Chlor Alkali Industry

Lords Chloro Alkali Limited
Plot no.SP-460, Matsya Industrial Area, Alwar,

Rajasthan-301030, India.
Risk Analysis
Report Prepared by:-
www.qmsglobal.in
M/s QMS India Ltd.

nd
94/26, 2 Floor, Kalpataru, Vijay Path, Mansarovar, Jaipur-302020,
Email: desk@qmsglobal.in, qms.india@hotmail.com
M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited
2018-19
Risk Analysis Study
TABLE OF CONTENT
Chapter Title Page No.
1 Introduction
2 Company Detail
3 Risk Assessment
4 Safety at Project Site
5 Risk Mitigation Measures
Conclusion and suggestion
Annexures
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background of the Study
As per Environment Impact Assessment Notification dated 14th September 2006,
operation of power plants above 500MW requires Environmental Clearance (EC) from
MoEF as category ‘A’ project before the commencement of ground activity. M/s Lords
Chloro Alkali Limited has appointed M/s QMS India Limited to prepare the Risk
Assessment report for the MIA Plant District-Alwar, Rajasthan, India to facilitate
environment clearance for the same from Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF),
Govt. of India.
The principle objective of this study was to identify major risks of Chemicals Leakage at
site and to evaluate consequences of identified hazard scenarios for effective
management, suggesting minimum preventive and protective measures & change of
practices to ensure safety.
1.2 Risk Assessment
Accidental risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident
consisting of an event or sequence of events resulting into fire, toxic hazards or explosion
to human health and environment.
Risk Assessment (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular facility
poses to the public. It begins with the identification of probable potential hazardous
events at an industry and categorization as per the predetermined criteria. The
consequences of major credible events are calculated for different combinations of
weather conditions to simulate worst possible scenario. These consequence predictions
are combined to provide numerical measures of the risk for the entire facility.
In practice the selection of accident scenarios for analysis is carried out on the basis of
past accident analysis at similar projects, engineering judgement and expertise in the field
of risk analysis especially in accident analysis.
a. To estimate risk to public receptors i.e. employees & public

b. To evaluate a range of risk reduction measures
c. To meet legal or regulatory requirements as stipulated in Rajasthan Factory and
Boilers Act 1948.
d. To assist and evaluate the emergency preparedness and response plans especially
for the Risk Assessment under different scenarios.
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1.3 Objectives
The main objectives of the Risk Assessment (RA) study are to:
 Identification of vulnerable units with resources to hazard indices,
 Generation of release scenarios for escape of toxic/flammable chemicals from
facilities along the Plant,
 Estimation of damage distances for the accidental release based on different
scenarios,
 Estimation of probability of occurrence of hazardous event through event tree
analysis,
 Modelling of heat loss from buried pipeline due to leak and its dependency on
various parameters,
 Suggestion of risk mitigation measures for storage facilities at plant and electric
hazards along the plant,
 Determine damage due to major hazards having damage potential to life & property
and provide a scientific basis to assess safety level of the facility.
The principle objective of this study was to identify major risks in the manufacture of
specialty fine chemicals and storage of hazardous chemical at site and to evaluate on-site &
off-site consequences of identified hazard scenarios. Pointers are then given for effective
mitigation of hazards in terms of suggestions for effective disaster management, suggesting
minimum preventive and protective measures & change of practices to ensure safety.
1.4 Scope
The scope of the present report is to carry out risk assessment for the Plant. Standard industry
practices are considered while carrying out risk assessment study.
The hazard potential and estimation of consequences in case of its accidental release are the
issues of immediate relevance to be considered. It is therefore, imperative to carry out
Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) analysis at the first stage, which identifies vulnerable
areas around the Plant and suggests a set of recommendations to improve safety. The work
undertaken consists of the following stages:
 Collection of relevant data on operating conditions and selection / evaluation of
accident scenarios for the storage and facilities at plant and along the pipelines
Identification of major risk areas.
 Hazard identification through computation of Fire and Explosion Index (FEI)
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 Damage distance computation based on pool fire, jet fire and flash fire scenarios
Consequential analysis of probable risks / failure cases
 Risk quantification based on probabilities of fire frequency from standard international
database
 Evaluation of heat radiation & pressure wave profiles for identified failure cases
 Risk assessment on the basic of the above evaluation & risk acceptability
 Minimum preventive & protective measures to be taken to minimize risks to maximum
possible extent.
 Giving recommendations for effective disaster management
 Suggesting other measures to further lower the probability of risk
 Preparation of a comprehensive report on the Risk Assessment for the proposed
facilities.
1.5 Methodology:
The procedure used for carrying out the Risk Assessment study is outlined below:
1. Identify potential hazardous situations to determine the vulnerable zones for
Chemicals dispersion using comprehensible software package.
2. Suggest mitigating measures to reduce the damage, considering all aspects of the
facilities.
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The flow chart of the methodology for the present study is shown in following page.
Risk Assessment Study Methodology Flowchart
Start
Data Collection - Facility, Process And Meteorological
Preparation of hazardous operations & storage details list
Identification of potential hazards and their operability
Defining Of Parameters For Each Of Chemicals & Each Of Hazards
Defining release type (continuous or instantaneous )

& determine release rates
Dispersion Modelling of Selected Cases for Consequence
Preparation Of Summery Of Consequence Results
Evaluation Of Potential Risk To The Surrounding Population
Discussion & Recommendation Of Mitigate / Remedial Measures
END
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Chapter – 2 Company Details

M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Ltd. (LCAL) was incorporated in 1979, for producing and exporting a wide
range of chemicals, which commanded the market in North India.
LCAL has built sophisticated manufacturing facilities at Alwar (Rajasthan), having locational
advantage in chlor-alkali deficit region. A well-integrated Caustic-Soda Plant with a capacity of
275 TPD and with a production potential to tap by-products, both functional and non-functional.
Our manufacturing unit is set up in the developed industrial area at SP-460, MIA, Alwar in the
colourful state of Rajasthan, India.
The plant is fully mechanized with the latest state-of-the-art technology machineries from:
 M/s. Asahi Kasei Chemicals Corporation, Japan
 UDHE Germany
2.1 Details of the Plant
S. No. Particulars Details

A. Product Details Production Capacity TPA
B. Existing Proposed Total
(a) (b) (a+b)
C. Caustic soda 90729 74271 165000
D. Chlorine 80190 66247 146437
E. Hydrochloric acid 66000 53475 119475
F. Hydrogen 2272 1857 4129
G. Calcium Hypo 10000 0 10000
H. Stable Bleaching Powder 14520 0 14520
I. Trichloroethylene 5000 0 5000
J. Chlorinated Paraffin wax 0 99000 99000
(CPW)
K. Hydrochloric acid 0 154440 154440
L. Sodium hypochlorite 0 33000 33000
M. Aluminum Chloride 0 33000 33000
N. Mono Chloro Acetic acid 0 33000 33000
O. Sulphuryl chloride 0 33000 33000
P. Boiler Details Particulars Existing Proposed After Expansion
Boiler 15 TPH 10 TPH 25 TPH (10+10+5)
Capacity (10+5)
Q. Location Details
Plot No. SP-460, Matsya Industrial Area (MIA), Alwar (Rajathan)
Tehsil Alwar
District Alwar
State Rajasthan
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Latitude 27°50'37.30"N
Longitude 76°68'51.86"E
Toposheet No. 54A/10, 54A/11, 54A/14, 54A/15
R. Area Details
o Total plant area: 338958.75 sq. m.
o No additional land is required for the proposed
Total Plant Area
expansion, as the same will be done within the
existing plant premises.
40% (135660 sq. m.) of the total plant area has already
been developed under greenbelt / plantation. Green belt
Greenbelt / Plantation Area
is developed along with the road and plant boundary to
(ha)
reduce noise levels, dust pollution and improve
surrounding environment. The same shall be maintained.
S. Environmental Setting Details (with approximate aerial distance & direction from plant
site)
1. Nearest Town /City Alwar ~6.5 km in NW direction from the Project Site
2. Nearest National Highway / o SH 14 - Alwar - Bharatpur (~3.0 km in NNE direction)
State Highway o SH 25 - Alwar - Rajgarh (~6.0 km in WNW direction)
3. Nearest Railway station  Alwar Railway Station ~8.0 km in NW direction from
project site
4. Nearest Airport  Jaipur Airport, 112 km SW direction from project site
Man Power Requirement Additional for
Total after proposed
Existing proposed
(Persons) expansion
expansion
250 150 400
Source: Preference will be given to local area
2.2 Project Site:
The company M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited is located at Latitude 27°50'37.30"N and
longitude 76°68'51.86"E in SP-460, Matsya Industrial Area (MIA), Alwar (Rajathan)
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2.3 Manufacturing Process
General
Brine for Ion Exchange membranes Chloro—alkali process is prepared by dissolving salt through salt
feeding facilities into the return brine from the electrolysis plant, and purified in primary brine
purification plant.
The membrane Chlor—alkali process, however, requires a secondary brine purification process also.
After the conventional treatment, brine is purified with brine filter and ion exchange resin column in
order to obtain suitable quality for the ion exchange membrane Chlor—alkali process.
Primary Brine Purification
Primary brine purification section is composed of salt conveyor system Salt saturator, reactor,
Clarifier, clarified brine tank and associated facilities. This process includes salt saturation, chemical
dosage, reaction, settling and filtration. The purpose of this process is to resituate the return brine
with raw salt and to remove impurities from the saturated raw brine. The return brine is fed to the
top of salt saturator and is saturated with salt while the brine flows upward through the salt bed in
salt saturator. The salt is continuously supplied at the top of the salt saturator by salt conveyor
system.
The saturated raw brine overflows from salt saturator and flows into reactor. Chemicals, such as
Barium chloride, Sodium carbonate, Caustic Soda and flocculent along with re-circulated sludge
from brine clarifier are fed to reactor.
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Calcium, Magnesium and other multivalent cautions in the raw brine react with those chemicals and
are changed to suspended solids while the brine is fed into clarifier.
The suspended solid in the brine are removed by settling separation in clarifier. The brine, thus
clarified, flows into clarified brine tank over the weir of clarifier. Slurry on the bottom of clarifier is
pumped out and re-circulated to the brine line before reactor. A part of slurry is purged to clarifier
slurry pit and pumped out to sludge filtration section.
Secondary Brine Purification
Secondary brine purification section is composed of brine filter and Ion exchange resin column. The
suspended solids in the brine is filtered by brine filter and discharged with filter aid to filter slurry
put. The discharged brine with filter aid pumped out to sludge filter section. Ion exchange resin
column packed with special ion exchange resin is operated and controlled automatically from
control room.
This specially developed ion exchange resin can remove multivalent cat-ions harmful to the ion
exchange membrane to such an extent as cannot be achieved by conventional chemical treatment.
It ensures stable operation of ion exchange Membrane cell.
Electrolysis
The electrolysis section is consists of electrolyzers, catholyte and anolyte circulation tanks.
(i) Electolyzer:
Electrolyzer is composed of a number of bi-polar cell frames with metal anodes and activated
cathode, ion exchange membranes press unit for mounting cell frames, sub headers for anolyte and
catholyte sub headers for discharging electrolysis products.
(ii) Anolyte circulation
Anolyte is fed from anolyte circulation tank and anolyte circulation pump, the anolyte is fed from
anolyte circulation tank to each of anode compartment through sub headers and hoses and re-
circulated to anolyte circulation tank. Purified brine is fed to the anolyte tank in order to keep
anolyte concentration within designed level. The dilute brine is sent to return brine tank and de-
chlorination.
(iii) Catholyte circulation
Catholyte circulation is composed of its tank and catholyte pump. Catholyte is fed from catholyte
circulation tank to each of catholyte compartment through sub headers and hoses and re-circulated
to catholyte circulation tank. Caustic soda concentration is continuously monitored to designed level
by feeding DM water. Caustic soda generated is sent to caustic soda tank.
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Main reaction
In the ion exchange membrane process for producing caustic soda perm selective cat ion exchange
membrane are installed between anode and cathode. The electrolysis is carried in accordance with
following reactions:
Anode Cl– = ½Cl2 + e–
Cathode H2O + e– = ½ H2 + OH–
Overall NaCl + H2O = NaOH + ½ Cl2 + ½ H2
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Chapter 3 –Risk Assessment

3.1 Introduction
Industrial plants deal with materials, which are generally hazardous in nature by virtue of their
intrinsic chemical properties or their operating temperatures or pressures or a combination of
these. Fire, explosion, toxic release or combinations of these are the hazards associated with
industrial plants using hazardous chemicals. More comprehensive, systematic and sophisticated
methods of Safety Engineering, such as, Hazard Analysis and Quantitative Risk Assessment
have now been developed to improve upon the integrity, reliability and safety of industrial
plants.
The primary emphasis in safety engineering is to reduce risk to human life, property and
environment. Some of the more important methods used to achieve this are:
 Quantitative Risk Analysis: Provides a relative measure of the likelihood and severity of
various possible hazardous events by critically examining the plant process and design.
 Work Safety Analysis: The technique discussed whether the plant layout and operating
procedures in practice have any inherent infirmities.
 Safety Audit: Takes a careful look at plant operating conditions, work practices and work
environments to detect unsafe conditions.
Together, these three broad tools attempt to minimize the chances of accidents occurring. Yet,
there always exists, no matter how remote, probability of occurrence of a major accident. If the
accident involves highly hazardous chemicals in sufficiently large quantities, the consequences
may be serious to the plant, to surrounding areas and the populations residing therein.
3.2 Risk Assessment
A three levels‟ risk assessment approach has been adopted for the M/s Lords Chloro Alkali
Limited SP-460, Matsya Industrial Area (MIA), Alwar (Rajathan). The risk assessment levels are
generally consistent with the practices encountered through various assignments for medium
and large chemical industries. The brief outline of the three tier approach is given below:
 Level 1 – Risk Screening
This is top-down review of worst- case potential hazards/risks, aimed primarily at identifying
plant sites or areas within plant, which pose the highest risk. Various screening factors
considered include:
 Inventory of hazardous materials;
 Hazardous Materials properties;
 Storage conditions (e.g. temperature and pressure);
 Location sensitivity (distance to residential areas/populace).
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The data/information is obtained from plant. The results provide a relative indication of the
extent of hazards and potential for risk exposure.
 Level 2 – Major Risk Survey (Semi - Quantitative)
The survey approach combines the site inspection with established risk assessment
techniques applied both qualitative as well quantitative mode. The primary objective is to
identify and select major risks at a specific location in the plant considering possible soft
spots/weak links during operation/maintenance. Aspects covered in the risk usually
include:
 Process Hazards;
 Process Safety Management Systems;
 Fire Protection and Emergency response equipment and programs.
 Security Vulnerability;
 Impact of hazards consequences (equipment damage, business interruption, injury,
fatalities);
 Qualitative risk identification of scenarios involving hazardous materials;
 Risk reduction measures.
Selection of critical scenarios and their potential of damage provide means of prioritising
mitigative measures and allocate the resources to the areas with highest risks.
 Level 3 – Quantitative Risk Assessment (Deterministic)
This is the stage of assessment of risks associated with all credible hazards (scenarios) with
potential to cause an undesirable outcome such as human injury, fatality or destruction of
property. The four basic elements include:
i. Hazards identification utilising formal approach (Level 2, HAZOP etc.);
ii. Frequency Analysis. Based on past safety data (incidents / accidents); Identifying likely
pathway of failures and quantifying the toxic/ inflammable material release;
iii. Hazards analysis to quantify the consequences of various hazards scenarios (fire,
explosion, BLEVE, toxic vapour release etc.).Establish minimum value for damage (e.g.
IDLH, over pressure, radiation flux) to assess the impact on environment.
iv. Risk Quantification: Quantitative techniques are used considering effect/ impact due
to weather data, population data, and frequency of occurrences and likely hood of
ignition / toxic release. Data are analysed considering likely damage (in terms of injury/
fatality, property damage) each scenarios is likely to cause.
QRA provides a means to determine the relative significance of a number of undesired
events, allowing analyst and the team to focus their risk reduction efforts where they will
be beneficial most.
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 The company is an existing plant as well as proposed expansion project which is
hazardous in nature. The QRA for this plant is based on Level 1 and Level 2.
 The below table gives the list of products (and their monthly production capacity)
to be manufactured in the project. Table below gives the bulk storages of liquid and
gaseous raw materials and their monthly consumption.
Bulk Hazardous Materials Storages (Table 3.1)
Production Capacity TPA (MT)

S.No Name of Product Existing Proposed Total State
(a) (b) (a+b)
1 Caustic soda 90.729 74.271 165.000 Solid
2 Chlorine 80.190 66.247 146.437 Liquid
3 Hydrochloric acid 66.000 53.475 11.9475 Liquid
4 Hydrogen 2.272 1.857 4.129 Gas
5 Calcium Hypo 10.000 - 10.000 Solid
6 Stable Bleaching Powder 14.520 - 14.520 Solid
7 Trichloroethylene 5.000 - 5.000 Liquid
8 Chlorinated Paraffin wax (CPW) - 99000 99.000 Liquid
9 Hydrochloric acid - 154.440 154.440 Liquid
10 Sodium hypochlorite - 33.000 33.000 Liquid
11 Aluminum Chloride - 33.000 33.000 Solid
12 Mono Chloro Acetic acid - 33.000 33.000 Solid
13 Sulphuryl chloride - 33.000 33.000 Liquid
3.3 Risk Screening Approach

Risk screening of the plant was undertaken through process study and study of data/information
provided by company. Data of major/ bulk storages of raw materials, intermediates and other
chemicals were collected. MSDS of hazardous chemicals were studied vis a vis their inventories
and mode of storage. The plant will be using number of hazardous chemicals and also producing
organic chemicals – hazardous in nature. The chemicals stored in bulk (liquid or gaseous) and
defined under MSHIC Rule will be considered for detailed analysis. Most of the chemicals are
hazardous in nature. However hazards potential (for damage) of products and other materials to
plant personnel, environment and off-site area is different for different materials. The company
will be using different types of raw materials but only 13 are stored in bulk and are listed under
“List of hazardous and Toxic Chemicals” category under MSIHC Rules, 1989 (including
subsequent amendments). The raw materials coming under hazardous category as specified by
MSIHC Rules, 1989 (including subsequent amendments) is given in annexure 1.
3.4 Risk Assessment Approach
Identification of hazards and likely scenarios (based on Level-1 and Level-2 activities) calls for
detailed analysis of each scenario for potential of damage, impact area (may vary with weather
conditions/wind direction) and safety system in place. Subsequently each incident is classified
according to relative risk classifications provided in Table below as Table 3.2:
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Table 3.2 Risk probability

Stage Description
Serious Incident One that could cause:
(> 10-2/yr.)  Any serious injury or fatality on/off site;
 Property damage of Rs 1 Crore offsite or Rs. 5 Crore
onsite.
10‐3/yr. A failure which could reasonably be expected to occur within
the expected life time of the plant. Examples of high failure
likelihood are process leaks or single instrument or valve
failures or a human error which could result in releases of
hazardous materials.
This level is unacceptable to everyone.
Accidents providing hazard at this level are difficult to find,
when risk approached this level, immediate action is taken to
reduce the hazard.
(10-3-10-4/yr.) A failure or sequence of failures which has a low probability of
occurrence within the expected lifetime of the plant. Examples of
moderate likelihood are dual instrument or valve failures,
combination of instrument failures and human errors, or single
failures of small process lines or fittings.
Safety slogans popularized for accident in this category
shown an element of fear, i.e. the life you save may be your
own.
(<10-4) A failure or series of failures which have a very low
probability of occurrence within the expected lifetime of
plant. Examples of „low‟ likelihood are multiple instruments
or valve failures or multiple human errors, or single
spontaneous failures of tanks or process vessels.
10‐6/yr. Impact limited to the local area of the event
Not of great concern to average person.
Assigning a relative risk to each scenario provides a means of prioritising associated risk
mitigation measures and planned actions.
3.5 Risk Acceptance
The acceptance of risk by individuals and collectively by society in M/s Lords Chloro Alkali
Limited is affected by many parameters. Some people may accept the risk voluntarily while
some may do so involuntarily. The general public acceptance also depends on their
understanding and knowledge of risks. Finally each individual has a different perception for risk
acceptance. The lowest level for involuntary uses is set by the risk of death from natural events
such as lightening, flood, earthquakes, etc. M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited is carried out survey
of risks in this range which is shown in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3 Risk level for various activities commonly encountered

S N. Activities/Resources Estimated Risk *10-6 fatalities per year
1. Run over by Road Accidents 55
2. Natural Disasters 1.8
3. Falling Aircrafts 0.9
4. Explosions of vessels 0.5
5. Transportation of Chemicals 0.7
3.6 Starting Event (SE) Severity Risk Categories

The severity is evaluated by considering the impact of the possible consequences in terms
of:
 Health and safety of people;
 Public disruption;
 Environmental;
The definition of the severity has been done according to the criteria defined in the
table:-
Categories of Severity Table: 3.4
Categories Criteria
of Severity Health/Safety Public Disruption Environmental
1 Minor impact on Minimal to none Minor / little or no response
personnel; first needed
aid only
2 Medical Minor isolated Moderate / limited
treatment for impact, no coverage response of short duration
personal; lost by national media oil spill response
time incident communicated by media
3 Serious injury to Small community Serious / significant
personnel impact on public is resource commitment oil
limited, attracts spill response
national media communicated by media
4 Impairment of Large community Major / extended duration /
temporary refuge impact on a large full scale response requires
scale and corporate assistance and
communicated by picked up by national /
national / international media
international media
Starting Event (SE) frequency categories:

The frequency of occurrence of each SE is based on quantitative criteria, considering failure
rates of equipment and systems. Quantitative criteria are based on available data banks
and technical literature for equipment failure. The definition of the frequency has been
done according to the criteria defined in table.
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Starting event risk categories:
The risk class is defined as a combination of frequency and severity. Accordingly a Risk
Matrix has been prepared and this risk matrix is presented in table 3.5.
Frequency Description Definition

Category
A Practically Scenario should not occur during the life of plant.
impossible No historical references to suggest that it will occur.
Frequency: < 1 in 106 years.
B Not likely but Similar events are unlikely to occur, but occurred
possible somewhere in the world.
Multiple events of reliable systems are in place.
Frequency: 1 in 104 to 1 in 106 years.
C Occurs Likely to occur with this kind of installation during its life.
sometime This event could occur with multiple system failures,
unlikely to fail all together.
Frequency: 1 in 103 to 1 in 104 years.
D Isolated Likely to occur with this kind of installation during its life.
incidents Human errors can cause the event
Less than three levels of protection.
Frequency: 1 in 10 to 1 in 103 years
E Repeated Likely to occur at this location.
incidents Event has occurred in similar installations.
Single failure can cause the event.
Frequent: >1 in 10 years.
Risk category matrix Table 3.6
Severity Frequency Category

Category A B C D E
1 NCR NCR NCR NCR NCR
2 NCR NCR MR MR CR
3 NCR MR MR CR CR
4 MR MR CR CR CR
Risk Category Description
NCR Non The risk is considered acceptable. No additional measures
Critical required.
MR Moderate The risk is considered acceptable, but when kept under
control. Required additional controls should be evaluated
and implemented; employing benefits analysis to evaluate
the available alternatives in order to attain further reduction
of the risk.
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CR Critical The risk is considered normally not acceptable with existing

controls. Operational alternative methods should be
considered in order to reduce the probability of occurrence
as well as the consequences to levels as low as feasible.
Evaluating risks is important for determining priorities for the implementation of risk
control measures, prevention and mitigation and the likelihood of the incident occurring
(F) and the severity of the possible consequences (C). The severity of the possible
consequences related to the risks to environment, safety, property and stakeholders is
illustrated in Table below.
Severity of Possible Consequences (C) Table 3.7
S.N. Severity Safety Property Environment Stakeholders
1. Catastrophic Multiple fatalities. Total loss. Long-term Tank operations
Local communities Extensive costs environmental cease. Long-
and public to replace. impairment of term loss of
affected. ecosystem trade.
functions. Trans-
boundary pollution
and major spill
response.
2. Severe Single fatality or Severe structural Serious medium Bad national
multiple severe damage. High term publicity. Tank
injuries costs to repair Environmental operations
and service. effects. Spill restricted
response required. temporarily.
Medium-term
loss of trade.
3. Significant Multiple or severe Structural Moderate short- Bad national and
injuries damage. Low term effects of local publicity.
costs. pollution and Tank operations
minimal response restricted
required temporarily.
Short-term loss
of trade
4. Minor Minor injuries Minor structural Non-significant spill, Bad local
and equipment minor pollution. publicity
damage. Local response Or short-term
Minimal costs. needed. loss of revenue
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3.7 Quantitative Risk Assessment

Start
Identify Consequence Outcomes
Select Consequence Outcomes
Next Next
Estimate Consequence
Record Frequency and Consequence

in a summary Table
Have all Consequence outcomes

been studied?
Have all failure cases been studied?
Have all risk areas been studied?
Finish
YES
3.8 Hazardous Material Storage

The solid raw materials will be received in bags or drums and will be stored in godowns. The
products (liquid or solid) will be packed in drums and stored in product godowns as per market
demand. The bulk storages of liquid hazardous materials are given in the Table 3.1 above.
The solid material spillage can results in polluting small area only. The damage to personnel can
be through ingress- dermal (if individual come in contact), oral (if individual food gets infected
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through fugitive dust) or inhalation (fugitive dust). The main route is fugitive dust which in
covered area will move to short distance only.
The risk is through liquid/gaseous materials which are volatile material. The toxic vapours due to
spillage of such material can travel to some distance and cause damage.
As per the list of the hazardous chemical storage and handling Safety:-
o PESO classified products are received through road tanker and stored in PESO
storage tank as per rules.
o Tank farm is constructed as per PESO department requirement and separation
distance will be maintained.
o Static earthing provision is made for road tanker as well as storage tank.
o Road tanker unloading procedure is prepared and implemented.
o Fire Hydrant and Fire fighting system is provided as per Indian std.
o Spark arrestor on tanker exhaust line is being provided to all vehicles in side
premises.
o Flame proof type equipments and lighting are provided.
o Trained and experience operators are employed for tank farm area.
o As per Indian Standard and NFPA label (hazard identification) capacity and content
are displayed on storage tank training for the same.
o Chemical/Solvents are transferred by pump only in plant area and day tanks are
provided in process area. DCS operation logics provided in tanks and all controls
with interlocking system provided for process as well as storage tank farm safety.
o Double Jumpers are provided on flammable chemical handling pipeline flanges.
o Flexible SS hose are used for road tanker unloading and loading purpose.
o Static earthing automation arrangement provided at unloading and loading station
for road tanker.
o Double static earthing provided to storage tank.
Hydrogen cylinders
o Hydrogen will be in the tank area as per the layout. Storage licence is obtained
from PESO as per rules.
o Hydrogen storage area is available in open area with well ventilated and safe
distance will be maintained as per rule.
o Sprinkler system provision will be made in storage area.
o Gas detectors will be provided in Hydrogen storage area.
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o Copper tube will be used for Hydrogen connection with header.

o PRV station will be provided for Hydrogen.
o Non sparking tools will be used for any maintenance work.
o Work permit followed
o Firefighting equipment provided.
o PPEs used during the work, Safety shower, eye wash provided.
o Level indicator, alarm for high level & temperature at local as well as on DCS.
Hydrogenation Plant:
o Total enclosed process system.
o DCS operational plant
o Safety valve and other safety provisions provided in the process.
o Cooling Chilling and power alternative arrangement have been made.
o PRV station with shut off valve, safety valve provision will be available for
hydrogenation reaction.
o SOP will be prepared and displayed at process area, operators will be trained for
the same.
o Static earthing and electric earthing (Double ) provided.
o Rector vent extended outside the process area and flame arrestor provided on
vent line.
Toxic Hazards
o Acid spillage-its impact will be limited to spillage area. Any person moving in area
and getting splash will get the injury. In addition the spillage will cause pollution
problem. The spillage is to be collected and neutralized for toxic contents before
disposal.
Occupational Health
o Company will have a well-equipped first aid Center. It will also have staff
personnel trained in first aid. Injured personnel will be immediately rushed to
hospital after giving first aid. All employees will have regular medical checkup as
per norms. An emergency vehicle/ambulance will always (round the clock)
available for meeting any eventuality.
For Acid and Alkali storage area (Sulfuric Acid and Hydrochloric Acid)
o Caution note and emergency first aid measures will be displayed and available,
training for the same to al l employees will be done.
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o Carbouys will be stored away from the process plant.

o Indian standard and NFPA label will be displayed.
o Required PPEs like full body protect ion PVC suit, Hand gloves, gumboot,
Respiratory mask etc. will be provided to operator.
o Neutralizing agent will be kept ready for tackle any emergency spillage.
o Safety shower, eye wash with quenching unit will be provided in acid storage
area.
Process Safety:
o DCS control system for the existing plant as well as proposed facilities.
o Any rise in temperature, pressure etc. will be indicated with alarm followed by
necessary corrective act ion. Also provided Safety interlocks and redundancy in
DCS.
o All vessels & storage tanks are provided with high level alarms and necessary
pump tripping system.
o Gas leak detect ion & alarm system provided in all the critical area of the plant.
o Fire water tank & fire hydrant piping are provided for entire plant. Jet monitor
with foam trolley /hydrant points / fire extinguisher etc. are provided at strategic
points.
o Existing fire hydrant system will be updated and extended for proposed facilities
o All chemicals are stored in PESO licensed area with al l regulatory requirements.
o Standby DG power is provided for all process requirements.
o HSE management system is fully implemented. All procedures like work to
permit, Tanker loading and unloading, Accident investigation, Preventive
maintenance schedule, Static earthing and electrical earthing, etc. prepared and
implemented.
o The reaction is carried by heating, cooling, chilling, brine as a utility through
jackets/limpet coils.
o Control loops for control of pressure and temp. in the reactor s are provided.
o PRV provided from boiler high pressure line to control required pressure in
reactor.
o Utility like Chilling, cooling, vacuum, steaming and its alternative provided to
control reaction parameters in a safe manner.
o Free Fall of any material on the vessel is avoided.
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o Static earthing provision made at design stage to all solvent handling

equipments, reactors, vessels & powder handling equipments.
o All emergency valves and switches and emergency handling facilities are easily
accessible.
o Further all the vessels are examined periodically by a recognized competent
person under the Rajasthan Factory Rules.
o All the vessels and equipments are well earthed appropriately and well
protected against Static Electricity. Also for draining in drums proper earthing
facilities provided.
o Materials transferred by pumping through pipeline from tanks.
o Flame proof light fittings installed in the plant.
o All the Plant Personnel provided with Personal Protection Equipments to protect
against any adverse health effect during operations, leakage, spillages or splash.
o PPE like Helmets, Safety Shoes, Safety Glasses, Acid-Alkali Proof Gloves etc.
provided to the employees as per needs. All employees trained and updated in
Safety aspects through induction and periodic training in safety.
o Material Safety Data Sheets of Raw Materials & Products are readily available at
shop floor.
3.9 Identification of Risk Areas
The procedure for QRA starts with identification of major risk areas in the plant. In
M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited, major risk areas are storage tank, plant processing,
Chlorine Tonner, Boiler, utility etc.
• Bulk loading from storage tanks or unloading from Tanker to storage tank.
• Majority of the major accident hazard in the above operations arise from the
property of the chemicals involved. Therefore, majority of the actual accident
events in the plant are fire, Toxic leakage and explosion.
3.10 Identification of Failure cases for risk areas
• Release due to catastrophic failure of storage tanks or process vessels.
• Rupture of connected pipe with storage tank or process vessels.
• Continuous release at significant rates for long durations transfer pipelines
caused by sudden, major break of the pipeline.
• Continuous release at low rate through small holes or cracks in piping and
vessels, flange leaks, and leakage from pump glands and similar seals.
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3.11 Major Hazard

Hazard is an inherent property of a substance, agent and source of energy or situation
having the potential to cause undesirable consequence (e.g. properties that can cause
adverse effects or damage to health, the environment or property)
The following section addresses the major workplace fire hazards at M/s Lords Chloro
Alkali Limited:-
A. Fire and explosion
B. Electrical Fire hazards
C. Office Fire Hazards
D. Cutting, Welding, and Open Flame Work
E. Flammable and Combustible Materials
F. Smoking
G. Others like Portable Heaters etc
A. Fire and explosion
M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited, Stores chemicals such as Chlorine, Hydrogen etc
through tanks and its facilities. Fire and explosion can occur due to leakage or secondary
fire, a detailed Emergency plan is available to handle such risks. Dispersion models are
attached in the annexure.
B. Electrical Fire hazards
Electrical system failures and the misuses of electrical equipment are leading causes of
workplace fires. Fires can result from lose ground connections, wiring with frayed
insulation, or overloaded fuses, circuits, motors, or outlets.
To prevent electrical fires, employees shall:
1. Make sure that worn wires are replaced.
2. Use only appropriately rated fuses.
3. Never use extension cords as substitutes for wiring improvements.
4. Use only approved extension cords.
5. Check wiring in hazardous locations where the risk of fire is especially high.
6. Check electrical equipment to ensure that it is either properly grounded or double
insulated.
7. Ensure adequate spacing while performing maintenance.
C. Office Fire Hazards
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Fire risks are limited to M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited, industrial facilities. Fires in
offices have become more likely because of the increased use of electrical equipment,
such as computers and fax machines. To prevent office fires, employees shall:
1. Avoid overloading circuits with office equipment.
2. Turn off non-essential electrical equipment at the end of each workday.
3. Keep storage areas clear of rubbish.
4. Ensure that extension cords are not placed under carpets.
5. Ensure that trash and paper set aside for recycling is not allowed to accumulate.
D. Cutting, Welding, and Open Flame Work
Safety Dept. shall ensure the following:
1. All necessary hot work permits have been obtained prior to work beginning.
2. Oxygen-fuel gas systems are equipped with listed and/or approved backflow valves
and pressure-relief devices.
3. Welders and helpers are wearing eye protection and protective clothing as
appropriate.
4. Cutting or welding is prohibited in areas where explosive atmospheres of gases,
vapors, or dusts could develop form residues or accumulations in confined spaces.
5. Cutting or welding is prohibited on metal walls, ceilings, or roofs built of combustible
sandwich –type panel construction or having combustible covering.
6. Confined spaces such as tanks are tested to ensure that the atmosphere is not over
ten percent of the lower flammable limit before cutting or welding in or on the tank.
7. Small tanks, piping, or containers that cannot be entered are cleaned, purged, and
tested before cutting or welding on them begins.
8. Fire watch has been established.
3.12 Class A combustibles.
These include common combustible materials (wood, paper, cloth, rubber, and plastics)
that can act as fuel and are found in non-specialized areas such as offices.
To handle Class A combustibles safely following measures should be taken:
a. Dispose of waste daily.
b. Keep trash in metal-lined receptacles with tight-fitting covers (metal wastebaskets
that are emptied every day do not need to be covered).
c. Keep work areas clean and free of fuel paths that could allow a fire to spread.
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d. Deep combustibles away from accidental ignition sources, such as hot plates,
soldering irons, or other heat-or spark-producing devices.
e. Store paper stock in metal cabinets.
f. Store rags in metal bins with self-closing lids.
g. Do not order excessive amounts of combustibles.
h. Make frequent inspections to anticipate fires before they start.
Water, multi-purpose dry chemical (ABC), and CO2 are approved fire extinguishing
agents for Class A combustibles.
3.13 Class B combustibles.
These include flammable and combustible liquids (oils, greases, tars, oil-based paints,
and lacquers), flammable gases, and flammable aerosols.
To handle Class B combustibles safely:
a. Use only approved pumps, taking suction form the top, to dispense liquids from
tanks, drums, barrels, or similar containers (or use approved self-closing valves or
faucets).
b. Do not dispense Class B flammable liquids into containers unless the nozzle and
container are electrically interconnected by contact or by a bonding wire. Either the
tank or container must be grounded.
c. Store, handle, and use Class B combustibles only in approved locations where vapors
are prevented from reaching ignition sources such as heating or electric equipment,
open flames, or mechanical or electric sparks.
d. Do not use a flammable liquid as a cleaning agent inside a building (the only
exception is in a closed machine approved for cleaning agent inside a building (the
only exception is in a closed machine approved for cleaning with flammable liquids).
e. Do not use, handle, or store Class B combustibles near exits, stairs, or any other areas
normally used as exits.
f. Do not weld, cut, grind, or use unsafe electrical appliances or equipment near Class
B combustibles.
g. Do not generate heat, allow an open flame, or smoke near Class B combustibles.
h. Know the location of and how to use the nearest portable fire extinguisher rated for
Class B fire.
Water should not be used to extinguish Class B fires caused by flammable liquids.
Water can cause the burning liquid to spread, making the fire worse. To extinguish a
fire caused by flammable liquids, exclude the air around the burning liquid. The
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following fire-extinguishing agents are approved for Class B combustibles: carbon

dioxide, multi-purpose dry chemical (ABC), Halon 1301, and Halon 1211.
3.14 Identification of Hazards
Risk assessment process rests on identification of Specific hazards, hazardous area of
LCAL, and hazard scenario & vulnerable to effect of hazardous situations in facilities
involved in processing and storage of gases/chemicals. Identification of hazards is the
most important step to improve the safety of LCAL Plant. The hazard study is designed to
identify the hazard in terms of chemicals/ Gases inventories and vulnerable
practices/operations.
The following main hazards may exist in the factory under the situations given below-
 High temperature and pressure.
 Fire & explosions (due to inflammable / combustible materials).
 Toxic and corrosive chemicals.
 Toxic and flammable gases and dust.
 Electricity (Receiving / Distribution).
 Disposal of wastes.
 Work at heights.
 Work in confined spaces / vessels / tank etc.
 Non-working of safety devices, interlocks, failure of high RPM machineries.
 Any other consequences due to leak of Chemicals.
 Hazards during heavy equipment handling (Crane, etc.)
 Road accident
General Nature of Hazards
In M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited, Chemicals to be handled are highly toxic,
inflammable and also have explosive properties. Any small fire in the installation, if not
extinguished at early stage can cause large scale damage and may have a cascading
effect. Hence the unit have -
a. A quick responsive containment and control system requiring well planned safety and
fire fighting system.
b. Well organized trained manpower to handle the process equipment & systems safely.
c. Well trained personnel to handle safety and fire fighting equipment to extinguish fire
inside the installation promptly as well as tackle any type of emergency.
d. Well planned Disaster Management Plan.
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3.15 Event Frequency/Release Event Tree

It is estimate of the number of times a specified phenomenon (events) occurs within a
specified interval. The event frequency includes all the causes, namely overfilling,
rollover, overpressure, under pressure, material/construction defects and maintenance
hazards. It is also common practice to take this frequency as inclusive of natural hazards
since the generic event frequencies calculated in the literature include failures caused by
natural events such as earthquakes etc.
For any single release from a vessel or piping system, several different hazards may
occur, dependent on such factors as availability of ignition sources and the reactivity of
the material (for overpressure potential). The chance that any single event will result
from a release of material is dependent on these factors, as well as the “size” of the
release. For this work, the release size was divided into three categories.
a. Small releases (leaks), characterized by a 1/4-inch (6.35 mm) diameter hole.
b. Moderate releases (punctures), characterized by a 1-inch (25.4 mm) diameter hole.
c. Large releases (ruptures), characterized by a hole with a diameter equal to the pipe
diameter or, for vessels and certain process equipment, a hole with a diameter
equal to the diameter of the largest attached pipe.
Each delayed ignition branch divides again into two branches: flash fire (and subsequent
pool/torch fire) and vapor cloud deflagration (explosion). If the release does not find an
ignition source, the outcome is dissipation of the hazardous fluid. The bottom of the
event tree shows twelve “outcomes” that have some Probability of occurring if the
release occurs.
3.16 Event Tree for a Flammable Release
Process Piping Failure
The section of pipe is defined as any straight portion of pipe of welded construction
between any two fittings (such as flanges, valves, strainers, elbows, etc.). Pipe failure
rates are not sufficiently detailed to allow a determination of the failure frequency as a
function of the size of the release (i.e., size of the hole in the pipe).
Valves
The valve body can be considered similar to pipe, and the valve bonnet gasket can be
treated like other gaskets. To be conservative, each flanged valve is considered to have a
failure rate equal to a 10-foot (3-m) section of pipe and one gasket. Similarly, a threaded
valve is treated like 10 feet (3 m) of pipe, one gasket, and one screwed fitting.
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Pressure Vessel Failure Rates

Bush’s number is based on “disruptive” failures which are assumed to be failures of such
magnitude that the affected vessel would need to be taken out of service immediately for
repair or replacement. The following failure rates are proposed for pressurized process
vessels Table 3.8.
Hole size up to ¼ inch ¼ inch to 1 inch 1 inch to full rupture
Expected failure 3.0 x 10- 4.0 x 10-5/year 5.0 x 10-6/year
rate 5/year
S.No Scenarios Effect

1. Tank on Fire Fire in any one storage tank can damage the
tank as well as other tanks in the immediate
vicinity and may have a cascading effect.
2. Vessel connection Can cause fire damaging all the tanks if the fire
Failure/ Catastrophic is not tackled immediately. Explosion can occur
Failure of Storage Tank due to failure of MS tank nozzle failure/MS
tank catastrophic failure.
3. Gasket Failure in Pump Can cause Pool fire/Jet fire and explosion,
Discharge Line damaging adjoining pipelines, tanks and other
properties.
4. Full bore failure of Can cause pool fire and explosion, damaging
Pump Discharge lines adjoining pipelines, tanks and other properties.
5. Failure of Unloading Arm Can cause fire/explosion damaging the trucks,
pipelines and entire loading.
6. Mechanical seal failure of Can cause fire damaging the pumps and other
pumps
Pump Failure Rates

For pumps fitted with double mechanical seals, a major seal leak occurs only if both seals
fail. If the two seal failures were always caused by independent events, the failure rate
for a double seal configuration would be the square of the single seal failure rate.
However, some causes of seal failure can result in the simultaneous failure of both seals
(e.g., bearing failures, excessive vibration, improper installation, etc.).
Human Error
The probability of occurrence of any specific accident can be influenced by human error.
However, in most situations, it is not possible to quantify this influence. Fortunately, it is
seldom necessary to attempt such quantification. There are two general forms in which
human error can contribute to the failure of a component or system of components. The
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first form, which is implicit in nature, includes poor component design, improper
specification of components, flawed manufacturing, and improper selection of materials of
construction, and similar situations that result in the installation and use of defective
components or the improper use of non-defective components. The second form, which is
explicit in nature, includes improper operation and improper maintenance.
Most of the available equipment failure rate data bases do not categorize the causes of
the failures. Whether the rupture of a pipe is due to excessive corrosion, poor design,
improper welding procedure, or some other cause, the rupture is simply added to the
data base as one “pipe failure.” Thus, since implicit human errors manifest themselves in
the form of component failures, they are already included in the failure rate data bases
for component failures.
3.17 Hazards Area of M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited (LCAL)

Manufacturing process of LCAL Indicates usage of various raw materials along with type
of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily seen that raw materials even though
hazardous in nature, are used in continuous process & inventory are large/midsize at
process plant.
Following area considered as hazardous area at LCAL
1. Chemicals Storage Area at LCAL
2. Utility area of LCAL
3. Road Tanker unloading.
4. Other Critical Equipments
5. Boiler
3.18 Hazard Scenario and Effects
Following hazard scenarios are considered for detailed analysis and safe distances
computed.
All the scenarios are having damage potential to a different degree. However, maximum
damage can happen due to storage tank/pipeline connection failure or in case of tank
fire. In all the above cases fire/explosion can occur due to ignition of the vapor of
petrochemical products. The sources of ignitions may be
a. Hot work in the vicinity
b. Smoking
c. Lightning
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d. Generation of static electricity

e. Radiant heat from outside.
f. Deliberate ignition or sabotage.
3.19 Safe Practice followed for handling, storage, transportation and unloading of
chemicals
Recommendations
Recommendations are made for different aspects of the OHS parameters in project and are
given in subsequent paragraphs.
Storage of Hazardous Chemicals in Bulk

 Attempt should be made to find suitable less hazardous alternate chemicals, to
replace the hazardous chemical. The inventory of all hazardous chemicals for that
matter must be kept as minimum as possible.
 The tanks should be located so as not to pose safety problems due to leakage and
reaction with other chemicals stored nearby.
 The storage area should be declared as a prohibited area and should be provided
with fencing having at least two exits/“No Smoking” and/or “Prohibited Area” display
boards, as applicable should be provided at site.
 The storage tank and foundation should be of suitable material of construction to
prevent corrosion.
 The connections and openings to the tank should be as less as possible so that the
possibility of leakage and maintenance hazards is minimized.
 Each storage tank should have necessary instruments to monitor its level, pressure
and temperature.
 The storage tanks/area should have suitable fire protection and fire fighting facility.
 The name of chemical, type of hazard, emergency operational instructions, antidote,
first aid etc. should be displayed near each tank.
 All cables and electric fittings shall be constructed, installed, protected, operated and
maintained in such a manner so as to prevent risk of open sparking.
Storage of Hazardous Chemicals in Drums and other Containers
 The drums should never be filled full with the liquid chemical. There should be
sufficient space to take care of thermal Greenfield.
 The drums should preferably be stored in a well-ventilated shed (preferably away
from process units) with impermeable floor sloping away from drums.
 Periodic site inspection should be carried out to ensure that there is no leakage from
any of the drums.
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Unloading of Tank Trucks
 Before the tanker enters the industry premises, the tanker is to be inspected for
authorized entry and safe and sound condition of the tanker, its contents and that of
the prime mover. Tankers entering plant are to be fitted with flare arresters on their
exhaust.
 Static charge neutralizing at gate entry only.
 The quality of the chemical in the tanker should be ascertained before unloading to
avoid contamination of chemical already at storage.
 Coupling used for connecting hose to tanker must be leak proof.
 For flammable chemicals, the tanker and the hose are to be properly earthed before
starting unloading operation.
 Unloading should be done under personal supervision of responsible staff authorized
by the management.
 Provision of sample quantity of water/neutralizing medium to take care of leakage /
spillage must be made.
 Fire alarm and fire fighting facility commensurate with the chemical should be
provided at the unloading point.
Transportation, Unloading and handling procedure for chemicals Table 3.9:-
S.No. Activity Type of Possible Procedures.
Hazard
1 Transportation Leakage,  Training will be provided to driver and
by road tanker Spillage, fire, cleaner regarding the safe driving,
explosion, Toxic hazard of Flammable chemicals,
release emergency handling, use of SCBA sets.
 TREM card will kept with Transporter.
 Fire extinguishers will be kept with
tanker.
 Spark arrestor will be provided to
tanker exhaust.
 Instructions will be given not to stop
road tanker in populated area.
 Clear Hazard Identification symbol and
emergency telephone number will be
displayed as per HAZCHEM CODE.
 Appropriate PPEs will be kept with
tanker.
2 Road tanker Leakage,  Priority will be given to Tanker to

unloading at Spillage, fire, immediately enter the storage
site. explosion, toxic premises at site and will not be kept
release waiting near the gate or the main road.
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 Security person will check License,

TREM CARD, Fire extinguisher
condition, First Aid Box condition,
Antidote Kit, required PPEs as per SOP
laid down.
 Store officer will take sample as per
sampling SOP from sampling point.
 After approval of QC/QA department
unloading procedure will be allowed be
started.
Following precautions will be adopted
during unloading:-
 Wheel stopper will be provided to
Tanker at unloading platform.
 Static earthing will be provided to road
tanker.
 Tanker unloading procedure will be
followed according to check list and
implemented.
 Flexible SS hose connection will be
done at Tanker outlet line.
 All Tanker valves will be closed.
 Finally earthing connection and wheel
stopper will be removed.
 Only day time unloading will be
permitted.
3 Storage tank Leakage,  Appropriate storage tank will be
safety Spillage, Fire, provided as per IS code.
Explosion, Toxic  Dyke wall will be provided to storage
release. tank as per requirement.
 Level transmitter will be provided with
low level high level auto cut-off
provision.
 Fire hydrant monitor with foam
attachment facility will be provided.
 Dumping / Drain vessel/alternate
vessel will be provided to collect dyke
wall spillage material as per the
requirement.
 Flame proof type pump will be
provided.
 Double static earthing will be provided
to storage tank.
 Jumper clip will be provided to all
Solvent handling pipeline flanges.
4 Transfer from Leakage,  Double mechanical seal type FLP type
storage tank to Spillage due to pump will be provided.
Day tank Line rupture,  Double on / off switch will provided at
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Flange Gasket tank farm and process area near day

failure, Fire, tank. Pump auto cut off with day tank
Explosion, Toxic high level will be provided.
release.  Flame arrestor will be provided on day
tank vent.
 Over flow will be provided for
additional safety.
 NRV will be provided on pump
discharge line.
 Double Jumper clip will be provided to
all solvent handling pipeline.
 Double static earthing will be provided
to day tank.
5 Transfer from Leakage,  Transfer through closed pumping
Day Spillage due to system.
tank to Line rupture,  Total quantity of day tank material will
reactor. Flange Gasket be charged in to reactor at a time.
failure, Fire,  NRV will be provided on day tank
Explosion, Toxic outlet line.
release.  Static earthing will be provided to
storage tank.
 Jumpers will be provided to pipeline
flanges.
Drums Transportation , Unloading and handling procedure Table 3.10
S.No. Activity Type of Possible Procedures.
Hazard
1 Transportation Leakage,  Training will be provided to driver and
of Chemical Spillage, fire, cleaner regarding the safe driving,
drums explosion, Toxic hazard of Flammable chemicals,
release emergency handling, use
 First Aid Kit will be kept.
 Fire extinguishers will be kept.
 Spark arrestor will be provided to
exhaust.
 Instructions will be given not to stop
road tanker in populated area.
 Clear Hazard Identification symbol and
emergency telephone number will be
displayed as per HAZCHEM CODE.
 Appropriate PPEs will be kept.
2 Drums Leakage,  Priority will be given to truck to
unloading at Spillage, fire, immediately enter the storage
site. explosion, Toxic premises at site and will not be kept
release waiting near the gate or the main road.
 Security person will check Licence,
TREM CARD, Fire extinguisher
condition, First Aid Kit condition,
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Antidote Kit, required PPEs as per SOP

laid down.
 QA/QC Chemist will take sample as per
sampling SOP from sampling point.
 After approval ofQA/QC department
unloading procedure will be allowed be
started.
Following precautions will be adopted
during unloading:-
 Wheel stopper will be provided to TL at
unloading platform.
 Only day time unloading will be
permitted.
3 Godown/ Leakage,  Flame Proof type light fittings will be
warehouse Spillage, Fire, provided.
safety Explosion,  Proper ventilation will be provided in
Toxic release. godown.
 Proper label and identification board
/stickers will be provided in the storage
area.
 Conductive drum pallets will be
provided.
 Drum handling trolley / stackers/fork
lift will be used for drum handling.
 Separate dispensing room with local
exhaust and static earthing provision
will be made.
 Materials will be stored as per its
compatibility study and separate area
will be made for flammable, corrosive
and toxic chemical drums storage.
 Smoking and other spark, flame
generating item will be banned from
the Gate.
4 Chemical Leakage,  Solvent transfer by vacuum or by pump
transfer from Spillage due to only.
drum to Day Line rupture,  Static earthing will be provided.
tank/ reactor Flange Gasket  SS flexible hose / conductive hose will
failure, Fire, be used.
Explosion,
Toxic release.
5 Chemical Leakage,  Transferred chemical from drums to

transfer from Spillage due to storage tank/reactor in closed loop by
Day tank to Line rupture, pump.
reactor. Flange Gasket  Total quantity of day tank material will
failure, Fire, be charged in to reactor at a time.
Explosion,  NRV will be provided on day tank
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Toxic release. outlet line.

 Static earthing will be provided to
storage tank.
 Jumpers will be provided to pipeline
flanges.
3.20 General Safety Practices
Work Permit System
 No hot/cold work shall be undertaken without a work permit except in the areas pre-
determined and designated by the owner-in-charge.
 Permit should be issued only for a single shift and its validity should expire at the
termination of the shift. However, where the work has to be continued, the same
permit may be revalidated in the succeeding shift, by authorized person after
satisfying the normal checks.
 Equipment or area where work is to be conducted should be inspected to ensure that

it is safe to carry out the work and assess other safety requirements/stipulations.
 Unsafe conditions for performance of work may arise from surrounding area. It
should be cleaned-up to remove flammable material such as oil, rags, grass etc.
 Other activities (routine/non-routine) being carried out near-by which can create
conditions unsafe for performance of the permit work, should be taken into
consideration and the concerned persons should be alerted accordingly.
 Running water hose and portable fire extinguisher are required respectively to
flush/dilute in case of release of any hazardous chemical or to quench sparks and to
put out small fires immediately.
 In order to meet any contingency, it should be ensured that the fire water system
including fire water pumps, storage, network etc. is checked and kept ready for
immediate use.
 Equipment/Vessel, on which the work permit is being issued, should be completely
isolated from the rest of the plant with which it is connected during normal
operation, in order to ensure that there is no change in the work environment with
respect to presence of toxic/flammable gases, liquids, hazardous chemicals etc. in the
course of the work.
 Equipment under pressure should be depressurized after isolation. This will be
followed by draining/purging/water flushing etc. as the case may be.
 Proper means of exit is required in case of emergencies developed on account of the
work or otherwise. Availability of an alternate route of escape should be considered.
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Contractor Safety
Duties and responsibilities of the contractor should include the following:
 To implement safe methods and practices, deploy appropriate machinery, tools and
tackles, experienced supervisory personnel and skilled work force etc. required for
execution.
 To prepare a comprehensive and documented plan for implementation, monitoring
and reporting of Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) and implement the same after
its approval.
 To nominate qualified and trained Safety Engineers/Officers reporting to the Site in
charge, for supervision, co-ordination and, liaison for the implementation of the
safety plan.
 To arrange for fire protection equipment as per the advice of owner.

 To ensure that its employees have completed appropriate health and safety training
as required by the statute / regulation and also as per requirements of the
Owner/Consultant.
 To comply with all the security arrangements of owner.
 To ensure availability of First Aid boxes and First Aid trained attendant.
 To ensure that all incidents including near misses are reported to all concerned
immediately.
 To ensure strict compliance with work permit system by carrying out work only with
appropriate work permits and after ensuring that all safety precautions/conditions in
the permit are complied with and closing the same after job completion.
 To ensure that the workers likely to be exposed to hazardous chemicals/materials
have access to appropriate Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), wherever applicable,
and provide necessary mitigation measures.
 To ensure that appropriate warning signboards or tags are displayed.
 To ensure that workers have proper training for their job assignments, including use
of appropriate PPE and first aid fire fighting equipment.
 To comply with all applicable safety and health standards, rules, regulations and
orders issued by competent authority pertaining to the assigned activities.
 To conduct daily inspections to ensure compliance with safety standards, codes,
regulations, rules and orders applicable to the work concerned.
Static Electricity
 Ensure no metal objects/appurtenances projecting from roof/shell plates, which will
attract highly charged spots in fuel for dissipation.
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 Ensure reduced rate of flow initially into tank/vessel until fill point/nozzle is
completely submerged in fluid.
 Ensure periodic checking and recording of earthing test for tanks and piping systems
are maintained.
 Agitation with air, steam gas, jet nozzle or mechanical mixtures should be avoided.
 Ensure no personnel are allowed on tank roof for gauging/sampling during product
transfer unless dip pipes extend to bottom of tanks. Use only mechanical gauges for
ascertaining product transferred during transfer operations otherwise.
 Protective bonding is required when fill open containers where the product to be
handled has a flash point below 54.5 0C (130 0F) or, in the case of a higher flash point
product, when it is heated to within 6.0 0C (15 0F) of its flash point. The purpose is to
keep the nozzle and container at the same electrical potential, thus avoiding a
possible static spark in the area of a flammable mixture.
 Small containers made up of plastic or other non-conductive materials should not be
used for filling of fuels.
 Water washing is safe from a static electricity stand-point. However, there should be
no insulated conductive objects within the tank.
Lightning Protection
 Measures to control fugitive emission from storage tanks should be given special
consideration.
 Structures of exceptional vulnerability by reason of explosive or highly flammable
contents need special consideration and every possible protection need to be
provided even against the rare occurrence of a lightning discharge
 A lightning protection system (Conventional Air Terminal System) consists of the
following three basic components - Air terminal, Down conductor and Earth
connection.
 Non-conducting chimneys whose overall width or diameter at top is upto 1.5m shall
be provided with one down conductor, and chimneys with overall width or diameter
at top more than 1.5m shall be provided with 2 no. down conductors.
 Metal stacks shall be properly earthed at the bottom.
 Flammable liquids shall be stored in essentially gastight structures.
 Openings where flammable concentrations of vapour or gas can escape to the
atmosphere shall be closed or otherwise protected against the entrance of flame.
 Structures and all accessories e.g. dip-gauge hatches, vent valves shall be maintained
in good and sound operating conditions.
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 Flammable air-vapour mixtures shall be prevented to the greatest possible extent
from accumulating outside storage tanks.
 Potential spark-gaps between metallic conductors shall be avoided at points where
flammable vapours may escape or accumulate.
Personnel Safety (Personnel Protective Equipment)

 Special clothing and personal protective equipment necessary for entry.
 Protective equipment should be inspected frequently to ensure that it is in good
condition. Frequency of checking can be decided depending upon the usage.
 After the use of protective equipment, it should be cleaned and disinfected before
being issued to another person.
 Glove materials must resist the product‟s active ingredients and its solvents. It should
allow adequate grip so that applicators can safely carry out their jobs(e.g. change
nozzles and screens).
 For protection of eyes always use goggles, polycarbonate lenses are preferred to
protect eyes from flying objects. Face shields are secondary means of eye protection
and are designed to be worn over safety spectacles or goggles for full face protection.
 When purchasing eye protection, make sure it complies with ANSI Z87 for
occupational and educational eye and face protection.
 Sleeve guards should be use when handling hazardous materials to avoid the
splashing effect of material.
 Wash contaminated clothing and other PPE daily, as soon as possible after wearing.
Delay in laundering will reduce the likelihood of total residual removal.
 Follow the work instruction/checklist.
 Know about MSDS of hazardous chemicals used.
 A person not-familiar with MSDS and trained in use of appropriate shall not
commence any work with hazardous chemicals.
 Frequently refer to the MSDS and use of appropriate PPE.
 Display prominently requisite information on MSDS and use of PPE through
illustrations.
 It is essential that right type of PPE and in sound condition be used.
 All stocks of PPEs should be periodically inspected, serviced and maintained and
unusable ones removed from stock of usable PPEs and sent for disposal.
 All PPEs should be cleaned for personal hygiene and kept packed in poly bags.
 All PPEs should be inspected before and after each use.
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Training
 Participant‟s reaction should be obtained in respect of the course content; training
methods/techniques used by the faculty, quality of course material etc.
 Before employees are exposed to any fungicides, pesticide formulation, inert or raw
material, they should be fully apprised of the following:
a. Identification by name, characteristics (smell, appearance, etc.) and physical

properties.
b. Hazards of toxicity.
c. Signs and symptoms of overexposure
d. Fire and explosion hazards.
e. Precaution of safe handling
f. Emergency first aid treatment for over exposure.
 It should be ascertained whether participants‟ are learning in terms of knowledge

and skills in specific areas or activities e.g. safe operating and maintenance
procedures, fire prevention and control etc. have improved after the training.
 It should be checked in what ways and to what degree/extent the attitude of the
participants (values or beliefs) have been influenced by the training program. An
evaluation of their behaviour on the job is necessary for this purpose.
 Change in participants‟ performance at their place of work as a result of the training,

should be evaluated.
 The effectiveness of faculty in each training program should be evaluated and

necessary changes if need be, should be made in subsequent training program.
 The impact of the training program on the performance standards of the organization
and attainment of tangible results with respect to safety should be evaluated.
 Records of training should be maintained in respect of every employee indicating the

types and the period of training program attended, performance evaluation and the
need for future training.
 The impact of training program should be evaluated in terms of overall safety

objectives achieved.
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Chapter 4 – Safety at Project Site

4.1 General Safety Practices - Process Safety:
 Plant will be established as per legal Requirements Indian Factory Act / Raj Factory
Rules 1951 and other relevant requirement, safety will be the first priority to make
plant fool proof safe.
 Safety measures are to be adopted from the design stage.
 Safety Valve, PRV and pressure gauge are provided on the tank.
 Free Fall of any flammable material in the vessel shall be avoided.
 Static earthing provision should be made at design stage to the tank.
 All emergency valves and switches and emergency handling facilities should be easily
assessable.
 Further the Storage tanks and Pipelines should be examined periodically by a

recognized competent persons under the Rajasthan Factory Rules 1951
 The Storage tanks, Pipelines and other equipments should be well earthed
appropriately and well protected against Static Electricity.
 All flammable material storage tanks should be away from the Storage tanks.
 Flame proof light fittings should be installed in the plant.
 All the Personnel should be provided with Personal Protection Equipments to protect
against any adverse health effect during operations, leakage, spillages or splash. PPE
like Helmets, Safety Shoes, Safety Glasses, Acid-Alkali Proof Gloves etc. should be
provided to the employees. All employees should be given and updated in Safety
aspects through periodic training in safety.
 Material Safety Data Sheets should be readily available.

4.2 Fire fighting system:-
 Sufficient numbers of Fire extinguishers should be installed in storage area as per fire
load calculation.
 Fire hydrant system as per Legal norms should be installed in the plant.
4.3 Pipeline:
 The various pipelines to transfer i.e. charging, draining etc. in the plant shall be
periodically inspected for Support, Vibration, Corrosion conditions, Painting,
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and Colour Code. Pipelines and Flexible pipeline are appropriately earthed to
avoid accumulation of Static Electricity. Periodic Checkups of the pipelines
shall be conducted to curb any chances of mishap due to leakages. Preventive
Maintenance Schedules shall be in practice.
4.4 Emergency Planning:
 Transport Emergency planning and training to driver and cleaner should be provided.
 On way emergency telephone number list will be provided to transporter.
 Chemical handling & transportation safety SOP should be prepared and trained
employees.
 Emergency siren and wind sock should be provided.
 Scenario base On Site emergency Plan should be prepared.
 Tele Communication system and mobile phone should be used in case of emergency
situations for communication.
 First Aid Boxes and Occupational health centre should be made at site.
 Hydrant system & sprinkler system should be provided as per requirements.
 Emergency organization and team should be prepared as per On-site/Off-site
emergency planning.
4.5 Effects of Release of chemicals
 Chemicals may be released as a result of failures / catastrophes, causing possible
damage to the surrounding area. In the following discussion, an account is taken of
various effects of release of chemicals and the parameters to be determined for
quantification of such damages.
 In case of release of chemicals the damages will depend largely on source strength.
The strength of the source means the volume of the substance released. The release
may be instantaneous or semi-continuous.
 In the case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source and in semi-
continuous release, the strength of the source depends on the outflow time.
 In order to fire the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state of a
substance in a vessel. The physical properties, viz. Pressure and temperature of the
substance determine the phase of release.
 Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails. Depending on
the storage conditions the following situations may occur. The source strength is
equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage system. In the event of the
instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form.
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4.6 Modes of Failure:

Release due to catastrophic failure of storage vessel, outlet valve/line failure or road
tanker.
Release through a hole/crack developed at welded joints/flanges / nozzles / valves etc.
Release due to exposure of liquid to atmosphere in the above scenarios.
The study defined the safety relevant loss of containment events (LOC) that could
happen in the selected hazardous relevant equipment. Accordingly, the following five
major accident scenarios were identified:
 Scenario 1: Total rupture of feeding pipeline.
 Scenario 2: Hole (crack) in storage tank.
 Scenario 3: Release through the safety valves of the storage tank.
 Scenario 4: Hole in feeding pipeline during the unloading.
4.7 Dispersion modelling
Release of Chemicals is very common in accident situation. Such hazardous chemicals
are release in the environment in case failure of storage tank, pipe network, valve
failure or complete failure of vessel. It is very complex to estimate dispersion manner
of such complex situation.
Dispersion modelling technique is used in this study to estimate the concentration and
time profile of release hazardous chemical. In most cases, release chemical forms a
vapor cloud, Explosion and travel in the down ward wind direction. So it is very
important to account for the weather condition in such study along with the other
following factor.
a. Density of the air compared to air
b. The rate of release
c. Orientation of release
d. Weather stability
e. Wind speed and direction
These gases can react with air and water which has significant effect in calculations in
dispersion modelling. The level of effects on people of such material depends on
concentration and time of exposure. It is very difficult to estimate the size of cloud and
accurate concentration with time. To avoid such problems, it is good to assume certain
constants. For safety reasons, the assumption is always based on the worst condition
scenario. Dispersion modelling for Hydrogen and Chlorine.
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Dispersion Modelling
3-
Chlorine 80M Tank rupture Flash Vaporization forming Gas Cloud
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3-
Chlorine 80M Tank rupture free spread Liquid Pool one Min. Rapid Vaporization of Cryogenic
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Chlorine Tonner - Tank rupture Flash Vaporization forming Gas Cloud
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Chlorine Tonner - Tank rupture free spread Liquid Pool one Min. Rapid Vaporization of
Cryogenic
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Hydrogen Gas Tank 200M3 - Bullet catastrophic failure Puff
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Risk Level Overall
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FN Curve
Risk Contours
The results of all possible unique accidents can be combined to produce risk scenarios a
measure of the overall risk presented by the subject of the study. The measure of risk
must be in a form that is easy to interpret and can be compared to risk criteria and/or
risks associated with ordinary human activities.
One presentation method that meets these criteria is the use of risk contours. If early
fatality is the measure of risk, then each risk contour is the locus of points where there
exists a specific probability of being exposed to a fatal hazard, over a one-year period.
The level of risk illustrated by a particular risk contour is the risk of lethal exposure to
any of the acute hazards associated with many possible releases. Because the risk
contours are based on annual data, the risk level for a given contour is the risk to an
individual who remains at a specific location for 24 hours a day, for 365 consecutive
days.
Risk contours define the summation of all hazard zones for all accident scenarios
combined with all respective probabilities. The set of risk contours in Figure illustrates
how the probability of fatal exposure from a release within a unit varies with location
around the facility. It is important to note that the risk contours are independent of the
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local population density and distribution. Thus, whether there are 2, 20, or 200 persons
at a specific location outside the facility, and they are there continuously for one year,
the risk of exposure to a fatal hazard would be the same for each of the persons at that
location.
4.8 Effects of Releases of Hazardous Substances
Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures / catastrophes, causing
possible damage to the surrounding area. In the following discussion, an account is
taken of various effects of release of hazardous substances and the parameters to be
determined for quantification of such damages.
In case of release of hazardous substances the damages depend largely on source
strength. The strength of the source means the volume of the substance released. The
release may be instantaneous or semi-continuous. In the case of instantaneous release,
the strength of the source is given in kg and in semi-continuous release the strength of
the source depends on the outflow time (kg/s.).
In order to fire the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state of a
substance in a vessel. The physical properties, viz. Pressure and temperature of the
substance determine the phase of release. This may be gas, gas condensed to liquid and
liquid in equilibrium with its vapour or solids.
Instantaneous release occurs, for example, if a storage tank fails. Depending on the
storage conditions the following situations may occur. The source strength is equal to
the contents of the capacity of the storage system.
In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The
evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool.
Tank on Fire/ Pool Fire
In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid forms. The
evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool.
The heat load on object outside a burning pool of liquid can be calculated with the heat
radiation model. This model uses average radiation intensity, which is dependent on the
liquid. Account is also taken of the diameter-to height ratio of the fire, which depends
on the burning liquid. In addition, the heat load is also influenced by the following
factors:
 Distance from the fire
 The relative humidity of the air (water vapour has a relatively high heat-
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absorbing capacity)
 The orientation i.e. horizontal/vertical of the objective irradiated with respect
to the fire.
Fire Ball
This happens during the burning of liquid, the bulk of which is initially over rich (i.e.
above the upper flammable limit.). The whole cloud appears to be on fire as
combustion is taking place at eddy boundaries where air is entrained (i.e. a
propagating diffusion flame). The buoyancy of the hot combustion products may lift
the cloud form the ground, subsequently forming a mushroom shaped cloud.
Combustion rates are high and the hazard is primarily thermal.
“UVCE”
UVCE stands for unconfined vapour cloud explosion. The clouds of solvent vapour mix
with air (within flammability limit 3.0 % to 11 %) may cause propagating flames when
ignited. In certain cases flame may take place within seconds. The thermal radiation
intensity is severe depending on the total mass of vapour in cloud and may cause
secondary fire. When the flame travels very fast, it explodes causing high over pressure
or blast effect, resulting in heavy damage at considerable distance from the release
point. Such explosion is called UVCE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion) and is most
common cause of such industrial accident.
DISPERSION CASES
Plumes:
Plumes are continuous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Smoke from a
chimney is an example. Plumes can cause FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS as secondary
scenarios.
PUFFS:
Puffs are instantaneous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Puffs can give rise to
FIRE BALLS and vapour cloud explosions (VCE). A special case of vapour cloud explosion
is the Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapour Explosion (BLEVE).
SPILLS POOL:
Spills are liquid pools created by leaking liquid chemicals. Spills cause evaporation and
dispersal of toxic gases and if the spilled liquid is flammable, then it can catch fire
creating a pool fire also the vapours can cause explosion.
Modes of Failure:
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 Liquid release due to catastrophic failure of storage vessel or road tanker.

 Liquid release through a hole/crack developed at welded joints/flanges /
nozzles /valves etc.
 Vapour release due to exposure of liquid to atmosphere in the above scenarios.
 Gas release due to catastrophic failure of Storage tank or outlet valve/line
failure.
Based on the above the following accident scenarios were conceived as most probable
failure cases:
Event Cause
Tank on Fire : Ignition availability
Pool fire : Failure of pump outlet-inlet line + Ignition availability
Fire Ball/Flash : Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ storage tank
fire
UVCE : Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ tank
Vapour generation due to substrate and wind
Vapour cloud generation and about 15 % of total
vapour mass between the UEL-LEL %
Ignition availability
Considering the quantity of storages & nature of Toxic and Flammable storage,
following scenarios were taken up for detailed analysis & safe distances computed:
 Catastrophic failure of storage tank which on ignition poses heat radiation
hazards to nearby areas.
 Catastrophic failure of road tank and presence of ignition source poses heat
radiation hazards to nearby areas.
Failure cases considered for consequence analysis are representative of worst-case
scenarios. Probability of occurrence of such cases is negligible (less than 1 x 10-6 per
year) because of strict adherence to preventive maintenance procedures within the
complex. General probabilities for various failure is provided in Tables, but
consequences of such cases can be grave & far reaching in case such systems fail
during life history of the company. Hence such scenarios are considered for detailed
analysis. It is to be noted however that such situations are not foreseeable or credible
as long as sufficient measures are taken. Also, consequence analysis studies help us
evaluate emergency planning measures of the Company.
Damage Criteria for Heat Radiation:
Damage effects vary with different scenarios. Calculations for various scenarios are
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made for the above failure cases to quantify the resulting damages.
The results are translated in term of injuries and damages to exposed personnel,
equipment, building etc.
Tank on fire /Pool fire due to direct ignition source on tank or road tanker or
catastrophic failure or leakage or damage from pipeline of storage facilities or road
tanker unloading arm, can result in heat radiation causing burns to people depending
on thermal load and period of exposure.
All such damages have to be specified criteria for each such resultant effect, to relate
the quantifier damages in this manner, damage criteria are used for Heat Radiation.
Damage Criteria – Heat Radiation
Heat Radiation Damage
Incident Flux KW/m2
38 : 100% lethality, heavy damage to tanks
37.5 : 100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment.
25 : 50% lethality, nonpiloted ignition
14 : Damage to normal buildings
12.5 : 1% lethality, piloted ignition
12 : Damage to vegetation
6 : Burns (escape routes)
4.5 : Not lethal, 1st degree burns
3 : 1st degree burns possible
(personnel only in emergency allowed)
2 : Feeling of discomfort
1.5 : No discomfort even after long exposure
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Chapter 5 – Risk Mitigation Measures

5.1 Dispersion modelling at M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited
The possible consequences were grouped into the following four risk categories:
1. Environment risks of pollution to surface water, ground water, air, soil/land,
natural resources, and flora and fauna
2. Safety risks to the health, safety and security of personnel and community
3. Property risks Tanks, infrastructure and other and commercial operations,
4. Stakeholders risks to the interests of public and private stakeholders, relevant
line agencies, commercial operations, loss of trade and public relations.
5.2 Accidents analysis M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited handles considerably Quantity of
hazardous chemical. The characteristics of the above material can lead to toxic effects.
In general, accidents can occur in three stages.
• Construction start‐up or shut down stages
• Normal process operation
• Storage and transfer operation
Construction, Commissioning, Start‐Up or Shut Down Stage
During construction stage, most of the accidents occur due to
• Human errors (by passing safety rules and regulations).
• Improper lying of cables.
• Improper housekeeping (Keeping combustible materials near welding/gas
cutting operations).
• Material handling
• Handling tools.
• Working heights/elevated levels.
• Materials handling with equipments like crane, hydraulic pay loaders, JCB and
porcelain.
• Earth moving and filling.
• Pressure testing of lines.
• Uncovered trenches, pressuring of the line etc.
• Unsafe electrical practices.
Normal Process Operations
Accidents generally occur due to Toxic, Hazardous/flammable gas release /leakages, fire,
explosion and electrical short circuits etc. Some of the important reasons are as follows.
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• Malfunctioning of equipment
• Power failures
• Failure of utilities
• System failure
• Ageing / corroding of equipment
• Improper communication
• Failure to take corrective steps in time Etc.
Storage and Transfer Operation
The most common accidents generally occur during storage and transfer
operations of materials and chemicals spillage/overfilling, mechanical failure and
external impacts.
• Accident can also occur during opening & maintenance of pipelines, bullets,
cylinders, pumps, flanges, drains etc.
• Static electricity.
• Thunder and lighting.
• On the job accident due to human error.
5.3 Identification of Hazards
Risk assessment process rests on identification of Specific hazards, hazardous area of
M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited and hazard scenario & vulnerable to effect of
hazardous situations in facilities involved in processing and storage of
gases/chemicals. Identification of hazards is the most important step to improve the
safety of Plant. The hazard study is designed to identify the hazard in terms of
chemicals inventories and vulnerable practices/operations.
The following main hazards may exist at the site area under the situations given
below-
 Toxic/Corrosive chemicals.
 High temperature and pressure.
 Fire & explosions (due to inflammable/combustible materials).
 Electricity (Receiving/Distribution).
 Disposal of wastes.
 Work at heights.
 Work in confined spaces / vessels / tank etc.
 Nonworking of safety devices, interlocks, failure of high RPM machineries.
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 Any other consequences due to leak of chemicals.

 Hazards during heavy equipment handling (Crane, etc.)
 Road accident
5.4 General mitigation for hazard control
 A quick responsive containment and control system requiring well planned
safety and fire fighting system.
 Well organized trained manpower to handle the process equipment & systems
safely.
 Well trained personnel to handle safety and fire fighting equipment to
extinguish fire inside the installation promptly as well as tackle any type of
emergency.
 Well planned Disaster Management Plan.
5.5 Event Frequency
It is estimate of the number of times a specified phenomenon (events) occurs within a
specified interval. The event frequency includes all the causes, namely overfilling,
rollover, over pressure, under pressure, ice heave, material/construction defects and
maintenance hazards. It is also common practice to take this frequency as inclusive of
natural hazards since the generic event frequencies calculated in the literature include
failures caused by natural events such as earthquakes etc.
5.6 Existing Prevention and Emergency Response Measures
Before the possible consequences of a hazard can be determined, the existing risk
control measures were evaluated, which include:
 Procedural such as checklists, safe work procedures, work processes, hazard
analysis and emergency response plans.
 Human resources such as knowledge and skills, training, supervision,
communication and emergency response drills.
 Engineering design such as construction and design of ports, terminals, vessels
and systems of work.
 Maintenance such as the maintenance and use of proper equipment.
 Safety equipment such as fire fighting, fire detection, alarms and personal
protective equipment (PPE)
The scope of the study covers mitigation measures based on Risk Analysis. The Fire and
Explosion Indices were computed for the identification and screening of vulnerable
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sections and consequence analysis was carried out for the accidental release scenarios
of hazardous chemicals at various atmospheric conditions. The following are general
and specific mitigation measures.
5.7 General Recommendations
 Fire prevention and code enforcement is one of the major areas of
responsibility for the fire service. Following are the general recommendations
for the proposed facility
 Facility should be equipped with the following fire fighting systems
o Fire hydrant installation
o Fire Extinguishers
 Surrounding population (includes all strata of society) should be made aware
of the safety precautions to be taken in the event of any mishap within the
facility. This can effectively be done by conducting safety training programs
 Safety escape routes and its signage should be provided at strategic locations
and should be easily accessible
 A wind direction pointer should also be installed at the visible locations, so
that in an emergency the wind direction can be directly seen and downwind
population cautioned
 Periodical mock drills should be conducted so as to check the alertness &
efficiency and records should be maintained
 Signboard including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type of possible
emergencies should be installed at the site
 In general, all the safety precautions should be strictly adhered to as per
statutory laws and recommendations of in addition to other statutory
requirements of concerned organizations.
5.8 Specific Recommendations
Electricity Hazard
 All electrical equipment should be provided with proper earthing. Earthed
electrode should be periodically tested and maintained
 Emergency lighting should be available at all critical locations including the
operator’s room to carry out safe shut down and ready identification of fire
fighting facilities such as fire water pumps and fire alarm stations.
 All electrical equipment should be free from carbon dust, oil deposits, and
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grease.
 Approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and boots, tester,
fuse tongs, discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp, wooden or insulated ladder
should be used while carrying out the maintenance of electrical parts
 Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit should be
prevented by providing fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection
 Carbon dioxide or dry chemical fire extinguishers to be used for electrical fires
Pumps
 Preventive Maintenance Inspection Schedule for Pumps should be conducted
as per the equipment manual of the manufacturer.
5.9 Fire Fighting System
 The fire protection equipment should be kept in good operating condition at
all times and fire fighting system should be periodically tested for proper
functioning and logged for record and corrective actions.
Fire Protection System
 The typical fire fighting system for the various facilities described is outlined in
this section:
 Adequate number of engine driven fire water pumps should be provided. The
pumps started automatically in the event of drop in header pressure. The
actuation through pressure switches, the setting of which staggered to
achieve sequential starting of the pumps to meet the system demand.
 Portable Fire Extinguishers: Besides, fire hydrant arrangement, portable fire
extinguishers of suitable categories should be placed at control rooms,
electrical switchgear room and various utility buildings for immediate use in
the event of fire. Two different kinds of extinguishers i.e. CO2 and DCP should
be provided. Each type of extinguisher has its own characteristic to fight a
particular class of fire. The size and type of extinguishers should be decided as
per recommendations of statutory requirement as per factory Act/Rules,
PESO and relevant Indian Standard and should be placed in convenient
accessible locations.
Fire Water Storage
 The factory has the provision for easily accessible surface reservoir having
following minimum features:
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 Capacity: There are water tanks with a total capacity of each 425 m3.
 Facility for cleaning and repair: Storage reservoir shall be in two equal
interconnected compartments to facilitate cleaning and repairs.
 Emergency: The installation has facilities for receiving and diverting all the
water coming to the installation to fire water storage tanks in case of an
emergency.
Fire Water Distribution Network
 It is designed to provide fire water supply at a minimum residual pressure of 7
kg/cm2 even if it is required at the hydraulically remotest point of application.
 It should be covering all the critical facilities and supply water at the designed
flow rate around the facility.
Accessories, Consumable and Spares
 Fire hoses, hose boxes, water and nozzles, spares, consumables etc. required
on the basis of number of hydrants and types of expected fires should be
procured and supplied. The quantity and quality of these items should meet
requirements of factories act/rules.
5.10 Risk to Personnel
 Good safety management, strict adherence to safety management procedures
and competency assurance reduce the risk. Safety practices are needed to
carry out jobs safely and without causing any injury to self, colleagues and
system.
 For total safety of any operation, each team member must religiously follow
the safety practices / procedures pertaining to respective operational area. If
every team member starts working with this attitude, zero accident rate is not
a distant dream.
 Any operation is a team effort and its success depends upon the sincerity,
efficiency and motivation of all team members. Safety in such operations is
not a duty of a single person, but it is everyone's job.
 Use of protective fireproof clothing and escape respirators reduce the risk of
being seriously burnt. In addition, adequate fire fighting facilities and first aid
facilities should be provided, in case of any emergency.
Risks to Environment
Ensuring proper safety can lower the frequency of leakage. Risk reducing
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measures include proper training for personnel, presence of well-trained

engineers and strict adherence to safety management procedures to be
incorporated in the plan.
5.11 Precautionary Measures for Falling Objects
 Provide safety helmets to protect workers below against falling objects
 Ensure that there are no loose objects & all tools are properly secured
 Danger areas should be clearly marked with suitable safety signs indicating
that access is restricted to essential personnel wearing hard hats while the
work is in progress.
5.12 Training
On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go a
long way in improving their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the
operation of plant, especially from the safety stand point. In order to combat
with emergency situations arising out of accident release of hazardous
chemicals.
5.13 Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs’)
 Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs’) provides additional protection to
workers exposed to workplace hazards in conjunction with other facility
controls and safety systems.
 PPEs are most important resort beyond the other facility controls and provide
the worker with an extra level of personal protection. Recommended
measures for use of PPEs in the workplace include:
 Active use of PPEs if alternative technologies, work plans or procedures
cannot eliminate, or sufficiently reduce, a hazard or exposure.
 Identification and provision of appropriate PPEs that offers adequate
protection to the worker, co-workers, and occasional visitors, without
incurring unnecessary inconvenience to the individual.
 Proper maintenance of PPEs, including cleaning when dirty and replacement
when damaged or worn out. Proper use of PPEs should be part of the
recurrent training programs for Employees.
 Selection of PPEs should be based on the hazard and risk ranking described
earlier in this section, and selected according to criteria on performance and
testing established.
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Summary of Recommended Personal Protective Equipment According to Hazard is

given in the table shown below Table 5.1:-
Objective Workplace Hazards Suggested PPEs
Eye and Flying particles, molten metal, Safety glasses with side-shields,
Face liquid chemicals, gases or protective shades, etc.
Protection Vapors, light radiation
Head Falling objects, inadequate Plastic helmets with top and side
Protection height clearance, and impact protection
overhead power cords
Hearing Noise, ultra-sound Hearing protectors (ear plugs or
Protection ear muffs)
Foot Failing or rolling objects, Safety shoes and boots for
Protection points objects. Corrosive or protection against moving and
hot liquids failing objects, liquids and
chemicals
Hand Hazardous materials, cuts or Gloves made of rubber or
Protection lacerations, vibrations, synthetic material (Neoprene),
extreme temperatures leather, steel, insulation
materials, etc.
Respiratory Dust, fogs, fumes, mists, Facemasks with appropriate
Protection gases, smokes, Vapors Oxygen filters for dust removal and air
deficiency purification (chemical, mists,
vapors and gases).
Single or multi-gas personal
monitors, if available Portable or
supplied air (fixed lines).
SCBA : Full (at least 1 ) and Half
(2)
Body / Leg Extreme temperatures, Insulating clothing, body suits,
Protection hazardous materials, biological aprons etc. of appropriate
agents, cutting and laceration materials
5.14 Other Safety Prevent Measures at regulators M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited
Safety precautionary measures should be taken for manufacturing processes
are listed below:
 Layout of the plant with sufficient safety distances
 Use of proper material of construction for equipment and piping
 Safety Relief Valve, Rupture disk, temperature scanner, pressure indicator and
flow meter should be installed to vessel wherever required.
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• Pumps should be provided with mechanical seals to avoid spillage through gland.
• All electrical items have been carefully selected and are either flame proof/
intrinsic safety type in licensed area.
• Proper earthing of all storage tanks, pipelines, structures and trucks for
filling/dispatch of petroleum products.
• Raw materials should be stored separately, as per their characteristics.
• The complete plant and storage area should be declared no smoking zone for
which proper sign board, notice are to be displayed at appropriate places.
• On Site Emergency Plan and Fire mock drill should be carried out periodically.
• Flameproof electrical motors, switches, lights, wiring etc. should be provided in
chemicals usage area.
• Colour code system for pipe lines is adopted as per IS 2379 Colour Code System.
• Non sparking tools should be used in flammable zone.
• Prevent the creation of flammable or explosive concentrations of vapor in air and
avoid vapour concentration higher than the Occupational exposure limits.
• To avoid ignition of vapour by static electricity discharge, all metal parts of the
equipment should be grounded, and it should be checked periodically.
• Safety devices and control instruments should be calibrated once in a year.
• Unloading of chemicals should be carried out under strict supervision only.
• The management should be updated regularly for the status & importance of
Health, Safety & Environment.
5.15 Health & Safety Policy
• The management should update regularly & displayed at certain places &
circulated to the workers.
5.16 Safety Manuals
• The management should prepare the Safety Manual, Safety Booklet, etc. for
enhance safety culture in company.
5.17 Inspection & Maintenance
• The frequency for various activities in the plant, process & Storage are mainlined
with attentively by the management, as per following Table 5.2:
S.N. Frequency Inspection & Maintenance Activities
1. Daily Critical equipments, controls, indicators, levels, switches,
settings, drain valves, leakages, storage tanks
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2. Weekly Inspection & maintenance of Rotary Equipments.

3. Monthly All Interlocks
4. Quarterly All Indicators Alarms, trips & Control
5. Half Yearly Ultrasonic Thickness Gauge, Earthing check
6. Annual All valves, safety valves, Painting of vessels Pipe lines.
5.18 Test, Examination & Certification

 Test & Examination of Lifting Tackles, Lift, Hoist, Pressure Vessels etc., are carried
out by the Competent Person & records in prescribed forms are maintained.
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

1. The Risk Assessment study for M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited has all desirable
protective measures in the installation associated with storage as well as pipelines. The
safety instrument system is almost proper. Few administrative controls will be added in
the system to make safety system more full proof.
2. Standard & safe operating procedure and preventive maintenance of pipeline,
pumps/motors and critical equipment will be followed.
3. Preventive Maintenance plan to be prepared for the storage area to check the working
of safety control system.
4. Any change/modification should be incorporated in P & I diagram (P&ID) and safety
manual.
5. The Operational Control system should be carefully monitored to ensure satisfactory
operation.
6. Regular equipment & pipeline thickness across the length testing should be followed to
monitor corrosion and external damage.
7. Ensure all studs/nuts or bolts are in good condition.
8. All NO/NC valves may be suitably identified as per color codes.
9. Calibration/ verification plan for all critical equipments to be planned.
10. Safety measures mentioned in HAZOP sheet under column “Action required” should be
implemented.
11. An online monitoring system particularly for pressure and flow with adequate Logic and
control needs to be introduced for checking the working condition of existing measures.
12. Ensure that the transfer hoses are inspected visually on daily basis & periodical statuary
testing are done 6 monthly.
13. Ensure adequate preparedness during unloading operations, such preparedness may be
included in the Onsite Emergency Plan.
14. Replace gasket at the time of Preventive Maintenance.
15. Ensure the cleaning of choked sprinkler immediately on identification.
16. Ensure & check the thickness of fire water line for any possible loss of wall thickness due
to corrosion.
17. Ensure and check the earth pit resistance once in six month.
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Annexure
S.N. Details Annexure

1. Hazards Chemicals/Raw Materials (stored in Bulk) Annexure-1
2. Possible Failure and Causes Annexure-2
3. Various Risk and Consequences Annexure-3
4. Factory Layout Annexure-4
5. Company Organisation Chart Annexure-5
6. Emergency Equipment and Facilities Annexure-6
7. Chlorine Work Instruction Annexure-7
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Annexure – 1
Hazards Chemicals/Raw Materials (stored in Bulk)
S. No.& Threshold Quantity (TQ in MT) as
Raw Material/ per MSHIC Rules
S.No Hazards Controls
Chemicals Schedule-1, Schedule-2, Schedule-3,
Part-II Part-I Part-I
1 Caustic soda - - - May cause severe irritation or Use process enclosures, local
burns to the eyes, skin, exhaust ventilation, or other
gastrointestinal tract, and engineering controls to control
respiratory system. Risk of serious airborne levels below
damage to eyes. recommended exposure limits.
Avoid contact with the skin and the
eyes. Keep away from food and
drink. Handle in accordance with
good industrial hygiene and safety
practice. Wash hands before breaks
and immediately after handling the
product.
2 Chlorine 85 5 108 Severe acute effects, caused Do not breathe vapor or mist. Do
death, lung congestion, not get in eyes, on skin, or on
pulmonary edema, pneumonia, clothing, wash thoroughly after
pleurisy and bronchitis.
handling. Liquefied gas under
Inhalations of this material are
irritating to the nose, mouth, and pressure, Piping and equipment
throat and lungs. It may also must be thoroughly cleaned of
cause burns to the respiratory organics and moisture before use.
tract, which can result in Corrosive to most metals in the
shortness of breath, wheezing, presence of moisture. Liquid lines
and violent coughing. must have suitable expansion
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chambers between block valves
due to the high coefficient of
expansion.
3 Hydrochloric acid 221 - - Very hazardous in case of skin Keep locked up. Keep container
contact (corrosive, irritant, dry. Do not ingest. Do not breathe
permeator), of eye contact gas/fumes/ vapor/spray. Never add
(irritant, corrosive), of ingestion. water to this product.
Slightly hazardous in case of In case of insufficient ventilation,
inhalation (lung sensitizer). Non- wear suitable respiratory
corrosive for lungs. Liquid or equipment. If ingested, seek
spray mist may produce tissue medical advice immediately and
damage particularly on mucous show the container or the label.
membranes of eyes, mouth and Avoid contact with skin and eyes.
respiratory tract. Skin contact Keep away from incompatibles
may produce burns. Inhalation of such as oxidizing agents, organic
the spray mist may produce materials, metals, alkalis, moisture.
severe irritation of respiratory May corrode metallic surfaces.
tract, characterized by coughing, Store in a metallic or coated
choking, or shortness of breath. fiberboard drum using a strong
Severe over-exposure can result polyethylene inner package.
in death. Inflammation of the eye
is characterized by redness,
watering, and itching. Skin
inflammation is characterized by
itching, scaling, reddening, or,
occasionally, blistering.
4 Hydrogen 222 - 143 Effects are due to lack of oxygen. Remove to fresh air. If not
Moderate concentrations may breathing, give artificial respiration.
cause headache, drowsiness, If breathing is difficult, qualified
dizziness, excitation, excess personnel may give oxygen.
salivation, vomiting, and
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unconsciousness. Lack of oxygen
can kill.
Flame is nearly invisible. Escaping
gas may ignite spontaneously.
Hydrogen has a low ignition
energy. Fireball forms if gas cloud
ignites immediately after release.
Forms explosive mixtures with air
and oxidizing agents.
5 Calcium Hypo - - - Very hazardous in case of skin Check for and remove any contact
contact (irritant), of eye contact lenses. Immediately flush eyes with
(irritant), of ingestion, of running water for at least 15
inhalation. Slightly hazardous in minutes, keeping eyelids open.
case of skin contact (permeator). Cold water may be used. Do not
Corrosive to eyes and skin. use an eye ointment.
Inhalation of dust will produce If the chemical got onto the clothed
irritation to gastro-intestinal or portion of the body, remove the
respiratory tract, characterized by contaminated clothes as quickly as
burning, sneezing and coughing. possible, protecting your own
Severe overexposure can produce hands and body. Place the victim
lung damage, choking, under a deluge shower.
unconsciousness or death.
Prolonged exposure may result in
skin burns and ulcerations.
6 Stable Bleaching - - - Severe Irritant, effects from Immediate treatment preferably in
Powder inhalation of vapour or mist vary a hospital is mandatory. In treating
from mild irritation, coughing, corrosive poisoning, do not induce
wheezing, burns to serious vomiting; do not attempt gastric
damage of upper respiratory lavage; and do not attempt to
tract, depending on severity of neutralize the corrosive substance.
exposure. Vomiting will increase the severity
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Inhalation of this material is of damage to the oesophagus as
irritating to the nose, mouth, and the corrosive substance will again
throat and lungs. It may also come in contact with it. Attempting
cause burns to the respiratory gastric lavage may result in
tract, which can result in perforating either the oesophagus
shortness of breath, wheezing, or stomach. If the trachea has been
choking, and chest pain. If damaged tracheostamy may be
splashed into eyes can cause required. For oesophageal burns
irreversible tissue damage and begin broad-spectrum antibiotics
blindness, the Symptoms may and corticosteroid therapy.
include bleeding, vomiting, Intravenous fluids will be required
diarrhea, fall in blood pressure, if oesophageal or gastric damage
sneezing, sore throat or runny prevents ingestion of liquids.
nose. Rest and medical
observation are therefore
essential.
7 Trichloroethylene 403 - - The substance is toxic to kidneys, Provide exhaust ventilation or
the nervous system, liver, heart, other engineering controls to keep
upper respiratory tract. Repeated the airborne concentrations of
or prolonged exposure to the vapors below their respective
substance can produce target threshold limit value. Ensure that
organs damage. eyewash stations and safety
showers are proximal to the work-
station location.
Splash goggles. Full suit. Vapor
respirator. Boots. Gloves. A self-
contained breathing apparatus
should be used to avoid inhalation
of the product. Suggested
protective clothing might not be
sufficient; consult a specialist
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BEFORE handling this product.
8 Chlorinated - - - Repeated exposure may cause Remove contaminated clothing and
Paraffin wax skin dryness and cracking. wash affected area with sufficient
(CPW) Unlikely to be hazardous by skin quantity of soap and water for 15-
absorption. 20 minutes. Irrigate with eyewash
solution or clean water, holding the
eyelids apart, for at least 10
minutes.
9 Sodium - - - May cause irritation to the Remove to fresh air. If not

hypochlorite respiratory that (Nose and throat; breathing, give artificial respiration.
symptoms may include coughing If breathing is difficult, give Oxygen,
and sore throat). get medical attention immediately.
May cause nausea and vomiting. Immediately flush skin with plenty
Contact may cause severe of water for at least 15 minutes
irritation and damage especially while removing contaminated
at higher concentration. clothing and shoes. Get medical
attention immediately. Wash
clothing before re-use. Thoroughly
clean shoes before re-use.
Immediately flush eyes with plenty
of water for at least 15 minutes,
lifting lower and upper eyelids
occasionally. Get medical attention
immediately.
10 Aluminum - - - Very hazardous in case of skin In case of contact, immediately
Chloride contact (irritant), of ingestion, of flush skin with plenty of water for
inhalation. Hazardous in case of at least 15 minutes while removing
skin contact (corrosive), of eye contaminated clothing and shoes.
contact (irritant). The amount of Cover the irritated skin with an
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tissue damage depends on length emollient. Wash clothing before
of contact. Eye contact can result reuse. Thoroughly clean shoes
in corneal damage or blindness. before reuse.
Skin contact can produce Wash with a disinfectant soap and
inflammation and blistering. cover the contaminated skin with
Inhalation of dust will produce an anti-bacterial cream. If inhaled,
irritation to gastro-intestinal or remove to fresh air. If not
respiratory tract, characterized by breathing, give artificial respiration.
burning, sneezing and coughing. If breathing is difficult, give oxygen.
Severe over-exposure can
produce lung damage, choking,
The substance is toxic to lungs,
mucous membranes. Repeated or
prolonged exposure to the
substance can produce target
organs damage. Repeated
exposure of the eyes to a low
level of dust can produce eye
irritation. Repeated skin exposure
can produce local skin
destruction, or dermatitis.
11 Mono Chloro - - - Extremely hazardous in case of In case of contact, immediately
Acetic acid skin contact (corrosive, irritant), flush skin with plenty of water for
of eye contact (irritant), of at least 15 minutes while removing
ingestion, of inhalation. Very contaminated clothing and shoes.
hazardous in case of skin contact Cover the irritated skin with an
(permeator). The amount of emollient. Wash clothing before
tissue damage depends on length reuse. Thoroughly clean shoes
of contact. Eye contact can result before reuse.
in corneal damage or blindness. Wash with a disinfectant soap and
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Skin contact can produce cover the contaminated skin with
inflammation and blistering. an anti-bacterial cream. If inhaled,
Inhalation of dust will produce remove to fresh air. If not
irritation to gastro-intestinal or breathing, give artificial respiration.
respiratory tract, characterized by If breathing is difficult, give oxygen.
burning, sneezing and coughing.
Severe over-exposure can
produce lung damage, choking,
Inflammation of the eye is
characterized by redness,
watering and itching. Skin
inflammation is characterized by
itching, scaling, reddening, or,
12 Sulphuryl - - - Extremely hazardous in case of If the chemical got onto the clothed
chloride skin contact (corrosive, irritant, portion of the body, remove the
sensitizer), of eye contact contaminated clothes as quickly as
(irritant), of ingestion, of possible, protecting your own
inhalation. Liquid or spray mist hands and body. Place the victim
may produce tissue damage under a deluge shower. If the
particularly on mucous chemical got on the victim's
membranes of eyes, mouth and exposed skin, such as the hands:
respiratory tract. Skin contact Gently and thoroughly wash the
may produce burns. Inhalation of contaminated skin with running
the spray mist may produce water and non-abrasive soap. Be
severe irritation of respiratory particularly careful to clean folds,
tract, characterized by coughing, crevices, creases and groin. If
choking, or shortness of breath. irritation persists, seek medical
Inflammation of the eye is attention. Wash contaminated
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characterized by redness, clothing before reusing. Wash with
watering, and itching. Skin a disinfectant soap and cover the
inflammation is characterized by contaminated skin with an anti-
itching, scaling, reddening, or, bacterial cream.
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Annexure – 2
Possible Failure and Causes
S.N. Failure Mode Probable Causes Remarks

1. Flange/Gasket Incorrect gasket Attention to be paid during selection
failure Incorrect installation. and installation of gaskets.
2. Weld failure It is normally due to poor Welding to be done by certified
quality of welds welders with right quality of welding
rods. Inspection and radiography must
also be done.
3. Pipe corrosion Sometimes fabrication or Pipes material of construction should
erosion or failure installation leaves stress be selected correctly. Design should
due to stress in the pipes. Erosion or take care of erosion effects and
corrosion also are installation of pipes should not leave
sometimes the cause. any stress.
4. Over Pressurization Over pressurization can Necessary procedures should be there
of pipeline occur due to failure of to prevent.
SRV or incorrect
operation.
5. Deficient installation Pipes design and It must be ensured that installation is
of pipes installation is sometimes as per correct standards completely.
not as per appropriate
standard.
6. Leaks from valve Leaks from glands, Right selection of valves and their
bonnets or failures valves Maintenance should be ensured.
spindle is sometimes the
cause.
7. Instruments failure Multifarious instruments Reliability of instruments working
are used for control of must be ensured through proper
process parameters. Any selection and maintenance
such instrument failure
can cause mishap.
8. Failures of protective Protective system like Reliability of protective system must
system SRV, bursting discs, vent be ensured highest through inspection
header, drain lines etc. and proper maintenance.
are provided to take care
of abnormal conditions.
9. Operational effort Plant operational Operating procedures must be
parameters should not be complete and strictly followed.
exceeded beyond the
permissible limits.
10. Other failures There are external other Design and operating philosophy must
reasons causing the consider all possible reasons.
failures.
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Annexure – 3
Various Risk and consequences
S.N. Activity Risk Consequence Nature of likely Existing Control

Accident/ Harm Measures
1 Receipt of Leakage  Blurred vision  May cause  Avoid contact with
Chemicals during Burning pain, irritation if eyes.
Tankers transportatio redness, and blisters inhaled or  Skin Contact - Remove
n on the skin ingested. contaminated clothing
 Burning sensation in  Slightly irritating and wash affected area
the nose, throat, and to eyes and skin, with sufficient quantity
eye  Repeated or of soap and water for
 Coughing prolonged 15-20 minutes.
 Chest tightness exposure to high  Eye Contact- Irrigate
Difficulty breathing levels may cause with eyewash solution
or shortness of kidney and liver or clean water, holding
breath. damage. the eyelids apart, for at
 Fluid in the lungs least 10 minutes.
 Nausea and vomiting Obtain medical
 Watery eyes attention.
Wheezing  Full-face piece
respirator with
cartridges/canister
 SCBA
 PVC Hand gloves/ body
suit
 Eye Protection.
 Gas Leak Detector
2 Building collapse Any natural  Injuries & Fatalities  All building &  Structure stability is by
Earthquake Calamities  Building damage. sheds of the competent person for
Sabotage Week company as all structure.
structure given in the Fac.  No overloading of
Attack by layout structures and
bomb etc. building.
Over loading
Electrical Overload  Fire  Electrical  Installation as per
3 Installation Loose  Suffocation of transformer electricity rules.
failure like contacts persons inside the switch yard  Other Controls
Transformer, PCC Short circuit plant  Electrical MCC provided
etc. rooms  Rubber mat provided
 Earthing provision
4 Cyclone/Flood Natural  Injuries & Fatalities  All building &  Evacuations & other
Calamities  Building damage sheds of the steps as per guidelines
company as of district crisis
given in the Fac. management group
layout
5 Use of fire Failure to  Injuries  All building &  Monthly inspection of
extinguisher operate  Damage sheds of the fire extinguisher
Discharge company as  Operational
hose failure given in the Fac. Instruction
due to layout
jamming
Slip of grip of
hose
Malfunctionin
g of caps
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Annexure-4
Factory Layout
Enclosed
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Annexure-5
Company Organisation Chart
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Annexure-6
Emergency Equipment and Facilities:
Fire Fighting System
Water Storage Capacity for firefighting-425 m³
Fire Fighting System in three phase

First Phase : 15 Fire Hydrant
Second Phase : 22 Fire Hydrant
Third Phase : 20 Fire Hydrant
Total No of Fire Hydrant - 57 Fire Hydrant
Total no of Hose Box : 57 Hose Box

Total No of Hose’s : 114 hoses
Total No of axe : 57 axe
Main Pump
Pressure of main pump : 10 to 12 Kg/cm2(Operational Pressure)
Motor : 100 kw
RPM : 2950
Pump Flow : 272 m3
Jockey Pump-
Pressure of jockey Pump : 6 kg/cm2 (for maintaining /hold the
pressure in line to pressurize the
firefighting system.)
Motor : 9.3 kw
RPM : 2880
Total No of fire extinguishers:-

ABC Type Fire extinguishers : 41
Co2 Type Fire Extinguisher : 64
DCP type Fire Extinguisher : 19
AB Mech Foam Type fire : 05
extinguisher
Total : 129
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Detail of Fire extinguisher:-
The following is the detail of fire extinguishers present in our plant.
Sr. Department Co2 DCP TYPE AB Mech ABC TYPE TOTAL
no Foam
1 UHDE Cell House 3 1 - 5 9
2 MCP Cell house 2 1 1 3 7
3 Secondary brine MCC (MCP) 3 - - 1 4
4 MCP Rectifier 3 2 - 2 7
5 MCP 110 5 - - - 5
6 MCC 40 (SBP WAD) 3 - - - 3
7 Sub Station yard 12 2 - 2 16
8 Primary brine MCC 2 - - - 2
9 DG Room 2 1 2 5
10 WAD 1 1 - - 2
11 Cl2 Bottling 1 1 1 - 3
12 Evaporation plant 1 1 - 2 4
13 Cl2 plant 1 1 1 1 4
14 Plant office(QCD)(R & D) 3 1 - 1 5
15 Hydrogen holder 1 - - - 1
16 Boiler plant 1 2 1 1 5
17 HCL 2 - 1 1 4
18 Comp house 2 - - - 2
19 workshop 1 - - 1 2
20 Sales 1 - - 1 2
21 Brine Plant 1 - - 1 2
22 Weight bridge - - - 1 1
23 Admn Block - - - 1 1
24 Security 8 4 - 1 13
25 DM Plant 1 - - - 1
26 Store 1 - - 1 2
27 MCC 25,30,32 (near comp 2 - - 1 3
house)
28 Hydrogen Section 1 1 - 12 14
Total 64 19 5 41 129
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Detail of self-contain breathing apparatus (SCBA)
Sr. No. Plant No of SCBA Set Status
1 MCP Cell house 2 OK
2 Chlorine Bottling 2 OK
3 WAD Plant 2 OK
4 UHDE Cell House 1 OK
5 Chlorine plant 2 OK
6 Compressor House 1 OK
7 Security 1 OK
8 Chlorine emergency Kit 2 OK
Total 13
Detail of Fire Bucket:-
Sr. No Plant Name No. of Fire Bucket
1 MCP (Cell House) 4
2 MCP rectifier area 4
3 UHDE Cell house 4
4 UHDE Rectifier 4
5 Boiler Plant 4
6 RFO Storage 4
7 Hydrogen Gas Holder 4
8 Substation 4
9 Switchyard 4
10 DG (Near Diesel Generator) 4
11 RFO fusion 4
12 MCC 110 2
13 Workshop 4
14 Plant Office 4
15 Store 4
16 Weight Bridge 4
Total 62
Detail of Safety Shower and Eye washer:-

Sr. No Plant Name No. of Safety Shower
1 MCP Cell House 2
2 UHDE Cell House 2
3 Evaporation Plant 1
4 Evaporation Dispatch 1
5 Cl2 Plant & HCL Unit 1
6 WAD Plant 1
Total 8
Gas Mask individual Section:-

S.NO Area Type of SCBA Nos.
1 Chlorine Full face cartage type gas mask 3
Full face canister type gas mask 3
Half face cartage type gas mask 2
2 Chlorine bottling Mouth piece gas mask 5
3 HCL Plant Full face cartage type gas mask 1
4 MCP Cell house Full face canister type gas mask 1
Full face cartage type gas mask 1
5 UHDE cell house Full face canister type gas mask 1
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6 Mechanical w/s Full face canister type gas mask 2
7 Instrumentation Full face cartage type gas mask 1
w/s
8 WAD Full face cartage type gas mask 1
half face cartage type gas mask 1
9 Security Full face canister type gas mask 1
There are seven numbers of Chlorine sensors in our company premises to tackle any chlorine nuisance.
Emergency chlorine kit is also available to mitigate the chlorine Emergency.
Dispensary:-
We have a visiting medical Doctor who comes to plant daily and also available on phone as and when
required.
We have one compounder who compounds the medicines &filling of doctor's prescription, providing
first aid treatment.
First aid available round the clock, security inspector also trained for first aid.
For transportation purpose, Ambulance is available round the clock in factory premises.
No of bed -5
No of Bed attach with oxygen breathing system- 4
Safe Assembly Points
1. Main Gate
2. Northern Gate
3. Back side gate of Power Plant
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Risk Analysis Study
List of key Persons with Telephone nos.
S.No Name Designation/Department Mobile Landline (TATA phone)
1 Mr. Deepak Mathur Director- Technical 9928913009 7737050205

2 Mr.KN Punni General Manager (C&A) 9829650474 7737050237
3 Mr.Mahesh Yadav General Manager (HRD) 9460254838 8233050206
4 Mr.Ravi Singhal Process 9414809815 7737050230
5 Mr.Ajay Sharma Process 9929603168 7737050228
6 Mr.BL Tiwari Mechanical 8003096172 8829050226
7 Mr.Lilaram Yadav Mechanical 8003096173 8829050226
8 Mr.Pramod Chandra Electrical 9660098225 8829050224
9 Mr.Sunil Khandelwal Instrumentation 8058609209 8233020233
10 Mr.RN Gupta Stores 8003096176 8233050239
11 Mr.Eesh Sharma Commercial 7300072388
12 Mr.SS Rathore QCD & R&D 8003096174 7737050213
13 Mr.DK Shishodiya Hydrogen bottling 9828094031 7737050210
14 Mr.SK Singh 9660046226 7737050229 (Cl2)/
8233050220 (HCl) /
Chlorine/HCl/WAD/Bottling
15 Mr.NK Goyal 9352206286 7737050231 (Cl2)/
8233050221 (Bottling)
16 Mr.Dayaram Brine/ DM plant 9414810155 7737050235
17 Mr.DK Chattopadhyay Process - MCP 9414333194 7737050228
18 Mr. Amit Kumar 9783069562
19 Mr.PM Gupta Evaporation 9413436421 8233050212/8233050207
20 Mr. Jagdish Jhajaria Electrical 9887369432 8829050224
Mr. Omprakash
21 WAD/ETP -- 8233050219
Sharma
22 Mr. AS Chaudhry Sales 9660047558 8233050240
23 Mr. Kamal Singh Security 9928478075 7737050245/ 7737050244/
24 Security Office Security 7597674952 8829050243
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Risk Analysis Study
List of Trained Person for Fire Fighting
Sr. No NAME DEPARTMENT

1 Mr. Lilaram Yadav Mechanical
2 Mr. Amit Kumar Safety
3 Mr. Naveen Bajala Mechanical
4 Mr.Lokesh Kumar Mechanical
5 Mr. Vikram Saini Instrument
6 Mr. Dharmveer Instrument
7 Mr. Ajeet Singh Electrical
8 Mr. Sanjay K Yadav Electrical
9 Mr.Dilip Shinghal Store
10 Mr. Ramjas Nishad MCP
11 Mr.Dharmveer Singh Boiler
12 Mr. Rishikesh Singh DM Plant
13 Mr. Shivcharan Electrical
14 Mr. Gajender Singh Primary Brine
15 Mr. Vishnu Sharma WAD
16 Mr. Bhuvnesh Kumar WAD
17 Mr. Umesh Kumar Chlorine Bottling
18 Mr. Rakesh Shivhare Chlorine Bottling
19 Mr. Lalit Saini Evaporation Plant
20 Mr. Subodh Chaudhary Chlorine Plant
21 Mr. Pradeep Tiwari Chlorine Plant
22 Mr. Baljit Singh Security
23 Mr. Pooran Singh Security
24 Mr. Ajeet Singh Security
25 Mr. Rajendra Kumar Security
26 Mr. jayant Sing Security
27 Mr. Kamal Singh Security
28 Mr. Vishnu Kumar Primary Brine
29 Mr. Mukesh Kumar UHDE
30 Mr. CP Pandey UHDE
Off Site Measures

The list of persons and agencies to be informed with telephone numbers is given below:
Agency Tel.No.
Police Station MIA 0144-2881100
Police Control Room Alwar 100
Solanki Hospital alwar 0144-270040
Civil Hospital 0144-2346033
D.M 0144-2337545
SP 0144-2337453
CMO 0144-2340145
Factory Inspector 0144-2341574
Depot. Manager (RSRTC) 0144-2222485
Fire brigade 101/0144-2701264
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Risk Analysis Study
Annexure 7
Chlorine Work Instructions for Workers

Dyksjhu xSl dk HkaMkj.k vkSj vkikrdkyhu ;kstuk
Dyksjhu xSl Chlorine Gas
Dyksjhu ,d jklk;fud rRo gSA lkekU; rkieku vkSj ncko ij Dyksjhu (Cl2 ;k ^^MkbZDyksjhu**) xSl
ds :i esa ik;h tkrh gSA bldk iz;ksx rj.krkyksa dks dhVk.kqjfgr cukus esa fd;k tkrk gSA ;g
,d ihys vkSj gjs jax dh gok ls gYdh izkÑfrd xSl gS tks ,d fuf’pr ncko vkSj rkieku ij
nzo esa cny tkrh gSA bldk iz;ksx dkxt vkSj diM+s cukus esa Hkh fd;k tkrk gSA blesa ;g
Cyhfpax ,tsVa ¼/kqykbZ djus okys nzO;½ ds :i esa dke esa ykbZ tkrh gSA ok;q dh mifLFkfr esa ;g
ty ds lkFk fØ;k dj gkbMªkfs yd vEy dk fuekZ.k djrh gSA ;g xSl LokLF; ds fy, gkfudkjd
gksrh gSA Cyhp vkSj dhVk.kquk’kd cukus ds dkj[kkus esa dke djus okys yksxksa esa blls izHkkfor
gksus dh vk’kadk vf/kd jgrh gSA ;fn dksbZ yacs le; rd blds laidZ esa jgrk gS rks mlds
LokLF; ij gkfudkjd izHkko iM+rk gSA bldh rst xa/k vka[kksa] Ropk vkSj 'olu ra= ds fy,
gkfudkjd gksrh gSA blls xys esa ?kko] [kkalh vkSj vka[kksa o Ropk esa tyu gks ldrh gS] blls
lkal ysus esa leL;k gksrh gSA
HkkSfrd fLFkrh
Phase Gas
Density (0 °C, 101.325 kPa) 3.2 g/L
Liquid density atb.p. 1.5625[1] g·cm−3
Melting point 171.6 K−150.7 °F −101.5 °C, ,
Boiling point −29.27 °F −34.04 °C, 239.11 K,
Critical point 416.9 K, 7.991 MPa
Heat of fusion (Cl2) 6.406 kJ·mol−1
Heat of vaporization (Cl2) 20.41 kJ·mol−1
Molar heat capacity (Cl2) 33.949 J·mol−
S.NO. Name of Chemical Max. Qty available at a time

1. Liquid chlorine 36 Tonners
Dyksjhu yhdst dh tk¡p

Dyksjhu xSl dh fo’ks"krk gS fd ;g rh[kh xa/k okyh gSA ;gk¡ rd fd 3 ihih,e dh cgqr de
,dkxzrk esa Hkh gok esa bldk irk yxk;k tk ldrk gSA blds fjlko fcUnq dk irk veksfu;e
VkWpZ dh enn ls yxk;k tk ldrk gSA
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Risk Analysis Study
fMªy dk fooj.k:
Dyksjhu fjlko dk irk yxus ij fuEu dk;Zokgh mi;ksx esa yh tk;s %&
1- fjlko gksrh lHkh dkfeZd ,oa la;a= vkWijsVj xSl dh fn’kk tkusa vkSj foam Mk;jsD’ku bUMhdsVj
dks ns[kdj gok cgko dh mYVh fn’kk esa HkkxsAa
2- {ks= dks ?ksjk can dj nsAa
3- dsoy vuqHkoh vkSj izf’kf{kr vkWijsVj gh fjlko dk;Z esa 'kkfey gksA
4- fjlko esa Hkkx ysus ds fy, “Self Contained Breathing” vFkok Dyksjhu xSl ekLd dk
mi;ksx djsAa
5- rqjUr QLVZ ,M ysAa
6- veksfu;k VkWpZ dk mi;ksx dj fjlko dks Vªsl djsAa
7- fjlko dh vksj dksbZ Hkh ikuh dk fNM+dko u djsa D;ksfa d blls fjlko vkSj Hkh c<+
tk;sxkA
8- Dyksjhu nwf"kr {ks= esa xgjh lk¡l ysus ls cpsaA
rhoz izHkko
Dyksjhu ds exposure dk igyk y{k.k vka[k] ukd vkSj xys dh 'ys"ek f>Yyh esa tyu o ikuh
vkuk gS] tks lhus esa QSy tkrk gSA blds ckn rhoz [kkalh vkSj Nkrh ds ihNs nnZ gks ldrk gSA
[kkalh ds ckn mYVh gks ldrh gSA Dyksjhu ds exposure dh vof/k vR;f/kd gS] rks ;g cSpus h]
xys esa tyu iSnk dj Nhadus vkSj izpqj ykj yk ldrh gS pje ekeyksa esa] QsQM+kas ds Ård
izHkkfor gks ldrs gaS] ftlds ifj.kkeLo:i jDrpki ,oa QsQM+s esa edema gks ldrk gSA
fofHkUu lkaærk esa Dyksjhu ds izHkko
Chlorine concentration in air (PPM) Effects
(15 mins. Or 8 hrs)
0.2 – 0.5 yacs le; rd dksbZ fo"kkDr izHkko ugha
0.5 ekewyh xa/k
1.0 – 3.0 fuf'pr xa/k] vka[kksa vkSj ukd esa tyu
6.0 xys esa tyu
30.0 rhoz [kk¡lh
100 ?kkrd {kfr gks ldrh gSA
10000 ;gk¡ rd fd dqN xgjh lk¡l ysus ds ckn thou
ds fy, [krjkA
Dyksjhu xSl dk fjlko gksus ij izHkko&
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Risk Analysis Study
IykaV es Dyksjhu xSl yhd gksus ij vk¡[k] xyk] ukd vkSj ’okl uyh dks izHkkfor dj ldrh gSA
tgk¡ rd lHkao gks lds xSl yhdst ugha gksus nsuk pkfg, o xSl yhdst gksus ij rqjUr jksdus ds
mik; djus pkfg,A
yhdst dh voLFkk es dk;Z djrs le; lqj{kk cpko ds midj.k vo’; dke es ykus pkfg,A /;ku
esa j[ks fd vius vki cxSj MkWDVj dh vuqefr ds dksbZ Hkh vkW;y dSfedy izfrjks/kd o vU;
nokbZ;kW bR;kfn ihfMr O;fDr dks u ns] xSl ds nq"izHkko ls ihfMr O;fDr ds mipkj gsrq
fuEufyf[kr mipkj dke es ysosa &
Ropk izHkkfor gksus ij% &
1- izHkkfor {ks= ls ihfM+rksa dks rqjar fudkysA
2- ihfM+r dks rqjar fudVre 'kkWoj ds ikl ys tk;sA
3- nwf"kr diM+s fudky nsAa
4- lkekU; py jgs ikuh dh cM+h ek=k ls Ropk dks /kks ysAa
5- eqyk;e rkSfy;s ls 'kq"d Ropk dks /khjs&/khjs lkQ djsAa
6- fpfdRld dh lykg ds fcuk fdlh Hkh rsy ;k rsy ds ejge dk mi;ksx u djsAa
7- rqjar utnhd ds vLirky esa ys tk;sA
vkW[ks izHkkfor gksus ij% &
1. izHkkfor {ks= ls ihfM+rksa dks rqjar fudkysA
2. vkW[kks dks vPNh rjg ls ikuh ls /kks;sA
3. vkbZ yks’ku dh 2&3 cwn vka[k es MkysA
xys es [kkfj’k] [kqtykgV gksus ij%&
1. [kqtykgV de djus ds fy;s foDl] gkYl bR;kfn dh xksfy;ka pwls ;k dkcksZuSV fyfDoM
feDlpj ih ysA
2. ihijesUV dk vdZ ikuh es Mkydj ihus ls Qk;nk gksrk gSA
3. xeZ dkWQh o pk; ihus ls Hkh vkjke gksrk gSA
’okl vo:) gksus ij
1. fjLlfijsVj ¼d`f=e ’okl ysus dk ;a=½ ds }kjk ’okl nsuk izkjEHk djsAa
2. ’okl nsus dh izfØ;k rc rd djrs jgs tc rd fd lkekU; lkal u ykSV vk;s vFkok MkDVj
euk u dj nsAa
3. ’okl ds lkekU; gksus ij xeZ pk; ;k dkQh bR;kfn nh tk ldrh gSA
4. mfpr mipkj ds fy, ihfMr O;fDr dks ’kkUr j[kus dk iz;kl djsAa ,slh voLFkk es mls
FkdkoV igqpkWus okyk dksbZ dk;Z u nsoAsa
csgks’kh dh voLFkk esa
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1. flj dks FkksMk uhps dh rjQ j[ks rkfd efLr"d dh rjQ [kwu dk izokg c<us esa lgk;rk fey
ldsA
2. diMkas dks <hyk dj nsAa
3. eqWg ij ikuh ds NhVsa MkysA
4. gkFkksa vkSj iSjks dks Åij dh rjQ MkysAa
5. ’kh?kzrk ls mipkj ds fy;s MkDVj ds ikl ;k fMLisUljh igqpkWus dk izca/k djsAa
fjlko ds le; rRdkyhu mik;-

1. yhd gksrh xSl dh fn’kk tkusAa ”””””””
2. izHkkfor {ks= ls nwj gks tkos A
3. ’kh?kz LoPN okrkoj.k esa tkosaA
4. yhd gksrh xSl dh fn’kk es vyx gV tkus ds fy;s vU; yksxks dks Hkh crk;sA
5. eqWg caUn j[ks vkSj xhyk diMk iSM vFkok :eky dks ukd vkSj eqWg ij yxk;saA
6. ikuh ls eqag vk[ksa /kks Mkys vkSj diM+s cnysAa
7. rqjUr izkFkfed mipkj ysAa
HkaMkj.k vkSj gSaMfyax esa lko/kkuh
1. ,d Nk;kafdr {ks= esa lwjt dh jks’kuh] nqdku funsZf’kr djus ds fy, daVsuj dk inkZQk’k u djsAa
2. daVsuj ;k okYo rksM+us ds fy, ikuh dk mi;ksx u djsAa
3. Dyksjhu lsok ds fy, mi;qDr ihohlh protection suit and gloves, specific
respirator dk mi;ksx djsAa

4. ;fn fjlko gksrk gS] rks fjlko dks jksdus ds fy, bejtsalh fdV dk mi;ksx djsAa
5. Ropk ds laidZ esa vkus ls cpsAa
izkFkfed lgk;rk ,oa mipkj dk {ks=%&
1. jksx dk irk djuk] ftlls cqf)erkiw.kZ vkSj dq’ky mipkj fd;k tk ldsAa
2. ;g fuf’pr djuk fd fdl lhek rd mipkj fd;k tk;sAa
3. nq?kZVuk ls ihfMr O;fDr dks ?kj] vLirky];k vU; lqjf{kr txg ij igq¡pkukA
4. ;fn Ropk ds laidZ esa vk tk;s ikuh dh vf/kdrk ls bls /kks ysaA
5. ;fn lkal ysus esa ijs’kkuh gks] rks O;fDr dks goknkj {ks= esa ys tkosa
6. tyu dks nwj djus ds fy, cough syrup and throat lozenge dk mi;ksx djsAa
113

Chlor Alkali Industry

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Chlor Alkali Industry

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Lords Chloro Alkali Limited

Plot no.SP-460, Matsya Industrial Area, Alwar,

Report Prepared by:-

M/s QMS India Ltd.

a. To estimate risk to public receptors i.e. employees & public

Data Collection - Facility, Process And Meteorological

Preparation of hazardous operations & storage details list

Identification of potential hazards and their operability

Defining Of Parameters For Each Of Chemicals & Each Of Hazards

Defining release type (continuous or instantaneous )

Dispersion Modelling of Selected Cases for Consequence

Preparation Of Summery Of Consequence Results

Evaluation Of Potential Risk To The Surrounding Population

Discussion & Recommendation Of Mitigate / Remedial Measures

Chapter – 2 Company Details

2.1 Details of the Plant

S. No. Particulars Details

2.2 Project Site:

2.3 Manufacturing Process

Chapter 3 –Risk Assessment

Bulk Hazardous Materials Storages (Table 3.1)

Production Capacity TPA (MT)

3.3 Risk Screening Approach

Table 3.2 Risk probability

Table 3.3 Risk level for various activities commonly encountered

3.6 Starting Event (SE) Severity Risk Categories

Starting Event (SE) frequency categories:

Starting event risk categories:

Frequency Description Definition

Risk category matrix Table 3.6

Severity Frequency Category

CR Critical The risk is considered normally not acceptable with existing

3.7 Quantitative Risk Assessment

Identify Consequence Outcomes

Select Consequence Outcomes

Record Frequency and Consequence

Have all Consequence outcomes

Have all failure cases been studied?

Have all risk areas been studied?

3.8 Hazardous Material Storage

o Copper tube will be used for Hydrogen connection with header.

o Carbouys will be stored away from the process plant.

o Static earthing provision made at design stage to all solvent handling

3.11 Major Hazard

following fire-extinguishing agents are approved for Class B combustibles: carbon

3.15 Event Frequency/Release Event Tree

Pressure Vessel Failure Rates

S.No Scenarios Effect

Pump Failure Rates

3.17 Hazards Area of M/s Lords Chloro Alkali Limited (LCAL)

d. Generation of static electricity

Storage of Hazardous Chemicals in Bulk

2 Road tanker Leakage,  Priority will be given to Tanker to

 Security person will check License,

Flange Gasket tank farm and process area near day

Antidote Kit, required PPEs as per SOP

5 Chemical Leakage,  Transferred chemical from drums to

Toxic release. outlet line.

 Equipment or area where work is to be conducted should be inspected to ensure that

 To arrange for fire protection equipment as per the advice of owner.

Personnel Safety (Personnel Protective Equipment)

 All PPEs should be inspected before and after each use.

a. Identification by name, characteristics (smell, appearance, etc.) and physical