Cargo Security Awareness ETextbook 2nd Ed 2016 TCGP-79-Đã Chuyển Đổi

Cargo Security
Awareness
Course eTextbook
2nd
Edition
Program
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Cargo Security Awareness Course eTextbook 2nd

Edition Material No: 400734
ISBN 978-92-9229-325-3
© 2016 International Air Transport Association. All rights
reserved. Montreal—Geneva
CARGO SECURITY AWARENESS COURSE TEXTBOOK
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Course Guide............................................................................................................................1
Introduction................................................................................................................................... 3
Module 1: Threats to Civil Aviation...........................................................................................7

Module Introduction...................................................................................................................... 9
1.1 Why is Civil Aviation an Attractive Target?.................................................................................11
1.1.1 Unit Overview............................................................................................................. 11
1.1.2 Profile of Civil Aviation................................................................................................ 11
1.1.3 Why it is an Attractive Target......................................................................................12
1.1.4 Other Developments Adding to Popularity..................................................................12
1.1.5 Unit Summary............................................................................................................. 13
1.2 Types of Threats, Sources and Methodology.............................................................................14
1.2.1 Unit Overview............................................................................................................. 14
1.2.2 Types of Threats......................................................................................................... 14
1.2.3 Sources of Threats..................................................................................................... 16
1.2.4 Methodology Used in the Past....................................................................................17
1.2.5 Unit Summary............................................................................................................. 18
1.3 Past Aviation Security Incidents Related to Cargo.....................................................................19
1.3.1 Unit Overview............................................................................................................. 19
1.3.2 Types of Incidents in the Past.....................................................................................19
1.3.3 Security Measures Implemented as a Result of Past Incidents..................................24
1.3.4 Unit Summary............................................................................................................. 26
Module Summary....................................................................................................................... 27
Answer Key................................................................................................................................ 28
Module 2: Introduction to Cargo Security...............................................................................29

Module Introduction.................................................................................................................... 31
2.1 What is Cargo?........................................................................................................................... 33
2.1.1 Unit Overview............................................................................................................. 33
2.1.2 Terms and Definitions.................................................................................................33
2.1.3 Types of Shipments.................................................................................................... 35
2.1.4 Unit Summary............................................................................................................. 38
2.2 The Reasons and Guidelines of Cargo Security.........................................................................39
2.2.1 Reasons for Cargo Security........................................................................................ 39
2.2.2 Challenges for Security............................................................................................... 40
2.2.3 Principles of Cargo Security.......................................................................................40
2.2.4 Application of Principles.............................................................................................. 45
2.2.5 Unit Summary............................................................................................................. 48
Module Summary....................................................................................................................... 49
Answer Key................................................................................................................................ 50
Module 3: Implementing Cargo Security Measures..........................................................51

3.1 Warehouse/Building Security Measures.....................................................................................55
3.1.1 Unit Overview............................................................................................................. 55
3.1.2 Fundamentals of Warehouse/Building Security..........................................................55
3.1.3 Access Control Measures........................................................................................... 58
3.1.4 Unit Summary............................................................................................................. 65
3.2 Regulated Agent Regime........................................................................................................... 66
3.2.1 Fundamentals of the Regulated Agent Regime..........................................................66
3.2.2 IATA Consignment Security Declaration.....................................................................71
3.2.3 IATA Electronic Air Waybill (e-AWB)..........................................................................73
3.2.4 Unit Summary............................................................................................................. 76
3.2.5 Cargo Acceptance, Handling, Storage and Transportation.........................................76
3.2.6 Unit Summary............................................................................................................. 80
Module Summary....................................................................................................................... 81
Attachment: IATA Consignment Security Declaration................................................................82
Answer Key................................................................................................................................ 83
Module 4: Crime Prevention & Security Quality Control Measures................................85

4.1 Crime Prevention in Cargo Facilities.......................................................................................... 89
4.1.1 Unit Overview............................................................................................................. 89
4.1.2 Types of Criminal Activities......................................................................................... 89
4.1.3 Crime Prevention Techniques....................................................................................91
4.1.4 Unit Summary............................................................................................................. 95
4.2 Security Quality Control.............................................................................................................. 96
4.2.1 Principles of Security Quality Control..........................................................................96
4.2.2 ICAO's Focus for Cargo Security................................................................................96
4.2.3 Security Screening at Airfreight Terminals..................................................................97
4.2.4 European Union Aviation Security Initiative................................................................98
4.2.5 Unit Summary........................................................................................................... 101
4.3 Implementing Security Quality Control Measures.....................................................................102
4.3.1 The Challenge.......................................................................................................... 102
4.3.2 Access Control......................................................................................................... 102
4.3.3 Unit Summary........................................................................................................... 107
Module Summary..................................................................................................................... 108
Answer Key.............................................................................................................................. 109
Module 5: Recognition and Management of Threats......................................................111

Module Introduction.................................................................................................................. 113
5.1 Components and Dangers of Explosives.................................................................................115
5.1.1 Unit Overview........................................................................................................... 115
5.1.2 Understanding Explosives........................................................................................116
5.1.3 How IEDs are Detonated.......................................................................................... 119
5.1.4 Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats.................................119
5.1.5 Unit Summary........................................................................................................... 122
Module Summary..................................................................................................................... 123
Answer Key.............................................................................................................................. 124
Module 6: Detection of Threats.............................................................................................125

6.1 Application of the Principles of Cargo Security.........................................................................129
6.1.1 Unit Overview........................................................................................................... 129
6.1.2 Application of the Principles of Cargo Security.........................................................129
6.1.3 Unit Summary........................................................................................................... 135
6.2 Cargo Security Technology...................................................................................................... 136
6.2.1 Requirements for Screening.....................................................................................136
6.2.2 Methods of Screening and Technology Used...........................................................138
6.2.3 Unit Summary........................................................................................................... 144
6.3 Risk Assessment and Management.........................................................................................145
6.3.1 What is Risk Management?......................................................................................145
6.3.2 Risk Assessment...................................................................................................... 145
6.3.3 Risk Management..................................................................................................... 146
6.3.4 The Cargo Environment............................................................................................ 147
6.3.5 Unit Summary........................................................................................................... 149
Module Summary..................................................................................................................... 150
Answer Key.............................................................................................................................. 151
Module 7: Management and Administration.........................................................................153

7.1 Change in Mindset................................................................................................................... 157
7.1.1 Unit Overview........................................................................................................... 157
7.1.2 Management and HR Strategies...............................................................................157
7.1.3 Unit Summary........................................................................................................... 164
7.2 Training and Development....................................................................................................... 165

7.2.1 Human Factors in Security.......................................................................................165
7.2.2 Training Needs......................................................................................................... 166
7.2.3 Response and Management of Aviation Incidents....................................................171
7.2.4 Unit Summary........................................................................................................... 176
Module Summary..................................................................................................................... 177
Answer Key.............................................................................................................................. 178
Course Guide
Cargo Training Program
Introduction
The IATA Cargo Security Awareness Manual has 7 Modules, each followed by
a progress check questions with which the student can verify gained
knowledge from his readings. The training materials are all easy to read and
understand. Each subject area is dealt with in detail and examples and
exercises have been included in each module to illustrate the instruction. You
will be able to monitor your progress through self-administered sets of review
questions provided at the end of every unit.
Two major organizations playing vital role in the field of aviation cargo security.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is focused primarily on
developing and coordinating an effective global policy and legal framework. At
the same time International Air Transport Association (IATA) in close cooper-
ation with governments, decision-makers and leading authorities such as
ICAO, the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the European
Commission, Transport Canada and the Canadian Air Transport Security
Authority (CATSA) working to ensure that appropriate policies are written with
the benefit of airline operational expertise and to assist member airlines
correctly to implement those policies.
The prime objective of both organizations is Safe and Secure Air Transport.
The Yemen printer cartridge incident focused attention on aviation cargo as a
weak point in global security chain. The air cargo system is a complicated
network involving variety of stakeholders including manufacturers, shipper,
freight forwarders, airport and airline. Air cargo industry handles enormous
amount of ULDs, pallets, packages, and mail carried domestically and
internationally aboard passenger and freighter aircraft. The air cargo system is
vulnerable to security threats and this advanced the need of all aviation cargo
related personnel to be trained in air cargo security awareness. This training
applies to the protection of people and assets from unlawful interference and
the necessity of ensuring all personnel have a positive attitude to security. It is
very important each individual to understand and accept philosophy of
“Security's everybody business” because this refers to personal and public
safety and security.
Propose of Air Cargo Security is to “harden” possible targets to the extent
that perpetration will not be attempted and air cargo shipments becomes
unattrac- tive for potential attacks.
This course will give you an informative overview of the aviation security
threats related to cargo and will give you basic knowledge of how security
measures are conducted.
This training will also prepare air cargo staff to understand their part in this
dynamic system. As well It may provide the foundation for all security
personnel who have to execute cargo security functions as part of their daily
routines.
The course is based on current industry regulations and publications. It
covers the following subjects and objectives:
Module 1–“Threats to Civil Aviation” will inform you about the reasons why
the aviation industry has been traditionally a popular target for terrorist and the
types of attacks that have been used against it.
Module 2–“Introduction to Cargo Security” will give you an informative
overview of cargo and its complexities. It will also introduce you to the
principles of cargo security.
Module 3–“Implementing Cargo Security Measures” will introduce you to
the fundamentals of implementing cargo security. Unlike implementing
security
Introduction 3
measures for passengers and their baggage, cargo security is much more
complex.
Module 4–“Crime Prevention & Security Quality Control Measures” will
present you one of the most common areas of threats for airfreight i.e. crime.
We will also discuss security quality control measures to reduce these threats.
Module 5–“Recognition and Management of Threats” will look at one of the
most common threats facing the aviation industry i.e. the use of explosives.
Besides explosives, you will learn that some articles are also not allowed to be
carried onto aircraft such as undeclared dangerous goods and prohibited
items.
Module 6–“Detection of Threats” will present two aspects related to
“detection of Threats” to cargo and all other items that also are carried on board
an aircraft, especially mail, catering, stores and supplies.
Module 7–“Management and Administration” will give you an informative
overview of management and administration of cargo security operations. You
will be introduced to a new concept in enhancing security using a pro-active
approach to security.
LEARNING AIDS
To help you successfully complete and enjoy the course in a productive
fashion, we have included the following learning aids:
Module Overview
At the beginning of each module, you will see an introduction that provides an
overview of the module's content. The module overview also highlights the
learning objectives of the content you will be covering.
Units
Each module is composed of several units, which include:
Unit Overview
The beginning of each unit provides you with an overview of the topics to be
covered and its learning objectives.
Study Check
At the end of each unit is a short exercise composed of multiple choice, short
answers, or matching questions. These are designed to provide you with the
opportunity to see if you understood the material. An “Answer Key” follows the
exercise so that you can check your responses.
Unit Summary
Each unit ends with a summary of the key points.
Module Summary
Each module ends with a summary which brings together the main points of
each unit.
Key Learning Points
Key Learning Points are highlighted throughout the text and are designed to
emphasis particularly important issues and facts.
Did You Know?

Additional interesting facts related to the topic and found under this heading.
USE OF LANGUAGE
We realise that there is an international audience for this and other IATA
distance education programmes, and that many students will have English as a
second language. As such, we have made every effort to keep the language in
this manual at a level which every student can understand.
Note
1. We will be using some Latin abbreviations in the text, most notably
‘i.e.’ (meaning ‘id est’ or ‘that is’) and ‘e.g.’ (meaning ‘exempli gratia’ or
‘for example’).
2. For practical reasons the terms ‘he’, ‘him’ and ‘his’ have been used to
refer to male and female persons
Module 1:
Threats to Civil
Aviation
• Explain reasons why civil aviation is an attractive target

• State the type of threats, sources and methodology used in the past
• Examine past AVSEC incidents related to cargo
Module Learning
Objectives
Upon completion of
this module, you
should be
able to:
Module Introduction
This module will give you an informative overview of the aviation security
threats related to cargo and will introduce you the core concepts and
terminology which will be explored in greater depth in later modules related to
cargo security. For example, this module explains the threats to Civil Aviation in
respect to cargo which will form the foundation upon which we will understand
the concept of what and how cargo security is applied in the air cargo
environment. By understanding the threat you will begin appreciate the
important role you play in helping to make any airport or airline a safe and
secure so that passengers can have a pleasant flight to and from destinations.
In this module too, you will look at the reasons why the aviation industry has
been traditionally a popular target for terrorist and the types of attacks that has
been used against it.
You will also examine the people who have targeted this industry in the past
and their motivation in having executed these attacks. This is important to
understand as the industry still continues to be a popular target and the type of
people beginning to enter into such activities is evolving.
You will be introduced to past incidents related to cargo that were perpetrated
against aviation and how these have impacted the ever changing dynamics of
the security measures that needs to be introduced to reduce a recurrence of
similar incidents and the role you play in contributing to the effectiveness of
these measures.
Module Introduction 9
1.1 Why is Civil Aviation an Attractive Target?
• Describe the profile of civil aviation

• Describe why Civil Aviation is an attractive target
Unit Learning
• Describe what other developments that have added to its popularity
Objectives
Upon completion of this
module, you should be 1.1.1 Unit Overview
able to:
The threats to aviation security can be broadly categorized under terrorism
and crime. History has shown that the aviation industry has suffered numerous
hijacks, attacks on airports and other aviation related facilities, bomb blasts
and more recently the use of aircraft as weapons of mass destruction. In order
to understand the types of threats that the aviation industry has faced before,
it may be prudent to understand why this industry has and will continue to be
popular terrorists and criminals.
Key Learning Point

Civil Aviation has been targeted by terrorist since the 60s’.
1.1.2 Profile of Civil Aviation

Domestic and international civil aviation is the basis of a multi national business
involved in the transport of people and goods to and from various ports of the
World. Wide-bodied aircraft, capable of tremendous speed and range, at a
reasonable cost of passage have opened up the world to the businessman and
the tourist. Cargo capacity, enabling the express just in time delivery of
exports/imports, has made air transport attractive to international trade.
Civil aviation has been marked by:
• rapid technological and engineering development;
• rapid growth in all forms of civil aviation;
• increasing commercialization of all aviation assets and services;
• an interdependence between human beings and technology;
• the reactive development of international aviation security measures;
• a sharing of the skies and facilities by civil, military and general aviation;
• increasing affordability of air travel.
Unit 1.1: Why is Civil Aviation an Attractive Target? 11

Did You Know?
Cargo has traditionally not been a popular target for terrorists?
1.1.3 Why it is an Attractive Target

Civil Aviation is a growing sector. It is very fast and because this it is the most
popular mode of transportation for international travel, it has attracted
attention from various categories of people. Holiday travellers, businessmen,
dignitaries and other ordinary people who need to travel within their own
country or cross international borders. However, it has also attracted the
attention of terrorists and criminals, who use the industry to perpetrate crimes
to serve their group or individual needs. For this category of people the
industry has become attractive because:
• It is High profile, has commercial value and is considered prestigious;
• Of high passenger traffic levels;
• An Incident may force a government reaction, e.g will increase security;
• It may offer limited risk to terrorist (possibly remote from incident).
Key Learning Point

The vulnerability of civil aviation is continuously on the increase as terrorist find
this industry an attractive target.
1.1.4 Other Developments Adding to Popularity

The industry is continuously re-inventing itself as it is very competitive and
dynamic. Developments in the industry have added to its popularity with
terrorists and criminals alike. The developments include:
• Air travel has expanded to more destinations due to global trade
growing economies;
• More passengers are traveling (3.5 billion) as air travel has become
more affordable;
• More airlines are started, especially low cost airlines due to
increasing demands for air travel and also competitive needs;
• More airports are being built to cater to the increased air traffic and
the concept of ‘hubbing’;
• Bigger and newer aircraft (A380, B787) are coming on line to meet
both fuel efficiency and the green environment needs;
• More air cargo is being delivered as cargo has been identified as
the fastest growing sector;
• Aircraft is now a vehicle of attack, not just a target, as was
effectively demonstrated by the 9/11 incident.
These have all added to the vulnerability of the industry. Thus all types of
threats are being projected against the industry by a variety of perpetrations,
some of it fall under the most ‘unlikely’ threats.
Study Check 1.1
TRUE FALSE
1. Place a check in the True or False box
beside the following statements.
(a) Threats to Aviation can be categorised
as terrorism and crime.
(b) The entry of the A380 aircraft has had
no impact on its popularity to terrorists.
(c) The 1st known hijack of an aircraft took
place in Peru.
(d) Terrorists realise that targeting civil
aviation provided greater threat to them.
2. Give four reasons why civil aviation is an
attractive target to terrorists and
criminals. Write your answer in the space
provided.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
3. In the space provided ,place in order which
of these is the most common and least
common (terrorism and crime)
(a)
(b)
1.1.5 Unit Summary

In this unit, you learned why civil aviation is attractive to terrorists and
criminals. It also provided you with some perspectives on how the industry has
developed over the years and how these developments have further
enhanced
its popularity.
1.2 Types of Threats, Sources and Methodology
• Describe the types of threats

• Cite sources of threats
Unit Learning
• Describe the methodology used
Objectives
Upon completion of this unit
you should be able 1.2.1 Unit Overview
to:
This unit introduces you to the types of threats that civil aviation has
experienced in the past and also looks at the category of people who were
involved in such attacks. You will be introduced to the methodology of some of
these attacks as they will clearly demonstrate the creativity in planning and
execution of the perpetrators. You will also be introduced to the term “Acts of
Unlawful Interference” which ICAO uses to categorise these threats.
Key Learning Point

The threat posed by missile attacks using Manpads has been recognised as a
new emerging risk to civil aviation.
1.2.2 Types of Threats

Threats to civil aviation fall into two broad groups, direct and indirect.
Direct threats are those that specifically target civil aviation. They include the
following:
• Bomb/Improvised Explosive Device (IED)–Threats to place a
bomb/IED on an aircraft or in a terminal or other airport buildings and
aviation facilities;
• Sabotage–Threats of malicious or wanton destruction to aviation
facilities and equipment. Could include the use of bombs/IEDs;
• Extortion–Intimidation of aviation industry organisations for financial gain
by threatening to attack aviation assets owned or managed by the
industry organisation;
• Violent Protest–The threat of protest by politically or issue motivated
groups from whom there is, or likely to be, intent to commit acts of
violence and/or to disrupt the operations of an airport or other aviation
facility;
• Breaches of Security–Threats to breach or compromise security
measures with the intention of gaining access to security restricted areas
of airports or to place weapons or sabotage devices on an aircraft;
• War-like Actions–Threats to an aircraft arising from its operation into
or over countries where hostile action is occurring. Threats could be in
the
form of ground to air or air to air fire directed against aircraft in flight or
armed assault when on the ground;
• Improvised Incendiary Device (IID)–Threats to place an incendiary
device on an aircraft or in a terminal or other airport buildings and
aviation facilities;
• CBRN–This is the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear systems that can cause havoc if unleashed
• Hijack–Threats to seize control of an aircraft, in the air or on the ground;
• Seizure of Hostages–Threats to seize hostages in a terminal or
other airport building. Such a threat, if carried out, could lead to a
barricade situation and cause major disruption to the facility involved;
• Armed Attacks–Threats by an individual or a group to carry out an
armed attack at an airport or other facility serving civil aviation;
• Sabotage–Threats of malicious or wanton destruction to aviation
facilities and equipment. Could include the use of bombs/IEDs;
• Extortion–Intimidation of aviation industry organisations for financial gain
by threatening to attack aviation assets owned or managed by the
industry organisation;
• Violent Protest–The threat of protest by politically or issue motivated
groups from whom there is, or likely to be, intent to commit acts of
violence and/or to disrupt the operations of an airport or other aviation
facility;
• Breaches of Security–Threats to breach or compromise security
measures with the intention of gaining access to security restricted areas
of airports or to place weapons or sabotage devices on an aircraft;
• War-like Actions–Threats to an aircraft arising from its operation into
or over countries where hostile action is occurring. Threats could be in
the form of ground to air or air to air fire directed against aircraft in flight
or armed assault when on the ground;
• Missile Attacks–Threats of attack against low flying aircraft, i.e.
approach- ing or departing an airport by persons using shoulder fired
surface to air missiles;
• Suicide Attacks–Attacks executed by suicide bombers via Vehicle
bound or human carried against aviation facilities or assets.
Indirect threats can arise from actions which, while not intended to threaten
aviation, are unlawful and because they occur at an airport or on an aircraft
have the potential to pose a threat. They include:
• drug, flora and fauna trafficking;
• smuggling, e.g. currency or bullion;
• in-flight violence, e.g. assault by an individual or a group on
other passenger or flight crew; and
• work place violence.
Where trafficking and smuggling is detected at an airport, action by law
enforcement officers to apprehend the offenders could lead to a situation
where aviation operations are threatened by the offenders in their attempt to
avoid arrest. It could also lead to the grounding of aircraft due to the discovery
of illicit goods. Examples would be an offender seizing a hostage and
barricading themselves in an office or lounge in a terminal building or the
grounding of an aircraft for a search of the cargo hold.
Unit 1.2: Types of Threats, Sources and Methodology 15

In the case of in-flight or work place violence, unless quick and effective action
is taken to deal with the situation, the violence could escalate to a point where
the safe operation of an aircraft could be at risk or damage could occur to
airport facilities and equipment.
As a result of the numerous ways that threats have been perpetrated against
civil aviation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), which is a
United Nations body that regulates safety and security for aviation in its
Contracting states, categorised the threats under the term “Act of Unlawful
interference”. All the 191 Contracting States, have adopted this term in their
legislation and applied it to domestic as well as international civil aviation.
As a summary definition of aviation security can be said that it is a complex of
measures/material and human resources/intended to protect civil aviation
against acts of unlawful interference. Under the above given definitions of
cases and after 09.11.2001, the expanded definitions and specifies the types
of acts which are based on the basic definition of it, namely that an act of
unlawful interference is making a threat, attempt or action against civil aviation,
as follows:
• Unlawful seizure of aircraft (aircraft);
• Destruction of aircraft in service;
• The taking of hostages on board the aircraft or at airports;
• Forcibly boarding the aircraft entering the airport or air base perimeter;
• Introduction of weapons or dangerous device or material intended
for criminal purposes, on board the aircraft or airport;
• The use of aircraft in operation for causing death, serious injury or
damage to property or environment;
• Communication of false information, which jeopardize the safety of
aircraft in flight or on the ground and the passengers, crew, ground staff
or the public airport or within the perimeter of the base of civil aviation.
1.2.3 Sources of Threats

The threat to civil aviation can come from a variety of sources. These include:
• Terrorists;
• Criminals;
• The mentally disturbed;
• Employees (disaffected, and those with criminal motive);
• Refugees;
• Other Governments.
In fact this list is ever changing. More recently, intelligence agencies have
identified individuals who are involved in what is termed as “Do-it-yourself-
terrorists”. These are individuals who have been influenced by extremist
doctrines and decide to act and carry out terrorist activities.
There are also groups who align themselves to certain terrorist organisations
such as Al Qaeda and act unilaterally in the name of the group to conduct
terrorist activities. Such groups may have members who have no previous
records or trace of being involved in such activities in the past.
The motives for terrorists groups can be many. Some of the more common
ones are:
• To gain publicity for their cause;
• To gain release of prisoners or other terrorists;
• To change government or international policy;
• To undermine and discredit authorities who oppose their cause;
• To target individuals for assassination who are possibly unsympathetic
to their cause;
• To frighten the public and disrupt normal life;
• To obtain money by threat or blackmail.
• To cause economic damage by disrupting or damaging supply chains
that result in additional costs to combat the threat.
Did You Know?

Experts predict that terrorists will begin to look closer at cargo to see how to
exploit it to introduce explosive devices on board a flight.
1.2.4 Methodology Used in the Past

Some of the methods used by terrorists in the past against civil aviation are as
follows:
• Hijacking Techniques which involves smuggling of arms or weapons
on board an aircraft and seizing the aircraft forcibly and taking
hostages.
• Hijacking Techniques which involves taking control of an aircraft and
using it to destroy strategic targets or cause the maximum number of
casualties.
• Sabotage–This involves the use of explosives, incendiary or a
combination of both to be introduced on board an aircraft or placed in
strategic locations in airport facilities for the purpose to cause death and
destruction. Most commonly in check-in baggage but also through cargo,
though
less frequent.
• Manpads–Otherwise known as Man Portable Air Defence Systems,
which are used against aircraft in flight or on the ground. Manpads have
been recognised as one of the new emerging threats to civil aviation.
• Suicide Bomber–As mentioned earlier this will involve the detonation of
explosives that are carried on a vehicle or on the person. The
destructive power of such a method can be devastating.
• Military Style Attacks–These can be conducted by a group of terrorist
armed with automatic weapons and explosives launching a military
style assault into airport facilities such as terminal buildings and other
similar installations.
• CBRN–This is the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear systems that can cause havoc if unleashed. It is understood
that terrorist are acquiring such devices, which will change the threat
environment dramatically.
• Cyber-Terrorism–This is a highly technological warfare that involves
the intentional crippling of an organisations communications and
computer networks.
Study Check 1.2
TRUE FALSE
1. Threats can come as direct or indirect
2. Hijacks and sabotage are indirect threats
3. Suicide attacks can be vehicle or human
4. One of the motives for terrorist is to
change government or international policy
5. Employees are not a source of threat
6. Manpads and Sabotage methods were
used in the past
7. Name any two indirect threat to civil aviation
(a)
(b)
1.2.5 Unit Summary

In this unit, you learned the types of threat, sources and methods used in the
past. These provide you with a perspective of the vulnerability of civil aviation
to such threats and dimensions of these threats. It has also been mentioned
that in the past, it was more common for terrorists to target check-in baggage
to introduce explosive devices on board and how now they are looking more at
cargo for this purpose.
1.3 Past Aviation Security Incidents Related

to Cargo
• List the type of incidents

Unit Learning • Explain the security measures that were implemented as a result of past
Objectives incidents
Upon completion of this unit
you should be able to:
1.3.1 Unit Overview
This unit will introduce you to past incidents related to cargo that were
perpetrated against civil aviation. It will also demonstrate to you the types of
methods (as discussed in the earlier session) that were used by terrorists.
However, we will not be able to list all of the aviation related incidents but will
highlight those that had a significant impact on the industry and have shaped
the way security is being done today.
1.3.2 Types of Incidents in the Past

We have seen the methods that were used by terrorists in the past in order to
cause death and destruction and how they creatively executed these attacks
against civil aviation. Their success can be attributed to many factors. One
these is that aviation security tends to be very reactive rather than proactive in
its approach to reduce the potential of the threats being executed against it.
The main reason for this is because terrorists have the ‘element of surprise’.
This means that they choose the date, target, time and method to use against
civil aviation. Thus traditionally, security reacts to an incident that has already
happened and then puts in place measures to reduce recurrence. It is with this
back drop that we are going to discuss some the major incidents that was
perpetrated against civil aviation.
23 June, 1985: Air India 182–Montreal-London-Delhi
Unit 1.3: Past Aviation Security Incidents Related to Cargo 19

Air India Flight 182 was operating on the Montreal–London–Delhi route. On
23 June 1985, the airplane operating on the route was blown up by a bomb at
an altitude of 31,000 feet (9,400 m), and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean while
in Irish airspace.
A total of 329 people were killed, including 280 Canadians, 27 British citizens
and 22 Indians. The incident was the largest mass murder in modern Canadian
history. It was the first bombing of a 747 jumbo jet, preceding the better-known
1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, which was also brought
down by explosives placed in a radio inside a bag without its passenger
boarding. The explosion and downing occurred within an hour of the fatal
Narita Airport bombing, which also originated from Canada. In this case, a bag
exploded on the ground before being placed on another Air India flight.
Evidence from the explosion pointed to an attempt to blow up two airliners
simultaneously.
April 1986: TWA 840 , Rome–Athens
Trans World AirlinesFlight 840 was a Boeing 727-231 flying en route from
Rome’s Fiumicino Airport to Athens. A bomb was detonated on the aircraft
while it was over Argos, Greece, ejecting four American passengers (including
a nine-month-old infant) to their deaths below. Five others on the aircraft were
injured as the cabin suffered a rapid decompression. The remaining 110
passengers survived the incident as pilot Richard “Pete” Petersen made an
emergency landing.
A group calling itself the Arab Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility,
saying it was committed because of “American arrogance” and clashes with
Libya in the Gulf of Sidra the week before. Investigators concluded that the
bomb contained one pound of plastic explosive. It is suspected it had been
placed under the seat cushion on a previous journey by a Lebanese woman
(later arrested, never convicted) who worked for the Abu Nidal Organization,
which was opposed to the peace process.
Did You Know?

Air Lanka L-1011 was saved from total destruction and death of all passengers
as the bomb went off while it was still on the ground due to late departure.
May 3, 1986: Air Lanka Colombo International Airport
On 3 May 1986, an Air Lanka L-1011 Tristar aircraft on the ground at Colombo
prior to a flight to the Maldives, suffered a bomb explosion. The incident
occurred as passengers were boarding the aircraft prior to its departure for a
scheduled flight to the Maldives. The explosive device was placed inside a
consignment of perishable cargo that had been placed in the C2 cargo
compartment near the rear of the aircraft.
The flight had in fact been delayed because of damage caused during the
loading of the aircraft and would appear to have been timed to explode when
the aircraft was in the air. A total of 16 persons were killed and 40 persons
injured 16 of them seriously. Responsibility for the bomb attack was placed with
extremists from the Tamil separatists that operate within Sri Lanka.
December 21, 1988: PA 103 From London–New York
Key Learning Point

As a result of Pan Am 103, a new security regulation required baggage of
passengers who were not on the flight to be off loaded.
On 21 December 1988, Pan Am flight 103 was on route from London Heathrow
airport to New York. What was not known was that there was an explosive
device disguised as a transistor radio in the bag of one of the passengers that
was loaded in the cargo hold of the aircraft. The passenger was not on board
the flight. This flight originated from Frankfurt and the bag with the explosive
device from Malta. The explosive device exploded when the flight was over
Lockerbie Scotland killing 259 passengers and 11 Lockerbie residents. The
bomb was planted by Libyan agents.
19 September 1989–UTA 772 From Brazzaville to Paris
UTA Flight 772 of the French airline Union des Transports Aériens was
a scheduled flight operating from Brazzaville in the Republic of Congo, via
N’Djamena in Chad, to Paris CDG airport in France.
On 19 September 1989 the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 aircraft registered

N54629 took off from N’Djamena International Airport at 13:13. Forty six
minutes later, at its cruising altitude of 35,100 ft, an explosion caused UTA
Flight 772 to break up over the Sahara Desert near the towns of Bilma and
Ténéré in Niger. All 156 passengers and 15 crew members died. An
investigation commission of the ICAO determined that a bomb placed in a
container in location 13-R in the forward cargo hold caused the destruction of
the aircraft. The commission suggested that the most plausible hypothesis was
for the bomb to have been inside the baggage loaded at Brazzaville airport.
October 2010–Printer Toner Bomb from Yemen
According to aviation security experts, the PETN explosive used in the Yemen
parcel bombs is “almost undetectable” even for sniffer dogs.
(Reuters-http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss_news/
Parcel_bombs_spark_air_freight_concerns.html?cid=28699974)
Two US-bound parcel bombs were sent to the US from Yemen. The bombs
from Yemen have been blamed on al Qaeda. The two US-bound parcel bombs
containing the lethal explosive PETN packed into computer printer cartridges
and addressed to synagogues in Chicago were found in Dubai and Britain.
31 October 2015–Metrojet 7K9268 Sharm el-Sheikh to St Peterburg
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/24/middleeast/egypt-sissi- russian-plane-sinai/
The Egyptian authorities have not yet published a definitive report on the crash
or possible terrorism as a cause. However, the Russian Federal Security
Service said a bomb with 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds) of explosives had
detonated on board the plane. The photograph (below) shows a possible
detonator and switch.
Did You Know?
That ICAO was established in 1947?
1.3.3 Security Measures Implemented as a

Result of Past Incidents
As a result of the number of attacks against civil aviation, there were number of
security measures that were implemented to reduce the possibility of such
recurrences. The United Nations Organisation called ICAO, and other govern-
mental agencies are responsible for these. ICAO has produced two security
documents namely Annex 17, which is called “Safeguarding International Civil
Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference” and the ICAO Security Manual
which also called “Document 8973”. The latest Edition being Document 8973/8.
Annex 17 contains the Standards and Recommended Practices and dictates
the security requirements that have to be implemented in the airports of the
Contracting State and Document 8973, how they can be implemented. The
latest Edition of Annex 17 is Edition 9.
Therefore, following the various Acts of Unlawful Interferences, ICAO
made changes to Annex 17 that came as amendments. Some of the key
changes that came as a result were as follows:
4.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that aircraft security checks of
originating aircraft engaged in commercial air transport movements are
performed or an aircraft security search is carried out. The determination of
whether it is an aircraft security check or a search that is appropriate shall be
based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national
authorities.
4.5.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that
originating hold baggage is screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft
engaged in commercial air transport operations departing from a security
restricted area.
4.5.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport
operators do not transport the baggage of persons who are not on board the
aircraft unless that baggage is identified as unaccompanied and subjected to
appropriate screening.
4.6.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that cargo and mail to be carried
on a passenger commercial aircraft are protected from unauthorized inter-
ference from the point screening or other security controls are applied until
departure of the aircraft.
4.6.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that catering, stores and supplies
intended for carriage on passenger commercial flights are subjected to
appropriate security controls and thereafter protected until loaded onto the
aircraft.
Each Contracting State shall establish measures to prevent weapons, explo-
sives or any other dangerous devices, articles or substances, which may be
used to commit an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of which
is not authorized, from being introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board
an aircraft engaged in civil aviation.
The above are only some of the many measures that were required to be
implemented to raise the security status of the airports and airlines to protect
against Acts of Unlawful Interference.
Regulators have approached industry to find solutions to strengthen the
security processes without impacting the vital flow of commerce.
All parties have agreed to pursue a multi-layered approach to improve security
of air cargo:
1. “Risk assessment”–improving data intelligence flow to facilitate the
identification of high-risk cargo;
2. “Secure supply chain”–involving all supply chain stakeholders to secure
the cargo and maintain its integrity along its journey;
3. “Physical screening” ensuring that only secure cargo is loaded onto
an aircraft.
When there are imminent threats, regulators issue urgent instructions that must
be implemented in short timeframes (e.g. Emergency amendments”) to negate
acts of unlawful interference. These urgent instructions are required to be
implemented by airlines within very short time scales!
Study Check 1.3
TRUE FALSE
1. Aviation Security is proactive most of the time.
2. Terrorists have the ‘element of surprise’.
3. One of the methods used to destroy an
aircraft was by placing an explosive device on
board.
4. The bomb on board Pan Am 103 was in
a Transistor radio.
5. The flight is allowed to take off with the check-
in baggage of a passenger who is NOT on
board.
6. ICAO security requirements are found in
Annex 17.
7. Document 8973 is the same as Annex 17.
8. There were 19 hijackers who conducted
the 9/11 operations.
9. Attacks into airport facilities is also an Act
of Unlawful Interference.
1.3.4 Unit Summary

In this unit we have seen how terrorists have used very creative ways of
targetting civil aviation in the past. It also demonstrates clearly that civil
aviation, due to its popularity, have been hit since the early 60s' and the
reactive nature of the industry. The security measures that have been
introduced by ICAO and governments over the years are increasing and this,
presently, is the only way that the industry can tackle the threats that are
being perpetrated.
Module Summary
A number of topics were discussed in this module to introduce you to threats to
aviation. The key points that were covered include the following:
(a) Aviation is and will continue to be attractive to terrorists as a target
because it is a dynamic industry that is growing in terms of both
airlines and airports.
(b) History has shown us that terrorists are creative in the methods they
have used in the past to target aviation successfully. They will continue
to be attack soft targets.
(c) Security measures will continue to increase with these attacks as
aviation tries to reduce recurrence.
(d) ICAO has therefore introduced Annex 17 and ICAO Security Manual to
help Contracting States to enhance their airport security measures so
that terrorist will not be successful in conducting Acts of Unlawful
Interference against the airports or airlines.
(e) Aviation security is still very much reactive to the threats as the terrorists
have the element of surprise. It is hoped that by being more proactive,
this will change in the future.
(f) There are new sources of threats in addition to the traditional sources
that security agencies are aware of. This is because recent trends show
that the new ‘terrorists’ have no background records of past involvement
in such acts. Terrorists are now beginning to exploit the weakness of
cargo security measures.
Module Summary 27
Answer Key Study Check 1.3
Study Check 1.1 1. False–Aviation Security is, traditionally, reactive.
1. 2. True–The terrorists have the element of
surprise against civil aviation as they choose
the date,
(a) True. These are the key threats faced by civil time, target and method.
aviation.
3. True–This was one of the techniques used by
(b) False. The introduction of the A380 aircraft terrorists in the
past. means that the terrorist can inflict greater
numbers of casualty as this aircraft can carry 4. True–The transistor radio was in a check-in bag-
up to 800 passengers. gage and was rigged to be an explosive device.
(c) True. The 1st hijack took place 21 5. False–Following the Pan Am incident, baggage
February 1931 in Peru. of a passenger NOT on board was required to be
off-loaded.
(d) False. Terrorist have the confidence that tar-
geting civil aviation provides a lesser threat 6. True–Annex 17 contains the Standards and
of them to be detected and detained. Rec- ommended Practices.
2. Four reasons for civil aviation being popular are: 7. False–Document 8973 give guidelines as to
how the security measures in Annex 17 can be
im-
(a) High profile, plemented.
(b) High passenger traffic levels, 8. True–19 hijackers who cleared security at differ-
(c) Incident will force government intervention, ent airports to board 4 aircraft.
(d) Offers limited risk to terrorists 9. True–Attacks into airport facilities are also
classified as Acts of Unlawful Interference by
3. The most common to the least common ICAO.
between terrorism and crime is
(a) Crime
(b) Terrorism
Study Check 1.2

1. True–threats can be either direct or indirect
in nature
2. False–Hijacks and sabotages are classified
as direct threats
3. True–Suicides came be carried out with
vehicle borne or human borne explosives
4. True–Terrorist have used such motive in the
past successfully
5. False–Disgruntled or corrupt employees are
a sources of threat to civil aviation
6. True–Attacks using Manpads and sabotage
techniques have been used against civil
aviation before
7. The following are two examples of indirect
threats
• drug, flora and fauna trafficking;
• smuggling, e.g. currency or bullion.
Module 2:
Introduction to Cargo
Security
• Define what is cargo

• State the reasons and guidelines of cargo security
Module Learning
Objectives
Upon completion of
this module, you
should be
able to:
Module Introduction
This module will give you an informative overview of cargo and its complexities.
It will also introduce you to the principles of cargo security.
We have already discussed the threats to aviation security in the previous
module. We have also discussed past incidents related to cargo that caused
death, destruction and damage.
Cargo is considered in the aviation industry as the ‘Achilles heel’, simply
because it is still the weakest link in the aviation security chain. Cargo
operations are complex and involve many stakeholders. Presently, due to the
nature of cargo and the complexity of cargo operations, it is not possible at the
present time to screen cargo 100% in all countries as is done for passenger’s
baggage.
In order for us to understand the challenges that security faces in implementing
cargo security, we will also need to understand cargo operations. This will be
discussed in this module as well.
2.1 What is Cargo?
• Describe the terms and definitions

• Describe the type of shipments
Unit
Learning
Objectives
2.1.1 Unit Overview
Upon completion of this unit,
you should be able to:
In this unit we will introduce you to Cargo operations. This is important

because, in order to be able to effectively implement cargo security
measures, it is necessary to appreciate the challenges and complexities
related to cargo.
These are the same issues that make cargo security so daunting and so
attractive to the terrorists today. It is also because there has been greater
implementation of aviation security measures for passengers and their
baggage. This has made targeting these traditional areas more difficult, thus
cargo has become a more attractive option for those persons attempting to
carry out an act of unlawful interference.
Key Learning Point

Since enhanced security measures for passengers and their baggage, cargo
has become a more attractive target.
2.1.2 Terms and Definitions

Aviation Cargo is defined by IATA as:
“Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or
mishandled baggage.”
However, for operational understanding, any item that is accompanied by an
‘Air Waybill’ is considered as cargo. These include normal freight, consoli-
dations, transshipments, unaccompanied courier items, postal mail, diplomatic,
company materials, unaccompanied baggage and special cargo such as
dangerous goods, perishables, live animals and time-and-temperature sensi-
tive products shipped as freight on a passenger-carrying aircraft or freighter.
So how does cargo move? The typical cargo flow, as it is termed, starts when
an individual or organization decides to send an item or a consignment to
someone via airfreight. Cargo originates from a consignor and is finally
delivered to a consignee.
In between these two categories, the cargo may pass through many hands
before it is finally delivered to the consignee. This process is called the cargo
flow.
Unit 2.1: What is Cargo? 33
The typical cargo flow process can be diagrammatically shown as follows
(see Figure 2.1.2)
Figure 2.1.2—Cargo Flow
Consignor
The consignor (shipper) is the originator of the cargo. They are the first link to
the cargo supply chain. The supply chain of cargo starts when the goods are
prepared for carriage or when the goods become identifiable as air cargo.
Freight Forwarder
The freight forwarder is a person or company engaged in the business of
storing and dispatching shipments on behalf of other firms or individuals and of
handling the formalities involved with such shipments.
The services provided include: tracking inland transportation, preparation of
shipping and export documents, warehousing, booking cargo space, negotiat-
ing freight charges, etc.
Shipments and items of Cargo may be moved to an Aircraft Operator
for carriage by:
(a) Directly from a consignor/shipper

(b) From a Freight Forwarder
(c) From another Aircraft Operator
(d) From Courier Companies
(e) Cruise and Shipping lines
2.1.3 Types of Shipments
Cargo shipments can be classified into many types. Thus this adds to the
complexity of cargo.
Normal Freight
Normal freight is freight that is produced by a manufacturer/supplier that
requires carriage by air to reach its intended destination or consignee. It also
does not require special handling.
Consolidation
Consolidations are shipments of Air Cargo that comprises Normal Freight from
more than one consignor/shipper, usually because the amount of Freight from
some shippers are too small to use a normal shipment of Freight in its own
right or to avail better freight rates. The individual or organisation that handles
such freight is called consolidators.
A Consolidator is a freight forwarder, who will collect shipments from shippers
and smaller freight forwarders, and consolidate them into one large shipment
under a master air waybill.
Special Cargo:
Example: Dangerous Goods (DG)
Since hazardous materials are transported all over the world onboard airplanes
on a daily basis, the ICAO Dangerous Goods Technical Instructions (TI) were
created to ensure that highest possible level of safety in this type of commerce.
To ensure compliance with ICAO TI, IATA developed a manual named
“Dangerous Goods Regulations” (DGR). Dangerous goods are defined as
“articles or substances which are capable of posing a significant risk to health,
safety, property or the environment”. DGR provides a set of criteria used to
determine if the term “Dangerous Goods” applies.
Transhipment
Transhipment is a shipment that has already been transported by Air from its
point of origin to the Freight Forwarder/Aircraft Operator who will subsequently
send the shipment on to another flight.
Unaccompanied Courier Items
These are shipments received by Freight Forwarders/Aircraft Operators from
Companies who collect items from other people and undertake to deliver them
at their final destination, without a representative of the Courier Company
travelling as a passenger on the flight.
Postal Mail
These are items or shipments tendered by and intended for delivery to State
regulated/controlled postal services destined for carriage by air and distribution
in accordance with the rules of the Universal Postal Union (U.P.U.).
Diplomatic Mail
Diplomatic mail is shipments and items that are sent from State
Representatives/Embassies/Consulates for official purposes where the recipi-
ent is their Nation State.
Company Materials (COMAT)
These are shipments or Materials sent by an Aircraft Operator on their own
Aircraft, for their own use at the destination of those shipments or Materials.
Unaccompanied Baggage shipped as freight
These are personal effects sent by the shipper for any reason where they will
not be travelling on the same aircraft with its owner. An example of this is
when someone has been posted to another country for work. Usually they
have to send their personal items to that country in advance of them arriving.
These personal items that they are sending ahead of them will go under this
category of cargo.
Catering Supplies
While Catering supplies and aircraft operators’ stores and supplies are not
considered as cargo, we must also ensure security controls are applied. The
supplies intended for carriage on passenger flights can provide a means to
introduce weapons, explosive devices or substances intended for use by a
perpetrator of an act of unlawful interference. Protection against acts of
unlawful interference will require careful consideration and planning by all
organizations, security agencies and aircraft operators involved.
The ICAO Annex 17 Standard 4.6.5 defines this requirement.
Study Check 2.1
1. Why is Cargo considered in the aviation industry as the ‘Achilles heel’?

(a) because it is very complex
(b) because it is popular with terrorists
(c) because it is the weakest link
2. It is possible at the present time to screen cargo 100% as is done

for passenger’s baggage.
True or False
3. Cargo is defined as:
(a) Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores
and accompanied or mishandled baggage.
(b) Any property carried on an aircraft including mail, stores and
accompanied or mishandled baggage.
(c) Any property carried on an aircraft including mail, stores and
unaccompanied or mishandled baggage.
4. For operational understanding, any item that is accompanied by an

is considered as being cargo.
(a) Manifest
(b) Air Waybill
(c) Export Control Form
5. A consignor is the one who:

(a) receives the cargo finally
(b) loads the cargo on the aircraft
(c) is the originator of the cargo
6. Shipments and items of Cargo may be moved to an Aircraft Operator

for carriage by air in many ways such as:
(a) Directly from a consignor/shipper
(b)
(e)
7. There are many types of shipments, they include:

(a) Normal freight
(b) Consolidation
(c)
(d) Unaccompanied courier items
(e)
(f)
(g) Company stores
(h) Unaccompanied baggage
2.1.4 Unit Summary
In this unit we introduced you to Cargo flow and the various definitions used for
cargo operations. It is important for you to understand this as it will then help
you appreciate the need for effective cargo security measures.
We also explained the definitions of the types of cargo and the typical cargo
flow process. This is to stress the complexity involved in the movement of
cargo from a consignor to the consignees. We have seen the number of hands
or players involved in the process. These are the same issues that make cargo
security so daunting and so attractive to the terrorists today.
2.2 The Reasons and Guidelines

of Cargo Security
• Describe the reasons for cargo security

Unit Learning • Describe the challenges for security
Objectives
Upon completion of this • List the guidelines for cargo security
unit, you should be
able to: • Describe the application of the principles
2.2.1 Reasons for Cargo Security

We have already discussed the reasons why cargo security is important. As the
widespread implementation of aviation security measures regarding passen-
gers and their baggage has become more effective so has air cargo become a
more attractive option for those persons attempting to carry out an act of
unlawful interference.
The volume of air cargo carried is large and increasing, the cargo system is
well known, perpetrators are able to target specific flights and cargo consign-
ments which can be difficult to screen. Additionally it is difficult to screen all air
cargo and there is a low personal risk to the perpetrator.
In fact the type of threats in air cargo that can be used to inflict death, injuries
or other damages to the aviation properties would be:
(a) An introduction of an IED or IID through cargo.
(b) An introduction of a CBRN weapon through cargo.
(c) Hijacking an airplane to be used as a weapon itself.
It is difficult to target a specific flight.
It is traditionally assumed that it is difficult to target an aircraft because:

(a) Under normal circumstances, the weight priority on a passenger-
carrying aircraft will be given to passengers and bags.
(b) Cargo accepted by an air carrier may be travelling on any of its
flights covering the same route.
(c) While air cargo is generally transported soon after acceptance because
of time-sensitivity, it is still difficult to predict the exact period of transit for
a specific shipment;
(d) There is only a specific amount of weight assigned to cargo on a
commercial flight. After this limit is reached, cargo will be offloaded
and rebooked.
Electronic or Paper trail
Cargo operators have to track and trace and manage a full electronic or “paper
trail” documenting the origin, destination, contents and location of shipments
throughout the entire process.
These operators must also collect and maintain substantial information on their
customers (shippers and regulated agents).
Unit 2.2: The Reasons and Guidelines of Cargo Security 39

Complexity of the system
Once a shipment is tendered for transport, it becomes difficult for a terrorist to
track or alter it. Shipments may be left on hold at airports due to minor details in
paperwork and export permits.
Key Learning Point

The complexity of cargo makes it a challenge for security to screen it 100%.
2.2.2 Challenges for Security
Diversity and dimension

The nature, variety and size of the shipments facilitate concealment. Besides,
in large airports, the amount of cargo processed makes it difficult to screen
100% of the shipments in a timely manner. Furthermore, most x-ray machines
used for cargo screening do not have the capability to detect small objects
concealed in large shipments. Such a technology is in production but many
countries will not be able to afford such machines when it comes into service.
Handling
Handling of cargo involves shipments changing hands and locations numerous
times, providing numerous occasions for it to be tampered with.
Impersonality
The human factor is an essential part of any security system. Cargo, however,
eliminates any contact between a terrorist and a security officer, thus removing
a layer of security.
2.2.3 Principles of Cargo Security

An effective cargo security system must have the capability to:
(a) Effectively neutralize the vulnerabilities of the system
(b) Take advantage of the strengths
(c) Be realistic
To achieve this and counter the threats faced in cargo, specific security
procedures have to be developed that represent a cost-effective and pragmatic
approach. Measures and procedures should be in place to prevent explosives
or other dangerous devices, which may be used to commit acts of unlawful
interference, from being accepted for carriage by air by means of cargo,
courier, express parcel or mail consignments.
Principles
The ICAO Annex 17 is part of International Standards and Recommended
Practices.
ICAO is also looking at introducing the concept of High Risk Cargo into its
Annex 17 guidance material.
Principle 1 – Security Controls
Standard 4.6.1:
Each Contracting State shall ensure that appropriate security Controls,
including screening where practicable, are applied to cargo and mail, and
prior to their being loaded onto an aircraft engaged in passenger commercial
air transport operations.
Principle 2 – Supply Chain Security Process
Standard 4.6.2:
Each Contracting State shall establish a supply chain security process, which
includes the approval of regulated agents and/or known consignors, if such
entities are involved in implementing screening or other security controls of
cargo and mail.
Principle 3 – Protection of cargo after security controls
Standard 4.6.3:
Each Contracting State shall ensure that cargo and mail to be carried on a
passenger commercial aircraft are protected from unauthorized interference
from the point screening or other security controls are applied until departure
of the aircraft.
Principle 4 – Implementation of Regulated Agents
Standard 4.6.4:
Each Contracting State shall ensure that operators do not accept cargo or
mail for carriage on an aircraft engaged in passenger commercial air
transport operations unless the application of screening or other security
controls is confirmed and accounted for by a regulated agent, or such
consignments are subjected to screening. Consignments which cannot be
confirmed
and accounted for by a regulated agent are to be subjected to screening.
Principle 5 – Security control for Catering
Standard 4.6.5:
Each Contracting State shall ensure that catering, stores and supplies
aircraft.
Principle 6 – Screening of merchandise and supplies
Standard 4.6.5:
Each Contracting State shall ensure that merchandise and supplies intro-
duced into security restricted areas are subject to appropriate security
controls, which may include screening.
Principle 7 – Application of security controls according to shipment’s
classification
Standard 4.6.7:
Each Contracting State shall ensure that security controls to be applied to
cargo and mail for transportation on all-cargo aircraft are determined on the
basis of a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national
authorities.
The IATA Recommended Practice 1630 is intended to protect air carrier
operators against acts of unlawful interference.
As described on chapter 3 of the RP1630:
3.1 General: All cargo intended to be carried on passengers before being
uplifted onto an aircraft shall be subject to security controls. Air Carriers should
not accept cargo for carriage unless security controls have been applied or
their application has been confirmed by a Regulated Agent, or if being loaded
on an all-cargo aircraft, an Account Consignor.
3.6.2 All consignments accepted from Known Shippers and/or Regulated
Agents will be deemed to have met required security provisions only after
proper checks have been completed.
3.11 The appropriate authorities and/or carriers may require a security
declaration to be provided in paper or electronic format or any other means
that may be allowed in the future “Guidance material to assist the
implementation of the Recommended Practice is published in IATA Security
Manual.
ACC3 – EU security requirements for incoming air cargo
Building on the Principles of cargo security, the European Union (EU)
implemented new security initiatives, requiring carriers to comply with its
security regulations.
“Air carriers that fly air cargo or mail into the EU from a non-EU airport are
required to comply with the EU ACC3 programme for inbound cargo and mail.
Only air carriers that comply with this programme can be designated as an ‘Air
Cargo or Mail Carrier operating into the Union from a Third Country Airport’
(ACC3) and may thus carry cargo or mail into the EU. ACC3 designation is
required for each non-EU airport from which an air carrier flies air cargo or mail
to the EU.
ACC3s must ensure that all cargo and mail is physically screened according to
EU standards or comes from an EU aviation security validated secure supply
chain. EU aviation security validation of ACC3’s cargo and mail operations at
each departure airport for EU bound flights is mandatory since 1 July 2014.”
In other words, air cargo or mail shall not be carried from the last point of
departure (non-EU) to the EU/EEA without being subject to security controls.
To obtain (and maintain) the ACC3 status, an air carrier needs to submit its
relevant air cargo or mail security program in each non-EU site to an EU
aviation security Independent Validator (IV).
This validator will assess the carrier’s security measures outlined in its security
program to ensure its relevance and completeness and also the ACC3’s
implementation of the aviation security measures during an on-site verification.
The Independent Validator will draft a report based on the findings and submit
it to the appropriate authority of the EU Member State that has been assigned
for the designation of the ACC3.
EC Regulations 272/2009, 185/2010 and amending regulation 859/2011
Above regulations aim at protecting persons and goods within the European
Union by setting common rules for safeguarding civil aviation.
As per EC Regulation 272/2009 (supplementing EC Regulation 300/2008):
“1. Cargo and mail to be loaded on an aircraft shall be screened unless:
(a) security controls have been applied to the consignment by a
regulated agent, and the consignment has been protected from
unauthorized interference from the time that those security controls
were applied ; or
(b) security controls have been applied to the consignment by a known
consignor and the consignment has been protected from
unauthorized interference from the time that those security controls
were applied ; or
(c) security controls have been applied to the consignment by an account
consignor and the consignment has been protected from unauthorized
interference from the time that those security controls were applied and
the cargo is carried on an all-cargo aircraft or the mail on an all-mail
aircraft;”
“2. Cargo and mail: the process for the approval or designation of regulated
agents, known consignors and account consignors…
1. Regulated agent shall be approved by the appropriate authority…
2. Known Consignor shall be approved by the appropriate authority…
3. Account Consignor shall be designated by a regulated agent. “
As per Commission Regulation 2015/1998 (repealing EC Regulation
185/2010 and amendments)
Under 6.3.1.1, any entity that applies security controls “shall be approved as a
regulated agent. This includes third party logistics providers responsible for
integrated warehousing and transportation services, air carriers and handling
agents.”
A regulated agent may subcontract:
(a) any of the security controls referred to in point 6.3.2 to another
regulated agent;
(b) any of the security controls referred to in point 6.3.2 to another entity,
where the controls are carried out at the regulated agent’s own site or at
an airport, and are covered by the regulated agent’s or airport security
programme;
(c) any of the security controls referred to in point 6.3.2 to another entity,
where the controls are carried out elsewhere than at the regulated
agent’s own site or at an airport, and the entity has been certified or
approved and listed for the provision of these services by the appropriate
authority; and
(d) the protection and transportation of consignments to a haulier that
meets the requirements of point 6.6.
6.3.2 “Security controls to be applied by a regulated agent”
6.3.2.1 “When accepting any consignment, a regulated agent shall establish
whether the entity from which it receives the consignment is a regulated
agent, a known consignor, an account consignor, or none of these”.
6.3.2.2 “The person delivering the consignment to the regulated agent or to
the carrier shall present an identity card, passport, or any other document
which includes his or her photograph and has been issued or recognized by
the national authority. The card or document shall be used to establish the
identity of the person delivering the consignments.”
6.3.2.5 “…the regulated agent shall ensure that the consignment tendered
to the air carrier or another regulated agent is accompanied by the
appropriate documentation either in form of an air waybill or in a separate
declaration and either in an electronic format or in writing.”
6.3.2.6 “The documentation shall be available for inspection by the appropri-
ate authority at any point before the consignment is loaded on to an aircraft
and shall provide the following information:
(a) site specific name and address of the regulated agent that issued the
security status and/or its unique alphanumeric identifier as received
from the appropriate authority;
(b) a unique identifier of the consignment such as the number of the (house
or master) air waybill;
(c) the content of the consignment;
(d) the security status of the consignment stating:
• ‘SPX’, meaning secure for passenger, all-cargo and all-mail aircraft, or
• ‘SCO’, meaning secure for all-cargo and all-mail aircraft only, or
• ‘SHR’, meaning secure for passenger, all-cargo and all-mail aircraft
in accordance with high risk requirements;
(e) The reason that the security was issued, stating:
• “KC” meaning received from a known consigno,r or
• “AC” meaning received from an account consignor, or
• “RA”, meaning selected by a regulated agent, or
• the means or methods of screening used, or
• the grounds for exempting the consignment from screening:
(f) the name of the person who issued the security status, or an
equivalent identification and the date and time of issue;
(g) the unique identifier received from the appropriate authority, of any
regulated agent who has accepted the security status given to a
consignment by another regulated agent.
6.3.2.7 “In the case of consolidations, the requirements of points 6.3.2.5 and
6.3.2.6 shall be considered as met if:
(a) the regulated agent performing the consolidation retains the information
required under points 6.3.2.6(a) to (g) for each individual consignment
for the duration of the flight(s) or for 24 hours, whichever is the longer;
and
(b) the documentation accompanying the consolidation includes the alphanu-
meric identifier of the regulated agent who performed the consolidation, a
unique identifier of the consolidation and its security status.Point (a) shall
not be required for consolidations that are always subject to screening or
exempted from screening in line with points 6.2.1(d) and (e) of
Commission Implementing Decision C(2015) 8005 if the regulated agent
gives the consolidation a unique identifier and indicates the security status
and a single reason why this security status was issued
6.3.2.8 “When accepting a consignment to which not all required controls
have previously been applied, the regulated agent may also elect not to
apply the security controls as referred to in point 6.3.2 but to hand the
consignment over to another regulated agent to ensure the application of the
security controls.”
2.2.4 Application of Principles
The concept for applying the principles of cargo security are based on the
following:
(a) Aircraft carrying Cargo must operate from a secure environment;
(b) All Air Cargo must be subjected to some form of Security Control, before
being placed on board a Passenger Carrying Aircraft; maximum effort
must be devoted to the Screening of Air Cargo Shipments whose Security
cannot readily be determined; and
(c) A shipment of Air Cargo, once security cleared, must be protected
from unlawful interference.
The concept also specifies that the Security Clearance of Air Cargo must
consist of:
(a) active procedures to detect devices that may have already been
placed into Air Cargo OR;
(b) preventative security measures being placed into Air Cargo when it is
initially packed and at all stages thereafter in its handling prior to its
being loaded onto an Aircraft.
The concept also requires that wherever practicable screening of cargo has to
be conducted using any one or a combination of the following:
Physical Inspection and/or hand search (PHS);
• Visual check (VCK);
• X-ray equipment (XRY);
• Explosive Detection Systems (EDS);
• Remote Explosive Scent Tracing Explosive Detection Dogs (RES);
• Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD);
• Vapor Explosive Trace Detection(VPT);
• Particle Explosive Trace Detection (PRT) ;
• Cargo and Mail Metal Detection Equipment (MDE);
• Subjected to any other means (AOM).
However, in consideration of the difficulty of screening cargo 100%, it is
advocated that preventative measures are based on a multi-layered approach
commencing with the rationale that if the shipment is packed securely initially,
and then kept secure thereafter, the requirement for Screening or Searching is
reduced.
This is especially when it is expected that some shippers send the majority of
Air Cargo, therefore the system-based approach is cost-effective, and if
properly implemented and controlled, will provide for effective Security.
This means that Air Cargo should be properly protected from interference and
accounted for at every stage of its journey. In general terms an overview of the
system is as follows:
(a) The Originator of the goods (where the goods are first identifiable
as Export Cargo) packs the goods in a secure environment
(b) The goods are then certified as secure and passed to the
Freight Forwarder or Aircraft Operator Airline by secure vehicle
(c) Upon receipt by the Freight Forwarder or Aircraft Operator, the
shipments and documentation are checked for evidence of interference,
recorded as being received securely, and are then stored in a Secure
Area.
(d) In due course they are then passed to the next Freight Forwarder,
Consolidator, Integrator or Aircraft Operator in a secure condition
and certified as such.
These Procedures, if properly applied, provide an effective form of Risk
Assessment that should result in the majority of Air Cargo not being required to
be screened or searched.
This will leave the Security Screening Staff employed by Aircraft Operators and
Freight Forwarders to Screen the more dubious shipments such as:
(a) Unaccompanied personal effects,
(b) Shipments where there are discrepancies between the cargo
descriptions, weights, pieces.
(c) first time shipments, and
(d) any shipments whose Security Integrity cannot be established or is
in doubt
With this process in place, the ultimate responsibility remains with the aircraft
operator to ensure that appropriate security measures have been carried out
but in effect the Air Cargo Security Programme allows Aircraft Operators to
delegate some of that responsibility to Regulated Agents.
The concept of the regulated Agents will be explained in the next module.
Study Check 2.2
1. Why has cargo become a potential target for terrorists?

(a) because terrorists have nowhere else to target
(b) because of widespread implementation of aviation security
measures for passengers and their baggage
(c) because it is the easiest target for terrorists
2. The type of threats that cargo can be exploited for include an

introduction of an IED or IID, an introduction of a CBRN weapon
and .
(a) Hijacking an airplane to be used as a weapon itself.
(b) Hijacking a commercial airplane to be used as a weapon of
mass destruction.
(c) Threatening a passenger to carry an explosive device on board an
all- cargo airplane.
3. Traditionally, it was assumed cargo will be difficult to target because

cargo accepted by an air carrier may be travelling on any of its flights
covering the same route.
True or False
4. The challenges to security for cargo are because of:

(a) Diversity & dimension
(b) Handling and
(c)
5. An effective cargo security system must have the capability to:

(a)
(c) Be realistic
6. Cargo that is secure for loading onto a passenger aircraft has a

security status of
(a) SPX
(b) SCO
(c) SHR
7. One of the concept for applying the principles of cargo security is that
an aircraft carrying Cargo can operate from any environment.
True or False
8. Name three methods that can be used to screen cargo.
(a)
(b)
(c)
2.2.5 Unit Summary

In this unit we have discussed the reasons why cargo security is very
important. We also looked at the complexity of cargo that has resulted in
challenges for security.
It was for this very reason that ICAO developed the principles of cargo security
so that despite the complexity of challenges faced by security, a rational and
pragmatic approach can be applied that will help ensure that cargo that gets
loaded on board a commercial flight is made safe and secure. Finally we
looked at how this approach can be implemented through the Regulated Agent
Regime, which will be discussed in detail in the next module.
Module Summary
In this we introduced you to Cargo flow and the various definitions used for
cargo operations so as to help you appreciate the need for effective cargo
security measures. We also discussed the definitions of the types of cargo and
the typical cargo flow process. This is to stress the complexity involved in the
movement of cargo from a consignor to the consignees. We have seen the
number of hands or players involved in the process. These are the same
issues that make cargo security so daunting and so attractive to the
terrorists today.
In this module we also discussed the reasons why cargo security is very
important and the challenges for security in relation to the complexity of cargo.
We then discussed the reasons why ICAO developed the principles of cargo
security in order to recommend a rational and pragmatic approach that will help
ensure that cargo that gets loaded on board a commercial flight is made safe
and secure and how this approach can be implemented through the Regulated
Agent Regime.We also looked at the EU’s ACC3 compliance requirement for
operators flying cargo and mail into the EU from a non-EU last point of
departure The key topics covered in this module were:
(a) the terms and definitions
(b) type of shipments
(c) the reasons for cargo security
(d) the challenges for security
(e) the principles for cargo security
(f) the application of the principles
Module Summary 49
Answer Key 7. False
Study Check 2.1 8. Methods:
1. (c) because it is the weakest link • X-ray equipment (XRY);
2. False • Explosive Detection Systems (EDS);
3. (a) Any property carried on an aircraft other • Remote Explosive Scent Tracing
than mail, stores and accompanied or Explosive Detection Dogs (RES);
mishandled
baggage. • Free Running Explosive Detection Dogs
4. (b) Air Waybill (FRD);
5. (c) who is the originator of the • Vapor Explosive Trace Detection(VPT);
cargo 6. • Particle Explosive Trace Detection (PRT) ;
(a) Directly from a consignor/shipper • Cargo and Mail Metal Detection
Equipment (MDE);
(b) From a Freight Forwarder
• Subjected to any other means (AOM).
(e) Cruise and Shipping lines
7.
(a) Normal freight
(b) Consolidation
(c) Transhipment
(d) Unaccompanied courier items
(e) Postal mail
(f) Diplomatic mail
(g) Company stores
(h) Unaccompanied baggage
(i) Special cargo
Study Check 2.2

1. (b) because of widespread implementation of
aviation security measures for passengers
and their baggage
2. (a) Hijacking an airplane to be used as a
weapon itself
3. True
4. (c) Impersonality
5. An effective cargo security system must have
the capability to
(a) Effectively neutralize the vulnerabilities of
the system
(c) Be realistic
6. (a) SPX
Module 3:
Implementing Cargo Security Measures
• Describe warehouse/building security measures

• Describe the Regulated Agent Regime
• Describe IATA Consignment Security Declaration and e-CSD
Module Learning • Describe e-Air Waybill

Objectives
Upon completion of
this module, you
should be
able to:
Module Introduction
This module will introduce you to the fundamentals of implementing
cargo security. Unlike implementing security measures for passengers
and their baggage, cargo security is much more complex.
This is more so because anything and everything can go on an aircraft as
cargo. Thus cargo security can be broadly separated into two parts. One is
based on the concept of securing cargo from its source to the time it is loaded
on board the aircraft and the second part looks at the security of cargo when
it is in storage, i.e. the warehouse security itself.
We will also see how information through the e-Consignment Security
Declaration (e-CSD) and e-AWB play a crucial role in the ensuring the integrity
of the secured air supply chain.
In this module, we are going to look at how they are integrated to create
a seamless system, which we hope will help us achieve our aim of
securing cargo.
3.1 Warehouse/Building Security Measures
• Describe the fundamentals of warehouse/building security

• Describe access control measures
Unit
Learning
Objectives
3.1.1 Unit Overview
you should be able In this unit we will introduce you to warehouse cargo security operations. This
to: is important because, in order to be able to effectively secure cargo, it is
necessary to appreciate the threats that we can face and ensure that cargo is
not tempered with when they are in storage prior to them being loaded onto an
aircraft. ICAO Annex 17 clearly specifies this need as follows:
Standard 4.6.3
Each Contracting State shall ensure that cargo and mail to be carried on a
passenger commercial aircraft are protected from unauthorized interference
from the point screening or other security controls are applied until departure
of the aircraft.
In addition the IATA ISARP says:
Sec 3.7.1 If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo and/or mail
on passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure cargo and/or
mail shipments for transport on passenger flights are subjected to the
appropriate security controls, including screening where practicable, as estab-
lished by the applicable state(s).
So how can we achieve this requirement? In this unit we will look at the
fundamentals of warehouse security measures.
The security clearance of air cargo may consist of either active procedures to
detect devices that may have been already placed into air cargo, or preventive
security to stop devices being placed into air cargo when it is initially packed
and at all stages thereafter in its handling prior to it being loaded onto an
aircraft. Active procedures could include the use of conventional X-ray
equipment, explosive detection systems, explosive trace detection equipment,
hand search, simulation chambers and explosive detection dogs.
Preventive measures are based on the rationale that if the consignment is
packed securely initially, and then kept secure thereafter, the requirement for
screening or searching is reduced. This involves security of the ware-
house/building.
Key Learning Point

The securing of cargo involves both the supply chain security as well as
warehouse security.
3.1.2 Fundamentals of
Warehouse/Building Security
In order to satisfy the International and National requirements to safeguard
Cargo for carriage by air from Acts of Unlawful Interference and criminal
activities, it is not enough to merely screen Cargo that will be loaded onto an
aircraft.
Unit 3.1: Warehouse/Building Security Measures 55

It is also necessary that such consignments, once security “cleared” remain
protected from subsequent interference until they are loaded into the aircraft on
which they will travel on.
This means the application of a pragmatic and systematic approach to building
security that not only meets the need of the security fraternity but also the
business needs. It must be borne in mind that it is not the purpose of security
measures to be implemented at all cost without considering the impact it will
have on the business side of things. Thus security measures must not paralyze
operations that support the business needs.
Therefore, in implementing building security measures, we need to consider
the following:
(a) Building security measures
(b) Background checks on personnel working in secure areas
(c) Access control systems
(d) Intruder detection systems
Warehouse/Building security measures
This begins with a security risk assessment, whereby, all potential threats to
the facility and its vulnerability to these threats are to be identified. Such
threats can be related to an act of unlawful interference or criminal activities.
Once this is done, the next step will be to identify the appropriate security
measures that are to be implemented in order to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
One of the common threats for cargo is the possibility of it being tempered
with or stolen when it is in storage.
Cargo which is in the process of being made secure must be held in secure
premises. Attention to the security of all doors, windows and skylights should
be paid, and where necessary locks, barriers, access control systems and
P.I.D.S (Passive Intruder Detection Systems) installed. Electronic security
measures will be discussed in greater detail in this unit.
All possible accesses into the building must be surveyed to identify possible
unauthorized entry localities and these must then be secured.
The area surrounding the Building, loading/unloading areas, vehicle overnight
parking areas and car parks should all be access controlled and protected from
interference by the implementation of a variety of measures such as:
(a) Security Fencing
(b) Good Lighting
(c) CCTV cameras coverage
(d) Security Patrols
A security fence is a must for the warehouse as this prevents unauthorised
entry into the facility. The fence will be equipped with a variety of defensive
measures such as Fence Intruder Devices, CCTV cameras and other
protective measures including good lighting.
Lighting is a key component of any security measure as it can be deployed to:
(a) to reveal intruders;
(b) to deter intruders; and
(c) to conceal defenders.
The most common form of perimeter barrier is a chain-link fence. Such fences
permit security staff to see out and they let light from the security lighting fall on
the surrounding land; both these factors making surreptitious approach difficult.
Perimeter lighting is intended to enable security guards to detect anyone
loitering outside the perimeter, attempting to breach the fence by cutting,
forcing gates, climbing over, tunneling under, etc., as well as anyone
attempting a crime from inside such as throwing goods over the fence or
passing things under or through the fence.
An important feature of security lighting technology is to make things appear to
be bright. Intruders will show up in silhouette against the brighter background.
This is the REVEALMENT effect.
Another effect of lighting is the glare. But in security lighting, glare is often
deliberately directed towards the perimeter so that an intruder will face the
discomfort and confusion of “bright” lights. As he approaches the perimeter,
he may be dazzled by the lights directed at him, and he cannot be sure that
there is not a security guard standing beyond the lights. He cannot know if he
has been observed and thus will feel vulnerable. This is the DETERRENT
effect.
In many cases it is possible to arrange the lighting so that the intruder is
exposed to glare which prevents him from knowing if there is a defender behind
the lights. The guard can observe without being seen and the intruder knows
this and thus may be deterred from his purpose. This is the DEFENDER
CONCEALMENT effect.
The warehouse itself is designed to store a variety of cargo, ranging from

valuable cargo to cargo that has been secured through the application of
security controls. For this reason, warehouses will have a special area to store
cargo that has been secured by the application of security controls. They
usually are stored in cages. The protection of these cages is also important to
prevent tempering of the cargo or theft. Thus a cage will have its own specific
security measures.
The cage must be made securable with a padlock or other tamper-evident
means. Usually the cage locking system is based on a two ‘key’ system
whereby, the lock requires 2 keys for it to be opened. This prevents
unauthorized entry into the cage and helps control whoever needs to have
access into the cage.
It can also be secured by using temper evident seals. A one-time, numbered

seal will show if a perpetrator has attempted to open any item of Air Cargo or
access the Secure Cage/Area area. It should be of a type that cannot be
replaced without evidence of damage/interference, usually by a weak-link or
frangible segment.
Did You Know?

Lights can be used for many purposes to help security enforcement.
3.1.3 Access Control Measures

Standard 4.2.1
Each Contracting State shall ensure that the access to airside areas at
airports serving civil aviation is controlled in order to prevent unauthorized
entry.
The IATA ISARP says:
Sec 3.1.2 The operator shall ensure measures are in place that provide for the
control and supervision of movement of personnel and vehicles to and from the
aircraft in security restricted areas and prevent unauthorized access to the
aircraft.
Access control is a major component in preventive security measures.
The purpose of access control is to prevent unauthorised access To a facility,
Building, or a restricted or controlled area. It is also to allow regular users to
come and go without delay or Inconvenience. For the cargo facility it further
assists staff to deal efficiently with genuine visitors, deliveries, collections etc.
A good access control system will use a combination of systems such as:
(a) Manually operated pass system
(b) Automated pass system
(c) Patrols
(d) Surveillance
The security pass or badge is for the control of people. Thus it will allow
security personnel to ensure that everyone's pass is valid and that it belongs to
the person wearing it by paying particular attention to photographs. Security
personnel or staff will also be able to report anyone attempting to gain access
without proper authorisation.
However, one of the setbacks of the manual security badges is that it is very
difficult to manage these, especially if there is a high turnover of staff and also
when it comes to renewing the badges. Thus many organisations are moving
towards automated access control systems.
However, even with such a system, security personnel are still required to
supervise, deal with visitors and troubleshoot. Such systems must be installed
as an integral part of the physical security.
Automated access control systems
Automated systems utilise three methods or a combination of them for
identification and verification as follows:
(a) Electro/Mechanical Locks–Push Button
(b) Radio–Controlled Devices
(c) Biometric Devices
(d) Coded Card Systems
Figure 3.1.3a—Push Button System
The advantage of push button systems (see figure 3.1.3a) is that it allows for a
programmed code known only to authorised entrants. Further to this, no keys
are required, eliminating the need for key control measures. Another big
advantage will be that the program can be quickly changed if compromised.
This system can therefore be used for the cage security in the cargo
warehouse.
Another system is the radio-controlled devices. One such device is the
proximity access control system (see figure 3.1.3b). This system requires
authorised persons to carry A TOKEN (radio transmitter). The token has a
coded signal and operates as a hands free device. Similar to the push button
system, codes are easy to change.
Figure 3.1.3b—Proximity Access Control System
Coded Cards
Coded cards are another simple access control system. It uses a plastic coded
card that is specific to each individual. One of the advantages of this system is
that the codes are electronically inputted thus it will be difficult to duplicate it the
card is lost. Besides the system recognises the card NOT the person.
However, using such a system by itself is not the best. It should be augmented
by PIN.
Biometric Systems
Biometrics is a new science that facilitates the recognition of physical features

of a person. Thus it has become one of the most effective access control
system in use today. Biometric systems are able to recognise:
(a) Fingerprint
(b) Palm Print
(c) Voice
(d) Facial
(e) Iris/Retina scan
(f) Signature
In the cargo warehouse, this system can be used for access into office areas,
cage security and other critical areas within the cargo warehouse.
Patrols
The security of the warehouse will have to be augmented with physical patrols
by security personnel. Usually these patrols are integrated with other security
measures that are in place in the warehouse such as surveillance systems and
other access control measures as mentioned earlier.
One aspect of patrols is that it must not be rostered in a manner in which it
has a regular pattern. This is to prevent ‘predictive criminal activities’. This
means that criminals are able to predict the times when the patrollers are
going to be at a designated location.
The functions of the patrol team is to detect and respond to security Incidents
and check persons and vehicles to ensure that they are authorised.
Surveillance
As mentioned above, surveillance is also an integral part of warehouse
security. The most common surveillance system is CCTV cameras. These are
strategically deployed within critical areas in the warehouse so that remote
surveillance can be conducted by security personnel.
CCTV cameras also act as a deterrent to criminals because they will be able
to see the cameras located at different locations in the warehouse and will
become aware that they are ‘being watched’. CCTV cameras have also
evolved over the years from fixed cameras to ‘pan and tilt’ cameras and now
to ‘biometric enabled’ cameras. Whatever the case, it is usually not possible to
monitor the cameras live and thus most of the CCTV systems are self
recording so that they can be reviewed in the event of any incident in the
warehouse.
Control of vehicles
Preventive security measures for the cargo terminals not only are for people
but also for vehicles. Just as personnel require security badges, vehicles also
need to be controlled by the use of vehicle permits. These can be permanent
or temporary.
In order to enforce the control of vehicles, the warehouse facility will have
vehicle access control points (see figure 3.1.3c).
Figure 3.1.3c—Vehicle Control Point

These security check points must also be well planned with the
necessary facilities to allow for security personnel to control, search and
manage the movement of vehicles in and out of the cargo facility. Such
vehicle access control points must also be well lit with CCTV coverage
and big enough to handle the expected type of vehicles that will be going
through such check points (see figure 3.1.3d).
Figure 3.1.3d—Vehicle Access Control Check Point
Study Check 3.1
1. The security clearance of air cargo may consist of either active

procedures or preventive security procedures. What do active procedures
involve?
(a) to stop devices being placed into air cargo when it is initially
packed and at all stages thereafter
(b) to detect devices that may have been already placed into air cargo
(c) to detect devices that have not been placed into air cargo yet
2. Active procedures could include the use of conventional X-ray

equipment, explosive detection systems, explosive trace detection
equipment, hand search, simulation chambers and explosive detection
dogs.
True or False
3. Preventive measures are based on:

(a) security of the warehouse/building
(b) security of any property carried on an aircraft including mail, stores
and accompanied or mishandled baggage.
(c) security of any property carried on an aircraft including mail, stores
and unaccompanied or mishandled baggage.
4. Consignments, once security “cleared” must from sub-
sequent interference until they are loaded into the aircraft.
(a) is returned to consignor to protect
(b) remain protected
(c) is returned to regulated agent to protect
5. In implementing building security measures, we need to consider

the following:
(a) Building security measures
(b) Background checks on personnel working in secure areas
(c) Access control systems
(d)
6. The area surrounding the Building should all be access controlled and
protected from interference by the implementation of a variety of
measures such as:
(a)
(b)
(c) CCTV cameras coverage
(d) Security Patrols
7. Lighting is a key component of any security measure as it can be

deployed to:
(a) to reveal intruders;
(b) to deter intruders; and
(c)
8. A good access control system will use a combination of systems such as:
(a) Manually operated pass system
(b) Automated pass system
(c)
(d) Surveillance
9. Biometrics is a new science that facilitates the recognition of

physical features of an aircraft.
True or False
3.1.4 Unit Summary
In this unit we introduced you to warehouse/building security. This is one of two
requirements for the security of cargo. Warehouse security is essential as this
will be the final ‘resting’ place for the cargo before it is loaded onto an aircraft
and as such once the cargo is made secure by the application of security
controls, it will be necessary to ensure that the cargo is protected from
tempering and criminal activities.
In this unit we have also seen how warehouse security can be implemented
by a combination of both physical and electronic security measures. The
integration of these two elements will impact the effectiveness of the overall
security of the warehouse. In the next unit we will look at the other
component of cargo security, i.e. securing the cargo from source to being
loaded onto the aircraft.
3.2 Regulated Agent Regime
• Describe the fundamentals of the regulated agent regime

• Cargo acceptance, handling, storage and transportation
Unit
Learning
Objectives
3.2.1 Fundamentals of the Regulated Agent
you should be able to: Regime
We have already described the first element of cargo security being the
warehouse/building security measures (Micro perspective). In this unit we will
look at the second or macro perspective to securing cargo called the Regulated
Agent Regime.
This requirement was brought into being after the 9/11 incident in the USA. It
was then identified that cargo is the ‘Achilles heel’ and it required greater
security measures to prevent it from being exploited by terrorists to introduce
explosive devices on board aircraft.
The whole idea is to distribute the cargo security responsibility across the
supply chain rather than focus it on the air carrier alone, as is the traditional
practice. Under this regime, there will be 3 key parties involved namely, the
known shippers/consignors, regulated agents and the air carrier.
Thus ICAO has made this regime mandatory for its member States. The ICAO
Standard that defined this is as follows:
Standard 4.6.4
Each Contracting State shall ensure that operators do not accept cargo or
mail for carriage on an aircraft engaged in passenger commercial air
confirmed and accounted for by a regulated agent are to be subjected to
screening.
IATA ISARP says:
Sec 3.7.4 If the operator transports revenue cargo/or mail on passenger flights,
and if the operator accepts cargo and/or mail from a regulated agent or known
shipper/consignor at any location, the operator shall have a process to ensure,
in such locations, cargo and/or mail is not accepted for transport on a
passenger flight unless:
(i) Shipments have been subjected to appropriate security controls through
a known shipper/consignor programme or by the operator, thus have
become known cargo;
(ii) The application of security controls has been confirmed or accounted for
by the operator or a regulated agent
One of the main challenges facing security in relation to cargo is the fact that
cargo can be difficult to screen due to the varying sizes that it comes in.
Additionally it is impractical to screen all air cargo at the present moment
because there is no x-ray machine that can take the different sizes as
mentioned.
One of the earlier practices for securing cargo is called the cargo ‘cooling
period’. This was based on the rationale that in the early days of terrorism, the
most common type of explosive device used by terrorists was the ‘time bomb’.
This means, an explosive device that had a timer like a clock that can be set
to detonate at a designated time.
However, such a trigger had its limitations because clocks only had a 12 hour
time span that can be used to detonate the device. Thus it was decided that
cargo consignments can be left to ‘cool’ on the ground for 24 hours before they
are loaded onto the aircraft. If the cargo is intact after the 24 hours of cooling
then it is presumed to be free of any explosive devices.
This changed when clocks were digitized. Now they could go up to 24 hours.
Thus cargo was cooled for 48 hours and above to determine if there was any
time bomb in the consignment. Due to the advancement in technology and the
creative nature of the terrorists of today, we realise that explosive devices are
being activated using more advanced methods such as the mobile phone.
Therefore a more robust methodology was needed, at least until screening
technology became more advanced.
Besides traditionally the the aircraft operator is only one link in the cargo flow.
Thus the risk of an explosive device being successfully infiltrated through
security was very high. However, if the number of links to the security of cargo
can be distributed across the supply chain, then the risk can be reduced
dramatically. Therefore, it became evident that in order to secure the cargo
throughout the handling, responsibility had to be assigned to the other parties
involved.
This gave birth to the Regulated Agent Regime as promulgated by ICAO.
Traditional method
Traditionally, cargo security controls were applied at the airport by the aircraft
operator (see figure 3.2.1a).
Figure 3.2.1a—The traditional method
Unit 3.2: Regulated Agent Regime 67

The Regulated Agent regime distributes the responsibility of securing the cargo
(see figure 3.2.1b).
Figure 3.2.1b—The regulated agent regime
How it works?
The ICAO definition of a regulated agent is:
“An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity that conducts business with an
operator and provides security controls that are accepted or required by the
appropriate authority in respect of cargo or mail.”
Thus a regulated agent or RA can be a freight forwarder, a shipper, a Ground
Handling Agent or a Carrier who applies appropriate security controls on cargo
and is regulated by a relevant authority.
Since the Regulated Agent regime allows for most of the security controls to be
performed away from the airport, it enables aircraft operators and airports to
focus the screening on more high-risk cargo.
The Regulated Agent is in effect being handed the responsibility of screening
and securing the cargo. However, air carriers or ground handling agents acting
on their behalf maintain the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the aircraft
and therefore must ensure compliance with all cargo security regulations.
The Concept of the Regulated Agent is broad enough for it to be applied in
different ways by the Contracting States.
Since it is the “appropriate authority” of each State that dictates the
required security controls that the Regulated Agent must apply, it has to
establish the following:
(a) Does the Country have a security controls in place to ensure cargo
cannot be loaded unless secured?
(b) How does the State define “controls”?
(c) What types of “controls” are required along the supply chain?
(d) Does the Country have a Regulated Agent scheme in place?
(e) How will the State validate a Regulated Agent?
All these and more questions will be addressed by the State's Civil Aviation
Authorities and must be clearly defined, since cargo received by the Aircraft
Operator from a Regulated Agent is deemed safe and secure and further
screening need not be applied.
Thus the potential options for qualifying a “Regulated Agent” either by
regulatory authority or airline will involve the following:
(a) Vetting of agents' premises and security program
(b) Vetting of personnel–agent, transportation providers
(c) Agent having the ability to vet shippers and transportation
providers, including premises, security systems and personnel
(d) Agent being able to comply with all regulatory requirements
Responsibilities of a regulated agent
The State can require the Regulated Agent to ensure the following:
(a) Secure premises
(b) Screening of air cargo
(c) Awareness Training for all employees involved in handling air cargo
(d) Training of screeners
(e) Secure vehicles
(f) Staff background checks
(g) Segregation areas for known/unknown cargo
Key Learning Point

The success of the regulated agent regime is dependent on all who are
involved doing their part diligently.
Thus a certified RA will have to decide the level of security control to be
employed on any particular item of cargo (usually dependant on the status of
that item of cargo at point of acceptance). They will have to also ensure that
the driver delivering cargo has photo ID and the vehicle delivering the
shipment is secure (tamper-evident seals, intact, matching the paperwork).
Besides this they will also have to ensure shipper's paperwork is in order and
items accepted as known cargo are protected until loading.
The RA is to carry out the appropriate level of screening to the required
standard and to satisfy himself that the level of screening is acceptable. Once
screening has been completed the next step will be the protection of cargo,
access control and patrolling of controlled areas to ensure that the cargo is not
tempered with.
Known Consignor
The ICAO definition of the Known Consignor is:
A consignor who originates cargo or mail for its own account and whose
procedures meet the common security rules and standards sufficient to allow
the carriage of cargo and mail on any aircfraft.
The known conspirator must be able to meet the requirements:
(a) Receive its own unique identification by the appropriate authority

(b) Consignments are prepared in secure premises
(c) Consignments are prepared by reliable staff members
(d) Consignments are protected against unauthorised interference
during preparation, storage and transportation for which it is
responsible
(e) It accepts that packaging and contents of any consignment may
be examined for security reasons
(f) Certifies in writing that, to the best of its knowledge, the
consignments does not contain any restricted articles or dangerous
devices or substances
Did You Know?

Note: some countries still require further screening either by a Regulated Agent
or a Carrier.
Consignments from known shippers/consignors may be security cleared and
accepted as long as:
(a) The employee accepting the cargo is satisfied that the person
delivering the cargo is or represents the known shipper/consignor
(b) There is no sign of tampering with the cargo
(c) Descriptions of the consignment on the paperwork match the consignment
Known and Unknown Cargo
Under this regime cargo will be classified as known or unknown cargo. Known
cargo is best defined as being:
(a) A consignment of air cargo accepted from a regulated agent directly from
a known shipper/consignor to which appropriate security controls have
been applied, or
(b) A consignment of unknown cargo that has subsequently been subjected
to appropriate security controls.
Consignments received from non-regulated agents will therefore:
(a) Be treated as unknown cargo, and
(b) Have appropriate security controls applied such as, screening,
searching or other approved methods, prior to being accepted for
transport by air
3.2.2 IATA Consignment Security Declaration

One of the tools to ensure that cargo is protected throughout its entire
movement in the supply-chain and to ensure regulated agents are held
accountable is the use of Consignment Security Declarations.
The consignment security declaration serves as clear evidence of who has
screened and secured what, how and when and ensures that security
measures have been applied.
The IATA Consignment Security Declaration (CSD), accommodates the
following security information:
1. Identifies who has taken the responsibility to secure the cargo;
identifies who has maintained its integrity until it is loaded onto the
aircraft e.g. unique identification of the regulated agents (party
accountable for accepting and securing the cargo)
2. Provides information on the content of the consignment such as the
unique consignment identification, the cargo description and the security
status
e.g. can be loaded on 1) passengers aircraft or 2) all-cargo aircraft only
3. Identifies the reason why the security status was issued (e.g. known
cargo coming from a known consignor) and the means deployed to
secure that cargo (e.g. x-ray equipment, particle explosive trace
detection):
4. Identifies the name of the person within the regulated agent who issued
the security status, or an equivalent identification including the date and
time of the security status issuance;
5. Provides room for specific country emergency textual statement that
secure operators have to comply with (e.g. 1) this consignment does not
contain any component originating from country x, 2) this account has
been known to the agent for the past 6 months)
This declaration can be produced all along the supply chain by a Regulated
Agent to the Regulators in case of a request for an audit. Consignments, other
than those exempt from security controls, not covered by a valid Consignment
Security Declaration will be treated as unknown cargo and subject to
screening.
The CSD can be printed out from the electronic message and used within
stakeholders that do not have an IT system supporting the e-CSD.
e-CSD
The e-CSD allows operators to exchange and archive security information

electronically to ensure that only secure cargo is shipped. This electronic
document can also be audited by regulators at any point in the supply-chain
and printed from electronic records.
IATA in cooperation with the industry and Regulators developed an electronic
standard consignment (cargo and mail) security declaration that provides
regulators with an audit trail of security information related to a typical supply
chain movement. IATA adopted the electronic standard consignment security
declaration as IATA Recommended Practice 1630 “Cargo and Security “ and
Resolution 651 Consignment Security Declaration (CSD) and Electronic
Consignment Security Declaration (e-CSD).
ICAO has included into the next version of the guidance material of Annex 17
“Security” a security declaration based on standards developed by IATA and
allowing it to be in electronic format. The e-CSD has also been approved by the
EU.
An electronic certificate is comprised in a FWB (Freight Waybill) message. It
provides information who secured what consignment, how and when through a
standardized mechanism of data exchange and a standard template. Similar to
the paper CSD, the e-CSD contains the following information:
• RA unique id
• HWB/AWB#
• Cargo Description
• Security Status
• Reason that the security status was issued:
• KC/AC
• Screening/Exemption
• Person issuing status
• Date and time
• Box 15: additional security info
When does the information need to be provided?
1. Before the cargo is loaded on board of the aircraft
2. Information must be available for inspection according to legislation
(e.g. EU: 24 hours or duration of the flight)
Benefits of e-CSD:
1. Increases security
(a) No alteration of security data elements
2. Reduces costs
(a) Eliminate the many security declaration forms in use in each
country and for each single carrier
3. Facilitates compliance
(a) When a Regulator requires confirmation that cargo is secured,
operators will be able to produce the CSD layout generated from
the electronic records
(b) Ensure compliance to the EU ACC3 Regulation
4. Improves efficiency
(a) Systems logic is able to automatically assign the security status to
a consignment upon scanning
5. Increases productivity
(a) Reduces acceptance process times
(b) Help process shipments faster ensuring loading as scheduled.
3.2.3 IATA Electronic Air Waybill (e-AWB)

The Air Waybill (AWB) is a critical air cargo document that constitutes the
contract of carriage between the “shipper” (forwarder) and the “carrier” (airline).
The e-AWB removes the requirement for a paper Air Waybill, significantly
simplifying the air freight supply chain process as there is no longer a need to
print, handle or archive the paper AWB.
The e-AWB is the most critical document of the suite of documents that are part
of the end-to-end e-freight process.
It works through electronic messages and a signed a-AWB agreement. There
are two kinds of e-AWB agreements–Bilateral (Recommended Practice 1670)
and Mulitlateral (Resolution 672). The multilateral agreement entitles an airline
to print a paper AWB on behalf of the freight forwarder when needed, in case
the airline is offering this service. The Cargo Receipt evidences the e-AWB.
How does the e-AWB affect cargo security?
The e-AWB information is a crucial element in the secure chain of custody
transfer. The carriers are able to receive and send accurate and relevant cargo
information in advance of the cargo, in particular to the regulators engaging in
manifest security reviews. The Advance Cargo Information (ACI) visibility
facilitates the recognition and screening of High Risk Cargo and Mail (HRCM)
throughout the process. Additional benefits of e-AWBs in relation to cargo
security are:
1. improved data quality: accuracy, integrity, validity, consistency,
completeness. This is due to the upstream information generation from
the shipper
2. secured access of the information to only those who require it, thus
mitigating the threat of document tampering or usage of information
to commit unlawful acts
3. enhanced efficiency in delivery of advanced reporting requirements
of accurate data to regulatory bodies
4. enhanced efficiency in being compliant with regulatory needs by
responding properly and in a faster manner to customs demands.
Study Check 3.2
1. One of the main challenges facing security in relation to cargo is the

fact that cargo can be difficult to screen due to:
(a) the varying sizes that it comes in
(b) the varying value of cargo
(c) the varying degree of security measures for passengers and
their baggage
2. One of the earlier practices for securing cargo is called:

(a) refrigeration.
(b) cargo bombardment
(c) cooling period
3. Traditionally the airport operator is only one link in the cargo

flow. True or False
4. The Regulated Agent Regime was implemented by:

(a) ACI
(b) ICAO
(c) IATA
5. The Regulated Agent regime allows for most of the security controls to
be performed within the airport.
True or False
6. The regulated agent is regulated by:

(a) ICAO
(b) IATA
(c) Appropriate Authority
7. A regulated agent or an air carrier may recognize a customer or
consignor as a known shipper/consignor.
True or False
8. Under this regime cargo will be classified as known or unknown

cargo. Known cargo is best defined as:
(a) A consignment of known cargo that has subsequently been
subjected to appropriate security controls
(b) A consignment of unknown cargo that has subsequently been
subjected to appropriate security controls
(c) A consignment of unknown cargo that has subsequently not
been subjected to appropriate security controls
9. The success of the regulated agent regime is very dependent on

many reasons, one of which is:
(a) All security personnel involved in processing cargo do their
jobs properly because the system is vulnerable to
complacency
(b) All airline personnel involved in processing cargo do their jobs
properly because the system is vulnerable to complacency
(c) All personnel involved in processing cargo do their jobs
properly because the system is vulnerable to complacency
10. Why is the consignment security declaration/e-CSD a key component of

a secure supply chain?
11. What are the two ways in which the e-AWB affect cargo security?
3.2.4 Unit Summary
In this unit we have discussed the second element in the security of cargo (the
macro perspective) which is the regulated agent regime.
We have described the philosophy and concept of this regime and also the
rationale as to the reason why it was necessary for this concept to be
introduced by ICAO. We have explained the key players in this system being
the regulators (Appropriate Authority), the regulated agents and the known
consignors. We have also discussed the roles and responsibilities of each of
these agencies.
We have also looked at the use of CSD and e-CSD as one of the tools to
ensure that cargo is protected throughout its entire movement in the supply-
chain and to ensure regulated agents are held accountable.
We have described how the e-AWB is a crucial element in the transfer of
advance information to ensure a secured chain of custody.
Finally we have also mentioned the success factor for this regime which
involves everyone who plays a role in the supply chain for cargo.
3.2.5 Cargo Acceptance, Handling, Storage

and Transportation
As part of the Regulated Agent Regime, there are strict rules related to the
overall management of cargo, especially in relation to how it is accepted,
handled, stored and transported. As a norm, these should begin at the
manufacturer's facility, so that the security integrity of the cargo consignment
can then be maintained along the supply chain, until it is loaded onto
the aircraft.
Cargo Acceptance
The IATA ISARPs governing this are:
Under the regime, the aircraft operator is only to accept cargo from a known
consignor and/or regulated agent. These entities are required to meet the
following requirements for the consignment:
(a) The consignment must be delivered by an established employee or
authorized representative of the known consignor or regulated
agent.
(b) the employee receiving the cargo for shipment must verify that the
consignment is indeed being delivered by the authorized representative
or established employee as indicated in the cargo security declaration or
other accompanying documents.
(c) there is no signs of tempering with the consignment; and
(d) the known consignor or regulated agent has provided a cargo security
declaration certifying that the cargo has been cleared in accordance with
their security programme; or another regulated agent has provided
notice that the cargo has been partially cleared (See IATA sample
attached to this module)
(Ref; Extract from ICAO Document 8973/8)
Cargo Handling
Once the cargo has been accepted, it must be handled properly, thus the
aircraft operator will have to:
(a) determine the level, if any, of security controls to be applied to any
given consignment;
(b) carry out appropriate security controls to the required level and record
the details of applied security controls;
(c) protect the consignment from unauthorized interference while it is in
the aircraft operator's custody, particularly after it has been made
known cargo;
(d) ensure there is no sign of tempering;
(e) ensure that all consignments have been appropriately secured
before being placed on the aircraft; and
(f) ensure that all consignments placed on board an aircraft are recorded
in the cargo manifest.
(Ref: extracted from ICAO Document 8973/8)
Cargo Storage
The IATA ISARP governing this is:
Cargo storage is also an important part of ensuring that the integrity of secured
cargo is maintained. As a rule, cargo that has been secured, i.e. made known
cargo, has to be stored separately from unsecured cargo (unknown cargo).
It is recommended that known cargo be kept in cages, compartments, rooms or
buildings that can be locked and protected from unauthorized entry until it is
loaded onto aircraft.
All cargo receipt and despatch doors should have the capacity to be closed and
locked. These doors should be armed with intrusion detection devices or other
means of protection. Egress and ingress for vehicles and personnel must also
have the capacity to be locked when not in use and be protected with intrusion
detection devices or other protective measures.
Any known cargo suspected to have been ‘compromised’ will be declared as
unknown and security controls applied to make it known again.
Another category of cargo that is to be separated from other cargo will be
Dangerous Goods. Export and import cargo are also to be clearly separated.
Any high value cargo is to be kept in a cage that is locked and the key is kept
securely.
All Cargo is to be properly labelled to allow for easy identification and
retrieval. It is also recommended that daily audit of the warehouse is
conducted to identify any unauthorised, tampered or suspect cargo.
Preparation of cargo
Where possible, the built-up pallet (BUP) cargo operations are to be carried out
both in the presence of staff as well as CCTV coverage.
The BUP is to be kept tamper-evident through shrink wrapping. Documentation
containing the contents, dimensions and weight of the cargo is also to be
raised. The Air waybill is to be controlled so that it is not exploited for illegal
usage.
Transportation of cargo
The IATA ISARP governing this is:
Maintaining the security integrity of cargo in the supply chain also

involves transportation. It is critical that known cargo is not compromised
during the transportation process.
Therefore, under the regulated agent regime, there are specific requirements
for ensuring the security of the transportation of the known cargo from the point
of dispatch until it arrives at the airport prior to the cargo being loaded onto
aircraft. Some of these requirements include the following:
(a) All vehicles used in the transportation of cargo are kept locked/sealed
and secured when not in use.
(b) The keys to the vehicle are kept secure and key issue book maintained.
(c) No cargo is left on board the vehicle despite its export schedule.
(d) The vehicle is never left unattended, especially when loaded or during
the transportation process.
(e) The vehicle whilst transporting cargo is kept locked/sealed.
(f) All drivers are not allowed to deviate from their journey. Any deviation
has to be reported (including stopping for meals or to visit restrooms),
during the move to the airport.
(g) Vehicles do not transport any unauthorized cargo or persons, except
cargo that has been designated and the authorized representative or
established employee of the known consignor or regulated agent.
If there is any indication that the cargo is suspected to have been ‘compro-
mised’ during the transportation phase, then the known cargo will be declared
as ‘unknown’ and security controls are applied to make it known again before
loading onto the aircraft.
Study Check 3.2.5
1. As a norm, securing of the cargo should begin at the aircraft operator's

facility, so that the security integrity of the cargo consignment can then
be maintained along the supply chain.
True or False
2. Under the regime, the aircraft operator is only to accept cargo from:
(a) Manufacturer
(b) Any freight agent
(c) Known consignor or regulated agent
3. The known cargo must be delivered by an established employee or

authorized representative of the known consignor or regulated
agent.
True or False
4. If there is any sign of tempering of known cargo, it will be

declared as .
(a) Unknown cargo
(b) Suspicious cargo
(c) Valuable cargo
5. Once cargo is accepted, it has to be protected from

unauthorized interference while it is in the aircraft operator's
custody.
True or False
6. It is recommended that known cargo be kept in normal storage entry until

it is loaded onto aircraft.
True or False
7. What is he recommended method of the BUP is to be kept tamper evident?

(a) Netting
(b) Shrink wrapping
(c) Crating
8. As part of transportation security of cargo, the driver can take any

route and deviate in any direction on the way to the airport.
True or False
3.2.6 Unit Summary

In this unit we have discussed the importance of maintaining the security
integrity of known cargo throughout the supply chain. we saw how known cargo
is to be maintained secure during acceptance, handling, preparation, storage
and transportation.
Module Summary
In this module we introduced you to warehouse/building security which is
considered as the micro perspective to cargo security. This is one of two
requirements for the security of cargo. We have seen the importance of
warehouse security as it is the final ‘resting’ place for the cargo before it is
loaded onto an aircraft.
We have also seen how warehouse security can be implemented by a
combination of both physical and electronic security measures and the
importance of integrating two elements to ensure the effectiveness of the
overall security of the warehouse.
In this module we have also discussed the second element in the security of
cargo (the macro perspective) which is the regulated agent regime.
We have described the philosophy and concept of this regime and also the
rationale as to the reason why it was necessary for this concept to be
introduced by ICAO. We have been introduced to the key players in this system
being the regulators (Appropriate Authority), the regulated agents and the
known consignors and how they make the system work.
We have also looked at the use of CSD and e-CSD as one of the tools to
ensure that cargo is protected throughout its entire movement in the supply-
chain and to ensure regulated agents are held accountable.
We have also described how the e-AWB is a crucial element in the transfer of
advance information to ensure a secured chain of custody.
Finally we have also mentioned the success factor for this regime which
involves everyone who plays a role in the supply chain for cargo.
We also looked at how the security of cargo is to be maintained during
acceptance, handling, preparation, storage and transportation.
Some of the key topics covered in this module are:
(a) Fundamentals of warehouse/building security
(b) Warehouse/Building security measures
(c) Automated access control systems
(d) Fundamentals of the regulated agent regime
(e) How the concept works
(f) Responsibilities of a regulated agent
(g) Known Consignor
(h) Known and Unknown cargo
(i) Cargo acceptance
(j) Cargo handling
(k) Cargo storage
(l) Cargo preparation
(m) Cargo transportation
Module Summary 81
Attachment: IATA Consignment
Security Declaration
Answer Key Study Check 3.2.5

Study Check 3.1 1. False–As a norm, securing of the cargo should
begin at the the manufacturer's facility, so that the
1. (b) to detect devices that may have been already security integrity of the cargo consignment can
placed into air cargo then be maintained along the supply chain.
2. True 2. (c) Known consignor or regulated agent
3. (a) security of the warehouse/building 3. True
4. (b) remain protected 4. (a) Unknown cargo
5. (d) Intruder detection systems 5. True
6. (a) Security Fencing 6. False–It is be kept in a cage that can be locked
(b) Good Lighting and protected from unauthorized entry.
7. (c) to conceal defenders 7. (b) shrink wrapping
8. (c) Patrols 8. False–All drivers are not allowed to deviate
from their journey. Any deviation has to be
reported
9. False (including stopping for meals or to visit
restrooms), during the move to the
airport.
Study Check 3.2
1. (a) the varying sizes that it comes in
2. (c) cooling period
3. False–it is the aircraft operator
4. (b) ICAO
5. False–security controls outside the airport
6. (c) Appropriate Authority
7. True
8. (b) A consignment of unknown cargo that has
subsequently been subjected to appropriate
security controls
9. (c) All personnel involved in processing cargo
do their jobs properly because the system is
vulnerable to complacency
10. The consignment security declaration serves as
clear evidence of who has screened and
secured what, how and when and ensures that
security measures have been applied.
11. (1) The carriers are able to receive and send
accurate and relevant cargo information in ad-
vance of the cargo, in particular to the
regulators engaging in manifest security
reviews.
12. (2) The Advance Cargo Information (ACI)
visibility facilitates the recognition and screening
of High Risk Cargo and Mail (HRCM) throughout
the process
Answer Key 83
Module 4:
Crime Prevention & Security Quality
Control Measures
• Describe crime prevention in cargo facilities

• Explain the concept of security Quality Control
• Implementing security quality control
Module Learning
Objectives
Upon completion of
this module, you
should be
able to:
Module Introduction
This module will give you an informative overview of one of the most common
areas of threats for airfreight i.e. crime. We will also discuss security quality
control measures to reduce these threats. Although the main focus for cargo
security has been in relation to threats posed by terrorists, cargo has been
subjected to day to day criminal acts, the most common being theft.
It is therefore important for us to look at this area of weakness and discuss the
measures that have to be implemented in the warehouse to ensure that theft
and other criminal activities are controlled.
We will review the European Union's aviation security initiative–ACC3–in
response to the potential threats.
It will not be sufficient for the implementation of just security measures to
prevent criminal activities in airfreight warehouses but also to tighten up
procedural and security quality control measures.
We will therefore visit these areas as well in this module. One of the areas
that will also be discussed in this module will be how cargo security quality
control measures are to be implemented.
4.1 Crime Prevention in Cargo Facilities
• Unit Overview
• Describe the types of criminal activities
Unit Learning
• Describe Crime prevention Techniques.
Objectives
to:
In this unit we will introduce you to crime in cargo facilities and the crime
prevention measures necessary to reduce such crime. This is important
because, in order to be able to effectively implement cargo security measures,
we must tackle both the threats posed by a potential act of terrorism as well as
day to day criminal activities that impact airfreight security.
Thus what is required is a ‘Total Approach’ to security that covers all areas of
airfreight security. This method is sometimes called the ‘Layered’ security
concept or ‘Onion’ concept. What this means is putting in place a variety of
security measures that would be criminal or terrorist will have to beat in order to
be successful. The idea is that the more the layers, the more difficult it will
become for these criminals to be successful. In fact these layers may also
become a deterrent for criminals to even attempt their plans, knowing that their
chances of being detected will be high. This will be the focus of this unit.
Key Learning Point

has become a more attractive target.
4.1.2 Types of Criminal Activities

Crime prevention is defined as:
“The anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of
action to remove or reduce it.”
We have already mentioned earlier that crime is the most common in the
airfreight operations. Thus it is important to realize that if crime is not controlled
to its minimum, then it can impact the following:
• Business
• Morale of staff
• Image of the organization
Business
Imagine an organization that has a very high crime rate. This will have an
impact on the bottom line of the organization. Losses that take place in any
organization will be equal to losses in terms of money as well. Thus the more
the losses through theft, vandalism etc, and the more money the organization
will lose financially.
Morale of Staff
All crime has to be confirmed and subsequently reported to the police for
investigations. Imagine an organization that has to report crime to the police
on a regular basis which requires police do their investigations. More often
than not, the police will have to interview staff and other workers as part of the
investigative process. What will this do to the motivation and morale of staff
Unit 4.1: Crime Prevention in Cargo Facilities 89

who are subjected regularly to such requirements? They will definitely not be
happy and their morale working in such as organization will also take a dip.
Image of the Organization
Any organization that suffers high rates of crime will eventually not be popular
to those potential and existing customers. An airfreight company that is hit by
regular criminal activities will be seen as being ‘insecure’. Thus customers will
move away from doing business with such an organization for fear of having
their consignments being affected by criminal activities as well. The image of
such an organization will eventually be tarnished as news spreads about their
crime ridden reputation.
What are we protecting?
We need to understand what we are protecting? As a general rule, we are in

the business of protecting:
(a) Our assets
(b) Our people and their property
(c) Our Intellectual Property
What are assets in the Cargo terminal? These include the building, all types of
cargo that in storage, any type of vehicle, forklifts and other equipment that is
used for the movement and storage of the cargo etc.
We are also responsible for the protection of not only those who are working in
the cargo terminals but also our customers, visitors etc, who may come to the
cargo facilities for business or for official visits.
Intellectual property refers to all information that is related to the running of the
cargo business. These may include cargo storage and transportation rates and
other proprietary information that sometimes may be sought after by competi-
tors conducting similar business.
Who commits crimes?
We are protecting all of what has been mentioned from criminals who target
and exploit weak areas in the cargo security system. The types of people who
commit these crimes are:
(a) Employees
(b) Visitors
(c) Customers
(d) Burglars
(e) Syndicated Operators
(f) Saboteurs
There are many reasons why people get involved in crime but some of the
more common reasons in cargo related crimes are:
(a) Temptation–Due to the nature of cargo that is so diverse, from relatively
inexpensive to very high value cargo, to vulnerable cargo such as
branded goods, they create temptation for those provided with the
opportunity to exploit the situation. Thus theft in cargo terminals is a
common phenom- enon.
(b) Less risk of being caught–There is also this confidence for those
involved in crimes that the chances of them being caught is very slim
and that encourages them to commit the crime.
(c) Challenge–It is also known that employees challenge each other to
commit crimes and sometimes the reward for success has monetary
attractions.
Many of the cargo terminals in airports are known to have ‘syndicated’ criminal
groups who are very well organized and usually made up of employees who
are well informed of the type of cargo that they are handling and also security
procedures.
Types of Crimes
The type of crimes can vary from very minor offences such as petty theft to
major well organized operations involving millions of dollars worth of theft.
Other types of common crimes are:
(a) Misappropriation of Funds - Fraud
(b) Substance Abuse
(c) Bribery
(d) Theft ( Petty theft to Burglary)
(e) Vandalism
(f) Espionage of Intellectual Property & Cyber Crimes
(g) Smuggling goods (prohibited drugs, cigarettes, alcohol)
(h) Terrorism ( Bomb Threats, Sabotage etc)
4.1.3 Crime Prevention Techniques

Crime prevention is a science. It cannot be handled piecemeal but a more
wholesome approach is needed. Thus a recommended concept looks at three
key components in the crime prevention approach namely:
(a) First Line–Employees
(b) Second Line–The Software (Procedural Measures)
(c) Third Line–The Hardware (Physical Security Measures)
Employees
Employees form the first line of defense. This is because they work in the
cargo facility daily. They know the ins and out of cargo operations and also, in
most instances, have knowledge of unethical practices or criminal related
activities that are going on in the cargo terminal, including the people who are
involved in such activities.
Thus they can be a very important source of information for security and no
effort is to be spared to win them over to become the eyes and ears of the
organization. This takes effort and time as they will not come forward with
information if they do not have trust in security or the management.
Sometimes, an incentive system that provides rewards for information leading
to the prevention and or arrest of those involved in such activities, will go a
long way in encouraging important information to come from employees.
Besides, employees:
(a) are the most important and most expensive resource
(b) can be effectively employed for optimal returns
(c) are the single most effective monitoring & control system
(d) must be given security awareness education
Security personnel are usually a small number and they cannot be expected to
be everywhere, but employees are at all locations of a cargo terminal as they
work there daily. Thus their security awareness education must cover actions
to take for a variety of possible situations such as:
(a) Those without proper security badges
(b) Unauthorized entry
(c) Suspicious personnel
(d) Unattended items
(e) Unusual activities
(f) Unattended documents
Other important topics that must be covered as part of their awareness training
can include:
(a) Personnel Security Measures
(b) Information Security Measures
(c) Physical Security Measures
(d) Standards & Procedures established and consequence of non-compliance
Such training is to be done regularly and all new employees need to undergo
such training as part of their Company Orientation programme.
The Software (Procedural Measures)
The software will be the security procedures for cargo. This will be the second
line of defense. Security procedures will cover the control of storage,
transportation and documentation for cargo. It will also include directives for the
control of assets.
Proper control of cargo documents such as the Air Waybill and other such
documents are to be implemented to prevent these documents from being
used for the commission of criminal activities. Document security will also
include procedures for the proper destruction of unused materials and control
on accessibility of sensitive information.
There must be clear written instructions on proper handing and taking over
procedures for the different teams performing shift duties at the cargo
terminals. Aviation cargo processing is moving in the direction of e-documen-
tation, thus computer security will become increasingly critical. Another
measure will be to establish employee accountability and background
screening for all those who work in the cargo terminals.
The Hardware (Physical Security Measures)
The final line of defense will be the ‘Hardware’, which will be the physical
security measures for the cargo facility. This was discussed in detail in module
3. However, just to reinforce the requirements for physical security, it will be
necessary to state that they will include:
(a) Barriers–access control devises & structures (Badges, Escorting,
holding/waiting areas for personnel and vehicles)
(b) Equipment–detection, alarm, communication and control systems
(c) Personnel–Trained personnel to administer and implement the
systems (Guards, CCTV Operators, Response Teams etc)
(d) Records–Maintenance of historical and incident records & transaction logs
(e) Testing the Systems
Did You Know?

Airfreight is the fastest growing industry in Aviation.
Other measures
The earlier measure can be further supported by other measures to enhance
the overall security awareness of the cargo community. Some of these will be
to organize regular ‘Crime Prevention’ campaigns, induction programs for new
employees as mentioned earlier, training for non-security supervisors and
poster competitions that will get the community involved.
Another feature will be to establish a 24/7 hotline manned by security, so that
those who encounter any security related incidents can ‘tip off’ security, who
can respond quickly and perhaps prevent or apprehend would be criminals.
This can be tied to informer schemes with rewards to information leading to an
arrest and conviction of criminals.
Crime prevention awards can also be implemented to recognize those who
helped prevent crime or assisted security in solving crimes. There are also
organizations which have ‘planted’ security personnel as employees in the
cargo company intentionally. These undercover security personnel will then be
the intelligence for security.
A system to penalize vendors/suppliers/contractors who breach or fail to
comply with security regulations should also be implemented. This
group should also be given security briefings.
It must be remembered that an effective crime prevention program must meet
the needs of the community it protects bearing in mind that
“Low Crime Does Not Mean No Crime”
Study Check 4.1
1. In order to be able to effectively implement cargo security measures,

we must tackle:
(a) Warehouse and Vehicle security
(b) Access control and personnel security
(c) Potential act of terrorism and crime
2. ‘Total Approach’ to security that covers all areas of airfreight security.

This method is sometimes called the ‘Layered’ security concept
True or False
3. If crime is not controlled to its minimum, then it can impact the following:
(a)
(b) Morale of staff
(c) Image of the organization
4. In security we are in the business of protecting:

(a) Our assets
(c)
5. Three key components in crime prevention approach are:

(a) Employees
(b) .
(c) The Hardware (Physical Security Measures)
6. The types of people who commit these crimes are:

(a) Employees
(b)
(c) Customers
(d)
(e) Syndicated Operators
(f) Saboteurs
7. There are many reasons why people get involved in crime, one
reason being:
(a) Frustration
(b) Temptation
(c) Lack of cargo knowledge
8. The most common types of crimes are:

(a) Misappropriation of Funds - Fraud
(b) Substance Abuse
(c)
(d) Theft ( Petty theft to Burglary)
(e)
(f) Espionage of Intellectual Property & Cyber Crimes
(g) Smuggling goods (prohibited drugs, cigarettes, alcohol)
(h) Terrorism ( Bomb Threats, Sabotage etc)
9. Thus their security awareness education must cover actions to take for
a variety of possible situations such as:
(a)
(b) Unauthorized entry
(d)
(e)
(f) Unattended documents
4.1.4 Unit Summary

In this unit we looked at crime in cargo facilities and the crime prevention
measures necessary to reduce such crime. This is important because, in order
to be able to effectively implement cargo security measures, we must tackle
both the threats posed by a potential act of terrorism as well as day to day
criminal activities that impact airfreight security.
Thus we looked at the 3 components that will help to enhance crime
prevention through a wholesome approach. This method is sometimes called
the ‘Layered’ security concept.
In the next unit, we will discuss security quality control measures.
4.2 Security Quality Control
• Describe the principles of security quality control
Unit
4.2.1 Principles of Security Quality Control
Learning
Objectives
unit, you should be
able to:
A key component in the successful application of aviation security measures is
ensuring that controls are being continually applied in a manner that provides
effective security. It is necessary therefore for States to ensure that a system of
quality control measures for cargo is developed and implemented for the
purpose of ensuring the continuing effectiveness of its national aviation security
programme.
This will require ensuring that cargo security processes are subject to periodic
inspection, survey, audit and testing by designated authorities to determine
compliance with required standards.
The designated appropriate authority will need to ensure that there is a legal
basis which authorizes such periodic monitoring of cargo security standards
and operating procedures that suitable reports are made highlighting any
lapses and weaknesses in security measures, recommending procedures for
their correction, and ensuring effective rectification is carried out.
The IATA ISARP says:
Thus the Cargo security will be based on the underlying principle that:
(a) Aircraft shall operate in a secured environment, thereby requiring
consignments of cargo transported on commercial passenger aircraft to
be subjected to some degree of security measures before they are
loaded onto the aircraft.
(b) Security measures will be used to screen and clear cargo.
(c) Cargo that has been cleared shall then be protected from unlawful
interference or contamination until they are loaded onto the
aircraft.
4.2.2 ICAO's Focus for Cargo Security

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has adopted more
stringent air cargo security standards, as part of its ongoing efforts to enhance
the overall security of air transport operations worldwide.
The new measures emphasize:
(a) more extensive screening of cargo,
(b) mail and other goods prior to placing them on board commercial aircraft
and better protection from unauthorized interference from the point
where security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.
Also included is the strengthening of provisions related to the:

(a) deployment of security equipment,
(b) the security of air traffic service providers,
(c) training programs and instructor certification systems, and
(d) cyber threats.
Key Learning Point

The risk for cargo to be exploited by terrorists is high as it is extremely
difficult to check every item that passes through as freight.
Reasons for the emphasis
The reasons for the ICAO emphasis on cargo is as follows:

(a) High volumes of cargo can make it extremely difficult to security check
every item that passes through airports or freight forwarding agents
hands.
(b) It is possible to target a specific airline or even flight
(c) Passengers and baggage is now checked 100% which makes cargo
a more attractive option for the terrorist.
(d) Maybe the substitution of a parcel into the cargo regime could be
deemed as vulnerability.
(e) Lockerbie was an attack organized by targeting the cargo hold of an
aircraft. (The Pan Am flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie largely
attributed to an IED planted in the luggage that was placed in the
luggage container of the plane.
4.2.3 Security Screening at Airfreight Terminals

Security measures will have to be carried out by the Cargo Terminal Operators
when RCAs (Regulated Cargo Agents) lodge their cargo at the airfreight
terminals. It is important that RCAs differentiate their cargo into Known and
Unknown and inform the Cargo Terminal Operators accordingly so that the
correct levels of security measures can be imposed on the different cargo. This
can be done by indicating on the export control form accordingly. Known
Consignor should be represented by indicating “KC” on the export control form
just beside the MAWB number. Similarly, for Unknown Consignor, it should be
represented by indicating “UC” on the export control form.
Only cargo from known consignors and RCAs will be deemed as known cargo.
Unknown cargo, referring to those that are not from known consignors or
RCAs, shall be fully screened and the screening charges borne by the air
cargo agent.
Unit 4.2: Security Quality Control 97

4.2.4 European Union Aviation Security Initiative
In Module 2, we have discussed the European Union's ACC3 Regulations and
the role of the different stakeholders (Operators, Regulated Agents, Known
Consigners and Account Consignors) in securing the air cargo supply chain
upstream. Using the ACC3 as an example, we will now examine how security
measures must be applied in the cargo terminal and ramp and how they affect
each other in the air cargo supply chain.
ACC3 Airline Responsibility
The ACC3-designated carrier
1. must not accept cargo or mail for carriage on an EU-bound aircraft
unless screening or other security controls has been applied and
validated by an EU aviation security validated regulated agent (RA3),
known consignor (KC3) or an account consignor (AC3) of a EU aviation
security validated regulated agent, or such consignments are subject to
screening in accordance with Union legislation.
2. must have a process to ensure that appropriate security controls are
applied to all EU/EEA bound air cargo and air mail unless it is exempted
from screening in accordance with Union legislation and that cargo or
mail is protected thereafter until loading onto aircraft. Security controls
shall consist of:
• physical screening which shall be of a standard sufficient to
reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are concealed in the
consignment, or
• other security controls which are part of a Supply Chain Security
process that reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are
concealed in the consignment.
A checklist with the general headings below is part of the validation process
for a carrier to be designated as ACC3. In the checklist, these headings have
subsequent detailed questions regarding each part of the validation:
1. Identification of the entity valiated and the validator
2. Organization and responsibilities of the ACC3 at the airport
3. Security Programme of the air carrier for each non-EU station
4. Staff recruitment and training
5. Acceptance procedures
6. Database
7. Screening
8. High Risk Cargo or Mail (HRCM)
9. Protection
10. Accompanying Documentation
11. Compliance
In the cargo terminal, when conducting the work below, the ACC3 (or RA3)
staff must apply security controls according to approved procedures by the EU
(or validated by the Independent Validator if RA3).
1. Acceptance:
• verify if the consignment is delivered by a person from an EU-
validated regulated agent (RA3) or known consignor (KC3) and if the
person is listed in its database or an account consignor (AC3) of such
a regulated agent,
• verify if the consignment is presented with all the required security
information (air waybill and security status information on paper or
by electronic means) that corresponds to the air cargo and mail
consignments being delivered,
• verify if the consignment is free from any signs of tampering, and
• verify if the consignment has to be treated as high risk cargo and
mail (HRCM).
Reference: Commission Regulation 2015/1998, Point 6.8.3.1
2. Database:
• When receiving air cargo or mail, the ACC3 has to check the
database whether the agent or consignor or another carrier is listed.
If the entity is not included in the database, the air cargo or air mail
delivered will have to be screened before loading.
Reference: Points 6.8.4.1 and 6.8.4.3
3. Screening:
• If the cargo received, including transfer/transit cargo and mail, has
not been protected from the time security controls were applied, the
ACC3 has to screen the cargo according to the standards specified
by the EU.
Reference: Points 6.8.3.1, 6.8.3.2, 6.8.3.
4. High Risk Cargo and Mail (HRCM):
• HRCM are consignments or transfer cargo from origins identified
as high risk by the EU or which appear to have been significantly
tampered with. Such consignments have to be screened in line
with specific instructions provided by the appropriate EU/EEA
authority having designated the ACC3.
• The ACC3 must provide the latest state of information on high risk
origins to the appropriate authority of the EU/EEA airport to which
it carries cargo.
• The ACC3 shall apply the same measures regardless of whether it
receives high risk cargo and mail from another air carrier or
through other modes of transportation.
Reference: Points 6.7 and 6.8.3.4
5. Protection:
• The ACC3 must ensure EU/EEA bound air cargo and/or air mail is
protected from unauthorised interference from the point where
security screening or other security controls are applied or from the
point of acceptance after screening or security controls have been
applied, until loading.
• Protection can be physical (barriers, locked rooms, etc.), human
(patrols, trained staff, etc.) and technological (CCTV, intrusion
alarm, etc.).
• EU/EEA bound secured air cargo or mail should be separated from
air cargo or mail which is not secured.
Reference: Point 6.8.3
6. Accompanying Dcouments:
• The ACC3 shall ensure that:
1. the security status of the consignment (SPX, SCO, or SHR) is
indicated in the accompanying documentation, either in the form
of an air waybill, equivalent postal documentation or in a separate
declaration and either in an electronic format or in writing; and
2. Its unique alphanumeric identifier appears on documentation
accompanying the consignments carried, either in electronic
format or in writing.
Reference: Points 6.3.2.6 (d), 6.8.3.4 and 6.8.3.5
Study Check 4.2
1. A key component in the successful application of aviation security

measures is ensuring that controls are being continually applied in
a manner that provides effective security.
True or False
2. Cargo security processes must be subject to periodic inspection,

survey, audit and by designated authorities.
(a) patrolling
(b) regulating
(c) testing
3. Cargo security will be based on the underlying principle that:

(a) Aircraft shall operate in a secured environment, thereby requiring
consignments of cargo transported on commercial passenger
aircraft to be subjected to some degree of security measures before
they are loaded onto the aircraft.
(b)
(c) Cargo that has been cleared shall then be protected from unlawful
interference or contamination until they are loaded onto the
aircraft.
4. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has adopted

more stringent air cargo security standards, they include:
(b) and
(c) other goods prior to placing them on board commercial aircraft and
better protection from unauthorized interference from the point
where security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.
5. One of the reasons for ICAO's emphasis on cargo is that it is not

possible to target a specific airline or even flight.
True or False
6. Under the Regulated agent concept, only cargo from known
consignors and RCAs' will be deemed as known cargo.
True or False
7. Airlines are not required to submit security programmes for each

station they are operating from in relation to the EU ACC3 regulations.
True or False
8. The of the consignment has to be

indicated on the air waybill, either in an electronic format or in
writing.
(a) Name of the person delivering the goods to the ACC3
(b) Customs contact at destination
(c) Security status
4.2.5 Unit Summary

In this unit we looked at the principles of security quality control and ICAO's
focus and emphasis on cargo security. Cargo has become an important area
of concentration since the recent ‘printer bomb’ incident. This has sparked a
sharp reaction from the International Aviation security fraternity. The European
Union's ACC3 initiative is a result of the incident.
We also looked at what the UK has implemented and the impact it will have
on the airlines. Similarly, we should begin to see similar action by other
countries in the near future.
We have also reviewed the European Union's aviation security initiat-
ive–ACC3–in response to the potential threats.
In the next unit, we will discuss what is required for the implementation of
security quality control measures.
4.3 Implementing Security
Quality Control Measures
• Describe how to implement security quality control measures
Unit Learning
Objectives 4.3.1 The Challenge
Upon completion of this unit, The challenge facing security officers is how to translate the regulations
you should be able to: promulgated by ICAO for the securing of cargo. This has always been the
case. This is because cargo unlike passengers and their baggage passes
through many hands along the cargo supply chain and can get contaminated
anywhere along that route. Further to this, it is not possible to screen every
piece of cargo both due to lack of screening technology and the volume of
cargo that passes through airports.
Thus it will be necessary to employ basic security measures that will act as a
minimum level of security controls that will help reduce the risk of cargo being
exploited by terrorists.
4.3.2 Access Control

Basic security measures
The first line of defense will be to ensure that access control is strictly
implemented. This means that Cargo protection is emphasised. Methods of
enforcing security measures are as follows:
(a) Wearing of tamperproof IDs
(b) Manually operated pass systems
(c) Automated pass systems
(d) Locked and secure areas
(e) Secured containers packing
(f) Patrols of security controlled areas
(g) Surveillance (physical or electronic)
(h) Intruder Detection Systems
(i) Challenging of strangers or unauthorized people
Each of these must be meticulously implemented following a Security Risk
Assessment, so that they will help deter would be criminals and terrorists from
exploiting cargo for their actions.
Cargo Protection
Ensuring the cargo is well protected is best achieved from ensuring both the
documentation processes as well as the physical cargo is protected. This will
include ensuring proper inventory control, security the cargo from the point of
acceptance, collection, transport as well as storage. This means that there is a
need to protect secured cargo at all times until it is loaded onto the aircraft.
Some of the ways this is done is:
(a) Screened Cargo that is received must be transferred to a secure
area awaiting dispatch and kept separate from that has not been
screened
(b) Screened cargo is kept in an area where only authorized personnel
have access
(c) Everyone entering such areas must be checked to ensure they
are authorized
(d) Visitors must be checked, especially those claiming statutory right of entry
(e) Suspicious activity must be quickly reported to security for action
(f) Security badges must be clearly displayed for easy identification
Patrolling
Depending on the size of the warehouse, security and/or operational staff
should at regular intervals conduct patrolling services. This will ensure proper
monitoring of existing processes which will ensure that there is no discrepancy
between the procedures and actual implementation on the ground.
Patrolling also ensures that those who have no access are detected and also
acts as deterrence to those who have malicious ideas. It helps to maintain the
security needs of the controlled area. There are many methods of patrolling
that can be adopted as follows:
(a) It should be done regularly; however, the timing for the patrols must
be varied to avoid a pattern.
(b) When patrolling, keep eyes and ears open to any thing or persons
that appear suspicious
(c) Look out for unidentified packages or items left at the wrong places
(d) Doors or windows that are open when supposed to be shut
(e) Any damage to fences or barriers
(f) Any suspicious activities outside of the perimeter fence
Unit 4.3: Implementing Security Quality Control Measures 103

(g) Be aware of your surroundings, so that you can identify anything that is
not in order
(h) Ensure that you know who to contact in the event you need to
report anything suspicious
Key Learning Point

Hand searching is an easy job to perform: therefore it is easy to do it
incorrectly. It does and must take time.
Physical Screening
Physical screening of cargo involves ensuring and verifying that the electronic
or hardcopy documentation in the manifest that accompanies the cargo is
accurate and matches the cargo accordingly and no illicit items posing a
security risk to the aircraft have been detected. In conducting physical search
look out for:
(a) Broken seals or packaging
(b) Ensure the depth of the carton is correct, that there are no
hidden compartments
(c) Re-sealed or re-packed signs
(d) Greasy stains and small holes in the exterior of the package or strong
smell that could indicate or mask the smell of explosives (almonds)
(e) Altered documentation
(f) The documentation details, including the description of cargo, matched
the cargo being examined.
Where the cargo is palletized–it is important to ensure that the number of
pieces and contents tally with the documentation.
There are items that cannot be searched. They are:
(a) Containers with life saving organs or drugs inside
(b) Diplomatic mail
(c) Courier or mail items less than ¼ inch thick and no heavier than 250 grams
(d) Special Nuclear Materials
Whichever method is used for the purpose of screening cargo and personnel
operating in cargo facilities, the main purpose is to:
(a) prevent explosives, incendiary other prohibited items that could be
smuggled in for the purpose of being used for subversive
purposes.
(b) prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country
(c) prevent narcotics smuggling
There are also a number of occasions where screening may be required to be
conducted. They include:
(a) Routine screening of personnel
(b) Screening of vehicles
(c) Screening of selected people, vehicles or items
(d) Bomb search
(e) Forensic applications
(f) Special situations or events
(g) Protection of special infrastructure features
However, more and more organizations are using x-ray technology for cargo
screening. This means that we need to understand more about how such
technology works and the technological developments that exists in such
technology today.
Document security
Control of documents is another important area for the protection of cargo.
Some of the fundamentals for document security are as follows:
(a) ‘Closed’ cargo documents are to be kept in a secure location for 5 years
(b) All staff are to sign a Non-disclosure agreement
(c) Restrict cutting of AWBs & Export Control Forms to designated people
(d) Give all staff information security briefing
(e) Observe information security by password protecting all desk tops/Lap
tops where sensitive information is kept
Vehicle security
Similar to document security, vehicles used for the transportation of cargo are
to be made secure by:
(a) Vehicle is to be secure throughout the journey
(b) Ensure no deviation from the route
(c) Have strict procedures to prevent drivers from carrying any
unauthorized passengers or cargo
(d) If stops are to made along the way, vehicle must be locked
(e) Carrying of unauthorized people in vehicle is not allowed
(f) Legitimate parking locations are to be used
(g) Ensure that supervisor is informed of any route changes
Study Check 4.3
1. Unlike passengers and their baggage, cargo passes through many

hands along the cargo supply chain and can get contaminated anywhere
along that route.
True or False
2. Cargo protection measures are as follows:

(a)
(b) Manually operated pass systems
(c) Automated pass systems
(d)
(e) Secured containers packing
(f) Patrols of security controlled areas
(g) Surveillance (physical or electronic)
(h)
(i) Challenging of strangers or unauthorized people
3. Ensuring the cargo is well protected is best achieved from ensuring

both the documentation processes as well as is protected.
(a) Physical cargo
(b) Access control
(c) Transport security
4. Patrolling ensures that those who have no access are allowed access
and also acts as deterrence to those who have malicious ideas.
True or False
5. In conducting physical search look out for:

(a)
(b) Ensure the depth of the carton is correct, that there are no
hidden compartments
(c)
(d) Greasy stains and small holes in the exterior of the package or
strong smell that could indicate or mask the smell of explosives
(almonds)
(e)
(f) The documentation details, including the description of cargo,
matched the cargo being examined
6. There are items that cannot be searched. They include:
(a) Containers with life saving organs or drugs inside
(b)
(c) Courier or mail items less than ¼ inch thick and no heavier than
250 grams
(d)
7. Name any 3 occasions where screening may be required to be conducted?

(a)
(b)
(c)
8. All staff are to sign a Non-disclosure

agreement. True or False
9. Similar to document security, vehicles used for the transportation of

cargo are to be made secure by:
(b)
(c) Have strict procedures to prevent drivers from carrying any
unauthorized passengers or cargo
(d) If stops are to made along the way, vehicle must be locked
(e)
(f)
(g) Ensure that supervisor is informed of any route changes
4.3.3 Unit Summary

In this unit we have discussed how to implement cargo security quality control
measures. We have seen that cargo security is always challenging for security
officers. This is due to the nature of cargo and the lack of screening technology.
This has resulted in the need to implement basic cargo security measures.
We have seen how this can be done and the importance of ensuring that
there is a total approach for cargo protection. That includes the cargo, the
facility, the people, the vehicles and the documents.
Module Summary
This module gave you an informative overview of one of the most common
areas of threats for airfreight i.e. crime and how to reduce crime in cargo. We
also discussed security quality control measures to reduce these threats.
Although the main focus for cargo security has been in relation to threats posed
by terrorists, cargo has been subjected to day to day criminal acts, the most
common being theft.
The area of weaknesses in cargo security was also discussed in terms of
the measures that have to be implemented in the warehouse to ensure that
theft and other criminal activities are controlled.
We have also reviewed the European Union's aviation security initiat-
ive–ACC3–in response to the potential threats.
This module also looked at how cargo security quality control is to be
implemented through the application of basic security measures.
The key topics covered in this module were:
(a) Types of criminal activities
(b) Crime prevention Techniques
(c) EU's aviations security initiative–ACC3
(d) Principles of security quality control
(e) How to implement security quality control measures
Answer Key 9. Security awareness education must cover actions

to take for a variety of possible situations such
as:
Study Check 4.1
(a) Those without proper security badges
1. (c) potential acts of terrorism and crime
2. True (b) Unauthorized entry
3. If crime is not controlled to its minimum, then
it can impact the following: (d) Unattended items
(a) Business (e) Unusual activities

(b) Morale of staff (f) Unattended documents
(c) Image of the organization

Study Check 4.2
4. In security we are in the business of protecting:
1. True
(a) Our assets
2. (c) testing
3. (b) Security measures will be used to screen and
(c) Our Intellectual Property clear cargo.
5. Three key components in crime prevention 4. The International Civil Aviation Organization
approach are: (ICAO) has adopted more stringent air
cargo security standards, they include:
(a) Employees
(b) The Software (Procedural Measures)
(b) mail and
(c) The Hardware (Physical Security
Measures) (c) other goods prior to placing them on board
commercial aircraft and better protection
6. The types of people who commit these from unauthorized interference from the point
crimes are: where security controls are applied until de-
(a) Employees parture of the aircraft.
5. False–it is possible to target a specific airline or
(b) Visitors
(c) Customers even flight.
(d) Burglars 6. False
(e) Syndicated Operators 7. (c) security status
(f) Saboteurs
7. (b) Temptation Study Check 4.3
8. The most common types of crimes are: 1. True
(a) Misappropriation of Funds—Fraud 2. Cargo protection measures are as follows:
(b) Substance Abuse (a) Wearing of IDs
(c) Bribery (b) Manually operated pass systems
(d) Theft (Petty theft to Burglary) (c) Automated pass systems
(e) Vandalism (d) Locked and secure areas
(f) Espionage of Intellectual Property & (e) Secured containers packing
Cyber
Crimes (f) Patrols of security controlled areas
(g) Smuggling goods (prohibited drugs, ciga- (g) Surveillance (physical or electronic)
rettes, alcohol)
(h) Intruder Detection Systems
(h) Terrorism ( Bomb Threats, Sabotage etc.)
(i) Challenging of strangers or unauthorized
Answer Key 109

people
110 Module 4: Crime Prevention & Security Quality Control Measures

3. (a)–physical cargo (d) If stops are to made along the way, vehicle
4. False–Patrolling also ensures that those who must be locked
have no access are detected and also acts as (e) Carrying of unauthorized people in vehicle is
deterrence to those who have malicious ideas. not allowed
5. In conducting physical search look out for: (f) Legitimate parking locations are to be used
(a) Broken seals or packaging (g) Ensure that supervisor is informed of any
(b) Ensure the depth of the carton is correct, route changes
that there are no hidden compartments
(c) Re-sealed or re-packed signs
(d) Greasy stains and small holes in the
exterior of the package or strong smell that
could indicate or mask the smell of
explosives (almonds)
(e) Altered paperwork
(f) The documentation details, including the
description of cargo, matched the cargo
being examined
6. There are items that cannot be searched.
They include:
(a) Containers with life saving organs or
drugs inside
(b) Diplomatic mail
(c) Courier or mail items less than ¼ inch
thick and no heavier than 250 grams
(d) Special Nuclear Materials
7. Name any 3 occasions where screening may
be required to be conducted?
(a) Routine screening of personnel
(b) Screening of vehicles
(c) Screening of selected people, vehicles
or items
(d) Bomb search
(e) Forensic applications
(f) Special situations or events
(g) Protection of special infrastructure features
8. True
9. Similar to document security, vehicles used for
the transportation of cargo are to be made secure
by:
(b) Ensure no deviation from the route
(c) Have strict procedures to prevent drivers
from carrying any unauthorized passengers
or cargo
Module 5:
Recognition and Management of Threats
• Describe the components and dangers of explosives

• Describe the restrictions related to dangerous goods
• Describe the restrictions related to prohibited items
Module Learning
Objectives
Upon completion of
this module, you
should be
able to:
Module Introduction
This module will look at one of the most common threats facing the aviation
industry i.e. the use of explosives by terrorists to cause major destruction and
catastrophic actions. Since this is a major issue, it is important that we
understand explosives, so that we can not only recognise it but also be able to
take the necessary action to prevent its successful use against the industry.
Besides explosives, we will also discuss other threats that are also not
allowed to be carried onto aircraft such as undeclared dangerous goods and
prohibited items.
Cargo can be easily exploited to introduce all of the above items onto the
aircraft as proven in some of the incidents that have been mentioned in
Module 1. Since the improvement of security measures for both passengers
and their baggage, it is expected and feared that terrorists will exploit cargo
for this purpose.
Finally, we will also discuss how to handle a bomb threat, which can be
experienced by any organisation in an airport and a cargo facility is no
exception. This module was written with extracts from ICAO’s Instructions: AS
8/11-07/26 dated 30 March 2007 entitled, “Recommended security control
guidelines for screening liquids, gels and aerosols”.
The IATA ISARPs governing this requirement are:
Sec 4.1.1 The operator shall have a process to identify security threats directed
against the operator, to include:
(i) Assessment of associated risks;
(ii) Development of appropriate response measures
Sec 4.1.2 The operator shall have a process to ensure the implementation of
appropriate security measures in response to:
(i) security threats directed against the operator
(ii) threat level issued by applicable aviation authorities

5.1 Components and Dangers of Explosives
• Understanding explosives
• Describe how IEDs are detonated
Unit Learning
• Explain what is CBRN threats
Objectives
to:
In this unit we will introduce you to a wide range of components that could be
used to build an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), which is extensively used
by terrorists against the aviation industry. In the past and also in recent times,
the industry has experienced bomb related threats and incidents. In the past,
the most common method to introduce explosive devices onto aircraft was via
baggage. However, with enhanced security measures being used in many
airports today, terrorists have become aware of the risk of being discovered if
they use this traditional method and also the difficulty of penetrating airport
security measures.
Aviation Security specialists have identified that, they will begin to look at how
to exploit other areas such as cargo, mail, catering supplies etc to penetrate
security and get IEDs onto aircraft for the purpose of blowing the plane up in
flight.
That is the reason all staff working in the airport, including those working in
the other areas such as cargo terminals, catering centers and also in postal
mail facilities need to be educated on the recognition and action on discovery
of such devices.
Key Learning Point

has become a more attractive for terrorists to use to introduce explosives on
board an aircraft.
Unit 5.1: Components and Dangers of Explosives 115

5.1.2 Understanding Explosives
The term “Improvised” basically means homemade or made out of anything

that is easily available.
An explosion is classified by how fast explosive materials convert from latent
state, solid, liquid, or slurry, to a gas. An explosive is “stored energy”, which is
released extremely quickly. It involved a rapid expansion of energy producing
heat, light and blast (pressure wave) which is what is described as the
explosive chain.
Characteristics of Explosives
Explosives are generally classified as High and Low explosives because of the
specific characteristics these types of explosives demonstrate.
High explosives are normally less sensitive, which means that they do not
normally explode on their own. Thus high explosives can be handled in a rough
manner but will not explode. Furthermore, they do not require containment to
explode providing more ways in how they are concealed.
However, when activated, they explode with a shattering effect that can deafen
the hearing of those who are in close proximity of the explosion.
Further to this, high explosives are not affected by confinement, which means
that it does not matter whether they are placed in a container or as they are,
they will not explode. They need a detonator to activate them. Some examples
of high explosives will be:
(a) SEMTEX, which is the most popular explosive used by terrorists
(b) PETN (sheet explosive)
(c) Granular or solid high explosive
(d) Rock explosives
(e) Dynamite and
(f) TNT
In addition of classification as High or Low explosives, there are also liquid
explosives.
Low explosives, on the other hand, readily burn, need confinement before they
can explode and they explode with a pushing effect. The simplest form of low
explosive will be gun powder.
Other examples of low explosives will be:
(a) Propellants
(b) Flare compositions
(c) Detonator
(d) Smokeless powder
(e) Match heads
Types and Components of Explosive Devices
For the purpose of recognition, explosives are classified into two types:
(a) Conventional or Standard Ordnance (usually found in the military) and
(b) Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), that are commonly used by terrorists
Conventional explosives are ‘marked’ and as such have a name. Thus
hand grenades, dynamite and PETN or sheet explosives are examples of
conventional.
The reverse is true for Improvised Explosive Devices which are created or
invented and are not ‘marked’. IEDs’ are easily concealed in any household
items, such as electronic devices, toys, books, shoes and many other items.
They are very difficult to detect since it is almost impossible to imagine how
they look like.
An explosive device must have the following components:
(a) Power source
(b) Detonator
(c) Main charge or explosive
(d) Timer
These four items combine to create the explosive chain. To add delay or
accuracy for the device to explode, a timer is added.
The power source provides the electricity needed to complete the
electrical circuit. For this purpose, batteries are usually used. Some
explosives use a mechanical power source. Such an explosive is a hand
grenade.
Commercial explosives
All military forms of explosive can be used commercially. Traditionally

explosives of this grouping are less efficient, but for the purpose of aviation
terrorism they should not be underestimated. Commercially available explo-
sives are changing from the traditional stick of blasting gelignite wrapped in
brown paper to powders contained in tins, detonation cord and plastic
containers that look like household products, usually brightly coloured, that
require little preparation.
Generally, commercial explosives are nitro-glycerine based. Nitro-glycerine is a
“forced” compound, constantly in a state of conflict.
Characteristics are:
(a) Unstable.
(b) Degrades over a short period (18 months-2 years).
(c) Distinctive smell of marzipan/almonds.
(d) Temperature/shock sensitive.
(e) Examples of such explosives include:
(f) TNT
(g) Dynamite sticks
5.1.3 How IEDs are Detonated
IEDs can be detonated in a variety of ways. Here we shall look at some of the
more commonly used techniques for detonation.
Chemical time delay
This is one of the ways that IEDs can be detonated. These are military stores, a
tube containing a small amount of sulphuric acid in a wax capsule which when
activated will mix with lead oxide which in turn will detonate explosive
compound.
Switches/Delay mechanisms
Under the category of switches and delay mechanisms. we have a few types.
They include:
(a) Mechanical (watch, clockwork timer).
(b) Ambient (changes to temperature, light, sound, air pressure).
(c) Victim operated (anti-handling).
(d) Terrorist command (remote switching, command wire).
Command detonation is a method used whereby the terrorist will trigger the
detonation. One such way this is done is by the use of a mobile phone or a TV
remote, or touch two command wires together, or depress a plunger to induce
electrical current.
There are many ingenious ways in which terrorists actually trigger the IED for
detonation, however, in the event that a suspicious item is discovered by
anyone, regardless of where it is found, they must not touch the item. Only
specially trained bomb technicians are allowed to handle such suspicious
items.
Did You Know?

The components of an IED, especially the main charge or detonator are
considered as explosives.
5.1.4 Chemical, Biological, Radiation and

Nuclear (CBRN) Threats
One of the greatest fears for security specialists and intelligence agencies is
that terrorists may have the capability to move into more dangerous types of
threats related to CBRN. Such threats are considered real as in the past one
such famous incident was the Sarin Gas release by terrorists in the
underground train system in Japan which killed and injured many innocent
civilians.
Chemical
Chemicals can be used to poison or injure people. It is caused by chemical
substances, including ex-military chemical warfare agents or legitimate but
harmful household or industrial chemicals. Although technically they are very
difficult to produce as mentioned earlier, Sarin Gas was successfully manufac-
tured and used in the Japanese subway system. However, Industrial chemicals
are more easily obtained and used.
Biological
These will cause Illnesses if they are used deliberately as they can be anything
from dangerous bacteria, viruses or fungi, or biological toxins. Typhoid
poisoning has occurred in Oregon 1984 (750 people) by the Rajneesh sect,
none fatally. A simple virus has to be robust enough to survive dissemi-
nation–an ongoing problem for groups everywhere. Unreliability leads to loss
of credibility.
Radiological
Radiological threats if used will cause Illnesses through exposure to harmful
radioactive materials contaminating the environment. In the past, a caesium
capsule has been attached to an IED In an attempt by Chechen rebels in a
Moscow park, with no real difference in result. However radioactive contami-
nation by exposing nuclear materials in water or air remains a possibility.
Nuclear
Given the enormous difficulty in manufacture of a viable device and delivery

system, it is more likely that a tactical nuclear weapon would be “procured”
from an existing arsenal by terrorists, if they intend to use it.
Study Check 5.1
1. What does I.E.D. stand for?

(a) Improvised Examination Device
(b) Improvised Extermination Device
(c) Improvised Explosive Device
2. What is one of the reasons why terrorist will attempt to exploit

the weakness of cargo security?
(a) Passenger and baggage security measures have been
improved tremendously
(b) Airport security has improved dramatically
(c) Mail security has been enhanced
3. The term “Improvised” basically means:

(a) made in a factory
(b) homemade
(c) handmade
4. An explosion is classified by how fast explosive materials convert

from latent state, solid, liquid, or slurry, to a gas.
True or False
5. High explosives are normally very sensitive, which means that they
do explode on their own.
True or False
6. One of these in NOT an example of low explosives:

(a) Propellants
(b) Semtex
(c) Detonator
(d) Smokeless powder
(e) Match heads
7. Explosives are classified into two types:

(a) Conventional or Standard Ordnance (usually found in the military) and
(b)
8. Each explosive device must have the following components:
(a) Power source
(b)
(c) Main charge or explosive
(d) Timer
9. There are a few types of switches and delay mechanisms. They include:
(a) Mechanical (watch, clockwork timer).
(b) Ambient (changes to temperature, light, sound, air pressure).
(c) Victim operated (anti-handling).
(d)
10. What does C.B.R.N stand for?

(a) Chemical, Barometric, Radiological, Nuclear
(b) Cyber, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
(c) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
5.1.5 Unit Summary

In this unit we introduced you to explosives. This is necessary as terrorists are
very familiar with and are experts in the making and use of IEDs against the
aviation industry. We have seen the characteristics, classification and
examples of different types of explosives, including military and commercial
explosives.
We also discussed another area of threat which experts say may be used by
terrorists called CBRN. This unit is to enable you to be able to get a good
understanding of explosives and to be able to recognize them, based on the
components that they are made of, so that you can then take immediate action
to report it to the necessary authorities to handle them.
Module Summary
In this module we introduced you to a wide range of components that could be
used to build an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), which is extensively used
by terrorists against the aviation industry. We emphasized that these could be
infiltrated on board a flight through cargo as had happened in the past and also
in recent times.
(a) Understanding explosives
(b) How IEDs are detonated
(c) What CBRN threats are.
The security personnel especially those involved in screening cargo at the
terminals, and each one of us, have a role to play in detecting possible threats,
Vigilance is key!
Module Summary 123

Answer Key
Study Check 5.1
1. (c) Improvised Explosive Device
2. (a) Passenger and baggage security
measures have been improved tremendously
3. (b) homemade
4. True
5. False–They are less sensitive, thus will not
normally explode on their own
6. (b)–Semtex
7. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
8. Detonator
9. Terrorist command (remote switching,
command wire).
10. (c) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
Module 6:
Detection of Threats
• Apply the principles of cargo security

• Describe cargo screening technology
Module Learning
Objectives
Upon completion of
this module, you
should be
able to:
Module Introduction
This module will look at two aspects related to “detection of Threats” to cargo
and all other items that also are carried on board an aircraft. We will examine
the reasons and principles involved in cargo security that will provide the ICAO
mandatory Standards that will dictate how cargo security is to be implemented.
This module will also give you an idea as to the types of cargo screening
technology that is being brought into the industry to facilitate detection of a
variety of threats that could be infiltrated through cargo into the aircraft.
It will also provide you with some techniques that can be used to screen cargo
bearing in mind that due to the nature and size of cargo, it is not going to be
possible to screen all cargo using x-ray technology.
We will also discuss the actions to take in the event of a discovery of certain
types of threats when screening cargo. The most serious being explosives.
Obviously, it will be realized that due to limitations on screening technology, it
is still very much dependent on the human factor to prevent any potential
threats from being introduced on board an aircraft through cargo.
In this module, we will also look at risk assessment and management as well
as look at ways to assess the critical business assets and processes,
evaluate a Threat, assess Vulnerability, construct a risk matrix to develop
countermeasures to mitigate the threats.

6.1 Application of the

Principles of Cargo
Security
• Unit Overview
Unit Learning • Describe the application of the principles of cargo screening
Objectives
unit, you should be 6.1.1 Unit
able to: Overview
In this unit we will introduce you to the application of the guiding principles for
cargo security as promulgated by ICAO. The reasons and principles were
discussed in Module 2 and will be reinforced in this module. It will provide you
with not only the ICAO Standards related to the implementation of cargo
security but also how these are to be translated into practical application on the
ground.
The implementation of these measures will have to be seen in the light of
ensuring that the security of cargo is maintained throughout the supply chain.
We will also see how cargo security is applied at each stage from acceptance,
storage, transportation and loading of cargo onto the aircraft.
6.1.2 Application of the Principles of

Cargo Security
“4.6.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that security controls are applied
to cargo and mail, prior to their being loaded onto an aircraft engaged in
passenger commercial air transport operations.”
Principle 1: Security Controls
“4.6.2 Each Contracting State shall establish a supply chain security process,
which includes the approval of regulated agents and/or known consignors, if
such entities are involved in implementing screening or other security controls
of cargo and mail.”
Principle 2: Implementation of Regulated Agents
“4.6.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that cargo and mail to be carried
on a passenger commercial aircraft are protected from unauthorized inter-
ference from the point security controls are applied until departure of the
aircraft.”
Principle 3: Protection of cargo after security controls
“4.6.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that operators do not accept cargo
or mail for carriage on an aircraft engaged in passenger commercial air
confirmed and accounted for by a regulated agent are to be subjected to
screening.”
Principle 4: Application of security controls according to shipment’s
classification
Unit 6.1: Application of the Principles of Cargo Security 129

The principles of cargo security were specified in Module 2 and may be
reinforced as follows:
130 Module 6: Detection of Threats

“4.6.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that catering, stores and supplies
aircraft.”
Principle 5: Application of security controls for catering, stores and
supplies
In order to implement these principles, ICAO has made it mandatory for
member States to be compliant with the Regulated Agent Regime which
basically ensures that security controls and harmonised security are in place in
a manner that does not impede the flow of cargo and that does not reduce or
eliminate the inherent speed of air cargo. This creates a ‘total approach’ to
cargo security.
Known shippers/consignors, regulated agents and air carriers will be the three
key parties for a supply chain security system.
The protection of the air cargo infrastructure will be similar to passenger
operations and in addition, security controls will be implemented on the
ground to protect the cargo from the time it is accepted in the cargo terminal to
the time it is loaded on board the aircraft.
Storage of Cargo
In order to ensure secure storage of cargo, some security measures need to be

established in cargo terminals and buildings. These include the following:
(a) All cargo receiving and dispatching doors should have the capability of
being closed and locked when not in use. If doorways need to be kept
clear for ventilation purposes, metal screen doors that can be locked can
be used as an alternative;
(b) Cargo receiving and dispatching doors, if possible should be equipped
with intruder detection devices or other means of protection;
(c) Doors intended for use by vehicle should not be used by any person to
enter or exit buildings as this may provide an avenue to circumvent
security controls;
(d) Personnel doors should be designed and located to ensure that entry
and exit of personnel can be controlled. These doors should also have
the capability of being locked and secured when not in use; and
(e) Signs indicating that all dangerous devices and weapons contained in a
consignment should be declared and posted at the cargo acceptance
point to deter undeclared transportation by inadvertent or innocent of an
item such as dangerous goods, weapons, etc.
Ground Transportation of Cargo
In case of partly transportation of air cargo by ground it should only be
transported by:
(a) A known shipper/consignor’s, a regulated agent’s or an air carrier’s
own transport; or
(b) Transporters whose operating procedures and security measures
have been approved by the regulated agent or the air carrier
Based on this the rules that will be applied for ground transportation will be:
(a) The driver should be required to present a valid security permit or
company identity document from the cargo dispatcher, before any cargo is
loaded. The credentials should adhere to requirements similar to those of
a restricted area pass.
(b) Immediately prior to loading the cargo compartment of the vehicle should
be searched. For this purpose may be used a 7-point inspection process
for trailers covering front wall, left side, right side, floor, ceiling/roof,
inside/outside doors and outside/undercarriage. The inspection should
examine the structure for any alteration or addition to the structure, and
staff involved in these checks should be provided with appropriate
lighting and tools. The integrity of the compartment should be maintained
until loading is complete.
(c) Unless consignments have been individually secured or affixed with
tamper evident seals, the cargo compartment should be secured or
made tamper-evident using seals or locks installed immediately following
completion of loading. Curtain-sided vehicle should be secured with
cords.
(d) The driver should not leave the vehicle unattended or make unscheduled
stops (except to present documents or in case of emergency). When
returning to the vehicle, prior to continuing on his journey, the driver
should verify the integrity of the seals and/or locks.
(e) Before a cargo consignment is transported to either the aircraft or its
next storage point, it should be checked by an appointed, trained staff
member to ensure that it was not tampered with in any obvious way.
Loading and Handling of Cargo
Despite the fact that the transit of cargo consignments from the storage facility
and/or cargo terminal will normally take place in a security restricted area, it will
still be important to ensure that the integrity of the shipment is maintained until
the aircraft is ready for take-off.
In addition to normal procedures to protect parked aircraft, it will also be
important that during the loading of the aircraft all loading and handling
personnel:
(a) Have authorised security restricted area access
(b) Visibly wear their security restricted area permit at all times
(c) Prior to loading, search the cargo hold to ensure that there are
no suspicious items or persons
(d) Ensure that, as they load consignments on the aircraft, there is
no evidence of tampering
(e) Ensure that no unauthorised personnel has or gains access to
cargo consignments on the apron or inside the aircraft
(f) Challenge anyone not in possession of a visible valid security
restricted area permit in the vicinity of an aircraft or cargo
consignment.
Acceptance Procedures
Regulated Agents receiving secured cargo should
• check in their country database the known consignor registration and
its expiry date
• check that the consignments shows no signs of tampering
• assign a security status to the consignment and enter the
security information in their system (SPX)
• tender the consignment to the carrier accompanied by the
security information either in paper or in electronic format
Regulated Agents may also receive unknown cargo or unsecured cargo (due to
tampering evidence). In this case the Regulated agents should:
• apply security controls to the consignments which may include
security screenings (e.g. X-ray)
• assign a security status to the consignments and enter the
security information in its system (e.g. SPX)
• tender the consignment to carriers accompanied by the security
information in paper or electronic format.
Air carrier shall implement and maintain adequate measures to protect air
cargo from unlawful interference, tampering, mishandling, damage, and
criminal activities involving robbery, theft and pilferage.
Air Cargo operator may only accept cargo from regulated agents under the
following conditions:
(a) The shipment is delivered by an established employee of a regulated
agent. If the consignor delivers or arranges for delivery of the cargo,
the employee receiving the cargo verifies that it was delivered by the
person nominated on the Consignment Security Declaration
(b) There is no sign of tampering with the shipment
(c) The regulated agent has provided either an electronic or hardcopy
Consignment Security Declaration that the cargo has had security
measures applied in accordance with the Regulated Agent
Security Programme; or
(d) Another regulated agent has provided a notice that the cargo has
been partially cleared in accordance with the Regulated Agent
Security Pro- gramme. Partially cleared cargo may be accepted from
other regulated agents or forwarded to air carriers for security
clearance. Details of the partial clearance should accompany the air
waybill.
Once the cargo has been accepted, the air carrier will:
(a) Determine the level, if any, of security controls to be applied to any
given consignment
(b) Carry out appropriate security controls to the required level
(c) Protect the consignment from unlawful interference while it is in the
air carrier’s custody, particularly after it has been made “known
cargo”
(d) Ensure that all consignments have been secured to an appropriate
level before being placed in the aircraft
(e) Ensure that consignments tendered to the carrier are accompanied by
the appropriate electronic or hardcopy documentation.
(f) Ensure that all consignments placed on board the aircraft are recorded
If there are indications that some freight may have been tampered with, or
security elements such as the audit trail, tamper-evident materials or pro-
cedures do not appear to meet established standards, an investigation must be
conducted to establish whether or not the security integrity of the freight has
been maintained. In such cases screening must be carried out.
Study Check 6.1
1. In order to implement the principles for cargo security, ICAO has made
it mandatory for member States to implement:
(a) Warehouse security measures
(b) Regulated Agent Regime
(c) 100% cargo screening
2. The 3 key players for the cargo security programme will be:
(a) Known shippers/consignors, regulated agents and air carriers
(b) Air carriers, Appropriate Authority and Police
(c) Known shippers/consignors, Security and Ground handling agents
3. In order to ensure secure storage of cargo, some security measures

need to be established in cargo terminals, one of which will be, to ensure
that cargo receiving and dispatching doors should be equipped with
intruder detection devices or other means of protection.
True or False
4. Under the cargo security regime, air cargo can be transported by:
(a) Transporters whose operating procedures and security measures
are certified by the Appropriate Authority
(b) Transporters who prove that they have the safest drivers
(c) Transporters whose operating procedures and security measures
have been approved by the regulated agent or the air carrier
5. One of the principles for cargo security states that, it will be important
to ensure that the integrity of the cargo shipment is maintained until it
is stored in the cargo terminal in the airport.
True or False
6. Besides the normal procedures to protect parked aircraft, it will be

necessary that during the loading of the aircraft all loading and
handling personnel:
(a) Have authorised security restricted area access
(b)
(c) Prior to loading, search the cargo hold to ensure that there are
no suspicious items or persons
(d) Ensure that, as they load consignments on the aircraft, there is
no evidence of tampering
(e) Ensure that no unauthorised personnel has or gains access to
cargo consignments on the apron or inside the aircraft
(f) Challenge anyone not in possession of a visible valid security
restricted area permit in the vicinity of an aircraft or cargo
consignment.
7. Challenging anyone not in possession of a visible valid security
restricted area permit in the vicinity of an aircraft or cargo consignment
is optional.
True or False
8. All drivers are required to present a valid security permit or company

identity document from the cargo dispatcher, before any cargo is
loaded.
True or False
9. One of the condition under which an Air carrier can accept cargo
from regulated agents is when:
(a) There is no sign of tampering with the shipment
(b) The vehicle being used does not have a hard top
(c) The vehicle being used to transport the cargo is not sealed.
10. Once the cargo has been accepted, the air carrier will ensure that
all consignments placed on board the aircraft are recorded.
True or False
6.1.3 Unit Summary

In this unit we have discussed the application of the guiding principles for cargo
security as promulgated by ICAO. It also provided you with not only the ICAO
Standards related to the implementation of cargo security but also how these
are to be translated into practical application on the ground.
You were shown how the security of cargo is maintained throughout the supply
chain and how cargo security is applied at each stage from acceptance,
storage, transportation and loading of cargo onto the aircraft.
6.2 Cargo Security Technology
• Describe the requirements for screening
• Methods of screening and technology used
Unit In this unit we will look at the requirement for screening and also the methods
that are used for screening of cargo. It will also introduce you to a variety of
Learning
technology that is being brought into the industry to help security personnel to
Objectives screen cargo more effectively and detect threats that can come in many forms
Upon completion of this and such as explosive devices, chemical, biological, or radiological related.
unit, you should be Even Dangerous Goods (DG) can be exploited by terrorist to cause great
able to: danger to an aircraft. Human factor will continue to play the key role in effective
detection capability as no known technology, currently available will be able to
replace the human intelligence.
These needs have become even more evident after the 9/11 incident and the
more recent “Printer” bomb incident, as these showed the world the capability
and creative nature of the terrorists and their sheer determination to try and
attack commercial aviation.
6.2.1 Requirements for Screening

Screening is a term that is commonly used to describe different ways in
which vehicles, people and the items they carry are checked. They can be
intrusive, which means conducting physical checks or non-intrusive which
means using other means that will not require physical checks.
Air cargo
As required by ICAO, appropriate security controls will be needed for air cargo,
courier and express parcels and mail intended for carriage on international
passenger flights. Such controls will normally be a combination of screening
and administrative procedures.
This means that all air cargo, courier and express parcels and mail intended for
carriage on international passenger flights shall be subject to appropriate
security controls by aircraft operators and/or agents or other entities desig-
nated by [appropriate authority] as “regulated agents” prior to being placed on
board an aircraft.
Thus specific security controls will have to be applied to air cargo, courier and
express parcels and mail. Air cargo, courier and express parcels and mail
intended for carriage on international passenger flights being moved within an
airport will have to be handled and moved in a secure environment and/or
afforded sufficient security to prevent the introduction of weapons, explosives
and other dangerous devices.
Yet we have read that Cargo shipments transported by air include a wide range
of products of different size, weight and density which is real challenge for
screening personnel, but task can be completed using different scanning
techniques which will be explained in Chapter 7.2.2.
Where cargo security integrity becomes doubtful or cannot be verified that it
has been handled and secured through freight supply chain, that cargo must
be classified as ‘unsecured’ and screened.
Further to that, screening of the following should be required:
(a) Specific categories of cargo considered to pose a higher risk
(e.g. unaccompanied baggage)
(b) Consignments on specific flight under special circumstances (e.g.
flight under increased threat, when requested by the air carrier, in
case of a bomb threat, etc.)
(c) Some States may require random screening (not based on threat) of
a percentage of known cargo
Mail
Mail needs to be treated differently than other cargo consignments. Generally,

the confidentiality of mail is protected by national legislation. Further to that, the
lower threat level that individual mail items (falling in particular categories) may
represent and the technological and operational difficulties.
Still, much like other cargo consignments, some security controls need to be
applied to all mail shipment in order to ensure only known mail is carried on
board aircraft.
While screening of all mail is difficult because of particular legalities and
potential operational and technological constraints under normal conditions,
the authority to inspect should be provided by the appropriate authority when
the threat assessment would justify such measures.
Mail needs to be subjected to security controls in the same manner as cargo
shipments unless it is known mail, transhipment mail or letters less than 5mm
thick or is exempted due to its contents.
Generally, for legal reasons, security controls and screening can only be
performed by the postal authorities. However, the following guidance is
provided in the event a controlling postal authority requires carriers to conduct
screening.
Security controls applied to known mail only need to be applied to a proportion
of the mail, to be determined by the appropriate authority and the postal
Unit 6.2: Cargo Security Technology 137

authority and based on a risk assessment. Mail selected for screening will be
selected at random or through a targeted approach.
Catering, stores and supplies
Catering, stores and supplies also get onto the aircraft thus it will be necessary
to ensure that they do not contain any restricted articles that could endanger
the safety of the aircraft. Therefore, like cargo it will be necessary to implement
the security controls to prevent the introduction of restricted articles into air
carrier catering supplies intended for carriage on passenger flights.
The security controls will be applied according to a structured approach that will
include measures for:
(a) The catering facility
(b) Preparation, storage, transportation and checking of catering supplies
As is the case for Cargo, the concept of the “Known Consignor” can also be
applied to catering, stores and supplies.
6.2.2 Methods of Screening and Technology Used

There are two types of screening methods:
(a) Threat detection techniques, the purpose of which is to detect one or
many components of an improvised explosive device (IED) (detonator,
energy charge, explosives)
(i) Hand-search
(ii) Conventional X-rays
(iii) Explosive Detection Systems (EDS)
(iv) Metal detection
(v) Explosive trace and vapour detection
(vi) Explosive detection dogs
(vii) Very large X-rays
(viii) Visual check
(ix) Metal detection
(x) Advance Technology x-ray or other wave based systems
(b) Threat activation techniques, which are designed to activate an IED
before the consignment is loaded on board the aircraft
(i) Decompression chambers
(ii) Full flight simulation systems
(iii) Security storage (Security storage should only be used when it is not
feasible to apply any other method of screening due to the particular
nature of the consignment. Holding a shipment will impede on the
advantage that air cargo has on other modes of freight shipping,
namely its speed. When it is used, the hold period should be of at
least 24 hours and no more than 48 hours.)
Threat detection techniques are the most appropriate screening solution where
screening takes place prior to consolidation. It may be difficult to effectively use
the screening equipment on large consignments and depending on the
contents of the consignment.
Whilst proper training of screeners may eliminate some of the weaknesses, the
screening methods are still limited in what they can detect.
Threat activation techniques are considered better because they are immune
to human factors and, in most cases, issues involving size of shipments.
However, the process can be time consuming and may not trigger all types of
IED unless full flight simulation systems are used and even then, will not detect
an IED which is not triggered by pressure, vibration, etc. However, these
systems can be very costly to purchase and operate.
All screening methods can be inefficient when they are not suited to the type of
consignment being screened. In some cases, a single screening method may
not be sufficient to screen all types of cargo.
Therefore, more than one method should be used wherever possible. The keys
to screening are to constantly apply the most appropriate screening method for
each consignment and ensure that the screening staff applying these methods
has been properly trained.
The screening method used, should cause as little delay as is possible to the
transport of cargo.
Did You Know?

There are items that is classified as cargo and yet is exempted from screening.
Exemptions to screening
However, there are also items that travel as cargo which are exempted from
screening because of their special nature.
The rules for these exemptions are set by States and are updated on a periodic
basis.
The above categories of cargo may be exempted from screening provided that
they are:
(a) Clearly declared on shipping documents as such;
(b) Physically checked upon receipt for signs of tampering;
(c) Subject to documentary checks and direct verification (e.g. by
telephone call to the shipper) to establish their bona fides
(d) Continually protected from unlawful interference
Other items that can also be exempted will include:
(a) Packages less than 5mm thick and/or less than 450g (sometimes 250g)
(or other criteria as set by the appropriate authority)
(b) Packages weighing less than a certain pre-determined weight
(usually 450g or 250g)
(c) Transhipment cargo, if coming from a State where appropriate security
controls have been performed and provided that the shipment remains
protected from unlawful interference throughout the transfer/transit
period Cargo coming from known shippers/consignors and regulated
agents
Key Learning Point

If a suspicious item is found in a consignment while security controls are being
applied, it is important that Staff members do not touch it.
Treatment of Suspect Cargo
Initially, a determination needs to be made as to what is causing the
suspicion. If an item is suspicious because it is too opaque for proper analysis
or cannot be understood, using one screening methodology, different
methodologies should be employed. If an item is suspicious because it
appears to be an explosive device (with all the necessary components):
(a) Suspect cargo should be treated as unknown cargo and subjected to
additional screening to ensure that no suspicious or potentially
dangerous items are found within the consignment.
(b) If it cannot be confirmed with certainty that the consignment does not
contain any potentially dangerous item the air carrier should not carry
it.
If a suspicious item is found in a consignment while security controls are being
applied, it is important that:
(a) Staff members do not touch it
(b) The security department and the explosive ordinance disposal (EOD)
unit are contacted
(c) The consignment is not moved by anyone except EOD unit personnel
(d) The security department determine which areas are at risk and
evacuate them
The EOD should determine whether or not it is necessary to detonate the
consignment basing their assessment solely on the threat posed by the
suspicious device
Once the situation is resolved, if a dangerous item has been positively
identified, all consignments destined for the same flight and/or accepted from
the same shipper, should then be screened as these should be considered as
being higher threat consignments. Government regulators should be notified,
as well as, any other passenger and cargo carriers at the facility.
Technology used
a. X-ray technology
The most common technology for screening of cargo is still x-ray technology.
However, due to the nature and diverse size of cargo it is always not possible
to screen cargo using x-ray technology aloe. Other options have to be
applied.
b. Explosive detection technology
This category of system can discriminate, to a degree, between explosives and
other materials and indicate this visually, by a number of means, to the
operator. These systems have typically been employed to screen the checked
baggage at airports and run in automatic mode, where a detection of an
explosive-like material in a bag will activate a diverter and allow the image to be
examined by an operator. However, they are also used for cargo screening.
c. Bulk explosives detection technology
Bulk explosives detection devices measure some bulk characteristic of
materials in an attempt to detect the possible presence of explosives. Some of
the bulk characteristics that may be measured are the X-ray absorption
coefficient; the X-ray backscatter coefficient; the dielectric constant; gamma or
neutron interaction; and the microwave, millimetre wave, or infrared emissions.
Further analysis of these parameters can result in calculated mass, density,
nitrogen content, and effective Z (effective atomic number). While none of
these characteristics are unique to explosives, they are sufficiently indicative to
point to a high probability of the presence of explosives. Fortunately, many
materials that share similar bulk characteristics with explosives are not
common in everyday items. The false alarm rate for bulk detection devices can
be low enough to allow for automatic detection of explosives and explosives-
like materials.
d. Thermal neutron activation
Thermal neutron activation (TNA) is commercially available and being used in
several airports for scanning hold baggage. The main difficulties with such
technology at the present time include cost, size and weight of the equipment.
However, this technology is now available for cargo screening as well.
The decision to use thermal, or low-energy, neutrons for the detection of
explosive materials in packages is a natural one. Neutrons have excellent
penetrating power and interact with nitrogen-rich materials, such as explosives,
in a well-known and predictable way. Thermal neutrons are absorbed by many
atoms. When a thermal neutron is absorbed there is an associated release of a
gamma ray photon (much like a phosphor gives off visible photons when
exposed to ultraviolet light). The wavelength (energy) of the emitted photon is
very specific to the atom that absorbs the neutron. Because the wavelength of
the photon is highly specific, the detection of photons of the wavelength emitted
by nitrogen when absorbing a thermal neutron indicates the presence of
nitrogen.
e. Pulse fast neutron analysis
Pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) is a technique that evolved from earlier
work on investigating the use of fast neutrons to detect explosives. The PFNA
technique measures the elemental composition of the contents inside the
scanned object. A pulsed neutron created by a pulsed deuteron beam striking
a deuteron target is shined on an object. The neutrons interact with the
elemental constituents of the object and create gamma rays with energies
characteristic of the elements. From the energy and time of arrival of the
gamma rays in detectors, an elemental image of the object can be created.
These measure- ments are used to generate a three-dimensional map of the
contents inside the container.
Computer software then determines the presence of specific combinations of
elements and characterizes materials of interest. The contents of the scanned
object can therefore be determined with a high degree of accuracy. The whole
process is independent of operator interpretation since the detection of the
material does not rely on either the shape or the material of packaging used.
f. Chemical-based detection
Chemical-based detection comprises field test kits that use liquid or aerosol-
based chemicals for the identification of explosive residue. Initially, the surface
suspected of being contaminated with explosive residue (a package, clothing, a
person, etc.) is wiped with a special test paper. Then the paper is sprayed with
a series of detection chemical reagents. The presence and nature of the
explosive are revealed by a colour characteristic of the reaction of the
chemicals to the explosive residue.
g. Explosive detection dogs
Trained dogs can be an effective tool for the detection of concealed explosives.
Such dogs are used by a number of Contracting States’ security agencies,
armed forces and law enforcement organizations in applications involving
aviation security controls.
h. Simulation chambers
Simulation chambers are facilities designed to activate trigger-controlled
explosive or incendiary devices in cargo, mail or baggage by simulating
environmental flight conditions. Depending on the type of simulation chamber,
one or several parameters of flight conditions can be simulated. Operations of
these facilities are not conditioned by the type or amount of explosives, or by
the size or volume of baggage, cargo or mail. In addition Human Factors do not
impact on the performance of simulation chambers. It should be noted,
however, that simulation chambers of both types detect devices by triggering
them which may result in damage to the consignment and facility.
Study Check 6.2
1. Dangerous Goods (DG) can be exploited by terrorist to cause great

danger to an aircraft.
True or False
2. Screening is a term that is commonly used to describe:

(a) Using x-ray machines to screen vehicles, people and other items
(b) Using a curtain as a screen to cover sensitive cargo items
(c) Using different ways to screen vehicles, people and other items
3. Regulated agents are certified as such by:

(a) The airlines
(b) The appropriate authority of the State
(c) the police
4. The main purpose for specific security controls to be applied to air

cargo, courier and express parcels and mail is to:
(a) prevent the introduction of weapons, drugs, explosives and
other dangerous devices
(b) prevent the introduction of weapons, explosives and other
dangerous devices
(c) prevent the introduction of animals, explosives and other
dangerous devices
5. There exist two specific threats to the air cargo industry:

(a) The introduction of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in a
cargo consignment that will be loaded on board a passenger
aircraft
(b)
6. Mail needs to be treated differently than other cargo

consignments. True or False
7. Mail is not to be subjected to security controls in the same manner

as cargo shipments.
True or False
8. The security controls will be applied according to a structured

approach that will include measures for:
(a)
(b) Preparation, storage, transportation and checking of catering supplies
9. There are two types of screening methods. They are:
(a) Threat detection techniques
(b)
10. Using simulation chambers for explosive detection is a Threat

Detection Technique.
True or False
11. Life-sustaining items such as blood, blood products, bone marrow

and human organs for transplant are exempted from screening.
True or False
12. Suspect cargo should be treated as known cargo and therefore not
be subjected to additional screening.
True or False
13. Trained dogs can be an effective tool for the detection of

concealed explosives.
True or false
6.2.3 Unit Summary

In this unit we introduced the requirement for screening and also the methods
that are used for screening of cargo. We also introduced you to a variety of
technology that is being brought into the industry to help screeners screen
cargo more effectively and detect threats that can come in many forms and
such as explosive devices, chemical, biological, or radiological related. Even
Dangerous Goods (DG) can be exploited by terrorist to cause great danger to
an aircraft. However, human factor will continue to play the key role in effective
detection capability as no known technology, currently available will be able to
replace the human intelligence.
6.3 Risk Assessment and Management
• Understand the principles and methodology of Risk Assessment

• Apply risk management to air cargo
Unit
Learning
Objectives
6.3.1 What is Risk Management?
module, you should be It is a structured process to coordinate activities to direct and control an
able to: organization to manage and minimise uncertainties/risks (ISO31000:2009).
Risk management assesses the ‘threats’ and manages the risks with the goal
of achieving sustained benefit in order to achieve the objectives of an
organization.
The ISO Standard outlines an approach to developing a framework that will
assist organizations to integrate risk management into their organization-wide
risk management systems and to consider the links between the risk
management framework and their organizations’ objectives.
Definitions:
Threat (T)–A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other
hostile action on someone
Hazard–whatever can cause damage. Hazards relates to the present, it is real
and can be assessed but cannot be changed or managed
Vulnerability (V)–Exposure to the possibility of being attacked or harmed
Probability (P)–The extent to which something is likely to happen
Consequence (C)–A result or effect or condition
Risk (R)
• Is a combination of the probability of an event and its
consequences (ISO/IEC Guide 73)
• The probability that a hazard/danger can cause damage/possible
unde- sired consequences
• Relates to the future, could be a ‘probability’ (%) or a ‘frequency
of occurrence’ (= based on past events)
• Can be managed and possibly
reduced Therefore, what is the risk in
security?
It is a measure of the probability that terrorists will attempt an attack
(threat/“T”), the result or effect (C) and succeed in exploiting the target's
(vulnerabilities/“V”. In essence, R = T x C x V.
6.3.2 Risk Assessment

To assess the risk, we must know what the possible actions (attacks) are,
determine the likely targets of attack (know our assets) and examine what the
possible range of consequences (strictly related to the vulnerability, or
“weaknesses”, of the assets) are.
For there to be a credible threat to a target, two factors must exist - the intent or
desire and the capability to do so.
A Threat Assessment is a judgment of the likelihood or probability of an event
taking place that could adversely affect civil aviation. Its purpose is to
Unit 6.3: Risk Assessment and Management 145
determine IF there is a threat,
WHERE it may come from and
HOW it may be
146 Module 6: Detection of Threats

perpetrated. The Assessment draws in part on the known history of past Acts
of Unlawful Interference (AUI).
To name a few, sources of threats in civil aviation would be terrorists, criminals,
employees (either disaffected or criminally motivated), other governments and
mentally disturbed passengers or others.
By combining the system’s Vulnerability, the likelihood of the Threat and the
Criticality (Consequence) of the asset together and rating them (Low, Medium
or High risk), we would identify security risks and elect the appropriate
countermeasures, based upon cost-effectiveness, as each risk is prioritized.
6.3.3 Risk Management
Do not take a
to break a
The principles of risk management are that it creates value; addresses

uncertainty; it is systematic, structured & timely based on the best available
information; tailored, dynamic and responsive to change; facilitates continual
improvement and enhancement; encourages proactive management; improves
reporting; improves stakeholder confidence; establishes a reliable basis for
decision making and planning; improves controls; improves loss prevention &
incident; and last but not least, improves organizational resilience.
The organization must provide countermeasures that are appropriate, cost-
effective and commensurate with the risk.
There are three to five levels of threats defined by the authorities and the
Baseline must be achievable. Each level leads to a pre-determined set of
measures. However, additional measures for security control at each level may
be defined.
Guarded 1-Minimum 2-Low
Elevated Severe 3-Medium 4-High
Critical
When there is an increase in threat, this leads to an increase in the security

response.
The overall strategies to counteract the threat(s) are
Strategies Assessment Criteria

 Vulnerability: characteristic
of a target which can be
 Reaction exploited for an attack.
 Protection  Mitigation/containment:
reduction of damages and/or
 Prevention effectiveness of an attack
 Transferring  CBA: Cost Benefit Analysis
 Resilience: capability to
continue normal operations
6.3.4 The Cargo Environment

Due to the complexity of the air cargo supply chain, the many stakeholders, the
different types of cargo and the handling requirements, we have a unique
environment. Field knowledge is critical to make an effective evaluation of the
risks in order to manage them.
There are several relevant essentials points to remember:
1. Why do we need to manage the risk? What are we seeking to protect?
2. How can we manage the risk?
3. What are the Hazards? The cargo environment includes “in-house”
threats in the form of dangerous goods shipments, industrial espionage
and human factors.
4. Vulnerability
(a) Our vulnerability affects threat as it is exploited by terrorists.
(b) What is our exposure to a threat and attractiveness as a target?
(c) Which areas of our cargo operations could be attacked?
5. Probability–what is the probability level of being attacked?
6. Consequences
(a) What would be the result or effect, such as loss of lives,
operational disruption, financial loss?
(b) What countermeasures are in place?
7. Level of threat–although we are working in the known shipper/regulated
agent environment we also have to manage the risk on a shipment
level.
8. Complexity–we need to verify all levels of threats in all areas of concerns
in the supply chain.
9. Collaboration–Many countries are using advance risk assessment
systems and the relevant government agencies and private organisations
aim to cooperate (for example, the TSA-CBP) on a greater scale to share
information and processes.
We can minimize the threat by minimizing the relevant hands involved after
screening but only if we have the capability in terms of technology, labour and
other resources to do so.
Study Check 6.3
1. Risks relate to the

present. True or False
2. What must we know in order to assess risks?
3. What are three sources of threats?
4. The organization must provide countermeasures regardless of cost and

the risk.
True or False
5. We need to verify all levels of threats in the total air cargo supply
chain. True or False
6.3.5 Unit Summary
In this unit, we looked at ways to assess the critical business assets and
processes, evaluate a Threat, assess Vulnerability, construct a risk matrix and
develop countermeasures to mitigate the threats.
The module also defined the principles of risk management and described how
we can apply risk management to ensure the security of the air cargo supply
chain.
Some of the key topics that were discussed in this module were:
(a) Definitions of terms
(b) How to assess risks
(c) The significance of risk management
(d) Principles of risk management
(e) Applying risk management to air cargo
Module Summary
This module looked at two aspects related to “detection of Threats” to cargo
and all other items that are carried on board an aircraft. It examined the
reasons and principles involved in cargo security and the ICAO mandatory
Standards that dictate how cargo security is to be implemented.
This module discussed the types of cargo screening technology that is being
brought into and used in the industry to facilitate detection of a variety of threats
that could be infiltrated through cargo and other items, into the aircraft.
The module explained some techniques that can be used to screen cargo
bearing in mind that due to the nature and size of cargo, it is not going to be
possible to screen all cargo using x-ray technology.
It described the actions to take in the event of a discovery of certain types of
threats when screening cargo, the most serious being explosives
We reviewed risk assessment and management and looked at ways to assess
the critical business assets and processes, evaluate a Threat, assess
Vulnerability, construct a risk matrix to develop countermeasures to mitigate
the threats.
Some of the key topics that were discussed in this module were:
(a) The application of the principles of cargo screening
(b) The requirements for screening
(c) Methods of screening and technology used
(d) Risk Assessment and Management
Answer Key Study Check 6.3

Study Check 6.1 1. False. Risks relate to the future.
1. (b) Regulated Agent Regime 2. To assess the risk, we must know what the
possible actions (attacks) are, determine the
likely
2. (a) Known shippers/consignors, regulated agents targets of attack (know our assets) and examine
and air carriers what the possible range of consequences (strictly
3. True related to the vulnerability, or “weaknesses”, of
the assets) are.
4. (c) Transporters whose operating procedures and
security measures have been approved by the 3. Sources of threats include terrorists, criminals,
regulated agent or the air carrier employees (either disaffected or criminally
motivated), other governments and mentally disturbed
5. False passengers or others.
6. Visibly wear their security restricted area permit at 4. False. The organization must provide counter-
all times measures that are appropriate, cost-effective and
7. False commensurate with the risk.
8. True 5. True
9. (a) There is no sign of tampering with the
shipment
10. True
Study Check 6.2

1. True
2. (c) Using different ways to screen vehicles,
people and other items
3. (b) The appropriate authority of the State
4. (b) prevent the introduction of weapons,
explosives and other dangerous devices
5. The commandeering of an all-cargo aircraft in
order to use it as a weapon of mass
destruction
6. True
7. False
8. The catering facility
9. Threat activation techniques
10. False. It is a Threat Activation Technique
11. True
12. False. It should be treated as unknown cargo
and be subjected to screening.
13. True
Answer Key 151

Module 7:
Management and Administration
• A change in mindset–proactive approach to security

• Describe training needs for security screeners
Module Learning
Objectives
Upon completion of
this module, you
should be
able to:
Module Introduction
This module will give you an informative overview of management and
administration of cargo security operations. You will be introduced to a new
concept in enhancing security using a pro-active approach to security.
This will be necessary since the threats that are the industry is facing is very
dynamic and terrorists are continuously challenging the alertness and reactive
nature of aviation security.
As was mentioned earlier, Cargo is considered in the aviation industry as the
‘Achilles heel’, simply because it is still the weakest link in the aviation security
chain. This is because cargo operations are complex and very tedious. To add
to the complexity, it is not possible at the present time to screen cargo 100%
as is done for passengers baggage.
In this module we will begin to understand the importance of good security
management and administration that will help enhance cargo security oper-
ations. We will also look at the training needs for aviation security officers,
especially security screeners who are an important group who play a major part
in ensuring that explosive or other threats do not penetrate the aviation network
and harm the industry. This will be discussed in this module.

7.1 Change in Mindset
• Explain Security Management System

• Describe HRM and HRD strategies
Unit Learning
• Describe human factors in security
Objectives
to:
In this unit we will introduce you to how important it is to introduce
‘management’ into cargo security operations. We will introduce you to the new
way of looking at cargo security operations. It is through a change in the
mindset of security practitioners to ‘think pro-active’ and begin to focus on the
training and development of all staff and especially for their security personnel
rather than just focus on operational needs as has been the trend traditionally.
You will be introduced to the approach of implementing good management

practices implementation of Company Security measures and of turn around
security force from just a mediocre aviation security team to a very effective
and dynamic force that will be able to measure up the changing needs for
aviation and cargo security and the threats.
7.1.2 Management and HR Strategies

Security Management System
The discovered in October 2010 of two packages, each containing a bomb
consisting of 300 to 400 grams of plastic explosives and a detonating
mechanism on separate cargo planes from Yemen to the United States
attracted attention of the aviation community to security issues connected with
cargo transportation. It is clear that where is appropriate the Air Freight
Operators have to create various organizational and management programs to
support security culture and enhance the security integrity of daily operations.
The Operators can establish, implement and maintain a Company Security
Plan in accordance with Local Legislation. This plan needs to explain the
established practices of the company and which practical measures are
applicable to the Operator’s location. Hereby taking into account the local
operational environment. This plan must manage various security risks and
needs to have a multimodal vision. This means that it must take into
consideration different security challenges faced by transportation supply
chain.
The Security Plan is a vital part of the management system which will identify,
typically through policy, risk assessment, management review or other means,
Unit 7.1: Change in Mindset 157

the infrastructure and resource requirements that are necessary to deliver safe
and secure operations.
Examples of risk management practices includes:
• An assessment of threats to air cargo security in a particular country or
region, based on culture characteristics, past activities or intelligence
data;
• An assessment of company vulnerabilities to security threats, by
identifying system weaknesses and strengths that may be exploited in
creating the preventive measures.
A hierarchy of threat levels will normally exist. Threat descriptors may include
the terms ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ and include an explanation of what each
threat level means. Specific information should exist to justify changes in the
threat assessment.
The management need to ensure the financial viability of the Security Plan
because it is an important factor in providing continuous secure transportation
of goods by air.
Another part of the security management is the creation of crisis and
contingency management plans which will address any breaches of security.
The response to changes in the threat level or any other disruption to the
normal operation.
Potential crisis scenarios may include criminal or terrorist incidents, natural
disasters, loss of utilities, loss of access to operational sites, limitation or loss of
fuel supplies, transport infrastructure disruption, financial disruption, loss of
critical IT and communications systems, civil unrest, military action, political
instability, supply chain disruption, loss of staff or equipment etc.
HRM and HRD strategies
Key Learning Point

HRM and HRD interventions are the key to an effective and professional
aviation security force.
What does pro-active mean? From the definition in the Oxford Dictionary it is:
“Acting in advance to deal with an expected difficulty or anticipating”
What will this mean to security? It means that if this is put into motion, then
there will be a high possibility that our security personnel will be able to take a
proactive stance to prevent:
(a) Acts of Unlawful Interference
(b) Acts of terrorism
Approach
The approach can be diagrammatically illustrated as follows:
We all can accept the notion that ‘management’ is a well-tested science that
can be applied to security management as well.
Translated this means that in any organization, it is standard practice to have a
goal, or objective or an aim etc to work towards. Only if we all identify an
objective that has to be determined at the start, can we then work backwards
and then develop a strategy to achieve that objective.
It takes everyone in the organization to play their part in helping the
organization achieve its objective. Thus it is only logical that in any
organization it is the people who can make the difference. Thus people
management and development becomes an essential part of any
organizational objective. This is the new way of thinking. Thus it is necessary
to have a very good Human Resource Management (HRM) and Human
Resource Development (HRD) process in place.
This means implementing a security management system which sets out
security objectives and strategies as an integral part of daily security
operations.
This is done by systematically integrating people management into the day to
day operations of the organization, closely linking it to the achievement of
objectives, sometimes called ‘Management by Objectives’.
Human resource and human resource development
As mentioned earlier, in order to ensure that personnel have an all round
development it will be important to create a platform for them to perform at their
best, it will be necessary therefore to design and implement a good human
resource and human resource development process. This can be done by 3
simple steps. Develop the:
(a) HR Philosophy
(b) HR Objectives
(c) HRD Guiding Principles
It is very important Company Management to have clear vision how Security
System to be created and what security personnel is needed
HR Philosophy
The HR philosophy must identify what will be an aviation security officer’s
needs in order to enable them to be both professional and effective in the tasks
they undertake. Organizations’ must re-think what their product really is? In this
case, cargo security officers are involved in providing both protective and
preventative security. Thus if aviation security organizations begin to look at
their product as the security officer, rather than the services they provide, then
logically, they will begin to focus more on the training and development of the
security officer.
What this means is that over time, a well trained and well exposed security
officer will be able to provide both the protective and preventive security
functions more efficiently and professionally. This means that the service
standard that they will provide these services with will also be enhanced.
HR Objectives
Based on the above notion that the product is the security officer, the
organization can then define its HR objectives as to how it can develop this
product into a professional and efficient work machine by matching the security
officer’s needs into action as follows:
THE ORGANISATION’S PRODUCT THE PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT SECURITY OFFICER WHO NEEDS:ACHIEVED
THROUGH:
– skills – training
– knowledge – development
– alertness – communications
– morale – reward systems
– health – personal state (wellness,
personality)
Companies can become transformed by focusing on HR management and all
processes that revolve around the Security Officer, including areas traditionally
left to the employee, such as wellness, personality, community service and
language skills.
What this means is that each of the security officers needs can then be
addressed by a relevant product development process as is shown in the
above chart. Thus skills are enhanced through training, knowledge is
enhanced through a development process, maintaining their alertness in the
operational area can be improved through up to date communications on a
variety of threats and other security related issues. Their morale will have to be
managed through appropriate reward systems and welfare and their health,
which is a very important aspect, can be managed through a good healthcare
and fitness system that must be in place in the organization.
This requires the organization to have a very structured Human Resource
Development process in place. One suggestion will be a process as per the
diagram depicted below.
The human resource process begins at the recruitment phase itself. It is

important that only the most suitable candidates are selected for the position of
aviation security officers without compromising on the pre-requisites that would
have been determined. This can happen if the organization is caught in a
situation whereby they are not able to get the required numbers to fill the
vacancy available.
As part of this process, there will be a need to do manpower planning to meet
the requirements of the various jobs that the security officers are expected to
perform. Thus the number of security officers required to perform cargo
security functions will have to be factored into the manpower planning
requirement as their training needs may be different.
As part of the planning process, it will also be necessary to design a series

of packages that will meet the motivational needs of the security officers.
These will include:
(a) Rewards scheme for good performance
(b) Salary upgrades scheme
(c) Promotion scheme
(d) Benefits scheme
(e) Upgrading scheme (personal development)
As part of their development, it will be necessary to provide them with an all
round exposure to as many areas of their jobs through:
(a) Job rotation schemes
(b) A well designed career planning process
(c) A good leadership development programme
(d) Continuous functional skills training
(e) General training to further enhance their knowledge
(f) Providing them with a variety of assignments
Quality Control
The human resource planning process is then closed through a quality control
system that looks at:
(a) Fair and non-biased appraisal system
(b) A performance/potential ranking system to identify the organizations
to performers to help them move up the next rung in their
performance.
One of the ways to improve the manpower planning process is to benchmark
company security organizations with other similar organizations who are known
to have a well renown and tested system. Benchmarking is especially useful for
challenging assumptions.
Management on the other hand are the ‘hardware’ of the organization. It is

therefore the responsibility of management to provide good, fair and open
minded HR policies to guide, motivate and develop all security staff to be
leaders in the organization and mentors of newly promoted and new security
officers. The basic belief is that managers should develop their people, treat
them well, motivate them, empower them, and they will have to take care of
their problems for them.
The tools that security personnel use as part of their daily operations will then
become the ‘Hardware’. Since as aviation security officers, they will have to
handle a variety of equipment/technology in order to facilitate a more speedy
and accurate completion of their tasks. It will be important that management
ensure that they are provided with these tools and also to ensure that they are
trained to use these tools safely without endangering them in the process of
using them.
Study Check 7.1
1. Cargo is considered in the aviation industry as the ‘Achilles

heel’ True or False
2. The new way of thinking in security requires a change in the mindset.

This means:
(a) Security measures must ‘people oriented’
(b) Security management must ‘think pro-active’
(c) Security personnel must look professional
3. The ‘new way of thinking’ requires implementing a security

management system (SeMS) which sets out security objectives and
strategies as an integral part of daily security operations.
True or False
4. To provide personnel with an all round development it will be important

to create a platform for them to perform at their best by 3 simple steps.
They are:
(a) HR Philosophy
(b) HR Objectives
(c)
5. Security companies can still do very well, even if they only focus on
the services they provide rather than their security officers.
True or False
6. A good HRD process involves:

(a) Recruitment
(b) Rewards system
(c) Development
(d) Performance Appraisal system
7. As part of the planning process, it will also be necessary to design a

series of packages that will meet the motivational needs:
(a)
(c)
(d)
8. One of the ways to improve the manpower planning process is for
security organizations to benchmark with other similar organizations who
are known to have a well renown and tested system.
True or False
7.1.3 Unit Summary

In this unit you were introduced a new concept to ‘management of aviation
security personnel’. It looked at a new way of improving cargo security
operations through the management and development of security officers who
will be responsible to function as aviation and cargo security officers. It
introduced you to a change in the mindset of security practitioners to ‘think pro-
active’ and begin to focus on the training and development of their security
personnel rather than just focus on operational needs as has been the
trend traditionally.
This module also discussed the approach of implementing good management
practices and interventions to turn around the security force from just a
mediocre aviation security team to a very effective and dynamic force that will
be able to measure up the changing needs for aviation and cargo security and
threats.
7.2 Training and Development
• Describe human factors in security

• Describe training needs
Unit Learning
• Describe how to respond and manage aviation Incidents
Objectives
you should be able 7.2.1 Human Factors in Security
to:
Extract from ICAO Document 8973–Edition 8
In the civil aviation security system, the most critical component is the
operators who make the security-critical decisions. Human factors (HF) are
essential elements to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of aviation
security, and should be applied to all aspects of civil aviation security
operations, particularly where the deployment of increasingly sophisticated
technologies has intensified the demands on human operators. In order to
achieve the highest standards of security in civil aviation, human factors
considerations in relation to the civil aviation security system should be
addressed through collective and collaborative international efforts. One
mechanism for building international consensus and collaboration is the
International Aviation Security Human Factors Technical Advisory Group
(InterTAG), which coordinates the exchange of research and development
information related to recommended practices for HF.
ICAO encourages States to promote human factors research programmes,
which should be applied in the development of new security technology and
equipment, and establish a human factors component in their national civil
aviation security programmes with a view to developing and promulgating
guidelines, specifications, and certification criteria for system performance
levels in civil aviation security. States should also develop and implement
improved recruitment, selection, training, and assessment processes for their
civil aviation security personnel.
The first objective of human factors considerations in civil aviation security
operations should be to make the civil aviation security system resilient to the
consequences of human error. Human factors should help achieve this
objective by leveraging human capabilities and limitations to enhance overall
system performance. Such enhancement should be effected by matching the
limitations and capabilities of the operators to the processes, procedures,
technologies, and equipment that support civil aviation security operations.
The second objective should be to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the overall civil aviation security system. Efficiency in the system can be
defined in many ways, for example, by considering how many security officers
are required to screen all baggage, how much time is required to screen a
given number of passengers, and how threat detection performance and
compliance should be evaluated.
These objectives can be achieved through knowledge of human factors that,
when appropriately applied, assists in:
(a) defining safety regulations;
(b) integrating such knowledge into the design of and certification process
for equipment;
Unit 7.2: Training and Development 165

(c) developing and defining procedures designed to enhance error-
resilience; and
(d) providing guidance for the selection, training, assessment, and
performance management of security personnel.
The Air Cargo Operator will establish and maintain a local security training
program that includes initial and recurrent training, with validation where
necessary.
In relation to training in aviation security, special attention is paid to screeners.
This is because security officers at screening checkpoints in particular, and
those involved in hold baggage screening, work in teams, and the team
environment can have a significant impact on job performance.
7.2.2 Training Needs
While the central importance of human performance (or Human Factors

issues) to many areas of civil aviation (e.g. aircraft cockpit design) has been
recognized for several decades, the importance of Human Factors issues in
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of civil aviation security has only
recently been acknowledged.
It was not long ago that this Human Factors perspective was applied in civil
aviation security operations, where the deployment of increasingly sophisti-
cated technologies. In order to achieve the highest standards of security in civil
aviation, ICAO says that it is important for States to take the Human Factors in
relation to the civil aviation security system seriously. One mechanism for
building international consensus and collaboration is the International Techni-
cal Advisory Group (InterTAG) which coordinates the exchange of research
and development information relating to Recommended Practices for Human
Factors among all participating States.
Key Learning Point

Screeners need to undergo initial employment training, OJT and CBT on
screening.
Clearly, the pressing urgency of this issue cannot be overemphasized. Already,
the securing of the air transportation system, which encompasses countless
airports, aircraft, flights as well as 1.6 billion passengers (1999 ICAO figures)
and their accompanying luggage, has become an increasingly complex task. A
single lapse in aviation security operations can result in huge fatalities, the
destruction of equipment and the erosion of the travelling public’s confidence in
air travel. Essentially, it takes the presence of just one explosive device on
board an aircraft—among a billion or more bags screened—to shatter the
credibility of the entire civil aviation security system. As we have seen this can
be through passengers baggage or even through any other item that is put on
board a flight, including cargo, catering, supplies stores and even mail.
An objective of Human Factors considerations in civil aviation security
operations is to make the aviation security system resilient to the conse-
quences of human error. Human Factors helps achieve this objective by
leveraging human capabilities and adaptabilities to enhance overall system
performance. This is done by matching the limitations and capabilities of the
operators to the technologies that support civil aviation security operations.
A second objective is to improve the efficiency of the overall aviation security
system. Efficiency in the system can be defined in many different ways: how
many screeners are required to screen all baggage, how much time is required
to screen a given number of passengers, how should the threat detection
performance be evaluated, etc.
In all cases, the rationale is that, with the systematic deployment of people
and equipment into civil aviation security operations, proper consideration of
Human Factors will ensure optimal safety performance and efficiency. As was
mentioned earlier, this is especially in relation to security screeners and what
needs to be looked into in ensuring their performance will be the human
factors framework as indicated by IATA (See figure 7.1.2).
Figure 7.1.2—Human factor framework
The framework involves 4 axes namely the operators (screeners), the

technology they use, the operational environment under which they operate
and the certification process.
Axis 1 focuses on personnel selection, training and assessment and retention
of security screeners
Axis 2 looks at the types of equipment that is used in aviation
security Axis 3 focuses on operational environment and
organizational culture Axis 4 is about the certification of the
screeners.
Training
The Operator shall have a training program with a balanced curriculum of
theoretical and practical training to ensure:
(a) Personnel, employed by or under the control of the Operator and
external service providers who implement security controls, have the
competence to perform their duties;
(b) Operational personnel, through security awareness training, understand
established Security Standards and Local Operating Procedures in
relation to their responsibilities, and are able to contribute to the
prevention of acts of sabotage and other forms of unlawful interference.
It is recommended the security training program to cover (but not be limited to):
• General security awareness and understanding of the security threat
• Supply chain concepts in air cargo
• Methods of preventing unlawful interference, or criminal activities
including theft, pilferage etc.
• Security access control requirements
• Understanding of security IDs and authorization to enter secure
freight operational areas
• Patrolling procedures
• Manual screening and searching techniques
• Identification of IEDs and other threats
• Operation of screening equipment and x-ray imaging (where appropriate)
• Manual handling
• Communication/notification training (where appropriate)
• CCTV operation (where appropriate)
The awareness training should be job specifics oriented and shall cover topics
established by Company Security Plans and in accordance with local legis-
lation. For example drivers involved in the transportation of air cargo shall be
provided with sufficient security awareness training to enable them to under-
stand and carry out their duties (including incident reporting, truck cabin and
ignition keys protection).
The Operator have to establish and maintain records of employees Security
Training in accordance with the requirements of the local legislations. The
employer must maintain and retain records of recruitment, employment,
resignation, termination and retirement of an employee for a minimum of two
(2) years or unless otherwise directed by local employment regulations.
Let’s take a look at the training of screeners.
Training usually includes two major parts: initial employment training (IET) and
on-the-job training (OJT). IET is increasingly being complemented by com-
puter-based training (CBT). OJT, on the other hand, may be quite variable and
its relation to the initial training may not always be optimal or obvious.
A critical component is Training Assessment which is necessary for deter-
mining whether or not the training provided to operators is valid (i.e.
appropriate) and is of sufficient depth and breadth to maximize the probability
that each individual operator will perform to a desired criterion level.
A related element requires an objective evaluation of operators who should
achieve, through a particular training programme, some predetermined and
objective level of performance proficiency that then has to be validated in the
operational environment. Once qualified personnel have been properly selec-
ted, trained and assessed, numerous measures have to be implemented in
order to retain qualified personnel.
CBT may be a combination of computer-based instruction and simulation.
There are CBT systems that have both the instruction and simulation built in.
These systems are also able to test the competency of the screeners from
basic level 3 to advanced level 1.
(a) Computer-based instruction consists of tutorials providing information
on a particular topic area, with questions and applied examples
interspersed throughout a training session. This enables trainees to check
their understanding and learn through feedback throughout the session.
The main objective of computer-based instruction is the development of
knowledge.
(b) Simulation, on the other hand, trains the practical skills of how to operate
an X-ray system and interpret the X-ray image by providing the trainee
with a replication of their field task.
Classroom and CBT training are usually followed by varying periods of OJT.
OJT is provided to allow for mastery of the following tasks: walk-through metal
detector; hand-held metal detector; consent search; bag search; X-ray
screening; and exit lane management. Civil aviation authorities will typically
establish the standards for OJT which would define the topics that must be
covered, the amount of time to be dedicated to each subject, and the
evaluation process for the training.
Some States require up to 99 hours of initial training for airport security
personnel, covering topics such as security objectives, legislation and struc-
tures, the national security programme, airport security objectives and
methods, and working knowledge of automated equipment (including metal
detectors, X-ray systems, and Explosives Detection Systems (EDS)). Class-
room training is usually supplemented by Computer-based Training (CBT) or
web-based training that may be more interactive.
For example, the Netherlands requires screener candidates to train and be
certified as general security officers and then undertake specialized training
and be certified to work as checkpoint screeners. The requirement is 40 hours
of specialized training for screeners, including classroom work, CBT, and role
playing. This is followed by two months of OJT and 24 hours of additional
yearly training to maintain certification.
Assessment
The assessment of the screeners will be another important part of the
training loop. There are a number of ways that they can be assessed. One of
the most effective ways is to use TIP (Threat Image Projection).
The incorporation of TIP as an element of classroom training, CBT and OJT will
enhance efforts to make objective assessment of performance levels and its
relation to earlier training programmes. This is an important way to evaluate the
effectiveness of training programmes by unobtrusively assessing performance
on the job.
7.2.3 Response and Management of
Aviation Incidents
Managing and responding to aviation incidents is important as non-conform-

ance to prescribed procedures for handling them can lead to the incident
developing into a crisis. It is therefore critical that all staff working in cargo
terminals or in cargo warehouses be trained to identify and manage a variety of
incidents that can be experienced in the aviation industry.
These incidents could be man-made such as criminal activities or acts of
terrorism or an act of nature such as a natural disaster. Whatever the case,
organisations must develop procedures for such incidents based on a risk
assessment. Following such an assessment and based on the risks identified,
procedures for managing and reporting such incidents will have to be
developed. Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) will also have to be
developed so that all personnel are able be familiar to their roles and actions.
Of course one important part for an effective and efficient management
process will be training of all personnel on their tasks considering identified
incidents.
Some of the incidents related to cargo could come in the form of discovering
a variety of threats during the screening of cargo, such as discovery of
explosive devices, undeclared DG, prohibited items, etc.
A cargo facility can be subject to unauthorized entry, sabotage, theft of cargo
and syndicated criminal activities. A bomb threat is also a possibility.
It is not possible to have one procedure to be used for all of the above incidents
mentioned but to have specific procedures written up for each type of a threat
identified. This also applies to responding, managing and reporting these
incidents.
It is for this reason that both ICAO and IATA have guidance materials on how
to handle and respond to some of the more common threats such a Bomb
Threat. They also provide different samples of reporting incident templates that
can be used for different types of incidents that aviation related organisations
can encounter. These incidents are classified under ‘Acts of Unlawful Inter-
ference’.
Cargo specific incidents

Some of the cargo specific incidents are as follows:
(a) Theft and attempted theft of cargo
(b) Cargo tampering including suspect tampering of cargo
(c) Discovery of suspicious or unauthorized cargo
(d) Discovery of unauthorized vehicle
(e) Discovery of unauthorized person/s or suspicious person/s
(f) Any other incidents or circumstances that may threaten the security
the warehouse/terminal or cargo and personnel.
Response under the Regulated Agent Regime
In the event of a security alert, either in the cargo warehouse/terminal the
recommended procedure will be:
(a) Brief all relevant personnel, including management
(b) Inform third party service providers to monitor cargo
transportation carefully; including not receiving of any tampered
cargo.
(c) Confirm equipment serviceability (weighing machine), CCTV system are
all operational and any other security technology.
(d) Ensure no cargo is left outside the warehouse/terminal area (during
silent hours or during normal operations)
(e) Extra checks on cargo vehicles (to ensure no signs of tampering)
(f) Monitor cargo operations to ensure no tampering or unauthorized
access takes place
Procedures for responding to and reporting of aviation security incidents
As for other types of incidents that can be encountered in a cargo ware-
house/terminal, the first step is will be to ensure that a security program is
developed for the cargo warehouse/terminal consistent with the established
policy in the national civil aviation security program.
The Security program will outline the responsibility and obligation of policing
authorities, security and other relevant authorities to investigate suspected
explosive devices or other potential hazards at the premises. Explosive
ordnance disposal teams and other specialized personnel should be available
to the authorities to investigate, render safe, remove and dispose of suspected
explosive devices and other potentially dangerous hazards.
In each case, the result of the investigation should be communicated to the

security and airport authorities who, after due consultations with the concerned
agencies will re-evaluate security measures and procedures and take action
necessary to remedy weaknesses. If any changes are contemplated in
procedures for screening of cargo, mail and stores, the matter should be
discussed by the airport security committee and sufficient notice given to the
concerned agencies to enable them to incorporate the change in their
procedures.
It is very important that the cargo security plan clearly reflect, in accordance
with the national aviation security program, responsibility for the evaluation of
all potential bomb or other violent threats, whether they affect aircraft on the
ground or in flight, or buildings on the airport. Bomb warning assessors must
be appointed and appropriately trained in order that they can assess the threat
and give guidance to what security measures are considered appropriate to
counter the threat received.
Each bomb warning by telephone, written message or other means of
communication alleging that an unlawful act will occur at an airport or cargo
chain facilities must be considered serious. Each case should be thoroughly
investigated to safeguard the public. All threats will be reported immediately to
the relevant authority. All key personnel in the warehouse/terminal should be
familiar with a specific reporting format according to the SOP.
When dealing with an incident of a suspect explosive device there are basic
measures which if followed will help in protecting life and limiting damage to
property. A general rule is that any suspect bag, package or vehicle left
unattended or abandoned must only be opened by its owner or, if necessary in
the owner’s absence, by an explosive disposal expert.
For suspected explosive devices staff must be trained NOT to:
(a) touch, manipulate or move the suspect object;
(b) throw water or any other substance on the object;
(c) cover the object;
(d) remain in the immediate vicinity of the object nor allow others to do so;
(e) use radio equipment in the vicinity of the suspect device; or
(f) Produce any sound, heat or vibrations in the vicinity of the object.
If there is fire, staff should inform the fire service immediately. Staff should
attempt to put out the fire using a fire extinguisher, if they are trained.
However, this should only be done if the staff member’s life is not threatened.
Any other flammable products should be kept separate or removed to prevent
the fire from spreading. This should also be done by staff if it is assessed that
it is safe to do so.
Study Check 7.2
1. Human factors (HF) are not essential elements to improving the

effectiveness and efficiency of aviation security?
True or False
2. One mechanism for building international consensus and

collaboration related to recommended practices for HF is the:
(a) International Aviation Security Human Factors Technical
Advisory Group
(b) International Aviation Safety Human Factors Technical Advisory Group
(c) International Aviation Science in Human Factors Technical
Advisory Group
3. States should also develop and implement improved recruitment,

selection, training, and assessment processes for their civil aviation
security personnel.
True or False
4. Human factors should help leverage human capabilities and limitations

to enhance overall system performance.
True or False
5. Human factors considerations in civil aviation security operations

are based on 2 objectives. They are:
(a) To make the civil aviation security system resilient to the
consequences of human error
(b)
6. The human factors framework consists of 4 Axes. They are:

(a) Axis 1 focuses on personnel selection, training and assessment
and retention of security screeners
(b)
(c) Axis 3 focuses on operational environment and organizational culture
(d)
7. Screening officer training usually includes two major parts

(a) initial employment training (IET) and
(b)
8. Computer Based Training (CBT) may be a combination of:

(a) and
(b) simulation.
9. One of the most effectives ways to conduct assessment of screeners is
to use TIP (Threat Image Projection).
True or False
10. Better selection and training would certainly impact positively on

de- creasing such direct costs associated with a high turnover rate.
True or False
11. Aviation related incidents can be man-made or natural. Indicate next to

the incident if it is man-made (mm) or natural (n) as follows:
(a) Sabotage ( )
(b) Bomb Threat ( )
(c) Electrical short circuit ( )
(d) Earthquake ( )
(e) Explosive device ( )
12. The first step is will be to ensure that a security programme is developed
for the cargo warehouse/terminal consistent with the established policy
in the national civil aviation security programme.
True or False
7.2.4 Unit Summary

In this unit we have seen that the objective of human factors considerations in
civil aviation security operations is be to make the civil aviation security system
resilient to the consequences of human error. We have realised that Human
factors will help achieve this objective by leveraging human capabilities and
limitations to enhance overall system performance. We have discussed the
importance of security screeners in aviation and the importance of matching
the limitations and capabilities of the screeners to the processes, procedures,
technologies, and equipment that support civil aviation security operations.
We have also discussed how we can improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of the overall civil aviation security system by considering how many security
officers are required to screen all baggage, how much time is required to
screen a given number of passengers, and how threat detection performance
and compliance should be evaluated.
We looked at the training needs for screeners and how they can be tested and
retained. In this unit we also discussed the importance of responding and
managing aviation related incidents and also cargo specific incidents.
Module Summary
This module provided you an informative overview of management and
administration of cargo security operations. You were also introduced to a new
concept in enhancing security using a pro-active approach to security.
We have explained why this is necessary since the threats that the industry is
facing is very dynamic and terrorists are continuously challenging the alertness
and reactive nature of aviation security.
We have also highlighted that cargo is considered in the aviation industry as
the ‘Achilles heel’, simply because it is still the weakest link in the aviation
security chain because it is not possible at the present time to screen cargo
100% as is done for passengers baggage.
In this module we described the importance of good security management and
administration that will help enhance cargo security operations. We looked at
the training needs for aviation officers, especially security screeners who are
an important group who play a major part in ensuring that explosive or other
threats do not penetrate the aviation network and harm the industry. We also
discussed the importance of responding and managing aviation incidents.
(a) Human factors in security
(b) Training needs
(c) Response and management of aviation incidents
(d) Cargo specific incidents
(e) Response under regulated agent regime
(f) Procedures for responding to and reporting of aviation security incidents
Module Summary 177

Answer Key 10. True
Study Check 7.1 11.
1. True (a) Sabotage (mm)
2. (b) Security management must ‘think pro-active’ (b) Bomb Threat (mm)
3. True (c) Electrical short circuit (n)
4. (c) HRD Guiding Principles (d) Earthquake (n)
5. False (e) Explosive device (mm)
6. 12. True
(a)
(b) Rewards system
(c)
(d) Performance Appraisal system
7.
(a) Rewards scheme for good performance
(c) Promotion scheme
(d) Benefits scheme
8. True
Study Check 7.2

1. False
2. (a) International Aviation Security Human
Factors Technical Advisory Group
3. True
4. True
5. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the overall civil aviation security system
6.
(a) Axis 1 focuses on personnel selection, train-
ing and assessment and retention of
security screeners
(b) Axis 2 looks at the types of equipment that
is used in aviation security
(c) Axis 3 focuses on operational
environment and organizational culture
(d) Axis 4 is about the certification of
the screeners.
7. (b) on-the-job training (OJT).
8. (a) computer-based instruction
9. True
www.iata.org/training
IATA Training & Development Institute

KNOWLEDGE • EXPERIENCE • NETWORKING • SKILLS • RESULTS
Printed in Canada Material Number 400734 ISBN 978-92-9229-325-3

Cargo Security Awareness ETextbook 2nd Ed 2016 TCGP-79-Đã Chuyển Đổi

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Cargo Security

Cargo Security Awareness Course eTextbook 2nd

Module 1: Threats to Civil Aviation...........................................................................................7

Module 2: Introduction to Cargo Security...............................................................................29

Module 3: Implementing Cargo Security Measures..........................................................51

Module 4: Crime Prevention & Security Quality Control Measures................................85

Module 5: Recognition and Management of Threats......................................................111

Module 6: Detection of Threats.............................................................................................125

Module 7: Management and Administration.........................................................................153

7.2 Training and Development....................................................................................................... 165

Did You Know?

• Explain reasons why civil aviation is an attractive target

1.1 Why is Civil Aviation an Attractive Target?

• Describe the profile of civil aviation

Key Learning Point

1.1.2 Profile of Civil Aviation

Unit 1.1: Why is Civil Aviation an Attractive Target? 11

1.1.3 Why it is an Attractive Target

Key Learning Point

1.1.4 Other Developments Adding to Popularity

1.1.5 Unit Summary

• Describe the types of threats

Key Learning Point

1.2.2 Types of Threats

Unit 1.2: Types of Threats, Sources and Methodology 15

1.2.3 Sources of Threats

Did You Know?

1.2.4 Methodology Used in the Past

1.2.5 Unit Summary

1.3 Past Aviation Security Incidents Related

• List the type of incidents

1.3.2 Types of Incidents in the Past

Unit 1.3: Past Aviation Security Incidents Related to Cargo 19

Did You Know?

Key Learning Point

On 19 September 1989 the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 aircraft registered

31 October 2015–Metrojet 7K9268 Sharm el-Sheikh to St Peterburg

1.3.3 Security Measures Implemented as a

1.3.4 Unit Summary

Study Check 1.2

• Define what is cargo

2.1 What is Cargo?

• Describe the terms and definitions

In this unit we will introduce you to Cargo operations. This is important

Key Learning Point

2.1.2 Terms and Definitions

Figure 2.1.2—Cargo Flow

(a) Directly from a consignor/shipper

Study Check 2.1

1. Why is Cargo considered in the aviation industry as the ‘Achilles heel’?

2. It is possible at the present time to screen cargo 100% as is done

4. For operational understanding, any item that is accompanied by an

5. A consignor is the one who:

6. Shipments and items of Cargo may be moved to an Aircraft Operator

7. There are many types of shipments, they include:

2.2 The Reasons and Guidelines

• Describe the reasons for cargo security

2.2.1 Reasons for Cargo Security

It is difficult to target a specific flight.

It is traditionally assumed that it is difficult to target an aircraft because:

Unit 2.2: The Reasons and Guidelines of Cargo Security 39

Key Learning Point

2.2.2 Challenges for Security

Diversity and dimension