The projection of imperial power in Procopius

Mark-Anthony Karantabias
(University of Kentucky)

With respect to the nature of the imperial office, there has been a scholarly consensus
for some time now. Material and literary evidence, and the concept of the oriental
despot, are often used as a rubric to define it. Although the available evidence is
instrumental to our understanding of the office, it must also be contextualized.
The Later Roman Empire is much more complex than these sources lead us to believe,
as they form only a snapshot of an enormous canvas. In Justinian’s case, however,
these characteristics are often amplified considerably. It is in large part attributable to
Procopius’ importance as a source for his reign. In his Anecdota, we are confronted
with a lengthy diatribe against Justinian and his administration. Its literary genre is
in many respects reminiscent of contemporary tabloid journalism with its wild and
extravagant stories.1 Therefore, we must be very careful in our propensity to mine his
psogos for evidence. One might gloss over the sensational sections to focus on parts of
the narrative that seem factual. Although some anecdotes might appear to be rather
credible, they should still be scrutinized. A skeptical eye might provide a much
clearer picture of Justinian in a larger historical context. A failure to take these
matters into consideration has led to a misunderstanding of Justinian’s ability to
exercise imperial power. Justinian was far from the absolute ruler Procopius made
him out to be, for his legitimacy depended on a combination of circumstances.2
Several scholars have examined imperial power at both a macro and micro level.
One of the predominant interpretations views the emperor’s power as the result
of independent Classical and Christian expressions. As a tool to legitimize imperial
power, it is proposed, emperors deliberately disseminated imperial ideology.3

1. For example, Theodora using magic to control Justinian: Anecdota 22.28; 1-2; both her
and Justinian being half demon and half human: 12.14.
2. Procopius’ impact on Gibbon has influenced the current narrative. See Cameron 1997,
p. 45. Bell’s criticisms of the historian’s reliance on Procopius: Bell 2013, p. 15. Lep-
pin’s acknowledgement of the problems: Leppin 2011, pp. 13-17. Emperors’ legitimacy:
Flaig 1992; Pfeilschifter 2013; Börm 2015, pp. 239-264.
3. Dvornik 1966; Hopkins 1978, pp. 197-242; Maas 1986, pp. 17-31; Maas 1992, pp. 2-3;
Gordon 1990, pp. 199-231; Ando 2000, esp. pp. 5-15; 2001; Alcock et al. 2001, p. 281; Kelly 2006,
pp. 181-183; Noreña 2011; Slootjes 2011, pp. 243-244; Bell 2013, p. 213 ff; Pazdernik 2005.

Le monde de Procope / The World of Procopius,

sous la direction de Geoffrey Greatrex et Sylvain Janniard, 2018 — p. 000-000
56 • MARK-ANTHONY KARANTABIAS

Another school of thought understands the role of the emperor in a wider frame
encapsulating social classes and their interacting dynamics.4 Other interpretative
frameworks have also been used by notable scholars. E. Stein and A. H. M. Jones, for
example, examine the complexities of the imperial system through its institutions.
More recently, however, historians have examined the evidence using new interpretat-
ive methods.5 From a wider perspective, many scholars have categorized Justinian
as a tyrant.6 Though each interpretative rubric has its merits, in many cases there
appears to be a substantial focus on the imperial office from a top-down perspective.
Efforts to contextualize Justinian in the socio-political construction of Late Antiquity
may answer more questions than it may create. The following pages set out to
define the relationship between Procopius’ portrayal of Justinian and imperial
power in the context of his Anecdota. Contrary to Procopius’ narrative, Justinian
was not very different from his Late Antique predecessors. First, an examination
of the theme of tyranny will be conducted, with special attention given to justice
and institutions. Thereafter, Procopius’ descriptions are then contrasted with the
socio-political conditions.

1. The rhetorical construction of a tyrant

When examining the distortion of Justinian’s character in Procopius, tyranny, as

a theme, is central to the discussion. A tyrant may exercise his power arbitrarily,
disparaging, ignoring, modifying or even adding to the established laws and customs.
This concept is largely the focus of the Anecdota, as Procopius repeatedly critiques
Justinian’s arbitrariness: “Daily, [Justinian] was not only manipulating the laws of
the Romans to his own ends.”7 In stark contrast to The Wars, he is quick to employ
rhetorical devices to disparage his sovereign. In these instances, Procopius underscores
corruption, murders and repeated violations of private property. Specifically, he
emphasizes his extraordinary legal powers, bribery, as well as his disregard of private
property. This is key in his portrayal of the emperor as a tyrannical ruler. An autocrat
deemed to be above the law conjures up the feeling of resentment in Procopius’
targeted audience. His intention to stress this characteristic continually was calculated.
Repeating an allegation in a litany of instances may eventually transform these very
allegations into reality. There is a slight parallel in contemporary jurisprudence,
namely the Repetition Rule, which involves the repetition of one source through
different channels.8 In both cases, the more often an allegation is repeated, particularly
a libel, the more harm it might cause. In this section, the following themes, which
Procopius underscores, are examined: a disregard for the law, the destruction of life
and property, and the disdain for established institutions and customs.

4. Banaji 2001, pp. 37, 93, 100; Sarris 2006, pp. 228-234; Sarris 2010, pp. 25-42.

5. Institutional analysis: Jones 1964; Stein 1959. Newer interpretations: Ruffini 2008;
Slootjes 2011; Pfeilschifter 2013.
6. Honoré 1978, pp. 28-30; Kaldellis 2004; Kaldellis 2005, p. 13; Pazdernik 2005, p. 196;
Gilmer 2013, pp. 53-54; Bell 2013, pp. 9-11, 247-252.
7. Proc., Anecd. 28.16 (here and henceforth, I provide my own translations).
8. Repetition Rule: Kenyon 2006, pp. 29-30. McAlpine v. Bercrow is an illustrative example
from the United Kingdom.
 THE PROJECTION OF IMPERIAL POWER IN PROCOPIUS • 57

At many points in the Anecdota, Procopius alleges that Justinian repeatedly

trampled the law. In a case of forgery, Procopius recounts, Priscus devised a plan to
benefit the Church in Emesa by illegally magnifying Mammianus’ previously estab-
lished land inheritance. He made it appear that ancestors of certain wealthy citizens
of Emesa owed Mammianus a total of 100 centenaria. In return, the Church of Emesa
would grant Priscus a percentage of the money. However, there were legal chrono-
logical limitations on such endeavors. To overcome this, Procopius alleges, Priscus
bribed Justinian to have the laws amended.9 We do not have any other corroborating
sources, however, although in 535 and 541, there is evidence that changes were made
to the laws.10 The two events may be connected, but the reliability of Procopius’
allegations here must not be overlooked notably when considering his other outrageous
accusations in the Anecdota. There are countless distortions and fallacies peppered
throughout his work and this case may not be an exception.11
The incident, he describes, prompts many more questions than it answers. The
timeline of the incident is one. Emesa’s case is illustrative of a much larger problem,
which involved the elite coveting unalienable ecclesiastical properties. Justinian
sought to redress the issue by tightening the restrictions, which Anastasius had
loosened. Contrary to Procopius’ claims, these events likely occurred between
A.D. 535 and 541 and, therefore, it is highly unlikely that Priscus was the causative
force behind the legal amendments.12 Furthermore, Procopius appears to be too
familiar with some details whereas other episodes often lack such detail.13 His
familiarity with the details may be explained by his proximity to the individuals
involved. It is possible that they were personal acquaintances or extensions thereof. As
a wealthy native of Caesarea, it is conceivable that his social network included notable
families from Emesa. Hence, Procopius may have had many reasons to sympath-
ize with the targets of Priscus’ scheme and therefore to distort his narrative.
Moreover, the incident was fitting to use in his effort to distort Justinian’s repres-
entation.
Procopius also proclaims that there has never been such a great “fear of any
tyrant” and that no individual could escape his wrath. He claims that he was unable
to recount the truth in the History of the Wars. Had he done so, Justinian’s countless
spies would have discovered it and his life would have been in peril.14 Here, Procopius
gives the impression that the Roman Empire had become the most ruthless police
state in history. This opinion is mirrored in the works of T. Honoré, P. Bell and
A. Kaldellis.15 Procopius, however, conveniently fails to mention that this was not a
novelty. Emperors had done the same for centuries. By the time of Justinian, lèse-majesté
was thoroughly entrenched in Roman Law. Paulus’ Sententiae even describe how

9. Proc., Anecd. 28.1-15; the legality of the matter: Kaiser 1999.

10. Novella 9; 111 (its reversal).
11. Justinian, a demon in human form: Proc., Anecd. 18.1; his admission that his narrative
may appear as a series of myths: 1.4-5.
12. Novella 7; Sarris 2018.
13. Proc., Anecd. 29.12; 16.
14. Proc., Anecd. 1.1-4; Theodora’s similar use of spies: 16.11-15.
15. Honoré 1978, pp. 28-30; Kaldellis 2004, pp. 118-119; Kaldellis 2005, p. 13; Bell 2013, pp. 9-11.
 58 • MARK-ANTHONY KARANTABIAS

torture was used in such cases.16 Procopius was surely attempting to shock his audience
in the opening lines when he paints this dark picture; he deliberately overlooks
well-established legal precedents, which demonstrate that there was nothing novel
in Justinian’s practices.
The threat to private property, another important theme in the Anecdota,
directly targets his intended audience: the elite. Procopius repeatedly underscores
Justinian’s tyrannical treatment of private property. For example, he claims that
the emperor used trumped up criminal charges to achieve his ends. He goes so far
as to state that Justinian’s treatment of private property led to the Empire’s impov-
erishment.17 Yet Justinian did not behave like Sulla, for example, in that regard. He
did not even use the Nika Riot as an excuse to initiate a bloody purge in which he
could seize private property on a grand scale. Moreover, in a conspiracy involving
Artabanes, Justinian settled the matter rather clemently.18
In Procopius’ efforts to construct a tyrant rhetorically, he deliberately distorts
his accounts of several events. First, there is Evangelus, a wealthy lawyer, who
purchased the village of Porphyreon for 300 centenaria. Procopius claims that when
Justinian discovered this, the village was bought back at a fraction of the price, thus
depriving Evangelus of his property and a portion of the money he paid.19 There
may be a conflict of interest in this account, G. Greatrex suggests, for it is possible
that Procopius was an acquaintance of his. At any rate, the anecdote is undoubtedly
biased against the emperor.20 Moreover the information available implies an incon-
sistency between Evangelus’ case and attested bureaucratic practices. This appears
to be an illicit purchase of property. Different laws could have been violated in
the transaction, but we can only infer because of the lack of details. Evangelus may
have violated laws prohibiting the sale of metrocomiae to outsiders. In this scenario,
the incident may reveal much about the lawyer. Despite the enactment of laws on
the sale of villages in A.D. 415 and 468, the powerful Apiones continued to pursue
acquisitions. The seller or sellers may have also violated laws against the alienation
of property, which was liable to municipal taxation. At any rate, it was likely a legal
case, since Justinian had a propensity to follow and apply the law.21
In many other cases involving property, Procopius attempts to stress the emperor’s
tyrannical behavior. Prominent individuals died intestate and the alleged misap-
propriation of their estates is what attracts the ancient author’s attention.22

16. Tacitus, Ann. 1.72-74, 78; 2.50; 3.38, 66-67; 15.56; Suetonius, Vita Divi Augusti 55; under:
Cassius Dio, Roman History 56.27; CJ VIII.9.6; 9.7-8; Dig. 48.4, 6; Paulus, Sententiae 5.29.1-2.
17. Proc., Anecd. 8.9-11; 31-32.
18. Justinian was very mild in the settlement of the Riot: Malalas, Chronicle 18.71; the emperor
and the elites: Greatrex 2014, p. 83; Börm 2010; Börm 2015, p. 263. Artabanes: Wars 7.32.51;
cf. Sarris 2018.
19. Proc., Anecd. 30.17-20.
? 20. Greatrex in this volume, pp. 000-000; Dagron 1979, pp. 35-36; Kaplan 1992, pp. 145-146;
Laniado 2002, pp. 154, 158.
21. PLRE 3, Euangelus. Potential laws broken: CTh XI.24; CJ XI.56; 3.1.8; Jones 1964, pp. 787-788;
cf. Sarris 2018, p. 248.
22. Proc., Anecd. 29.12-25; intestacy: Daube 1965; Crook 1973; Johnston 2015.
 THE PROJECTION OF IMPERIAL POWER IN PROCOPIUS • 59

In Euphratas’ case, we do know that he was a eunuch, who served Justinian as a

high functionary of the Sacred Bedchamber. Unfortunately for a potential heir, his
nephew, Justinian claimed the inheritance. As an Abasgian eunuch, Euphratas was
surely a slave at one point and he likely became a freedman. Legally, this case would
justify Justinian’s action. When a freedman dies intestate and his property was
valued at more than 100 aurei, his patron acquired the entire estate.23 Conveniently,
Procopius fails to discuss the legality of the matter, just as he does immediately
thereafter in another similar story involving Anatolius’ daughter.24
In this episode, Procopius appears to have vested interests. He embellishes an
event involving individuals whom he surely knew; indeed, he betrays a detailed
knowledge of the incident. This is a notable trend in his narrative. An unnamed
woman was allegedly deprived of her true inheritance after her father, Anatolius,
died. Thereafter, the estate of her deceased husband, Mamilianus, a Caesarean, was
given to their daughter. However, she survived her childless daughter, but was
deprived of her deceased husband’s estate. Procopius laments her lot by disparaging
one of Justinian’s laws, which enabled the municipal council to seize three quarters
of an estate. The same also occurred when her daughter died, whereupon she was
allotted one solidus per day.25 Procopius accuses Justinian of theft, but fails to explain
that the estate was actually transferred to Ascalon’s municipal council to ensure its
solvency. She could have inherited three quarters of the estate, had Mamilianus been a
curialis in Ascalon. Hence Justinian promulgated a law to ensure that estates could
not impoverish one city council and simultaneously enrich another.26 The imperial
administration did not misappropriate Anatolius’ daughter’s inheritance. On the
contrary, the law’s intention was to ensure the fiscal solvency of municipal councils.
This attempt to portray the emperor as a tyrant is somewhat effective because
of the deliberate omission of crucial information in the law itself. Procopius
then recounts the process involving the estate of Mamilianus’ daughter. Because
Anatolius’ daughter survived her only child, her husband’s estate, he expected,
would revert entirely back to the old widow. However, she was granted a handsome
daily sum of one solidus instead.27 Again, the author fails to explain the legality
of the matter. Had she married a Caesarean curialis, she would have retained three
quarters of the estate. It ensured that the municipal council of Caesarea would not
be deprived of its fiscal resource. In this instance, Procopius uses an argumentum ad
misericordiam to garner from his audience additional anger against Justinian, who
was clearly not a threat to their private property.
Two separate incidents involving Eudaemon and Eirenaeus appear again to
involve deliberate omissions. Both events are mentioned in passing, but the author
does not fail to disparage the emperor.28 We are told that the former died with heirs,
but that the emperor proceeded to claim the estates. Procopius quickly moves on to

23. Institutiones 3.7.3.

24. Holum 1996, pp. 625 ff.
25. Proc., Anecd. 29.17-25.
26. Novella 38.4.
27. Novella 38; Holum 1996, p. 625.
28. Proc., Anecd. 29.12; 16.
60 • MARK-ANTHONY KARANTABIAS

the settlement of Euphratas’ property. Upon closer examination, it appears that

Procopius is using the term heir very loosely. For Eudaemon to obtain such a prominent
position for a nephew and not a son is rather telling. Moreover, to achieve this, he
must have used two key assets to obtain the position of dux et augustalis of Alexandria
for his nephew – social capital, namely the actual or potential resources in a social
network, and symbolic capital, the prestige or honors that mark one’s social standing.
The situation appears to indicate that Eudaemon lacked immediate heirs. Further-
more, when examining other situations involving the inheritance of an estate,
Justinian’s administration appears to have respected and applied the laws. Even if
these allegations were true, there was a precedence.29 Nevertheless, conveniently,
the case of Eudaemon’s estate is quickly mentioned in passing between John Laxarion’s
death and the settlement of Euphratas’ estate. Similarly, in the case of Eirenaeus,
Procopius does not provide any detail. Surely, these anecdotes are mentioned in passing
to underpin the more detailed, yet distorted accounts of Euphratas, Anatolius and
Mamilianus’ estates. In reality, Procopius’ rhetorical juxtaposition of Roman law and
tyranny is intentionally erroneous. Private property was not under siege by Justinian.
Corruption, an inherent characteristic of a tyrant, is also a focus of Procopius, as
he makes several charges against the imperial administration. He attempts to show
that the excesses of maladministration were unique to Justinian’s reign. However, it
was commonplace as far back as the Republican period. In the law codes, it is rather
clear that the problem pestered every emperor in Late Antiquity. Therefore, in
Justinian’s case, it comes as no surprise.30 One story involves Malthanes, possibly
a dux of Cilicia. Justinian sent him there to halt an outbreak of violence. In the process,
Malthanes proceeded to plunder the provincials. When the Blues of Tarsus spoke out
publicly against him, he retaliated by ordering their death. Unfortunately, Damianus,
possibly a senator, mistakenly fell victim to this purge.31 There are several problems
here. Not only was the plundering of provinces expected, it was a long-established
Roman custom. Procopius, however, falsely portrays such behavior as peculiar to
Justinian’s reign.32 Moreover, Procopius fails to acknowledge that this case involved
lèse-majesté, which also extends to the emperor’s officials. Lastly, the event occurred
roughly eight years after the Nika Riot. It is not surprising that the imperial admin-
istration would attempt to crush any potential chaos that the Blues might cause.
After attempting to elicit a feeling of animosity in his audience, Procopius then
directs his attention to the emperor. Regarding Malthanes’ acts, he accuses the
emperor of false outrage. Justinian launched an investigation into the matter, but
charges were dropped because he allegedly received a bribe from Leo, Malthanes’
father-in-law. For the most part, the allegation of bribery is baseless. When examining
the events at Tarsus, Malthanes had a legal right to suppress the Blues. This would

29. Zosimus, Historia Nova 5.24.1 makes similar accusations against Theodosius and Eudoxia;
Pfeilschifter 2013, pp. 387-388.
30. Examples of laws targeting corruption in the provincial administration: CTh I.15.6; I.29.5;
VIII.1.11; VIII.15.3-5; XI.1.11; XI.17.1; XII.6. 12; Novella 8; 24-30.
31. Proc., Anecd. 29.29-38; Main 2013, pp. 18-19, 48-50.
32. Cicero, Ep. ad Atticum 5.21; Juvenal, Satire 8, 87-97; Symmachus, Ep. 5.63.2; Maximus
Taurinensis, Sermo 26; CJ X.19.9; CTh VIII.11.1; Novella 25.4. Also see MacMullen 1988;
MacMullen 2006, p. 477; Tate 2004, p. 369; MacMullen 1987, pp. 748-754; Palme 1999, p. 114.
 THE PROJECTION OF IMPERIAL POWER IN PROCOPIUS • 61

explain the dropped charges. Considering the litany of deliberate distortions, the
bribery allegation’s credibility is hampered by a lack of corroboration in our sources.
In these cases, there is no clear indication of Justinian’s corruption.
Scattered throughout the Anecdota are also accusations against the emperor and
his close entourage of authoring or condoning the murder or torture of innocent
individuals. In the case of Photius, Procopius intends to elicit pity for Belisarius’
stepson. Because of Antonina, Theodora summoned him to Constantinople where
she had him tortured for three years. However, Photius had conspired with Belisarius
unlawfully to kidnap and imprison Theodosius, Antonina’s lover, and Calligonus,
one of Antonina’s agents. Moreover, Photius also stole great sums from both men.
Nevertheless, Procopius emphasizes Antonina’s promiscuity and unfaithfulness.
He blatantly overlooks the misappropriation of private property and depicts the
empress as a bloodthirsty tyrant. Theodora arrested and tortured, he claims, many
men associated with Photius. He fails, surely deliberately, to mention who they are
and what connections they might have had to the crimes.33 Because of the lacuna in
the account here, we are left to wonder if the torturing of these individuals actually
occurred and if they were connected to the false imprisonment and robbery of
Theodosius and Calligonus. However inaccurate the account of this love triangle is,
Photius did in fact break several Roman laws. Hence the focus on the empress here
is rather misplaced. Gender may be one reason, but his anti-imperial agenda is
consistent.34 Procopius again attempts to slander her in another incident involving
Bouzes. Yet again, he focuses on the empress’ actions and not on the legality of the
matter, which involved lèse-majesté.35 In both cases, Procopius proceeds to embellish
the narrative to elicit the pity of his audience while simultaneously prompting
anger towards the empress.
The circus factions are at the center of another incident in which Procopius
alleges Justinian’s involvement. Unrest was widespread throughout the Empire
and, in the tumult, a certain Hypatius was murdered. Because of his death, Procopius
states, Justin ordered his Urban Prefect, Theodotus, to investigate the matter. It
would lead to the arrest and execution of several citizens. However, in the account
Procopius subtly accuses Justinian of being conveniently ill during the investig-
ation. Because of Theodotus’ investigation, many were arrested and executed.
However, Justinian suddenly recovered and Theodotus thereupon fell out of favor.
He was relentlessly pursued on charges of sorcery and poisoning. To obtain confes-
sions, Justin then tortured members of Theodotus’ entourage, but eventually exiled
him to Jerusalem.36 Other available accounts provide corresponding and conflicting
information. Theodotus, according to Malalas, proceeded to execute an influential
man, Theodosius and, in response, Justin dismissed him. John of Nikiu’s version,

33. Proc., Anecd. 2.3-5; 12-14; 3.2-11.

34. His backhanded treatment of Euphemia’s original name: Anecd. 6.17; 9.47-50;
Vasiliev 1950, p. 61, n. 39. For gender and power, see Cameron 1985, pp. 67-83;
Kaldellis 2004, pp. 142-150; Ziche 2012, pp. 311-323.
35. Proc., Anecd. 4.1-12.
36. Vasiliev 1950, pp. 116-119; Greatrex 1996, pp. 140-142.
62 • MARK-ANTHONY KARANTABIAS

surely using both Malalas and Procopius, also places the blame on Justinian. According
to John, Justinian caused the widespread unrest. Interestingly, he adds that Theodotus
arrested Justinian, but when the latter became ill, he was released.37 In retrospect,
Procopius is ambiguous when he fails to distinguish Justin from Justinian in his
account, perhaps deliberately; he only refers to Justin implicitly. By doing so, he
rhetorically shifts most if not all of the blame to Justinian while Malalas does not
make mention of Justinian. Although Justin was in power at that point, Procopius
attempts to make his readers believe that Justinian was the true ruler orchestrating
these machinations.38 Again, this is another rather problematic anecdote used to
buttress the psogos. Procopius widens his chronological scope in order to advance
his agenda, which is to tarnish Justinian’s image. Consequently, we have not seen
any compelling evidence up to this point that proves Justinian illicitly destroyed life
and property.
Antiquarianism, as a cultural structure, was long-established in Rome and
innovation was generally treated with the utmost disdain. In the Novels’ prooimia,
this Roman characteristic is rather apparent.39 There is a systematic effort to mask
innovations using clever rhetorical devices. Hence, a sovereign who might author
any type of rash novelties would undoubtedly draw the ire of many. In essence, to
social conservatives like John Lydus and Procopius, only a tyrant could have a dis-
regard for established customs and institutions.40 Therefore, it is no surprise that
Procopius launches scathing attacks on Justinian for his repeated attempts “to
innovate” because he “did not think it fit to preserve what had come before.” To
him, Justinian was a “corruptor” of long-established institutions and he also had a
propensity to bring about confusion on account of his inability “to observe things that
were established.” This “quarrelsome and most innovating man” was responsible for
introducing things that were once deemed illegal in the laws and for “abolishing
existing things and customs altogether.”41
Two specific developments particularly drew Procopius’ indignation. To contex-
tualize them first, Procopius underlines his feelings towards Justinian when discussing
Domitian. He ruled when the general sentiment toward the concept of a monarchy
was volatile. Augustus had navigated the transition from the Republic with remarkable
political astuteness. Domitian was not as skillful a politician. He openly elevated
himself by claiming the titles dominus and deus. According to Procopius, Justinian
physically resembled the reviled emperor; however, the physical comparison is at
best tenuous when examining the available art depicting each emperor. It is more
likely a backhanded comparison of both reigns, as A. Kaldellis proposes. For Procopius
proceeds to stress Domitian’s unpopularity, his reign’s brutal end and his legacy.42

37. Malalas, Chronicle 17.12; John of Nikiu 90.16-19.

38. Proc., Anecd. 9.33-42; 6.19 cf. Croke 2007. For more, see Greatrex 2016, pp. 171-172.
39. Antiquarianism, mimesis and innovation: Hunger 1964; Hunger 1969, pp. 15-38; Mango 1975;
Maas 1986, pp. 17-31; Maas 1992; Odorico 2006, pp. 223-227; Bjornlie 2013, pp. 83-89;
Moore 2014, pp. 44-49; Karantabias 2015, pp. 169-229; Kruse 2015, p. 240; Greatrex (forthc.).
40. For John Lydus, see de Mag 2.1; 3.3; 19.9.
41. Proc., Anecd. 6.21.
42. Proc., Anecd. 6.21.
 THE PROJECTION OF IMPERIAL POWER IN PROCOPIUS • 63

Thereafter, Procopius underlines two innovations at his work’s end. It is not

coincidental that he chose to do so, as the very last impression is intended to have a
lasting impact rhetorically. At the climax of his literary crescendo, the ancient
author sought to leave his audience with a most passionate hatred of Justinian.
First, in the past, he claims, proskynesis was a customary ritual. However, Justinian
added to this traditional obeisance. Regardless of rank, those who approached had
to prostrate themselves completely and kiss the foot not only of Justinian, but also
of Theodora. This ritual, however, was observed as far back as the reign of Septimius
Severus. Ample sources corroborate Procopius’ claim that the custom evolved from
Diocletian’s time.43 In addition, he claims that the imperial couple required to be
referred to as despots. The usage of the term as an imperial address was not a novelty.
Beginning with Diocletian, the same title in Latin, dominus, was used to address
emperors. Under Justinian, its importance evolved, as its usage was regularized.
Yet, John Lydus claims that Justinian grudgingly accepted this address so as not to
offend his subjects. Nevertheless, to Procopius, these were outrageous innovations.44
The accusations at the work’s conclusion are merely rhetorical, as A. Alföldi
argues, and are not a sign of a “modern tyranny.”45 Procopius’ attempts to portray
Justinian as a cruel tyrant and by extension as an emperor well beyond the norm
should not be taken at face value. Tyranny is not in any way a feasible explanation
for the two innovations above, for example. One must contextualize the event by
considering the tumultuous beginning to Justinian’s long reign. Also, one must peel
away from the narrative the litany of rhetorical devices, namely hyperboles and
fallacies, which Procopius employs. The Nika Riot underscored the emperor’s fragility;
his life and political position hung in the balance. Therefore, an ostentatious
re-branding was necessary and thus this was surely the reason for the amplification
of court ceremony. It was intended to create an illusion of imperial omnipotence
publicly when really the imperial office was not so formidable (more on this in the
next section).46 In addition, this might explain Justinian’s discomfort with the title
despot. It may have been a thinly veiled attempt to address his public image. In fact,
these two innovations may have been answers to his reign’s shaky beginnings.
As opposed to what A. Kaldellis and M. Maas argue, this may explain Lydus’ claims
of Justinian’s modesty. Nevertheless, this modesty might not have been welcomed
by Lydus; he may have been contrasting his behavior with that of Augustus, as some
propose.47 This may be the reason for Lydus and Procopius’ criticisms, but it does

43. For adoratio: Amm. Marc. 15.5.18; Jerome, Chron. (GCS 47 p. 226); Lactantius, Mort. Pers. 18.9;
Eusebius, Vita Constantini 4.67; Alföldi 1934, pp. 41, 59; Avery 1940, pp. 72-80. Earlier evidence:
Suet., Vitell. 2.5; Kolb 2001, pp. 39-40.
44. Its longstanding history: Aurelius Victor, de Caeseribus 39.2-4; Panegyrici Latini 8.13.3;
9.6.1; Bréhier 1905, pp. 168, 171; Kaldellis 2004, pp. 136-137; Hagedorn et al. 1980, pp. 166-167;
Rösch 1978, p. 139; Pfeilschifter 2013, pp. 457-458. Discomfort with the title: John Lydus,
de Mag 1.6 cf. Maas 1992, p. 94; Kaldellis 2004, p. 134. Proskynesis’ late developments:
Treitinger 1938, pp. 87, 91 ff.; Alföldi 1970, pp. 41 ff., 63 ff.; Löhken 1982, pp. 48-53;
Kolb 2001, pp. 39-41, 117-119.
45. Alföldi 1970, pp. 24-25; Kaldellis 2004, p. 119.
46. Court ceremony’s symbolic capital: Kolb 2001, pp. 76 ff; Börm 2015, p. 18.
47. Kaldellis 2004, pp. 133-134; Pazdernik 2009, p. 75; cf. Kolb 2001, pp. 199 ff.
64 • MARK-ANTHONY KARANTABIAS

not determine the innovations’ causes, however. In essence, Procopius’ narrative

might be revealing more about himself than his emperor.

2. Socio-political conditions in Late Antiquity

After examining many of Procopius’ accusations above, Justinian was not too
different than his Late Antique predecessors. Moreover, we have argued that Justinian
was not a tyrant, despite what many scholars have argued. The Anecdota is a deliberate
attempt to construct a tyrant rhetorically, for the rhetoric largely does not reflect
reality. It is clear that many of the charges are fabrications or hyperboles, which were
used to include Justinian in a notorious category that includes the likes of Nero and
Domitian. Moreover, Procopius’ narrative does not reflect the social, cultural, political
and economic conditions of the sixth century; it reflects the elite’s interests.48 In the
early 530s, Justinian undid many of the tetrarchic reforms in Asia Minor and its
vicinity. The bureaucracy, including its personnel, was trimmed significantly. In
addition, many bureaucratic zones of uncertainty were targeted, including the sale
of offices and squatting on public land. Moreover, Justinian promoted new men to
the most eminent imperial posts, as many of his predecessors had done.49 The imperial
court was attempting to rein in the bureaucracy and by extension the notables.
However, attempting does not necessarily equate to accomplishing; the emperor’s
power in practice remains to be analyzed. We shall now examine urban change, the
evolution of the elite and, finally, its relationship with the emperor.
Through the tetrarchic reforms, fundamental and systemic changes were set
in motion. They rocked social and political structures to their foundations, so much
so that social and symbolic capital were in many respects unrecognizable. The
elite’s evolution is very illustrative and symptomatic of these realities. Once the
apex of a political career for most, civic life lost its importance for most if not all
principales. With the general pivot away from the municipal councils to the admin-
istrative center, vibrant civic cultures in the provinces slowly began to decline.
Symbolic capital, particularly euergetism, had changed. Patronizing Christian
buildings became common, but the civic competition among aristocrats no longer
manifested itself in classical Roman buildings. Prominent curiales no longer vied for
supremacy in this arena; they sought far better opportunities in the imperial
bureaucracy. Consequently, the Roman Empire would witness gradual urban decline.50
Civic duty was overshadowed by the prospect of lucrative careers in the imperial
bureaucracy. In the long run this vastly enhanced the status of the wealthiest elite;
the emperors’ efforts to expand the imperial bureaucracy in the hope of a marked

48. Sarris 2018.
49. The emperor and elite: Sarris 2006, pp. 210-217; 2011; 2013, pp. 167-188; Greatrex 2014,
pp. 82-86; Karantabias 2015, pp. 66-110, 169-229. Reforms: Novella 8; 24-30.
50. Urban decline and symbolic capital’s transformation: Cameron 1993, pp. 157-158; Liebes-
chuetz 2001; Karantabias 2015, pp. 91-108. Caesarea’s amphitheater and hippodrome’s
closure: Proc., Anecd. 26.8; Greatrex 2014, p. 78. The curia’s evolution: Laniado 2002;
Heather 2005, pp. 116-118; Karantabias 2015, pp. 11-65.
 THE PROJECTION OF IMPERIAL POWER IN PROCOPIUS • 65

increase in efficiency would be their own office’s undoing, as can be observed in the
developments in the defunct Western Empire, as G. Cecconi and G. Greatrex describe.51
The urban landscape is emblematic of the Roman aristocracy’s evolution in
Late Antiquity. With the relegation of civic politics came the monumental drain of
resources at the provincial level. In the High Empire, eminent provincials seldom
aspired to join the imperial administration owing to its extremely limited size;
opportunities did not abound. However, with the expansion of the bureaucracy, the
career of a notable became limitless. In addition, because of the evolution of social
capital, the distinction between the principales and the rest of the Roman aristocracy
became more pronounced. The curiae instantly became stepping stones for notables,
because they were demoted on the social scale. Consequently, many curiales were
left behind with fewer resources to meet the same administrative demands. Further
draining the core administrative unit of the Roman Empire, the principales who left
the municipal councils for greener pastures often acquired tax immunity in the
process.52 And while the notables quickly filled the expanded bureaucracy’s ranks,
the gap between the emperor and the periphery grew exponentially. In the High
Empire, a correspondence between Pliny the Younger and Trajan was unexcep-
tional. Under the Dominate, communications from the provinces to the capital were
easily manipulated to conceal illicit activities among other things.53 Therefore, while
the central administration attempted to enhance its control over the periphery and
its resources, it eventually achieved the opposite. In Justinian’s case, his efforts at
reforming the bureaucracy did not bear fruit. Less than a decade after the provincial
reforms of the 530s, Justinian struggled to pay his soldiers. The financial hardships
would endure and even worsen, ultimately contributing to the usurpation of Phocas
and the seventh-century collapse.54
The imperial administration instead created an extremely powerful bulwark.
While economic capital remained largely the same, social capital’s evolution was
extraordinary. Whereas many social networks were once largely provincial, in Late
Antiquity, their webs became extensive, spreading through multiple provinces and
reaching the capital. The imperial bureaucracy’s expansion and stratification enabled
this. In Aphrodito, this development can be observed. Several pagarchs attempted
to infringe upon the village’s status (autopragia) and annex it completely. The situation
reached a climax when one of the pagarchs, Theodosius, exacted and kept the
village’s taxes. After Aphrodito lost its powerful patrons, who could have defused
the situation, Dioscorus attempted to defend Aphrodito by appealing to higher

51. Cecconi 2005; Greatrex 2015.

52. Garnsey 1970, p. 280; Lepelley 1986, pp. 227-244; Sarris 2006, pp. 210-217; 2011, pp. 375-392;
2013; Karantabias 2015, pp. 11-65.
53. Principales departing curiae for more lucrative opportunities: Libanius, Orationes 18.135-139;
147-148; 192-193; 2.58, Misopogon 365b, 367d-368b; CTh XII.1.187; Theodosius, Novella 15.1-2;
Jones 1964, pp. 543-545; 748-753. For individuals like Bryonianus: Foss 1977, pp. 167-168;
Carrié 1979, p. 214. Hyperechius of Ancyra: Libanius, Epistulae 296, 298, 308, 731, 777, 803, 805.
Achillius: Libanius, Epistulae 756. Communication under High Empire: Pliny the Younger
Epist. 10.96; the Dominate: Kelly 1997, p. 158; Gascou 2004.
54. This is not the only factor contributing to these events, but an extremely important one.
66 • MARK-ANTHONY KARANTABIAS

authorities, including Justinian and Theodora. Unfortunately for him, a pagarch

was almost immune from reprimand. Selected by the most eminent segment of
Roman society, he was then appointed by a Praetorian Prefect or a Governor. His
nomination was ultimately ratified by the emperor and only he had the power to
dismiss a pagarch. Therefore, it is no surprise that Dioscorus’ appeals in the capital
fell on deaf ears.55
What emerges in this account is the importance of social capital. The pagarchs
in Aphrodito’s vicinity possessed considerable social capital, so much so that the
emperor and empress did not even answer their client-village’s pleas in the conflict.
This may have been the result of several circumstances. First, although under the
patronage of the imperial couple, Aphrodito was more dispensable than the individual
pagarchs. There may have also been a conflict of interest within the two parties’
social networks. Lastly, it is also distinctly possible that the pagarchs’ social networks
wielded considerable power to the point that Justinian did not see it fit to get
involved. Their connections may have included even more powerful elements, such
as one or more of the great Egyptian families. Nevertheless, there is a clear indication
that Justinian could not throw his weight around arbitrarily. In essence, he could
not behave in a tyrannical fashion without serious repercussions. Centralization
was a sacrifice made by former emperors that led to this phenomenon. Unlike
Claudius, for example, Justinian never possessed boundless power. Despite the
Roman aristocracy’s vehement opposition, the former incorporated Gallic nobles
into the Senate. Justinian had to conform to restrictive institutions, which were
already in place.56
Systematic purges on a large scale were not conceivable on account of the intric-
ate relationship between the imperial court and its bureaucracy, which was staffed
largely by the elite. The Tetrarchs unwittingly created and expanded a series of
institutions, which would eventually sap the imperial office’s power. The bureau-
cracy created a set of predictable and systematic norms and procedures; its results
were pre-determined. For example, Justinian did not commission a law code to
violate it as he pleased. On the contrary, he largely appears to have respected it.
He did not arbitrarily seize private property and authorize the killing and imprison-
ment of the innocent. In this systematized administration, officials, uninfluenced
by those affected, were making decisions to resolve problems of which they did not
have any direct knowledge. The administration would eventually become inert and
would not be as responsive to imperial demands. There was very little agency in the
process for the emperor. Unfortunately for Justinian, the inversely proportional
distribution of power had evolved in the elite’s favor and not his. They were familiar
with the predictability and weaknesses of bureaucratic procedures and were naturally
inclined to seek out zones of uncertainty. When certain ones were targeted legislat-
ively, they would eventually move on to find and exploit others. The imperial

55. P. Cairo Maspéro 67002; 67019; 67021; 67024; 67026; 67067; 67094; 67128; 67283; P. London
V 1661; V 1677; V 1682; Edicta 13.12, 25. For illegal taxation in Egypt: Edicta 13; the pagar-
chy: Mazza 1995; Gascou 1985, pp. 61-75. Outline of events: Karantabias 2015, pp. 72-78.
56. Cf. Pfeilschifter 2013, pp. 178-210, who argues that Justinian’s legitimacy depended on
acceptance groups.
 THE PROJECTION OF IMPERIAL POWER IN PROCOPIUS • 67

bureaucratic machinery was thus not a top-down structure. In it, power was a nego-
tiation between two or more actors. Officials could exploit the system’s flaws, for
example, to purchase offices, obtain tax immunity or misappropriate taxes. Repeated
imperial efforts to limit and eradicate corruption were made, but their effectiveness
was quite limited. With the evolution of both the bureaucracy and the upper-tier
aristocracy, the emperor was hamstrung. It is no coincidence that there is significant
weakness shown in Justinian’s provincial reforms. An excess of rhetoric had to be
used to placate bureaucrats, including notables, when he overhauled several provincial
administrations.57 A tyrant like Sulla would never bother with such a thing.
In retrospect, Justinian was neither the tyrant nor the exceptional emperor
Procopius made him out to be. Had he been so, the fallout after the Nika Riot would
have resembled the actions of Sulla following the civil war or Septimius Severus’
purges. In previous periods, notables were expendable and their assets a potential
prize. For this reason, the great families of those times did not survive. They were
not intricately involved in a complex web of administration. Many victims of these
incidents could not muster as much social capital as the Apiones. Hence we may
observe a significant change in imperial retaliatory measures such as after the Nika
Riot or the conspiracy involving Artabanes.58 Whether there were many conspirators
or not, we do note a significant mildness in the emperor’s response despite the
monumental devastation in Constantinople and the threat to his life. This is a striking
indication of the emperor’s vulnerability. Retaliatory actions had to be calculated
meticulously.59 This is a far cry from the earlier imperial period and the Late Republic.60
Nevertheless, the Late Antique emperor, in theory, could conduct ruthless purges
on the grandest of scales. This would indeed happen not too long after Justinian.
However, predictably, it did not end well. The usurper Phocas proceeded to eliminate
not only Maurice’s family but many other eminent imperial officials. His image as a
savior from Maurice’s oppressive fiscal policy quickly changed for the worse.
Notables from every corner of the Empire mustered their social capital collectively
and quickly rebelled. This included one of the most eminent families in the Empire,
the Apiones. It is therefore not surprising that Phocas, in theory a tyrant with absolute
powers, was doomed.61 In sum, this formidable imperial power was merely a veneer.
When the Tetrarchs began implementing their administrative reforms, they did not
realize that they were sacrificing their successors’ power as a bargaining chip to
gain better access to provincial resources and to thwart future rebellions. It is for
these reasons that Procopius’ portrayal of Justinian is deliberately and significantly
distorted. His narrative reveals more about himself and his intended audience than

57. Novella 8, 24-31.

58. The magnitude of aristocratic participation in the Riot: Bell 2013, pp. 278, 307, 324;
Greatrex 1997, pp. 80, 83; Gizewski 1988, p. 157; Haldon 2004, pp. 188-189. To Brandes,
the Riot was staged to legitimize confiscations of senatorial property to fund the building
program: 2014, pp. 239-265. Artabanes: Wars 7.32.51.
59. Börm 2015, pp. 167-173; Greatrex 2014, pp. 83-86; Karantabias 2015, pp. 230-239.
60. Sulla’s proscriptions: Plutarch, Sulla 31; Appian, Civil Wars 1.2-6; Nero’s purge: Tacitus,
Annales 15.60-71; Septimius Severus: Historia Augusta: Vita Septimii Severi 12-14; Valentinian:
Ammianus Marcellinus, Roman History 28.1.
61. Stathakopoulos 2014, pp. 68-69.
68 • MARK-ANTHONY KARANTABIAS

about Justinian. In theory, Justinian was attempting to control his bureaucracy

more effectively, but, in practice, the conditions could not allow it. Yet, these
attempts, which include the alterations to court ceremony and the reduction in size
of the bureaucracy amongst others, could only frustrate their targets.

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