
there were no other competing reclamation companies being
operated by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was
created essentially to perform a public service considering that
it was primarily responsible for a coordinated, economical and
efficient reclamation, administration and operation of lands be-
longing to the government with the object of maximizing their
utilization and hastening their development consistent with
the public interest."
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Philippine

Reclamation Authority is a "government instrumental-
ity vested with corporate powers and performing an
essential public service pursuant to Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code,"
which provides that a government instrumentality "re-
fers to any agency of the National Government, not in-
tegrated within the department framework, vested with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
though a charter. This term includes regulatory agen-
cies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations."
On the basis of this definition, the Supreme Court
has acknowledgedthat the Manila International Airport
tions. These instrumentalities are not the 'government-

owned or controlled corporations' referred to in Section
16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution." Thus, "the
Constitution imposes no limitation when the legislature
creates government instrumentalities vested with cor-
porate powers but performing essential governmental or
public functions. Congress has plenary authority to cre-
ate government instrumentalities vested with corporate
powers provided these instrumentalities perform essen-
tial government functions or public services.?"
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has
considered the Boy Scouts of the Philippines as both a
government instrumentality and a government-owned or
controlled corporation, attached to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports. Its employees are there-
fore covered by civil service laws and rules.28
The government agency is a more comprehensive
concept which refers to any of the various units of the
Government of the Republicof the Philippines, including
a department, bureau, office, instrumentality or GOCC,
or a local government or a distinct unit therein.29
The issue in Hidalgo v. Republic of the Philippines"
was whether or not the employees of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Commissary and Exchange Services,
which was organized pursuant to Letter of Instruction
No. 31 of President Marcos in 1972, were subject to the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, considering
that the entity was engaged in proprietary functions,
21
Republic of the Philippines v. City of Paraii.aque, 677 SCRA
246.
2"
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 80767 April 22, 1991, 196 SCRA 176.
2.q Republic Act No. 10149, Section 3(k).
'° G.R. No. 179793, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 391.

The PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, which

is likewise a government-owned or controlled corpora-
tion without an original charter, is also not covered by
the rules of the Civil Service Commission.32
In Ang v. Philippine National Bank,33 the petitioner
was dismissed by the respondent for offenses committed
by her prior to its privatization, or when the respondent
was still a government-owned or controlled corporation,
but discovered only after she was re-hired by the privat-
ized corporation. Among the issues was her entitlement
to retirement benefits covering the period prior to her
re-hiring by the privatized corporation, or which she
earned while the same was still a government-owned or
controlled corporation. The Supreme Court held -
"Here, when PNB was privatized, Ang's employment

with it as a government-owned corporation ceased. Indeed, the
PNB already computed the retirement and other benefits to
which she was entitled as a result of the cessation of her em-
ployment. Since she had no pending administrative case on the
day she ceased to be a PNB employee and had been cleared of
any accountability, all those benefits already accrued to her on
the date of her termination. As for possible benefits accruing to
Ang after May 26, 1996 [or after the privatization of the
GOCC), the same should be deemed governed by the Labor
Code since the PNB that rehired her on May 27, 1996 has be-
come a private corporation."
Positions in the civil service are classified under

the Administrative Code of 1987 into the career service
and the non-career service.
The career service is characterized by: (1) entrance
based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as
32
Gamogamo v. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation,
G.R. No. 141707, May 7, 2002, 431 Phil. 510, 521-522.
33
G.R. No. 178762, June 16, 2010, 621 SCRA 120.
The non-career service is characterized by: (1) en-

trance on bases other than those of the usual tests of
merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2)
tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or
which is coterminous with that of the appointing au-
thority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made. The non-career service includes:
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confi-
dential staff;
(2) Department heads and other officials of Cabi-
net rank who hold positions at the pleasure of the Presi-
dent and their personal or confidential staff;
(3) Chairmen and members of commissions and
boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or
confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employ-
ment in the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing
agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed one year, and perform or
accomplish the specific work or job, under their own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervi-
sion from the hiring agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel."
It is provided by the new Constitution that the

Civil Service "shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission. "35
"' See Civil Service Commission v. Pililla Water District, G.R.

No. 190147, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 406.
:m Art. IX-B, Sec. 1(1).
Temporary appointments do not have a definite

term and may be withdrawn or discontinued, with or
without cause, by the appointing power.38
"The purpose of van acting or temporary appoint-
ment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official
functions by authorizing a person to discharge those
functions pending the selection of a permanent or an-
other appointee. An acting appointee accepts the posi-
tion on the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called to do so by the appointing authority.
Therefore, his term of office is not fixed but endures at
the pleasure of the appointing authority. His separation
from the service does not import removal but merely the
expiration of his term - a mode of termination of offi-
cial relations that falls outside the coverage of the con-
stitutional provision on security of tenure since no re-
moval from officeis involved.'?"
(1) Exceptions
Excepted from the requirement of competitive ex-

aminations are the policy-determining, primarily confi-
dential and highly technical positions.
A "policy-determiningposition" is one charged with
the laying down of principal or fundamental guidelines
or rules, such as that of a head of a department.
The "primarily confidential position" is one denot-
ing not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee
for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy
"' But see pages 636-638.

as General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011, 646 SCRA
567, citing Achacoso v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991,
195 SCRA 235; see also Amores v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. 170093, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 160.
which it has acknowledgedas primarily confidential in

character. Thus-
"Among those positions judicially determined as primar-

ily confidential positions are the following: Chief Legal Counsel
of the Philippine National Bank; Confidential Agent of the Of-
fice of the Auditor, GSIS; Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan;
Secretary to the City Mayor; Senior Security and Security
Guard in the Office of the Vice Mayor; Secretary to the Board
of a government corporation; City Legal Counsel, City Legal
Officer or City Attorney; Provincial Attorney; Private Secre-
tary; and Board Secretary II of the Philippine State College of
Aeronautics. xxx The Court in these instances focused on the
nature of the functions of the office characterized by such 'close
intimacy' between the appointee and appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or free-
dom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust on confi-
dential matters of state."
The positions of General Manager of a water dis-

trict" and Corporate Secretary in a government-owned
or controlled corporation48 have likewise been considered
as primarily confidential in character.
Among the other standards set by the Supreme
Court in determining whether or not a position is pri-
marily confidential in character are that a "primarily
close intimacy exists" between the appointing authority
and the appointee, which ensures the highest degree of
trust and unfettered communication and discussion on
the most confidential of matters; its functions must "not
be routinary, ordinary and day to day in character;" and
that the "primarily confidential position is characterized
by the close proximity of the positions of the appointer
and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and
'1 Ibid.
•• Civil Service Commission v. Javier, supra.
Ultimately, such civil servants will become callous

to the demands of public service in the cynical belief
that their incumbency is guaranteed, regardless of their
poor performance, as Jong as they have political protec-
tion.
As for those who may not be so fortunate as to se-
cure this assurance, the probability is that they will be
prey to the ambitions of their more opportunistic col-
leagues. Indeed, even favored outsiders may be able to
enter the public service by securing the ouster of "un-
protected" incumbent civil servants.
To avoid this, the Administrative Code of 1987 enu-
merates the different grounds for the discipline of civil
servants and provides for a fixed procedure for their ad-
ministrative investigation.53 Non-compliance with these
rules will constitute a denial of their constitutional secu-
rity of tenure.
Pending his administrative investigation, it is pro-
vided that the employeecharged shall be subject to pre-
ventive suspension but the same shall be lifted after
ninety days if he is not a presidential appointee unless
the delay in the conduct of the probe is imputable to
him."
Consistent with said law, the Civil Service Com-
mission has likewise promulgated its Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service" which,
among others, also specify the various charges which
may be filed against civil servants and the procedure for
their investigation and adjudication. Said Revised Rules
require the conduct of a preliminary investigation" for
•3 Book V(A), Sec. 46.

<tu«, Secs. 47, 52.
"CSC Resolution No. 1101502, November 18, 2011.
56
lbid., Rule 4, Sections 15-19.
as it may, we cannot interpret the creation of such bodies nor

the passage oflaws such as - R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing
for the creation of such disciplinary bodies - as having divested
the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline gov-
ernment employees, including those in the academe. To hold
otherwise would not~ only negate the very purpose for which
the CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism, integ-
rity, and accountability in our civil service, but would also im-
pliedly amend the Constitution itself.?"
"Based on all of the foregoing," said the Court, "the

inescapable conclusionis that the CSC may take cogni-
zance of an administrative case filed directly with it
against an official or employee of a chartered state col-
lege or university. This is regardless of whether the
complainant is a private citizen or a member of the civil
service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the
Board of Regents of the school.'?"
Indeed, there have been many rulings to the effect
that the Civil Service Commission shares its discipli-
nary authority with other entities. Accordingly, in
Camacho v. Gloria,64 the Supreme Court ruled that "un-
der E.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state university
official may be filed with either the university's Board of
Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission."
As previously noted though, it may not exercise its
disciplinary authority over court personnel, even for
acts done by them prior to their appointment to the
judiciary, in view of the Supreme Court's exclusive ad-
62
Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
176162, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 353, citing Civil Service Com-
mission v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009, 589 SCRA 88.
s:1 Ibid.
64
456 Phil. 399 (2003); see also Civil Service Commission v. Al-
fonso, G.R. No. 179452, supra. and Civil Service Commission v.
Sojor, G.R. No. 168766, May 22, 2008, 554 SCRA 160.
ticularly the highly technical officers, are nonetheless

also entitled to security of tenure. Thus -
"The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential po-

sitions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries) ends
upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only
as long as confidencein them endures; and thus their cessation
involves no removal. But the situation is different for those
holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and
qualifications. The Constitution clearly distinguished the pri-
marily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the
loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and
erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental
charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary techni-
cian, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys
security of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a
highly technical officer, such as an economist or a scientist of
avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security
and be removable at any time, without right to a hearing or
chance to defend himself. No technical men worthy of the name
would be willing to accept work under such conditions. Ulti-
mately, the rule advocated by the Bank would demand that
highly technical positions be filled by persons who must labor
always with an eye cocked at the humor to their superiors. It
would signify that the so-called highly technical positions will
have to be filled by incompetents and yes-men, who must rely
not on their own qualifications and skill but on their ability to
curry favor with the powerful. The entire objective of the Con-
stitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil Service on the
basis of merit would be thus negated.''"
Partisan Political Activity
The following provision is a substantial reproduc-

tion from the 1935 Constitution:
6A Corpus v. Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965, 13

SCRA 591.
THE CIVIL SERVICE CO:MMISSION 631
canvassing or soliciting votes or political support or

contributions for any political party or candidate or, in
general, becoming activelyidentified with the success or
failure of any candidate or candidates for election to
publre. offi ce. 70 ~
Seneres v. COMELEC11 involved an Acting Admin-

istrator or Chief of the Land Railway Transport Author-
ity (who was concurrently the president of a political
party) who was accused of having engaged in election-
eering for having signed, in his capacity as the head of
said political party, the list of the latter's nominations
for the party-list elections. The Supreme Court found
nothing wrong with what he did and declared that the
act of submitting a nomination list "cannot, without
more, be considered electioneering or partisan political
activity within the context of the Election Code,"Section
79 of which provides that the terms "election campaign"
or "partisan political activity" refer to "(1) forming or-
ganizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other
groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a can-
didate; (2) holding political caucuses, conferences, meet-
ings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate; (3)
making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or
holding interviews for or against the election of any
candidate for public office;( 4) publishing or distributing
campaign literature or materials designed to support or
oppose the election of any candidate; or (5) directly or
indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or
against a candidate."
70
Sec. 14, Rule XVIII, Civil Service Rules.
"G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 557.
period. Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of

a political office,elective positions included. The prohi-
bition notwithstanding, civil service officers and em-
ployees are allowed ~to vote, as well as express their
views on political issues, or mention the names of cer-
tain candidates for public officewhom they support."
It should be stressed that even members of the
armed forces are subject to the prohibition against en-
gaging in partisan political activity. And the reason
should be quite obvious: considering the physical
strength of the military organization, its direct involve-
ment in partisan political affairs could exert an un-
healthy pressure on the electorate to the prejudice of
our democratic institutions. Such pressure, if permitted,
could also undermine the declared principle in Article
II, Section 3, of the Constitution that "civilian authority
is at all times supreme over the military."
But this provision should be interpreted to apply
only to the active members of the armed forces and not
also to the reservists. In Cailles vs. Bonifacio, 74 the Su-
preme Court, in justifying this rule, declared that "a
contrary interpretation will render ineligible to run for
any elective office all male citizens of the Philippines
between the ages of 21 and 50, who, under the provi-
sions of the National Defense Act, are automatically
members of the reserved force in accordance with the
terms and limitations thereof."
The purpose of the prohibition against partisan po-
litical activity is twofold:to prevent the members of the
civil service from using the resources of the government
for the benefit of their candidates, and to insulate them
" 65 Phil. 328.

tion of the teachers to be reinstated pending the deci-

sion on the merits of their case was denied by the Su-
preme Court.
The Supreme Court likewise declared in Alliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employ-
ment that the "personnel of government-owned or con-
trolled corporations are now part of the civil service. It
would not be fair to allow them to engage in concerted
activities to wring higher salaries or fringe benefits from
Government even as other civil service personnel such
as the hundreds of thousands of public school teachers,
soldiers, policemen, health personnel, and other gov-
ernment workers are denied the right to engage in simi-
lar activities."?"
In GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa
GSIS,79 the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the
petitioner to institute formal charges against its em-
ployees who staged a walk-out and participated in a
mass protest or demonstration outside the GSIS for four
straight days, in violation of the rules of the Civil Ser-
vice Commission regarding self-organization, strikes,
demonstrations and concerted actions. However, the
Supreme Court found the respondents in GSIS v. Vil-
laviza, 80 who wore red shirts at a public hearing, as hav-
ing simply lawfully exercised their freedom of expres-
sion. Thus-
"Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as·

much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests
against what they believe 'to be a violation of their rights and
interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom
of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the
1"
G.R. No. L-60403August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1.
1"
"0 G.R. No. 180291,July 27, 2010, 625 SCRA 669.
law protects the right of the resident trainees from be-

ing removed from officewithout cause."
Moreover, it must be noted that, in Re: Vehicular
Accident involving SC Shuttle Bus No. 3 with Plate No.
SEG-357 driven by Gerry B. Moral, Driver II-Casual,83
the Supreme Court declared that "even a casual or tem-
porary employee enjoys security of tenure and cannot be
dismissed except for cause enumerated in Sec. 22, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations
and other pertinent laws." This ruling has since been
affirmed, and clarified, in Philippine Charity Sweep-
stakes Office Board of Directors v. Lapid,84 where the
Court held-
"Despite this new ruling on casual employees, it is not

the intention of the Court to make the status of a casual em-
ployee at par with that of a regular employee, who enjoys per-
manence of employment. The rule is still that casual employ-
ment will cease automatically at the end of the period unless
renewed as stated in the Plantilla of Casual Employment.
Casual employees may also be terminated anytime though sub-
ject to certain conditions or qualifications with reference to the
abovequoted CSC Form No. 001. Thus, they may be laid-off
anytime before the expiration of the employment period pro-
vided any of the followingoccurs: (1) when their services are no
longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project
has already been completed/finished; or (4) their performance
are (sic) below par.
"Equally important, they are entitled to due process es-
pecially if they are to be removed for more serious causes or for
causes other than the reasons mentioned in CSC Form No.
001. This is pursuant to Section 2, Article IX (B) of the Consti-
tution and Section 46 of the Civil Service Law. The reason for
this is that their termination from the service could carry a
penalty affecting their rights and future employment in the
government."
"1A.M. No. 2008-13-SC,November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 352.

""G.R. No. 191940, April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 546.
conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the Presi-

dent and the Congress an annual report on its programs."
In Trade and Investment Development Corporation

of the Philippines v.~ Civil Service Commission, 87 the
petitioner, a government-owned or controlled corpora-
tion, invoking the provisions of a law which it claimed
provided for its exemption from the rules of the Civil
Service Commission on compensation, position classifi-
cation and qualification standards, challenged the ap-
plicability of said rules to its appointments. The Com-
mission maintained though that all government-owned
or controlled corporations should follow the civil service
laws on appointments, regardless of their statutory ex-
emption from said civil service rules. In upholding the
petitioner, the Supreme Court declared -
"While not explicitly stated, the CSC's rule-making

power is subsumed under its designation as the government's
'central personnel agency' in Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. The 1987 Administrative Code then spelled out
the CSC's rule-making power in concrete terms in Section 12,
Book V, Title I-A, which empowered the CSC to implement the
civil service law and other pertinent laws, and to promulgate
policies, standards and guidelines for the civil service. xx x.
"But while the grant of the CSC's rule-making power is
untouchable by Congress, the laws that the CSC interprets and
enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an admin-
istrative agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative power is subject to
the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies.
The rules that the CSC formulates must not override, but must
be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement."
'7 G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013, 681 SCRA 27, citing Grego
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274

SCRA 481, 498 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals, 240 SCRA 368 (1995).
By contrast, there are also dedicated civil servants

who nevertheless are often by-passed in promotions
simply because they do not have the political "pull" that
can be relied upon by 4the less deserving appointees pre-
empting them. The demoralization of these forgotten
and deprived functionaries will also considerably impair
the efficiencyof the civil service.
This provision should be read with Article XI, Sec-
tion 1, on public officeas a public trust.
The rest of the foregoing provision requires no com-
ment except that it belongs not in a constitution but in
an implementing statute or perhaps a speech or a man-
ual of instructions.
Oath
Soon after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,

all public officials and employees, including members of
the armed forces, took an oath to support and defend it,
conformably to Sect.ion4 of Article IX-B and Section 5(1)
of Article XVI.
Disqualifications
It is provided in Article IX-B, Section 7, that "no

elective official shall be eligible for appointment or des-
ignation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure."
The original rule inhibited appointment during the
term, the purpose being to ensure that the officialwould
remain in the position to which he had been elected by
the people. This was not only his right but his responsi-
bility ifhe was to fulfill their mandate.
The issue in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma"

was the validity of the concurrent appointment of the
respondent as Chairman of the Presidential Commis-
sion on Good Government~··
and Chief Presidential Lega.l
Counsel. The Supreme Court declared the same as un-
constitutional, for being in violation of Section 7, par. 2,
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are
incompatible offices. "The duties of the CPLC include
giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive departments
and agencies and to review investigations involving
heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as
other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without
question, an agency under the Executive Department.
Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to
the review of the CPLC."
The Court added that "as CPLC, respondent Elma
will be required to give his legal opinion on his own ac-
tions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation
conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission,
which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such
cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be
raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid
in imposing the prohibition against holding incompati-
ble offices."
The Court further explained that the "strict prohi-
bition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Consti-
tution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to
the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecre-
tary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may
have the same rank as the latter positions."
90
G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53.
be permitted only after the expiration of a period of one

year from the date of their defeat in the elections. The
disqualification is not made permanent because defeat
in an election does n<Jt mean that the candidate is en-
tirely unfit for public office.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,92 the Supreme Court
nullified the acquittal of a municipal mayor who was
charged with violating the provisions of Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code which punishes any public offi-
cer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any
public office any person lacking the legal qualifications
therefor. This mayor was prosecuted for said offense for
having appointed, upon his assumption into office, a
relative of his wife, who had only two months before lost
his mayoralty bid in another municipality. The Court
said-
''The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the

qualifications for a position are provided by law and that it
may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualifi-
cation for a position may be temporarily disqualified for ap-
pointment to a public position by reason of the one-year prohi-
bition imposed on losing candidates. However, there is no vio-
lation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a person
suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long
as the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the
law.
"There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this inter-
pretation. On the contrary, legal disqualification in Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code simply means disqualification under
the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 pro-
hibits [sic] losing candidates within one year after such elec-
tion to be appointed to any office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries."
"" G.R. No. 164185, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 449.
To correct this situation, it is now provided in Arti-

cle IX-B,Section 5 that:
"Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardi-

zation of compensation of government officials and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corpora-
tions with original charters, taking into account the nature of
the responsibility pertaining to, and the qualifications required
for, their positions."
Double Compensation
The following is a rewriting of one of the general

provisionsin Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution:
"Sec. 8. No elective or appointive public officer or em-
ployee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensa-
tion, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without
the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or
title of any kind from any foreign government.
"Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as addi-
tional, double, or indirect compensation."
The prohibition against additional, double or indi-

rect compensation has a dual purpose: to inform the
people of the exact amount a public functionary is re-
ceiving from the government so they can demand com-
mensurate services; and to prevent the public function-
ary from dividing his time among the several positions
concurrently held by him and ineptly performing his
duties in all of them because he cannot devote to each
the proper attention it deserves. The exception is where
the law allows him to receive extra compensation for
services rendered in another position which is an exten-
sion or connected with his basic work, as where the
chairmen of the committees on education in the two
houses of the Congress may collect allowances as ex
officio members of the U.P. board of regents.
benefits aimed at improving the services of these employees.

Considering, however, that the payment of these benefits cons-
titute disbursement of public funds, it must not contravene the
law on disbursement of public funds.
"As clearly explained by the Court in Yap u. Commission
on Audit, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and bene-
fits of government officers and employees should be granted to
compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and
the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must
be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein,
additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be neces-
sary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and
functions of the government officers and employees. Without
this limitation, government officers and employees may be paid
enormous sums without limit or without justification necessary
other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed
by the government. Public funds are the property of the people
and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent
dissipation and waste.
"Undoubtedly, the above computation of the awardees'
reward is excessive and tantamount to double and additional
compensation. This cannot be justified by the mere fact that
the awardees have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Neither can it be justified that the reward
is given as a gratuity at the end of the last term of the quali-
fied elective official. The fact remains that the remuneration is
equivalent to everything that the awardees received during the
entire period that he served as such official. Indirectly, their
salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they receive half of
them at the end of their last term."
It is significant that the Court, "in line with exist-

ing jurisprudence," did not require said former city
councilors to refund said retirement and gratuity pay,
despite upholding the disallowance by the Commission
on Audit of the same, "because all the parties acted in
good faith." It noted that "the city officialsdisbursed the
retirement and gratuity pay remuneration in the honest
belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMM:ISSION 651
In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 97 the Supreme Court held

that the prohibition of the Constitution was against
double compensation, not double appointments. Hence,
a second position may be held concurrently with the
principal position as long as the two are not incompati-
ble, but the incumbent cannot collect additional salaries
for services rendered unless specifically allowedby law.
The purpose of the prohibition against acceptance
of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind
from any foreign state is to insulate the public function-
ary from improper foreign influence, which may be ex-
erted on him to the prejudice of the national interest. At
times, however, the gesture of the foreign state may be a
sincere manifestation of appreciation or respect and
without any sinister or ulterior motive, in which case it
would be ungracious of the intended recipient to reject
the token offered.In such an event, the prohibition may
be relaxed and the offer accepted with the consent of the
Congress.
97
98 Phil. 705.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 653
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,

holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elec-
tions. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman,
shall be members oftthe Philippine bar who have been engaged
in the practice oflaw for at least ten years.
"(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be ap-
pointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappoint-
ment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Mem-
bers for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the prede-
cessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or desig-
nated in a temporary or acting capacity."
The decrease in membership from nine to seven

was intended to facilitate decisions of the Commission
en bane by concurrence of only four members constitut-
ing a majority of the body.2
In Marcoleta v. Borra.' the Supreme Court ex-
plained that "the provision that majority of Comelec
members should be lawyers pertains to the desired com-
position of the Comelec.While the appointing authority
may follow such constitutional mandate, the appoint-
ment of a full complement of lawyers in the Comelec
membership is not precluded." Moreover, in Gutierrez v.
House of Representatives Committee on Justice." the
Court acknowledged that the Commission on Elections
is a collegial body. Accordingly,"the act of the head of a
1
Constitution, Article IX-C.
2
See Estrella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004,
429 SCRA 789; Marcoleta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181377, April 24,
2009, 586 SCRA 765.
"A.C. No. 7732, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 474.
'G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 198, 234,
cited in Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 199082, Septem-
ber 18, 2012, 681 SCRA 181.
and the holding of the polls, and see to it that the can-
vass of the votes and the proclamation of the winners
are done in accordance with law.
Such authority includes the power to annul an ille-
gal registry of voters," to cancel a proclamation made by
the board of canvassers on the basis of an irregular or
incomplete canvass," and even to oust the candidate
proclaimed notwithstanding that he has already as-
sumed office.7 The Commission on Elections may reject
nuisance candidacies," refuse to give due course to or
cancel certificates of candidacy," or even disqualify can-
didates."
Under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified
petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that
said certificate has been filed to put the election process
in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the officefor which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate. Votes
cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final
5
Prudente v. Genuino, G.R. No. L-5222, Nov. 6, 1951.
" Lacson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-16261, Dec.
28, 1951.
1
Aguam v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 883.
• Omnibus Election Code, Section 69; see Bautista v. COME-
LEC, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998, 298 SCRA 480.
• Ibid., Section 78; see Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447.
'0 Id., Section 68; see Justimbaste v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179413, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 736.
their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case,

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine
days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the
names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified
List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed,
what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of dis-
qualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candi-
dates if the official ballots still carry their names?
"We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 consider-
ing the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in
a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate
has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not
stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As
earlier discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under
Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition
to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such
cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be
equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in
the OEC and Local Government Code.
"Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters
were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio
because COMELEC published the same before election day. As
we pronounced in Bautista, the voters' constructive knowledge
of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable,
as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for
Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candi-
date, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candi-
dates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the bal-
lots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even
under the automated voting system especially considering that
voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the
nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they in-
tended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots
to correct the same.
"Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No.
4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our ju-
risprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests
especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public of-
ficials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as
our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities
and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both
less qualified,18 or when one claims to be eligible despite

his disqualification on the basis of an accessory penalty
imposed upon him in connectionwith his conviction in a
criminal case.19 It should be noted that Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Coae provides that "any person who
has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more
than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office,unless he has been given plenary pardon
or granted amnesty." Mere technical irregularities in
the preparation and submission of certificates of candi-
dacy, such as the signing of the same under oath, al-
though considered mandatory prior to the elections,
shall not be sufficient to invalidate the same as these
are to be considered as merely directory requirements
after the elections, "to give effect to the will of the peo-
ple."20 Moreover, the withdrawal of a certificate of can-
didacy does not necessarily render the certificate void ab
initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced
thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subse-
quently withdrawn. 21
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 may
be filed at any time after the last day for filing of the
18
Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 196804, October
9, 2012, 683 SCRA 197.
19
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, Octo-
ber 9, 2012, 683 SCRA l; see Aratea v. Commission on Elections,
20
Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008,
545 SCRA 635.
21
Limbona v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008, 555
SCRA391.
Federico u. Commission on Elections,26 the Court invali-

dated the substitution of a candidate for mayor who
withdrew her candidacy for purposes of substituting her
husband as candidate, for governor because of the lat-
ter's death. It said that, while her substitution of her
husband because of his death may have been valid be-
cause said substitution may be done until midday of
election day, her substitution as a candidate for mayor
was invalid because the deadline for the same had long
prescribed. The Court stressed that her substitution as
a mayoralty candidate was not by reason of her death or
disqualification. A candidate whose certificate of candi-
dacy is cancelled or denied due course may likewise not
be substituted." "A cancelled certificate of candidacy
void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.?"
In Aratea u. COMELEC,29 the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that there may be instances when the
grounds for both Sections 68 and 78 may overlap, as
when a candidate who represents that he is a resident of
the place where he seeks election but is actually a per-
manent resident or immigrant to a foreign country, in
which case, he would clearly also not be a resident of the
place where he seeks election for at least one year im-
2"
Ibid.
27
Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 196804, October
9, 2012, supra.; Tagolino v. HRET and Lucy Torres, G.R. No. 202202,
March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574; see Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No.
136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617.
2•
Aratea v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229, October
9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105; see Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, cited in Talaga v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012, supra.; see also De la
Cruz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192221, November 13,
2012, supra.
'"Supra.
Omnibus Election Code restrictively enumerates the

issues which can be raised in a pre-proclamation contro-
versy: (a) illegal compositionor proceedings of the board
of canvassers; (b) the canvassed election returns are
incomplete, contain niaterial defects, appear to be tam-
pered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the
same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as
mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this
Code; (c) the election returns were prepared under du-
ress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obvi-
ously manufactured or not authentic; and (d) when sub-
stitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling
places were canvassed, the results of which materially
affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or can-
didates.?"
In Abayon v. COMELEC and Raul Daza,33 the Su-
preme Court emphasized that the abduction of a voter,
the killing of a political leader, the threats which pre-
vented the holding of the campaign sorties, and the in-
timidation of voters, or of terrorism (and also massive
vote-buying and bribery) are proper grounds for an elec-
tion protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.
The Commission on Elections may, of course, pro-
claim winning candidates, guided by the following pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court.
In the old case of Topacio v. Paredes." the Supreme
Court announced that "a second-placer cannot be pro-
claimed as the winner in an election contest.?" Thus,
'" Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192289, Janu-

ary 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 129.
"0 G.R. No. 181295, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 473.
"' 23 Phil. 238 (1912).

"" Ibid., cited in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 195649, April 16, 2013.
tion as to bring such awareness within the realm of

notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.?" This ruling
was consistent with \ts earlier pronouncement in Labo
v. Commission on Elections." where the Court declared
that, under this sole exception, the electorate may be
said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their
votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible
candidate with the second highest number of votes may
be deemed elected. Accordingly,this ruling was not ap-
plied in Talaga because, in said case, the "second ele-
ment was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were
(sic) not the least aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby's
ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELECEn
Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution
invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the
decisions.t'" Thus -
"Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was

only a second placer. Labo, Jr. should be applied. There,. the
Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second
highest number of votes for the contested office could not as-
sume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer
because the second placer was 'not the choice of the sovereign
will.' Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated can-
didate could not be deemed elected to the office. There was to
be no question that the second placer lost in the election, was
repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated
position. No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lu-
40
See Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955,
June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 50.
11
G.R. No. 105111 & 105384, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297.
"Supra.
didacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent

in the 10 May 2004 elections.
"The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified
by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and
votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory
provision oflaw. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Elec-
toral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
"'Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.-Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commis-
sion shall continue with the trial and hearing of the ac-
tion, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the com-
plainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.'
"Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers
two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes
final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the
first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualifica-
tion becomes final after the elections, which is the situation
covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
"The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6
of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is
categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before
an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final
on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. There-
fore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat's favor are stray. Cayat
was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng's
proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candi-
date, second to none."
Moreover, in subsequent decisions of the Supreme

Court, it made clear that its earlier rulings holding that
the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the
Accordingly, in Maquiling v. Commission on Elec-

tions" where the winning candidate was disqualified on
the ground of lack of citizenship, the Supreme Court
pronounced that "the popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate." Thus -
"The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statu-

tory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candi-
date. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and even-
tually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect
in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as
well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is
the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to
occupyelective positions in our republic."
It stressed that -
"An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number

of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he
could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by
virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening cir-
cumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon
prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the op-
portunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate
and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the
outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate re-
mains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to
hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor can-
not cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive le-
gal requirements of eligibility to run for public office."
48
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013.
qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can

be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote
count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candi-
dates.
"That the disqualified candidate has already been pro-
claimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subse-
quent disqualification based on a substantive ground that ex-
isted prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not
only the COC but also the proclamation.
"Section 6 ofR.A. No. 6646 provides:
"'Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.-Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be.
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commis-
sion shall continue with the trial and hearing of the ac-
tion, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the com-
plainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.'
''There was no chance for Arnado's proclamation to be
suspended under this rule because Amado failed to file his an-
swer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only
filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and
after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
"The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sen-
tence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a can-
didate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the of-
fice.
"The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino
and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candi-
dacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office
based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Accordingly,it was held authorized, in Sanchez v.

Commission on Elections, 51 to declare a failure of elec-
tion because of the terrorism that attended the counting
of the votes and the preparation of the election returns
and to call another el~ction.
"A failure of election may be declared only in the
three instances stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Elec-
tion Code: the election has not been held; the election
has been suspended before the hour fixed by law; and
the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns have. given rise to the consequent failure to
elect, meaning nobody emerged as the winner. Fur-
thermore, the reason for such failure of election should
be force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes. Finally, before the COMELEC can
grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
election, the concurrenceof 2 conditions must be estab-
lished, namely: (1) no voting has taken place in the pre-
cincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if
there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a
failure to elect; and (2) the votes cast would affect the
result of the election.?"
In Sangcopan v. COMELEC, 53 the Supreme Court,
citing Sanchez, clarified that the "annulment of election
can only be done when the COMELEC finds that an
election was vitiated by widespread and pervasive ter-
rorism and election frauds, which resulted in the sub-
mission at gunpoint of falsified and tampered election
returns, and it is impossible to purge the illegal from
the valid returns, so that there are no returns worthy of
"' 114 SCRA 454 (1982).

"2 Presbiterio v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178884, June 30, 2008,
556 SCRA 815.
''1G.R. No. 170216, March 12, 2008, 548 SCRA 148.
a resolution of the respondent directing newspapers to

provide it with free space of not less than one half-page
for the common use of political parties and candidates.
Through Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, it held that the
compulsory "donatioJ" was a "taking" of private prop-
erty without payment of the just compensation required
in expropriation cases. Moreover, the respondent had
not established the necessity of the taking, considering
that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertis-
ing space, let alone its own authority to expropriate.
In seeming contrast though, the Supreme Court
held in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines u. COMELEC56 that a law requiring ra-
dio and television stations to give free air time to the
Commission on Elections to enable it to broadcast in-
formation regarding candidates constitutes a valid regu-
lation by the State on the use of its air waves. The Court
considered said law to be a valid exercise of the police
power.
At any rate, it has been declared that the Commis-
sion's broad power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall," carries
with it all necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.57 These would include its
authority to promulgate rules for purposes of regulating
elections. It has accordingly been observed that "pursu-
ant to this authority, the Comelec issues various resolu-
tions prior to every local or national elections setting
,., 289 SCRA 337.

'1 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295 (1941), cited
in Dumarpa v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 192249, April 2,

2013, 694 SCRA 403.
running as a candidate" as a ground for disqualification

under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In BANAT v. COMELEC,63 the Supreme Court
ruled that, when the, Commissionon Elections En Banc
acts as the National Board of Canvassers for the elec-
tion of Senators, it does not, as such, undermine or en-
croach upon the prerogatives and independence of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, despite its authority to en-
tertain pre-proclamation cases, considering that this
power shall merely be to determine the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass, which may
be exercised or done before the proclamation of the win-
ning senatorial candidates. It is only after these win-
ning candidates have been proclaimed that the Senate
Electoral Tribunal may exercise its jurisdiction over
their election, their qualifications and the pertinent
election returns.
To give more "teeth" to its authority to enforce and
administer election laws, the present Constitution reit-
erates the requirement that "no pardon, amnesty, parole
or suspension of sentence for the violation of election
laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission?" This rule, significantly, now covers even
violations of administrative rules or regulations con-
cerning elections.
Without this provision, persons convicted of elec-
tion offenses committed by them for the benefit of the
party in power might be undeservedly relieved of their
penalties by a grateful administration.
"'1 G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 4 77.

c,4 Art. IX-C, Sec. 7.
election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code,

and to prosecute the same. The COMELEC may avail itself of
the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. It
is clear that the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City
Fiscals, and/or their .respective assistants have been given con-
tinuing authority, a; deputies of the Commission, to conduct a
preliminary investigation of complaints involving election of-
fenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. Such
authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the
COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judg-
ment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the
integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where
it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done
by the COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of
the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it
are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in
derogation of its resolutions, directives or orders in relation to
election cases that such prosecutors are deputized to investi-
gate and prosecute. Being mere deputies, provincial and city
prosecutors, acting on behalf of the COMELEC, must proceed
within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.t'"
Accordingly,under Section 2, Rule 34 of the Come-

lee Rules of Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors
and their assistants are given continuing authority as
deputies to conduct the preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under election
laws and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be
filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them by
the Commissionor its duly authorized representatives.69
In Arroyo u. Department of Justice." the Supreme
Court acknowledged that complaints for violations of
election laws may be filed either with the Commission
68
Dino v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4, 2009, 607
SCRA.251.
69
Commission on Elections v. Espanol, G.R. Nos. 149164-73,
December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 554, 565.
70
proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a

full-blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt
to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualifi-
cation of the offender, which may even include disqualification
from holding a future public office."
(2) Decision of Election Contests
"(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all con-

tests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate ju-
risdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elec-
tive barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited ju-
risdiction."
"Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
elections contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable."
Exclusive original jurisdiction is now vested in the

Commission over election contests relating to the elec-
tion, returns and qualifications of all regional, provin-
cial and city officials. These cases may be appealed to
the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari, 74 which is
limited to questions of law involving grave abuse of dis-
cretion or lack or excess ofjurisdiction.
This express grant of power upon the Commission
to resolve election protests carries with it the grant of
all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the
effective and efficient exercise of the power expressly
granted, which includes the authority to order a techni-
74
Rules of Court, Rule 64; see Lokin v. Commission on Elec-
tions, G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 538; Reyes v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA
512, 516, cited in Versoza v. Carague, G.R. No. 157838, March 8,
2011, 644 SCRA 679; Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
192289, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 129
as originally decided by regional or municipal trial

courts, and its decisions in these cases shall be final,
executory and not appealable. This rule does not conflict
with the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Article VIII, Section 5(2), which covers only
the final judgments and orders of courts of justice. The
Commission is not a judicial tribunal but only an ad-
ministrative body. Even so, its decisions, orders and
rulings may be challenged in a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court under Article IX-A, Section 7,
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.78
As held in Javier v. Commission on Electionsi"
"The word 'contests' should not be given a restrictive

meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible
scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Con-
stitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the
1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as referring
to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective
office, made before or after proclamation of the winner,
whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.
Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent mean-
ing and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2)
and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
"The phrase 'election, returns and qualifications' should
be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affect-
ing the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to
specify, we can say that 'election' referred to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the holding ofthe electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; 'returns'
to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the win-
ners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election re-
turns; and 'qualifications' to matters that could be raised in a
quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
1"
Ibid.
w 144 SCRA 194.
sions of courts in election cases.84 These would include

petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders
of regional trial courts in municipal election contests"
and of municipal trial courts in barangay election
cases."
Accordingto Section 3 of this heading:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en bane

or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure
in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for recon-
sideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
bane."
The Commission meets in two divisions, each con-

sisting of three members. Their decisions may be ele-
vated in a motion for reconsideration to, and may be
reviewed by, the Commissionsitting en bane.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,87 the Court held that it is
the Commission sitting in division, and not the Com-
mission en bane, which has jurisdiction over petitions to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. This ruling is consis-
tent with the general pronouncement of the Supreme
Court to the effect that the Commission,sitting en bane,
does not have the authority to hear and decide election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, in the
first instance, as the COMELEC in division has such
84
Bulilis v. Nuez, G. R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011, 655 SCRA
241.
ss Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011,
643 SCRA 631.
86
Bulilis v. Nuez, supra.
87
338 Phil. 484 (1997), cited in Bautista v. Commission on
Elections, 460 Phil. 459, 478 (2003); see also Ibrahim v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 192289, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA 129.
First Division to first decide the protest on its merits,

and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the de-
nial of his special affirmative defenses to the COME-
LEC En Banc along with the other errors committed by
the division upon th{ merits." Neither would it have
certiorari jurisdiction even over final resolutions of a
division of the Commission.94
The only time that the Supreme Court may review
an interlocutory order of a division of the Commission
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is when it acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
as when it rules on a matter which only the Commission
en bane may properly determine in accordance with the
Commission's Rules of Procedure.95
In Layug u. Commission on Elections." the Su-
preme Court assumed jurisdiction over a petition for
certiorari covering a resolution of a division of the
Commission which had become final, the pertinent mo-
tion for reconsideration, which was filed by the peti-
tioner beyond the deadline, having been properly denied
by said division.
"'Ambil v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 143398, October

25, 2000, 344 SCRA 358, 365-366; see also Jumamil v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. Nos. 167989-93, March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 553;
Dimayuga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174763, April 24,
2007, 522 SCRA 220; Cayetano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
193846, April 12, 2011, supra., cited in Cagas v. Commission on
Elections, supra.
95
Khov. Commission on Elections; G.R. No. 124033, September
25, 1997, 279 SCRA 463, 471-473; see also Repol v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 161418, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 321, cited in
Cagas v. Commission on Elections, supra.
"" G.R. No. 192984, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 135.
(3) Decision of Administrative Questions
"(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all

questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and locatiori of polling places, appointment of election
officials and inspectors, and registration of voters."
Determination of the myriad administrative details

relating to the conduct of the elections is the responsibil-
ity of the Commission on Elections. Thus, it ascertains
the establishment of precincts, the designation of polling
places, the purchase of election paraphernalia, the ap-
pointment of election officials,the registration of voters,
and the conduct of elections in general.
In Guevara u. Commission on Elections, 101 the peti-
tioner was cited for contempt by the respondent for hav-
ing published a news report in the Manila Times about
certain irregularities alleged to have been committed by
the latter in the purchase of ballot boxes. The Supreme
Court held that the contempt power conferred upon the
Commission on Elections by law was an inherently judi-
cial prerogative and could not be exercised by it in con-
nection with the discharge of its purely routinary or
administrative duties, as distinguished from its quasi-
judicial duties.
In Bedol u. COMELEC,102 the Court sustained the
exercise by the Commissionon Elections of its contempt
power in connection with the canvassing of votes, noting
that the act of canvassing votes is not purely ministe-
rial, but also quasi-judicial. It declared that its investi-
gation of reports on electoral fraud was a fact-finding
act relevant to its quasi-judicial power.
'0' 104 Phil. 269.

102
to leave no doubt as to the superior authority in the

exercise of this power, it is provided in Section 2(8) of
this heading that the Commission may merely "recom-
mend to the President the removal of any officer or em-
ployee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or dis-
obedience to, its decision, order, or directive." The Com-
mission cannot exercise direct disciplinary authority
over them.
This is one instance where the Commissionon Elec-
tions, although expressly declared to be independent by
the Constitution, is subordinated to the President.
(5) Registration of Political Parties
"(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political par-

ties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other re-
quirements, must present their platform or program of gov-
ernment; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be reg-
istered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through vio-
lence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign gov-
ernment shall likewise be refused registration.
"Financial contributions from foreign governments and
their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates related to elections, constitute interference in na-
tional affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Com-
mission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed
bylaw."
Registration of political parties is necessary to give

them political identity and juridical personality for pur-
poses of the elections where they intend to participate.
It is essential that they present their programs and
platforms of government for the information of the elec-
torate whose support they are seeking as otherwise the
held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full
battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their
purpose in employing violence and using unlawful
means to achieve their goals in the process defying the
laws of organized societies."
The Court declared that the Commission did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in making such an
administrative finding and held -
"In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did

not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood because (a)
no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its
members immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the ho-
tel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.
These arguments present a very narrow interpretation of the
concepts of violence and unlawful means, and downplays the
threat of violence displayed by the soldiers during the take-
over.
"Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitu-
tion, parties, organizations and coalitions that 'seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means' shall be denied
registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of
B.P. 881, which provides that 'no political party which seeks to
achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accredita-
tion.'
"Violenceis the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force,
usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or
fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse
of force; that force which is employed against common right,
against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other
hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need
not be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with
evil intent for it to exist.
"In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that
was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the
leaders of MAGDALOduring the siege, their objectives were to
express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former
President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the
military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state.
limited only to exammmg whether MAGDALO pos-

sessed all the necessary qualifications and none of dis-
qualifications for registration as a political party. In
arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had
to assess whether there was substantial evidence ade-
quate to support this conclusion."
The Court concluded though by declaring that "in
view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the
members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired dur-
ing the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted
as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications
from party registration."
It is established that "to join electoral contests, a
party or organization must undergo the two-step process
of registration and accreditation.t''" Moreover, "political
coalitions need to register in accordance with the estab-
lished norms and procedures, if they are to be recog-
nized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law
to registered coalitions. Registered political parties
carry a different legal personality from that of the coali-
tion they may wish to establish with other similarly
registered parties. If they want to coalesce with one
another without the formal registration of their coali-
tion, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their
and their members' democratic freedom of choice, but
they cannot receive official recognition for their coali-
tion. Or they can choose to secure the registration of
their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges
accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to
be accredited as a dominant majority or minority party.
'0" Liberal Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191771, 6 May 2010,
620 SCRA 393, cited in Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC,

supra.
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,

organization or coalition if it is a religious sect or de-
nomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes; it advocates violence or unlawful
means to seek its goal; it is a foreign party or organiza-
tion; it is receiving support from any foreign govern-
ment, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or mem-
bers or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes; it violates or fails to comply with
laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; it de-
clares untruthful statements in its petition; it has
ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or it fails to par-
ticipate in the last two preceding elections.?"
It must be noted that the Commission on Elections
would, under Section 6, have the authority to either
refuse or to cancel the registration of any national, re-
gional or sectoral party, organization or coalition. The
Supreme Court has had occasion to distinguish between
the two options available to the COMELEC.Thus -
"The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately

apparent from their basic definitions. To refuse is to decline or
to turn down, while to cancel is to annul or remove. Adopting
such meanings within the context of Section 6, refusal of regis-
tration happens during the inceptive stage when an organiza-
tion seeks admission into the roster of COMELEC-registered
party-list organizations through a petition for registration.
Cancellation on the other hand, takes place after the fact of
registration when an inquiry is done by the COMELEC,motu
propio or upon a verified complaint, on whether a registered
'°" See BANATv. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009,

592 SCRA 294, where the Supreme Court declared as unconstitu-
tional the other ground specified in Section 6, to wit, "failure to
obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
the COMELEC's power to register a party-list group, as

distinguished from the entirely separate power invoked
by the complaint, which is the power to cancel.t''"
The Commission's power to register political par-
ties includes "the ascertainment of the identity of the
political party and its legitimate officers responsible for
its acts."!" It likewise involves "the determination of the
persons who must act on its behalf."!" It may therefore
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to
register political parties.!" Its jurisdiction extends to
cases pertaining to party leadership and the nomination
of party-list representatives. Its "jurisdiction to settle
the struggle for leadership within the party is well es-
tablished. This singular power to rule upon questions of
party identity and leadership is exercised by the
COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers.t''"
Its authority to resolve intra-party disputes has been
considered as "a necessary tributary of its constitution-
ally mandated power to enforce election laws and regis-
ter political parties."!"
110
Ibid.
111
Kalaw v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 80218, Minute
Resolution dated November 5, 1987.
112
Palmares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 86177-78,
Minute Resolution dated August 31, 1989.
11"
Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010,
612 SCRA 761.
11'
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. Commission on Elec-
tions, 468 Phil. 70 (2004).
"" Lokin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193808, June
26, 2012, 674 SCRA 538.
Commission on Elections to refuse to give due course to

certificates of nuisance candidates, and assures equal
treatment for all candidates, privileged or not, consis-
tently with the constitutional rule that "bona fide ccn-
didates for any public office shall be free from any form
of harassment and discrimination.t''" Moreover, Section
18 (1) of Article III provides that "no person shall be
detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations."
The required report can be the basis of legislation
that may improve the conduct of future elections. Fur-
thermore, it can be used for the purpose of determining
certain questions relative to election contests or to the
credentials of the candidates proclaimed elected. Thus,
in Vera v. Avelino, 117 the report of the Commission on
Elections that irregularities characterized the elections
held in many places in Central Luzon was the major
justification invoked by the majority of the members of
the Senate for the resolution they passed to defer the
oath-taking of three Oppositionsenators-elect.
Election Period
"Sec. 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in

special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days
before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter."
The old law prescribed an election period that

ended on election day, disregarding the fact that the
electoral process continues even beyond the actual con-
duct of the polls and, indeed, is terminated only after
the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the
winners. The new election period is more realistic be-
11•
Constitution, Art. IX-C, Sec. 10.
111.
77 Phil. 191.
include six legislators, three to be nominated by the

party having the highest number of members and the
other three by the party having the second highest
number of members in the Senate or the House of Rep-
resentatives, as the c~se might be. Now, the six legisla-
tors are apportioned on the basis of the different politi-
cal parties represented in the chamber, whatever their
number.
Additionally, it is provided in the followingsections
that:
"Sec. 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed
to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to
the provisions of this Article."
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, or-
ganization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those regis-
tered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitu-
tion."
The usual privileges enjoyed by the majority and

minority parties under the old laws, such as representa-
tion in the boards of election inspectors and the boards
of canvassers, are also now discontinued by Section 8,
thus:
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions

registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented
in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors,
boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with
law."
While affiliation with a strong political party is an

important factor in the success of a candidate for elec-
tive office, the above provision will diminish to a consid-
erable degree the possibility of undeserving nominees
winning on the strength alone of the party to which they
Judicial Review
The Commission on Elections has been character-

ized as "an independent constitutional body with a dis-
tinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In
the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of
fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of
laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be
stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justi-
fied in the case of an organization of lesser responsibil-
ity. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from
interfering with the Comelec's exercise of its power
which, by law and by the nature of its office properly
pertains to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the Comelec'spart, as here,
the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective
hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of
that body."122
The power of review of the Supreme Court under
Article IX-A, Section 7, is available not only against
decisions, orders or rulings rendered by the Commission
on Elections in an election contest but also those relat-
ing to the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. Thus, a
person whose certificate of candidacy is rejected or can-
celed by the Commission on Elections on the ground,
say, that he does not possess the required qualifications,
may elevate the matter on certiorari to the Supreme
Court.
In Luison v. Garcia, 12.1 a certificate of candidacy
filed by the respondent was canceled by the Commission
on Elections on the ground that it was not under oath.
122
Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009,
599 SCRA 69.
12"
101 Phil. 1218.
icy, there are matters that by their nature ought to be left for
final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or
entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure the faith-
ful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrari-
ness."
At any rate, the orders, ruling and decisions ren-

dered or issued by the Commissionen bane which may
be the subjects of the Supreme Court's power of review
must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudica-
tory or quasi-judicial power.125
As explained by the Supreme Court in Lokin v.
Commission on Elections,126 its review of judgments and
final orders of the Commissionon Elections is governed
specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which, cu-
riously, provides that judgments or final orders or reso-
lutions of the Commission on Elections may be brought
by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certio-
rari under Rule 65 within thirty days, under Section 3
of Rule 64.
As held in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop
v. Ferrer, 127 "what is contemplated by the term final or-
ders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC review-
able by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by
law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before
the COMELECand taken cognizanceofby the said body
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial pow-
ers." Hence, an order of the Commission on Elections
awarding a contract for the construction of voting
ras Cayetano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193846,

April 12, 2011, 648 SCRA 561.
126
G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 538; see also
Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192289, January 8,
2013, 688 SCRA 129.
12'
135 SCRA 25.
Chapter 16
THE COMl\fiSSION ON AUDIT
THE COMMISSIONON AUDIT is the watchdog of the

financial operations of the government. This is an im-
portant constitutional role as the stability of govern-
ment depends to a considerable degree on the integrity
of its fiscal policies and transactions. So many regimes
have floundered and collapsedbecause of their improvi-
dent and irregular management of public funds and
properties. This can be avoided in our country with a
vigilant and conscientiousCommissionon Audit.
The Commission on Audit replaces the General
Auditing Office established under the 1935 Constitu-
tion. Like its predecessor and the other Constitutional
Commissions under the present charter, the Commis-
sion on Audit is afforded certain guarantees to safe-
guard and strengthen its independence and effective-
ness.
Composition and Qualifications
The Commission on Audit created under the 1973

Constitution is substantially retained by the new char-
ter in Article IX-Dthus:
"Section l. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit

composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified
709
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT 711
counts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expen-

ditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by
or pertaining to, the government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
and controlled corporations with original charters and on 'a
post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and of-
fices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Con-
stitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c)
other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the granting insti-
tution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or eq-
uity. However, where the internal control system of the au-
dited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such
measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are
necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall
keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such pe-
riod as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and
other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
"(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority,
subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of
its audit and examination, establish the techniques and meth-
ods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties."
Public funds are derived mainly from taxes, fines,

and loans contracted by the government. All collections
are required to be turned over to the national treasury
and accounted for in accordance with law and regula-
tions. The Commissionon Audit sees to it that this duty
is duly performed by the officers receiving these collec-
tions.
Once these funds are deposited with the Treasury,
they cannot be released therefrom except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law. This law may come
from the Constitution itself or from the Congress. In the
THE COMMISSIONON AUDIT 713
he has any doubt over the accounts rendered, may make

an actual examination of the funds and property repre-
sented by such paper accounts or balances before issu-
ing his certificate of clearance."
In the discharge of its responsibility to keep the
general accounts of the government and, for such period
as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers per-
taining thereto, the Commission on Audit acts as the
central accounting agency of the Government and has
the custody, and thus can protect the integrity, of all
vouchers relating to the accounts of the various govern-
ment offices. By virtue of this authority, the Commis-
sion on Audit can more efficiently keep track of all re-
ceipts and disbursements of public funds and properties
and record the same on the basis of the pertinent vouch-
ers.
The Commission on Audit continues to be empow-
ered to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention of irregu-
lar, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscion-
able expenditures or uses of public funds and property.4
In Riel v. Wright,5 the petitioner was seeking pay-
ment of his salary for services rendered by him as tem-
porary clerk of the Senate. The Insular Auditor denied
his claim on the ground inter alia that his services were
unnecessary because the body had a sufficient number
of permanent employees and, moreover, the session had
already ended many days before. The Supreme Court
said: "Neither is there any merit in the allegation made
in the answer that the services of the petitioner and
other employees of the same status are and have been
4
Constitution, Article IX-D, Section 2(2).
'49 Phil. 195.
tor General, but a discretional power authorizing him to de-

termine whether or not the expenditure in question is irregu-
lar, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant."
The apparent inconsistencybetween the two above-

mentioned cases can be easily reconciled. In the Riel
Case, the Insular Auditor was questioning the necessity
of an appropriation, a matter clearly out of his jurisdic-
tion; in the Matute Case, the Auditor General was exer-
cising his authority to "examine, audit and settle, in
accordance with law and administrative regulations," an
account that was demonstrably unlawful.
A definitive interpretation of the Auditor-General's
"critical function," as it is called, was made by the Su-
preme Court in Guevara u. Gimenez. 7 In this case the
Central Bank had retained the legal services of the peti-
tioner as collaborating counsel with its legal staff for a
stipulated "fee of Pl0,000.00 plus a per diem of P300.00
for every hearing or trial." The Auditor-General ap-
proved the basic fee, provided it was payable in install-
ments, but not the per diem, on the ground that it was
unnecessary. Somewhat inconsistently, the respondent
also argued that the petitioner should not have been
retained at all because the Central Bank had its own
regular counsel anyway, not to mention the Government
Corporate Counsel and the lawyers in the Department
of Justice. Justice Roberto Concepcion,in rejecting these
contentions, declared for a unanimous Court as follows:
"It is well-settled, however, that when a contract has

been made by an agencyof the Government, through its proper
officer, acting within the scope of his authority, and there is an
appropriation made by law to cover the disbursements re-
quired by said contract, apart from the fact that delivery of the
goods or rendition of the services stipulated has been duly at-
1
6 SCRA 813 (1962).
can be done, so it is argued, through the power of the

Commissionto refuse to "examine, audit and settle" any
account violating its own regulations "for the prevention
and disallowance of. irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds or properties."
This view has actually been affirmed in subsequent
rulings of the Supreme Court. Thus, in Caltex Philip-
pines, Inc. u. Commission on Audit,8 the Court declared
that "the ruling on this particular point, quoted by peti-
tioner from the cases of Guevarra us. Gimenez and
Ramos us. Aquino, are no longer controlling as the two
were decided in the light of the 1935 Constitution."
"There can be no doubt, however, that the audit power of

the Auditor General under the 1935 Constitution and the
Commission on Audit under the 1973 Constitution authorized
them to disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds
and property. Our present Constitution retains that same
power and authority, further strengthened by the definition of
the COA's general jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines and Administrative Code of
1987. Pursuant to its power to promulgate accounting and au-
diting rules and regulations for the prevention of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of
funds, the COA promulgated on 29 March 1977 COA Circular
No. 77-55. Since the COA is responsible for the enforcement of
the rules and regulations, it goes without saying that failure to
comply with them is a ground for disapproving the payment of
the proposed expenditure."
Indeed, it has been held that the Commission on

Audit "is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine,
• G.R. No. 92585, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 726; see also Na-
tional Electrification Administration v. Commission on Audit, 427
Phil. 464, 481 (2002); Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471; Tagum Doctors Enterprises
v. Apsay, G.R. No. 81188, August SCRA 471, 489.
certain institutions whose functions would otherwise be

hampered by such requirements. Where expenditures
are urgently needed, and delay is likely to defeat the
purposes of the body 9r result in prejudice to its opera-
tions, special measures are allowed to be taken by the
Commissionon Audit to adapt to the problem.
Thus, "there is nothing in the said provision that
requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all govern-
ment transactions and for all government agencies. The
only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found
in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-
audit is mandated for certain government or private
entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the
internal control system of an audited entity is inade-
quate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt meas-
ures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to cor-
rect the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is
not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the
COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line
with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA
has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination."?'
As previously noted, any monetary claim against
the government must first be filed with the Commission
on Audit, which must act upon it within sixty days. In
Pacete v. Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit, 12
the petitioner contended that failure of Commission on
Audit to act on his claim within the reglementary period
resulted in its automatic approval pursuant to Section 1
of C.A. No. 327. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that the petitioner's remedy was to file a petition for
II
De la Llana v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G. R. No.
180989, February 7, 2012, 665 SCRA 176.
12
185 SCRA 1 (1990).
tober 25, 2000) They should bear in mind that the pri-
mary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims
of any sort due from the Government or any of its sub-
divisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the
Commission on Audit (COA) pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1445." It added, "it was of no moment that a
final and executory decision already validated the claim
against the UP. The settlement of the monetary claim
was still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA
despite the final decision of the RTC having already
validated the claim. As such, Stern Builders and de la
Cruz as the claimants had no alternative except to first
seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim."
This is so because under Section 2 (1) of Article IX-
D of the Constitution, the Commissionon Audit has the
"power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle
all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned
or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government."
These would include informer's rewards granted by the
Department of Finance and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue,16 benefits and privileges granted to the per-
sonnel of a local water district under a collective bar-
gaining agreement, 17 the grant of compensation other
than the payment of per diems, 18 coconut levy funds,
being special public funds, 19 the oil price stabilization
1•
Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545, April 23,
2008, 552 SCRA 471, at 488.
17
Abanilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 14234 7, August
25, 2005, 468 SCRA 87.
18
De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 471 SCRA 624.
19
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Republic of
the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA
514; see also Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 49.
and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. These

would include local water districts," which are govern-
ment-owned or controlled corporations, local government
units, despite their acknowledgedfiscal autonomy," and
even the Boy Scoutsof\he Philippines.26
In Civil Service Commission v. Pobre,27 the Su-
preme Court held that while the determination of leave
benefits is within the functions of the Civil Service
Commission as the central personnel agency of the gov-
ernment, the duty to examine accounts and expendi-
tures relating to such benefits properly pertains to the
Commission on Audit. Even as the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the Civil Service Commission's jurisdiction in
said case, it clarified that the same is not exclusive as it
is shared with the Commission on Audit.
The power of the Commission on Audit to examine
and audit authorizes it to disallow public expenditures
in accordance with its own rules, subject only to the
requirements of the Constitution and applicable laws.
This prerogative has been considered as independent of
the authority of other agencies of government to deter-
mine the liability of public officers involved in said pub-
lic expenditures. It has thus been ruled that the dis-
missal of criminal charges against an individual with
respect to his handling of government funds or proper-
ties would not necessarily preclude the Commission
2'
Feliciano v. Aranez, G.R. No. 165641, August 25, 2010, 629
SCRA 103; Barbo v Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 157542, October
10, 2008, 568 SCRA 302.
25
Veloso v. Commission on Audit, supra.
26
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 177131, June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 146.
21
438 SCRA 334.
Prohibited Exemptions
During the Marcos regime, certain entities of the

government were exempted from audit by the Commis-
sion on Audit, with the result that they were allowed
the fullest leeway in the squandering and misappropria-
tion of public funds and properties. As a reaction
against that practice, and to prevent its recurrence, it is
provided in Section 3 that:
"Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of

the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any
investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission on Audit."
Among the issues in Philippine Coconut Producers

Federation, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines" was
whether the purchase of shares of stock in a private
banking corporation using coconut levy funds was sub-
ject to the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Au-
dit. The Court stressed that it was and held-
"The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA
with the responsibility for State audit. (Mamaril v. Domingo,
G.R. No. 100284, October 13, 1993, 227 SCRA 206) As an inde-
pendent supreme State auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be
undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3
of the 1987 Constitution, "[n]o law shall be passed exempting
any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission on Audit." Following the mandate of
the COA and the parameters set forth by the foregoing provi-
sions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over the coconut levy
funds, being special public funds. Conversely, the COA has the
power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all ac-
32
G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA 514; see
also Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos.
147036-37,April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 49.
Commission on Audit, and in Osmeiia v. Orbos" where

the Court likewise found the oil price stabilization fund,
which was a special fund mainly because this was seg-
regated from the general fund and placed in what the
law referred to as a t;ust account, as also subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.
Report
The annual report from the Commission on Audit is

required as follows:
"Sec. 4. The Commission shall submit to the President

and the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual re-
port covering the financial condition and operation of the Gov-
ernment, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, in-
cluding government-ownedor controlled corporations, and non-
governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend
measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and effi-
ciency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required
bylaw."
Through the report required by this provision, the

President and the Congress shall be informed of the
financial status of the government and the manner in
which revenues have been collected, appropriation laws
have been implemented, and expenditures or uses of
public funds and properties undertaken. Information
contained in this report and the recommendations made
by the Commission on Audit will be useful in enabling
the government to improve its financial operations.
The authority of the Commission to recommend
measures to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the government empowers it "to conduct the so-called
performance audit which consists of the analytical and
3'
G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 703, 711.
Chapter 17
ARTICLE XI of the new Constitution begins with a

platitude, to wit: "Public office is a public trust. "1 While
perhaps belonging more appropriately to a political
speech rather than the fundamental law, this hack-
neyed statement nonetheless does not lose any validity
because of its triteness. The framers of the Constitution
probably believed, at the risk of involving themselves in
a cliche, that there was a necessity to perpetuate this
reminder of the nature of the mandate reposed in all
public officers by the sovereign people. Presumably,
they wanted to underline the necessity for a return to
the old concepts and values of public office.This is per-
haps also the reason why the provision goes on to say,
like a pastor from his pulpit, that ''public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives. "2 The preacher may as well add "public
service is its own reward."
At any rate, the Supreme Court emphasized in
Cornejo u. Gabriel' that the Constitutional precept that
public officeis a public trust is the underlying principle
I
Constitution, Art. XI.
2
Ibid.
O
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
'41 Phil. 188, 193-194 (1920).
729
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 731
number of officials, the purpose being to ensure the

highest care in their indictment and conviction and the
imposition of special penalties in case of a finding of
guilt, taking into account the degree or nature of the
offense committed and the high status of the wrong-
doers.
In actual practice, impeachment may be "a rusted
blunderbuss," as Rossiter puts it, seldom brandished
and hardly ever used. Except only where there is a
strong public outcry against the respondent, as in the
case of U.S. President Richard Nixon, the decision to
impeach is usually blocked by a protective majority on
the basis of partisan or pragmatic considerations. On
the other hand, politics may also provoke impeachment
of an officialwho has incurred the hostility of the party
in power, as in the case of U.S. President Andrew John-
son, who escaped convictionby only one vote. More re-
cently, President Bill Clinton was also exonerated, in
his case even with the support of some minority sena-
tors.
The charges filed in 1988 against the entire mem-
bership of the Supreme Court can only evoke disap-
pointment and apprehension over how impeachment
can be employed for the gratification of private malice or
vainglory. Judges are especially subject to vindictive-
ness from disgruntled litigants and can be easily har-
assed with impeachment charges, which can be filed
easily enough, regardless of their merits. The impeach-
ment of President Joseph Estrada in 2000 appeared to
be justified, however, although the trial was abruptly
terminated because of the "people power" demonstra-
tions at Edsa that forced him out of office even without
his formal convictionby the Senate.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PlJBLIC OFFICERS 733
Many sectors believe that his removal was only

proper because, as specified in the impeachment com-
plaint, his "ethical blindness, introduction of political
partisanship at the expense of due process, and intrigue
into the court at the expense of the reputation of his
fellow justices, his undermining basic and cherished
principles of intellectual, financial, and ethical honesty
by using his powers not to arrive at the truth, or hold
the court to the highest standards, but instead, to cover
up and excuse the shortcomings of the court, has (sic)
betrayed public trust by erodingpublic confidencein the
administration of justice.""
"Never has the position of Chief Justice, or the standing

of the Supreme Court, as an institution, been so tainted with
the perception of bias and partiality, as it is now: not even in
the dark days of martial law, has the chief magistrate behaved
with such arrogance, impunity, and cynicism. And yet, for the
authentic rule of law to prevail, the public must have absolute
trust and confidence in the justice, probity, integrity, and im-
partiality, of the members of the Supreme Court. To have any
justice, much more, a Chief Justice, who does not live up to the
expectation of being like Caesar's wife -beyond reproach- is to
fatally impede the ability of our institutions to function and
dispense true justice to the people.t'"
Although the impeachment complaint specified

many charges regarding Chief Justice Corona's charac-
ter and performance as the "leader" of the Supreme
Court, such as, for instance, his "partiality and subser-
vience in cases involving the Arroyo Administration
from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court
Justice and until his dubious appointment as a mid-
II
Verified Complaint for Impeachment, December 12, 2011,
Prefatory Statement.
12
Ibid.
What was not expected was his public demeanor as

he brought out his defenses, not in the halls of the Sen-
ate as an Impeachment Court where many believed they
properly pertained, but outside it, or before the masses,
perhaps, believing that he was embroiled in a political,
and not a legal, conflict. In an unprecedented fashion, a
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court delivered impas-
sioned, if not feisty, "political" speeches against the
President from the balcony of the Supreme Court, with
the court personnel, wearing colored shirts announcing
their support for their Chief Justice, providing him with
what was largely perceived as nothing more than or-
chestrated applause. We saw the Chief Magistrate mak-
ing the rounds of morning television shows, one after
the other, subjecting himself to television interviews,
not unlike a movie starlet promoting a new film. He
visited one radio station after the other and engaged in
morning chitchats with popular radio hosts. He even
allowed, if not encouraged, television cameramen to
take video footage of him attending several masses held
in the halls of the Supreme Court, perhaps, to proclaim
before the public his piety, which he probably felt he
needed to do as part of his defense in the impeachment
proceedings. Many viewed these acts of Chief Justice
Corona as conduct certainly unbecominga Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, which demeaned, if not cheap-
ened, the high officehe then held.
In the end, the evidence relied upon by the Im-
peachment Court in convicting him turned out to have
come mostly from no other source than himself, when he
formally disclosed (or admitted, wittingly or unwit-
tingly) details relevant to his many bank accounts and
real properties in the course of his lengthy monologue
which he ended with his patently premeditated walk-
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PlIBLIC OFFICERS 737
sive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative

enactment. Deputy Ombudsmen and Special Prosecu-
tors are therefore not impeachable officers even if the
law provides for their :i;:emoval on the same grounds as.
removal by impeachment.17
The power to impeach is essentially a non-
legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Con-
gress only within the limits of the authority conferred
upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be
expanded by the grantee itself even if motivated by the
desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other offi-
cials of the government.
It is provided by decree" that the justices of the
Sandiganbayan may be removed only through process of
impeachment, the purpose evidently being to withdraw
them from the removal power of the Supreme Court.
This prohibition is of dubious constitutionality. In the
first place, the list of impeachable officers is covered by
the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Sec-
ondly, Article VIII, Section 11, of the Constitution states
that all judges of lower courts-and these would include
the Sandiganbayan-are under the disciplinary power
of the Supreme Court and may be removed by it. This
view is bolstered by the last sentence of Article XI, Sec-
tion 2, which runs in full as follows:
"Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the mem-

bers of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from of-
fice, on impeachment for and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
11
Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sep-
tember 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614.
1•
P.D. No. 1606, Section 1.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PuBLIC OFFICERS 739
"Bribery'' is committed by any public officer who

shall agree to perform an act, whether or not constitut-
ing a crime, or refrain from doing an act which he is
officially required to do in connection with the perform-
ance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer',
promise, gift or present received by him personally or
through the mediation of another, or who shall accept
gifts offered to him by reason of his office.23
"Other high crimes," according to the special com-
mittee of the House of Representatives that investigated
the impeachment charges against President Quirino,
are supposed to refer to those offenses "which, like trea-
son and bribery, are of so serious and enormous a na-
ture as to strike at the very life or the orderly workings
of the government." This rather ambiguous definition,
assuming it is correct, would probably exclude such
offenses as rape and murder which, although as serious
as treason and bribery, will not necessarily strike at the
orderly workings, let alone the life, of the government.
"Graft and corruption" is to be understood in the
light of the prohibited acts enumerated in the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was in force at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
"Betrayal of public trust" is a new ground added by
the Constitutional Commission as a catch-all to cover all
manner of offenses unbecoming a public functionary but
not punishable by the criminal statutes, like "inexcus-
able negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of authority,
breach of official duty by malfeasance or, misfeasance,
cronyism, favoritism, obstruction ofjustice.t'"
"'' Arts. 210-211, Ibid.

"Records of the CC, Vol. 2, p. 272.
all impeachment cases, making it both prosecutor and

judge at the same time in violation of due process oflaw.
The anomaly is avoided under the present procedure,
where the incompatible functions of accusation and de-.
cision are vested separately in the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate.
Under the new provisions, it is the House of Repre-
sentatives alone that can initiate an impeachment case
by a vote of at least one-third of its members. On the
other hand, the sole power to try and decide such case is
conferred on the Senate, which can convict only by a
vote of at least two-thirds of its members.
The applicable rules are as follows:
"Sec. 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have

the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
"(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citi-
zen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its re-
port to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution
shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
"(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable reso-
lution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded.
"(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of im-
peachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of
the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeach-
ment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
ACCOUN'I'ABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 7 43
endorsement even of a baseless impeachment complaint,

or one which would not be in conformity with the Rules
on Impeachment of the House of Representatives. Upon
its filing and referral to the appropriate house commit-
tee, no other impeachment complaint may be filed
against the same officialwithin a period of one year.
At any rate, the Supreme Court held in Gutierrez v.
The House of Representatioes" that "an impeachment
complaint need not allege only one impeachable of-
fense." In fact, according to the Court, multiple com-
plaints may be considered so long as they would all be
simultaneously referred or endorsed to the proper
Committee of the House of Representatives, and would
lead to only one impeachment proceeding.
Paragraph (3) was incorporated in the new chapter
to counteract a situation where the majority of the im-
peachment committee, although less than one-third of
the total membership of the House of Representatives,
may nullify the will of that number by refusing to en-
dorse the impeachment resolution. Such a situation
obtained in De Castro v. Committee on Justice" and
Romulo v. Yniguez" decided during the Marcos admini-
stration, over which the Supreme Court refused to as-
sume jurisdiction on the ground that the question pre-
sented was political in nature.
Section 8 authorizes Congress to "promulgate" its
rules on impeachment. Accordingto the Supreme Court,
the word "promulgate" must "be used in the context in
which it is generally understood-that is, to make
known." Thus -
21
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 198.
" G.R. No. L-71688, Sept. 3, 1985.
"' 141 SCRA 263 (1986).
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 7 45
demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it

asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition
from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment
Rules do not provide4 for . any provision regarding the
inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member
from participating in an impeachment proceeding. The
Committee may thus direct any question of partiality
towards the concerned member only. And any decision
on the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it is
not for this Court to interfere with that decision."Nev-
ertheless, the constitutional rights of the accused as
guaranteed in Article III, such as the right to due proc-
ess and against self-incrimination, are available in
these proceedings. The Rules of Court, while not strictly
applicable because the Senate is not a court of justice,
are also observed in the conduct of the trial. Notably,
the Constitution does not prescribe the quantum of evi-
dence needed for conviction.
The question of whether or not the impeached offi-
cial is subject to preventive suspension pendente lite has
never been raised in this jurisdiction. In the United
States, the issue was resolved as early as during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Convention of 1887,
when a proposal to provide for such preventive suspen-
sion if the President of the United States was on trial
was roundly rejected as being an unnecessary molesta-
tion.
According to Section 3(3), "no person shall be con-
victed without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate." The purpose evidently is to pre-
vent rash convictions that might result in irreparable
damage to the impeached official's honor and reputa-
tion, not to mention the trauma on the political life of
the nation.
In Francisco v. The House of Representatives,33 the

Supreme Court rejected the contention that it may not
exercise its judicial power with respect to impeachment
proceedings. Thus -
"The major difference between the judicial power of the

Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court
is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly
granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in na-
ture, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower
courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just
a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded defini-
tion to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discre-
tion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
"There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to
the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows the sole
power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, re-
quired vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeach-
ment of one and the same official.
"Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call
upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the prin-
ciple that 'whenever possible, the Court should defer to the
judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full
well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride.'
"But did not the people also express their will when they
instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution?
This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
11
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44; see also
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, Febru-
ary 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 198.
tive of whether his election is contested, is not essential before

such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
"Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the con-
tention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and in-
terdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution."
Impeachment proceedings have been "foreseen as

creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or high-
lighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger
that 'the decision will be regulated more by the com-
parative strength of parties, than by the real demon-
strations of innocence or guilt.' Given their concededly
political character, the precise role of the judiciary in
impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to
ensure the effective functioning of the separate
branches while preserving the structure of checks and
balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdic-
tion, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including those traditionally entrusted to
the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial
review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.?"
The judgment of conviction in the impeachment
proceedingsis also not subject to the pardoning power of
the President under Article VII, Section 19, of the Con-
stitution.
The convicted officialmay later be prosecuted in an
ordinary criminal action if the ground for his conviction
in the impeachment proceedings is also an indictable
"' Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242, July

17, 2012, 676 SCRA 563.
Under P.D. No. 1606, as amended,36 the Sandigan-

bayan consists of a presiding justice and 14 associate
justices and has the same rank as the Court of Appeals.
It sits in 5 divisions of three justices each, who shall be
necessary to constitute a quorum and whose unanimous
vote shall be required for the pronouncement of a judg-
ment. Its decisions may be brought on certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
Section 4 of said law provides that the Sandiganba-
yan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases in-
volving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, where the accused are officialsoccupying posi-
tions, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capac-
ity, to which the salary grade 27 is assigned, including,
among others, regional directors, governors, vice-
governors and provincial board members, city mayors,
vice-mayors, city councilors,37 army and air force colo-
nels or naval captains, high-ranking officers of the Phil-
ippine National Police, prosecutors and their assistants,
presidents, directors, trustees or managers of govern-
ment-owned or controlled corporations, members of
Congress and officials with SG27 and up, members of
the judiciary, and the chairmen and members of the
Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
Constitution. It likewise may exercise original jurisdic-
tion over other offenses or felonies, whether simple or
complexedwith other crimes, committed by public offi-
cials and employees mentioned above in relation to their
office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years
aaRepublic Act No 7975 and Republic Act No. 8249.

37
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, September 15,
2010, 630 SCRA 489.
It likewise does not have jurisdiction over an assis-

tant regional director of the Cooperative Development
Authority" and a punong barangay45 because their posi-
tions are classified below salary grade 27.
It is important to note that, in Orap v. Sandigan-
46
bayan, the Court affirmed the jursidiction of the
Sandiganbayan over a municipal judge charged with a
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Sandiganba-
yan shall place public officers facing criminal charges
for violations of said law under suspension pendente lite
for not more than ninety days.47 Although this suspen-
sion is mandatory," it requires a prior hearing to de-
termine "the validity of the information.?" That hearing
is similar to a challenge against the validity of the in-
formation by way of a motion to quash." This suspen-
sion is a mere "preventive measure?" that "arises from
the legal presumption that unless the accused is sus-
44
Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 188630, February 23, 2011,
644 SCRA 358.
45
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 172700,
July 23, 2010, 625 SCRA 299.
46
139 SCRA 252.
47
Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903, May 15,
1989, 173 SCRA 409, 419.
48
Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, 436
SCRA 337, 345.
49
Luciano v. Mariano, 148-B Phil. 178 (1971); People v. Albano,
Nos. L-45376-77,July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511, 517; see also Miguel
v. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012, 675
SCRA560.
'0 Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169888, November
11, 2008, 570 SCRA 622, 632.
"' Villasenor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700, March 4,
2008, 547 SCRA 658, at 666-667; Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 124067, March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 328, 339, at 336.
reau of Investigation which was filed also with the

Court of Appeals.56
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 further provides that the
Sandiganbayan "shall, have exclusive original jurisdic-
tion over petitions for the issuance of the writs of man-
damus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunc-
tions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar
nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Execu-
tive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:pro-
vided, that the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not
be exclusive of the Supreme Court."
In Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v.
Republic of the Philippines,57 the Supreme Court, citing
San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, 58 held that
suits dealing with "the recovery of sequestered shares,
property or business enterprises claimed, as alleged in
the corresponding basic complaints, to be ill-gotten as-
sets of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees and
acquired by taking undue advantage of relationships or
influence and/or through or as a result of improper use,
conversion or diversion of government funds or prop-
erty" clearly fall "within the unquestionable jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan." According to the Court, seques-
tered shares are prima facie ill-gotten wealth. The valid-
ity of their sequestration may therefore be determined
by the Sandiganbayan.59 Moreover, in Republic of the
56
Magno v. People, G.R. No. 171542, April 6, 2011, 647 SCRA
362.
"G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & 178193, January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA
514.
•• G.R. Nos. 104637-38, September 14, 2000, 340 SCRA 289.
'9 Cojuangco v. Republic, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012,
686 SCRA 472.

the Constitutional Commissions and enjoy the same

security of compensation. To strengthen its independ-
ence, the Constitution also gives the Office of the Om-
budsman fiscal autonomy and the power to appoint its
own officials and employees in accordance with civil
service laws. As previously noted, the Ombudsman is
among the officials who may be removed only through
impeachment.
The Supreme Court described the independence of
the Ombudsman in Gonzales v. Office of the President"
in this manner -
"The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman

is vested with was intended to free it from political considera-
tions in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of
the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the
Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means
nothing more· than that 'the terms of office, the salary, the ap-
pointments and discipline of all persons under the office' are
'reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians.' And so it
was that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had de-
clared the creation of the independent Office of the Ombuds-
man, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are
described as 'protectors of the people' and constitutionally
mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Govern-
ment Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent provisions under Article
XI prescribe a term of office of seven years without reappoint-
ment Section 11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during the
term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the
office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures
the exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The
cloak of independence is meant to build up the Office of the
Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function as
official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog
and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to ex-
tend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its offi-
cials to escape administrative discipline."
0'
(3) Term
The term of the Ombudsman and his deputies,

while also fixed at seven years, is not staggered like that
of the members of the' Constitutional Commissions. But
whereas the members of the Constitutional Commis-
sions are, upon completionof their terms, not prohibited
to run for elective office,the Ombudsman and his depu-
ties are disqualified from doing so in the election imme-
diately followingtheir cessation from office.
The applicable provision is Article XI, Section 11,
which says:
"Sec. 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve

for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall
not be qualified to run for any office in the election immedi-
ately succeeding their cessation from office."
If the purpose is to prevent the Ombudsman and

his deputies from using their offices to strengthen their
candidacies in the immediately succeeding election,
there is every reason, it would seem, to impose the same
disqualification on other retiring officers, like members
of the judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions,
whose officesare also non-political.
( 4) Powers and Functions
In the debates on this matter in the Constitutional

Commission, it was stressed by the sponsors of the Of-
fice of the Ombudsman that, whereas the original
Tanodbayan was supposed to be limited to the function
of prosecution of cases against public functionaries,
generally for graft and corruption, the former would be
considered "the champion of the citizen," to entertain
complaints addressed to him and take all necessary
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PlJBLIC OFFICERS 761
More specifically, in a reversal of the rule that the

Constitution should be worded in general language, the
details to be provided by implementing legislation, Sec-
tion 13 lists down the different powers and functions
that are supposed to be available to the Ombudsman in
the pursuit of the goals addressed to him by Section 12,
thus:
"Sec. 13. The Officeof the Ombudsman shall have the

followingpowers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any per-
son, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, un-
just, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivi-
sion, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any gov-
ernment-owned or controlled corporation with original charter,
to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to
stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the per-
formance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate ac-
tion against a public official or employee at fault, and recom-
mend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officerconcerned, in any appropriate case,
and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the dis-
bursement' or use of public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commissionon Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mis-
management, fraud, and corruption in government and make
It has been ruled that the Ombudsman need not

conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a
complaint. 11 Thus -
"Indeed, we have said in Knecht v. Desierto [353 Phil. 494

(1998)] and later in Mamburao, Inc. v. Office of the Ombuds-
man [398 Phil. 762 (2000)] and Karaan v. Office of the Om-
budsman [476 Phil. 536 (2004)] that should investigating offi-
cers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recom-
mend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their
discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investiga-
tion should be conducted. The Court has undoubtedly acknowl-
edged the powers of the Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint
outright without a preliminary investigation in The Presiden-
tial Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto. [437 Phil. 702 (2002)) We reiterate that the Ombuds-
man has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case
should be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation
is warranted. The Court therefore gives due deference to the
Ombudsman's decision to no longer conduct a preliminary in-
vestigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against
respondent Velasco."
The Supreme Court has held that it will not inter-

fere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence to ensure that his Office
is insulated from any outside pressure and improper
influence.72 "Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of
this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the
Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint
filed before it. Such initiative and independence are
inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one,
" Judge Angeles v. Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173,

March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 803.
72
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 138142, September 19, 2007, 533 SCRA
571.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF Pu8LIC OFFICERS 765
for vengeance.75 Thus, it has further been ruled that,

although in the exercise of his investigatory and prose-
cutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally "no differ-
ent from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who
must be charged.''" and "enjoys the same latitude of
discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that
must be established for the filing of an information in
court),?" his findings and conclusions on these matters
may not be reviewed by the courts except when he
gravely abuses his discretion,78 as when his action
amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he
acts outside the contemplation of law, 79 or when he exer-
cises his powers in an "arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility," provided "it
must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of a posi-
tive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty en-
joined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be
equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.?"
75
See Antonino v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 144492, December 18,
2008, 574 SCRA 403; ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA
59; Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580
SCRA693.
76
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado, G.R. No.
164538, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 88.
77
Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 390 Phil. 917 (2000).
78
Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February
19, 2008, 546 SCRA 303; Angeles v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133077, Sep-
tember 8, 2006, 501 SCRA 202
70
See Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 542 (2003) and
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168 (1996), cited in
Quarto v. the Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, G.R. No.
169042, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 580.
so Ganaden v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 169359-61, June 1, 2011,
650 SCRA 76, citing Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567,
held that, "once the case has been filed with said court,
it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman,
which has full control of the case so much so that the
Information may not be dismissed without the approval
of said court?" and it~ would not matter "whether such
filing of a motion to dismiss by the prosecution is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation.'?"
The remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of
the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal
cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court, not with the Court of Appeals.87
The Ombudsman likewise exercises direct adminis-
trative disciplinary authority over all elective and ap-
pointive officials of the Government and its subdivi-
sions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Mem-
bers of the Cabinet, local governments, government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by im-
peachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judi-
Tuguegarao v. Ting, G.R. Nos. 192435-36, September 14, 2011, 657

SCRA 760.
85
Nava v. National Bureau of Investigation, Regional Office
No. XI, Davao City, G.R. No. 134509, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 377,
394; see Dungog v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-77850-51, March 25,
1988, 159 SCRA 145, 148.
ss See Crespo v. Mogul, No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA
462, 471, cited in City Government ofTuguegarao v. Ting, G.R. Nos.
192435-36, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 760.
"' Belongilot v. Cua, G.R. No. 160933, November 24, 2010, cit-
ing Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 353
SCRA452.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PlmLIC OFFICERS 769
provisions in R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest

intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Om-
budsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These pro-
visions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication
which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints,
conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its
rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the produc-
tion of documents, place under preventive suspension public of-
ficers and employees pending an investigation, determine the
appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or em-
ployees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose
the said penalty. Thus, it is settled that the Office of the Om-
budsman can directly impose administrative sanctions.''"
Moreover, it has been ruled that it is discretionary

upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an
investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after
one year from the occurrence of the act or omission com-
plained of, as provided for in Section 20(5) of R.A. No.
6770.92 The one-year period stated in said law "does not
refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discre-
tion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would in-
vestigate a particular administrative offense.''"
91
Cabalit v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 180236, January
17, 2012, 663 SCRA 133; see also Office of the Ombudsman v.
Masing, G.R. No. 165416, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 253; Office of
the Ombudsman v. de Sahagun, G.R. No. 167982, August 13, 2008,
562 SCRA 122; Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero, G.R. No. 168718,
November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 106, 112-113; Office of the Ombuds-
man v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168079, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA
798, 806-807; Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
167844, November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 593, 610.
92
Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005,
451 SCRA 476.
93
Office of the Ombudsman v. Santiago, G.R. No. 161098, Sep-
tember 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 305; Republic of the Philippines v. Bad-
jao, supra.; Office of the Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, G.R.
No. 172700, July 23, 2010, 625 SCRA 299.
Accordingly,the. Court has held that the Ombuds-

man shares concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over
public school teachers with the Department of Educa-
tion, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
. w
4670, or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
although it has consistently provided that, when such
cases are instituted before him, he is bound to refer the
same to the proper committee of said Department.'?" In
Office of the Ombudsman v. Galiciai" the Court de-
clared that, although it is the School Superintendent (by
virtue of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers),
and not the Ombudsman, who has jurisdiction over ad-
ministrative cases against public school teachers, the
latter properly ruled on the respondent's case because
he is "estopped from belatedly assailing the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman. His right to due process was satis-
fied when he participated fully in the investigation pro-
ceedings. He was able to present evidence and argu-
ments in his defense. The investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman was therefore valid."
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,102 the Su-
preme Court, citing Fabella v. Court of Appeals." where
it required compliancewith the provisions of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers with respect to cases
against public school teachers who were charged with
violations of civil service laws, rules and regulations for
taking part in mass actions, made the followingclarifi-
ss Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940 (1997); Office of

the Ombudsman v. Medrano, G.R. No. 177580, October 17, 2008, 569
SCRA 747.
Ibid.; see also Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero, G.R. No.
!{)()
172635 October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 135.

w,'G.R. No. 167711, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA 327.
102,G.R.
No. 165416, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 253.
10"
Supra.
therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombuds-

man the authority to act on all administrative complaints, viz:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints.-The Om-
budsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not lim-
ited, to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course
of an agency's functions, though in accordance with
law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an ar-
bitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary pow-
ers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or de-
void ofjustification.
"Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administra-
tive investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consis-
tent with due process.
"It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend
that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority
on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an ex-
clusive procedure in administrative investigations involving
them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the
other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in
a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on No-
vember 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should
not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in
conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints
against all public officials and employees, with the exception of
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over
members of Congress and the Judiciary. If an issue should ever
arise, therefore, it should rather be whether the 1987 Constitu-
tion and R.A. No. 6770 have abrogated R.A. No. 4670. How-
ever, repeals by implication are not favored, and courts have
the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PiJBLIC OFFICERS 77 5
erring public official other than members of Congress

and the Judiciary who may be removed only by im-
peachment."
At any rate, while the Ombudsman would have the
"plenary power" to discipline elective officials over the
same disciplinary authority of the President under R.A.
No. 7160,105 he would nonetheless have the "option" to
"refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary au-
thority for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employ-
ees."106
The Ombudsman is authorized to place public offi-
cers or employees under preventive suspension without
pay for up to six months upon a finding of probable
cause to hold them liable for offenses which may war-
rant their dismissal from the service.'?' Under Section
24 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman or his
deputy may preventively suspend any officer or em-
ployee under his authority pending an investigation ifin
his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishon-
esty, oppression, grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's conti-
nued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him. Section 9 of Administrative Order No. 7 provides
that, pending investigation, the respondent may be pre-
ventively suspended without pay if, in the judgment of
'0' Hagad v. Goza Dadole, 321 Phil. 604 (1995).

106
Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero, supra.; cited in Gonza-
les v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012,
679 SCRA 614.
101
Office of the Ombudsman v. Cordova, G.R. No. 188650, Oc-
tober 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 465.
Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the

Ombudsman, such an appeal may be made if the pen-
alty imposed is suspension for more than a month. Said
penalty shall however;be immediately executory even
pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.!" Accordingto
the Supreme Court, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes
the discretion given to the Court of Appeals in Section
12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the
Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to
said court. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immedi-
ately executory is a special rule that prevails over the
provisions of the Rules of Court.l" Thus -
"The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately execu-

tory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an
appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. The aforemen-
tioned Section 7 is also clear in providing that in case the pen-
alty is removal and the respondent wins his appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension and
shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did
not receive by reason of the removal. The CA's issuance of a
preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dis-
missal imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case,
is thus an encroachment on the rule-making powers of the
Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitu-
tion, and Sections 18 and 27 ofR.A. No. 6770, which grants the
Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own
rules of procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders
2007, 525 SCRA 261, 265; Dimagiba v. Espartero, G.R. No. 154952,
July 16, 2012, 676 SCRA420.
112
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172224, January
26, 2011, 640 SCRA 544.
113
Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No. 175573
October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 140; see also Buencamino v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 175895, 12 April 2007, 520 SCRA 797.
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the

removal.t''"
Whether the Ombudsman makes a finding of prob-
able cause in the exercise of his criminal jurisdiction or.
an actual adjudication in a disciplinary case pursuant to
his administrative authority, there would be a need to
determine whether such finding or adjudication would
preclude any other investigative agency which may
share concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman,
such as the Department of Justice, with respect to his
criminal jurisdiction, and the Office of the President,
insofar as his administrative jurisdiction is concerned,
from further taking cognizanceof the same matter.
In Montemayor u. Bundalian, 118 the Supreme Court
sustained the President's dismissal from the service of a
Regional Director of the Department of Public Works
and Highways who was found liable for unexplained
wealth upon investigation by the now defunct Philippine
Commission against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC).
The Court categorically ruled therein that the prior
dismissal by the Ombudsman of similar charges against
said official in the exercise of his criminal jurisdiction
did not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case. Ac-
cording to the Court, "the doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was inves-
tigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal
liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged mis-
117
Facura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166495, February 16,
2011, 643 SCRA 427; Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R.
No. 175573, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 140.
11•
G.R. No. 149335, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 264.
against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing

the Officeof the President from proceeding against peti-
tioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption.
After all, the doctrine. of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise
of administrative powers."
It will be recalled that a preliminary investigation
in a criminal case is an administrative, and not a quasi-
judicial, proceeding, while administrative disciplinary
proceedings pertain to the exercise by the Ombudsman
of his quasi-judicial authority.125
In Trinidad u. Office of the Ombudsman,126 the Su-
preme Court declared that "resjudicata is a doctrine of
civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceed-
ings. But even if petitioner's argument were to be ex-
panded to contemplate 'res judicata in prison grey' or
the criminal law concept of double jeopardy, this Court
still finds it inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation con-
ducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. For the dis-
missal of a case during preliminary investigation does
not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investiga-
tion not being part of the trial." The Court clarified in
said case that "new matters or evidence are not prere-
quisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance
for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Om-
budsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the
evidence already submitted."
Whether in the exercise of his criminal or adminis-
trative jurisdiction, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
12"
Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth
Division, Cebu City, G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA
184.
126
Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166038, De-
cember 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 415, 423-425.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PlIBLIC OFFICERS 783
the Court, derogates the appointing power of the Om-

budsman.
As specified in Section 9, the Deputy Ombudsmen
shall be appointed by the President. They are, however,
subject to the supervision and control of the Ombuds-
man .129
In Gonzales v. Office of the President, 130 the Su-
preme Court pronounced that, although the Ombuds-
man is "possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own
people and mete out administrative sanctions upon
them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service" based on his general authority to exercise
"disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, in-
strumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or con-
trolled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary'' under
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6770, "it is equally with-
out question that the President has concurrent author-
ity with respect to removal from office of the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under speci-
fied conditions" as indicated in Section 8(2) of Republic
Act No. 6770, or "for any of the grounds provided for the
removal of the Ombudsman," which includes betrayal of
public trust, "and after due process." Thus -
"Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting
both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same
Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through
the person of the President, that would exercise the power of
12"
Republic Act No. 6770, Section 31; Estandarte v. People, G.R.
Nos. 156851-55,February 18, 2008,546 SCRA 130.
"'0 G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614.
grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of

the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No.
6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed
from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be
removed through impeachment, namely, 'culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.' Thus, it cannot be
rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter,
would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of
protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies
and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that
their removal can only be had on grounds provided by law."133
Moreover, consistent with the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction, the Supreme Court declared that when the
President takes cognizance of an administrative case
against a Deputy Ombudsman, the Ombudsman would
be precluded from further assuming jurisdiction over
the same. Thus -
"Considering the principles attending concurrence of ju-
risdiction where the Office of the President was the first to ini-
tiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have
prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding sepa-
rately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board,
and to defer instead to the President's assumption of authority,
especially when the administrative charge involved 'demand-
ing and soliciting a sum of money' which constitutes either
graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds re-
served for the President's exercise of his authority to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman."!"
The foregoingnotwithstanding, the Court neverthe-

less nullified the President's removal of a Deputy Om-
'"" Id.
'"' Id., see Article XI, Section 2; Republic Act No. 6770, Section
8(2).
neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust. Records

show that petitioner took considerably less time to act upon the
draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropri-
ate action compared to the length of time that said draft re-
mained pending and unacted upon in the Officeof Ombudsman
Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied PIS Insp.
Mendoza's motion for reconsideration within nine (9) calendar
days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was submit-
ted to him on April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his recommen-
dation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010
for the latter's final action. Clearly, the release of any final or-
der on the case was no longer in his hands.
"Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of
PIS Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained failure on pe-
titioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt dis-
position, the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevo-
lent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public trust.
More so because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears
to be an isolated case.
"Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to
endorse PIS Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without
citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a
manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would
amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cog-
nizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or pri-
vate parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of
the Office of the Ombudsman to be the 'champion of the peo-
ple.' The factual circumstances that the case was turned over
to the Officeof the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that
administrative liability was pronounced against PIS Insp.
Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the
truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately im-
plemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof re-
mained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply
taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case
considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social
ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case
that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was like-
wise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any
corrupt intention or questionable motivation.
"Accordingly,the OP's pronouncement of administrative
accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him
based on the same offense by the Special Prosecutor

before the Sandiganbayan.
In Inting v. Tanodbayan, 139 it was held that pursu-
ant to P.D. No. 1607, the Tanodbayan could review and
reverse the findings of a city fiscal and order him to
withdraw certain charges filed by him. The President's
power of control over fiscals was in this case exercised,
not through the Minister of Justice, but through the
Tanodbayan because the cases involved offenses alleg-
edly committed by a public functionary in connection
with her office.
In Zaldivar u. Gonzales, 140 where the respondent,
who had been appointed Tanodbayan before the adop-
tion of the 1987 Constitution, claimed he was the Om-
budsman under the new charter, the Supreme Court
ruled:
"The Office of the Tanodbayan, which was formerly held
by the respondent, was originally created by P.D. No. 1607
pursuant to Article XIII, Section 6, of the 1973 Constitution. It
was converted into the Office of the Special Prosecutor by Arti-
cle XI, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution and allowed to retain
only such of its powers as had not been transferred to the Om-
budsman. It is this new office as reduced in status by the pre-
sent charter that is now held by the respondent.
''The Office of the Ombudsman was directly created by
the self-executing provision of Article XI, Section 6, of the pre-
sent Constitution. No implementing legislation was needed to
bring it into existence, which legally commenced on February
2, 1987, when the charter was ratified. It was recently filled by
the President with a person other than the respondent. The re-
spondent is not and never has been the Ombudsman under the
present Constitution. What is more, it is now the new Om-
budsman who carries the title ofTanodbayan.
'"" 97 SCRA 494 (1980).

••0 160 SCRA 843 (1988).
ACCOUNTABILITY OF f>uBLIC OFFICERS 791
are instituted against the guilty person and shall begin

to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting double jeopardy.142 Under Section 11,
RA 3019, as amended, offenses committed under said
law prescribe in fifteen years.143 Prior to its amendment
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, how-
ever, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable
under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years.144
In Republic of the Philippines u. Desierto,145 the Su-
preme Court declared that, in the prosecution of cases
pertaining to behest loans obtained during the Marcos
regime, the prescriptive period shall be reckoned from
the discoveryof such loans. "The reason for this is that
the government, as aggrieved party, could not have
known that those loans existed when they were made.
Both parties to such loans supposedly conspired to per-
petrate fraud against the government. They could only
have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution
when the people ousted President Marcos from office.
And, prior to that date, no person would have dared
question the legality or propriety of the loans."
142
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130140, October 25, 1999, 317 SCRA 272;
The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Tabasondra, G.R. No. 133756, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 31.
"3 Republic v. Cojuangco, G.R. No. 139930, June 26, 2012, 674
SCRA492.
144
People v. Pacificador, 406 Phil. 774, 782 (2001); The Presi-
dential Ad-HocFact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 145184, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 295; The
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 138142, September 19, 2007, 533 SCRA 571; The
Presidential Ad-HocFact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 136225, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 513.
145
438 Phil. 201, 212 (2002); see also Republic v. Desierto, 416
Phil. 59, 77-78 (2001); Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265,
294 (2004).
lion. But, the action having prescribed, there is no point in dis-

cussing the existence of probable cause against the respon-
dents for violation of Section 3(e) ofR.A. 3019."
Loans
The following provision is intended to prevent the

officials mentioned therein from taking advantage of
their positions for the purpose of promoting their inter-
ests. Interestingly, the prohibition is limited only to
"business purposes" and does not include personal pur-
poses, which could also be the subject of improper self-
aggrandizement:
"Sec. 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial

accommodationfor any business purpose may be granted, di-
rectly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled
bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Su-
preme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Om-
budsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have control-
ling interest, during their tenure."
Assets and Liabilities
An illustration of the fussiness of the new Constitu-

tion is the following provision requiring the filing of a
statement of assets and liabilities by certain public offi-
cers. In fact, this requirement is already imposed by ex-
-..2 isting law, which applies not only to the said officials
but all public officers and employees. As there is no like-
lihood that this statute will be repealed, nor is there any
reason for such repeal, one may well wonder why the
Constitutional Commission saw fit to clutter an already
cluttered Constitution with this provision.
officialsand employeesin compliancewith the constitu-

tional policy to eradicate corruption, to promote trans-
parency in government, and to ensure that all govern-
ment employees and officials lead just and modest
lives,149 with the end itl. view of curtailing and minimiz~
ing the opportunities for official corruption and main-
taining a standard of honesty in the public service."?"
This duty, accordingto the Supreme Court, is especially
important in the case of the members and personnel of
the judiciary. "While every office in the government
service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Hence, judges
are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of
Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative poli-
cies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the
administration ofjustice."151
It is significant that Section 17 requires the Presi-
dent, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional officers, and offi-
cers of the armed forces with general or flag rank to
disclose their declarations to the public "in the manner
provided by law." Accordingly,Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6713, also known as the Code of Conduct and Ethi-
cal Standards for Public Officials and Employees, re-
quires, among others, the filing under oath by all public
officials and employees, except those who serve in an
149
Flores v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010,
629 SCRA 178, 199.
1"°
Cavite Crusade for Good Government v. Cajigal, 422 Phil. 1,
9 (2001).
1"1
Magarang v. Jardin, Sr., 386 Phil. 273, 284 (2000); Office of
the Court Administrator v. Judge Usman, A.M. No. SCC-08-12,
October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 411.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF Pu:Buc OFFICERS 797
In Re: Request for Copy of 2008 Statement of Assets,

Liabilities and Networth (SALN) and Personal Data
Sheets or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Su-
preme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judici-
ary, 154 the Supreme C~urt justified its promulgation of
guidelines for the release of the requested documents in
this manner -
''The independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as

important as the right to information which is subject to the
limitations provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the
need for fair and just adjudication of litigations may require a
court to be wary of deceptive requests for information which
shall otherwise be freely available. Where the request is di-
rectly or indirectly traced to a litigant, lawyer, or interested
party in a case pending before the court, or where the court is
reasonably certain that a disputed matter will come before it
under circumstances from which it may, also reasonably, be
assumed that the request is not made in good faith and for a
legitimate purpose, but to fish for information and, with the
implicit threat of its disclosure, to influence a decision or to
warn the court of the unpleasant consequences of an adverse
judgment, the request may be denied."
It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has re-

quired that all requests for copies of statements of as-
sets and liabilities of any Justice or judge to be filed
with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court or with
the Court Administrator, as the case may be, should
indicate the purpose for the same. Moreover, where a
decision has just been rendered by a court against the
person making the request and the request for informa-
tion appears to be a "fishing expedition" intended to
quest of Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism for the 2008

SALNs and Personal Data Sheets of Court of Appeals Justices, A.M.
No. 09-8-07-CA, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 27.
"4 A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 27.
At any rate, it will be recalled that Republic Act

No. 9225 provides that natural-born citizens who are
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
after their naturalization as citizens of a foreign coun-
try, or who, after the' effectivity of said law, shall be
allowed to retain their Philippine citizenship despite
their later becoming citizens of a foreign country, upon
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, may be
elected or appointed to public office only upon taking a
second oath consisting of, this time, also a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.156
It is clear from these provisions that dual citizens
under said law may not be elected or appointed to public
office. Stated otherwise, only those who swear sole alle-
giance to the Republic of the Philippines and renounce
their allegiance to any other foreign country would be
allowed to become public officers consistent with the
requirement under Section 18 that "public officers and
employees owe the State and this Constitution alle-
giance at all times." In other words, it is equally clear
that allegiance necessarily springs from, or is the es-
sence of, citizenship, as a requirement for public office,
such that when an individual voluntarily retains or
maintains his ties with a foreign country, of which he is
also a citizen, he cannot claim to owe sole allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and would therefore be
disqualified from becoming a public officer or employee
thereof.
Thus, in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 157 a
candidate who took such second oath was considered to
have recanted the same because of his having used his
'"0Sections 5 (2) and (3).

"' G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013.
2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office,

she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra,
Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath
contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renun-
ciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath. "161
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court stressed

in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School
Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datu-
manong'" that "Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution
is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, the framers were not concernedwith dual citizen-
ship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of ori-
gin even after their naturalization. Congress was given
a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parame-
ters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this
is done, it would be premature for the judicial depart-
ment, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining
to dual allegiance."
In any event, it bears noting that, as early as in the
case of Mercado v. Manzano,163 the Supreme Court, in
interpreting the disqualification of "dual citizenship"
under Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160, declared that
dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
"Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the

concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturali-
161
Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, supra.
'"' G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007, 523 SCRA 108.
"'1 G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, 367 Phil. 132 (1999).
sidered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, 165 such

ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enact-
ment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which pro-
vides for the additional condition of a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship."
16"
Valles v . COMELEC, 392 Phil. 327, 340 (2000); Mercado v.
Manzano, 367 Phil. 132, 152-153 (1999).
AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION 805
One illustration will suffice: In People v. Pomar, 1

decided in 1924, our Supreme Court declared unconsti-
tutional a law granting maternity leave privileges to
female employees on. the ground that it impaired the
obligation of contracts. At present, however, although
the impairment clause has not undergone any change in
language since then, such privileges are a commonplace.
Social legislation has been sustained under the ex-
panded concept of the police power as a valid limitation
on the freedom of contract.
There are provisions of the Constitution, however,
that are not as malleable to judicial interpretation.
These are what Cooley calls the "iron rules" which can-
not be altered except by formal amendment. Examples
are the provisions on the age qualifications of certain
officers or their term of office. The composition of the
Commissionon Audit, to take another illustration, can-
not be reduced or increased by a mere court decision.
Kinds of Constitutions
For purposes of this particular study, constitutions

may be classified into written or unwritten, conven-
tional or cumulative, and rigid or flexible.
A written constitution is one whose precepts are
embodied in one document or set of documents. An un-
written constitution, on the other hand, consists of rules
which have not been integrated into a single, concrete
form. These rules may include statutes of a fundamen-
tal character, judicial decisions, customs and traditions,
and certain commonlaw principles.
1
46 Phil. 440.
for delay in effecting the needed change and thus cause

irreparable injury to the public interest.
In a situation like this, the written constitution will
become an impediment rather than a spur to progress, a
treadmill to the nation seeking to liberate itself from the
shackles of obsolete rules no longer conformable to their
needs and aspirations. Where this happens, the people
may have to resort to a violation of the provisions of the
permanent constitution; and if they cannot make a new
constitution, they will have to make a revolution.
Amendment and Revision
Article XVII provides that the Constitution may be

changed either by amendment or revision.3
Amendment refers to isolated or piecemeal change
only, as distinguished from revision, which is a revamp
or rewriting of the whole instrument.
Thus, there was mere amendment of the Constitu-
tion of 1935 when the term of office of the President of
the Philippines was changed from six to four years. But
there was a revision when the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1971 rewrote the entire document and produced
the Constitution of 1973, which was in turn revised with
the adoption of the present Constitution.
Procedure
Two steps are involved in the amendment or revi-

sion of the Constitution. The first is the proposal and
the second is the ratification.
"Sec. 1.
unnecessary expenditure of public funds and time that

the calling of a constitutional conventionwill entail.
But if what is envisioned is the overhaul of the en-
tire Constitution, it is advisable to entrust the task to a
constitutional convention, which will have more time,
opportunity and presumably also the needed expertise
to discharge it.
The Supreme Court distinguished between an
amendment and a revision in Lambino v. Commission
on Elections.4 Thus -
"The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a

clear distinction between 'amendment' and 'revision' of the
Constitution. A people's initiative can only propose amend-
ments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits
initiatives to amendments.
"Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of sepa-
ration of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is
also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly re-
fers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally af-
fects only the specific provision being amended.
"The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change
is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'sub-
stantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or altera-
tion of numerous existing provisions.' The court examines only
the number of provisions affected and does not consider the de-
gree of the change.
"The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects
of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will 'accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
' G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160.
fully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underly-

ing ideologicalbasis of the existing Constitution."
Nevertheless, the choice of the method of proposal

lies in the exclusive discretion of the legislature. Thus..
in 1981, it decided to directly undertake what was prac-
tically a revision of the Constitution of 1973 instead of
calling a constitutional convention for the purpose.
The call for a constitutional convention may be
made by a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the
Congress. If they cannot make up their mind, the ques-
tion of whether or not to call the constitutional conven-
tion shall be submitted to the people themselves, by at
least a majority vote of all the members.
This last alternative is a plainly absurd procedure
that permits the members of the Congress to authorize
the waste of public funds by calling on their constituents
to make a decision that is essentially addressed to the
legislators themselves. In effect, they are allowed to
"pass the buck" simply because they are unable to agree
on the deoisionthe people expect them to make.
The 1935 Constitution provided that "the Congress,
in joint session assembled, by a vote of all the Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitu-
tion or call a convention for the purpose." Significantly,
the phrase "voting separately'' does not appear in the
corresponding provisions of Article XVII, which author-
izes the Congress, "upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members'" to propose amendments or a revision directly;
"by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members" to call a con-
stitutional convention; and "by a majority vote of all its
Members" to submit to the electorate the question of
ing legislation is enacted. The Congress has apparently

not yet done this. Unlike the referendum and initiative
in general, the proposal to amend the Constitution un-
der Section 2 must be made upon petition of not only ten
but twelve percent of the total number of registered
voters although the representation of each legislative
district is retained at three percent. As if the framers
were afraid that this method would be over-used, it was
not allowed to be employed until 1992, and not oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
In Lambino v. Commission on Elections,6 the peti-
tioners, claiming that their initiative petition "had the
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%)of its registered voters," whose signatures,
according to the petitioners, had been duly verified by
election registrars, asked the Commission on Elections
to hold a plebiscite for purposes of ratifying the same,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c) and
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act. The respondent denied due course to
said petition "for lack of an enabling law governing ini-
tiative petitions to amend the Constitution," as held by
the Supreme Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elec-
tione' where it declared Republic Act No. 6735 as in-
adequate for purposes of implementing the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the re-
spondent's denial of due course to said initiative petition
and stated that the "Lambino Group miserably failed to
6
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160. See Foot-
note 23 on page 826.
1
G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
supposed to have signed as their initiative petition. All

that they submitted to the Court was a copy of a signa-
ture sheet, which contained the following-
"PROPOSITIOW 'DO YOU APPROVE OF THE

AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERN-
MENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOV-
ERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFI-
CIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT;
AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYS-
TEM TO ANOTHER?'
"I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the
1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form
part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution
signifies my support for the filing thereof"
As concededby the petitioners, "there is not a· sin-

gle word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino
Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Nei-
ther does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposedchanges is attached to it."
Moreover, the Court observed that, considering
that the petitioners printed only 100,000 copies of the
initiative petition, only 100,000 of the alleged 6.3 mil-
lion signatories could have actually seen or read the
same, "assuming a 100 percent distribution with no
wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one
copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only
100,000signature sheets could have circulated with the
petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten
signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these
100,000signature sheets with the attached petition, the
maximum number of people who saw the petition before
they signed the signature sheets would not exceed
gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution re-

quires that an initiative must be 'directly proposed by the peo-
ple xx x in a petition' - meaning that the people must sign on
a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amend-
ments. On so vital fill issue as amending the nation's funda-
mental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amend-
ments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or
special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
"The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to di-
rectly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court
trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this
Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition.
However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption:
the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the
people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed
the petition.
"In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and un-
constitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the re-
quirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that
the initiative must be 'directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition."'
The Court likewise emphasized that Section 2 of

Article XVII of the Constitution entitles the people to
file a petition for initiative for purposes only of propos-
ing amendments to, and not revisions of, the Constitu-
non.
t"
"There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the

Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
'amendment' and 'revision' of the Constitution. The framers in-
tended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional con-
vention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose
only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language. of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people
the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people
cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to pro-
pose amendments."
B. Aumentado, Petitioners.' In the COMELEC, the Lambino

Group, claiming to act 'together with' the 6.3 million signato-
ries, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and
amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition
filed with the COMEI,,ECdid not even comply with the basic
requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as
valid.
"The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates
Section lO(a) of RA 6735 stating, 'No petition embracing more
than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; xx x.'
The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, man-
dating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments
or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally un-
related to the shift in the form of government. Since the pre-
sent initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA
6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the elec-
torate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's
initiative will still fail."
(A) Position of the Constitutional Convention
There are three theories on the relative position of

the constitutional convention vis-a-vis the regular de-
partments of the government.
The first, as announced in Loomis v. Jackson,8
holds that the constitutional convention is supreme over
the other departments of the government because the
powers it exercises are in the nature of sovereign pow-
ers. This theory is thus called the Theory of Conven-
tional Sovereignty.
The second, as announced in Wood's Appeal, 9 con-
siders the constitutional convention inferior to the other
departments of the government since it is merely a crea-
tion of the legislature.
"6 WVa. 613.

"79 Pa 59.
rect current problems. If they are accepted only after a

long delay, they may no longer serve the purposes for
which they were made in the first place. Moreover, pro-
posals should be voted upon at a time when interest in
them is still rife and the electorate is still knowledge-
able on the pros and cons of the issues submitted to
them.
According to -Iudge Jameson, "an alteration of the
Constitution proposed today has relation to the senti-
ment and felt needs of today and, if not ratified early
while the sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it
ought to be regarded as waived and not again to be
voted upon unless for a second time proposed.?"
One of the issues raised in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections" was the validity of the submission of cer-
tain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite
scheduled on the same day as the regular elections.
Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there
would be no proper submission of the proposal to the
people who would be more interested in the issues in-
volved in the election.
The Supreme Court, however, declared, in inter-
preting Article XV of the 1935 Constitution: "There is in
this provision nothing to indicate that the election
therein referred to is a special, not a general election.
The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratifi-
cation in special elections merely shows that Congress
deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then
obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
12
Constitutional Conventions, 4th ed., Sec. 535.
'"21 SCRA 774 (1967).
be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Fur-

thermore, the people were not given a proper "frame of
reference" in arriving at their decision because they had
at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised
Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would
be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the
light of the entire document.
The strict attitude of the Supreme Court in the
abovementioned case was relaxed in the Ratification
Cases" involving the validity of the ratification of the
1973 Constitution. By so doing, it removed any "further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being consid-
ered in force and effect."
As previously remarked, the Supreme Court held in
the Sanidad Case that the period from September 21 to
October 16, or a total of twenty-five days, would give the·
people sufficient time within which to study the pro-
posed amendments and vote intelligently thereon.
In Almario v. Alba, 17 the petitioners sought a post-
ponement of the plebiscite on the 1984 constitutional
amendments, to give the people more time to study the
proposed changes, particularly those relating to urban
reform and the inclusion of "grant" as an additional
mode of acquiring public lands. The Supreme Court
denied, holding there was enough time (67 days for the
amendment of Section 11 and 42 days for the amend-
ment of Section 12, both in Article XN). Justices Tee-
hankee, Abad Santos, Herrera and Relova dissented,
arguing that the proposed changes had not been suffi-
ciently disseminated and discussed and that there was
really a need for a more careful consideration.
1"
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33 (1973).
11
127 SCRA 69 (1984).
(Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the

regular National Assembly is in active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVII,
1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the Interim National Assembly to consti-
tute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent Presi-
dent undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the
people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,
the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in
lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended,
raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential De-
cree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to
have the force and effect of legislation, are assailed as invalid,
thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justi-
ciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon.
Section 2(2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: 'All
cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court en bane, and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may
be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at
least ten Members . . .' The Supreme Court has the last word
in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also
the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers or-
ganized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and a lim-
ited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that au-
thority to determine whether that power has been discharged
within its limits."
Thus, the judiciary may declare invalid a proposal

adopted by less than three-fourths of the members of
the Congress, or a call for a constitutional convention by
less than two-thirds of the legislature, or a ratification
made by less than a majority of the votes cast, or a
plebiscite irregularly held.
As noted earlier in Santiago u. Commission on Elec-
21
tions, the Supreme Court prohibited an attempt to
21
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997,270 SCRA 106.
Chapter 19
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
THE TRANSITORYPROVISIONSare so-called because

they do not have permanent duration, unlike the other
provisions in the preceding articles. Article XVIII will in
time become functus officio as the purposes of the sev-
eral sections thereof are fulfilled.
Elections
The following provisions have already been ad-

verted to in Chapter 8:
"Section 1. The first elections under this Constitution

of Members of the Congress shall be held on the second Mon-
day of May, 1987.
"The first local elections shall be held on a date to be de-
termined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include
the election of Members of the city or municipal councils in the
Metropolitan Manila Area."
"Sec. 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives, and the local officials first elected under the Con-
stitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
"Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first
twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six
years and the remaining twelve for three years."
The above rules were intended to eventually syn-

chronize elections for local and national officials, includ-
ing the President and the Vice-President of the Philip-
827
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 829
we unequivocally stated that 'the Constitution has mandated

synchronized national and local elections."'
It clarified that "although called regional elections,"

the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao elections
should be "included among the elections to be synchro-
nized as it is a 'local' election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution." According to the Court,
"the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than
other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough
reason to treat the ARMMregional elections differently
from the other local elections."
Existing Laws and Treaties
"Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,

proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive is-
suances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
"Sec. 4. All existing treaties or international agree-

ments which have not been ratified shall not be renewed or ex-
tended without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate."
All laws existing at the time of the ratification of

the new Constitution shall remain in force unless they
are inconsistent with the new charter or are changed by
the legislature or the President. As for treaties, the rule
is that if they have not been ratified before, they shall
not be renewed or extended without the concurrence of
the Senate, the implication being that if they had in fact
been ratified, they can then be extended or renewed
without such concurrence. This obviously conflicts with
the general requirement for Senate concurrence to trea-
"Ibid.
posed of the heads of all local government units comprising the

Metropolitan Manila Area."
According to the Supreme Court, the Congress was

convened for purposes of the above rule not on the date
its members assumed officeor took their oaths but when
it was formally inaugurated and actually started func-
tioning on July 27, 1987. Hence, the enactment by
President Aquino of Executive Order No. 273 on July 25,
1987 was within her reserved power to legislate under
Section 6 of Article XVIII.
In Association of Small Landowners of the Philip-
pines u. Secretary of Agrarian Reform" the Supreme
Court held:
"Executive Orders No. 228 and 229 were issued by Presi-

dent Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the
Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative
power from her. They were not 'midnight' enactments intended
to preempt the legislature. Neither is it correct to say that
these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative
power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless
modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by
the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative
simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that en-
acted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legisla-
tive power did not have the effect of invalidating the measures
enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it."
At any rate, it will be recalled that, in David u. Ar-

royo, 6 the Supreme Court categorically ruled that legis-
lative power is "peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state of emer-
gency" can justify the President's "exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees."
s 175 SCRA 343 (1989).

6
G.R. No. 171396,May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
Member serve longer than seven years including service before

the ratification of this Constitution."
Career Civil Service
Adequate protection was extended in the following

section to career civil servants who might be affected by
the reorganization of the government:
"Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from

the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution
shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay, and to retire-
ment and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of
general application in force at the time of their separation. In
lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be con-
sidered for employment in the government, or in any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including gov-
ernment-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidi-
aries. This provision also applies to career officers whose res-
ignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had been ac-
cepted."
In connection with such reorganization, it was also

provided that:
"Sec. 17. All properties, records, equipment, buildings

facilities, and other assets of any office or body abolished or re-
organized under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 or
this Constitution shall be transferred to the office or body to
which its powers, functions, and responsibilities substantially
pertain."
Priority Measures
The first Congress was supposed to give priority to

certain measures conformably to the following provi-
sions:
taining to the government and the people. Accordingly,

it was fittingly provided that:
"Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze

orders under Proclamation No. 3, dated March 25, 1986 in re-
lation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain opera-
tive for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of
this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certi-
fied by the President, the Congress may extend said period.
Such order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie
case.
"Sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon
showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the se-
questered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered
with the proper court. For sequestration or freeze orders issued
before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding
judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months
from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification,
the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six
months from the issuance thereof.
"The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automati-
cally lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as
herein provided."
While there certainly has been substantial progress

in the efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by
the favored few during the Marcos regime since the
promulgation of the Constitution several decades ago,
much still needs to be done to actually return these
funds to the coffers of the government.
Salaries
Apart from calling for the standardization of the

salaries of government functionaries, the new Charter
provides for the salaries of certain constitutional officers
as follows:
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Al-
mighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and estab-
lish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and
secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence
and democracyunder the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,
consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimen-
sions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
837
APPENDIX A 839
Sec. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social or-
der that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation
and free the people from poverty through policies that provide ade-
quate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living, and an improved qu~ity of life for all.
Sec. 10. The State shall promote socialjustice in all phases of
national development.
Sec. 11. The state values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiencyand the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Sec. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement
in public and civic affairs.
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecologyin accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.
Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to education, science
and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development.
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their wel-
fare.
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independ-
ent national economyeffectivelycontrolled by Filipinos.
APPENDIX A 841
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to

be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspon-
dence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order-requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without dis-
crimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired ex-
cept in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or socie-
ties for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty.
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commis-
sion of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
APPENDIX A 843
Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of

his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as
a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter, provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological,or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substan-
dard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law.
Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-
payment of a poll tax.
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punish-
ment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be en-
acted.
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSlllP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Phil-
ippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
APPENDIX A 845
Sec. 2. The Senate shall be composedof twenty-four Senators

who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philip-
pines, as may be provided by law.
Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years
and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next followingtheir election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts appor-
tioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of regis-
tered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list repre-
sentatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communi-
ties, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practica-
ble, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Repre-
sentatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
APPENDIX A 847
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including gov-

ernment-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be ap-
pointed to any office which may have been created or the emolu-
ments thereof increased d1tringthe term for which he was elected.
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representa-
tives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other adminis-
trative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privi-
lege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or con-
trolled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Govern-
ment for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act
on account of his office.
Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the
fourth Mondayof July for its regular session, unless a different date
is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of
days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its
next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Sec. 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compelthe attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concur-
rence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal.
APPENDIX A 849
tion in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The

rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Sec. 22. The heads of departments may upon their own ini-
tiative, with the consent sf the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their de-
partments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall
be conductedin executive session.
Sec. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the
sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and sub-
ject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers nec-
essary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills au-
thorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representa-
tives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Sec. 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropria-
tions recommended by the President for the operation of the Govern-
ment as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the gen-
eral appropriations bill unless it relates specificallyto some particu-
lar appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Con-
gress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations
for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually avail-
APPENDIX A 851
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as ifhe had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto
shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
Sec. 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equi-
table. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restric-
tions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, ton-
nage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or con-
vents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclu-
sively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed with-
out the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Sec. 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury ex-
cept in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, ap-
plied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.
If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled
or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general
funds of the Government.
Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate ju-
risdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
Sec. 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
enacted.
APPENDIX A 853
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,

duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city,
shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the
Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of
the Senate shall, not later.than thirty days after the day of the elec-
tion, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,
upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in
the manner provided by law, shall canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be pro-
claimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by
the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Con-
gress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
Sec. 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the
followingoath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and

conscientiouslyfulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President
or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me
God."
(In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
Sec. 6. The President shall have an official residence. The

salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.
They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument
from the Government or any other source.
Sec. 7. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall
assume office at the beginning of their terms.
APPENDIX A 855
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of

the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice- President to be held not
earlier than forty-five day~ nor later than sixty days from the time of
such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certi-
fied under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution
and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the
Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged
against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitu-
tion. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the
special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election.
Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declara-
tion to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet trans-
mit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is un-
able to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
officeas Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all
the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the Presi-
dent of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives their written declaration that the President is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide
the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene. If it is not in
session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and
without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last writ-
ten declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
APPENDIX A 857
ment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or ~oards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments dur-
ing the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes neces-
sary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress law-
less violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-
eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Con-
gress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Mem-
bers in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the procla-
mation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
APPENDIX A 859
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower cohrts as may be established by law. ·
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to set-
tle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demand-
able and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of juris-
diction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Govern-
ment.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, pre-
scribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumer-
ated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it un-
der-mines the security of tenure of its Members.
Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropria-
tions for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below
the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.
Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en bane or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, inter-
national or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the
Supreme Court en bane, and all other cases which under the Rules of
Court are required to be heard en bane, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regula-
tions, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least
three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained,
APPENDIX A 861
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive

rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in ac-
cordance with the Civil Service Law.
Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative super-

vision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Su-
preme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be
at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or
more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of
lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he
is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence,integrity, probity, and independence.
Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created un-
der the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a repre-
sentative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of
the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Su-
preme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by
the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Com-
mission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the rep-
resentative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor oflaw for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and
the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex
officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Su-
preme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations
for the Council.
APPENDIX A 863
Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of
this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate
courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certifi-
cation to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge
shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of
the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification
shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or
issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory' period,
the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been
incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
Sec. 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from
the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and
activities of the Judiciary.
ARTICLE IX
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
Section l. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be

in-dependent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall,
during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall
he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active manage-
ment or control of any business which in any way may be affected by
the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested,
directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agen-
cies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
APPENDIX A 865
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capac-

ity.
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivi-
sions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only ac-
cording to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable,
and, except as to positions which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination.
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause provided by law.
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, di-
rectly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political cam-
paign.
(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to gov-
ernment employees.
(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given
such protection as may be provided by law.
Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central person-
nel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsive-
ness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human re-
sources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institu-
tionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.
It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report
on its personnel programs.
Sec. 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or
affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of
compensation of government officials and employees, including those
in government-owned or controlled corporations with original char-
ters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining
to, and the qualifications required for their positions.
Sec. 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall,
within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
APPENDIX A 867
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative

to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts oflimited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on elec-
tion contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall
be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all ques-
tions affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and in-
spectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law en-
forcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, includ-
ing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, or-
ganizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements,
must present their platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denomina-
tions and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold
and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any
foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and,
when accepted shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penal-
ties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices.
APPENDIX A 869
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organiza-

tion, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions regis-
tered under the party-list' system, shall not be represented in the
voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Sec. 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special
cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day
of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
Sec. 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
Sec. 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to
defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections, plebi-
scites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the
regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be re-
leased automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the
Commission.
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Section 1. (1) There shall be a .Commission on Audit com-

posed of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines, and, at the time of their appoint-
ment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice oflaw for
at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elec-
tive position in the elections, immediately preceding their appoint-
ment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the
same profession.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appoint-
ments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no
APPENDIX A 871
ARTICLE X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Re-

public of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shal! be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentraliza-
tion with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,
allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and func-
tions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the local units.
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise gen-
eral supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed pow-
ers and functions.
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy oflocal autonomy. Such
taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local govern-
ments.
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as de-
termined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.
Sec. 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable
share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the na-
tional wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided
APPENDIX A 873
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Mus-

lim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinc-
tive historical and cultural heritage, economicand social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial in-
tegrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision
over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not
granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions
shall be vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives ap-
pointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of govern-
ment for the region consisting of the executive department and
legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representa-
tive of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities,
and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution
shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both
Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
APPENDIX A 875
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The

resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its con-
trary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeach-
ment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,
the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same officialmore than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators
shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philip-
pines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall pre-
side, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrenceof two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend fur-
ther than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punish-
ment accordingto law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment
to effectivelycarry out the purpose of this section.
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandigan-
bayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now
or hereafter may be provided by law.
Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the. Ombudsman to be known as Tanod-
bayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military estab-
lishment may likewise be appointed.
Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Om-
budsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Om-
budsman according to the Civil Service Law.
Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as
the Officeof the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and
APPENDIX A 877
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public

officialor employeeof the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or
controlledcorporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required hf law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any
abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a. public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliancetherewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it
with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions en-
tered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public
funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission
on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and infor-
mation necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to·
examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when cir-
cumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, misman-
agement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make rec-
ommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law.
Sec. 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be automati-
cally and regularly released.
Sec. 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlaw-
fully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from
their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel.
Sec. 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accom-
modation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indi-
rectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial
institution to the President,. the Vice-President, the Members' of the
APPENDIX A 879
ral resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricul-
tural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, or productidn-sharing agreements with Filipino citi-
zens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may
be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archi-
pelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the eco-
nomic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agree-
ments, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract en-
tered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from
its execution.
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricul-
tural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricul-
tural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands
of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines
APPENDIX A 881
implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and

policiesfor national development.
Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic
and DevelopmentAuthority shall function as the independent plan-
ning agency of the government. ·
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the
economicand planning agency, when the national interest dictates,
reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associa-
tions at least sixty per centum. of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, cer-
tain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with
its national goals and priorities.
Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of au-
thorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common
good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall
be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the
executive and managing officers of such corporation or association
must be citizens of the Philippines.
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Fili-
pino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
measures that help make them competitive.
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the
general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange
on the basis of equally and reciprocity.
APPENDIX A 883
Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the

Philippines, operating under existing laws, shall function as the
central monetary authority.
Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance
with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information
on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be
made available to the public.
Sec. 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provi-
sions of this Article shall be considered inimical to the national
interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as may be pro-
vided by law.
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the en-

actment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,and political ine-
qualities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, owner-
ship, use, and disposition of property and its increments.
Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the com-
mitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initia-
tive and self-reliance.
LABOR
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local

and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employ-
ment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collectivebargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activi-
ties, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall
be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be pro-
vided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the preferential use of volun-
APPENDIX A 885
shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate tech-

nology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop,
and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utiliza-
tion of marine and fishing resources.
Sec. 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to
invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote in-
dustrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public
sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their
lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
Sec. 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good,
undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing pro-
gram of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged
and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It
shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citi-
zens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect
the rights of small property owners.
Sec. 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor
their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a
just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken
without adequate consultation with them and the communities
where they are to be relocated.
HEALTH
Sec. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehen-

sive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Sec. 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective
food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health
manpower development and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.
APPENDIX A 887
Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the

followingpowers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure,
and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipi-
nos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitatorial powers over jails, prisons, or deten-
tion facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education,
and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to pro-
mote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with in-
ternational treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office,
or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with
law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be pro-
vided by law.
Sec. 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of viola-
tions of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendations.
APPENDIX A 889
hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authori-

ties of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without
additional cost to the Government.
Sec. 4. (1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of
public and private institutions in the educational system and shall
exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions.
(2) Educational institutions, other than those established by
religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citi-
zens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The
Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participa-
tion in all educational institutions.
The control and administration of educational institutions
shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines.
No educational institution shall be established exclusively for
aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of
the enrollment in any school.The provisions of this subsection shall
not apply to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and
their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other
foreign temporary residents.
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educa-
tional institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educa-
tional purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the
dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institu-
tions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by
law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those coopera-
tively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to
the limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends
and provisions for reinvestment.
(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, en-
dowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
Sec. 5. (1) The State shall take into account regional and
sectoral needs and conditions and shall encourage local planning in
the development of educational policies and programs.
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of
higher learning.
APPENDIX A 891
and development, invention, innovation, and their utilization; and to

science and technology education, training, and services. It shall
support indigenous, appropriate, and self-reliant scientific and tech-
nological capabilities, and their application to the country's produc-
tive systems and national l_ife.
Sec. 11. The Congress may provide for incentives, including
tax deductions, to encourage private participation in programs of
basic and applied scientific research. Scholarships, grants-in-aid, or
other forms of incentives shall be provided to deserving science
students, researchers, scientists, inventors, technologists, and spe-
cially gifted citizens.
Sec. 12. The State shall regulate the transfer and promote
the adaptation of technologyfrom all sources for the national benefit.
It shall encourage the widest participation of private groups, local
governments, and community-basedorganizations in the generation
and utilization of science and technology.
Sec. 13. The State shall protect and secure the exclusive
rights of scientists, inventors, artists, and other gifted citizens to
their intellectual property and creations, particularly when benefi-
cial to the people, for such period as may be provided by law.
ARTS AND CULTURE
Sec. 14. The State shall foster the preservation, enrichment,

and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the
principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and intel-
lectual expression.
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the
State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nation's
historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic
creations.
Sec. 16. All the country's artistic and historic wealth consti-
tutes the cultural treasure of the nation and shall be under the
protection of the State which may regulate its disposition.
Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop
their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these
rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.
Sec. 18. (1) The State shall ensure equal access to cultural
opportunities through the educational system, public or private
APPENDIX A 893
Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly mem-
bers but the State may also do so through just programs of social
security.
~ARTICLEXVI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white, and

blue, with a sun and three stars, as consecrated and honored by the
people and recognized by law.
Sec. 2. The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the
country, a national anthem, or a national seal, which shall all be
truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of
the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by
the people in a national referendum.
Sec. 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
Sec. 4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be com-
posed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training
and serve, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force
necessary for the security of the State.
Sec. 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an
oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nation-
alist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in
the performance of their duty.
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remu-
neration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the
State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in
any partisan political activity, except to vote.
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall,
at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian
position in the Government including government-owned or con-
trolled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow ex-
tension of their service.
APPENDIX A 895
(2) The advertising industry is impressed with public inter-

est, and shall be regulated by law for the protection of consumers
and the promotion of the general welfare.
Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least
seventy per centum of the-capital of which is owned by such citizens
shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of
entities in such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share
in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of
such entities must be citizens of the Philippines.
Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to ad-
vise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communi-
ties, the majority of the members of which shall come from such
communities.
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitu-

tion may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Mem-
bers; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be di-
rectly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratifi-
cation of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exer-
cise of this right.
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all
its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
APPENDIX A 897
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President

under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1992.
Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise leg-
islative powers until the fir~t Congress is convened.
Sec. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by ap-
pointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats
reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of
Article VI of this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by the Congress, the Presi-
dent may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the
heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Ma-
nila area.
Sec. 9. A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until
it is converted into a regular province or until its component munici-
palities are reverted to the mother province.
Sec. 10. All courts existing at the time of the ratification of this
Constitution shall continue to exercise their jurisdiction until other-
wise provided by law. The provisions of the existing Rules of Court,
judiciary acts, and procedural laws not inconsistent with this Constitu-
tion shall remain operative unless amended or repealed by the Su-
preme Court or the Congress.
Sec. 11. The incumbent Members of the Judiciary shall con-
tinue in office until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their officeor are removed for
cause.
Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the
ratification of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme
Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A
similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies.
Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of
this Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution
of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall
be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable.
Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of
Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed
APPENDIX A 899
Sec. 20. The first congress shall give priority to the determina-
tion of the period for the full implementation of free public secondary
education.
Sec. 21. The Congress shall provide efficaciousprocedures and
adequate remedies for the- reversion to the State of all lands of the
public domain and real rights connected therewith which were ac-
quired in violation of the Constitution or the public land laws, or
through corrupt practices. No transfer or disposition of such lands or
real rights shall be allowed until after the lapse of one year from the
ratification of this Constitution.
Sec. 22. At the earliest possible time, the Government shall
expropriate idle or abandoned agricultural lands as may be defined by
law, for distribution to the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform pro-
gram.
Sec. 23. Advertising entities affected by paragraph (2), Section
11 of Article XVI of this Constitution shall have five years from its
ratification to comply on a graduated and proportionate basis with the
minimum Filipino ownership requirement therein.
Sec. 24. Private armies and other armed groups not recognized
by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary
forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces not consistent with the
citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved
or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, rati-
fied by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referen-
dum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than
eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution. However,in
the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may
extend said period.
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon show-
ing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or
APPENDIX A 901
Roberto R Concepcion Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
Vicente B. Foz Edmundo G. Garcia
Jose Luis Martin C. p:ascon Serafin V.C. Guingona
Alberto M.K. Jamir Jose B. Laurel, Jr.
Eulogio R. Lerum Regalado E. Maambong
Christian S. Monsod Teodulo C. Natividad
Ma. Teresa F. Nieva Jose N. Nolledo
Blas F. Ople Minda Luz M. Quesada
Florenz D. Regalado Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr.
Cirilo A. Rigos Francisco A. Rodrigo
Ricardo J. Romulo Decoroso R. Rosales
Rene V. Sarmiento Jose E. Suarez
Lorenzo M. Sumulong Jaime S.L. Tadeo
Christine 0. Tan Gregorio J. Tingson
Efrain B. Treii.as Lugum L. Ulrn
Wilfrido V. Villacorta Bernardo M. Villegas
Attested by:
Flerida Ruth P. Romero

Secretary-General
APPENDIX A 903
northward to Antipolo Street, eastward to Rizal Avenue Exten-

sion, northward to boundary between Manila and Caloocan;
Fourth District: Barangays Nos. 395-586 SW-Estero de San
Miguel up to Mendiola Bridge, thence to C.M. Recto Avenue to
Quezon Boulevard; ,W-Quezon Boulevard, Andalucia, Dima-
salang up to boundary between Manila and Quezon City; NE-
City boundary between Manila and Quezon City up to Ramon
Magsaysay Boulevard; SE-Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard up
to V. Mapa Street; S--Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard up to
point Estero de San Miguel where Ramon Magsaysay Boule-
vard spans Estero de San Miguel; Fifth District: Barangays
Nos. 649-828 N-Mouth of Pasig River inland to point Paz M.
Guanzon Street extending to Estero de Pandacan; NE-Estero
de Pandacan up to Pedro Gil Street to Tejeron Street up to
boundary of Manila and Makati; SE-City boundary between
Manila and Makati up to Estero de Tripa de Gallina; S-City
boundary between Pasay and Manila down to Roxas Boulevard
up to edge of reclaimed areas westward to Manila Bay; W-
Manila Bay up to mouth of Pasig River; Sixth District: Baran-
gays Nos. 587-648; and 829-905 N-Starting from point which
is mouth of Estero de San Miguel going eastward to Mendiola
Bridge, following line along Estero de San Miguel up to point
where Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard spans Estero de San Mi-
guel, thence Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard eastward to City
boundary between Manila and Quezon City; NE-City bound-
ary up to point city boundary of Manila, San Juan and Quezon
City; E-Manila-San Juan-Mandaluyong-Makati bounda-
ries up to Tejeron Street; SE-Tejeron Street to Pedro Gil
Street up to bridge spanning Estero de Pandacan, SW & W-
Estero de Pandacan going northward to Paz M. Guanzon
Street, then northward on Paz M. Guazon Street up to Pasig
River to mouth ofEstero de San Miguel on Pasig River.
QUEZONCITY, four (4)-First District: Barangays Del Monte, Paltok,
Bungad, San Antonio, Katipunan, Veterans Village, Talayan,
Damayan, Mariblo, Paraiso, Sta. Cruz, Nayong Kanluran,
Philam, West Triangle, N.S. Amoranto, Paang Bundok, San
Isidro Labrador, Sta. Teresita, Salvacion, Maharlika, St. Peter,
Lourdes, Sto. Domingo, Sienna, San Jose, Manresa, Pag-ibig sa
Nayon, Balingasa, Masambong, Damar, Bahay Toro, Sto. Cristo,
Ramon Magsaysay, Project 6, Vasra, Alicia, and Bagong Pag-asa;
Second District: Barangays Fairview, New Era, Holy Spirit, Ba-
tasan Hills, Commonwealth, Payatas, Bagong Silangan, Sauyo,
APPENDIX A 905
REGION I
ABRA, one (1)

BENGUET with the City of Baguio, two (2)-First District: Baguio
City; Second Districts all the Municipalities ofBenguet.
!LOCOS NORTE with Laoag City, two (2)-First District: Laoag
City and the Municipalities of Bacarra, Bangui, Burgos,
Pagudpud, Pasuquin, Piddig, Sarrat, Vintar, Adams, Carasi,
and Dumalneg; Second District: Municipalities of Badoc,
Batac, Currimao, Dingras, Espiritu, Marcos, Nueva Era,
Paoay, Pinili, San Nicolas, and Solsona.
!LOCOS SUR, two (2)-First District: Municipalities of Bantay,
Cabugao, Caoayan, Magsingal, San Ildefonso, San Juan, San
Vicente, Santa Catalina, Santo Domingo, Sinait, and Vigan; Sec-
ond District: Municipalities of Alilem, Banayoyo, Burgos, Can-
don, Cervantes, Galimuyod, Gregorio del Pilar, Lidlidda, Nag-
bukel, Narvacan, Quirino, Salcedo, San Emilio, San Esteban,
Santa, Santa Cruz, Santa Lucia, Santa Maria, Santiago, Suyo,
Tagudin, Sigay, and Sugpon.
LA UNION, two (2)-First District: Municipalities of Bacnotan,
Balaoan, Bangar, Luna, San Fernando, San Gabriel, San Juan,
Santol, and Sudipen; Second District: Municipalities of Agoo,Ar-
ingay, Bagulin, Bauang, Burgos, Caba, Naguilian, Puga, Rosario,
Santo Tomas, and Tubao.
MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, one (1)
PANGASINAN with the Cities of Dagupan and San Carlos, six (6)-
First District: Municipalities of Bolinao, Bani, Agno, Burgos,
Dasol, Infanta, Mabini, Alaminos, Anda and Sual; Second Dis-
trict: Municipalities of Labrador, Lingayen, Bugallon, Aguilar,
Mangatarem, Binmaley, Urbiztondo and Basista; Third Dis-
trict: San Carlos City, and the Municipalities of Malasiqui, Ba-
yambang, Calasiao, Mapandan, and Sta. Barbara; Fourth Dis-
trict: Dagupan City and the Municipalities of Mangaldan, San
Fabian, San Jacinto, and Manaoag, Fifth District: Municipali-
ties of Binalonan, Laoac, Urdaneta, Villasis, Sison, Pozorrubio,
Bautista, Alcala, and Sto. Tomas; Sixth District: Municipalities
of Rosales, Asingan, Balungao, Sta. Maria, Umingan, San
Quintin, Natividad, Tayug, San Nicolas, and San Manuel.
APPENDIX A 907
Guimba, Quezon, Talavera, Licab, Sto. Domingo, Aliaga, and

Zaragoza; Second District: San Jose City and the Municipalities
of Lupao, Muiioz, Talugtog, Caranglan, Pantabangan, Llanera,
and Rizal; Third District: Cabanatuan City; Palayan City, and
the Municipalities of General Natividad, Bongabong, Laur,
Gabaldon, and Sta. ltosa; Fourth District: Municipalities of San
Leonardo, General Tinio, Peiiaranda, Gapan, San Isidro, Cabiao,
San Antonio, and Jaen.
PAMPANGAwith Angeles City, four (4)-First District: Angeles City
and the Municipalities of Mabalacat and Magalang; Second
District: Municipalities of Lubao, Guagua, Floridablanca, Po-
rac, Sta. Rita, and Sexmoan; Third District: Municipalities of
San Fernando, Arayat, Mexico, Bacolor, and Sta. Ana; Fourth
District: Municipalities of Candaba, Apalit, Macabebe, Masan-
tol, Minalin, Sto. Tomas, San Luis, and San Simon.
TARLAC,three (3)-First Disctrict: Municipalities ofMayantoc, Sta.
Ignacia, Camiling, Moncada, San Manuel, Anao, Paniqui,
Ramos, San Clemente, and Pura; Second District: Municipali-
ties ofTarlac, Gerona, and Victoria; Third District: Municipali-
ties of Bamban, Capas, Concepcion, and La Paz.
ZAMBALESwith Olongapo City, two (2)-First Disctrict: Olongapo
City and the Municipalities of Subic, Castillejos, and San
Marcelino; Second District: Municipalities of Botolan, Caban-
gan, Candelaria, Iba, Masinloc, Palauig, San Antonio, San
Felipe, San Narciso, and Sta. Cruz.
REGION IV
AURORA, one (1)

BATANGAS with the Cities of Batangas and Lipa, four (4)-First
District: Municipalities ofNasugbu, Lian, Calatagan, Balayan,
Tuy, Calaca, Lemery, and Taal; Second District: Batangas City
and the Municipalities of Lobo, San Pascual, Bauan, Mabini,
San Luis, and Tingloy; Third District: Municipalities of Balete,
Malvar, Sto. Tomas, Tanauan, Talisay, Laurel, Agoncillo, San
Nicolas, Sta. Teresita, Alitagtag, Cuenca, and Mataas Na Ka-
hoy; Fourth District: Lipa City and the Municipalities of San
Juan, Taysan, Rosario, P. Garcia, Ibaan, and San Jose.
CAVITE with the Cities of Tagaytay, Cavite and Trece Martires,
three (3)-First District: Cavite City and the Municipalities of
APPENDIX A 909
ties of E. Rodriguez, San Mateo, Morong, Cardona, Teresa, Ba-

ras, Tanay, Pililla, and Jala-Jala .
. ROMBLON, one (1)
REGION V
ALBAY with Legaspi City, three (3)-First District: Municipalities of

Bacacay, Malinao, Malilipot, Santo Domingo, Tabaco, and Tiwi;
Second District: Legaspi City and the Municipalities of Camalig,
Daraga, Manito, and Rapu-Rapu; Third District; Municipalities
of Guinobatan, Jovellar, Libon, Ligao, Oas, Pio Duran, and Po-
langui.
CAMARINES NORTE, one (1)
CAMARINES SUR including the Cities ofNaga and Iriga, four (4)-
First District: Municipalities of Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi, Sipo-
cot, Libmanan, Cabusao, Pamplona, Pasacao, Minalabac, and
San Fernando; Second District: Naga City and the Municipali-
ties of Bonbon, Calabanga, Camaligan, Canaman, Gainza, Ma-
garao, Milaor, Ocampo, and Pili; Third District: Municipalities
of Caramoan, Garchitorena, Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, San-
gay, San Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac, and Siruma; Fourth District:
Iriga City and the Municipalities of Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi,
Bula, and Nabua.
CATANDUANES, one (1)
MASBATE, three (3)-First District: Municipalities of San Pascual,
Claveria, Monreal, San Jacinto, San Fernando, and Batuan;
Second District: Municipalities of Masbate, Moho, Milagros,
Aroroy, Baleno, Balud, and Mandaon; Third District: Munici-
palities of Uson, Dimasalang, Palanas, Cataingan, Pio V. Cor-
puz, Esperanza, Placer, and Cawayan.
SORSOGON, two (2)-First District: Municipalities of Sorsogon, Pilar,
Donsol, Castilla, Bacon, Casiguran, and Magallanes; Second Dis-
trict: Municipalities of Barcelona, Prieto Diaz, Gubat, Juban, Bu-
lusan, Irosin, Sta. Magdalena, Matnog, and Bulan.
REGION VI
AKLAN, one (1)

ANTIQUE, one (1)
APPENDIX A 911
Lila, Dimiao, Valencia, Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna, Duero, Guin-

dulman, Candijay, Mabini, Alicia,Anda, Sierra Bullones, and Pi-
lar.
CEBU, with the Cities of Danao, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue, and Toledo,
six (6)-First District: Municipalities of Talisay, Minglanilla,
Naga, San Fernando, Carcar, and Sibongan; Second District:
Municipalities of Argao, Dalaguete, Alcoy, Boljoon, Oslob, San-
tander, Samboan, Ginatilan, Malabuyoc, Alegria, Badian,
Moalboal, Alcantara, Ronda, and Dumanjug; Third District:
Toledo City and the Municipalities of Barili, Aloguinsan, Pi-
namungajan, Balamban, Asturias, and Tuburan; Fourth Dis-
trict: Municipalities of Tabuelan, San Remigio, Sta. Fe, Banta-
yan, Madridejos, Daanbantayan, Medellin, Bogo, and Tabogon;
Fifth District: Danao City and the Municipalities of Borbon,
Sagod, Catmon, Carmen, Compostela, Liloan, San Francisco,
Poro, Tudela, and Pilar; Sixth District: Lapu-Lapu City, Man-
daue City and the Municipality of Cordova and Consolacion.
CEBU CITY, two (2)-First District: Barangays of Adlawon, Agsungot,
Apas, Bacayan, Banilad, Binaliw, Budla-an, Busay, Cambinocot,
Camputhaw, Capitol Site, Carreta, Central Proper, Cogon-
Ramos, Day-as, Ermita, Guba, Hipodromo, Kalubihan, Kama-
gayan, Kasambagan, Lahug, Lorega, Lusaran, Luz, Mabini, Ma-
bolo, Malubog, Pahina Central, Parian, Paril, Pit-os, Pulang
Bato, Sambag I, Sambag II, San Antonio, San Jose, San Roque,
Sta. Cruz, Sirao, T. Padilla, Talamban, Taptap, Tejero, Tinago,
and Zapatera; Second District: Barangays of Babag, Basak
Pardo, Basak San Nicolas, Bonbon, Buhisan, Bulacao Pardo,
Bout-Taup, Calamba, Cogon Pardo, Duljo Fatima, Guadalupe,
lnayawan, Kalunasan, Kinasang-an Pardo, Labangon, Mambal-
ing, Pahina San Nicolas, Pamutan, Pardo, Pasil Abuno, Sibugay,
Punta Princesa, Quiot, San Nicolas, Sawang Calero, Sinsin,
Suba Pasil, Sudlon, Sapangdako, Tabunan, Tigbao, Tisa, and
Toong.
NEGROS ORIENTAL, with the Cities of Bais, Canlaon, and Duma-
guete, three (3)-First District: Canlaon City and the Munici-
palities of Vallehermoso, Guihulngan, La Libertad, Jimalalud,
Tayasan, Ayungon, Bindoy, and Manjuyod; Second District:
Bais City, Dumaguete City, and the Municipalities ofMabinay,
Tanjay, Pamplona, Amlan, San Jose, and Sibulan; Third Dis-
trict: Municipalities of Valencia, Bacong, Dauin, Zamboan-
guita, Siaton, Sta. Catalina, Bayawan,, and Basay.
APPENDIX A 913
TAWI-TAWI,one (1)
ZAMBOANGADEL NORTE with the Cities of Dapitan and Dipolog,
three (3)-First District: Dapitan City and the Municipalities
of Sibutad, · Rizal, La Libertad, Mutia, Pifian, Sergio Osmefia,
Sr., and Polanco; Second District: Dipolog City and the Mu-
· nicipalities of Katipunan, Pres. Manuel A. Roxas, Manukan,
Ponot, Siayan, and Sindangan; Third District: Municipalities
of Salug; Godod, Liloy, Tampilisan, Labason, Gutalac, Siocon,
Baliguian, Siraway, Bacungan, and Sibuco.
ZAMBOANGADEL SUR, with Pagadian City, three (3)-First Dis-
trict: Pagadian City and the Municipalities of Dumingag, Maha-
yag, Molave, Tambulig, Midsalip, R. Magsaysay, Labangan,
Aurora, Tukuran, Josefina, and Don Mariano Marcos; Second
District: Municipalities of Dumalinao, San Pablo, Tabina,
Dimataling, Dinas, San Miguel, Margosatubig, Lapuyan, Ku-
malarang, Bayog, Lakewood, Pitogo, and Vincenzo A. Sagun;
Third District: Municipalities of Malangas, Alicia, Olutanga,
Mabuhay, Siay, Kabasalan, Naga, Ipil, Titay, Tungawan,
Buug, Imelda, Payao, Talusan, Diplahan, and Roseller Lim.
ZAMBOANGACITY, one (1)
REGION X
AGUSAN DEL NORTE, with the City of Butuan, two (2)-First Dis-
trict: Butuan City and the Municipality of Las Nieves; Second
District: Municipalities of Buenavista, Cabadbaran, Carmen,
Jabonga, Kitcharao, Magallanes, Nasipit, Santiago, Tubay, and
Remedios T. Romualdez.
AGUSAN DEL SUR, one (1)
BUKIDNON, three (3)-First District: Municipalities of Talakag,
Baungon, Malitbog, Libona, Manolo Fortich, Sumialo, Pangan-
tocan, and Kalilangan; Second District: Municipalities of Ma-
laybalay, Lantapan, Cabanglasan, Valencia, San Fernando,
and Impasugong; Third District: Municipalities of Maramag,
Quezon, Don Carlos, Kitaotao, Dangcagan, Kibawe, Damulog,
and Kadingilan.
CAMIGUIN, one (1)
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL with the Cities of Oroquieta, Ozamiz and
Tangub, two (2)-First District: Oroquieta City and the Mu-
nicipalities of Baliangao, Plaridel, Calarnba, Sapang Dalaga,
APPENDIX A 915
Paquibato; Third District: Districts of Toril, Tugbok, Calinan,

and Baguio.
SOUTH COTABATO with General Santos City, three (3)-First
District: General Santos City, and the Municipalities of Polo-
molok, Tampakan, and Tupi; Second District: Municipalities of
Tantangan, Norala, Banga, Sto. Nino, Surallah, Koronadal, Ti-
boli, and Lake Sebu; Third District: Municipalities of Alabel,
Malapatan, Glan, Maasim, Kiamba, Maitum, and Malungon.
SURIGAO DEL SUR, two (2)-First District: Municipalities of Ba-
yabas, Cantilan, Carrascal, Cortes, Lanuza, Madrid, San Mi-
guel, Tago, Tandag, Cagwait, Marihatag, San Agustin, Car-
men, and Lianga; Second District: Municipalities of Barobo,
Bislig, Hinatuan, Lingig, and Tagbina.
REGION XII
LANAO DEL NORTE with Iligan City, two (2)-First District: Iligan
City, Linamon, Kauswagan, Bacolod,Maigo, Kolambugan, Tubod,
and Baroy; Second District: Baloi, Pantar, Tagoloan, Poona-
Piagapo, Pantao-Ragat, Matungao, Tangkal, Munai, Nunungan,
Magsaysay, Salvador, Kapatagan, Karomatan, Sapad, and
Lala.
LANAO DEL SUR with Marawi City, two (2)-First District: Marawi
City and the Municipalities of Marantao, Piagapo, Saguiaran,
Tagoloan, Kapai, Ditsaan-Ramain, Bubong, Buadiposo-Buntong,
Bumbaran, Maguing, Wao, Molundo, Taraka, Lumba-Bayabao,
Poona-Bayabao, Masiu and Tamparan; Second District: Mu-
nicipalities of Balindong, Tugaya, Bacolod Grande, Madalum,
Madamba, Pualas, Ganassi, Pagayawan, Sultan Gumander,
Malabang, Balabagan, Kapatagan, Marogong, Tubaran, Bini-
dayan, Lumbatan, Lumbayanague, Butig, Bayang, and Ca-
lanogas.
MAGUINDANAO with Cotabato City, two (2)-First District: Cota-
bato City and the Municipalities of Parang, Sultan Kudarat,
Buldon, Barira, Dinaig, Kabuntalan, Matanog and Upi; Second
District: Municipalities of Pagalungan, Buluan, Sultan sa
Barongis, Maganoy, Talayan, South Upi, Datu Piang, Datu
Paglas, and Ampatuan.
NORTH COTABATO, two (2)-First District: Municipalities of Car-
men, Kabacan, Libungan, Midsayap, Pigkawayan, Pikit,
APPENDIX B
1973 CONSTITUTION
of the
Republic of the Philippines
PREAMBLE
WE, THE SOVEREIGN FILIPINO PEOPLE, IMPLORING THE AID

OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A GOV-
ERNMENT THAT SHALL EMBODYOUR IDEALS, PROMOTE THE
GENERAL WELFARE, CONSERVE AND DEVELOP THE PATRI-
MONY OF OUR NATION, AND SECURE TO OURSELVES AND
OUR POSTERITY THE BLESSINGS OF DEMOCRACY UNDER A
REGIME OF JUSTICE, PEACE, LIBERTY, AND EQUALITY, DO
ORDAINAND PROMULGATETHIS CONSTITUTION.
Article I
THE NATIONAL TERRITORY
SECTION 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine

archipelago, with all the islands and water embraced therein, and all
other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or
legal title, including the territorial sea, the air space, the subsoil, the
seabed, the insular shelves, and the other submarine areas over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the inter-
nal waters of the Philippines.
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
SECTION 1. The Philippines is a republican state. Sover-

eignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
917
APPENDIX B 919
Article III
CITIZENSffiP
SECTION 1. The f?llowingare citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philip-
pines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
pro-visions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SEC. 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an
alien shall retain her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omission she is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her citi-
zenship.
SEC. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in
the manner provided by law.
SEC. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Article IV
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process oflaw, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
SEC. 2. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other respon-
sible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
APPENDIX B 921
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposi-
tion of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
SEC. 17. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal of-
fense without due process-oflaw.
SEC. 18. All persons, except those charged with capital of-
fenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required.
SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process tc secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused pro-
vided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified.
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimida-
tion, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confessionobtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible in evidence.
SEC. 21. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or
unusual punishment inflicted.
SEC. 22. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punish-
ment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
SEC. 23. Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
Article V
DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENS
SECTION 1. It shall be the duty of the citizen to be loyal to

the Republic and to honor the Philippine flag, to defend the State
APPENDIX B 923
SEC. 3. A vote for the President shall also be a vote for the
Vice-President running under the same ticket of a political party,
unless otherwise provided by law.
SEC. 4. No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of election for
President, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
SEC. 5. The President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirti-
eth day of June following the day of the election and shall end at
noon of the same date six years thereafter when the term of his
successor shall begin.
The returns of every election for President, duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted
to the Speaker at the Batasang Pambansa, who shall, not later than
thirty days after the day of the election, and in the presence of the
Batasang Pambansa, open all the certificates, and the votes shall
then be counted.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be pro-
claimed elected; but in case two or more shall have an equal and the
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by a
vote of a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa in
session assembled.
SEC. 6. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of his term, the
President-elect shall have died, the Vice-President-elect shall become
President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time
fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President shall have
failed to qualify, then the Vice-President shall act as President until
a President shall have qualified. The Batasang Pambansa shall by
law provide for the case wherein neither a President-elect nor a Vice-
President-elect shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or
both shall have died at the time fixed for the beginning of their term,
declaring who shall then act as President or the manner in which
one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accord-
ingly until a President or Vice-President shall have qualified.
SEC. 7. The President, on assuming office, shall take the fol-
lowing oath or affirmation:
APPENDIX B 925
acting as President, the Speaker may not be removed. He shall not

be eligible for election in the immediately succeeding election for
President and Vice-President.
The Batasang Pambansa shall, at ten o'clockin the morning of
the third day after the vacancy occurs, convene in accordance with its
rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling
for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be
held not earlier than forty-fivedays nor later than sixty days from the
time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed
certified under paragraph (2), Section 19, Article VIII of this Constitu-
tion and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the
Batasang Pambansa. Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from
the requirements of paragraph (4), Section 16 of Article VIII of this
Constitution. The convening of the Batasang Pambansa cannot be
suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall
be called if the vacancy occurs within seventy days before the date of
the presidential election of 1987.
Appointments extended by the Acting President shall remain
effective, unless revoked by the newly elected President within
ninety days from his assumption of office.
The Batasang Pambansa shall by law provide for the case of
death, permanent disability or resignation of the Speaker at the time
the vacancy in the Office of the President occurs or subsequently
thereafter, declaring who shall serve as President until the Presi-
dent and the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified,
subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as
the Speaker when acting as President.
SEC. 10. The President shall have control of the ministries.
SEC. 11. The President shall be commander-in-chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the
public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law.
SEC. 12. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus
and offices, the officers of the armed forces of the Philippines from
the rank of brigadier general or commodore, and all other officers of
APPENDIX B 927
law, and those chosen by the President from Members of the Cabi-
net. Each district in Metropolitan Manila shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. The elective
representatives shall be apportioned by law among the provinces
with their componentcities, highly urbanized cities, and the districts
of Metropolitan Manila ih. accordance with the number of their re-
spective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, but the provinces with their component cities and highly ur-
banized cities shall have at least one representative each. The prov-
inces and cities shall have at least the same total number of repre-
sentatives as under the 1935 Constitution.
The manner of the election of the representatives shall be pre-
scribed by law. The number of representatives from each sector and
manner of their election or selection shall be provided by law.
SEC. 3. (1) The Members of the Batasang Pambansa shall
have a term of six years which shall begin, unless otherwise pro-
vided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.
(2) In case the Batasang Pambansa is dissolved, the newly
elected Members shall serve the unexpired portion of the term from
the time the President convokes the Batasan, which shall not be
later than thirty days immediately following their election.
SEC. 4. No person shall be a Member of the Batasang Pam-
bansa as a provincial, city or district representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the elec-
tion, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter in the political subdivision in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than six
months immediately preceding the day of the election.
A sectoral representative shall be a natural-born citizen, able
to read and write, and shall have such other qualifications as may be
provided by law.
SEC. 5. (1) The regular election of the Members of the Ba-
tasang Pambansa shall be held on the second Monday of May 1984
and every six years thereafter.
(2) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eight-
een months or more before a regular election, the Commission on
Elections shall call a special election to be held within sixty days
after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired
term.
APPENDIX B 929
within twenty-four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its
next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to
do so. A Member shall not be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Batasan or in any com-
mittee thereof.
SEC. 10. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall not
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Govern-
ment-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure except that
of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, member of the Cabinet,
or Deputy Minister. Neither shall he, during the term for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased while he was a Member
of the Batasang Pambansa.
SEC. 11. No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall ap-
pear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction,
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Gov-
ernment is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body. Neither shall, he directly or indi-
rectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any fran-
chise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdi-
vision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office. He shall
not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.
SEC. 12. (1) There shall be a question hour at least once a
month or as often as the Rules of the Batasang Pambansa may pro-
vide, which shall be included in its agenda, during which the Prime
Minister, the Deputy Minister or any Minister may be required to
appear and answer questions and interpellations by Members of the
Batasang Pambansa. Written questions shall be submitted to the
Speaker at least three days before a scheduled question hour. Inter-
pellation shall not be limited to the written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. The agenda shall specify the subjects of the
question hour. When the security of the State so requires and the
President so states in writing, the question hour shall be conducted
in executive session.
(2) The Batasang Pambansa or any of its committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
APPENDIX B 931
SEC. 16. (1) The Prime Minister shall submit to the Bata-
sang Pambansa within thirty days from the opening of each regular
session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of
receipts based on existing and proposed revenue measures, and of
expenditures. The form, content and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the gen-
eral appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particu-
lar appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Bata-
sang Pambansa shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually avail-
able as certified to by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal included therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appro-
priations; however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitu-
tional Commissions may by law by authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Batasang Pambansa
shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensu-
ing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and
effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Batasang
Pambansa.
SEC. 17. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equi-
table. The Batasang Pambansa shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
(2) The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the Presi-
dent to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively
APPENDIX B 933
Article IX
THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET
SECTION 1. There shall be a Cabinet which shall be com-

posed of Ministers with or without portfolio appointed by the Presi-
dent. At least a majority of the Members of the Cabinet who are
heads of ministries shall come from the provincial, city or district
representatives of the Batasang Pambansa.
The Prime Minister shall be the head of the Cabinet. He shall,
upon the nomination of the President from among the Members of
the Batasang Pambansa, be elected by a majority of all the Members
thereof.
SEC. 2. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be respon-
sible to the Batasang Pambansa for the program of government
approved by the President.
SEC. 3. The term of office of the Prime Minister shall com-
mence from the date of his election by the Batasang Pambansa and
shall end on the date that the nomination of his successor is submit-
ted by the President to the Batasang Pambansa. Any other member
of the Cabinet may be removed at the discretion of the President.
SEC. 4. (1) The President may nominate from among the
Members of the Batasang Pambansa a Deputy Prime Minister who
shall be elected by a majority of the Members thereof. The Deputy
Prime Minister shall perform such functions as may be assigned to
him by the Prime Minister.
(2) The President shall also appoint the Deputy Ministers
who shall perform such functions as may be assigned to them by law
or by the respective heads of ministries.
SEC. 5. The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and the
Members of the Cabinet, on assuming office, shall take the following
oath or affirmation:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as (name of position) of the
Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its
laws, do justice to every man and consecrate myself to the ser-
vice of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, the
last sentence will be omitted.)
SEC. 6. The salaries and emoluments of the Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be fixed by
APPENDIX B 935
dered en bane or in division may be modified or reversed except by

the Court sitting en bane.
SEC. 3. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the
Supreme Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
at least forty years of age, and has for ten years or more been a judge
of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philip-
pines.
(2) The Batasang Pambansa shall prescribe the qualifications
of judges of inferior courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.
SEC. 4. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of in-
ferior courts shall be appointed by the President.
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the followingpowers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambas-
sadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judg-
ments and decrees of inferior courts in-
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, executive agreement, law, ordinance, or executive
order or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assess-
ment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is
in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death
or life imprisonment.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is in-
volved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of inferior courts to other sta-
tions as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment
shall not last longer than six months without the consent of the
judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a mis-
carriage of justice.
APPENDIX B 937
lapsed without the rendition of the corresponding decision or resolu-

tion because the necessary vote cannot be had, the judgment, order,
or resolution appealed from shall be deemed affirmed, except in
those cases where a qualified majority is required and in appeals
from judgments of conviction in criminal cases; and in original spe-
cial civil actions and proceedings for habeas corpus, the petition in
such cases shall be deemed dismissed; and a certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Magistrate of the court shall be issued and
a copy thereof attached to the record of the case.
SEC. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from
the opening of each regular session of the Batasang Pambansa,
submit to the President, the Prime Minister, and the Batasang Pam-
bansa an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judi-
ciary.
Article XI
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the

Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barrios.
SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local govern-
ment code which may not thereafter be amended except by a major-
ity vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive an and ac-
countable local government structure with an effective system of
recall, allocating among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifi-
cations, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organi-
zation and operation of the local units. However, any change in the
existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
SEC. 4. (1) Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities and cities and municipalities with respect to compo-
nent barrios, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are
within the scope of their assigned powers and functions. Highly
APPENDIX B 939
at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree, and

must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elec-
tion immediately preceding their appointment. The Chairman and
the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of the Commissioners first ap-
pointed, one shall hold office for seven years, another for five years,
and the third for three years. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
(2) The Commission shall, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law, establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency,and integrity in the Civil Service.
SEC. 2. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly tech-
nical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to
be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination.
SEC. 3. No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law.
SEC. 4. (1) Unless otherwise provided by law, no elective
official shall be eligible for appointment to any office or position
during his tenure, except as Member of the Cabinet.
(2) No candidate who lost in an election shall be eligible for
appointment or reappointment to any office in the government, or in
any government-owned or controlled corporation, within one year
following such election.
SEC. 5. No officer or employee in the Civil Service, including
members of the armed forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in
any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to
vote.
SEC. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall provide for the stan-
dardization of compensation of government officials and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations,
taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to,
and the qualifications required for, the positions concerned.
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
SECTION 1. (1) There shall be an independent Commis-

sion on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
APPENDIX B 941
by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from
the date of their submission for decision.
SEC. 4. The Commission may recommend to the President
the removal of, or any other disciplinary action against, any officer
or employee it has deputized, for violation or disregard of, or disobe-
dience to, its decision, order or directive.
SEC. 5. The enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privi-
leges, or concessions granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, may be supervised or regulated by the
Commission during the election period for the purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, and honest elections.
SEC. 6. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special
cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day
of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
SEC. 7. No pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence for vio-
lation of the law or rules and regulations concerning elections shall
be granted without the recommendation of the Commission.
SEC. 8. The political parties whose respective candidates for
President have obtained the first and second highest number of votes
in the last preceding election for President under this Constitution
shall be entitled to accreditation if each has obtained at least ten
percent of the total number of votes cast in such election. If the
candidates for President obtaining the two highest number of votes
do not each obtain at least ten percent of the total number of votes
cast, or in case no election for President shall as yet have been held,
the Commission on Elections shall grant accreditation to political
parties as may be provided by law.
No religious sect shall be registered as a political party, and no
political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall
be entitled to accreditation.
SEC. 9. (1) Bona fide candidates for any public office shall
be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
Accredited political parties shall be represented in the regis-
tration board, board of election inspectors, board of canvassers, or
other similar bodies as may be provided by law.
APPENDIX B 943
brought to the Supreme Court or certiorari by the aggrieved party

within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
(3) Submit to the President, the Prime Minister, and the Ba-
tasang Pambansa, within the time fixed by law, an annual financial
report of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumen-
talities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and
recommend measures necessary to improve their efficiency and
effectiveness. It shall submit such other reports as may be· required
bylaw.
(4) Perform such other duties and functions as may be pre-
scribed by law.
Article XIII
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers

and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,and shall remain accountable to the
people.
SEC. 2. The President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be re-
moved from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or
graft and corruption.
SEC. 3. The Batasang Pambansa shall have the exclusive
power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment. Upon the
filing of a verified complaint, the Batasang Pambansa may initiate
impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its Members. No
official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-
thirds of all the Members thereof. When the Batasang Pambansa
sits in impeachment cases, its Members shall be on oath or affirma-
tion.
SEC. 4. Judgments in cases of impeachment shall be limited
to removal from officeand disqualification to hold any officeof honor,
trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial, and punishment, in accordance with law.
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court,
to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
APPENDIX B 945
or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject

to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Batasang Pambansa
when the public interest so requires. The State shall encourage
equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public
utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in the
capital thereof.
SEC. 6. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or
defense, establish and operate industries and means of transporta-
tion and communication, and upon payment of just compensation,
transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to
be operated by the Government.
SEC. 7. In times of national emergency when the public in-
terest so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the
operations of any privately owned public "utility or business affected
with public interest.
SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial, or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public do-
main, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, con-
cession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant.
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploita-
tion, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest,
may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into
service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the explora-
tion, development, exploitation or utilization of any of the natural
sources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial,
technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby
recognized as such.
APPENDIX B 947
tions, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public

domain.
SEC. 15. Notwithstanding the provision of Section Fourteen
of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippine who has lost
his Philippine citizenship.may be a transferee of private land, for use
by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa shall provide.
SEC. 16. Any provision of paragraph one, Section Fourteen,
Article Eight and of this article notwithstanding, the President may
enter into international treaties or agreements as the national wel-
fare and interest may require.
Article XV
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white,

and blue, with a sun and three stars, as consecrated and honored by
the people and recognizedby law.
SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa may by law adopt a new
name for the country, a national anthem, and a national seal, which
shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and
traditions of the people. Thereafter, the national name, anthem, and
seal so adopted shall not be subject to change except by constitutional
amendment.
SEC. 3. (1) This Constitution shall be officiallypromulgated
in English and in Filipino, and translated into each dialect spoken by
over fifty thousand people, and into Spanish and Arabic. In case of
conflict, the English text shall prevail.
(2) The Batasang Pambansa shall take steps toward the de-
velopment and formal adoption of a common national language to be
known as Filipino.
(3) Until otherwise provided by law, English and Pilipino
shali be the officiallanguages.
SEC. 4. All public officers and employees and members of the
armed forces· shall take an oath to support and defend the Constitu-
tion.
SEC. 5. No elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically
authorized by law, nor accept, without the consent of the Batasang
APPENDIX B 949
schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their de-

pendents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign
temporary residents.
(8) At the option expressed in writing by the parents or
guardians, and without 'cost to them and the Government, religion
shall be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and
high schools as may be provided by law.
SEC. 9. (1) The State shall promote scientific research and
invention. The advancement of science and technology shall have
priority in the national development.
(2) Filipino culture shall be preserved and developed for na-
tional identity. Arts and letters shall be under the patronage of the
State.
(3) The .exclusive right to inventions, writings, and artistic
creations shall be secured to inventors, authors, and artists for a
limited period. Scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other forms of incen-
tives shall be provided for specially gifted citizens.
SEC. 10. It shall be the responsibility of the State to achieve
and maintain population levels most conducive to the national wel-
fare.
SEC. 11. The State shall consider the customs, traditions, be-
liefs, and interests of national culture communities in the formula-
tion and implementation of state policies.
'SEC. 12. The State shall establish and maintain an inte-
grated national police force whose organization, administration, and
operation shall be provided by law.
SEC. 13. (1) · The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall in-
clude a citizen army composed of all able-bodied citizens of the Phil-
ippines who shall undergo military training as may be provided by
law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the
State.
(2) The citizen army shall have a corps of trained officers and
men in active duty status as may be necessary to train, service, and
keep it in reasonable preparedness at all times.
SEC. 14. The Batasang Pambansa shall establish a central
monetary authority which shall provide policy direction in the areas
of money, banking and credit. It shall have supervisory authority
over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory authority
as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies
APPENDIX B 951
one Constitutional Convention, those Members of the Senate and the

House of Representatives who shall express in writing to the Com-
mission on Elections within thirty days after the ratification of this
Constitution their option to serve therein, and those Delegates to the
nineteen hundred and s,,eventy-one Constitutional Convention who
have opted to serve therein by voting affirmatively for this Article.
They make their oath of office before any officer authorized to ad-
minister oath and qualify thereto, after the ratification of the Consti-
tution.
SEC. 3. (1) The incumbent President of the Philippine shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly and shall preside
over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected.
He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested
in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution
until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the in-
terim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then
exercise their respective power vested by this Constitution.
(2) All proclamations, orders, decrees, instruction, and acts
promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be
part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding,
and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subse-
quent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of
the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified
or repealed by the regular National Assembly.
SEC. 4. The interim Prime Minister and his Cabinet shall
exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the responsibili-
ties of the regular Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and shall be
subject to the same disqualifications provided in this Constitution.
SEC. 5. The interim National Assembly shall give priority to
measure for the orderly transition from the presidential to the par-
liamentary system, the reorganization of the Government, the eradi-
cation of graft and corruption, the effective maintenance of peace
and order, the implementation of declared agrarian reforms, the
standardization of compensation of government employees, and such
other measures as shall bridge the gap between the rich and the
poor.
SEC. 6. The interim National Assembly shall reapportion the
Batasan seats in accordance with Section Two, Article Eight, of the
Constitution.
APPENDIX B 953
tion shall, if entitled under the law then in force, receive the retire-
ment and other benefit accruing thereunder.
SEC. 14. All record, equipment, buildings, facilities, and
properties of any office or body abolished or reorganized under this
Constitution shall be transferred to the office of body to which its
powers, functions, and responsibilities substantially pertain.
SEC. 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call
by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amend-
ments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article
Sixteen hereof.
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose and, except as herein provided, shall super-
sede the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five and all
amendments thereto.
The foregoing Constitution was approved by the Filipino people
in a referendum held between January 10, 1973, and January 15,
1973, through the barangays (Citizens' Assemblies), the result of
which was announced under Proclamation Number One Thousand
One Hundred Two, dated January 17, 1973, by His Excellency,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By virtue whereof, the Constitution
came into full force and effect as of noon of January 17, 1973.
AMENDMENTS
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an

interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang
Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise pro-
vided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philip-
pines, representatives elected from the different regions of the na-
tion, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by
their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent Presi-
dent from the Members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives
shall be appointed among the regions in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, while the sectors shall be determined by law. The
number of representatives from each region or sector and the man-
ner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same pow-
ers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities,
APPENDIX B 955
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent

President shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
(The foregoing amendments were ratified by the Filipino people
in the referendum-plebiscite held on October 16-17, 1976, and pro-
claimed in full force and effect as of October 27, 1976, by the Presi-
dent of the Republic of the Philippines under Proclamation 1595.)
APPENDIX C 957
Region N: Aurora, one (1); Batangas with the cities of

Batangas and Lipa, four (4); Cavite with the cities of Cavite,
Tagaytay and Trece Martires, three (3); Laguna with San Pa-
blo City, four (4); Marinduque, one (1); Occidental Mindoro,
one (1); Oriental Mindoro, two (2); Palawan with Puerto Prin-
cesa City, one (1); Quezon with Lucena City, four (4); Romblon,
one (1); Rizal, two (2);
Region V.· Albay with Legaspi City, three (3); Cama-
rines Norte, one (1); Camarines Sur with the cities oflriga and
Naga, four (4); Catanduanes, one (1); Masbate, two (2), Sorso-
gon, two (2);
Region VI: Aldan, one (1); Antique, one (1); Capiz with
Roxas City, two (2); Iloilo with Iloilo City, five (5) Negros Occi-
dental with the cities of Bacolod, Bago, Cadiz, La Carlota, San
Carlos and Silay, seven (7);
Region VII: Bohol with Tagbilaran City, three (3); Cebu
with the cities of Danao, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue and Toledo, six
(6); Negros Oriental with the cities of Bais, Canlaon and
Dumaguete, three (3); Siquijor, one (1); Cebu City, two (2);
Region VIII: Leyte with the cities of Ormoc and Taclo-
ban, five (5); Southern Leyte, one (1); Eastern Samar, one (1);
Northern Samar, one (1); Samar with Calbayog City, two (2);
Region IX: Basilan, one (1); Sulu, one (1); Tawi-Tawi,
one (1); Zamboanga del Sur with Pagadian City, three (3);
Zamboanga City, one (1);
Region X: Agusan del Norte with Butuan City, one (1);
Agusan del Sur, one (1); Bukidnon, two (2); Camiguin, one (1);
Misamis Occidental with the cities of Oroquieta, Ozamis and
Tangub, one (1); Misamis Oriental with Gingoog City, two (2);
Surigao del Norte with Surigao City, one (1); Cagayan de Oro
City, one (1);
Region XI: Surigao del Sur, one (1); Davao del Norte,
three (3); Davao Oriental, one (1); Davao del Sur, two (2);
South Cotabato with General Santos City, three (3); Davao
City, two (2);
Region XII: Lanao del Norte, one (1); Lanao del Sur
with Marawi City, two (2); Maguindanao with Cotabato City,
two (2); North Cotabato, two (2); Sultan Kudarat, one (1); Ili-
gan City, one (1).
APPENDIXD
1935
CONSTITUTIONOF THE PHILIPPINES

PREAMBLE
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, IMPLORING THE AID OF DIVINE
PROVIDENCE, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT
THAT SHALLEMBODYTHEIR IDEALS,CONSERVEAND DEVELOP
THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION, PROMOTE THE GENERAL
WELFARE, AND SECURE TO THEMSELVES AND THEIR POS-
TERITY THE BLESSINGS OF INDEPENDENCE UNDER A RE-
GIME OF JUSTICE, LIBERTY,AND DEMOCRACYDO ORDAINAND
PROMULGATETHIS CONSTITUTION.
Article 1.-The National Territory
SECTION 1. The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded

to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the
United States and Spain on the tenth day of December, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, the limits of which are set forth in Article
III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty
concluded at Washington, between the United States and Spain on
the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, and in the treaty
concluded between the United States and Great Britain on the sec-
ond day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory
over which the present Government of the Philippine Islands exer-
cises jurisdiction.
Article 11.-Declaration of Principles
SECTION 1. The Philippines is a republican state. Sover-

eignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of govern-
ment, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required
by law to render personal military or civil service.
959
APPENDIX D 961
(9) No law granting a title of nobility shall be enacted, and no

person holding any office of profit or trust shall, without the consent
of the Congress of the Philippines, accept any present, emolument,
office,or title of any kind whatever from any foreign state.
(10) No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
(11) No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
(12) No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment
of a poll tax.
(13) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
(14) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same
may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for
such suspension shall exist.
(15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process oflaw.
(16) All persons shall before conviction be bailable by suffi-
cient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evi-
dence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required.
(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be pre-
sumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have com-
pulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
(18) No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
(19) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishment inflicted.
(20) No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall continue a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
(21) Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any per-
son by reason of poverty.
APPENDIX D 963
the Senators of the first group to serve for a term of six years, those
of the second group, for four years, and those of the third group, for
two years.
SEC. 4. No person shall be a Senator unless he be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, at the time of his election, is at
least thirty-five years of age, a qualified elector, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately prior to his
election.
SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be ap-
portioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according
to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province
shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an
appointment within three years after the return of every enumera-
tion, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been
made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of
Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall
be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly dis-
tricts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as practica-
ble, contiguous and compact territory.
SEC. 6. The term of office of the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be four years and shall begin on the thirtieth
day of December next followingtheir election.
SEC. 7. No person shall be a Member of the House of Repre-
sentatives unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
at the time of his election, is at least twenty-five years of age, a
qualified elector, and a resident of the province in which he is chosen
for not less than one year immediately prior to his election.
SEC. 8. (1) Elections for Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall be held in the manner and on the
dates fixed by law.
(2) In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Repre-
sentatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired
term.
SEC. 9. The Congress shall convene in regular session once
every year on the fourth Monday of January, unless a different date
is fixed by law. It may be called in special session at any time by the
President to consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
APPENDIX D 965
SEC. 13. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on

Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of their President and Speaker, respectively. The Com-
mission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in
session at the call of its Chairman or a majority of its Members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
SEC. 14. The Senator and the Members of the House of Rep-
resentatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an
annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclu-
sive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts
in the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to and
from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attend-
ing sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall
take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Mem-
bers of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
SEC. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the ses-
sions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in
any other place.
SEC. 16. No Senator or Member of the House of Representa-
tives may hold any other office or employment in the Government
without forfeiting his seat, nor shall any Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives, during the time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil office which may have been created or the
emoluments whereof shall have been increased while he was a
Member of the Congress.
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representa-
tives shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any
contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof, or in any :franchise or special privilege granted by the Con-
gress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before
the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein
the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee
APPENDIX D 967
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object. When a provision of an
appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President
cannot veto the provisions without at the same time, vetoing the par-
ticular item or items to which it relates. The item or items objectedto
shall not take effect except in the manner heretofore provided as to
bills returned to the Congress without the approval of the President.
If the veto refers to a bill or any item of an appropriation bill which
appropriates a sum in excess of ten per centum of the total amount
voted in the appropriation bill for the general expenses of the Gov-
ernment for the preceding year, or ifit should refer to a bill authoriz-
ing an increase of the public debt, the same shall not become a law
unless approved by three-fourths of all the Members of each House.
(3) The President shall have the power to veto any separate
item or items in a revenue or tariff bill, and the item or items shall
not take effect except in the manner provided as to bill vetoed by the
President.
SEC. 21. (1) No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill.
(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall
have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its
Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except
when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its imme-
diate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment
thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the
Journal.
SEC. 22. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform.
(2) The Congress may by law authorize the President, subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix, within
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage
and wharfage dues.
(3) Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appur-
tenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
SEC. 23. (1) All money collected on any tax levied for a spe-
cial purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
APPENDIX D 971
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments

or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
(5) The President shall from time to time give to the congress
information of the state of the Nation, and recommend to its consid-
eration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.
(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction,for all offenses, except in case of impeachment, upon such
conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may
deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of the Congress.
(7) The President shall have the power, with concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make treaties, and
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he shall ap-
point ambassadors, and other public ministers duly accredited to the
Government of the Philippines.
SEC. 11. (1) The executive departments of the present Gov-
ernment of the Philippine Islands shall continue as now authorized
by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise.
(2) The heads of departments and chiefs of bureaus or offices
and their assistants shall not during their continuance in office,
engage in the practice of any profession, or intervene, directly or
indirectly, in the management or control of any private enterprise
which in any way may be effected by the functions of their office; nor
shall they, directly or indirectly, be financially interested in any
contract with the Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof.
(3) The President may appoint the Vice-President as a mem-
ber of his Cabinet and also as head of an executive department.
Article Vlll.--Judicial Department
SECTION 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Su-

preme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by
law.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power td define, pre-
scribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal,
APPENDIX D 973
reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge

the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensations as
may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compen-
sation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos.
SEC. 10. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty
or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en bane,
and no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without con-
currence of two-thirds of all the members of the Court.
SEC. 11. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case
submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before
the case is assigned to a Justice for the writing of the opinion of the
Court. Any Justice dissenting from a decision shall state the reasons
for his dissent.
SEC. 12. No decision shall be rendered by any court ofrecord
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
SEC. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to prom-
ulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on plead-
ing, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared-Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court
to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Phil-
ippines.
Article IX.-Impeachment
SECTION 1. The President, the Vice-President, the Justices

of the Supreme Court, and the Auditor General, shall be removed
from office on impeachment for and conviction of, culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, or other high crimes.
SEC. 2. The House of Representatives, by a vote of two-
thirds of all its members, shall have the sole power of impeachment.
SEC. 3. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all im-
peachments. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on
APPENDIX D 975
SEC. 3. The Chairman and Members of the Commission on

Elections shall not, during their continuance in office, engage in the
practice of any profession, or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the
management or control of any private enterprise which in any way
may be affected by the functions of their office; nor shall they, di-
rectly and indirectly, be financially interested in any contract with
the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality.
SEC. 4. The Commission on Elections shall submit to the
President and the Congress, following each election, a report on the
manner in which such election was conducted.
Article XI.-:-General Auditing Office
SECTION 1. There shall be a General Auditing Office under

the direction and control of an Auditor General, who shall hold office
for a term of ten years and may not be reappointed. The Auditor
General shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, and shall receive an annual compen-
sation to be fixed by law which shall not be diminished during his
continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the
Auditor General shall receive an annual compensation of twelve
thousand pesos.
SEC. 2. The Auditor General shall examine, audit, and settle
all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever-
source, including trust funds derived from bond issues; and audit, in
accordance with the law and administrative regulations, all expendi-
tures of funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by the Gov-
ernment or the provinces or municipalities thereof. He shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and preserve the vouchers
pertaining thereto. It shall be the duty of the Auditor General to
bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expendi-
tures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, un-
necessary, excessive, or extravagant. He shall also perform such
other functions as may be prescribed by law.
SEC. 3. The decisions of the Auditor General shall be ren-
dered within the time fixed by law, and the same may be appealed to
the President whose action shall be final. When the aggrieved party
is a private person or entity, an appeal from the decision of the Audi-
tor General may be taken directly to a court of record in the manner
provided by law.
APPENDIX D 977
the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may

be the measure and the limit of the grant.
SEC. 2. No private corporation or association may acquire,
lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and
twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by
purchase in excess of one hundred and forty four hectares, or by
lease in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, or by
homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to raz-
ing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an indi-
vidual, private corporation, or association.
SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of pri-
vate agricultural land which individuals, corporations, or associa-
tions may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing prior to the
enactment of such law.
SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small
lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private ag-
ricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporation, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
SEC. 6. The State may, in the interest if national welfare
and defense, establish and operate industries and means of trans-
portation and communication, and upon payment of just compensa-
tion, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enter-
prises to be operated by the Government.
Article XIV.-General Provisions
SECTION 1. The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white

and blue, with a sun and three stars as consecrated and honored by
the people and recognized by law.
SEC. 2. All public officers and members of the armed forces
shall take an oath to support and defend the Constitution.
SEC. 3. The Congress shall take steps toward the develop-
ment and adoption of a common national language based on one of
the existing native languages. Until otherwise provided by law,
English and Spanish shall continue as official languages.
SEC. 4. The State shall promote scientific research and in-
vention. Arts and letters shall be under its patronage. The exclusive
APPENDIX D 979
Article XV.-Amendments
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint' session assembled, by a

vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amend-
ments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when ap-
proved by a majority of the vote cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted. To the people for their ratification.
Article XVI.-Transitory Provisions
SECTION 1. The first election of the officers provided in this

Constitution and the inauguration of the Government of the Com-
monwealth of the Philippines shall take place as provided in Public
Act Number One hundred and twenty-seven of. the Congress of the
United States, approved March Twenty-four nineteen hundred and
thirty-four.
SEC. 2. All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in
force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent
with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed
by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to
the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be con-
strued, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corre-
sponding officialsunder this Constitution.
SEC. 3. All courts existing at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction, until
otherwise provided by law in accordancewith this Constitution, and all
cases, civil and criminal, pending in said courts, shall be heard, tried,
and determined under the laws then in force.
SEC. 4. All officers and employeesin the existing Government
of the Philippine Islands shall continue in office until the Congress
shall provide otherwise, but all officers whose appointments are by
this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their respective
officers upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if
such appointment is made within a period of one year from the date of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. The members of the House of Representatives for the
Mountain Province shall be elected as may be provided by law. The
voters of municipalities and municipal districts formerly belonging to a
APPENDIX D 981
Article XVIII.-The Commonwealth and the Republic
SECTION 1. The government established by this Constitu-

tion shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon
the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of the Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines.
Ordinance Appended to the Constiiution
Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thir-

teen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitu-
tion, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into
by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United
States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursu-
ant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hun-
dred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of
July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploita-
tion, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petro-
leum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public
utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the
United States and to all forms of.business enterprises owned or con-
trolled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the
same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon,
citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or
controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
---oOo--

Philippine Political Law: Isagani Cruz

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Philippine Political Law: Isagani Cruz

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW

Bar Review Lecturer

ON FEBRUARY22, 1986, after almost thirteen years of

... from the blessed and bountiful beyond.

Scope of the Study............................................................................... 1

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PIDLIPPINES

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Permissible Delegation 162

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

The Senate : 186

Executive Privilege 366

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

The Appointing Power 389

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Independence of the Judiciary 467

(1) Exceptions 621

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Composition and Qualifications 652

THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Composition and Qualifications 709

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Priority Measures 833

A. The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 837

Abainza v. Arellano, G.R. No. 181644, December 8, 2008,

Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16,

Bacolod City Water District v. Bayona, G.R. No. 168780,

Besa v. PNB, 33 SCRA 330 622

Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 374 246

Commission on Elections v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186616,

De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009,

Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, Mar. 2, 2001,

Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940 (1997) 771

Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 120295

Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, June 20, 1997,

Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June

Hacienda Luisita Incorporated.v, Luisita Industrial

In Re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 139

Jacob v. Puno, 131 SCRA 144 418

Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 105111

Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 502 348

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 246, 820, 824

Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Briones, No. L-77210,

National Electrification Administration v. Morales, G.R.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No.

People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344 (1997) 455

Querubin v. Regional Cluster Director, Legal and

Radaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177135,

Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v.

Spouses Serfino v. Far East Bank and Trust Company,

Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., 511 Phil. 56 (2005) 563

Tilendo v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165975, Septem-

Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on

Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation,

Scope of the Study

POLITICAL LAW is that branch of public law which

Necessity for the Study

The inclusion of Political Law as a required subject

' People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887.

preted in the light of their understanding in the country

Background of the Study

The inhabitants of the Philippines originally con-

was established in the Philippine Islands, with William

Subsequently, in the Habeas Corpus Cases,5 the Su-