Christoph Wulf

History and Theory of Anthropology ANTHROPOLOGY

Geschichte und Theorie der Ethnologie OF EDUCATION

edited by/ herausgegeben von

Prof. Dr. Klaus-Peter Kopping

(University of Heidelberg)

Volume/Band 2

LIT LIT
 Table of Content

lntroduction . - .... -. . . . . . . ...................... .

Part One: The Problem of Human Perfectibility

Le 61-000 wtl 61
J.
2.
The Dream of Education . . . . . . . . . . . .
Perfecting the Individual
9

Wilhelm von Humboldt's Anthropology of Education 25

3. Work as Gesture and Ritual . . . . 37

Part Two: Mimesis in Education, Culture and Anthropology

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheilsaufnahme
4. Mimesis as an Anthropological Concept . . . . . 51
Wulf, Christoph: 5. Mimesis in Education . . . . . . .
Anthropology of Education/ Christoph Wulf. - Munster: LIT, 2002 . 77
6. The Mimetic Production of Gestures and Rituals 93
(History and Theory of Anthropology /Geschichte und Theorie dcr Ethnolog1e ; 2)
ISBN 3-82.58-5681-x
7. Imagination ,md the l'v1irnc:,is oflmagcs .. 103

Part Three: Global and lnterc11lt11ral Education

8. Youth Violence .. , . . . . . . 115

9. The Other . .... 123
Jo. The Globalisation of Education . 139
© LIT VERLAG Munster - Hamburg - London
Grcvcner Str. l 79 48159 Miinster Tel. 0251-23 5091 Fax 0251-2319 72 Outlook - Educational Anthropology: A New Pcrspecfr,:e on Education 149
e-Mail: lit@lit-vcrlag.de http://www.lit-verlag.de
Bibliography . 165
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Acknowledgements 177

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 Introduction

Educational anthropology constitutes an important field in education today, one that is

characterised by pluralism and diversity. No educational theory can claim to produce
alone the basic knowledge necessary for education. The same is true in the realm of
anthropology. There is no longer such a thing as a normative anthropology based on
the universal truth of religions and ideologies. On the contrary, all anthropological
knowledge is necessarily plural and heterogeneous. The field of educational anthro~
pology is therefore bound to be relative and fractional, provisional and limited. 1
Anthropological knowledge plays an important role both in the realm of educatio-
nal science as well as in the field of practical education. 2 Researchers, educators and
instructors possess a certain anthropological knowledge withou~ which they would not
be able to work. In the different contexts, an implicit anthropological knowledge is at
work. As is true for all implicit knowledge, anthropological knowledge seems to defy
explicit thought, and only evolves gradually, in the course of a long process of work.
Thus, it is necessary, both for those who deal with educational science as well as for
the practitioners of education, that the anthropological premises on which their work is
based be exposed and studied. In order to achieve this, the field of education must take
on an anthropological stance.3
Educational anthropology functions according to a double historical and cultural
contextuality: on the one hand for .those disclosing knowledge, and on the other hand
for those relying on that knowledge produced in a particular context. This double
historicity and culturality relativises the factual content of anthropology. At the same
time however; the constant relation to time allows for new perspectives which under-
line the fact that there is nothing that is true in itself and alone, but that rather, knowl-
edge must always be considered in relation to a specific context. 4
Anthropological knowledge is relative. There is no longer a guaranteed system of
references; no longer any room for normative anthropology. Thus, anthropological
Jmowledge can no longer expect to be acknowledged as any different from other disci-
plines relevant to educational science. This equality of position is all the more justified
insofar as the link between educational anthropology and the other social sciences has
become vague and uncertain. Anthropolo&ical knowledge is not connected to a fixed
subject and can no longer be clearly defined.
In addition, anthropology creates new questions, perspectives and themes within
education. The end of an era in which the dominant anthropological systems were

I Wulfl997.
2 Wulf 1995.
3 Wulf/Zirfas 1994.
4 Kamper/Wulf 1994.
 - .: ,.1£@

closed upon themselves gives rise to new opportunities to produce new objects. Some examined under a new light which allow new po 1·1115 t' - . r
·
c d ucalronal .
act1011 '
to be drawn.9
0 re1ercnce ,or
· thotial
"' 1t an d
of the new perspectives that arise out of this crossing between anthropology :md the
other disciplines connected to education are expressed in the following. 5 Anthropology of education includes ref1ection both ti
h I. . r . on ic competence as well ·is
Educational anthropology has become a historical and cultural anthropology of on t e 1mits 01 its own field of knowledoe It anal)'Ses th. 1·1·t- I · · ' '.
- ·.
Irnman se If-clcf1111t10n '° · ' ' c c 1 1cu ties mvolved 117
education that takes into account the historicity and culturality of the researcher as well and education that arise from ti cl', .
· f' . i· ' · ie isappearancc of urnvcrsal
;is his object. Historical and cultural anthropology of education still attempts to relate pomts o re erence. Anthropology of education shows ho., th, , ·
its perspectives and methods to the perspectives and methods of its object. I-Iowcver, d . fl- , I · d, .. , \\ e consequences of these
1 1cu tics cpend on the cond1t1ons of their production Jn otll, . d · ·. . . ,
its purpose is no longer to research say, the human or the child as universal beings, hut
·r·h ., · fr . . · er\\ or s It 1s , eflcxrve
c ui ,crcnt d1sc11ss1ons that constitute anthropoloov of' . I 1· , · -. ·
, d·, . . . . . . . oJ ec uca ton arc sometimes
to investigate real people and children in particular historic and social contexts. from contra 1clory. Dzscuss1011 1 eters hen: to the cons1stc t t- t· h
. . . , n orms o t OllITht and lanouao.
this point of view, the idea of a concept that could somehow encompass man as a that reveal particular educat10nal contexts. These contribut' t th 1° . ' c ''°c
· . c. o c s 1ap1ng of percep-
whole loses its value. Historical and cultural anthropology of education is not limited t10n, to t11e structures and concepts of education an·' re , · •
. . . ' , u present an expression ot ti
to certain cultures or certain epochs. In rcf1ecting its own historicity and culturality, the practices of power at work Ill society, in the ,vorld of science d · ·cl '. . le
. . . , · an m e 11cat1onal msti-
discipline is able, in theory, to overcome the Eurocentrism of the humanities and the tutes. W 1th111 the framework of education anthropolo,, J 1· . · .
o . o , , .. " • • . ' otca c 1scuss1ons contribute
purely historical interests of history; it engages in the unresolvt:d problems of the pre- queJt1011 .. , perspectJ\·eo and important rns10Jits ofrclevanc t ·d · I
sent and the future. 6 ;iction. 10 "' e o e ucat10na thought and
Educational anthropology aims, on the one hand, to criticise the fantasies of omni- Anthropology of education is manifold. It is wary of too Ji ·t,, -., · .
k . . ' as )- c1 conso 11uat10n or its
potence or powerlessness of education, and, on the other hand, to reveal the tension nowlcdgc and rcmams open to that which is 'different' Tha k' t ti· 1 .
. . · ' 11 s o 11s p uralism (as
between the possibility of hwnan perfection and the difficulty of human change. and opposed to an attitude that level thmgs out) a distinct open ... 1 ,. ct · . .'
. . - . ., . ness Cl\,ar s mter-d1sc1-
therefore to show the possihilities and limits or education. These functions result in a plmary work allows rnterest to be shown m the complexit,, ra(h tl I . ·. .
. · - ' er ian t 1c reductwn of
cl:rtain concentration on human creations, which focuses on examining and exposing anthropolog1cal knowleclgc. Knowledge of education is const·t t'cl .' .
. · .. . . i u c on t 11e basis of
thl: biological, sucial aml cultural limits· of the human process of dc~'elopmcnt that ~pec1fic cond1t1011s that arc dictated by culture and lanouao. , · 11 , , ·
. . . . . · . "' i:,e, cspecia y dt d time when
ccmstitutes education. Ill recent vears the limits of human creation have been rcve::tlcd mternat1onal1ty and rnterculturah(y are tnking on an iwr~·, 51·11 al . · . ,
,. ' v ~u O ) 1mpo1 tan[ TO 1e.
more than ever, as is manifest in popular expressions such as 'the limits or growth',
and 'risk society'. An increased humanisation of the world seems to nm parallel to the
At present, much of the knowledge transmitted bv the educ"t·
. .
correspond to people·s expectations. This poses the problem of tl . . : 1• ·
• " 1ona s,
1 .
stem does not
,
cbnger of its own destruction. 7
,ct · . ., . _. . . . ie ie at1011 between
e ucat1onal knowledge 311d social, mst1lutional and ccluc-itio 11 .,j 1·t . I . 1-
• . . . , u rea 1 : . nso ar as eel u-
Educational anthropology must involve an anthropological criticism of its own cat1011al knowledge contnbutes to thc formation and shc1p 1·11 o- f ti . .
. . , . . · , c o 1e next gcncrat1on 11
self~conception, which focuses on its competence as well as on its limits. This must, It must imply human selt-understancl111°, which it"elr is scrtit 1 · · ·l d · · ·
. . . .. "' ~ · nisc;t an questioned b,
for instance, work on the simplifications involved in the traditional anthropological the ptob!em of human pcr/ectzbzlity or 11011-per(cclibilirv fn 11 , . t . 1· . . )
. . . . . · 1e con ext o educational
comparisons bct\vccn man and animal. It must also take into account mistakes result- knowledge, this rrohlcm lies at the core of anthropological resnrch
ing from tl1e popular distinction between nature and culture. Further, anthropological \Vithin the realm of educational anthropo!oo-v b~rdcrl· '. b t. . , . -·
r. . . . ·., • . ., . . . c., _ mes c \1;ccn t 11e d1/terc 11 t
criticism must be dedicated to avoiding objectivist reductions of the human. Anthro- .101 ms of knm1,/u:lge hc1v-: d1ssolvcd and new forms ot instruct 1 ·0 1 b, cl ··
pological criticism examines the central concepts, models, and methods or educational . . 1, . n iave ccn eve! oped
Aesthetic eclucat1on - and mtercultura] education 13 are f · · ·
anthropology and reflects on the conditions of the legitimation or knowledge issued in _ . . 1. , . ' o particu 1ar importance
anwngst t ·,cse. The former 1s related to the emcrecnce of . . ct·
this realm. 8 . . . .. . - nc\v me 1a and connected
:.oc1al consequences, the latter 1efer~ lo the new economic d d, 1·
Thl: task of educational anthropology is to analyse. organise. re-evaluate and · · - · an emograp 11c contexts
charactenst1e of contemporary Europe. Out of this new c t 'Yt ,- ' ·
I . on c .. consequences emerge
produce knowledge issued by the sciences of education, and to dccomtruct educational t mt are relevant to education and traininu to learniiio .1 ., · l . . · 1.:
.,,. 'nu prac 11ca experience ,
L
. "" '
concepts from an anthropological perspective. This might involve for instance decon- Anthropology ot education is pa11lv the result of .1 " ,. 1 . 1 - · ..
structing Rousseau's negative education, Pestalozzi's elementary education or Hum- , . . . . ·. , con,, 1 uc zve process. I his
means that m its 1ctlect1on ,md research, it does not [Jre· su t b, , bl ·
boldt's vision or the individual's general education. New anthropological perspectives . . , . . . . · , me o c c1 e to understand
human bemg. h.athe1, 1t realises thJt its co1iccption of' m· I· , cl ·- '
may then reveal new dimensions to old problems. Thus, historical contexts can be · ,. r • . .·
C • an c epen s on specll1c condi-
llonJ ouch as histo11c und cultural facts, and c·m onl)' b, d, d . .·
' c un erstoo as a construetmn.
9 Wulf 1996a.
10 Wult' 1997.
5 Wulf 1994. 11 Licbau/\Vulf t 996.
6 Schiifer/Wulf 1999; Bilstein/Miller-Kipp/Wulf 1999; Liebau/Miller-Kipp/Wulf 1999. 12 Mollenhauer/Wulf 1996; Schafer/Wulf 1999.
7 Liith/Wulf 1987. 13 Dibie/Wulf 1998; Hess/Wulf 1999.
8 Kamper/Wulf 1994. 14 Wulf 1998; Morin/Wulf 1997; Wulf l995; Sting/Wulf 1994.

2
To the ex1ent that the deductive/nonnative systems of acquiring knowledge in anthro-
pology of education have been surpassed, it is necessury to develop a historical and
cultural anthropology of education that is shaped according to a constructivist and
reflexive movernent. 15
From an epistemological point of view, the following factors characterise therefore
the anthropology of education: corporeality, aestheticism, historiciry, plurality, c'.d-
turalitv, inlerculturalitv, multi- and transdisciplinarity, criticism and reflexivity, With
rcgiml to its content. there arc several problems within educational science that prove
the fundamental importuncc of anthropological research in the field.
Part one of this book will have a largely historico-cultural stance. It will focus on
the tension between the goal of human perfection and the limits of change. The slurting
point is the dream of making humans perfect through education, a dream that is charac-
teristic of the modern era. A relevant question here is the significance of imagination,
both for society and for the individual. Humans need dreams and utopias in order to
evolve. In view of his elasticity, every individual needs to imagine ·what or how he
would like to bc. 16 Education has a decisive role to play in this process. At the dawn of
the modern age_ Comenius created a utopia based on the goal of perfecting the human:
The whole Art of Teaching all Things to all Men. Throughout the course of educational
hislorv this dream has been constantlv reverted to, even if the utopias of Rousseau,
Pestalozzi, Herbart and Schlcicrmache~ are all somewhat different. However important
and necessary these utopias may seem, they have nevertheless sometimes degenerated
into nightmares. The ditriculty involved in realising the dreams has shown that chang-
ing the human is no easy task. I luman resistance and stubbornness constitute funda-
mental clements in education. This fonns the st.ming point of Humboldt's anthro-
pology. whose theory of education will be discussed in chapter two of this book.
I lumboldt aspires to perfect the individual. In his view, the unique character of the
individual. due to its historicity and culturality, ought to be at the centre of modern
cducation. In underlining the fact that each individual has his own personality that ht:
cannot escapc, Humboldt con:;idcrs rrecdom and free will to be constitutive elcmeuts
in the educative process. J\t the centre of his theory of c<lm:ation based on anthropol-
ogy, Humboldt places not the state or society, but the individual with its singular
charnctcr. its specific needs, points of view and capacities. Apart from education, lhe
notion of work in the Western world rcprcscnts the second most important strate~y
aimed at perfecting the human. An analysis of work in antique Greece. as well as Ill
Christianity will illustrate this phenomenon in chapter three. Nowadays however, the
,tralcgy of work is limited. There is not enough remunerated work. which brings us to
question the fundamental role of work in the individual's life. Can work continue to _be
our m::iin re::ison for existing? Does not the relation between work, education and lite
need to be redefined?
I 5 Sec l'aragr:ina I 9\l4- I998. . .
16 ln order tc, avoid cu111bcrsome repetitions 1hrou1:;liout the book and facilitate reading. rt has ,ccn
1he author's decision to opt for the use of the pr;nouns 'he', 'his' and 'himself instead of alterna-
lives such as 's/he', 'hislher', 'himself/herself etc. It is of course assumed that wherever such pro-
nouns occur the reader should understand both/all gender identities as being referred to.
4'
Part two deals with the role mimetic processes play in consolidating culture. and
socicty. 17 It focuses on the importnnce of mimetic processes in an individual's up-
bringing and education, in his use of gestures, in the staging of rituals and the creation
of community as well as on their Junction in internalising the outer world in the form
of images and their effects on the individual and his education. \Ve shall examine the
question of the relation between inner and outer worlds since this relates to the primary
task of education, which is to help the indi\'idual transform the outside world that is
imposed on llim, and integrate it, make it coexist with the interior world of the individ-
ual and vice-versa. The bridge between the inner and outer realms corresponds to the
human mimetic faculty. Thus, mimesis is defined as a conditio humana . 18 Chapter four
provides a general overview of the history and contemporary relevance of the concept
of mimesis. The analysis will show that mimesis is not only an aesthetic concept, but
an anthropological concept focussing on the shaping of the body and its senses. Chap-
ter five concentrates on the importance of mimetic processes for education and sociali-
sation. Mimetic processes do not only refer to humans but also to objects (in space).
How the child assimilates its environment though mimetic processes is examined in an
analysis of the autobiography of Walter Benjamin. The importance of these processes
is revealed in the relationship between man and woman as well as in psychogencsis.
Mimetic processes arc conceived in their central importance to c:ducation. Chapter six
analyses the role of mimetic processes in the performance of body gestures and rituals;
il shows the central role of rituals in producing the social and the community. In inter-
nalising images of performances, mimetic processes create a practical knowledge,
which is n prerequisite for adequate social nciing. Chapter seven deals with the role of
mimetic processes in the produt:lion of different types of images and the role of imagi-
nation in this process. I\fonctic processes allow one to assimilate the visual content of
images and integrate it into one's own world of images and imagination. They give rise
to inner and outc1· images that play nn essential role in education, and socialisation, as
well as in individual action. In the same way as the 1970s underlined the importance of
language in all realms of education, science and culture, at present we are beginning to
realise the importance of images and imagination. There is talk of an iconic turn. f\s a
result of the o:mcrgence of new media, the image has taken on an importance that was
unimaginable until now, especially with regard to the unification of the countries of the
European Union, as well as in the processes related to globalisation.
With these political and social developments education faces new challenges. lt
can no longer be considered only
~ . in the context of the nation state. \Vith the ncw~cleve-
lopmcnls in the Europenn Union, mobility between the members of the different
nations in Europe will increase. This will result in intensive migration processes. In
their context the encounter between members of different cultures with intensifv.
Questions of violence and of how to deal with the differences of people from 01h~r
cultures, i.e. with the other, will become increasingly important and raise issues relat-
ing to the globalisation of cclucation. Education \Vhich takes these developments into
account is inlercu!tura! eclucalion. As such it presents a challenge tu nation-based edu-
l cation ,m<l to an education based on one single culture. Jn part three education is con-
17 Gebauer/Wulf 1998.
18 Gebauer/Wulf 1995.
5
 ceived as an intcrcultural task that takes into account similarities and differences
between European nations and cultures. The way in which these differences are dealt
,vith will determine the future evolution of Europe. It is crucial that every individual
learn to live with the other who is different. Yet this task will have failed if the number
of racist, nationalist or xenophobic acts of violence continues to grow. 19 Chapter eight
deals with the issue ofwliy violent acts of this kind arc often committed by youths and
adolescents. In explaining the phenomenon of violence, we will stress the inadequate-
ness of many explanations. For indeed, there is ol!en an arbitrary element inherent to
such acts, which it is imporiant to take into account in order to reveal the uncontrolla-
ble and inevitable aspect of violence and thus uncover the complexity of the problem.
Violence is often directed towards the other because the other's difference has become
unbearable. Yet experiencing the other is a vital educational task which will be dis-
cussed in chapter nine. Confrontation with the other teaches us what is characteristic of
ourselves, and allows our fixed principles to be shifted. Thus, we realise that the other
ref1ccts what is foreign to us in ourselves and therefore expands our comprehension of
ourselves.
Chapter ten considers educational perspectives in the future. How arc we to foce
the challenges of globalisation'.1 211 How docs reducing the importance of nation state~
and national cultures effect the results of education'! I-low are we to m::mage the ten-
sions between the particular :md the universal? How are the two contr::idictory yet
intimakly connected tendencies of individualisation on the one hand, and globalisation
on the other dealt with in education'.! In the face of this evolution il is not sufficient to
conceive education only in a global perspective, since this merely mnounts too easily
to a generalisation of Eurocentric perspectives and to a reduction of the diversity of
cultures without however improving the quality of life on Earth'l 21
The dream of education and of man's pcrfectihility, the issues related to mimetic
processes in society and culture, education and soeialisaticin, issues of violence_ of the
other and of glohalisation, inscribed in a new concept of intercultural education, high-
light the increased importance of :111thropological perspectives in education. This is all
the more so since the new developments imply new perspectives on an increasing
complexity of education in the New lvlillerrnium. The outlook of this book treats edu-
cational anthropology therefore as a new perspective on t:ducation combining philo-
sophical_ historical and cultural, as \Veil m transclisciplinary and transnational issues.
Part One
The Problem of Human Perfectibility
Throughout modern history, visions of upbringing and education have been llccply
connc;lccl to tl1eories of human improvement. The programme of modem education,
challenging the limit to which humans can be perfected, is formulated in the words of
Comcnius: 'The whole Art of Teaching all Things to all lvfen'. This dream of education
is to overcome thal which cannot be improved or educated: the incorrigible strain of
human nature. The utopi;:in character of the drcc1111 causes powerftll energies to be re-
leased that can sometimes lead to the lives of cl1ildren and youths being sacrificed to
the desired vision, thus transfom1ing the drc:m1 into a nightmare. ldodern educational
discmirscs are intimatcly connected to the vision of education. Their c1irn is to improve
and perfect the individual. Various images of what it is to be human have resulted in
various expressions of the dream and its discourses. Gradually, the cb1m that every
individual's uniqueness should be the starting point and focus of cducntion has become
p::irt of the vision of education and it~ discourses._ Besi_des education, w~rk constitutes
the second strategy for human pcrfcct1on. Its aim is to improve the condition of the m-
dividual and the species. Like in the case of education. our notion of work is rooted in
a dream ofperfcclion and a desire to improve our conditions of!iie. The drc1stic human
consequences of unemployment in contemporary societies highlight the deep impor-
tance oCthe value orwork for life.

19 Dieckmann/Wimmer/Wulf 1997; Wimmer/Wulf/Dieckmann 1996.

20 Wulf 1998.
21 Wulf1995.
____ v
< 7
 1

The Dream of Education

Research into sleep I has shown that dreams are necessary; without dreams the human
brain would not function. Experiments have shown that when prevented from dream-
ing people start to laugh uncontrollably, show signs of irritability and eventually bcgin
to hallucinate. Throughout the cyclic process of sleep, long dreamless phases are fol-
lowed by periods of intense dreaming that are characterised by rapid eye movement.
Adults usually spend a fifth of their sleep in dream phases which occur at intervals of
about 90 minutes and can last between l O and 30 minutes, or up to 60 minutes al the
end of a night. If we are woken in a dream phase, we are usually able to remember
what we were dreaming.
The capacity to differentiate between dream and re:ility only corilt:s al a certain
stage in the development ofa person's consciousness, a stage that the little boy Kaspar
Hauser had not yet reached when, on 26th May 1828, he was found in a market place
in Ntirnberg. Describing the boy, Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach recounts that 'bed was
his most favourite of places ( ... ) Since sleeping in a bed he had begun to have dreams,
which at first however, he die! 110t n:cognize as dreams and would recount to his mc1ster
as real events, for only later did be learn the difference between being awake and
dreaming'. 2
Throughout the ages, and in all cultures it has been known that the borderline
between d~eam and reality, between fantasy and truth, defined by discursive reason is a
:;haky one, in constant need of re-evaluation. A poignant example of this is Tschuang-
Tschau's dream and ensuing reflection in the Taoist books: 'L Tschuang-Tschau, once
dreamt I was a butterfly, fluttering here and there without a care or desire, oblivious of
mv human being. Suddenly I awoke; and there I lay, once again myself. Now I do nm
k~ow: was I then a man dreaming I was a butterfly, or am I now a butterfly dreaming I
am a man':' There is, between a man and a butterfly, c1 barrier, the crossing ofwhieh is
c:-illed Change.' 3
The borderline between dream and reality is unclear, and partially a product of
social power m1d the prevalent discourse. Like speech and gestures, dreaming consti-
tutes an indispensable form of human expression, Novalis saw dreams as a protective
mechanism against the regularity and normnlity of life, as free access to its connected
fantasy, where all life's images arc jumbled up and the constant seriousness of adult-

J Rorbcly 1938.
2 quoted from Horisch 1979 (trans. A. Lagaay).
3 quoted from JocJ.:cl 195 8 {trans. ,\, Lagaay).

9
hood interruplcd by happy children's play. He pointed out how dreams keep us young
and considered the dream as, if not directly a gi!i from God, then u precious and deli-
cious task, and a friendly companion on our pilgrimage to the grave.
According to Gehlcn, the origin offantasv, or of what he calls 'primal imagination'
lies 'in the d~tritus ot· our dn:an;s, or in the. periods of concentrated vegetative proc-
esses' .4 Psychoanalysis is more boldly unequivocal: in our dreams, we experience who
we arc. Dreams open a way to the unconscious, and reveal information about a per-
son's dc:epest structure, which it is other.vise extremely difficult to know. Yet dreams
n::vcal nothing directly: whmever the manifest Llrcam-content, there is ;-ilways a laknt
dream-though~ implie~I. which according lo Frtcud, is what carries the core of lhc mes-
sZ1gc of every dream. Dn:am-thoughts mid dream-content me conceived as 'two ver-
sions of thr.: same subject-matter in two different languages'. Dream-thoughts arc at
first however inaccessible to consciousness and revealed in the course of dream-work.
Thus, 'the dream-content( ... ) is expressed as it ,vere in a pictographic script, the char-
acters of which have to btc transposed individually into the language of the dream-
thuughts. 1f we allempted to read these characters according tu their pictorial v~lue
inste;d of according to their symbolic relation, we should clearly be led into error·.)
Through dreams and davdrcams a person's everyday experiences arc worked
throu[!h a1;cl restructured, wisl1cs are fulfilled and life is made colourful and lively. No
one li~,cs without them, 'but it is a question of knowing them deeper and deeper ,md in
this way keeping them trained unerringly, usefully, on what is right. Let the daydreams
2row even follcr, since this means they arc enriching themselves around the sober
;lance; not in the sense of clogging, but of becoming clear. Not in the sensr.: of mer_el!
contemplative reason, which takes things as they arc and as they stmJ, but of partici-
pating reason. which takes them as they go. and therefore also as they could g? better.
Then let the davdrcams crow rec11ly fuller. that is, clearer, less random, more lamilwr.
more clcc1rJy u;clerstoocl and more mediated with the course of things. So that the
wheat whicl~ is trying to ripen can be encouraged to grow and be harvested' 6
\Ve pbn our lives in tlaydreams, anticipate both what we fear and hope for, dream
up alternatives and live beyond the given. ln daydreaming we come across that which
is 'not yet conscious' or 'has not yet occurred m become': in dreams we :irticulate our
hope l~r a better lilc, not in a utopian past but in the foture. This drcametl future_is lhe
background that enables every present step to be achieved. Daydreaming allows !or the
possibility that the natural course of things may be changed for the better.
Fantasy and imagination open up and develop in dreams :md daydreams; our ca-
pacity to picture cannot but imagine the fulfilment of wishes, think up ant.! p];:in alter-
native actions ant.! better conditions oflife. In dreams we anticipate new life forms and
actions. Our desires and their distorted images arc mimircd in the world of fairy mies,
in which all forms of transformation arc displayed, involving clothes, masks am!
magic. ln the fantasy world of fairy tale, all that in everyday life is impossible or for-
bidden is suddenly made possible. Similarly, theatre and film provide dream-like alkr-
natives thal increase life's variety. Most utopias can be conceived of as dreams, like
4 Gehlen 1988, p. 3 I 6.
5 Freud 1991, p.381.
6 Bloch 1986, p, 4.
the vision of a better social condition, of a better life. Think for instance of the Garden
of Eden, the Phaiaken Island of the Odyssey, of Plato's Po!itcia. Augustin's Divine
State, Thomas More's Utopia, Campnnelln's City of Sun, or Fouri~r's lesigns. Among
Such utopias is the dream of education, which, as the vision of total educabilitv and
formation can be tractcd to the beginning of historical societies, and has reached (l-i lull
clevclopmcnt since the start of the modern era.
The Llrcam of education arises as an answer to the following anthropologic condi-
tion described in 1929 by Heidegger: 'No other epoch has accumulated so great and so
Vnried a store of knowledge concerning man as the present one ... But also, no epoch
is less sure of its knowledge of what man is than the present one. ' 7
Following Nietzsche. humans have been described by Gchlcn as 'theorcticallv in-
<::oncr.:ivahle', and by Plessner, as that which 'cannot be explained in thought'. -One
C:ondition of man's theoretical ungraspableness is his relative openness to the world.
·I'his is related to the 'extra-uterine springtime' (Partmann) resulting in the reduction of
l1uman instincts tu mere rcsiJues of instincts. ivlax Sche!er referred to this in his 1929
:,hort publication entitkd /I.Ian's Place in Nature. The reduction of human instincts.
.:\nd a certain ·freedom of environment' resulting from the absence of a milieu specific
lo the species (Uexkiill), make education a necessity for lrnrnans. However, definim:
lhe anthropological condition does not help determine what kind of social and !if~
<.::ontlitions are desirable. What exactly the dream of education should be remains an
r..'Jpen question. Attempts \vithin educational anthropology to draw conclusions from the
~eneral anthropological condition have not been convincing. 8 Plcssner's dictum from
lhc point of view of l211ma11 ecce11/ricity can be held against thcm: 'As a being exposed
lc, the world, man remains concealed from himself - Homo abscnnditus. ' 9 Jn this
:~tatcment. one might say the second commandment, originally related to God, is re-
lc11cd to man: thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image nor likeness. 10
Time and again, education has clashed with this prohihition of images and imira-
fi011. For the sake of education. many an image of man has been devised and manv a
clrcam designed. Whilst some have been forgotten. others Jre still current. and so;ne
l,,we tcnclccl to recur - some only in the shaduw of accepted beliefs. Evcrv historic
<.::poch brings its own taboos and prohibitions that occasionally the dream (behind the
backs of those that hold power) manages lo overcome.
('__::omenius
C.:: 0 menius · dream of education is one that throughout modern historv has never ceased
t,) recur. It represents in many ways the visionary beginning of tl~c modern a2e. In
"harp contrast at the time to the contemporary horrors the Thirty Year War, Com~nius'
<.::(.)nception of education. rooted in the harmonious vision of his pansophy and his in-
<:::rcdible optimism, stands out as the dream or a better world. On the title page of his
-~-.__ ____________
1 Heidegger 1962, p. 216.
~ J<onig/Ramsenthaler 1980.
9 Plessner 1983, p. 353 (trans. A. Lagaay).
1() Bollnow 1980, p, 52 (trans. A. Lagaay).
11
Didactica Magna, 11 printed in Czech in 1628 and in Latin in 1637, the following pro-
gramme is laid out: I. God 11. The interior decoration
2. The World 12. Ways of travelling and
movinl!,.
'The Great Didactic. The whole Art of Teaching all Things to all Men
3. The Heaven 13. Intellectual activity
. Or .
A certain Inducement to found such Schools in all the Parishes, Town, and Villages of every Christian 4. The Elements 14. Schools, Theories,
Kingdom, that the entire Youth of both Sexes, none being excepted, shall Lessons
Quickly, Pleasantly, and Thoroughly 5. The Earth 15. Social Behaviour
Become learned in the Sciences, pure in Morals, (manners)
trained to Piety, and in this manner 6. The Plant World 16. The Citv
instructed in all things necessary 7. The Animals 17. Games and Entertainment
for the present and for 8. Human Beinl!s 18. Politics
. the future life, 9. Human professions and 19. Religion
in which, with respect to· everything that is suggested, activities.
Its FundamentafPrinciples lire set forth from the essential IO. Houses. What they are 20. The Last Judgement 13
nature of the matter, made of and how (the parts of
· Its Truth is proved by· examples from the several mechanical arts, a house).
· Its Order is clearly set forth in years, months, days, and hours, and, finally, ·
An Easy And Sure Method is shown, by which it can be pleasantly brought into existence.

L~t ·,he main object of this, our Didactic, be as follows: To seek and to find a method of instruction,
by which teachers may tei;ch less, but learners may learn more; by which schools may be the scene of
less· noise, aversion, and useless ·1abour, but of more leisure, enjoyment, and solid progress; and
through which the Christian community may have less darkness, perplexity, and dissension, but on
the other hand more light, orderliness, peace, and rest.'
It. is hard lo think of a clearer expression of the modern educational programme, de-
spite the deep embedment of Comenius' thought in the Christian teachings of the
Middle .Ages. Comenius had no doubt that the world was created in a certain order ac-
cording to God's desire and that man's task is.to progress though life's confusion to-
wards eternal bliss .. Of course Adam had sinned; but: Christ's ·.suffering brought
redemption to all. Thus, man's good nature could be developed through upbringing and
education. Comenius opens his explanation of pansophy in the Lexicon reale pan-
sophicum with the words 'Pansophia. est sapientia. universalis'. Pansophy stands for
general wisdom, universal wisdom, but also, all encompassing wisdom, which, rooted
in God's created world, the· Bible and human conscience, leads the way to recognition
and piety. In Comenius' mind there was no difference between recognising the world
and recognising God, both were directly related to each other. Thus, the driving force
of Comenian education was the .desire to see through the order of things and thus gain
better knowledge of God's Work. 12 . . . . .
· .The concept no doubt involves an encyclopaedic element. A good illustration of
this is the Orbis pictus, probably Comenius most famous work, which Goethe.was still
given to read in his childhood and which was reworked by Gailer. in 1835 as Neuer
Orbis pictus far die Jugend (The New .Orbis Pictus for Children). The Orbis pictus
presents the 'visible world'.
The pictorial representation of the world sphere begins and ends with. God. (God~ the
Last Judgement). The world is seen as a circular pattern of·connected meaning with a
beginning and an end, in between which nature on the one hand and human achieve-
ment on the other unfold. The picture book is encyclopaedic, but it does not present
things individually. Nothing is without connection: The classification of words and·
things/pictures, and the alphabetical order indicate ·an ordering principle that it is
nowadays virtually impossible to think without. Comenius' general purpose was that
each thing and each presentation should be perceived in its connection with the order ·
of humans and their lives. Whereas medieval Latin schools had focused on speaking
and remembering and not on looking, Comenius, taking the advantage of the expansion
of book printing, drew attention to realia and the objects of the world. The principle of
looking, founded in the Orbis pictus and which has been integral to education ever ·
since, paved the way to a new vahiation of perception, which was further influenced by
the English'sensualists.
The Orbis pictus constitutes an attempt to present children with a picture of the
world as a significant whole. 14 What matters in the Orbis pictus is that the world be·
shown in a particular way, with a particular educational intention. The images and con-
cepts presented do not introduce things as they are but rather show a relation between
them. Children are presented with a pre-conceived construct of the world, education-
ally prepared according to particular educational intentions, a construction made to ac-
company or indeed replace other visions of the world. The question as to which
segment of the world is presented irf which way by the older generation introduces an
unstoppable development which, according to Foucault in The Order of Things, con-
tributed to the foundation of modem education; 15 To express· it pointedly, the Orbis ·
pictus constituted the beginning of a development that has now gone so far that one

11 Comenius 1910, p. I.
,,:I
I
13 Comenius 1942.
14 Mollenhauer 1983.
12 Schaller I 962. 15 Foucault I 970.

12 I 13
could speak. of simulation with educational intent. 16 With this idea in mind, the afore-
!llrntiom:tl semc11i.;es from the tith: page of the Creal Didactic, that charncterisc the
modern ecluc::ition::il dream gain significance: The comph:te art of teaching everybody
e,·erv!hilw.
This ~,ision of complete education involved the highest educational utopia: in learn-
ing all that encompasses the world created by God, it was thought that man himself
became God-like. All that was needed was the right method. By following the right
path, man could be led beyond himself and made into a true human. Educatio11 was a
task set by God: cducation, a service to God. No longer should only a few chosen
people he taught, but all people. for all are God·s creation and therefore have a right to
cduc;:ition. This is the founding principle of the Christian expansion of education !Cl
encompass ·all youth of both sexes'. Educators at the time wen; euphoric: the business
of learning should be swift, pleasant and profound. The fact that the process might also
be difficult and involve overcoming oneself w:1s forgotten or repressed. Comcnius ·
new all-encompa:;sing mdhod was designed in the hope of getting around the
unplcasant side or learning. The self-delusion and over-estimation of education at the
time and the educators' conception of omnipotence were of' course, in time, bound to
lead to disappointment and disillusion.
C:omenius \Vas convinced that proper education shDu!d not simply involve acquir-
ing scientific k.no\\lcdgc, but also teach 'good manners' and 'piety'. in other words its
business wJs also to teach the right values. The youth should acquire the appropri;ite
knowledge, values and attitudes lo accomp,rny them through both this Jifo as well ,ls
the ·after-life'. With this emphasis on necessary knowledge fnr rhe future, the theory or
education took on two criteria, which have remained v,ilid until now. Children must be
taught the knowledge they need for both their present as well as their future lives. The
notion or neccssitv here is intimately connected to the choice of the right contcnt and
valucs of cclucati~n and therefore co1u1ci.;tcd lo the criteria involved in this choice~ a
question that the cd11c:1tional and curriculum reforms of the J970s \Vere much con-
cerned with. 17
Comcnius' concern was to convey the order of things. With a rather questionable
distinction between 'everything' and 'all'. he tried to define the principles thal underlie
all krnnvledge so as to reduce the qu;mtity of what in principle could be considered
possible knowledge. Later, Pcstalozzi was lo take up this idea in hie conception of
clemcntarv knowledge that has been Cunclamental to educc1tion ever since. Comcniu,;'
other crit~rion, th:-il ;hildren 's future should be taken into account in their education.
has proved to be equally important. Y ct how exactly can education be related to the
future':> Ever since the dawn of the modern era this question has been of constant rele-
vance to education. In the days when it was generally believed that Ciod determined the
lives of humans for all time, this question rnJ)' have seemed relatively easy to answer.
This may also have been the case when later, at the time of I lcgel and lvlarx, history
WJS seen to follow a particular path in which at least the future of hw,1an kind seemed
tu be pre-determined. But ever since the emergence of a rndical doubt in the meaning-
I6 Baudrillard 1993.
17 And especially since S.B. Robinson's short paper Bildungsreform als Revision des Curriculum
and Ein Stn1k1urkon::ept fiir Curriculume111wick/u11g, Neuwied/Bcrlin. 3rd edition I 971.
14
ful future of mankind, ever since the question of the future of new generations has he-
come connected to the !earfi.JI question of the future of the human species altogether,
despite the tact that the question is constantly present in educational science. it seems
nowadavs that no ckar answer will ever be found.
Cor1;enius' vision that one could improve humanity through education was never
realised. Moreover, the reality of school, according to the education system defined by
the ruling powers of the 18th and 19th centuries, was to paint a very different picture
or the experience of learning than what Comenius had intended in his optimistic vision
of the educated person. The shining dream of education that sought to determine the
procedure of teaching so that 'the educator teaches less. yet the pupil learns more', this
dream is deformed into a procedure that determines a precise order of the learning
processes, a procedure which shows up 'truth by examples drawn from the rnechnnical
Jrts' and which shows in its realisation 'the foundation in the nature of the object it-
self, in such a way thilt the emerging education system becomes an institution which
must al least be judged as controversial.
It is clc~r th:it the over-optimistic, utopian content of' Comenius' dream resulted in
pcopk foiling to consider the obstacles that were in its way. Thc following reasons
suggest that ;it the time of Comenius. any element that was at odds with the idea of
hu7,;,m educability was systematically suppressed:
The fact lhat the awful ,uffering experienced throughout the Thirty Year War seems
to have hacl no negative inl111cncc of Comcnian anthropology strongly suggests that
Comcnius' dream of education constituted the unconditional fulfilment of a deep
wish. /\!though man was seen 10 carry the burden of original sin. this negative
image was not sustained. hut sublimated hy the dream of a better humanity.
Altl;ough education was seen as a duty towards Goel, God was only really present at
the ma;gins of the educational process. Comenius · vision was in fact already the
drt'.am of a self-empowered human, capable or bt:ing completed through education.
Anything related to the experience of unconsciousness or the k.nowlcclgc of human
inadequacy when it comes to sorting out affairs was suppressed.
- To doubt God's design or the meaningfi.1lness of the order of things in the world was
not tolerated. Neither was tl1ere to be any doubt in man's capacity to recognise him-
self and the world. Thus. knowledge of the limitations of a human ·s ability to learn
was suppressed ,me! sacrificed to a vision of complete educability.
Jt is clear that these suppressed ;mthropological and political clements of relevance to
education were to gain considerable inllucm:c and, throughout the development of the
cducati0n system tn the following centuries, came to overlay the utopian aspects of
Comcnius· dn;am. The following five theses outline this development:
_ 1-hanan sclt~crnpowerment aml a growth in human :rntonomy were the aims of the
dream of education: l1rst it was seen as ::i service to God. later it was to contribute to
1-Jis effacement. This process was accompanied by an increase in rationality. mod-
ernisation and civilisation, which led to a deeper separation between 'inside' and
'outside' that allowed for an expansion of the interior realm as well as psychic dif-
ferentiation. Functional Reason was seen to direct human affections and demanded
15
 to be cbssified within the increasingly economically calculable patterns of life. This
development went so far as to result in the ex-territorialisation of affections and
consequently to a certain training of the bodv.
- One effect of education was to~ make hum;ns more disciplined, and consequently
more economically productive. People acquired new roles and modes of behaviour;
an increasingly high degree of synthetic achievement was valued. Education con-
tributed to the functionalisation of man. School taught people to keep to particular
timetables and remain within certain spaces. Gradually, disciplined behaviour was
adapted to natural processes; the reduction of any opposition to discipline contrib-
uted to making it more effective.
The emerging division of labour corresponds to the development of rational modes
of behaviour. R.1tionality, prudence and measure have become increasingly valued
modes of behaviour. They go hand in hand with a more differentiated capacity to
perceive, and, for an increasing number of people, a training of the mind and a ca-
pacity to abstract thinking. The organisation of school education and the expansion
of compulsory schooling contributed greatly to these developments.
The obligation to self-control, which - supported by corresponding school practices
- has increasingly replaced external control, has developed alongside people ·s in-
creasing dependency on the f'unctioning of the society as a whole. There arc signs of
a tendency to independence from the control which eliminates the connection be-
tween emotions and behaviour. The regulation of sex drive, also enforced by tbc
framework of education and the resulting extension of emotional life, is accompa-
nied by an increasing satisfaction of needs through fantasies and stories resulting in
a 'disembodying' and 'dcscnsual ising · of experience.
The gradual change in the inner structure of humans, throughout the course of the
civili:;ation process, has given rise to social contradictions, which are increasingly
finding a place within humans themselves. People increasingly have to take a criti-
cal look at themselves. ;\ sense of shame emerges when reople encounter internal
contradictions and arc seized bv the fear of no longer bcin>! ahlc to mediate hctween
their needs and the social non;1s. This is a concr;te expr:ssion of the now broken
relationship of the human with himself.
This analysis, whic/1 brings into view the excluded clements of the dream of education,
mGy have points or
common with ideological criticism, hut it is different insofar as it
docs not suppose tlrnt the Comenian dream or education is ideology according to false
consciousness. There arc also similarities with Roland Barthes' myth analyses. in
which he distinguishes between a primary object-linguistic system ;md a secondary
scrniologic, meta-linguistic system positioned above it. 18
Pictistie Education and the 'Industrial School' Movement
Following Comenius, the idea of the compulsory education of Christ's rcoplc was
continued in the 18th century with the Pietislic education of A.ugusl Hermann Fr:mch:.
I8 Barth es 1997.
16
In contrast to Comenius, this is a pess1m1st1c anthropology. As a result of inherited
original sin, which is not revocable through good work but through belief itself (sole
_lid;), every child is considered bad by nature, th:it is. equipped with an evil mind of its
own. which education is designed to break, in order to achieve examination of the
•inner-self and to develop 'real piety of the heart'. The development of 'piety of the
heart' and 'deed Christianity' became the main task or education. Praying and work-
ing, a ban on playing, and severe punishments for absence became the means of edu-
cation in order to strengthen the spirit against the impulses of the body. Education
became education with a view to asceticism and the fulfilment of duty; it became pro-
fessional education according to Luther. Graf Ludwig von Zinzendorf: a student of
Hermann Francke and founder of the Hcrrenhuter pietism, formulated the following
aim of life: 'We do not work in order to live, but rather we li-ve for the sake of v,1ork,
and when there is no more work we suffer or die.' 19 On the basis of this attitude, the
dailv routine of the I-lerrnhuter orphanage consiskd of three hours practice at silent
nrzi~er, six hours of phvsical work and five hours of lessons.
· ·The pietistic educ,;tion theory and the 'industrial school' movement. whose central
educational aims were diligence and 'industriousness', have some points in common
with the notion of educati;n with a view to work. Here the emphasis is on the eco-
nomic use or learning. The Gulsherr Rochow von Reckahn schools also implemented
this idea that pupils should acquire skills relevant to the rnral sphere of life.
Rousseau
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Emile, published in 1762, introduced a vision of education
without which modern education would be unthinkable. The great innovation or Rous-
seau's thought was that he did not view education as a merely a means to the achieve-
ment of hi~hcr objectives, but instead questioned the aims of education itselL In his
opinion. cducatio1; should no longer be an instrument of normative guidelines but
should respect and develop the child's self This, he thought, ought to be the founda-
tion and legitimation of education. Accordingly, the maturity, independence and dis-
cernment of an educated person arc not revealed in tbat as an adult he corresponds with
the ideas ,mcl judgements of thi: educator, but in that he has acquired a position of his
own. Rousseau's harsh criticism of an education, which is not derived from the child
and its own right to education, is based on the recognition that every socialised life in-
volving the development or some human possibilities will exclude others. This stance
could not be formulated in a more radical way than on the first pages of Emifr: 'God
makes all things good: man meddles with them and they become evil.( ... ) We are born
weak, wc need strength: helpless, we need aid: foolish. we need reason. All that we
lack ;:it birth. :ill that we need when we come to man ·s estate, is the gift of education
... ,ell Rousseau recognizes the anthropological dependence of humans on education: the
dream of education as 3 necessity for life. But he also emphasises the inadequacy of
education~] reality in comparison to the educational dream. On the one hand he thus
19 Ludwig von Zinzendorf as quoted in Blankertz 1982, p. 53 (trans. A. Lagaay).
20 Rousseau 1993, p. 5-6.
17

suggests the possibility of improvement in principle and is in this respect optimistic for
education. On the other hand however, he recognises the negative effects or power,
which are unavoidable in social situations,· and which continue to counteract human
improvement.
For Rousseau, education must stimulate those streneths in humans that allow them
to satisfy their own natural needs. Thus, the creation ~f 'artistic', not independently
achievable needs should be avoided since it interferes with the contentment of the child
or the human. Love for a child becomes the principle of education. Through love, an
atti tudc towards the child can be developed which. does not sacrifice present content-
ment to the future by subsuming the child's present under aims to be achieved in the
future. Games for instance, which exercise a child's physical and mental functions, and
constitute an essential element in the fulfilment of a child's present life, whilst at the
same time providing important experience for its future, come to play an important role
at the c:ntre. of education. Children's enthusiastic about games can also be projected
onto ob1ects m the learning process.
A child is indirectly educated through its environment, though this is educationally
arranged. He should also learn to work in this·way. 'Never let his work be judged by
any standard but that of the work of a master. Let it .be judged as. work, not because it
is his. Ifanything is clone well, I say, "That is a good piece of work", but do not ask
who did it. If he is pleased and proud and says, "I did it", answer indifferently, "No
matter who did it, it is well done". ' 21
·. Rousseau's educational ideal also includes discovering the significance of youth as
a transitional period between childhood and adulthood. Here the accent also lies on the
~articular life conditions brought about by puberty, the discovery of the youth's own
nght, and the significance of the teenage soul for human development. All in all, this
period _of life is about establishing the balance between wanting and being able to,
wh 1ch 1s so central to the feeling of contentment.
·Rousseau's dream of the self aims of education, and of the self of each child that
education should stimulate, is reminiscent of Holderlin's conclusion: 'Man is a king
"".hen he dreams. a beggar when he reflects'. Despite growing awareness of the artifi-
~ially constructed nature of education and the human character, which has led to
'.nc:easmg doubt in the existence of the 'self, Rousseau's postulates continue to be
1~d1~pcnsable components of modem educational reflection. Although dreams often
signify an awakenmg, Rousseau's educational dream presupposes that the awakening
has not yet taken pince. To quote Benjamin, 'awakening is a grndual process that
unfolds throughout the life of an individual, as well as of a generation. Sleep is their
primary starting point. A generation's youth experience has a lot in common with the
experience of dream. Its historical body is a dream hotly. Every epoch has this drcam-
onented side, this child side' 22 • Rousseau's Emile is most definitely a dream that is in
conflict with its epoch, in which reason demands to seize power, yet in which, in the
name of reason, others are· excluded. Denied nnd clevnlued in this process is the auton-
omy of nature, dreams, the divine, as well as that which is inaccessible through lan-
guage, and secrets. Such is the cost of standardisation, universalisation, and the
21 Ibid., p. 197.
22 Benjamin 19~2. p. '190 (trans. A. L3g;iay).
l ,,('
abstractness of modem life in the 'Disciplinary Society' (Foucault) with its subjects,
self-controlled, identical-to-themselves, colonised subjects in the process of self-
empowerment, whose badly healed wounds are still hurting with fantasy memories of
other ways oflifo. . . , . .
Many of Rousseau's ideas were adopted m Basedow_ s mo_del scho~l m~tttute, the
Philantropinum, founded in Dessau in I 774 as w~ll as m philanthrop1sm m
g~neral.
One example here is the idea of the child's own nght to the dev~lopment ~t his own
spectrum of possibilities. This is accompanied by, with the exceptmn o~ Latm schools,
rigid in verbalism, the attempt to includ~ mod~rn Ian~ages, _mathem~t1cs and nat~ral
sciences in the curriculum and to provide children with a hbera!-mmded educat1o_n.
The reference of education to the world of work and to the respective level of the chil-
dren is also allocated importance. The aim is to establish a balance in young people as
a precondition for a useful life.
Humboldt
The Gemrnn classic period provided the backdrop for t~e ne~t ~eat vision of educa-
tion. The driving force of this period was New Humamsm with its aesthetic an? ph1-
lological concern. Winckelmann's Geclanken ubcr die Nac~ahr:zung der griech1sch~n
Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst (Ideas on the Im1tatJOn of Greek Works m
Painting and Sculpture), published in 1755, can_ be regar~ed as t_hc b~ginning of the
aesthetic orientation towards an idealised Cireek image agamst which Nietzsche was to
heavily inveigh a hundred years later. The philological _element gr~w above all out of
the new study of Classics, which involved a new valuatton of the Greek language as a.
historical phenomenon. Although New Humanis111 did not develop an education in the
ow sense it did elaborate its own theory of educat10n. Humboldt saw an .educa-
~~:al value i:i classical studies insofar as they help the individual to find himself._ The
. of practical usefulness, which had still been considered a central educational
no t10n . d · · 1·
task by Comenius, the pietists and the philru:1thropists, was rcJecte as a cntenon ~
education. Now the vision was of an education that transcends usefulnes_s: reason 1s
cultivated in the study of languages and Antiquity: This_ kind. of e~u~ation 1s pr~sumed
to result in an all-round human development, which, s1nc~ 1? prmc1plc unach'.ev_abk;
,1ins a life-long task. In the education process, a person s mner strength assimilates
rern, · b · Ed ·
the objects with which he is dealing .and makes th~m ?~rt of Ins own cmg. uc~tio_n
therefore takes place in an encounter between the rnd1v1dual and the worl_d. The aim 1s
an education which develops the individual as a whole and ~qually. While the educa-
bility of the individual is viewed as a_ form~! capac_ilY,_ Classics represent the material
side of the education process, on which this capacity 1s based: As Rousseau portrays
nature, in the same way Humboldt portrays Classics, as the ongms of Occ1de1t1l c_ul-
tun:, as the reference point of education. Greek studies offer an ~lcmentary exp anat1on
of the human constitution and are therefore particularly well smted to a general educa-
tion This vision of education was severely criticised in th~ sixties and seventies of the
20th century, particularly since it was perceived as causing a withdrawal o:the subject
into inwardness. In Cierrnany in particular, due to the effects connected with the Prus-
JC)
 sian educational reform, this was held responsible for the withdrawal of the intellectual
bourgeoisie from politics and the ensuing political consequences. The criticism is cer-
tainly partially justified. However, it disregards the critical content of a position,
which, whilst emphasizing the importance of the subject in education, wishes to resist
the demands of the society with regard to human usefulness and fi.mctionality. 23 In
addition, for civil democracies, the aim of a comprehensive general education c~ntains
an indispensable contra-factual point of orientation. This point of orientation was inci-
~entally also indispensable in the former German Democratic Republic in the cduca-
t10nal ann of an all-round educated socialist citizen.
An analysis of Comcnius' dream to achieve complete human education, Rous-
seau's dream to realise the child's own right to development in an environment deter-
mined by love, and Humboldt's dream to free people from the narrow considerations
of usefulness and educate them with the help of Greek culture, gives rise to the ques-
tion as to whether the realisation of these dreams would not be more likelv result in
nightmares. The literal realisation of the Comenian dream could lead to a ~omplctcly
pedagogised world in which the univcrsalisation or knowledge would result in a com-
prehensive uniformisation and levelling, into whose framcwo;k the unknown would be
'.1ssimilatecl and sacrificed to the all-round knowledge. Indeed, an educational society
rn which humans would be continually trying to perfect themselves by means of con-
s_tant newly acquired knowledge and in this way searching for their secularised sc1lva-
t1on. Educat10n and its inherent functionalisation would thus enter all areas of life.
Many aspects or this dream appear to have been realised by the institution of general
compulsory schooling operated in most countries and in particular the ideas of lifo long
learning in an international educational society propagated by UNESCO. The culture
and science industries have also contributed to this. Yet the Jream of human em-
powerment through learning and the acquisition of knowledge ;:ilways comes up
agamst obstacles. Despite the widespread beliefth;:it its realisation is only a question of
the nght method, in practice, a realisation of the dream is mostly unsuccessfol. Some-
thing ~imilar is true of Rou5seau's demand for the child's right to a self-determined
c:clucatmn and development, which now has a fixed place in the values and aim canons
of modern education. However, older generations contravene this, often unintention-
':lly, as if they knew that the complete realisation ofvoung people \Yould lead to chaos.
f:viclencc for corresponding diversions from the strai~hl and narrow can be found in
the environment of anti-authorit:iric1n education and a~ti-education. Education's claim
to totally penetrate all areas of the pupil's life, and the ensuing delusion of omnipo-
tence ;ire also manifest in the laboratory conditions fix optimal education, like those
clcve_lopcd by Rousseau in Emile. Humboldt's dream of educatccl people also requires
for
rclatlVISlll? its realisation. In order not to become a compulsory idec1, even this edu-
cational v1s10n needs to be supplemented bv the concrete realitv of education. involv-
ing many other visions. " " ·
. If education were to succeed in realising its dreams perfectly, there would be a real
nsk these dreams could change into nightmares. The utopian beauty of education fas-
cmatcs becm1se it does not succeed in perfectly realising its dreams. The permanent
gap between dreams and their realisation is whal save;; bolh the dream and the reality
23 Heydorn 1970.
20
thev distort. Were this gap to collapse, were dreams and their realisations to coincide,
the)' would implode, and cause perhaps the encl of education altogether.
Nightmares
The Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries produced nightmares of education as well as
dreams. Katharina Rutschky's text collection Schwarze Padagogik (Black education)
provides clear evidence of this. These nightmares form the ever pres~nt other side of
education. The educator's repressed emotions, suppressed by educational censorship
and onlv slowly registering in consciousness are evident here. Gradually the claim to
cliscipli;1e, rationalisation and subjection openly articulaks itself. In the_ face of these,
fantasies, education became a means of producmg the cl11ld, above all with the help ot
schools, which were increasingly clevelopccl into total institutions. In the course of this,
the educ:nor's duty was to push the victim througl1 the civilisation process, which
dem:inded c1 domestication of the child's teelings. No doubt the educator also experi-
enced himself as a victim of his education in this fiel<l. Psychoarrnlytical theories give
rise to the presumption that the educator needs the child in order to assuage his own
unconscious problems with the discipline. Two examples from the work of H.J. Cam-
pc elucidate these sides of education, its fantasies, delusions and dreams:
J. ',\pply full attention to a good physical relationship, especially physical touglie11ing up of chil-
dren ..
7 Protect the youth from loneliness and futility ...
Do illlt l'.i,,-; the youth su much work, or of the sort that coulu tire them
-1. Toke ca~c to protect the youth from temptation, as much as is possible
5. Don·t let children go to bed so early or get up so bte tr1at tky hav<: time to lay awake in berl
(i_ Reject the warm Ceathcr eiderdown as pointless anc\ harmful ... . . . .
7. Prevent young boys from the early stages, so that they do not form the habit of puttmg their
lwnds in their trousers.
8. Do not permit girls to cross their thighs when sitting ...
9. Do not allow t"o children of the same or a different sex to sleep next lo e:ich other
10. Strive to forbid and to distance an)thing leading to friction of the sexual organs ...
\I. Do not \eave children of the same and different sc,es alone ...
12. Imprint the rules ofmodcsly on the minds of the youth .. _. , . . . ,2 _1
13. Keep the youth from all sights w\11ch could have a negative effect on the 1mag111m10n ...
In his determined battle against the sin of masturbation, J. I-1. Campc further describes
in explicit detail the possibility of infihulation, which represents the cli~1ax o~the fig?t
of education c1gainst desires. To explain this concept, Campe reports o! a pupil, who lil
C:ampc's eyes fought a praiseworthy battle against 'the harmful burdens of self-weak-
ness'. 'He took a nail, lay his foreskin, somewhat pulled forward, on the table, posi-
tioned the nail on top of it, and - you have to admire the boy's virtuous heroic courage'
_ with the strong blow of a book, nailed himself lo the table. Hereupon he tore out the
n;:iil ,md tainted. ;\fti.:r he had recovered, he pulled a thread covered in spirit through
24 Oest/Campe, Vollsta11diges System zur Verhiitung der Selbstschwiichung ( I 787), quoted in Rutsch-
ky 1977, p. 304 (trans. C. Shail).
2]
 . . · · le and make it more conscious. In Schleiermacher's opinion, educa-
the holes which were still bleeding, the same procedure as with ear lobe holes. With r~ahty m p_nnc1p t be broken down and understood like a text according to a her~ie-
the help of healing balsam, which he was give by a surgeon, both wounds gradually
healed, and two holes remained through which the thread ran. Through these he then
tton~l real~ty dm.;
neutic met o . e
theoretical assumptions at work in the reality must be recogmsed
E . h Wen·1ger took up this thought and distinguished what
d d"fied if necessary. nc h
poked a piece of brass wire, which he bent slightly in the middle where it hung over an mo. I ade theorv - one at work in the practice, often unbeknown to t e
the gland so that it would not press. After that, he bent the ends of the wire with a he cu_ll_-:d a first gr a· d theory which encompasses the behav10ur of the
t t10ncr - from a secon gra e . . . . h d
small pair of pliers so that they would cover the small area of foreskin above each hole, prac '. . . . ot alwu s resent but often latent. Finally, Wemger d1stmgu1~ e a
and keep the wire there. ' 25 pract1t1oncr, yet is n h ~b~ect 'is the relation between theory and practice m the
The various detailed fantasies of punishment of children and teenagers belong to third grade t~c?ry, w o~ebl. ~ l~ifying relations between theory and practice in the
practice'. Tlns 1s respons1 c 1or c . 28
the nightmares of education. They reveal the completely sadist fantasies of the educa- . 1 t xt of educational practice.
tor. At the same time this implies a tendency to depart from the physical reference of bcha:11oura con: himsdf developed a series of aspects which can be used to ~e1:e-
the punishment and to use punishment forms which penetrate the child's emotional in- trat;~::~~:;~~:a~l)~rthe historical education reality. The following aspects arc d1stm-
terior.26
guished:
'direct (positive) educati~n and indirect (negative) edl1cation,
Schleiermacher
receptivity and spontane1ly
support and opposition, . . .
In contrast to the education concepts of Comenius, Rousseau and Humholdt, who . d l ment of conscience and the unioldmg of skills,
countered educational reality with a dream of better education, by principally better - the eve op . . ., 9
formal and material education'.-
people, in a better world, Schleiermacher chose a different approach, which therefore
m:e<ls to be briefly outlined. Schleiermacher's dream is of significance because it has .d ·ter· for educational intervention, which Schleiermacher per-·
become important for Dilthey's educational concept, for the humanistic education These aspects prov1 e en ta . . . ' .
. h · with 'broken mtent10nahtv . .
(Geisteswissenschaftliche Padagogik) based on his concept, and for new approaches to ce1ves as b~ av10ur . h uld not be se;n as purpose-rational behaviour derived
educational theory. The starting point of education for Schleiermacher is not educa- Educat10nal ~chav1our s otechnical hehaviour Luhmann and Schorr acknowledge
tional theory, but the existing education reality. This reality is the product of a socio- fir?m pd. rt"ic·ul ,ar aims. nor as · .
n tho n~te that 'the educational system is structurally shape accor. -
d d
historical process which is considerably determined by social power factor~, but also this problem whe . l,yd fi .· ,,30 However tht:y claim to have to conclude from this
. t technol1101ca c 1c1enc, . . . . . I . h t h 1
numerous theoretical assumptions. There is a cc1tain dignity in the practical reality of mg o a . ." 11 . . .· · l svstcms that there is 'no obJcct1ve y ng t ec no -
. . I· k of cuusa aw m soc1<1 J d' . I
education that goes beyond any educational theory or dream. for it will not be simply ex1stmg c1c • d then ·ipply' In their opinion people, ten s1mp Y
,d only recogmsc an • · · . 1
shaped by a once developed theory or a once dreamed dream, according to the target- ogy thal one.ne"' . d 1· of comJJle"·1tv and shortened, in fact mcorrect caus.·a
, ·at1vc re uc ions · ,, J' · · f
oriented technological paradigms of :m educational theory. Thus, educational theory - to resort to ope1 . . . , t t themselves in reference to themselves and m re -
and-so also the dreams of cducJtion ~ must be rooted in and inspired by the reality of Plans by which parttc1pants . .
onen J e
i , 1I
·
erence to other parllcipan 5 .- .
education. Schleiermacher expres:.es this recognition as follows: 'Great emphasis was
thus laid.... on 1hc outer effects, and even if the theory only emerged later, no less did
the educative activity hold the character of an art. And is it not so in every realm, that
can he called art in the strictest sense, that the practice is always much older than the Conclusion
theory, so that one can hardly say that it first acquires its particular character through d t n utopian and nighLmare-like elements mix. The l_atter ;ire in
theory? The dignity of the practice is in fact independent of the theory; through theory, ln the dream of e uca 10 d . d t to disturb the hope of realising utopian dreams.
fbeing suppresse m or er no rt 1·
practice merely becomes more conscious.' 27 While Comenius, Rousseau and Hum- clanger o . d . ·1ar processes o[ suppression allowed large pa s o
boldt designed thtir dreams ofa new education in ways which were in contrast to real- Of course, it must be grante ' s1!111 fthe 20th century to advance the dream of eman-
. · th Sixties and Seventies o .
ity, Schleiermaeher speaks of the self~dignity of educational reality, claiming that it is society m e ' . . . . g development and reform of the education sys-
. . , d democra!Jsat1on mvo1vm ll
to a large extent independent of theory, through which it simply becomes more con- c1pat1on dn lvino new forms of organisation, aims, content and means as we as
scious. Like Heidegger and Plessner, Schleiermacher thus already advm1ces the idea tern. Thus, hy app • 07 • • • ft achers and pupils nursery school teachers and
new approaches to the act1v1t1es o e '
that human reality cannot be encompassed by theory. Theory can merely penetrate

25 Cnmpe, Die In.fibula/ion (1787), quoted in Rutschky 1977. p. 31 & (trans. A. Lagaay). 2& Weniger 1957, PP· 7- 22 ·
29 Blankertz 1982, p. 114 (trans. A. Lagaay).
2ri See K. E. Bahrdt, Wodurch die Korperstrafen zu erselzen sind ( 1776). quoted in Rutschky as above
p. 406. 30 Luhmann/Schorr 1982. .
31 Luhmann/Schorr 1982, P· 19 (trans. A. Lagaay ).
'27 Scl1lciermnchcr 1923, pp. 10-11 (trans. A. Lagaay).
23
22
 children, the education system should contribute to the realisation of a better society.
Yet to take up a phrase by Benjamin, 'The coming awakening stands like a wooden
horse in the Troy of the dream' .32 As Odysseus's trick led the Greeks hidden in the
wooden horse into Troy, thereby sealing their victory, the new development worked in
the same way, sending up into flames the dream of the all-pervading power of educa-
tion. Feelings of resignation and a lack of orientation have spread - sentiments compa-
rable perhaps to those of the Greeks sailing around the seas after the destruction of the
dream of Troy. Those active in the field of education, who Jost the meaning they had
found in the dream, began to look for new directions. Some reverted to old schools of
thought and definition; others clung to simulation of the irretrievably lost dream. 33
_Due to the indeterminacy inherent to anthropology ancl the necessity of human self-
des_1gn, the dream of education is as necessary as education itself Yet the question re-
mams open as to what dreams are dreamt and which forms of education are realised in
a particular society and in a historical period. The dream swirls about the realities of
life and education; the dream supplements reality, corrects it, satisfies its unfulfilled
desires; the dream penetrates reality, evades it, transcends it; it designs contra factual
modifications and alternatives. The difference between the dr1eam an<l educational re-
ality is principally irrevocable; it corresponds with the difference between the imagi-
nary and the real, where a clear demarcation is however no longer possible. Instead,
~he i_maginary becomes increasingly real and the real increasingly imaginary. Yet there
Is still a tangible hiatus between imagination and reality, which, by exposing the limits
of'.hc possibilities of education to change human reality, and hy revealing the limits to
which humans can be educated, gives rise to ever-new compensatory dreams as well as
nightmares of education: ·. ·
32 Benjamin 1982. p. 19 (trans. A. Lagaay).
33 see note 17.
2
Perfecting the Individual .
Wilhelm von Humboldt's Anthropology and Educational Theory
Approach
In the works of Wilhelm von ·Humboldt, whom we have already briefly discussed, the
dream and discourse ofedm:ationtook on a new quality, focusing firmly on the impor-
tance of the individual. General education was to become the principle task with a
view to preparing the individual fo'. the requiren:ients offu'.ur~ l!fe. In "':hat follo;"s '!"'e
shall investigate three aspects rclatmg to education of the md1v1dual. Flfst the s1gn1fi-
cance of Humboldt's outline of a 'comparative anthropology' for historico-educational
anthropology; second, Humboldt's idea of the connection between e~ucation_ and mi-
mesis; and finally, the possibility, put forward by Humboldt, of a reciprocal mtercon-
nection between language, anthropology and educational theory. The following sets of
relations will play a central role in the pursuit of these themes: the relationship between
the individual and society, between old and new, between reality and the powers of
imagination, between the inner and outer realms, the particular and the general, that
which is historical as opposed to universal, and the relationship between language and
languages. In order to_ analyse these themes and problems, we shall yay close attentiot
to some of Humboldt's earlier works. The Plan for a Comparatzve Anthropology.,
which was written in 1797, forms a fundamental part of Humboldt's anthropology.
This is also true of his text entitled On the Human Spirit, which, written in the same
year, is of particular importance for educational theory ancl supplements the es~ay
Theory of Human Education, written in 1794/9 5. ~n T?ink:ng_ and Speaking,. wh1~h
pursues its subject in numerous studies on comparative lmg~1st1cs, "'.as also ':"n~en m
)794/5. '/he Sphere and Duties of Government developed II1 1792, 1s also s1gn1ficant
for the questions and topics pursued. These works, which were almost ail first pub-
lished by Leitzmann in the Academy Edition at the beginning of the 20th century,
contain many of the origins of Humboldt's later thought.
,\II titles by Humboldt as well as quotations in this chapter have been translated and adapted by A.
Laoaay ex~cpt quotations from The Sphere and Dwies of Gorernment, trans. Joseph Coulthard,
Th~emmes Press 1996 (reprint of London Chapman ed. 1854). Notes and bibliography refer to
German editions.
25
Humboldt's Reception
Alongside these texts hy the young Humboldt, which arc decisive for the above-men-
tioned themes, 1 would like to refer to a series of important analyses of his work with
much influence on further un<lcrstamJing of Humholdt's thought, either by distancing
themselves from his theory, or by developing new perspectives which have been
adopted in the following study. Let us note the follmving works in particular: Eduard
Spranger, Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Idea of Humanity ( 1909), Theodor Litt, The
Classical German Educational Ideal and the 1vfudern World of Work (I 959), Clemens
Menze, /Vi/helm H111nbold1 's Teaching and the Image of Humans ( 1965) nnd IFilhelm
von Hw11bolclt 's Educational Reform ( 1975), H.-J. Hcydorn, On the Contracliclion bc-
l\Vcen Education and Co111rol ( 1970), D. Benner. Wilhelm von H11mboldt 's Educational
T!wmy ( 1990), Jiirgen Trabant, Apc/iotes or the }deaning of Lcmguagc (1986) and
H11111bo/cit '.1· Traditions ( 1990), and H.-J. Wagner, Humboldt's Structural Ech,cational
Thcmy ( 1995). 2 These studies offer extremely different interpretations of Humboldt's
view. The multi-facetedncss and complexity of Humboldt's thought. opposing linear
interpretations aimed al clarity and consistency, is \'isiblc in the differences in opinion.
This, not least, constitutes the attraction ;md modernity of Humboldt's thought.
Historical Anth_ropology Avant la Lei/re
H umboldl 's original contribution to ::mthropology remain eel unappreciated for a lung
time. This was due to the fact that the fruitfulness of Herder or Humboldt's ideas,
emphasising the value of the particular and its connection with the genernl, could not
he understood because philosophical and educational anthropology exclusively focused
on the universal to the exclusion of the particular. lniluenced by the philosophical
anthropology of Schelcr, Plessner and Gehlen, the main l:Oncern was 'the position of
t/11: individual in thl: cosmos', 'rhe conditio hum.ma', and 'the human·. Edll(;ational
anthropology in the l 960s ancl 1970s, under the influence of philosophical anthropol-
ogy. also aimed at 1l1e child as homo educandus. 3 The results were rnthcr general swte-
rnents about the child, its educability and classification, abstracting from the respective
historical or cultural conditions. Interest in historically or culturally different child-
hoods, which are studied within the framework of Anglo-Saxon 'cultural anthropol-
ogy', was of less importance. It was not until the enrly 1990ies that the interest chan-
ged emphasis due to the 'discovery' of two-fold historicity and the field of 'historical
anthropology' : 1
The 90ics snw numerous attempts to use these endeavours to develop a historico-
cd11catio11a! wzthropology. 5 Against the background of these studies, new possibilities
have emerged lo comprehend Humboldt's comparative anthropology, the significance
of which can be seen i11 its attempt to cross a general with a particular perspectiYe.
2 Titles translated by i\. Lagaay. Sec bibliography for full original references.
J Wulf,'lirfos 1994.
4 Kamper/Wulf 1982; Gebauer et al. 1989; Kamper/Wulf 1994,
5 Wulf 1994; Wulf/Zirfas 1994; Mollenhauer/Wulf 1996; Liebau/Wulf 1996; Liebau/Miller-Kipp/
Wulf 1999; Bilstein/Miller-Kipp/Wulf 1999; Schafer/Wulf 1999,
26
Comparative Anthropology
What exactlv is Humboldt's 'comparative anthropology'? 'Its unique character con-
sists in the particular way in which it appronches empirical matter speculatively, his-
torical objects philosophically, and the actual condition of humankind from the point
of view of its possihlc development. ' 6 Anthropology should therefore neither be ex-
clusively empirical nor purely philosophical, but rather, be the ground where empiri-
cism and philosophy interconnect, that is, penetrate philosophically a historical object
so as to reveal possible developments within its treatment of the relevant human char-
acteristics. This conjunction of philosophy and empiricism, of the transl:endental and
the historical involves carrying out a philosophically led historical-anthropological in-
vestil(ntion of the 'differences of minds'. lnsofar as this should also reveal development
possibilities, its intentions overlap with those of education and of educational theory.
Neither concentrates on the realisation of a general norm but on the recognition of the
differences between cultures, historical epochs and individuals.
Anthropological research aims to 'register the particularities of the. moral character
uf different hu7mm races and judge them comparatively' 7 . Recognising the 'morn]
clrnrncter' cmerges as the main aim of anthropology. In line with the contemporary use
Qf language, ·moral' describes the 'cultural' aspects of the character. It is therefore the
task of anthropology to n:search the cultural mouldings of the different 'human types'
0 r the different societies. Just as the recognition of different 'characters' is important.
so is the recognition of individuals and societics as a whole. It is only in this wholeness
that the 'hu~an ideal' can nppear. ThllS consistently: 'A human, or indeed a class of
humans, can only t.;vcr take on One Form, or One Character. The human ideal, how-
cver. represents as many_ various fo_rms 3S it is po:~c;jb]e to combine, and therefore can-
not be achieved but w1th111 the totality of humans.
Anthropology therefore aims on the one hand, to rcsl'.arch the difference_s bet:vecn
societies, cultures and individuals, aud on the other hand, w1thm the very d1vcrs1ty of
these differences and contingencies, to understand the 'human ideal'.
1-lavinQ stated th;1t the task of anthropological research is to recognise the
'charactc/ of diffcrmt societies, groups of people and individuals, this term must now
be more ckarly de lined. Humboldt perceives character as variety in unity: 'That which
rnoves a m:m's soul, his thoughts, sentiments. tendencies and decisions, as well as
how in what order and connection they work, these are the points thnt constitute a
rnan;s ch:1racter ~ the relationship and the movement of his powers seen both simulta-
neouslv and as One. ' 9 This diversity in one determines the specific aspects. that is, the
form o-f each character. It is important to recognise the inner unity and structure of this
diversity, for in it lays the starling point for a~y individual action. At the same time,
reveals the imic!equaey of general anthropolog1cal statements and po111ts to the neces-
sity of approaching mimetically those aspects or the individual that cannot b<.: grasped
otherwise.
(i J-1uml1lJidt 1960. V,,I. L p. 35'.'.
7 Humboldt 1960, Vol. I, p. 337.
8 Humboldt 1960, VoL I, p. 339.
9 Humboldt 1960, Vol. I. p. 453.
27
 The task of comparative anthropology is to reconstruct the 'character' from the
'expressions of the human as a whole'. Here it is more important to capture a person's
individual characteristics, the relationship of the powers propelling him, his 'inner
nature and perfoction', than his 'suitability for external purposes'. A decisive factor in
investigations of this kind is to separate the essential from the coincidental, to see the
individual in his temporal genesis and to comprehend his historical limitation and
openness to the future. Finally, the great diversity of appearances must be gathered into
the 'highest unity· possible. Anthropology thus takes on the task of 'researching the
extent of possible differences within the human species, without infringing the ideal' 10 •
This assignment is supplemented by the challenge to 'measure the possible variety of
human natures according to their ideals; or in other words, to study the ways in which
the human ideal, which can never be encompassed by One Individual alone. is repre-
sented in the multitude '. 11
The :-iim of :-inthropological research is therefore lo recognise diversity and bring
the various elements together into a complex understanding of humans without elimi-
nating contradictions through simplification and abstraction. Anthropology attempts to
form a complex view of humans. It is thus directed towards the differences between
cultures, ditforent historical eras, groups and individuals. Its task is to mune, bring out,
and conceptualise these, without however losing sight of their common aspects, which
arc what allow for differences in the first place.
Central to anthropology is the study of individuality and the differences intrinsic to
this. The follov,ing points are considered:
differences bet\veen humans with regard to tl1eir occupation, the results of their dili-
gence and their ways of satisfying their needs,
differences in appearance, body build and behaviour, physiognomy, lunguage and
gestures,
differences between the sexes wilh rcgan.l lo body build, intellectual capabilities,
aesthetic character, will and the ability to feel or sense.
Despite its focus on individual character, anthropological recogmt1on strives for a
synthetic comprehension of humans as a whole. Three methods serve the task of an-
thropology. In the first. the human is seen as an object, which is to be empirically
researched. The spectrum of methods applied to natural science research lends itself to
this. The: second method i, aimed at the research of hum:m history and society. His-
tnrico-lwrmcneutical procedure plays a decisive role here. finally, philosophical
reflection and aesthetical _judgement fom1 the third anthropological method. The link-
ing of these different methods is of decisive importance for the fruitfulness of anthro-
pological research. For Humboldt, language, and its manifestation in a multitude of
languages, later becomes a model for anthropological research.
I-I um boldt sees a close connection between human recognition and education.
Without human recognition and anthropology, human education is impossible. An-
thropology. for its part, aims at the education ol' the human race. The relationship be-
IO Humboldt 1960, Vol. I, pp. 354-355.
11 Humboldt 1960. Vol. I, p. 350,
28
tween anthropology and educational theory is contingent. This means that there are
several possibilities to define this relationship and to realise a possibility by means of a
decision.
Contingency signifies the connection, characteristic of anthropological research,
between availability and unavailability in recognising and acting. 'Contingent is that
which is also possible otherwise, and it is also possible othenvise because it has no
necessarv rcnson for existing.' 12 Contingent, on the one hand, is what escapes planning
:me! is th~s recognised as unavailable. Aristotle introduced the category of coincidence
to describe this. His 'to occur by chance' was transl;-itecl as 'contingcre' in the Middle
/\ges. On the other hand, however, everything that is rccognisabk ,md subject to
de;ign is also contingent. In contrast to relationships, which are seen as unambiguous,
the t~rm refers to a contingence of possibilities, which have to be sckctcd or rejected.
therefore, within the scope of recognition and action. If the relation between anthro-
vology and education is understood as contingent, its diameter must !hen be oprn and
chanaeable which gives rise to the need to specify it in detail each time. For the rela-
tion betwc~n anthr~pological research and cducation::il theory to be contingent. both
,mthropology and educational theory must be open with reg.ire! to their possibilities of
recognition ::md action, which must. according to each specific historicul situation. he
limited hv decisions.
Anth;·opological knowledge is acquired through research into different cultures.
groups and individuals. This knowledge also contributes to an improved underst,mding
of euch individual culture, group or person. Recognition of similarities fuels our
knowlcdce of contingencies and therefore also of the possibilities of self-knowledge.
Effortst; understand~ the other further our understanding of the self and its possibili-
ties. Each individual has hut one rnoulciing, which can however be understood to he in
a contini2ent relationship to that which is simil:-ir as well as foreign. The experience of
continge~1cy between the individual sdf and the other marks a l'unclarnental moment in
the education process. for Humboldt, anthropological recognition is not only knowl-
cui2c for the sake of knowledge but also for the initiation of education processes,
wl;ose aim is to perfect and fulfil individuality.
Jn understanding anthropology as 'comparative'. Humboldt created an interest in
difference and thus conlingenc)' between that which is respectively individual. This
fc;~us led to the recognition of historicity and the culture specific moulding of the in-
dividual. from that perspective. 1-Iumbolclt can be understood as a forerunner of his-
/orirnl unrliropolngy and cu!mral anthropology. His effort lo reach beyond his interest
in individuality, to a complete underst;-inding of humnns. which would include differ-
ences and contingencies, constitutes a major challenge for hislorical and cultural
,mthropology.
Ellucation nnd the Limits of the State
One precondition for Humboldt's educational theory is the disco\·ery of the individual
as initiator, bearer and point of rdcrcncc of education processes, This value of lhc in-
12 Makropoulos 1994, p. 278 (trans. A. Lagaay).
29
dividua/ with its diversity is also present, as we have seen, in JJ11mholdt's anthropol-
ogy. It is also clearly artic11lated in llumboldt's early text, The Sphere and Duties of
Government ( I792). Herc Humboldt develops his view of ihc necessary !imitation of
Srate power, which is formulated against the background of his experiences with the
Absolutist State and with the French revolution. Although Humboldt greets these as
'historical signs', he assesses them as ambivalent because of their cruelty. Humboldt's
concern is 'to discover the legitimate objects to which the energies of state organisa-
tions should be directed, and define the limits within whicli those energies should be
exercised' 13 • ln order for the diversity of different citizens to unfold, the state must
limit its desire to control the community according to its views. This is even more nec-
essary as the state is not in a position to accommodate adequately the diversity and
complexity of social and community life. Only through the limitation of state power
can equality and freedom of the citizens be developed. The limitalion of state power is
a necessary precondition for the formation of diversity andfulfilmenl of the community.
The· limitation ofstme power shoulcl allow the citizens a universal education. leading to
the development of individuzdity, which makes them c;ipahlc of designing and partici-
pating in public politics. The pLifJJOSC of the state; is therefore no longer itself but the
well being of its cilizens. In modern societies, this can no longer be determined by
communal aims imposed on society as a whole. Rather, inclividuals h:-ive to set their
own aims and realise them. Social development thus depends as much on the educ:ition
of the members or society as it does on their creation of a scope fur development
granted by the state. Since in modern states to be hum:111 is no longer equivalent with
being a citizen, it is up to the incliYidual in these societies to determine the goals and
quality of human development. A prescribed definition for all members of society is
impossible. Determination is only possible as sclfdctcm1i11nrio11 ol the individual. It is
the duty of the state to secure the conditions necessary for this. The task of the indiYid-
ual is sclf-dctGmination.
Humboldt. like fichte, clearly Szt\Y the i111pene1rub!e 11a/11rc of the individual. The
individual pre-exists any human reflection or action and is Lhcreforc int:-ingiblc. Ac-
cording to Fichte. scll~awarcncss is 'an activity which uses only one cyr.:'. ln contrast
to Fichtt:, in whose view the T in its ineluctability stands as opposed to the world as
'not I'. Humboldt presumes an equal original relation between T and the world, 'in
which the receptivity and spontaneity of the T art: taken to be equ;illy originaL and,
although the T is at first thought of as fully undetermined. ;ill experiences are however
understood as the result of :m interaction with the world as transmitted by the sponta-
neitv and rcflcxivitv of the T. '. 1-: These arc determinations of the individual from out-
sid;, which do not ~tllov, for the possibility ofs<:lf-determination, and in so doing deny
the 1111dctcm1i11cd clw.'·octcr of each individual, whose desiun is incumbent upon him-
self. [ducation should protect this undetcrmim:cl quality a~1d not go to waste in the
compliance of hum:rns with imposed socizil encounters or at thr.; disposition of the
v;orld's rulers.
In the second half of his diocoursr.; on the limits of State action, Humboldt deter-
mines the aim and purpose of human life: 'The true encl of M:m, or that which is pre-
13 Humboldt 1960, Vol. I, p. 56; 1996, p. I.
14 Benner 1990, p. 32 (trans. A. Lagaay).
30
scribed by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested hy vague
and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to
a complete and consistent whole. Freedom is the grand and indispensable condition
which tlir.; possibility of such a development presupposes: but there is besides another
essential - in1imately connected with freedom, it is true-, a variety of situations. Even
the most free and self-rcli,mt of men is thwarted an<l hindered in his development hy
uniformity of position.' 15 Against the background of our considerations so far, it seems
reasonable not to interpret this position as though Humboldt were concerned with a
harmonious education, in which T and world are unified. In our underst:-incling,
'highest education' docs not mean a high general compulsory educatioml norm. which
it is necessary to imprint onto individuals. Neither docs 'Proportional education· mean
general compulsorv proportions of educational rnntent. Bt:nncr's interpretation. which
;oints ont the antinomic relation bt;tween the concepts of 'highest education' and
'proportional education'. seems more appropriate: 'The fi.irther the level of individual
education in a particular .trca or field falls hclmv the condition of modem work distri-
hution, tht: more other areas or fields - whatever they may be -- will re:1ct unpropor-
tion:-illy. On the other hand, the more all areas or tielcls of education clcvi;lop propor-
tionally, the less they will differ with respect to tht:ir progression and thus. at least in
E'eneral, the mt,re rccluccd the height :rnd level of their individual expression will he.' 11'
--f\vo conditions arc necessary for the individual to deal with this antinomy appropri-
ately- 'freedom' of the individual to dctcrminr.; his education process with its intrinsic
antinomics, and the 'diversity' and multiformity of educational situations.
lhic development of one's powers through education is seen as a purpost: or human
]ite. These powers constitute the difference between the organic and the non-organic
and char::ictcrise all living things. They art: present in a different way in every indi-
viduality. They arc required by education zrnd at the same time constitute educability.
Menze accurately determines their anthropological and educational signiCieanct::
'Power c1s the human a priori means that human is by nature action and energy; man. as
a human. always appears as an actor, and the activity, seen in these terms, is the fun-
damental trait of' human being.' 17 This power is the condition of every human and
Jiving being. /\s such. it remains pm:zling and unfathomable.
]nsofor as this (life) power is what constitutes individuals. it also propels their crlu-
czition processes. Education processes are rnergerir. They ;:ire designr.:d by the fact Lhat
human energy is aimed at an external object. 'Just as shec:r power requires an object on
\v"hieh to exert itself. and sheer form, or pure thought. a matter in which to express and
maintain itself so too docs man need a world outside of himself. This explains his
drive tc, constantly expand the realm of his knowledge and cffectivcncss.· 12· In order to
Corm itself there fore, the inner nature of humans requires the existence of an 'outside'.
Human thought and action czin only be designed with the help of an outer part, a 'not
lrnm;m, that is, the world'. Only through work on an outsidt: can the state of agitatio11
inhert:nt to the t:nergctic human structure be sc1tisfied and calmed. and an 'inner im-
provement and perfection· take place.
15 lfon1bolut I %0. Vol. I, p. (,,I; I 996, p. 10.
I6 Benner 1990, p. 49 (trans. A. Lagaay).
17 Menze 1965, p. I 00 (trans. A. Lagaay).
18 Humboldt 1960, Vol. I, p. 235.
 Ed_ucation means 'the connection of our "I" with the world in the most general,
most lively and most free mutual interaction'. 19
Education as Mimesis
Education processes conceived in this way are mimetic. Here mimesis does not just
mean 'imitation', but also 'simulation', 'representation' and 'expression'. Ifwe talk of
th~ ~imetic character of many education processes then mimesis is not limited to art,
wntmg ·and aesthetics; According to Humboldt, mimetic capabilities play a role in
~early ~II areas of human imagination, thought, speech, and action, and represent an
1mperat1ve condition for the 'connection of our I with the world'. Mimesis assists in
the !nd!v~dual's exte~si?n into: and assimilation with the outer world. This capacity of
t~e md1v1dual to. ass1mtlate with worlds outside of himself creates the energy which,
d1rected towards the outside; is characteristic ofhuman life. For Humboldt, creation of
t~e outer realm means simultaneously creating the inner world, and constitutes there-
fore education. Education is mimetic insofar as it does not strive to control but to form
individual strengths in a control-free encounter with outer worlds. In taking on outer
wor!ds, ·~-i~esis leads to the assimilation of the foreign. An individual uses his mi~
met1c ab1httesto extend towards the unfamiliar and incorporate it into his world ofims
ages, sounds and imagination. Outer world thus becomes inner world. This transfor~
mation, which constitutes ;the education process, is accomplished through transmitting
~he. o~ter world in pictures; and through adopting it into the inner image world of the
md1~1dual. The power of imagination then connects these images with the person's in-
ner image ~-orld of memories, desires and other ideas. Visualising that which is foreign
and unfamiliar helps the outer to become part of the inner sphere of the individual and
thus· furthers the. individual. In this mimetic association the world is disclosed to the
indivi~ual and vice-versa: The assimilation of intellige~ce and world constitutes the
educallon of the individual.
· ·Through mimesis; through assimilation with-the outer world, with objects and other
h~mans, a person experiences the difference of the outer world, its .non-identity with
his own world. Assimilation with the outer does not lead to an annulment of this dif-
fe~e~ce b~tween inner and outer. If this were the case, mimesis would degenerate into
m1m1cry, mto conformation to an. outer world, with disregard for the creative strengths
a?d e~ergies ~f the individual. The individual character of these energies ensures the
d1vers1ty of mimetic processes and their results. Its mimetic abilities lead the individual
to get in~olved in the world, to be fascinated by its novelties and unfamiliarity, to take
pleasure m the process of internalising the outer and to experience his own self in this
pleasure. ·
Miinetic processes are sensory. They are realised via eyes, e~s, touch, smell and
taste. However, they can "lllso.be geared towards imaginary worlds and make use of the
powers of imagination. Mimetic processes are aimed at the unknown· the encounter
with this gives rise to new experiences, in which unknown becomes k~own. Mimetic
behaviour involves both an active approach to the world and a rather passive absorp-
19 Humboldt I 960, Vol. I, p. 235.
32
tion of the world into the inner world of the individual. Whereas the. receptivity
required ensures proper assimilation, the active side of mimesis ensures the individual
character of the process. Mimetic processes are not merely ·processes of imitation;
something new always emerges in their course. In every mimetic approach to the
world, something new is created because every individual is different. The difference
of individuals thus also ensures the diversity of mimetic processes. Freedom, inde-
pendence and self-design are therefore imperative conditions for mimetic education
processes.
Education processes always take place in specific historico-cultural contexts,
which themselves do not lack preconditions but are linked to precedent models, Lan-
guage learning,. for example, is to a high extent a mimetic process involving a. model
that one must imitate, copy, and assimilate according to one's own individuality. For
many of these learning and education processes, the idols targeted by young people are
of decisive importance. It is their 'individual originality' that particularly invites emu-
lation. 'The exceptional people who serve here as models( ... ) always have a decisively·
original individuality .'20 The sense of superiority and difference inherent to this origi-
nal individuality induces mimetic potential. The young person wants to be like his fa~
vourite model. This mimetic drive is so compelling that he cannot resist it. This is .why
for Plato the choice of idols must be carefully controlled. Humboldt is similarly con-
vinced of the importance of idols for education and the self-:education of humans. The
'individual originality' of exceptional humans informs the individual of his own pos-
sibilities - not that one might become like them, but idols appeal to the capacities con-
tained in every human and invite the individual to develop these.
The mimesis of a model or idol involves the creation of a contingent relationship ,
between the model and the person mimetically related to it. The result ofthis relation-.
ship depends on the respective conditions of both the model and the individual. caught
in mimesis, and is thus only inadequately predictable. Although the mimeticrelation is
determined by reference to something that is already given (i.e. the model), its result
cannot be pre-defined, for this is no purpose-means-relationship, in which the .aims
predetermine the results. Mimetic processes are realised with 'broken intentions', They
take place without it having been clear initially, in which direction they will develop
and what their results will be. Their undefined character distinguishes them from more
target and results-orientated imitation processes. In mimetic processes, an individual
allows himself to be put under the spell of an object or other people, to be drawn into. a
process of simulation, and can even risk losing himself in the idol or .the world of ref-
erence. This drive to 'become Uke' shows the strength and power of mimesis with its
far-reaching effects on the individual.
Humboldt understood education to a large degree as mimetic, that is, as non-tele-.
ological; undetermined and uncertain. Education is aimed at the reconciliation between
outer historico-social :µid inner individual .conditions. The success of this process re-
quires individual freedom and a variety of socially created education opportunities.
Only in this way, can the claims and conflicts connected with aiming for the 'best',
'all-round', 'well-proportioned' education be dealt with. The results of these education
processes are open to the future. Op_enness to the future means: the unknown and un- ·
20 Humboldt 1960, Vol. I, p. 512.
33
certuin nature of the fi.tture, and the incompletability of human education are included
as constitutive elements in the education process, and efforts are made not to conceal
these insecurities with illusions of security.
Self-Mimesis
The mimetic movement of the individual is not directed only towards the outside, nor
is it solely aimed at assimilating the outer world. In his early text On the Human_ Spir!t,
Humboldt emphasises the central significance of the individual and of the suh1cct tor
anthropology and educational theory. According to these considerations, the key t_o
human definition lies in the humun self. Education is understood as a self-related mi-
metic movement of the individual. Humboldt defines its aim and :;tructure as follows:
'lvlan must therefore find something that he can, like a final goal, subordinate every-
thing else to, and according lo which, as an absolute measure, he can judge everything.
This is to be found nowhere but within himself: for as in the essence of all being, eve-
rything is related only tu him: but he can neither rely on his momentary pleasme nor on
~1;
his lrnppiness at all, for it is far more a trait of his nature to spurn pleasu!e and do th -
out happiness: it can therefore only lie in his inner value, in his highest fulfilment:
Only in free independence and autonomy can an individual uchicve his 'lu~hest
completion': only in this process can each person realise his uniqueness, and _fin_<l
himself. This independence is an 'inner spiritual life force', through which the 111 ~ 1-
vidual shapes himself according to his own dignity, which constitutes the specific
character of humans. This life force, which it is hard to define, can be equated with the
power of imagination, with whose help the individual relates to himsc:lf and thus to th e
rest of humanity: 'The call upon humans to develop themselves [Selbstbildung] means
following lhis lovely power am] as pnsons becoming individualities that nc:vcr'. al any
point in their lives achieve their final goal, or fulfil their standards but remam con-
stantly committed to giving "the highest strength and ·widest bn.:aclth'- of cxpres:ion 1_0
''the spirit of humanity". In other words, man should increase his pm:'cr5,~nd _reJmc hi_s
personality, and in so doing improve the morality of his practice of life_'-- Mimesis di-
rected both outwardlv and inwardlv could safeouard humans from a sense of estrange-
- - C •. l I
ment from the ,vorld as well as self-estrangement, states through whicl1 the ind 1:'IC ~a
is often prevented from achieving his potential, and which impinge on the possibility
of sclf~completion. It is unclear whether their mimetic capacity can protect humans
Ii-om this double estran0ement
c
or whether it degenerates
-
into mimicry, into the smiula-
tion of things concrete and dead.
Language
Humboldt"s works on languaee unite his thoughts on anthropology and educational
theory and add new dimen;ion; to these. Alread; in his early essay of 1793, A Study of
Antiquity and of the Greeks in Particular, Humboldt establishes a connection between
21 Humboldt I 960. Vol. I, p. 507.
22 Hermann 1994, p. 145.
34
the Greeks ancl the peculiarity of their language. In his fragment On Thinking and
Speaking, he emphasises tlie c:011nectio11 bctwec:11 language and individuality. Hum-
bolclt perceives a difference between the act of thinking and the object of thought and
recognises the specific of thinking in reflection. In reflection. the thinker confronts
objects, sums them up as entities, and names them. Humboldt sees language as that
which defines the inescapable human condition of being in-reference-to-the-world.
This is what makes rhe differences between different languages and their respective
worldviews irreducible. Every language must be llllderstood in its own particular his-
torical and individual character. To disregard this is to deny the individuality of each
language. A multitude of l,mguages guarantees the diversity of cul lures ,md indiviclu-
als. lt is a precondition for the diversity and shapeability of indivichrnl characters and
thc:ir cduc:ation processes.
Language is the ability to produce thoughts and link one's understanding and
ccnscs. 'Language is therefore, if not above all then ,1t least sensually, the means
througl1 which man crates simulta11eu11sly himself and the world or rather becomes
:1ware of himself by cutting a world away from himsclf.' 23 According to this, language
is not merely a sign or means of communicating, but far more a means of developing
thoughts, onc·s self and the world. Thoughts origin:ite in the connection of senses and
understanding. The production, expression and re-perception of a thought arc only
possible because it is created in words. 'To this encl, language is indispensable. For, in-
sofar as a spiritual idea paves its way through the lips, what the lips emit returns to
one's own ears. The idea is thus transformed into a real object without loss of its sub-
jectivity. ' 2 ' 1 l~ven more so than art does language require-the existence of the other.
"This direction tow:mls the: other, the altcrity of the thought-word does not yet exhaust
the: speech. The other must not only hear, he musl reply.( ... ) Speech requires that the
other ,1ctually produce material language, that he become a speaker. Language Ii fts the
appearance, lhe as-if of arl, and transforms it into real intcractional productivity. <' 5
Analogous to anthropology and educational theory. Humboldt understands the
historical and empirical diversity of languages as a richness of the world and of people.
The multitude of different languages docs not seriously hinder comprehension between
hurm1ns. Ir an individual grows up within one language as a child, he cnn learn other
languages and make himsc:lfundc:rstood. Comprehension between speakers or different
languages is possible. Just as in anthropology, research into the diversity or cultures
Jlso increases our knowledge of humans, research into the c/1[/i::renc:es or languages
ilmplifies our knowledge of 'language'. Language makes the world into a human
world. lts limits form the limits of culture and of the individual. Tt is wealth nnd limita-
tion in one:. Language highlights the gap between world and individual. which has be-
come historical. is exposed to constant change and is of decisive importance for the
education of the individual. Extension and cultivation of the individual take place via
langu,1ge, its self-extension and development. Language is the medium of ;.in education
procc:ss opE'n to the foture in the course of which conlrndictions and conflicts will ,11-
wnys have to be dealt with.
23 Schiller/1-lumboldt Vol. ll, p. 207, quoted in Trabant 1990, p. 38 (trans. A. Lagaay).
24 Trabanl 1990, p. 42 (trans. A. Lagaay).
25 Trabanl 1990, p. 42 (trans. A. Lagaay).
35
 The anthropological and educational significance of language can he outlined m 3
key word form as follows:

It is through language that humans become human. lleing human cannot be sepa-
rated from linguistic competence. Claims that humans invent language, and solely
through language achieve perfection fall sho11. Work as Gesture and Ritual
Language makes human expression and human community possible. Without it
humans would lack a fundamental means of expression and would not he social
beings. .
Every language constitutes a specific view or the world; this vinv of the world. 15
ineluctable. the individual cannot find a viewpoint outside of this language and its
viewpoint. ·Language constitutes the transmission of world and individuality.
Methodology
Language is a precondition for education and makes it possible for one to master the
world and be mastered by the world. It creates an individually specific world and As we have seen, the ultimate aim of education is to perfect and folfil the individual.
self-understanding. This was already clear in Comcnius' vision. and took on a new quality in Humboldt's
Language is the strength that creJtes the individual and the world. It is ~onncc'.cd concept of the individual's general education as the best qualification for a productive
with 1he spontaneous and creative energy of the individual and makes ind1v1duatwn
workin" world. As humans rely on education so too do they rely on work in order to
possible. develop society, the community and themselves. Tl1is has held true since the beginning
Insofar ;is human reflexivity and thought are connected lo language, yet humans
of occidental culture, in the Greek and Christi all trauilions in which work was always
cannot be equated to their li;iguislic being, the inexplicable nature of humans is also considered an anthropological necessity for human existence. Thm, work and educa-
experienced in language. . tion czin be conceived as the two most csscntial strategics of human pcrfcction and
The openness and incxplicabk nature of human cxistcnce, ,vhich is expcnence
fulfilment. whose success or failure can be reconstructed in an analysis of the civilisa-
through language, is a constitutive element of any historico-educational anthropol-
tion process. This assumption gives rise to two methodological steps. In order to com-
ogy and subsequent educational theory.
prehend the aims towards which work and education arc geared_ as stratcgi_cs of perfec-
tion, it is necessary to make both a historical and an cthno/ogzcal analysis of tl1e two
strategies. From the point of view of content, work and education difler from each
Outlook other GS strategics of fulfilment depending on the respective culture and historical pe-
riod. In this respect, nowadays, we are more interested in understanding the differences
ln J-Jumboldt's view, 1:-mguilge, education and anthropology arc closely connected.
hctwcen cultures and historical periods than in holding on to supposedly universal,
Being human means being linguistically able and educable. In an anthropological re-
Eurocentric, unhistorical statements. Concepts such as work, education arid perfection
spect_ it is decisive how whiclz language educates which people. It is not the ascertam-
mean clifkrcnt things in different cultures and historical periods. Using these concepts
im1 of a general linguistic capability and educability which is important but the rcspec-
in different situations gives rise to the danger of assuming reference to the same thing
ti,':'e hist;rico-cu]tu;al moulding of language and education. To analyse this i: the task
when in fact something different may be meant. It is the particular tflsk of historical
of linguistic anthropology and educational anthropology. Despite his pioneering mter-
anthropology lo uncover the differences concealed under a conceptual term and apply
est in the individual and the inherent differences with other contemporary thought, th e
them to the concept.
limitations of Humboldt's attitude, from today·s perspective, can be identified in three
main factors. Firstly, in the idectlness of humans and their education, second!~'· _in ltne_
with the spirit of the period, the continued helief in the cert1inty of the perfect1hJl1ty ot
Expansion and lnc,·casing Shortage of \York: An Antinomie Development
the individual and the human race, and thirdly, the confidence in the agreement of bo th_
aims in view of a nature necessary for their realisation. ln the light of the events 01
The intrncluction of the four-clay week without full pay by the Volkswagen group in
20th century, the view of the impcrfectibility of human existence has gained mterc st ,
October 1993 was a clear indication that work was running out in the work society.
but calls foi the radicalisation of Humboldt's thought in this respect. This had been predicted long before. As Hannah Arendt wrote with prophetic foresight
in I 958: 'ln store for us is the prospect of a work society in which the only remaining
activity that defines the society, work, has run out. What could bi: more disastrous?' 1

J Arendt 1981,pp. ll-12(trans.A.Lagaay).

36 37
 All industrial nations define themselves largely as work societies. Work is the 'only
remaining activity that defines the society'. Since the beginning of the 15th century,
;ind above all since the ernernencc of the mouem aoc and industrialisation. work has
increasingly become the defi;ing characteristic of life. It also plays an imp.ortant role
in individual and societal self-perception. A shortage ,ir absence of work inevitably re-
sults in crises of purpose for the individual and societv.
For this reason, um;mploymcnt is the 'basic sca~dal of our society'; it withholds
the human from what he: re4uircs for a minimal existence. 'Unemployment is an act of
violation. an ilSs,rnlt 3g:-iinst the physical, mental and spiritual integrity and intactm:ss
of the pnson afflicted. ' 2 Four million people in Germany, twenty million in the Euro-
pean Union and thirty-five million in Europe are arfectcc! by unemployment today. The
harboured hope of generating sufficient jobs through economic growth, to overcome
firmly established u11emp!oyme111 ha:; provc:d lo be an illusion. The explanation of mass
unemployment as a result of excessive salary costs and a rigid payment system foils
short. Further reasons are:
the conversion of the East German plan economy to a free enterprise economy.
!he world economic situation,
the technological revolution. i11 th,: course of" v,foch the techno]oov-conditioned rntc
of productivity exceeds the growth rJtc, leJJing to the lo:;s of mo~~ jobs than cJn be
created through growth.
Although the phenomenon of long lasting unemployment is in fact acknowledged by
the economic 3nd politiC3l world, a political attack on unemployment is consistently
avoided. Rather, it is maintained th~t this form of unemployment is also surmountable
with the tried and tested measures aimed at growth put forward by politicians and
economists. J\t the s:1me time, the following facts arc deliberately overseen. The
eighties saw the emergence of strong economic growth with a considerable increase in
dispos::iblc income. Yet this economic growth was only partially effective for generat-
ing employment ilnd led to a division of society into two parts: one largely participat-
ing in economic growth and the other increasingly excluded from economic growth.
The social and political consequences of this development into a two class society with
a rapidly increasing number of people affected by poverty. including the unemployed.
social benefit claimants and the homeless, are inestimable. Political rndicalisation and
an increase in violence are the visible expressions of increasing social conflicts.
Alongside family and soci::il life. work is the aspect of life through which most
people in our society determine their purpose. Material requirements can be satisfied,
social and personal recognition gained through work. Participation in socially organ-
ised work secures the social recognition of the individual. Work takes on a social and
subjective significance. Neither s;ciety nor the individtrnl can freely enjoy the different
meanings of work and its transformation. For the individual, the purpose of his work is
formed throughout the course of his life. The process of establishing one's purpose via
work begins in 1he family, is continued in school and increases in the ·world of em-
ployment. Life is structured ,md shaped by the values and norms connected with work.
2 Negt 1984, p. 8 (trans. A. Lagaay).
38
Thcsi.; include values such as motivation and commitment, rationality and precision,
conscientiousness and the fi.tltilment of duties, creativity and willingness for innovn-
tion. These values arc encouraged in childhood and later continuously developed aml
practised. The ·world of employment is finally rhe social institution per se for impreg-
nating these values in the body of the worker.
\Vork challenges competitiveness, secures existence, and helps the individual to
find purpo.,·e and idenlity. 1f society runs out of work or can no longer afford to pay for
it. then new decisions must he made as to the social function of work and its redistri-
bution. Forms of shortening working time have to be analysed in connection with these
decision processes. The tendency that has lead to a halving of weekly working time
from 70 to 35 homs and ol' life working time from 1 l0000 to 55 000 hours in the 20th
century is not expected to change. The invention of new technologies creates an in-
crcwsing shortage of work. While these technologies lead to economic growth, they
also give rise: to a decrease in work wvailable in society due to the accompanying ra-
tionalisation and progress in efficiency. The reduction of employment opportunities
has affected the branches of agriculture and industry in particular. But i:vcn the rapid
expansion of the service sector. today employing more than 50 per cent of the work-
force, cannot compensatt: for a redueliun of employment as a rcsult of raliom1lisatior1
ond th,: progn:ss in efficiency.
Ecu110111isrs have suggested the partial separation of-working time and ,~omprmy
working time as an important measure for the increase of f1exibility. This measure
should be tlrns equalled so that companies can connect longer company working times
with more flexible individual working hours. Depending on legislation. Saturday could
then be converted back into a normal working day. There should also be opportunities
for capacity-orientated variable working time comprising part time work, alternating
work weeks, sabbaticals and longer company working time. Finally, it would be neces-
sary to relieve the externalisation of many comp:my f\.mctions with the help of work
contracts. hired work fore,: and subcontractors. The economist and financial expert
Bert Rurup concludes from such considerations: 'With regard to content. work of the
future will be more qualified, more complex and orientated towards information proc-
essing. This transformed work content will be canied out by a workforce that is in-
creasingly 'female', 'old'. ·small' and 'immigrant', in less ,veekly work honrs, but
over a longer life working time and in more flexible organisation forms which will he
increasingly directed towards the individual requirements of specific companies.
Moreover, it is certain that the futur,: of work will no longer be characterised by our
contemporary time culture of free weekends and the dominance of the 'normal work
circumstances· or the industrial law basis of the · fulfilled work life'. · 3
The problem with these ideas is that they are exclusively oriented towards the
company and its competitiveness. They also pay less attention to the individual person,
for whom the loss of work is often connected to guilt assignment and a sense of cle-
valu:ition. For the individual, work means considerably more than the securing of ma-
terial existence; it provides a feeling of personal and social security, and transmits rec-
ognition, self-respect and self~rcalisation.
These considerations give rise to many questions:
3 Riirup 1994, p. 49 (trans. A. Lagaay).
39
 How can the association of prosperity with social security be prevented from de-
slroying competitiveness?
How can the gulf between the employed and the long-tem1 unemployed be pre-
vented from leading to social crises, which put democracy at risk?
How can work be distributed and organised so that, despite high personnel costs,
competitiveness, also in comparison to countries with lower wages, remains intact?
Could a 'second employment market' be created with tax money for the larger
groups of the population between the work market and unemployment?
- Could remunerated employment be stretched so that m;w employment sectors such
as house\vork, nursing of the elderly, and voluntary activities be identified?
Are fom1s of limited subsistence economy conceivable, in which for example rural
households produce part of their mm food?
Could new forms of work and ways of life be created by the development of a
quantity-neutral ecological lax refo~m, within \Vhich the productivity of energy is
increased instead of the productivity of work?
Gestures of\Vork
This outlining of the current social situation of work shows that gestures and rituals of
work, us they have developed in civil, capitalist organised industrial society, are in a
state of crisis. Nol only arc new strategies of creating and organising work necessary,
but alsn a new horizon for the understancline of the relation between work and life. Tf
throughout the civiiisation process in Europ;, work has become the determining factor
for the meaning or life. this valuation of work must be subjected to examination,
yielding new perspectives for the relation of work aml education. On the agenda is a
relali ,·isation of the meaning of vmrk for the human finding of purpose as well as. a
rndical pluralisation of life-relevant values, which are incidentally already evident 111
parts of the younger generation. There arc possibilities available to encourage a
stronger pluralisation of life-relevant factors. One of these lies in the historical recon-
struction of our rc]3tionship to work, within the context of which work can be recog-
nised as a socw/ construction. Emphasis on the historical conditioning of work reveals
its constructed character. It also however points to the historical changeability of our
relationship to work, in which Calvinism, capitalism and industrialism have played ::m
important role.
When \Vork is considered in terms of g:esture and rituaL new dimensions emerge,
which have hardly been dealt with in the di;courses on the topic of work and its future.
The understanding of work as gesture points to the fact that our relationship to work -
and thus to the world and to other people - is habitualised and incorporated from our
early childhood on. The link between work and ritual also refers to the fundamental
significance of work for the emergcncl: of society and the inner cohesion of comrnu-
nity. The character of work as rn/tural 'per/'urm~znce' and staging. with its sustained
effects. is expressed in the ritualisation of work.
. lf we talk of the gesture of work, we understand work as a movemenl of the body.
Significant bodily movements are understood as gestures, of which intentions form th e
basis without completely explaining their representation and forms of expression.
40
There is an irrevocable difference between the gesture of work as a physical represen-
tation and form of expression, and its linguistic meaning, conveyed with the help of
interpretations. Gestures of work contain real content beyond their intentionality.
Gestures are attempts to step out of the condition of merely being-in-body, and
make use of the body. A precondition for this is the eccentric position of humans. This
is what supcrst:des the animal in humans and allows humans to emerge from them-
selves and react with the world and themselves. The gesture of work is also based on
this human capacity, which is closely related to language, imagination and action.
1n contrast to mimic bodily expression, gestures arc separable from the body and
from spcci fie social situations and can thus be shaped and learnt. While expressions
and feeling, form and content, emotional content and physical forms of expression
cannot be distinguished from one another in mimic, in gestures these different aspects
are apparent, which allows for gestures to be designed intentionally. Since humans
perceive gestures as an expression of their self from inside and outside, gestures are
among the most important forms of human expression and experience. Humans are
embodied in gestures and they experience themselves in thi, embodiment. Social hc-
h3viour, involving gestures. rill13ls and roles, transforms physical being into a form of
asset. This transformation process, in which work plays an important role, makes
human existence po,sihlc.
Gestures have an impmi::mt function in the process of hmmm self-domestication. In
them, interior and exterior are one. At the same time, th,rnks to the human quality of
being open-to-the-world, gestures limit this inner/outer condition of human existence
through concrctisation. Furthermore, the significance of gestures ch:mgcs according to
space~ an time. Differences can be recognised with regard to gender :mcl class. Tvlany
gestures arc gender specific; others have no gender specific differences. Gestures of
~vork, howc\'cr. arc gender and class specific. They arc oHen linked to social spaces,
points in timt: and institutions. Institutions achieve their claims to power via the prac-
tice of institutionally specific gestures. Work can also be understood as a social insti-
tution. the claims of which arc carried through a variety of mechanisms.
Among the sustained strategies of imposing work as a dominant life form is the
instirntionalisation of the gesture 1f doing and of work in the human body. In a phe-
nomenological approach. Vilcm Flusser attempts to detem1inc the gesture of doing.
which is funclamcnt:il to the work gesture. He refers to the opposition [Entgegen-
setzung] of our hands as a human condition which calls us to 'involve both hands in a
challenge, a problem or :in object [Gcgcnst:md]. This "full" gesture is the gesture of
Joing. It presses down on the object from both sides so that both hands can touch each
other. Under this pressure, the object changes its form. and the new form, this "infor-
nrntion" impressed on the present world. is a way of overcoming one's basic human
constitution. In the object. both hands arc brought together in agreement ... Both hands
reach out to the world of objects. They grasp an object. They change its forn1 This
constant reformulation under the counter-pressure [Gcgendruck] of the object [Gcgcn-
5tand] constitutes "the gesture of working".• Thus, in the gesture of working, hands
invent new forms and impress these onto objects ... !lands snatch away the objective
context of these objects and use them againsl lhe context ... There is no social world
4 The Gennan verb schaffen includes ihe sense of 'creating' as well as 'working'.
41
left for the hands equipped with tools, which have forgorten their original object. Their
gesture of doing is apolitical and unethical'. 5
The gesture of doing makes the gesture of work possible. The gesture of work
emerges from the umklcrrnincd gesture of doing, from Poicsis, in the course of the
civilisation process. It originates from the proccsst:s lhal kd humans lo develop from
hunters, gatherers and nomads to settlers. A settled form of existence requires the
shaping and design of the claimed land. Gender specific and other forms of ,vork
sharing arc developed. This is accompanied by the differentiation of the world of work
and the development of social hierarchies. As a result, complex social structures
emerge within whose framework cultural production and differentiations grow. !vlyth,
religion and ritual play an important role here ,:md contribute considerably to the de-
velopment and shaping of the gesture of work.
The social reality of work produces and interprets, preserves and changes witb lhc
help of rituals, which can he understood as ,ymbo!ical!y coded bodi(v processes. Social
norms or work are registered in the human body hy means or rittrnls, which are carried
out by groups in social and normative determined spaces. These registration processes
also allow social power relationships to he incorporated. A sci/staging of society, of
culture and'ofthc individual take plac(; in the rituals of work, in the process of which
the necessary capacities arc acquired, confirmed am.l transforrm:t.l into practical knowl-
t:dgc.
The following thn:t: examples show how myth, religion and modernisation are in-
volved in the development of the gesture of work, which is currently in a slate of crisis.
Historical Perspectives: Greek Antiquity and Christianity
In Greek antiquity, the l'rnmctheus myth, as told by Hesiod, already gives important
indications about the significance of work for the constit11tion of European people.
Prometheus, renowned for his cunuing, his }defis, gets into an argument with Zeus,
who is equally charnctcrised by his divine and therefore higher Meris. The talc is the
portrayal of a duel bctwct:n liuman and di-:ine cunning_ Who will deceive whom? Who
will be deceived by whom? rake presents arc mutual!;, exchanged. Zeus emerges from
the argument as the victor. The humans and their representative, Prometheus, an.: pun-
ished for the sin of measuring themselves against the gods. Fin;illy, they 3rc now allo-
cated a place.
According to the I lesiodian talc, Prometheus tries to trick Zeus bv offering attrac-
tively packaged yet not very nutritious parts of a sacrificial cow. Zeus ·sees through this
attempt at deceit. Enraged, he forbids humans thereafter the use or the heavenly fire
that had hitherto been ;it their disposal. UnbeknO\vn to Zeus, Prometheus steals fire and
iakes it to the humans. The gods, however, will not be provoked without severe conse-
quence: Zeus refuses the humans possession of fire: the gods hide the corn, necessary
as a means of human nourishment. Where humans had once simply had to bend down
to pick thr.: corn growing of its own accord, now, since it has been hidden from them,
they have to grow it themselves. From then onwards, ponos, the arduous labour,
5 Flusser 1991, p. 61 (trans. A. Lagaay).
42·
ploughing, sowing and harvesting are necessary for humans to fot:d themselves. Work
is the human punishmem for the having dared compete with the gods. Work deals hu-
mans what they deserve. The gods do not ncct.l food: animals have no difficulty finding
it. Only humans an; forced to work to feed themselves. Out of anger, Zeus decides to
give the humans something that will make life even more problematic. He presents
them with a gift containing evil in a tempting shell: Pandora, the present of all gods -
\Voman. She is bait and a means of deception, whose animal nature remains hidden.
IJcr stomach swallows up the food that has to be produced by work. Humans become
the slaves of her stomach from \Vhose needs their efforts and worTies stem. Moreover,
Pandora is the fire that Zeus gives the humans in return for the stolen fire and which
thereaticr consumes humans. Pandora's fertility corresponds with the fertility of the
earth. In order to be able to receive and produce life, thl: fertility of both the e;irth and
,voman has to be tended to. All gifts are ambiguous. Something is given aml at the
same time, something is taken. They mix good and bad and are therefore of irrevocable
,ctmhiguity. All the elements mentioned in the myth arc contingently connected: the
(stolen) fire, woman and marriage, cereal farming and work. These elements serve to
allocate the humans lht:ir status between the gods and the animals, which cc111 be de-
fined in the following way:
'Humans art: not the masters of their own fate: they must make sacrifices to the
gods to win their favour.
Humans need fire to prepare food and for the production oftools.
Males need females as mates to assure the reproduction of the species.
In order to feed themselves. humans need to work the fields for cerea1. · 0
"r!ic rnylh reinforces the idea that all gitis from the got.ls arc two-ct.lgcd. The hum;:ms,
however, do not know the character of this ambiguity in advance. This is also true of
\vork, which is on the one side a punishment, and on the other a chance for human de-
velopment.
This view of work as an activity unworthy of humans remained intact into the time
of the (3rcck Polis. For the Greeks, work served simply to produce and provide the
t1cccssary goods for the preservation of life. As such it was the task of slaves. Thev
\vcre called oiketai if they belonged to the house. Jn contrast to the slaves belonging l~1
the house, the crallsmcn, the clemwurgoi, publicly offered their work and were able to
t11ove around freely to this aim in public. These craftsmen were later called banausoi.
-fhcy performed physical labour but were not allowed to participc1tc in public affoirs.
For the Greeks of the Polis, physical labour, which serves merely to preserve the bot.ly.
is of an inferior kind. The real human work or activity. i.e. the participation in bios
r,o!itikos - political life - begins when that which is necessary for the preservation of
the body has been dealt with. Slavery thus allows for a life or fulfilled activities for the
free.
The origin or work is not perceived much differently in the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion. I !ere, human history begins with the expulsion from heaven, which is also a pun-
ishment lor the violation of a divine commandment. !--Jere too, work, now prcscrihecl
6 Vernant I987. p. 179 (trans. A. Lagaay).
43
for humans, plays a decisive role: 'Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt
thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring fo1ih to thee;
and thou shalt eat the herb of the field: in the sweat ofthv face shalt thou eat bread till
thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou tak;n: for dust thou art, and unto
dust shalt thou return.' 7 As in the Prometheus myth, in Genesis, certain clements are
determined that characterise life after the fall from heaven. These include:
the tempting, evil-producing woman,
- sexuality, language, and consciousness.
work.
The central position of work is emphasised once more in the biblical 'He who does not
work shall not cat'. Work is a duty to God and other humans. In the parable of en-
trusted talents, God even demands of the humans that they reproduce and multiply that
which is originally granted to them. To make productive use of what they have re-
ceived from Goel meets with His approval. God demands that humans work; through
work they, in turn, prove their worthiness to God.
The human dutv to work is further intensified in the medieval Benedictine rule ora
et labora. Here w~rk becomes a form of worship or service to God. Further subdivi-
sions occur in the course of work sharing according to guild. The differences between
the artisans in medieval towns arc thus made visible by the fact that the members of
eai.:\1 guild set up business in the same street or part of the town. Thomism set up a
hicr::irchy of fields of work. Agriculture was ranked at the bottom. followed by crafts-
manship and spirituality. monks, nuns and. highest of all, priests. Commissioned by
God, it is the duty of the priests to take care of the souls of humans and thus their well
being after death.
171 contrast to Thomas Aquinas, who values spiritual above secular work, Luther
regards earthly and spiritual forms of work as equal. There arc even some suggestior~s
that Lulht:r gives precedence to earthly work over spiritual-monastic work. The deci-
sive difference to Thomas Aquinas lies in the fact that Luther highly respects all work
regardless of its results. The evaluation of work is therefore shifted from its success to
its~ fundamental ethos. According to Luther, the value of work lies in its ethos not in i:s
purpose or its success. The reason for this equal evaluation of every form of work 15
that .:ill forms of work arc defined bv Divine creation and therefore mcnial work is seen
as willed by Goel. The equc1l v.:ilu;tion of the different forms of work is further ex-
plained by the fact that ;iccorrling to the Lutheran view, work is no longer necessary for
the achievement of sc1lvation. For salvation is given through God's mercy c1lonc. The
form of one's work need not therefore serve the welfare of the soul. Rather, it can be
determined bv its usefulness for the world order. In this way. work takes on an inner
world rmton;my founded on God. It need not scrvc God di;e~tly, but can concentrate
fully on promoting human well being. Insofar c1s work serves humans, it serves Goel.
The scale of its ethical value lies in its use for other humans. Through this reference to
other people. work becomes a field of expression for Christian love.
7 Genesis 3. v_ 17-19.
44
For Calvin too, work is rooted in obedience to God. He presents work as a means
<)f self-discipline and asceticism more slrongly than Luther did. Accordingly, work is
rationalised and directed towards the intensification of production. According to the
C;nlvinist teaching of predestimtion, the individual is in principle unaware if he has
been chosen or not. However, ifhe has, God's choice is manifest in that person's moral
behaviour. This involves a strict control of sensuality, obedience to God in work. dili-
gence and self-discipline. Inversely, we can infer predestination from this behaviour.
1~ational work asceticism becomes a sign for having been chosen, and all the more so if
Qne's efforts arc crowned with success. Thus, it makes sense to strive to be successful
i 11 one's work. One ·s body, senses and feelings should he subordinated to the rcquire-
111ents of work. Success requires much effort. At the same time, it is not a question of
'>vork as such. of the pleasure of it or the enjoyment of its success. To ascribe work
c;uch value in itself would amount to an inc1clmissible attachment to ,vorldly things.
~ 1ich an attitude would forget that work and success are worship and constitute the
l1onouring of God. Work serves as the hallowing of God and tht: ascetic self-hallowing
<::if humans. The rntionalisalion of work docs not lead to a relief from the toil and effort
but to an improvement of the results of work. Due to this divine affording of purpose,
there can be no satisfaction through results from work. Work is c1 permanent. ncvcr-
\c:ndin~ task. Jn the sight of God, the achieved amounts to nothing and demands further
intensification and extension. Max Weber perceived and analysed the connections
between people's attitude to work, industrialisation and the spread or capitalism.
Disciplinary Society: Loss and Expansion of Work
-l'hcsc reJlcctions on the Calvinist concept of work contribute to our understanding of
the modem obsession with work. Further important aspects arc expressed in the phi-
losophies of Hegel ancl [Vian.:. In Hegel's opinion, God ·works on the world as if it were
lhe 'other of Himself in the historical process of his becoming a subject ... Wol"id his-
tory becomes the mighty chore of working out human and absolute subjectivity. This
t,rocess is at the same time one of absolute human scli~empowerment as well as great
pain'.~ For Marx too work is a decisive activity, through which humans become hu-
nian. Social structures and hierarchies arc formed and changed through work: depend-
in2 on the charncter of each historical epoch, work gives rise in a different way to rule
"nd repression. Marx pins his hopes for liberation and the abolition of the non-lcgiti-
n1ate ruk of some humans over other h11m;ms, on inrlustric1lisation anrl the connected
rationalisation and increased cffcctivcnc:ss of work. and on a fair distribution of pro-
duction means. In civil societies it is above all the working class whose social basis
1::onsists of only having their labour power to se!l. In Marx·s opinion it is definitely the
1o:mancipation of the working class that !cads to the liberation of humankind. 'In -his
view. humans arc socially essentially determined by work. Thus, human liberation
1::;urnot mean the liberation of humans from work, but rather, the liberation of work it-
:c:;clf. ·'1 It is clear that these hopes have not heen realised in advanced capitalism, yet this
~ Koslowski 1994, pp. 122-123 (trans. A. Lagaay).
9 Bohme J985, p. 158 (trans. A. Lagaay).
45
does not release us from the basic questions on which they arc founded, concerning the
relationship of work. possession and rule.
Throughout the modern age, the gesture of work has spread. It has moved into in-
creasingly more fields and encompassed an increasing area. It has become the move-
ment by which humans define themselves for themselves and in relation to Lhe world, a
means or discipline and expression for self-discipline and asceticism. Performing the
gesture of work gives rise to the production, repetition and expression of atmospheres,
feelings and attitudes, which make work and its continued effectuation possible. The
following factors have had a determining influence on the modem work gesture and its
development into rituals:
- purpose-rational organisation,
- economy of time.
the character of the work,
- faith in competitiveness,
confidence in the capacity of the world and the self to be designed.
Like other gestures, the ·work gesture is complex and in no way unambiguous. There is
no doubt that there is a wide spectrum of different mouldings. Such are the differcnc~s
between work forms in which the repetitive character is emphasised. and fonns m
which spontaneity and creativity play a central role that it is almost impossible to talk
of !he gesture of work. lt would perhaps be more accurate to speak of the gestures of
work.
1-lumans repeatedly stage situations of work. Many or these situations are ritu~ls;
they have a developed character, are visible :md are designed to be sci.:n. Like all_ ntu-
als ' thev., have a be C0 innine.__.. and an end ' take place in time and in certain spaces. R 1tuals
of work can be understood as a form of social practice, as strategies of social transac-
tion. Their significance cannot he reduced to a purpose-means-scheme. Rituals ofw?rk
receive their social functions through the fact that they possess a symbolic meanmg
that 'uvcr-determines· them. This over-determined character comes to light for in-
stance in the religious origin of work. Work is always self-representation, whether its
rituals have God or other humans as their point of reference. Human sclf-rcprcsent_a-
tion today is largely anchored in the staging of work rituals. Following the Calvm 1st
dynamic, work has been dramatically intensified and expanded, as if it were the only
purpose guarantor of human life. The intensification of work frequently !eilds to over-
working, that is. to the subordination to work of all life processes and activities along
with the sense that work's demands remain untulfilled. Work then is no longer a de-
mand but an excessive.: demand. Gradually, the work gesture extends into all areas. of
human life so that there is talk of political work. cultural work, educational work, m-
decd even relationship work.
This expansion or work into all areas of life involves tremendous trimming a nd
disciplining. To a greater extent than ever, hu1wm life becomes shaped around th c
principles of work. Elias and Foucault have studied the central role of disciplining a nd
sci t-:.control in the civilisation proccss. An increase in people's threshold of shame a~d
embarrassment, a distancing from the body, a loosening of external control and an in-
tensification of self-control are all processes that take on extreme importance for the
46
rnodem disposition to all-penetrating work. The expansion of time rule, of chronoc-
racy, has become an important clement in the emergence of work society because it is
"vhat brings hunrnns into line with the dictates of work. An end to this dynamic is not
foreseeable for the majority or humans. A new development however. is the fact that
recently more and more people have become excluded from the work dynamic and a
:-;harp division of society has emerged. Whereas one part of society is increasingly
1a!ling prey lo the mo loch-like demands of endlessly extending work, the other part is
(.:Ut off compklely from the world of work and thus foils into an area of life below that
'.vhich is socially acccpt:ible. Exclusion. isolation, dcvahwtion, economic and social
J")overty arc the consequences.
In a disciplinary society humans arc trimmed and trained according to time and
'.vork. This structuring of time and work, as well as their interrelations, engenders a
(.:crtain kind of human: an all round 'compatible' and employable human being.
<'t<lapted to the demands of modern industrial society. From an anthropological point or
vie\\'. it could be presumed that the universal human. who for a long time perceived
}, imself as being on the sure path of fulfilment both as an individual and as a species,
'.vas begotten via the disciplinary powers of 'time' and 'work'. This development was
sustained by the ideJ!s of the last century, ,vhich insisted that nothing stood in the way
~f continued human uevelopment. Insofar as these 'tales' have lost their binding
t,owcr, they have also increased doubt in the constructability or the universal hum<1n.
l nsofar as the economy of work and the economy of time play an important role for the
r,eneration of today's living humans, in view of the acceleration or time and in view c,f
-U 1e increasing shortage of, work, the anthropological question can be asked again. In
llic framework of normative anthropology directed towards universal humans, it w:is
J)redomin:rntiy a question of the perfectibility or humans with the help or work. With
lhc disintegration of J compelling anthropology, and in view of tl1c fading of the
t,1 <.:aning of work as a motor for human fulfilmcnL the question of the re!Jtionship of
~ uman fiilfilmenl and petfcction has to be confronted again. If more and more humans
;:ire not-re;ching fullilmcnt through work, both work and the human lose their universal
~haractcr. ft then becomes necessary, with the re!Jtivising or the function of work. to
question the universal character of' humans, which has for so long been assumed. The
f'ocus of interest will then rather be turned towi.lrds the historically particular human
,1nrl his specific questions :rnd problems. This opens the way for new forms of lrnm,rn
:c;clf-rclationship and for new forms of reflexive his!orico-ed11cntional m1/hropolo:-,'v.
With the end of a normative anthropology, the necessity emerges to rclativise the
l..inivcrsal charncter of work. We must differentiate between diverse forms of work and
{.)ther activities of life. Work thus loses its character as a synonym for life. lbnnah
<'\rcndt ri.:veaiecl simil;ir ideas in her study for Vita activa, active life. Her cum:nn was
'to considc.:r what il is we arc actually doing when we arc active' 10 It is not labour but
,-1r_;live life, which is the central point. Within its context. work. prod11clio11 and trade
~;:in he distinguished. ln order to be able lo be :ictive it is necessary to work. that is. to
l-ccep oneself alive in an exchange ,vith nature. Moreover. production means creating an
;:-lrtificial \Vorld dilTcrcnt from the natural world, a \,·oriel of people, of concrete thin,:,s
'-lnd objects. Finally. trade docs not just involve rt.:iating to the n:itural world or the a~--
l O Arendt 1981, p. 12 (trans. A. Lagaay).
47
tificial world of humans, but refers to the activity that takes place between people. All Part Two
three forms of activity are different.and cannot be associated to one unique activity in-
volving one particular gesture.
Such is the importance of this differentiation for the relativising of work and its
universal claim - and therefore also for human self-understanding - that we should not
obscure the fact that its difficulties lie exactly in that the analytically clear areas of life
practices lend to overlap and continually mix so that these and similar differences are Mimesis in Education, Culture and Anthropology
levelled out and eliminated. Further, the relation between work and life must be de-
fined more closely. This will lead to a further relativising of the universal character of
work, leading to new perspectives for a better handling of work, unemployment, pro-
duction and trade, in which active and contemplative life can emerge.

So far we have dealt with the reconstruction of the dream of education in the European
modern age. It transpired that the modern project to educate the individual contains a
utopian element rooted in cultural ideas. The aim of the following part is to show the
central role mimetic processes play in the construction, preservation and modification
of society and culture as well as of community and individuals. A historical analysis of
the use of the concept mimesis will reveal its anthropological character. We shall then
highlight the importance of mimetic processes in education and socialisation, when it
comes to learning about the outside world, or acquiring a sense of gender belonging, as
well as gaining the practical knowledge required for social behaviour. Further, our
attention will be focused on how gestural and ritual competence and performance can
be learnt through mimetic processes and how this contributes to creating the social.
finally, we shall observe how mimetic processes produce different types of images,
which are received by the imagination and used by it in different contexts.

49
48
 4

Mimesis as an Anthropological Concept

Introduction

Current conceptions of mimesis delimit the category insufficiently in two ways. Firstly,
mimesis means not only imitation, but also 'making oneself similar'. 'representing
oneself, 'expression', and 'pre-imitation'. Secondly, mimesis cannot be restricted to
art, poetry and aesthetics. The mimetic ability plays a role in almost every area of
lmimm activity. imagination, speech and thought. and thus represents an essential re-
quirement of social life. In the light of this understanding of mimesis. definitions
which comtrue an opposition between mimesis and the self-empowerment of modern
m,.m 1 or which envision the activity of mimesis merely in the distinctiveness of the lit-
erary representation of real i1ies 2 fall short of their mark..
Following the 'death of God' and the end of an obligatory nonnative anthropology.
mimesis acquires a special significance. 3 With the collapse of guarantees for a stable
divine and human order, the reference points for knowledge have been toppled, clis-
placc:d and have become mobile. Due to their inter-referentiality, they change con-
stantly. This creates a mimetic interrelationship of signs in which a single 'reality' no
]on ger constructs the moclel of imitation: instead, word and picture signs become thcm-
sel;es the mudel for other signs whicl1 imitate them and. in the process, change so that
in the complex mimetic process s0mcthing new is created.
:-V1imcsis has no single timelessly fixed meaning. The term has many significant
nuances. These are apparent in the classical use of the term by Plato and Aristotle.
Mimesis means 'imitation'. but it also means 'presentation' and 'expression'. The term
can refer to a relationship with given and with represented reality. and in this sense it
refers to a rcpre::entational relationship. The term can also refer to the imitation or
something thc1t is not giYcn, lik.c the representation of il myth that is always given in the
same representation and that has no other known model beyond this representation.
Here, mimesis has a myth-constituting function. Even in the case of the symbol. it is
not a question or a pure irnitational relationship; rather, the symbol refers to a new
symbol that cannot be found in the actually given reality: the symbol creates something

Blumenberg I 981, pp. 55-103.

2 Auerbach 1982.
3 Foucault J972; 1970. Also much to be recommended is the excellent analysis of Foucault in the
first chapterofDauk 1989.
of its own which cannot be explained by reference to a given reality, but which refers
rather to a unity that lies outside of the symbol.
As nature, so, too, the artist creates with the aid of mimesis something new and
other. This, in turn, enlarges the category of reality to the point where it becomes al-
most superfluous. In the mimetic acquisition of the given, the imagination of the per-
ceiver reshapes the process of imitation so that the 'imitated' acquires a new quality.
Mimesis unites the imitated object, the imitator and the process of imitation in which
tht: structurt:s fixed in the object to be imitated direct the mimetic process in the imita-
tor. In addition, the results are determined bv the individual situatiDn of the imitator. If
the mimetic acquisition refers to linguistic o~ pictorial products which themselves have
a mimetic relationship to other mimetic productions, thL: mimetic proce,s is especially
complex. This is the case with all cultural products which have no 'rock bottom' and
whose points of reference are produced and displaced in mimetic processes. Here, an
open and merely situationally restricted horizon for possibilities of meaning is given.
Mimesis is thus not directed backwards in the sense that it only aims at the imitation of
a given. It is also directed forwards.'1 The principally open character of a work of art
allows for mimesis to tum towards the not-as-yet-creatccl. 5 The goal is not ere-deter-
mined, but rather, realised in its 'becoming' development and in its recL:ption. 0
Already, Aristotle indicates that imitation is an inherited faculty: 'It manifests itself
from chilclhood onward, and man distinguishes himself from other animate beings by
the fact that he is especially capable of ~nitation and acquires his knowledge first a n cl
roremost through imitation as well as through the pleasur<:: that everyone finds in imi-
tation. ' 7 This special mimetic ability is related anthropologically to a) the early birth ~f
man and his thus predefim:cl dependence upon learning, h) his residual instinct consti-
tution. and, finally, c) the hiatus between stimulation and reaction.
Mimetic ability can only be comprehended in its historical expressions. Jlow these
arc cktcm1ined will depend upon their inexorable conceptual and historical position.
When analysed in the framework of historical anthropology, mimesis appears to be a
construction of numerous conceptions and discourses which accentuate various func-
tions. What arc the t\Jnctions and discourses constituting the term 'mimesis' tlrnt are
decisive for our understanding of mimesis? It is hoped that a reconstruction of selected
aspects with a large variety of nuances of meaning will help us to answer this questio~.
In the course of our study it will become apparent that mimesis is resistant to theory: it
resists the attempt to make it unambiguous by referring to its own complex affiliation
with imagination, language and the body.
Mimesis develop; before the qucsti~n can be raised whether that which is imitat~d
is 'goner or 'bad' and what effects it will have on the imitator. Often this pre-ethic
character of mimesis is seen as threatening and challenges one to place the ambiva-
lence of mimesis under control. On the one hand, large expectations are placed_ upon
the mimetic ability which is located at the centre of onto genetic and phylogenetic de-
velopment; on the other hand, the mimetic abilitv seems to enable adaptation and to
signi!)' a relinquishment of self-determination and a source of violence. Furthermore,
d Zuckcrbndl 1953.
5 Eco 1989; Iser 1984.
6 Feldmann 1988 . . ·
7 Aristotle, Poetics.
52
mimesis is understood as a power which acts to break down instrumental reason and
dismantle rcification. Thus mimesis appears as a possibility of freedom even in light of
the critique that it is itself caught in the content it is criticising.
In the following, we shall invcstigatL: important paradig;;,atic changes of mimesis
in aesthetics and in the social sphere and, finally, in the convergence of both these
tields in contemporary society.
Mimesis and Aesthetics
ln European history 'mimesis' appears first with very little terminological differentia-
tion. Whereas the term mimesis is used initially in social and aesthetic contexts without
distinction, increasingly a specifically aesthetic significance of thL: term is isolated
which, for Plato, still refers to social and cognitive processes but which tends to be-
come independen1. For many centuries mimesis was a central categorv in theories of
the arts and poetry. In modem aesthetic theory, however, mimesis in~n.:;sinely loses its
significance. The conception of the original creativity of man clashes with~ti1c idea or
mimesis when mimesis is reduced to imitation (imitatio ). thus lc;:iding to a devaluation
of the term. The snbjL:ct of modernity no longer secs itself as being determined by past
traditions. Already in the sixteenth century the battle against the canonisation of st vies
and for an enlargement of individual forms of expression had begun.x Thus the ~on-
ceptions of the mimetic relationship between world and man were marginalised, but
never fully forgotten.
Just as rhe craftsman or demiurg created ideas and objects, so the artist, accordinQ
to Plato, creates the 'world of appearance'. In the Middl~ Ages the world appears a:
the book of God which is lo ht.: read and mimetically interpreted.~ Human life must
thus face the demand nfthe imllat/o chrisll from which the norms or lifestyle and edu-
cation are deduced. ln the fifteenth century. the renaissance artist strivL:s to compre-
hend in his artistic works the plan underlying the natural characteristics of the world.
For Paracelsus. all cognition is formed through the mimetic relationship between the
microcosm 'man' and the macrocosm. 10 Even when s ueh conceptions recede into the
background in other historical periods, they are never completely forgotten: again and
aeain they arise in changing contexts. Thus for Hamann, nature is a t~xt whicli has to
b~ clecipherecl; for Goc!he, there exists an inexorable correspondence between man and
world: even Baudelaire postu13tcs a 'correspondence' between man and world. Inde-
pendent oft he various epochs. there seem to be no forms of contemporaneity bound to
them, since they Jre constituted over many centuries and thus make it next to impossi-
ble to write a systematic history of mimesis.
This is precisely what Auerbach stresses in his famous book on Mimesis in which
he discusses the 'interpretation of the real through literary representation or ''imita-
tion"' 11 and in which he pn::s<:nts a collectio11 of literary case studies with which he
strives to show how the different epochs shape reality in literature. His analysis shows
8 131umenhcrg I 981.
9 Flasch 1986.
10 See Bohme, G. and Bohme, H., in Kamper/Wulf(eds.) 1989a. pp. 44-57 and pp. 144-182.
11 Auerbach 1982. p. 515.
53
that it was quite possible, in the Middle Ages and in the Ren:iissance, 'to represent the
day to dc1y routines of reality in a dignified and meaningful unity in poetry as well as in
the graphic ans' . 12 Only in the seventeenth century did representatives of a more strict
imitation of antique literature designate norms against which the subsequent revolt of
the 'storm and stress' (Sturm und Drang) and the romantic period was directed.
Auerbach investigated the 'realistic works of serious style and character' he selected in
order lo determine how they represented reality. ]-le was less interested in the 'temporal
or causal development' than in the forrn which ullows for the representation of the
variety of methods of reworking reality . 13 However fascinating the individual studies
of Am:rbach 's work may be and however important they have generally become for
the discussion concerning mimesis, the hook manifests the limitations of the age in
which it was written by clinging to the concept of reality.
Feldmann's distinction between a representational and an ontologically constitutive
form of mimesis points in the same direction. 1" The representational side remains tied
to a given ·reality' that is not merely imitated, but also changed by its ';:irtistic trans-
formation'. That is why the depiction in a work of art is not a simple repetition of real-
ity, but merely its representation. The ontologically constitlltivc side of mimesis pro-
duces a new 'reality'. And here the power of mimesis is apparent in its ability to create
an imaginary world that is independent of the given 'reality'. But as in Auerbach's
work, here again the question has to be raised whether realitv - in each case histori-
cally differently conceived -- can act as a reference point [or mimesis. or whether,
especially in the face of the contemporary crisis of representation. we mnst assume a
radical plurality of conceptions of reality, each of which can serve as a point of depar-
ture for mimetic processes. so that 'reality' can no longer rationally be assumed to be
the referential point for mimesis. lndced. mimetic processes usu;:illy retcr to already
existing presuppositions and interpretations, images and texts, so that they engage in a
representational relationship not with reality, but ,vith other represent;:itions. Similar
reservations must be voiced against the term 'ontologicallv constitutive side· of mime-
sis. If mimesis develops in the field of art and poetr:/in th~ 'world of appearance·. then
it docs not produce new cs,encc, but merelv manifests something new in the world of
appearanec. 15 Mimesis thus constitutes a w~rld of appearance. not a world of essence.
Another question that must be raised is the extent to which mimesis in contemporary
art fonctions in respect to the world of appearance less constitutively and more
cleconstructively. ln any case, here we arc dealing with a manifestation of not just the
reproductive. hut also the productive side of mimesis which aims at an extension and
shaping of the world of imagination and appearance.
In the following we shall sketch the important stzigcs in the historical development
of the category of'mimcsis'. ll will become apparent that the tem1 is used in different
senses and that terminological clarity cannot be attained. The term has rather many
sides to it and must be sem:rntically interpreted according to the context in which it ap-
12 1\uerb8cl1 1932. p. 516.
t 3 Auerbach 1932. p. 516.
14 Feldmann 1988, pp. 18, 19.
15 Feldmann points, for instance, to the reality of the evocative and expansive power of mimesis. But
he attempts to such an extent throughout his interesting study to increasingly dissolve the concept
of reality that one wonders why he still attaches so much importance to it.
54
pears. Even the interpretation of a selected number of examples from the history of
mimesis must remain fragmentary and cannot be extended up to the present. The evo-
lution of mimesis in the Renaissance, in the French and German cbssical periods, in
the romantic period and in the aesthetics of the twentieth century, cannot be treated
here in detail. Montaigne, Diderot, Rousseau, Stendhal and Balzac, but also Baude-
laire, surrealism and contemporary postmodern art require an investigation of the role
mimesis plays in individual works and in their aesthetic thcorics. 16
The Origin of the Concept of Mimesis
The European term 'mimesis' originated in ancient Greece. According to the hypothe-
sis of Koller. its origin lay in daIIce. 17 Following this conviction, Kolin enlarges the
term mimesis. Mimesis no longer means simply 'imitation'. but also 'presentation' and
't:xpression'. With the use of mimesis in the Polzteia, the history of the krm is further
developed. Whereas in the third book the term is still used in its general meaning, in
the tenth book we find a restriction of mimesis to art and a consequent devaluation of
the term. Kollcr's claims occasioned a large and intensive discussion. His theorv that
the term 'imitation' stems from the delic hymns and originally was related to ~lance
,md to baccl1ic cult cannot be maintained. Equally problematical and unconvincing is
his hypothesis of two mutually contradicting mimesis-theories in the third and the tenth
book of the Politeia.
Manv cletailcd historico-lingnistic investigations have shown that the narrow con-
nection ](oiler postulates bctvvcen the word 'mimesis', dance and music docs not
exist. 13 In addition, his theory that Plato refers back to Damon's music theory is disput-
;1blc. 19 In appraising the investigations into the historical meaning of all words and
collocations belonging to the mimesis-group for the fifth century. Else isolates the
[ollowing meanings for the term: 1) 'mimesis' in the sense ofa direct depiction of the
appearance, act or expressions of animals or humans using speech, song and/or dance;
2) mimesis of the acts of one person by another in a general sense, without direct imi-
tation (in the ethical sense); 3) 'copying' a picture or print of a person or ;1 thing in
material form .20 In sum, these meanings of the term forbid us to speak of a mimesis
therny at this point in histOJ)'; what we have is a collection of similar word usages in
the centre of which we tind the imitation of a person or an animal with voice or ges-
ture. Olten. mimesis takes place in the medium of music and dance. With the aid of
human faculties something pre-aesthetic is imitated.
In distinction to Koller's opinion, we must assume that the tcrrn 'mimesis· came
from Sicily, the native land of the mime. to Greece, but first managed to establish itself
in Ionia and Attica. 'Mimesis' was. however, first widely used as a category in the filth
century; the term must have been current during Plato's lifetime. The various iso18te<l
meanings of the term - even \Vhen they are not considered to be essential - lead to two
J6 GebJucr/Wulf I 9')5.
17 Kol lcr I 954.
18 See for instance Else 1958.
19 Else op.cit.
:zo Else op.cit. p. 79.
discoverics. 21 lvlimesis does not have a special relationship with music and dance, but
has rather to do with mimos. Mimesis, or creating similarity, is not the initial sense of
mimos. Originally it meant: to stage a prank, to act like a 'mime'. Here the term re-
flects the low life staged at festivals ·with the intention of entertaining the rich. These
stagings were often ribald and disrespectful; they include scenes where individuals are
deceived and cheated. Only over a longer period of time did mimesis acquire the
meaning of 'emulate' and 'rival' that is developed in the third book of Plato's Politeia.
Out of the 63 extant collocations using a word from the mimesis-group in works
prior to Xenophon and Plato, only 19 have an aesthetic context, although here their
meaning is not distinguishable from their use outside the aesthetic context. 22 Beginning
with Xenophon, m1d most certainly in the works of Plato and Aristotle, the situation
changes. Mimesis slowly becomes a word that obtains its full significance in the field
of aesthetics.
In the third book of the Polireia mimesis encompasses several meanings. In one
case it means 'to make oneself like another in voice or stance, to depict ,mother per-
son ';23 mimesis leads here to the form of poetry, present in tragedy, comedy and in
parts of epic poetry, in which persons are directly depicted. In distinction to depiction
in the verbal arts, pure narration, as found in dithyrambic verse and in parts of epic
poetry, is differentiated. Mimesis serves Plato as a characteristic for a topology of
poetry.
Under the assumption that the poets play a large role in education - a rok which in
Plato's opinion ought to be played uy philosophers - Plato raiscs the question of the
educational effect of mimesis. Plato has no doubt about the effectiveness of mimesis in
education. Mimesis is, in his opinion, a cnnditio humnna which makes education pos-
sible rrnd which facilitates the process of education. Especially for the youth. many
decisive processes of acquiring knowledge are mimetic. And that is why Plato, in the
outline for his ideal state, demands absolute control over mimesis. I le demands that
mimesis henceforth refer to content. The c'.Umds arc not to be confronted with things
that make them weaker, instead of strong;r. Their education ought to en;-ible them to
perform their tasks. The choice of the content of poets and poetry must also follovi this
criterion. Only such poetic content may be circulated from which young guards may
learn and with which they themselves may grow. The depiction of the foibles of the
gods and of great men must thus be rejected, and wherever such depiction exists, it
must be banned from the state. This is all the more necessary insofar as it is most
doubtful whether the depictions of the foibles of Gods and heroes are actually true. For
thcr·c can be no doubt that for Plato greatness and weakness are incompatible. Due to
its 'pre-ethical' character, mimesis constitutes a danger wherever it is applied to
surm:thing negative that threatens to weaken man and draw him away from the com-
pletion ofliis social duties. ror this renson the choice of content must be placed under
control if the content is to he yil:lded up to mimetic reception.
This definition yields the conclusion that the depiction of desirable acts is ccrtainly
meaningful. For such depiction ch:-illcnges llS to imitate in the narrower scnSl' of emu-
21 Smbom 1966, pp. 20-22.
22 S0rbom 1966, p, 41.
23 Plato 1985 (The Republic) 393c.
56,-
lation. The goal of the mimetic process is to emulate exemplary acts or individuals and
to strive to be like them, to adapt oneself according lo their example. Such processes
are more likely to succeed insofar as they, loo, arc accommodated to the division and
concentration of Jabour. For Plato, this means that the guards should have the oppor-
lrniity of acquiring mimetically such depicted acts as are necessary in carrying out their
own duties; at the same time, the guards should concentrate strictly upon these duties,
since only by concentrating upon their duties can they maintain the energy they need in
order to learn everything required of them. In this instance mimesis has an ethical
component. With the aid of mimetic abilities, an exemplary model is supposed to be
imitated so that it becomes a part ofonesclf.
There is much debate over the question whether, in the third and tenth books of the
Politeia, there are contradictory usages of the term mimesis. Koller maintains that
there are; but he has been strongly criticised for this position. 2"1 In my view, the differ-
ences between the two books arise from the context, from the position of the tenth
book following the metaphor of the line, the allegory of the cave and the development
of the platonic conception of the soul. First, an ontic scale of priorities is developed
which leads to the devaluation of the painter and poet insofar as they arc least able to
imitate the idea. This results in a series of levels. 1n ontic respects, the idea brought
forth by the creator-god Phyturgos has the highest status. The next in line is the crafts-
man, the demiurg who sees the idea and, in contemplating it, creates an oh_jcet such as
a couch. The third place goes to the painter, since the painter does not see the idea and
has no real knowledge of the techniques with which he could create, in contempl.:ition
of the idea, the actual object: like one who, with the help of a mirror, produces mirror
irnaues, the painter is merely capable of making copies of already crc:atcd things. I le is
t]ie ;iimetes, the imitator par excellence who creates copies of a low ontological status.
The painter is equatc:d ,vith the poet, since the poet, too. produces only copies. Both
require no special technical k~owlcdgc of the objects tl_icy copy. lnst_ead, th:y have the
ability to copy everythmg, to 11rntat_e. Not only does this produ_ce ob_Jects o_l little onto-
loaical value; it also violates the prmc1ple (developed m the tlmd book) ol the conccn-
tra~ion on a single task with its inherent principle of the division oC labour. Despite
these shortcomings, the painter and the poet still receive their shan; of recognition: but
lhev ought, nevertheless, to be forbidden entrance 10 the ideal state which is to be con-
stn;cted-according to other principles.
Painters and poets do not produce ideas, as the gods do, or useful commodities, as
the cratismen do. They produce only the appearance of these things, and are not lim-
ited to certain objects. Painting and poetry arc not limited hy the artis1ic depiction of
t]Je objects, but by the arti~tic d_cpiction of their appearance, as they 'seem' to be. The
coal is not the depiction ol rcalny or of truth, but the art1st1c dcp1ct1on o1 phantasmata,
~ie appearances of appearnnc,~s. That is why p~intin? and mimetic poetry can depi~t
a
absolutely everythmg v1s1blc.- Here,_ hmvever_, It IS tirst and foremost matter of rrn-
1esis which creates images and 1llus10ns, a mimesis for which the d1f!erence bct,vccn
~ode! and representation is insignificant. The gml is not a true copy or resemblance,
i4 Zimbrich 1984.
i 5 Plato l985 (The Republic) 598a, 598b.
57
but the appearance of the appearances. 26 And thus art and aesthetics arc constituted
here as an autonomous sphere in which the artist and poet are the masters. They don't
have, in Plato's opinion, the ability to produce essences and are thus free of the claims
to reality whicb philosophy makes and which are destined to be the foundation of the
ideal state. The aesthetic sphere gains a certain independence from the interests or
philosophy and its own search for truth am! knowledge, its quest to attain the good and
the bcautiful. The price to be paid for this independence is banishment from the ideal
state, since the state cannot accept the unfathomable character of art and poetry.
PJD.to denies that m1 D.nd poetry haYe the ability to depict ideas. They arc concerned
with mimesis and not with methexis. From this moment onwards, the devaluation of
mimesis by comparison with philosophy's claim to perceive ideas and to seek knowl-
edge of lhc true, the good and the beautiful begins. But at the same time, platonic phi-
losophy is fascinated by the signifirnnce of mimesis in education, politics and aesthet-
ics. In this context wc find the mimetic character of Plato's own philosophy which
consists in depicting Socrates and his interlocutors and showing how knowledge is
sought in dialog and how the true, the good and the beautiful can be approached. Thus
Plato's relationship to mimesis rcmains contradictory and enigmatic.
For Aristotle, too. art is mimesis. Music in particular is mimesis of ethos; in dis-
tinction to painting and sculpture, which create visible lines, music creates an audible
inner movement. This is the expression of character; it has ethical effects. Tragedy is
placed in the centre of the poetics as the mimesis of active men. In tragedy, nothing is
depicted that did not already occur. Its themes and plots coincide with the mythical,
about \Vhich foct1rnl statements would be senseless. The action or tragedy should be
performed in such a way that the spectator responds mimetically, experiencing vicari-
ously the sense of terror and pity leading to catharsis. which strengthens the spectator's
character. 27
For Aristotle, mimesis docs not signi(v a copy of reality for which the distinction
bclwccn copy and original should disappear. Mimesis is re-creation and mewmorph~-
sis in one and aims at an embellishment and 'improvement', a ·structuring mimesis ·
Homer's depiction of Achilles is an example: it shows Achilles as a temperamental
light-headed man who nevertheless appears to be a scrupulous hero. In poetry, mimesis
is rclatecl to delineation of the possible and the general: and this brings a new clement
into the process of mimesis that is not present in the process of mere copying.
Poc:trv, painting amt music ought to imitate nature. How this is to be understood
depends. ,however. on the interpretation of the term 'nature'. The term nature is for
Aristotle not the nature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, something reduced to
the status of an object. Phys is signifies rather a nature with its inherent powers to pro-
duce life - a lively nature. If the arts, sucl1 as poetry, painting and music, are supposed
to imitate this nature, it cannot be a matter of a mere reproduction or naturalistic
copying of something. The presupposition of a 'living nature' in ·which the principle of
an intelligence is active redefines the meaning of the mimesis of nature. In this case
mimesis of nature means that art must imitate nature's powers. 28 With this conception,
26 Zitnbrich 198·1, p. 270.
27 Tarot 1970. Brecht's epic theatre was the first in which actors were required lo perform in such a
way as lo show that they were presenting and imitating and not being dissolved in the action,
28 See Flasch 1965.
58
the aspect of imitation in the narrower sense recedes; instead, the artist now depicts the
image he has within, independent of the question whether this image corresponds to an
object or person actually giYen in the ·world. In this sense mimesis does not mean the
creation of a copy, but the production of an image that does refer to a model and yet
docs not merely double the model.
Mimesis ims at furnishing an image the painter or poet sees with his inner eve. In
the process or giving artistic form to the image something new is created. The outline
guiding the formation of the work dissolves into the picture, drama or musical piece
developed in a medium different from the medium of the original outline. 1-lcre
chan2.cs, ellipses. additions and other modifications occur so that the resemblance with
the o~iginal plan is only marginally given. Occasionally the models upon which the
images and plans of the artists are based arc unknown; either they never existed, or
thevc are no longer extant. The image lies at the centre or artistic activity, whether as
the"imac:e containing the references to the models or as the image that is transposed via
the creative process into the work of art. In any case, the production of the image in-
cludes a transformation of the model.
lf the ar1ist is supposed to imitate nature, then this means ·creating like nature'.
The first step in this pr0cess is to create an image or a design. The art \vork then in-
volves reworking this image, constantly improving, correcting, and designing it anew,
As Emil Staiger brought to light in his interpretation of the seven drafts or Conrc1cl
Ferdin,:md Meyer's poem Dead Love (Die tore Liebe), from draft to draf1 the most im-
portant changes do not effect the content of the po~m but are far more in the relation·
,hip between its words, sounds. rhymes, and vcrses. 09 . .
What is the relation between the model (Vorbild) :me! its likeness (Abbild)? Docs
the former create the latter' 1 How are we to undcrst;md the connection? Already in an-
tiquitv. Phidia's celebrated depiction of Zeus led to spcculatinn about whether there
was; moclcl, and if so. where? Since there cannot have been a precedent however, this
irna"e of 7:eus must have been new. lt must have emerged in the working of the mate-
rial,"'inrough the artistic process itself. Anyone who sees the statue will recognise the
image, c:ven though there is no earlier model of 'Zeus' that one might know.
Zuckerkandl went so far as to claim that every work of art is 'an image in search of a
model. created in order to find within the human spirit its model, and thus fi.1lfil its
purpose. that of becoming an image' 311 • The image is not una_mbiguous: it is_ more of a
question than an an:c;wcr. /\ question put through the work ot art, and to which_ the ob-
server may answer m many different ways. Tbe structure of the work of art conjures up
images, strings of meaning and interpretations which all contribute to its complexity
,md ~11 aterialitv. The mimetic terms arc displaced: the work of art is no longer seen a:,
the imitation of a ccrt.iin model. Rather. there is a certain relationship of representa-
tion. of mimesis bctwce11 the work of art and the obscr.u. The aesthetic experience
aains sianilicancc as a place ofmirrn::tie relations. ot·course, the \Vork of art involves a
Z!efinccl ~limcnsion of content ancl form. relation or meaning and expression; yet these
only become alive in the 'aesthetic experience' or in the ·act of reading' (Iser). 31
?9 Staiger I 957.
JO Zuckerkandl I 958, p. 233 (trans. A, Lagaay).
'.JI Iser 1984; JauB 1964.
59
Mimesis in the Aesthetics of the Eighteenth Century
In the subsequent period mimesis and aesthetics remain closely linked to the demand
that art should imitate and perfect nature. Some have unjustly seen in this conception a
limitation of man's creative energies from which man only slowly began to liberate
himself. 32 According to this conception, Nicolaus von Cues's 'The Spoon-cutter'
( 1450) represents the new self-conscious man appearing in his day to day life, for
whom art is no longer the mimesis of nature, bul the mimesis of the 'infinite art' of
God; his gaze is directed not so much towards the heavens as towards the man made
world of objects. It is also significant that 'the entire emotiveness of creative and origi-
nal man and the break with the principle of imitation arises with the technical, and not
the artistic individua\' 33 . In Blumenberg's interpretation, creative man is constituted
through sudden inspiration (entusiasmo ); be attains perfection in the prcsent3tion of
original genius which makes mimesis of nature seem a limitation of man's powers.
In German aesthetic philosophy this change is accomplished within a single cen-
tury. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, German poetic theory was still domi-
nated by the influence of Italian, French and English podics. In Gottsched's Crilical
Poetics (Kritischr Dichtkunst, 1730) this is quite explicitly stated: 'I maintain most
earnestly: a poet is a skilful imitator of all natural things.' The similarity with Aristote-
lian poetics is obvious. The accent lies upon mimesis and less upon the praxis of the
genius. 'The relmionship between mimesis and poiesis can he represented schemati-
cally as a circle consisting of the poet and reader, listener or spectator; the poet alien-
ates the probable inlo the marvellous, the reader reduces the wonderful to the probabk,
to experiential reality: the poet masks truth and nature as fiction, the reader unmasks
the fiction as truth and nature. ' 34 The poet is permitted to represent the truth as he secs
it. The reader, howc\'cr, has the task of finding the model underlying the representation
and comparing it so that he may understand the poem as a 'wonderful' imitation of
nature. In this process lies the core of aesthetic experience.
In his Treatise on Imitation, Johann Elias Schlegel saw in this comparison of two
conceptions the origin of aesthetic pleasure. By contrast, the Swiss autliors Johann
Jacob Bodmer and Johann Jacob Breitinger criticised C.1ottsched's poetics. In Breitin-
ger's own Critical Poetics ( l 740), nature imitation is still valid; but we encounter for-
mulations here tlrnt foreshadow romantic poetics. Thus the poet has the task not of
copying the contemporary world as it exists, but rather of conceiving, with the aid of
fantasy, new terms and conceptions which arc to be 'sought' in another 'possible
world·. And thus the poets are also creators who create a new 'poetic world' in which
'everything is to be founded' as it should be 'in the interdependent principles of time
:md space,3 5 .
In the Enligh1cnmcnt of the eighteenth century, Batteaux's widely read aesthetic
system was definitive. Imitation lies at the centre of his work. Batteaux founds his
central aesthetic postulate using a deductive method, according to which the 'fine arts'
arc supposed to imitate nature following the spirit and the rules of good taste. Depm1-
Jc Blumenberg 19S1. pp. 56-59.
33 Blumenberg 1981, p. 59.
34 Prcisendanz 1972, p. 541.
35 Preisendanz t 967.
60
ing from the imitation of nature, we obtain here an increasing 'idealisation of beautiful
nature' in the ,vork of art. 36 The artist's relationsl1ip to nature is determined by two
characteristics: originality and taste. The artist's enthusiasm is the force with which the
Grtist represents his relationship to nature. The principle of reason is so influential in
mimetic processes that an order arises in multifariousness and a symmetry of parts in
relation to the whole, both of which are constructed out of the encounter of the human
mind with nature. The mimetic processes of the human mind arc irnlividual expres-
sions of an overlying reason which recognises the order. symmetry and unity of nc1ture:
taste is the coactive emotional element with which the objects arc correlated to man.
'Good taste' becomes the judge of the fine arts, a thought that Kant would soon adopt
and integrate into his system.
Gottschcd. Ramler and Schlegel all assist in disseminating these ideas in Ciermanv
which soon begin to inllucnce Sulzer, Nicolai, Mendelssohn and Lessin£ in P,crli;
Their controversial assessment ofllatteaux leads finally to a displacement o-fthe ;heor,:
of imitation. The object of criticism was especially the central position of the principl~
of imitation in the fine arts and the rational and dcrluctivc character of the thcorv.
which failed to consider the nature of human sensations. During the late C:nlightcnme;it
and the romantic period. the concept of nature imitation in its position at the centre of
poetic theory comes under sharp criticism: in its pl:Jce. new aesthetic perspectives arc
developed, which, however, cannot be discussed here.
In Jean Paul's Pre-School of Aesthetics (1804) the conception that poetry is thL:
representation or the subjectivity of the world via subjectivity offers us a perspective of
the ensuing development m which the mdcpcnclent and self~structuring element of mi-
mesis is radicalised. Novalio' demand - 'everything has to be poetic· - points in thl:
same direction. The poeticising of the world the romantics call for implies the same
subjectivisation of mimesis nn<l mir~~t'.c processes. According to the way the roman-
tics understood themselves, the poct1c1srng of the world nims at a process for whose re-
sults there is no model that could be imitated, since it is rather the pocticised world it-
self that is the goal. Imagination no doubt plays the decisive role here. since outside or
art there is nothing to which they can immediately rei::ne. Translatio11 or the image
draHed in one's inrngination into the medium or art is decisive; the irnngc itself how-
C\'er, cannot be red11ccd tu a model. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. the
subjective variations of this translation process incre:ise continually. The avant-r;ardc
in1~ 2 inc intensively new images and conceptions as points of departure for the artistic
proZess. This generate~ a radirnl pl~ralis_m with mimetic relationships between the arts
;incl leads to an incn:asmgly self-relcrenual art.
Social Mimesis
8evond the arts and poetry, mimesis has a central role in phylogeny and ontogeny, and
i ·civilisation and socialisation processes. l'vlimcsis is an inevitable prereqllisite for
~:lture, the social sphere and educ~tion, extending into many fields of human activity,
interaction and productwn, Munetic processes mfluencc man's relationship to nature,
36 Tubach 1983.
61·
to society and to one another. This can be demonstrated with many examples. For
plants an.ct animals, mimicry is the result of mutation and selection, a process of evolu-
tion. In the face of a darnier-filled natural environment it seems that early man went
through similar processes~of adaptation to nature, 'Which offercc.l defence against the
fears rrnture inspires and which were thus a means of survival. With the genesis of
magic, the situation changes. Now mimetic abilities serve man in conjuring up pre-
imitations: primary, and not secondary mimetic productions. Mimesis no longer ap-
pears as a reproduction of nature, but as a production in relation to nature. We are
however still faced ·with isolating the destructive social side of mimesis. Here the po-
tential social violence produced -through mimesis and the methods of dealing with it
arc of special interest. In the end, every encounter between peopk is dependent upon
their mimetic abilities, since without them sympathy. understanding and intcrsubjcc-
tivitv are not possible. Mimesis must thus be considered an essential precondition for
·the. social' in gem:ral. Ami thus w-: an; juslifieu in inlrouucing th-: concept of social
mimesis, a term which goes beyond the present context and requires more extensive
deconstructive investigation.
Mimicry: Ecological Mimesis
Forms of mimicry may be found not only in humans, but also in animals and plants.
The mimetic processes are of course distinct from one another, which is why we speak
rather of mimicry than of mimesis in connection with plants and animals. Plants arc
capable of extraordinary adaptation to their environment. Three clements play a role:
the model, the imitator and the signal receiver or animal, which cannot distinguish wi th
ecrtaintv between model and imitarnr. 37 Colours, distinctive forms m1cl behavioural
traits ar-c imitated. In distinction to the mimesis of humam, the mimicry of plants and
animals is the result of evolution. Over numerous generations, evolution manages to
create through a process of selection and mutation tl1e characteristics required for sur-
vival. A prerequisite for the development of mimicry through evolution is a reproduc-
tive benefit acquired by the imitator through mimicry.
Om: of the most well known forms of mimicry in plants can be found in the imita-
tion of an inedible species with the goal of avoiding being clevourecl by predators. Iii
this case. the naked survival of the adapting plant is already a reproductive advanta?e
by comparison with the plants incapable of such mimicry. The s::ime holds true l~r
animals which arc capable either of adapting in form or colour to their environment m
such a way that predators cannot locate and devour them, or of simulating lifelessness
in order to stay alive. Another form of mimicry exists between plants and their pollina-
tors. Herc the relaliunship is symbiotic; both profit !rum it. This situz.ition may also be
exploited by other plants whose form seems to promise the same nectar. but does not,
even though the plants themselves profit from the effect of pollinators. A well known
cxample is the cepha/onthera which imitates the form of the belltlower in areas where
it coexists with it. thus obtaining the advantage of pollirrntion by wasps despite thcir
lack ot' nectar. These plants may be clistinguishccl by the human eye clue to their cliffer-
37 Barrett 1987.
62
ent colours, but cannot be distinguished by wasps, since many wasps are red-blind and
confuse the two plants.
A further example of mimicry is offered by the insect orchid. ln this case the buds
give off a scent similar to the sexual trigger-scent of insects. As a result male bees per-
fom1 pseudo-copulation with the buds which in addition resemble a female bee from
the perspective of the male bee. When the bee lands on the plant, it absorbs pollen.
which, after leaving one plant, gets deposited on another plant. Thus the act of pseudo-
copulation results in significant benefits. Even the stapelia or carrion !lower almost
never has nectar for insects; it misleads female bees in search of carrion in which to ]av
their eggs, however, with its carrion scent, and the bees in tum fly from flower t~
flower, pollinating the flower in the process.
The processes of mimicry are aimed at a better adaptation to the environment and
offer the plant or animal better chances for survival. They arc introduced by mutation
and held in the correct direction for survival by selection. Similar processes determined
the history of humz.inkincl's ancestors in evolution and give us reason to suspect why
certain forms of Homo Australopithecus were not further clevelopecL At the 'alleged
be 2 inning of mankind' (Kant) stnnds the fear of the dangers of nature. Early man often
bad no better way to defend himself than to play dead. a 'petrifaction' reaction similar
to that found in small animals. With the aid of this adaptation to the appearance of
death, early man became unattackable; he survived, but as a 'detenceless victim'. 38
And i.n that sense he still had not managed to distance himself from the overwhelmin2
power of nature: his only mez.ins of survival was adaptation to the superior power ofth~
environment by way of petrifaction, alienation and reification. With this transformation
into the realm of the dead we glimpse a side of the civilisation process that has re-·
rnained determinant right up to the present. Whereas the transformation was initially
bound to the spatial environment in which man lives, it later catches hold of the tempo-
ral siJe of life in an excessive chronocracy. 39 In any case, humans arc in thi:; perspec-
tive the victims of ;rn evolution and civilisation process transacting independently of
them.
Mimesis and J\,lagic
Man acquires both distance and independence in respect to nature with the dcvclop-
nient of magic. Wherever magic is a determining feature in the relationship to the envi-
ronment hy comparison with the mere adaptation to nature and the defensive simula-
tion of death. man enters a nc\v phase in history. He hegins to influence nature with his
own activity. He develops his own conceptions of the relationships he observes in na-
ture and attempts to gain control over them. !le begins to prescribe to nature character-
istics and to expect consistency in their fulfilment. As a result. the mimetic relationship
lietwecn rnan and nature changes progressively. If at first this relationship could he
characterised by the 'petrifaction-reflect' in the face of nature's superior power and by
feigning the appearance of death, now the relationship may be considered one of pre-
38 Horkheimer/Adorno 197L
39 Wulf 1987,
63
imitation in which man develops images with the expectation that nature will 'follow'
them.
The efficacy of magic, which represents in all early culture man's attempt to gain
power over nature and over others, depends upon the intensity of emotions in the acts
of the individual performing magic and in their mimetic expression. If, for example,
fear is to he dispersed with a magical act, the spectator must act as if the fear has be-
fol len him. He must tremble, scream and represent himself as if he is in the throes of
terror; the sorcerer must align himself mimetically with the feared feeling and make
tht: fear itself tractahk in the eyes of those watching. In other cases, a ritual is ust:d to
attempt to imitate a goal. to anticipate a desired result hy acting it out. The attempt to
fructify a parched field with the aid of a fervent reunion is one example. Decisive here
is the transference of magic power onto the ohject - the fear or the barren field - in the
hope that it will be affected by the magic energy invested and respond mimetically to
it. [n order to secure the influence of magic. incantation. sound, and the central use or
wish-related words and mythological allusions arc resorted to.'w Magic is a power
belonging exclusively to humans which is represented with the aid of voice, physical
expression (danc<:) and ritual and which is directed towards very specific tasks. The
mimetic process consists in creating an image of the desired situation and the acts ne-
cessary in order to bring about the change: the image is then imitated with the intent to
contribute to its realisation with imitation. Here, magic has something in common ,vith
early forms of science. In Malinowski's attempt to differentiate the two. he suggests
that science presupposes that experience, effort ;cmd reason are valid. whereas magic
presupposes that 'hopes cannot go unfulfilled and wishes do not clcccive'.'11 The extent
to which this distinction may be applied must remain an open question here. Certainly,
reservations arc called for. since the development of science depends more upon de-
veloping concepts and theories in the hope that they may be valid than is commonly
acknowlcclgcd.
Although instrumental thinking and acting as well as the use of tools ancl instru-
ments in early cultures play an indcpemlcnt role, and although clear impressiono of
their application and limitations are available, there arc certain aspects and ,1ssociations
i'or which only magic is responsible. In these fields, the task ot·1hc sorcerer is to use his
methods to influence nature and other people. It occurs with the aid of 'pre-imitation· -
at least. th:ll is. in the opinion of Leopold Ziegler. But this does not mean that man
imit:1tes nature. Rather. he provides nature with a model for imitation, 'pre-imitating'
nature. 'He acts out theatrically and represents. he expresses mimetically what he ex-
pects from the authorial natura naturans. and he expresses it in the most drastic means
available to him. '" 2 Once again it is clear that the point of departure for magic-mimetic
behaviour lies in man, and not in nature.
With the help of thought man prescribes to nature what he expects from it. With
the intensity of his emotions and his representation he removes himself from the power
of nature and gains influence over nature. One could glimpse here the beginning of a
successive liberation ot-man from nature. In this case. mimesis would he the po,vcr to
40 Malinowski 1992.
41 Malinowski 1992. See also, Kippenberg/Luchesi (eds.) t 978.
42 Ziegler 1953.
make oneself similar to the 'authorial natura naturans' in order to gain influence over
it. In mimesis there would not he a subject-object split as there is in the sciences, where
the subject attempts to pcrctive and rule the objectified world. Instead, by making one-
self similar to nature and bringing oneself closer to it, nature itself is supposed to fall
under the influence of man's intentions. The environment receives an impression of
what man is expecting from it Procreative nature is urged, with pre-imitation, to yield
up the result that human wishes anticipate. Of course the wishes expressed here are
still in harmony with nature; they have not yet separated themselves from nature, have
not vet become autonomous. The process of pre-imitation represents an initial attempt
to c~eate a cosmic order in which the division between cause and effect has not yet
taken place. With the representation of wish-images and wish actions, magic aims at
brinaing nature to imitate them. Trust is placed in the infectious inlluencc embodied in
the ~nages and acts brought forth by nature and by man. This presupposes the possi-
bility of infection, seduction or effecting imitation by pre-acting. The magical effects
are the expected result stemming from conceptual images and from the mimetic actions
accompanying them. Since these wish-invested images are sometimes fulfilled and
since this fulfilment in the wake of magic activity receives special attention. the effects
and successes or magic mimetic behaviour are continually being noted, contributing to
the cult and social value of magic.
!Vlagic effects arc developed on the basis of thrc_e_ pr}nciples: contiguity, similarity
and contrast. On the one hand, a magic net may be ettecttv~ when brought to bear upon
a part that represents the whole towards wlrn:h ~he magic IS targded. For example, a~
object from the belongmgs of ~he enemy stands 111 con'.111gence with the enemy h1msclJ.
What one does to the ob1ect 1s suppos_ed _to be .transferred on to t~e owner. Agam, a
magic act may be effective when a snrnlanty exists between the ob_1cct upon which the
magic is directed and the ~bjcct which is supposed to be_ influenced. Where contiguity
is already present~ mimesis plays a role. Whenever s1milant1cs ~r~ given, m1mes1s is
especially activc_.j_, \Vherever such structured forms of magic act1v1ty may bt found in
modern society, forms ofrrnrnet1c action may be discovered.
Mimesis and Violence
ln1·t·ia l]vJ we noted mimesis in
.
the form of plant and animal mimicry, and thus as a frmn
• • • ·• ,
. · til~tina
ot Sll11 " c
death - playmg dead - exemplified by the petnfactJon reflex ot early
. ~. . . . .
in the face of the supenonty of danger-filled naturi.;. We also noted m1mes1s m the
man
context of magic as the abl·1·'.t)' to gam. ct·JSlnnCC an d_th e ab·1· . . .
I Ity to act '.1S-3-VIS 1rnture.
and as the ability to prc-11rntate and thus to prescribe to nature ccrtam exp_e~tc1t10ns.
a
Thus mimesis appears as co~puls1on to overcome h1erarch1es and social_ d1rtcrcnti_a-
. Revoking. in times oi cns1s, taboos and ntuals which hnhcrto mamtamed the d1t-
t1on. ~
, ., , s between people provokes a brea kd · own .111 h.1erarc,11es.
'. '1·
" 1mct1c. processes lead
fdc:nce . d . ·1 . f 1 , .
to an infectious, situc1t1onally relate ass1m1 at1on o numerous peop e. 1 he ,loss_of d_is-
. . between people can also be seen as a cause of the development or social v10-
t1nct1ons · ._ . . .
Icnce among them. Only the sacnt1cc of the scapegoat and the urnty ol the all agamst
43 Foucault I 970. p. 40.
65
one can resurrect the differences and appease the violence inherent in society. Here the
mimetic processes between people, particularly in the form in which they endanger
social order, become apparent. Recognition of the infectious character of mimesis,
noted already in the context of magic, is a point of departure for an important theory on
Lhe development of social violence. On the one hand, mimesis is an ability to learn at a
very young age, an ability made possible by man's eccentricity. By imituting others,
one acquires that which others have demonstrated. In this case it is a question of
'acquisition-mimesis'. With its help, the opinions, abilities and behavioural traits de-
veloped in a specific culture are handed down from generation to generation and
modified. Man's mimetic ability is constitutive in the formation of societies and in the
development of individuals. At the same time. it is the basis for the genesis of violence
between people. The mimetic acquisition of opinions and forms of action creates si-
multaneously competition am! rivalry between the imitated and imitating individual.
which serve as a springboard for violent acts. A contradictory situation arises: the
characteristics which the imitator strives to acquire from the imitated individual do not
coincicle with the wish of both to be distinct and unique. In this wish for distinction and
uniqueness lies the threat of' equality and indistinguishableness produced by mimesis. a
threat that excites the potential for violence in society.
Action carried out in great emotional inknsity seems to present a special challenge
to mimesis; the infectious character of laughter, of love and of violence is well
known. 4'1 In earlier cultures, every act of violence was answered by another act ofvio-
lenct:, a vicious circle of violence increasing in range and intensity. This vicious circle
often endangered the very heart of society. With the help of prohihitions and rituals,
society struggles even today to gain control over the mimetically created acts of vio-
lence. · of the sacrifice fulfil the expectations. The return to cairn appears as the proof of the
Prohibitions c1re intended to eliminate evervthing that threatens a community·
Competition and rivalry contlicts are tolerated 01{ly as long as they do not trnnsgress a
certain level within which they remain beneficial to society. Acts of violence are in any
case excluded. Prohibitions restrict imitative behaviour that is aimed at erasing the dif-
ferences which arc structurally necessary for the maintenance of society. Among these
me the divisions in labour and fi_mctions as well as the hierarchies determining the dii~
fcrences between social members. They together must remain intact since they have 3 n
integrating function, which could be endangered by unrestricted mimesis. A balancing
ac_t is required to mediate between the mimetic power holding society together and the
mimetic power threatening to dissolve it. Thus mimetic competition and rivalry con-
tl1cts over the most desired objects in society are permitted to a limited degree. Open
conf1icts, which debilitate the social order, are prohibited.
. Although prohibition of mimetic rivalry is aimed at repressing the potential for
v10\cncc contained in it, many rituals represent an attempt to canalise the manifest mi-
metic crises so that the consistence of society is not endangered. Whenever the rules
guiding mimetic rivalry arc broken, a violent crisis results.~ endangering society. The
task of ritual is to rccanalise the threatening potential of socictv into a unifying act of
social cooperation. By mimetically representing the endangering social dissolution aml
thus strengthening the integrative wishes and cohesive forces, rituals serve to stave off
44 Girard 1998: see also Girard 1987.
66
the threatening crises. Whcn:as prohibition is intended to impede the clevelopment of
mimetic crises, rituals help to overcome them by repeating certain integrative acts
constitutive of society. The repetition of rituals is Sllpposed to actualise the integrative
powers and overcome the disintegrative violence inherent in rivalry. In the eollectiv<c
performance of ritual, the community participates in the conciliating mimetic process.
Rituals and prohibition are thus mtended to help avoid or perhaps even overcome the
violence occasioned by mimesis.
In mimetic crises in which violent acts take place which cannot be succcssfullv
contained, the ritual sacrifice of a scapegoat nrny occur in an effort to surmount th.e
crisis. 45 In these situations a potential victim is chosen by the community, branded a
scapegoat and collectively sacrificed. In the unification of the community, an oppo-
nent-mimesis' arises. an alliance against the declared sacrificial enemy. Generally
someone i, unanimously chosen who is not capable of defending himself and whose
;nurder would not entail forth er acts of violence. Although the sacrifice is itself an act
of vioknce, om: nevertheless expc:cts from it that it put a halt to thL: mimetic circle of
violent nets since it concentrates the solidarity of the collective against the victim -
often chosen at random - and offers the collective the possibility to seemingly free it-
self from the inherent violence through sacrifice. Thus the end of the crisis is reached
with the use of the following reversal mechanism: On the one hand, the victim is made
responsible for the violence inherent in the society; a power is attributed to the victim
which the society does not have but which serves to liberate the society from its own
violent potential. On the other hand, the power to reconcile society is attributed to the
victim, a reconciliation experienced by society in the wake of the sacrifice of the vic-
tim. In both cases transference and attribution arc intended to guarantee that the results
responsibility of the victim for the mimetic crisis. This conviction is of course an
illusion. Jt is not society that suffers un_clcr the aggression of the victim, but the rather
the victim under the violence of the society. But lI1 order for the reversal mechanism to
function, neither transference nor attr!bution is _Yielded up to analysis. If they are. there
is a danger that the victim may loose its rcconc.1\mg and hberatmg power.
The performance oi sacrifices may be related le: the e_xecut:on of a_ representative
victim. calling to memory a nrnrder underlymg the Jormat'.on ot the society. In this in-
tt:rprctation - suggestc_d by F_reud - people pcrtorm sacrifices because 'a sponlancu_us
. . 1. 1 111 urder indeed first umted society and brought the end to a real rn1met1c cns1s'
Jlll 13 .
Girard). In that case. ritm.11 sacrifices would be attempts to stave off a threatening cri-
(. , crisis, however, arising not for its own sake, but as part of a repetition of the ear-
:t:; :ollective murder. Many myths arc, according to this hypothesis, ~emi_niscences
and adaptations of the !11urder which tounded SOCiety and culture and which 1S thus as-
., ted with such ternfymg vt0lence.
50Cl~ue to mimetic rivalry, a 'double' !soften :acrificccl, The d~ubl~ endangers diffcr-
· s ·'speciallv sU1tcd to reconcile the v10lence c1t work m m1mct1c nva\rv with
cnce an d 1- - - . J
. ,, tll Romulus and Remus. Cain and Abel are proof that the double must die since
lus uea · · · . . ·'
it is the double whose death may be mtcrprcted as the foundat1cmal murder of_ the ,cor-
. ig cociet)' Whereas m the case of Rome. the dcc1th of Remus - resultmo from
respon d 11 ., · "'
45 Girard 1986.
67
 me primarily visually' .49 In this encounter of my gaze with the gaze of another lies the
his provocation of Romulus - uppcars to be justified, Cain's murder of Abel is viewed
basic experience of reciprocity between myself and the other. When I see the eye of the
as a crime form the very beginning. This illustrates a characteristic of Judeo-Christian
other, the other sees me, and not just-my eye. The other individual has a certain ap-
history, distinguishing it from the rituals and myths of other cultures: history is nar~
pearance; he sees me and stands across from me at one and the same time; I can ex-
rated from the standpoint of the victim and not, as in most other cultures, from the
change positions with him. In the exchangeability of p~sitions he is ~he ~ther as I am
standpoint of the victor.
the other for him. The glance belongs to the outer and mner percept10n; 1t creates. the
Mimesis is thus active in the construction and destruction of societies from the very
sensual image quality and the expressiveness manifest within it, and is at the same time
beginning. Mimetic processes permeate social hierarchies and orders and affect the
the product of both. Led by the glance encountering the other, the reciprocity of body
dev~lopmen! of_social structures. They arc marked by their ambivalen~e; they develop
s_ocial orgamsation, but at the same time they endanger them and lead to their destruc-
paradigms, which probably coincides with the developmen! and mastei:r ?t: mot_or
skills can be discovered. 'Precisely becuuse the eyes with which I see are mv1s1ble tor
t10n. On the one hand, they can he harnessed and canalised, but on the other hand, they
me, the eyes of the person gazing at me and receiving my glance enter into a_reciprocal
threaten to grow wild and uncontrolled, as in the case of mass phenomena.
relationship with them.' 50 Thus the face and the structure of the other are prmted upon
my own 'movement paradigm·. T(ie appearance o'.· the other is reproducible in the op-
tical sense of movement and remams at the same time constant enough for Lhe renewal
Mimesis and the Other
of the movement of the other in my own movement system. The face of the other is my
face in reverse. This is also true for the entire body, the limbs of which are contrapun-
Following the analysis of the constructive and destructive role of mimetic processes in
societies with a distinct historical development, we turn now to the central role of mi- tal images ofmy own movement field. ·
In the gaze encountering the other, the reciprocity of the body paradigm is compre-
m~si~ in encounters with other people. Central to the following considerations is the
hended. The gaze must, however, be experienced as having the same meaning; and this
question of the processes which transact whenever two people encounter one another,
is possible ·exclusively on the basis of the eccentric position of man. The eccentricity is
when one individual stands before another, when they regard one another; relate to one
the prerequisite for reciprocity, for the fact thnt the body and movement of the other
another, each attempting to encompass the consciousness of the other.46 J can only
can be referred to one's own body and imitated with the aid of one's own gaze. The
experience the consciousness of the other by interrelating the expression and feelings
mimetic process is possible whenever the exchange of an event and its representation
of the other with my own feelings and by comparing my mimetic expression with my
in one's imagination is necessary. This in tum requires referring back to the body. Em-
corresponding psychic data. The perception of the other is predicated upon such ex-
bodying and objectifying are prerequisites for mimesis. Every mimetic act alludes to
periences. The observed relations between my mimetic expression and the mimetic ex-
one's own body. Whereas the individual can imitate pictures as they manifest them-
pression of the other give me information about the other. Here, according to Merleau-
selves, anima Is arc only capable of mere co-execution in v;hich certain movements nre
Pont~, lies the origin of intersubjectivity 47 Intersnbjectivity arises through the inner
repeated. ln distinction to the mere repetition tied to the pr~s_ent man as a social entity
relation between my body. my consciousness and the body of the other_ which allows
emerges via his predecessors and doubles. The act of g1vmg a name, for example,
the other to appear as the completion of the system. Evidence of the other is possible
evokes a relationship with the emim.:nt carriers of the name in the past. The child is
because I mysel1 am not transparent to myself and my subjectivity drags my body
urged to enter into a relationship of imitation and emulation. In carrying out such mi-
along_ behind it. My expressive movements. which l sense kinaesthetically, and the ex-
metic processes, the child develops into a new member of society, setting out for him-
pressive movements of the other, which I sense primarily through sight are related to
~ne another through externally and internally aimed internal perception. The combina- self certain models, tasks and duties.
In anthropological respects, mimesis is mnde possible through the hintus between
tion of both these forms of internal and external perception is - according to Max
stimulation and reaction. the 'unique position of man in the cosmos' (Scheler). eccen-
Scheler - the comprehension of expressive sense. 48
tricity (Plessner). The latter is a stipulation for the 'unalterable distant position' of man
Whether the 'bridges· between the zones of inner and outer perception in their
to hirnse lf and the possibility this offers for the objectification of impressions and thus
co_mm~n ~xpressive meaning are nlways passable, thus onering a way of explaining
for the experience of reciprocity of the body paradigm as an anthropological precondi-
m1mes1s; 1s doubtful. The intersubjectivity ofexpressive characteristics and the motion
r:latecl t_o bel_,avi?ur, attitude and stance as well as the processes of sympathy and an- tion for mimesis.
tipathy m m1met1c contexts do play a role. But tlJe possibility of imitation requires
more. According to Plessner's analysis, a 'localised transference of an observed fonn
into a zone of my appearance at my disposal must occur which is not as such given to

46 Schei er I 973; Merleau-Ponty I 945, p.404; Plessner 1982, pp.391-398; Plessner 1983, pp. 449-457.
47 Merleau-l'onty 1945, p. 404. 49 Plessner 1982. p. 394.
48 Plessner I 982, p. 393. 50 Plessner 1982, p. 395.
69
68
The,Convergence of Social and Aesthetic Mimesis
From the historical-linguistic analysis of the tenn mimesis we learned that, initially,
there was no distinction between mimesis in a social and in an aesthetic context. Be-
ginning with Plato the distinction is developed. But here the two dimensions of mime-
sis are conceived of as being interrelated to one another. Gradually, however, mimesis
becomes a central category for art and poetic theory, for philosophical aesthetics. The
meaning of mimetic processes for the communal and social organisation of people
seems to have been forgotten, although mimesis can be documented in the historical
reconstruction of social relationships, And although mimetic processes can also be ob-
served in the social sphere, they have rarely been recognised in their significance for
the development of the human sciences. Mimesis finds application Jnrgely in the field
of the arts and literature. Recently, however, the boarders separating art, science and
life have become porous. The previously valid differentiations are losing their capacity
to be distinguished. Restrictions of ideas, concepts and categories to certain fields are
being displaced. New connections and distinctions are being developed, rigid termino-
logical applications arc being broken, and new ways of organising such conceptual
thinking are being generated. This development has helped to render visible the un-
noted mimetic processes in many fields. This is so much more the case wherever fu-
sions of art, literature, aesthetics and science are currently common, since it is pre-
cisely in these new amalgams that the productive side of mimesis is most conspicuous.
M-imctic processes arc not tied to the borders previously established between these
fields: they relativise the existing borderlines and arc themselves transacted across
them. Often, mimetic processes combine a social and an aesthetic dimension; and often
this. combination leads to a new quality of the social and of the arts. Beyond this
'.productive side',· mimesis is also becoming a central category of social and aesthetic
processes.
And tlms .the ambivalent character of mimesis is once again evident. Mimesis con-
tributes to reification and 'making strange' by allowing for adaptation to fragmented
environments, ossified social structures and structures of dominance, to the coercion of
chronology and to the machine-like logic of self-referential processes. At the same
time, mimesis takes part in the restructuring of our world and in processes of simula-
tion. The 'advanced aestl1ctisation' of' lhe world cannot be revoked. The development
and spread of the mass media support this process. Their pictures react mimetically to
the realities they presuppose. Thus they create these realities, change them, and ·absorb
them. Miniaturisation and acceleration allow them to function as a substitute for 'real
experience' and 'truth' in day~to-day life. In day-to-day experience it is not reality that
becomes an image, but images which become reality. This gives rise to a plurality of
image-realities.
The difference between.reality and fiction disappears. Images are immediately at
hand. and thus flatter the omnipotence of man. Everything seems to be possible, at least
in image. Images simulate images in the search-for lost images and realities. Floods of
images drown the imagination and destroy the manageability of the other and the resis-
tance to the foreign. And yet mimesis is also related to the hope for a new form of re-
sistance against the processes just described. For mimesis also enables mm1 to step
outside himself and thus to create a proximity with objects and people. It is thus a nee-
70
essary prerequisite for the experience of the external world, for the encounter with·the
other, and for cognition. 51 It guarantees the possibility of resistance against abstraction,
against the reification and objectification of the world; it struggles to withstand the
logic of subsumption and clings to its theoretical evasiveness.
Reification and Resistance
Mimesis opposes its own theoretical formulation and alludes rather to the limits of the-
orisation. This characteristic fascinated Adorno. In the Dialectics of Enlightenment,
mimesis is first defined as a movement through which man loses himself in his envi-
ronment instead of conquering it. 'Mimesis makes ll1e world similar to itself.' In this
early period, human adaptation to the environment resembles processes of mimicry in
plants and animals. It represents an early form of alienation, ossification and confor-
mity to the 'dead'. 'Wherever the human strives to become like nature, it becomes
hardened against nature at the same time. Terror as defence is a form of mimicry. The
petri friction-reaction in man is an archaic method of survival: life pays its dues for its
own further existence wilh its own conformity to death. ' 52 In the form of ,mimicry,
mimesis is - according to Adorno - a pre-magic form of conflict with the superiority
of nature and its terrors, the expression of human suffering, but not the overcoming of
this status. Mimesis is not an irrational and unreasonable capability; it contains, rather,
an clement ofratiomlity, which enables the conscious :ictivity of mimesis and hinders
mimesis from entering into the 'service o[ dominance'. This rational element counter-
acts the dissolution of the subject and the decomposing power of mimesis.
Mimetic adaptation to the environment in which one lives leads to a reduction of
the time forms of past, present and future to time-space, and results in man's reifica-
tion: with the loss or a multiplicity of time, the plurality or dimensions of space is also
reduced. The myric1d of time structures is reduced to linear time. Although man ·lives
even longer, he is even shorter·ontimc: there is more to be done in the same amount of
time. The shortage of time leads to an acceleration of time, which takes firm hold of
man. Chronocracy results in a reduction of distinguishable actions, interactions and
experiences ac~ording t_o the _time-element required for them-Events b~come the cor-
ner stones ofttme w1thm which thmgs must be accomplished. Qualitative differences
arc neglected. Chronology homogenises, synchronises and functiomiliscs man's life-
time to achieve an increasing rationalisation and effectiveness. Alienation and reifica-
tion are unavoidable. These processes are strengthened by the effect mimesis has in
distinguishing and isolating forms of rationalisation. Mimesis debilitates the subject
and keeps it from attaining unified consciousness. At the same time, mimesis -evades
the dominance of the subject, remaining both resistant and ambivalent. ·
In the course of the civilisation process we noted the development of mimesis be-
ginning with ~h~ early forms ?f adaptat~on to_ inani m_ate nature, followed by the first
forms of acqumng autonomy m connection with magic, and later by the rational prac-
tice of Jabour. The master-slave relationship is also mimetic and may be correspond-
-
, 1 Wimmer 1'>8S.
52 Horkheimer//\dorno 1971, p. 205.
71
ingly interpreted. An early image of this may be found in Odysseus, who sails in the
same boat with his companions; they labonr, and he enjoys, but he enjoys only the
world of appearance. 53 The figure of Odysseus and his use of stealth presage the
change from early forms of socialisation to labour and science, hailing many develop-
ments in the history of European civilisation and the significance of mimesis in it.
Mimesis gets caught in the tension of increasingly autonomous instrumental rea-
son. Logical identity thinking, false non-contradiction and abstraction become chal-
lenges to the mimetic ability. Mimesis stands now in contradiction to the violence of
conceptual thinking, representing the world in rigid definitions. Mimesis approaches
what is not yet catalogued and huddles up lo it with a broken intention: it resists the
rigid subject-object division to which belong the opposition of ruler and ruled, being
and 'ought', and is thus intended to contribute to the reconciliation with reality.
Mimesis is an emphatic form of behaviour, a form of selt~adaptation of the subject
to objectivity that is resistant to instrnmental thought allhough it itself contains rntional
elements. Mimesis thus bears the hope that alienation and rcification may be over-
come, even if mimesis itself contains no criteria for critical an;ilvsis and develops prior
to the division in moral and immoral action. Mimesis is an expr~ssion of a certain form
of belrnviour of man to himself: self-imitation without the loss of the \Vorld of objects.
Mimesis enables man to step outside himself and to drnw the outer world into the inner
world and vice versa. The mimetic impulse produces the proximity to the object which
is not attainable without mimesis; the mimetic ability is a prerequisite for cognition.
The tendency inherent in mimesis to give the object priority and place the sell~em-
powermcnt of the subject later can be corrected using the rational clements contained
in mimesis.
If we assume that there is an overriding crisis of representation in which radical
plurality appears to be the 011ly solution,i.J eve1i the criticism related to the representa-
tional reh1tionship no longer takes hold. For Adorno, aesthetic theory and the mimesis
it is focused on is one answer to the crisis of critique. ln this situation, mimesis - ac-
cording to Adorno - can become a new rorm of resistance against the relations which
transg;css the hitherto valid boundaries. Jn aesthetics the best possibilities for this seem
to be given.
For Adorno, art is the imitation of nature, understood, however, as natura naturans,
the power of nature. The imitation of nature means imitation ofthe n:itmally beautiful.
Beauty charnctcrises the world of the non-objectiYc, of appcurancc. Appearance is in-
determinable ,md avoids precision. lt contains something 'more' that cannot be ascer-
tained. Art is tl1e imitation of the act of creating. Mimesis refers not to the external
similarity, but to the similarity with the act of creating. 'Mimesis of a work of art is
similarity with itself. ' 55 It is self-related, but without thus foiling prey to the forces or
identity in identity logic. Its model of art is / 'art pour I 'an, in which art itself is the
point of reference of art. In the humanities and human sciences radical pluralism has
resulted in a situation where numerous reference points exist with 'equal rights' side
by side with one another, each of which is self-referential for one form or another or
53 Horkheimer/Adorno 1971, p. 49.
54 Welsch 1987.
55 Adorno 1970, p. 159.
77
scientific production, but without offering the prospect of a 'higher trnth'. Herc the
contemporary state of the sciences resembles the arts. Use, emancipation and cognition
an.: implausible captions for producing art and science. Science itself has become today
more than ever before self-referential. In connection with the development of system
themy, self-referentiality was considered prooC of an increase in complexity. As
'autopoiesis' il is an essential component oflhe human sciences. How we are lo judge
them is, however, still an open question. Two by no means mutually exclusive
interpretations are obvious. On the one hand, one could view in the type of complexity
an unwilling adaptation to the Junctions of more elaborate machines which have come
to influence human life so heavily that life itself finally abandons its control to an ex-
ternal. machine-like logic. On the other hand, the insight into the self-referential char-
acter of large sectors of the sciences contains the prospect of eluding the forces of ab-
straction present in identity-logic and of getting involved in a mimetic cognitive
movement tied to language games and to the mimetic relationship of language games
amongst themselves, which arc open to the paralogic and the paradoxical. 56
Picturing and Simulation
No Jess decisive than alienation and reification is the picturing of the world. 57 Every-
thing has a tendency to become a picture; even opaque bodies are transfonncd. They
Jose their non-transparent and spatial character, become limpid and surface-like. Ab-
straction-processes result in pictures and picture-signs. We encounter them every-
where; nothing is more foreign and overpowering. Pictures cause things, 'realities' lo
disappear.
In addition to the transmission of texts. for the first time in hi:;tory pictures. too, arc
being stored and transmitted in an unimaginable dimension. Photographs, films, videos
have become memory joggers, giving rise to pictorial memories. \Vhereas earlier it \\'as
the texts that required the compliment of the imaginary picture, today imagination is
limited by the production of picture-texts whose tr,msmission is unlimited. fewer and
fewer people belong to tht: producers, and more and more to the consumers of finished
pictures and texts. ._ , . _ .
Pictures arc a speoi1c form o± abstraction. 1heJr two-dimensionality annihilates
space. The electronic medium of (TV) pictures ma~cs tl1eir nbiquitousness anu accel-
eration possible. 1 hesc pictures can spread almost smmltancously to all corners of the
earth at the speed of light. They miniaturise the world and allow for a particular kind of
s 1 ecific experience: the experience of pictures. They represent a new form of con-
~~mer goods and arc subjected to the principles of the market economy. They are pro-
duced nnd sold e\'en when the ob,1ccts they relate to ha\'e not yet become consumer
products. . .
Pictures get rrnxed together; they become exchangeable with others; they arc mi-
metically referred to others. In pictnres,_ picrnre fragments me_ selected and reassem-
bled; fractured pictures :1re produced wluch Ill each case comt1tute a new unity. They
56 Lyotard 1985.
57 Baudrillard 1987,
73
 created exclusively as a simulation of politics. The simulation often has more influence
move, refer to one another; even their acceleration makes them more similar to one
than the 'real' political controversies.
another: a mimesis of velocity. Various pictures become similar to one another exclu-
sively on the basis of their pure surfaceness and their electronic and miniaturising
medium, despite the differences of content. They participate in a profound mimetic re-
structuring of our contemporary world of images. The pictures themselves become Postscript
promiscuous.
The goal of this swdy is a new underst~nding of mimesis. Contemporary reductions of
Pictures spread at the speed of light; they are visually infectious. In mimetic proc-
the term are called into question and rejected. A lield occupied by many categories
es_ses they lead to the production of more and more pictures. This gives birth to a world
opens up for us. Mimicry, similarity, adaptation, imitation, representation, reproduc-
ot appearance and fascination that is severed from 'reality'. As a world of art and lit-
tion, simulation, adjustment, expression, premonition all belong to this field. The mul-
erature, this world of appearance no longer takes its (limited) place beside the world of
tifariousness of these: tenns displaces the limitation of mimesis to aesthetics. New
politics; it has rather the tendency to rob the other worlds of their reality-content and to
transdisciplinary perspectives open up. The relationship between environment and the
turn them into worlds of appearance. The aestheticisation of all sphe~es of life is the
social reappears as an equally important aspect of aesthetics. With the end of a norma-
product. And an immense increase in the importance of mimesis is an immediate con-
tive and binding anthropology, mimesis becomes a central category in the field of his-
sequence. More and more pictures are being produced which have only themselves as a
torical anthropology. Its fundamental ambivalence, noted already by Plato, is today
point of reference and for which there is no corresponding reality. The final result is
more than ever apparent. On the one hand, mimesis contributes to the transformation
that everything becomes art, a game of pictures and references in which everything is
of the world into pictures and images and thus to its aestheticisation. The images get .
possible, so that even ethical questions receive a subordinate importance. The 'ten-
swept up into a mimetic whirlwind. Thcir self-referentiality and velocity increase the
dency towards cul1ure-society· manifests here its ambivalent character. 58 If everything
abstraction and pictorialness. On the other hand, mimesis is a carrier of hope. It can do
has become a mimetic game with pictures and images, randomness and non-commit-
without definiteness, it can initiate movements with a fractured intention and offer
ment are inescapable. The picture worlds which are thus produced and which stand in a
room for the non-identical, and it can restore the moment to its own rights in the face
mimetic relationship to one another turn their influence back upon the world and
of chronocracy. Mimesis. contains possibilities for a non-instrumental wav of dealin2
aestheticise it. Thus diffen:ntiating between life and art, 'reality' and appearance, be-
with the other and with the world in which the specific is protected fro~ the. domi~
comes impossible. Life becomes a model for the world of appearance and the world of
nance of the universal and in which things and people are guaranteed safety. At the
appearance a model for life. The visual develops hypertrophically. Everything becomes
present stage in th~ process of civilisation, a choice between the two sides of mimesis
transparent; space dwindles into picture-like surfaceness; time coagulates as if there
is not possible; whether the possibility to choose between the two sides of mimesis
were only a present of accelerated pictures. The pictures draw desire onto themselves,
bind it and unframe it and reduce the differences. At the same time, the pictures avoid ever existed is an open question.
desire, simultaneously indicating with the presence of desire its very absence. 'Things'
and people long for a 'transgression', ;i step beyond in pictures. Desire blasts into the
emptmess of the electronic picture-sign.
More and more, pictures are becoming simulacra. They refer to something, adapt to
something, and arc products of mimetic behaviour. And thus political conflicts, for ex-
ample, are not waged for their own sake; they are staged rather for the sake of the irn-
age-crc:ation in 1elcvision. What takes place as a political conflict is actually already
conceived as image-creation. The television pictures become the medium for political
c?ntrov_ersy; the aestheticisation of politics is unavoidable. The spectator sees the
s1mulat1on _ofa political controversy in the course of which everything is staged so that
~e w_1ll be_heve t_hat the conflict is authentic. In fact, the authenticity of the representa-
tton ts a s1mulat1on. By playing upon the convictions and expectations of the spectator,
the spectat~r is led to consider the simulation authentic. From the very beginning, eve-
ryth111g 1s ~1med at the image-creation and reception in the world of appearance. Inso-
far a~ the image-creation and reception is achieved, the controversy itself is a success.
The mtended effects of the political sphere communicated via the television screen are

58 iis1he1ik und Kommunikation, Vol. 67/68: Kull11rgeschichle, Berlin 1987.

75
74
 5

Mimesis in Education

Mimesis as a Concept of Educational Anthropology

So far we have seen that 'mimesis' is not only a notion belonging to the realm of aes-
thetics. but also an anthropological concept. Thus, it is clear that mimetic processes
play an important role in educ,1tion and socialisation. At the same time, 'mimesis' has
a multiplicity of meanings, which forbid too narrow a focus on 'imitation'. Indeed,
mimetic activity does not mean simply 'imitation'. but also 'making oneself similar'.
'showing·. 'expressing' and 'demonstrating'. The concept involves other concepts
such as mimicry. representation, imitation, reproduction, simulation and autopoiesis.
As an ::rnthropological category. mimesis contributes to the understanding and expla-
nation of the processes of sociJlisation and education, of social activity and aesthetic
experience. Mimesis is thus well suited to describe and analyse interdisciplinary or
trans-disciplinary processes.
The 1ield of meaning of mimesis is principally ambivalent. On the one hand,
mimetic processes, as processes of mimicry, can lead to adaptation to given, rigid con-
ditions 1: on the other hand, many hopes are placed on mimetic processes. They can
lead to a 'living experience' (Adorno) of the external world, ol" others and of oneself.
Mimetic processes can initiate movement with a fractured intention, leave room for the
non-identical, create pos;;ibilitics for a non-instrumental n:lation,hip with the environ-
ment in which the particular is defended against the universal. in which objects and
people are protected. In the current socio-cultural stage of development. the ambiva-
lence of mimetic processes cannot be negated.
The mimetic abilities of children, youth and adults are closely tied to the processes
of the body and resist social tendencies of abstraction. They build bridges to the out-
side, to the external world and to other people: they attempt to break down the hard
subject-object split and take the edge off the sharp distinction between what is and
what ought to be. It is a matter of coming to understand the 'bctween' 2 that is experi-
enced in the subject's 'making itself similar' (;\clorno) to the external world or to an-
other individual. Mimetic processes contain rational elements, but are not exhausted bv
them: in these processes the individual steps outside himself, aligns himself with th~
world. has the possibility of transposing the outer world into hi, inner world ;md of

llorkheirner/Adornn 1971.
2 Derrida 1967a: 1967b.

77
giving expression to this inner world. Mimetic processes lead to closeness with objects
and with the other and arc thus necessary requirements for understanding.
While modern rational thought is related to the singular isolated cognitive subject,
mimesis is alwavs the affair of the relational network of people. The mimetic produc-
tion of a svmbo.lie world refers to other worlds and their creators and includes other
people in ~ne's own world. It recognises the exchange between world and man as well
as the aspect of power contained within it. The history of mimesis is the history of the
struggle for power over symbolic worlds, for powc:r to represent oneself and others and
to interpret the world according to one's own ideas. To this extent, mimesis belongs to
the history of power-relationships, especially where they concern education and social-
isation.
Mimetic processes are not mere processes of imitation, reproduction or formation.
On the contrary, they require individual shaping by the child. the youth or the adult.
The dearcc of individual difference varies according to diverse conditions. Our inquiry
into th; meaning of mimetic processes in the sph;rc of education and education, of
socialisation and social behaviour, constitutes a complex field of rcscmch from which,
in the following, a few exemplary aspects will be treated.
The Power of Mimesis
J\s \Ve have seen, already in the ancient world, in the pre-Socratic period, a number of
central meanings or 'mimesis' can be distinguished th<1t are still relevant today in the
field of persona genesis anJ cdm:atior1. Research into the existent texts of this period
referring to mimesis indicate the following semantic variants:
l. mimetic behaviour in the sense of the direct imitation of appearance, acts, or forms
of expression of animals or of a man in speech, song and/or dance,
2. the imitation of acts of one person by another in a very ge~cra_l sense:, . 3 and nonnative education, is controversial.
3. the reproduction of an image or a picture of a person or thrng 111 matenal form.
Mimesis is first applied to education in the third book of Plato's Politeia. Herc, the
idea that education takes place largely via mimesis is developed. An cxtraordina?
puwc:r is ascribed to mimetic processes, a power based upon the strong human mimetic•
instinct, which, especially in early childhood, enables motor, sensory, and speech de-
velopment, as well as intellectual, social and personal development. According to
Plato. children and the youth experience and acquire their social behaviour in their en-
counter ,vith other people, and in their experience of their modes of behaviour. In these
processes, values and points of view arc registered and incorporated by all the ~cnses.
Next to the visual senses of perception, the auditory senses are especially sigmficant._
Plato stresses the meaning of music and its mimetic proc<:ssing in the dcvelopme_nt o±
the mind's ability to experience. He distinguishes between various forms of music, to
which he ascribes a variety of effects on the 'psyches· of the young.
3 Else 1958, p. 79.
78
Role models, which challenge the youth to imitate, have similar lasting effects. The
models may be real people or fictional characters, and fictional images. In this historic
period, the models for education were primarily created by poetry, above all by Homer.
Plato criticised the lack of clarity and the 'mixed character' of poetry. For poetry por-
trnvs the inadequate sides of the Gods and the human weaknesses of heroes. This
mi~cd rcprcsentation is harmful to the role model of the Gods and heroes in the educa-
tion of the youth. And since literature cannot create clear models, it should be hanncd
from the Republic and replaced by philosophy, which focuses on the search for the
'beautifur, the 'good' and the 'trne'.
This platonic position of control and ban. also present in other social utopias and
normative educational theories, is tied to the following presuppositions:
Due the human mimetic predisposition, role models develop a lasting power over
youth, against which there is no successful defence. Models spur the mimetic de-
sin.; and 'force' the youth to strive to be like them. The exemplariness of a model
indicates a lack which desire seeks to overcome. Mimetic clcsire 4 motivates the
young individual to wish to be like his model. That is -why he attempts to make
himself similar to the model and to adapt himself to it.
In Plato's theory, the power of models is based in anthropology. Tt indicates a
conditio humana that appears parallel with the 'eccentric personality' (Plessner)
and 'world openness· (Schclcr). Human desire, which is only insignificantly in-
stinct-related, is infected by models, leading to a mimesis of a model. This mecha-
nism passes on ways or life and spheres oflife to the younger generation.
According to the concept dcveloped in Po!iteia, the perfection of the youth is made
possible by mimetic desire. which forces the youth to adapt to the world. The se-
lection of correct models is supposed to overcome human shortcomings and
achieve improvement. Tht: radicalism of this position, in which the lives and cxpc- ~
ricnces or young people arc determined on the basis of a normative anthropology
Aristotle strongly criticised Plato's position. Although ht: was equally con\'inccd of the
power of mimetic: processes. he drew other conclusions. The imperfect and the incor-
rigible should not be excluded from the realm of experience; rather, one must learn to
la~e up to them, to take up the struggle against them and to thus immunise oneself
against their infectiousness. The avoidance of negative models offers no defence
against them; the struggle with them docs. Without this experience, the youth is easily.
infected by and defenceless against negative models. Only those who work their way
through negative models can develop resistance and personal strength. Similar consid-
erations still play a role today in political education. According to these considerations.
firm political convictions arc not developed by fending off contradictory views, bnt bv
dealing with them critically. The same can be said for views and values in other field.~
of education. This position is also supported by psychoanalytic knowledge, which hcis
isolated the negative conscgucnccs of avoidance and protection in psychogenesis. 5
4 Girard 1998.
5 Wyss 1977.
79
 Due to the lasting effects of mimetic processes on child upbringing and education,
Plato demands strict controls over the influences on imagination; Aristotle calls for an
intensive confrontation with·their effects. Beginning with Plato it has been clear that
ideas, positions and values, but also social forms of living and acting are constructed
by means of mimetic processes. 6 As a result of their different requirements, the youth
do not generate a mere copy of their models; the mimetic process leads to difference,
which accounts for the autonomy and creative character of results. The model, ac-
quired in mimetic action, is not merely a copy of the basis of external similarity, but
rather a 'construction' of the mimetically behaving individual which leaves room for
difference, particularity and creativity.
Acquisition of the External World via Mimesis
In his autobiography, A Berlin Childhood Around 1900, Walter Benjamin describes in
numerous reminiscences the places, rooms, streets, houses, objects and events of his
childhood and describes their meaning for the inner development of the child. In recall-
ing the objects, scenes and events, he conveys the particular perspective of his child-
hood. His memory images do not belong to the programme of traditional autobiogra-
phies and their ·search for the origin of self-knowledge and self-consciousness; instead,
they consist in individual texts which narrate the feelings of happiness and fear during
childhood, but without drawing attention to the child as the subject in these self-reve-
lations. The framework for these extremely individual recollections is given in the_ in-
dication of place, 'Berlin', and time, 'around 1900'. In the implicit consideration of
these co-ordinates there arises a historical-anthropological analysis avant la Lettre.
Benjamin's autobiographical text breaks with the tradition of the self-representa-
tion of a subject investigating itself and with 'the central perspective' of the subject's
consciousness of its life's dynamic - a tradition stemming back to Augustine and
Rousseau. In its place, we find images, scenes and noises that cannot be subsumed un-
der the organisation of the subject. The texts con~ist in a chain of signs in which the
individual signs take part in a metonymic game and find truth in themselves. With their
metonymic movement, they incapacitate inherited sign systems, and explore new pos-
sibilities for writing and experience.7 .
· These memory images are suspended in the tension between city, childhood and
time. On the first page, the city already appears to be a labyrinth, a tangled clump of
knots in which the Benjamin child encounters· numerous obstacles, loses his orienta-
tion, wanders aimlessly and manages, again and again, to get involved in unforeseeable
situations.·The labyrinthine city-arouses memories of impassability, dangers, threaten-
ing, mythical powers and monsters. The experience of labyrinths is not restricted to the
city; it continues in the home and applies as well to the memory as it seeks its toilsome
path into childhood. .
For adults, childhood has passed; only with the help of language are the memories
of this age possible. Thus, for these autobiographical texts, the difference between the
6 Bourdieu 1990; Gebauer/Wulf 1993.
7 Schneider 1986.
&O·
direct experience of childhood .and its cumulative 'representation' and. linguistic pres-
entation is constitutive. The displacement between the lived, the recalled and the repre- ·
sented childhood hinders biographical clarity. Even -with the help of early sketches,
pictures and films, the biographical text remains a reconstruction. The images arising
out of childhood are fleeting. In order to make memories out of them, they must ·be
read, placed in the context of life, their meanings must be decoded. Memories are .
promises aimed at the present and the future in whose construction the temporally sub-
sequent fulfilment is contained. That is why the place and time fa which memories are
built must be precisely defined. In Benjamin's texts, memories become thought-pic-
tures mixed with allegories and emblems that await a deciphering reading.
Benjamin portrays how the child experiences the world mimetically. Like the wiz-
ard of earlier ages, the child produces 'similarities' between itself and the outer world;
it 'reads' the world and 'creates' in the process correspondences, Thus,. the child be--
comes a windmill by stretching his arms out and rotating them, producing the required
accompanying noise with his mouth. By doing this, the child-broadens his experience:
he realises how the wind drives a windmill; he experiences something of the power of
wind and the power of man's use of nature; he comprehends the fascination of human.
productivity. In the mimetic act of metamorphosing himself into a windmill, the child
in Benjamin's narrative experiences the possibilities - at least in play - of using his
power over nature. The moment the child's body becomes a windmill, the child ac-·
quaints himself with a basic form of machine and with the machine character of the
human body. At the same time, he experiences his body as an instrument ofrepresen-·
tation and expression. In the process he acquires not only concrete possibilities ofrep-
resentation and expression, but also has the experience of using his body for certain.
objectives in order to receive social recognition. Such mimetic· processes are accom-.
panied by symbolic interpretations, so that thought and speech are developed in them.
Benjamin's autobiographical text offers us numerous examples of the mimetic
conquering of streets and squares, and of the home with its rooms and chambers.-The
magic interpretation of the world of the child, in which the world is. animated and
answers the child, is achieved through processes of comparison and 'becoming like'.
Images from one's childhood are connected with meanings that the child intimates, but
which are articulated biographically much later.
Thus, in recollection of the entry to the family home: 'Among all the caryatids and
atlases, the cherubs and Pomona that used to glance at me, the most dear to me were
the dusty ones from the race of threshold specialists who guard the ·stew into existence
or into the house. They resigned themselves to waiting. Thus it was indifferent to them
whether they waited for a stranger, for the return·ofthe old Gods, or for the child with
his school books in hand who thrust himself past their feet thirty years ago.' 8 In the .
production of this picture from childhood memories, the figures seen in childhood are,
seen anew and interpreted anew. In a mimetic approach, the figures develop new levels
of meaning, which overlap the experiences of the child. The figures await the child, the
Gods, the stranger, at the same time. ·Thus, the difference between the world of the
child and the mythical world of the Gods disappears. Both worlds enclose one another
g Benjamin 1980, p. 138 (all lhe Benjamin quotations inthis chapter have been translated from the
original German text). ,
81
opment with which the child gradually constructs its relationship to the world, to lan-
guuge and to itself. With the help of these processes the child is transposed into the
structure and power relationships expressed in the symbolically coded world - rela-
tionships in reference to which distance, critique and change become possible only
later. With the help of its mimetic ability, the child adopts the meaning of objects and
forms of representation and action. In a mimetic move, it builds a bridge to the outer
world. At the centre ofmimctic activity lies the reference to the 'other', which is not to
be internalised, but with which one strives to become similar. In this movement there is
a pause in activity, a moment of passivity which is characteristic of the 'mimetic im-
pulse'.
The mimetic encounter with the world takes place in all the senses that develop
their sensibility in the course of these processes. The child's opportunity for mimetic
acquisition of the world constitutes a prerequisite for the quality of the sensory and
emotional receptivity of the later adult. This is especially true for the development of
its aesthetic sensibility and its ability to empathise, to feel sympathy, friendship and
love. The mimetic abilities result in the ability to comprehend the feelings of othe:5
without objectifying them and without becoming hardened against them. TI1e mimet1_c
ability alludes to the secretiveness of things, the auratic moment in aesthetic experi-
ences and the possibilities of'Jiving experience' (Adorno).
Psychogenesis via Mimesis
Whereas in the previous section of this chapter we attempted to show how childre~
mimetically acquire space and objects, we shall now tum our attention to the role mi-
metic processes play in psychogencsis, using three examples from Lacan's resean;h on
the psycho-strncture of the family. In his assessment of the undeniable and lasting psy-
chic formation of children in their mimetic relationship to their parents, Lacan comes
close to Plato's rigour. Here, it is not so much the possibility of freedom as the d~-
pendencies and moulding in mimetic processes, which are placed at the centre o_f Ins
analysis. Thus, he sees in the family a social institution in which mimctic-educat10nal
processes are organised for the small child.
According to Lacan, the family has its origins in a number of complexes. 'Complex'
is understood as 'the sum of reactions which account for all the organic functions from
emotions to object-adapted behavionr' 13 • A 'complex' reproduces a certain reality of
the surroundings. First, this reality represents its form in ils objective distinctivene:s at
a given stage of psychological development; this stage specifies the emergence ol the
complex. Second, the thus fixed reality repeats its effectiveness in events wh~ne:'er
certain experiences arc encountered, which would actually require a higher obJCCI'.~;
cntion of that reality; these experiences specify the conditioning of the 'comple~ ·
'Complex' can be qualified primarily as the ensemble of unconscious factors. m a
higher unity which result in psychological effects that are not controlled by consc1ous-
l 3 Lacan I986, p 45 (all the Lacan quotations in this chapter have bc,n transl~tcd fr?m ;he Gennan
edition referred to in the bibliography. Lacan 's original French text was pubhshed in L 'Enc
die Franr;aise. vol. VIII la Vie Mentale. ed. Henri Wallon 1938. pp. 8°40 S-8°40 16).
14 Lacan 1986, p. 45.
84
ness and that are contingently related to one another pnrapraxis, dreams, symptoms
arc among them. These observations lead to the assumption of the existence of an
'unconscious idea' - nn imago, whose development takes place in mimetic processes
which evade consciousness. Like the development of the imago, the formation of a
'complex' is detem1ined by cultural factors, which influence its content, form and ap-
pearance as an expression oflack in a given situation. In its content, the 'complex' is
representative of an object, which means it bears a mimetic relationship to that object.
In its form, the complex is determined by the given state of psychological development
that can be understood in part as being a result of the corresponding mimetic processes.
Jn the end, the complex, as the result of a lnck, is also a product of mimetic processes.
Lacan identifies three complexes which are characteristic for the psycho-strncture
of the nuclear family and in whose development mimetic processes play a central role:
l) the 'weaning complex', 2) the complex of the 'intruder' and 3) the Oedipus com-
plex. They arc shaped in a certain historical and social situation and ought thus to be
relativised in the sense of a historical-educational anthropology.
The Weaning Complex
The weaning complex encompasses biological, psychological and cultural aspects,
which arc inextricably intertwined. Despite the biological common ground, the com-
plex is distinguished in content and form from one culture to another, from family to
familv, from child to child. Weaning leaves a lasting impression ofan aborted biologi-
cal r~lationship in the hl1man psyche. which oftrn leads to a crisis, n psychological
trauma. Tht vital crisis is compounded by the initial psychic acceptance and rejection
of weaning. The acceptance and rejection of weaning 'can be understood as a choice';
thcv form the coexisting and contrary poles of a thus ambivalent altitude. According to
La~an 's intcrpn:tation. 'rejection of weaning is the basis of the positive side or the
complex: the imago of the infant's mother who seeks to resume nursing' 15 • In content,
the imaco is made possible by body-mimesis corresponding to the young age of the in-
fant which initially leaves the impression of the mother's breast and body on the men-
tal structun.:s of the child and which in turn model later psychic experience and mani-
fest themselves in the content of the consciousness. This mimesis of the mother's body
is closclv tied to the development of the child's needs and how these needs the mother
fulfils. r~ the first year, body mimesis plays a decisive role insofar as the child has no
co-on.lirrnted external. personal and internal cognition. What later is differentiated into
external, self. and internal cognition is still undifferentiated in body mimesis.
Lacan is convinced that weaning relativises the misery of birth that brings to an
abrupt and premature end the parasitic balance of uterine life, leaving the child ex-
posed to complete life-threatening helplessness. Wenning is a repetition of the still
more painfol separation caused by the premature birth of man. which initiates the
'extra-uterine spring'. Weaning has a mimetic relationship to the helplessness that re-
sults from this separation at birth, for which no motherly care cnn ever compensate.
15 Lacan 1986, p. 49.
85

Following Lacan's thesis, women have the chance to find repletion in their
'mother's-breast-image', in the child's suckling, embracing and eye contact. Thus the
mother can experience and satisfy the most primal of all desires. Even the endur~nce of
birth pains can be interpreted as representative compensation fo:
the 'fear t~at is b?m
with life'. 'Only the imago - which bears the stamp of the weamng '.hat beg ms at birt~-
in the depths of its psyche can explain the power, wealth and durat10n oft_he r~other s
feelings.' 16 In regard to our subject this means that even the 'mot~er's feelmgs ha~e a
mimetic origin. They are a response to the mother's own experience of lac~ at birth
and in weaning and attempt to minimise the suffering she experienced as an mfant for
her own child. Here the relation to the child is created through the memory of ~he
situation of the newborn and subsequently weaned child. In this reversal o~ the. situ-
ation. compensation for the sufferings once endured can be attained. _In he: m1_metic r\
ferral to the mother-imago, the mother can find a large degree of sat1sfa~t1on m her ac.
. of caring for the child. At the same time, the possibility of compensat10n _secures for
· the mother the affection of the child. As opposed to the many other m1met1c fomis al-
ready discussed, here we have an example of the mimesis of unconscious ime1g~s that,
owing to their early devek,pment. have the power to continually structure desire a nd·
wish. · ·
.· Furthermore, the imago of the mother's womb plays an important role m secunng
family bonds. Their form, removed from consciousness (the form of prenatal accom-
. modation), is appropriately symbolised in the house and the apartment - symbols
whose significance we discussed in the previous section using the example of "."alter
Benjamin's memory-images. The affection for the domestic unity of the family 15 dis-
tinguishable from the affection that every individual member of the family feels_ for t_he
other members. 'That is why giving up the security the family economy offers 1mpb~s
the far reaching consequences of a return to weaning; in most cases the complex is
sufficiently liquidated for _the first time on th_is o?casion.' 17 There _arises a psycho~::
netic development which 1s spurred on by rmmehc processes and m which the iep .
tion of the complex provides the basis for the feelings of the mother, brings about the_ir
sublimation in family-feelings and leads their liquidation to traces that are expressed m
· mankind's longing for universal hannony.
The Intruder Complex
;he small c~ild's first experience with the intruder complex and with envy as an ~rche-
type of social feeling occurs when it becomes acquainted with its brothers and si_Slers.
The conditions for this experience vary from culture to culture and from family to
family and depend upon the individual contingencies and one's place in th~ or_der 0 ~
children. Only rarely docs envy between children have its origin in substantial_nvali,
as a rule it is the result of mimetic processes, in whose framework one usually tmds t e
adaptation of a younger child to the older child. The younger child wishes to be like
the older child. Especially when the child does not yet have a command of the same
16 Lac an I 986, pp. 51-5:'.
17 Lac,m 1986, p. s:;
skills and feels inferior, the younger child experiences the older child as a rival. The
~Ider child also has a rival relati?nshi~ to the younger child in competing for the attcn-
t10n of the parents; the older child wishes to be like the younger one and receive the
same affection; often this mimetic desire leads to regression on the part of the older
child. Lacan explains these processes with the assumption ofan 'imago of the similar'
which is espe~ially active betw~cn children of similar ages. In such situations we may
assume the existence of a coercive force to be similar. Girard (1987) secs in this force
the origin ?fte~per tantrums, which oft~n occur between children ofone family. Here,
too, the mimetic processes mamfest thelf fundamental ambivalence: on the one hand
they effect rapprochement and similarity; on the other, they force the children and
a~ults to be dis_tinct ~nd diffc:ent_so that they may exist in their particularity. The am-
bivalence ofth1s feelmg consists m the mimetic desire for adaptation and in the simul-
taneous wish to be distinct. .. . .
Mimetic processes follow not only the example of others; they can also be self-ref-
c~ential giving_ way to sc!f-mime~is. La~ari secs an initial phase of self-referentiality
given already m early childhood 1mmed1ately after weaning. He calls-this the mirror
st~g~. In this sta~e, when the child's sense of its body is still characterised by a Jack of
ab1hty to c~-ordmat~ its_ organs and by the feeling of dismemberment and disjointed-
ne:s, the ~hdd sees _its ~1cture, upon _looking coincidentally into a mirror, as a physical
un:ty. This_ perc~pt10n 1s acc?mpamed by a 'joyous' feel_ing of happiness, since the
child :5ees itself m the ~efle_ctmn as _a uni~y t~a: it has not yet achieved in its physical
experience. The reflecllon m the mmor 1s s1m1lar to the child; at the same time it is
imaginary because it does not correspond to the physical reality of the child. But th
rencction in the mirror does indicate the unity the child knew before birth and strive:
to recreate on another level. The image of unity it sees in the mirror becomes a refer-
ence to t~e ~mago of unity that lives inside the child on the basis of its prenatal situ-
ation. This 1s t~e source of energy for the intellectual progress of the child. which
structures the child's search. ·
_Insofar as the_ reflection i1; the mirror r'."fers to a status which is targeted but not yet
~chiev~d and which appears _m the reflect10_n to_bc attainable, it triggers a strong feel-
mg of JOY- Thereafter the_ ch!ld attempts m1met1cally to recapture the image it saw in
the mirror, an image that 1s tied to the child's lost status. The image seen in the mirror
becomes · a· model f child .emulates in an attempt to achieve its unity . Th e mirror
· that the ·
reJkcl10n 1s a picture o the reality of the child, of its affective value -which is as illu-
sory as the picture - and of the child's structure, which is, as the child itself. a reflex of
the ~u~an f~rm. 'The perception of the form of the similar as an intellectual unilv is.
for hvm_g ~emgs, dependent upon a correlative level of intelligence and sociality.' 18
Fro:~ th1~ time onward, the s~gg!c to recreate the lost unity with the self occupies a
position m the ~entre of consc10usness. In the search for an affective unity, the child
unearths figurations . that represent
, to him his unity; Amon" "' such figurations·, th.e mirror
·
image has a special status. What the subject so openlv welcomes in the mirro · g
· · h · - . . - r 1ma e
1st11e m erent umty wit11m tt. Wh~t ~e_recogn~ses in the image is the ideal of the imago
of the double. What he celebrates 111 1t 1s the trrnmph of the life-saving tendency.'19
I 8 Lucai1 1986. p. 58.
19 Lncan 1986, p. 59.
. 'x7
The Oedipus Complex
In the development of sexual identity and in the farther psychogencsis of the child, the
Oedipus complex plays a central role. In the Oedipus constellation the child relates
himself mimetically to the parent of the same sex; this gives rise to a mimesis of the
desire of the parent of the same sex, but without occasioning a fulfilment of this in-
stinct. The parent of the same sex reappears in the child as the 'agent of sexual prohi-
bition and as an example of its violation' 20 . The repression of the desire leads to a
doubled affective moment: the child harbours aggression towards the parent with
whom it rivals on the basis of its sexual desire: at the same time, the child has a sense
of fear of such aggression. The feelings of being torn and of fear stemming from birth
and reactivated by weaning are inevitable. An overlapping of the castration phantasm
with the memories of a dismembered body is likely. The child's mimesis of the parent
of the same sex in the Oedipal triangle is decisive for the sublimation of reality, since
this parent is not the object, but the subject of desire and resists the desire of the child.
The prevention of the fulfilment of desire gives rise here to the object whose position
is thus determined as resistance against desire. The end of the crisis, according to the
opinion of psychoanalysts, lies in the development of the super-ego and of the subli-
mating ego ideal as well as in the increasing experience with reality.
One would not go too far in seeing in this mimetic constellation between parents
and children the basis for the inherent violence in the relationship between generations
which is crcatt:d by the following mechanism: the child relates mimeticully to the par-
ent who has already become what it itself is destined to he, which means that the child
strives to obtain s;1pport from the adult to become what the adult already is. At tlie
same time neither the adult nor the child can tolerate becoming the same and losing the
difference between them that safeguards their uniqueness. For this reason, the relation-
ship between the wish to be similar to one another and the wish to be distinct and
unique is· split. As we have seen, the mimetic desire is not a simple movement from
one subject to another. Rather, the desire is transacted over a third subject over the
desire of the third subject. If desire is mimetic, then it is preceded by the desire of Jn
'other' to which it is targeted and with which it relates mimetically. In this light, the
basic structure of desire is mimetic.
]Viimetic desire is aimed at the other, at the desire of the other, from whose origins
the subject constructs itself and its self-esteem. From the outset, the child has no cxpe-
rience of its self, not even in the I-thou-relationship, but rather, only the experience of
the other. There is no direct path to the development of the self: it always leads through
the other. The 'other' creates the child ,vho expects from the other that it be shown
what it should desire in order to find itself. The small child does not yet know that it
desires or what it desires. It learns both from the other. The child imitates the other be-
cause it cannot yet differentiate between itself and the other. The child has no self-per-
ception and no feeling of itself: it lets itself be filled with the other and with objects.
The adult shows the child, who is in search of itself and senses a deficit, who it is
and who it is capable of becoming. Alone the child is not able to find itself. The adult
thus demonstrates to the child how il may come lo itself. The decisive palh is the mi-
20 Lacan 1986, p. 63.
88
mesis of the desire of the adult, throughout which the child's own desire is developed.
Since initially a :mcial relationship, and not a subject, exists, it is mimesis that pro-
duces the undifferentiated relationship between the body of the small child and the
adult who serves as an exnmple. This gives rise to a mi~ctic correspondence between
one's own body and the body of the other - a correspondence leading lo a representa-
tion of the other in the small child, which is the prerequisite for the development of the
subject.
Due to the lasting effects of mimetic processes on uphringing and education, Plato
calls for strict controls over the influences on imagination; Aristotle demands an in-
tensive examination of their effects. As early as Plato it was clear that ideas, attitudes
and values, but also social and interactional forms arc shaped by rnimesis. 21 On the
basis of the various conditions of young people no simple copy of a role model is cre-
ated; the mimetic process leads to a difference that constitutes the individuality and the
creative character of its results. The acquired model, present in the mimetic act, is thus
not a mere illustration on the basis of external similarity, but rather a construction of
the mimetically behaving individual, a construction in which there is room for differ-
ence. particularity and creativity.
Perspectives
In conclusion, some considerations concerning the significance of mimesis for ecluca-
Lion and socialisation shall be developed which in part expound upon what has been
said and in pa1t offer new perspectives.
I. In distinction to imitation and simulation. the use of the term mimesis implies an
insistence upon an 'outside' that one approaches, to which one makes oneself similar,
but into which one cannot dissolve oneself~ an 'outside' in relation to which a differ-
ence remains. This 'outside' to which the child and youth move can be another person,
a part of the environment or a figurative and imaginary world. In any case, an approach
towards the outer \vorld takes place. By transmitting the 'outside' via the scmes and
the powers of imagination in a mimetic process into internal images, bodies of sound
worlds of touch, smell and taste, the outside gives rise to cxpcrie1{ccs which are tied t~
the living, inescapable physicalitv of the child.
2. Mimetic processes are given with physically and thus begin vcrv earlv. Thev
take place before the ]-thou split and the subject-object division, and c~ntrib~ile sub-
stantially to psychic, social and personal genesis. They arc closely tied to early com-
plexes and imagines and extend into the preconscious. Owing to their inter-relatedness
with the earliest processes of physical constitution in birth, weaning and desire, their
influences are very long lasting.
3. Even before thought and language arc developed, the child experiences the
world, himself and the other mimetically. His mimetic processes arc linked to the vari-
ous senses. Especially in learning motor skills, the mimetic talent pbys :m important
role. Also the acquisition of language is not imaginable without the mimetic oift. Mi-
mesis is the form oflifc oflhc child in early childhood. 0
21 Bourdieu 1990; Gebauer/Wulf 1993.
 offer decisive conditions for the genesis of living experience; in order for mimetic
4. Sexual desire is aroused· and developed through mimetic processes. Sexual
processes to develop, analysis and reflection are also required.
identity thus takes shape and sexual difference is experienced. Desire behaves mimeti-
10. Mime_tic processes a:e ambivalent; they contain an inherent impulse to adapt
cally in relation to another desire; it becomes infected and infects itself; it develops a
that can ccrtamly take place mdependcntly from the values of the world at hand. Thus.
dynamic that often stands in contradiction to the intentions of the subject. Already de-
there is also an adaptation to things obsolete and lifeless, which block or lead astray the
veloped ideas are modified and new ones are tested. Repeatedly, references to other
inner development of the child. Mimesis can deteriorate into simulation or mimicrv.
concepts and experiments are developed. Many of these processes take place uncon-
Bu_t i~ can ~!so lead to an extension of the child or youth into the surrounding world,
sciously.
bmldmg bridges to the outer world. The absence of violence is characteristic of the
5. Mimetic processes support human polycentricity. They extend into the layers of,
mim~tic adaptation to the external world. To form or change the world is not the goal
physicality, sensuality and desire in which powers other than consciousness are de-
of rn1mes1s, but rather to develop and educate oneself in the encounter with the world.
terminant. Among these powers are aggression, violence and destruction, powers that
11._ In ~imetic processes, a non-instrumental access to the world can take place.
are ·also developed through mimetic processes. In group and mass situations they can
The m1met1c movement leaves the other as he is and does not attempt to change him. It
be particularly active since in them the personal centre of navigation and responsibility
contai~s an open~~ss for the fo~eign by allowing it to remain and by approaching it,
is displaced by a group or inass authority, which, with its intoxicating infectiousness,
but without requmng that the difference be dissolved. The mimetic impulse directed
makes possible destructive actions the individuals would not be capable of committing
towards the other accepts the other's non-identity; it dispenses with definiteness for the
on their·own. ·
sake of the difference of the other, whose definiteness could only be attained by a re-
6. In the family, at school and at work, the values embodied by these institutions,
duction to the same, the familiar. Thc renunciation of definiteness secures the wealth
their ideas and norms are internalised by children, youth and adults through mimetic
of experience and the different nature of the foreign.
processes, As the discussion concerning the 'hidden curriculum' has shown, the values
I 2. In mimetic movement the anterior world is interpreted by a symbolically pro-
actually active in an institution can stand in sharp contradiction to the conscious self-
duced world, that itself is already interpreted. This results in a new understanding ofan
understanding of the institution. Analysis of institutions, the critique of ideology, insti-
already interpreted world. This is also true ofrepetition or simple reproduction. Thus, a
tutional consultants and institutional changes can bring to consciousness thcse contra-
dictions and remedy them. ~ ~ gesture that is repeatedly carried out creates other sense-structures than in its first exc-
cution. The gesture isolates an object or event from an everyday context and generates
7. The same is trrn;, hy analogy, of man· s constructive, educational and socialising
a perspective for its reception that is different from the perspective in which the ante-
influence. These also take place more often through mimetic processes than is com-
rior world is perceived. Isolation and change of perspective are the traits of aesthetic
monly_ supposed. Moreover, here too, there is a discrepancy between the self-image of
processes that connect with the close relationship, which is claimed to have existed
the teacher and the effects of his actual behaviour. Often the unknown and unintended
between mimesis and aesthetics since Plato. Mimetic reinterpretation is a new percep-
effects - for example, the efiects mediated by the personality of teachers and educators
tion. a 'seeing as' (Wittgenstein). The mimetic act involves the intention to manifest a
- have a lasting influence on children and the youth. Especially the manner in which
symbolically created world so that it may be perceived as a concrete world.
the individual teachers feel, think and judge is mimetically processed. Adaptation and
rejection play a role that is different in each case and whose consequences can scarcely
be calculated. The difficulty of estimating the effects of educational behaviour results
also from the fact that the same behaviour of a teacher or educator in different phases
of the individual's life may he assessed differently.
8. 1n Walter Benjamin's memory-images, we noted how important thc mimetic ac-
quisition of places, rooms and objects is for childhood development. From early child-
hood onward, the child continues to have a mimetic relationship to the world around,
which it experiences as animated. In this adaptation and rapprochement the child ex-
!ends itself into the world and absorbs it into its own inner, imaginary world, educating
itself m the process. Since this is always a matter of a historically and culturally de-
termined world, whose objects are symholically coded and have thus fixed meanings,
the enculturation of the child or youth also takes place in these mimetic processes.
9. Objects and institutions, imaginary figures and practical actions are embedded in
social relations of power that are mediated through adaptation and rapprochement.
· They are experienced in mimetic processes, but they are not understood. In order to
comprehend a mimetic experience, analysis and reflection is required. Often only
thereafter can one arrive at appropriate appraisals and judgements. Mimetic processes

91.
QO
 6

The Mimetic Production of Gestures and Rituals

lV!imctic processes play an important role in education and socialisation as well as in

constituting community life and the social in general. This can be shown with refer-
ence to the creation, maintaining and modification of gestures and rituals, which are of
greater significance for the cohesion of modern societies than is often expected.
Nowadays, social and educational conditions arc so complex and difficult to under-
stand that some people deplore the frightening complexity of the situation. The tradi-
tional support for orientation has disintegrated, both in the field of 'Wcltanscl1auun-
gen', in which the 'great stories" (Lyotard) have lost their integrating power, as well as
in the 'Lebenswelt' of the individual, in which he has to lead his 'own life' (Beck). Yet
in spite of this. neither societit:s nor individuals can do without some kind of orienta-
tion and order. Social practices are needed, especially in economically, culturally and
ethnically mixed societies, in which the variety of the social world and of individual
self concepts czm be expressed and represented. For this purpose, appropriate misc en
scene, styles, emblems, fashions and symbols are required. But what kind of social ac-
tions and social representations create social order and social structure':! To a large ex-
tent, social actions create forms of expression am] ways or structuring the social. Daily
actions based on routines and customs play an important role in the production of so-
cial representation and social urdt:r. The fact thnt people ::ire often not aware of the im-
portance of routines .ind customs for social relations makes them even more effective.
This lack of awareness favours the incorporation of social customs and societal struc-
tures since a 'hidden' knowledge develops, which tells people bow social rcl;itions
work. This intuitive, practical knowledge is not questioned and does not have lo be
legitimised: that which has always been done looks as if it were natural and does not
need lo be subject to or founded on arguments.
Among these social practices, rituals and gesture:, play an important role. The
question naturally arises as to how the social is produced through gestures and rituals
and whai role rituals and gestures play in educ::ition? The assumption is that mimetic
processes play a central role for the production and performance of gestures and ritu-
als. This is due to the fact that mimesis is related to the mise en scene of body behav-
iour. Already in pre-l'latonic times, the performer of humorous sketches was called
mimos. This underlines yet again how mimesis focuses on human behaviour, on body
language, and certain normative body movements. Rhythm, gestures and rituals are
some of till:: factors which are assimilated through sensual perception and adaptation
within the practical knowledge of the mimecist. One's bodily development. behaviour

93
and rcsponst:s arc comprehended and remembered as images, tones and sequences of
movement. They become part of one's internal library of images, sounds and move-
ments. which can be used in life when newly combined by the active transformations
of im~s:ination. Through this mimetic processing. it is possible to extend or disguise
previm:sly experienced ambiguous or contradictory actions c1nd behaviour. Mimesis is
thus conceived as the ability to assimilate and incorporate, to present and arrange ges-
tun.::; and rituals in a new social context.
Mimetic behaviour appears within social institutions such as families, schools and
businesses, whose social power structures determine to a great extent its possibilities
and limits. Nevertheless. social norms and institutional values are maintained, altered
and further conveved with their aid, as these institutions ensure continuity, change am!
forthcr dcvelopm~nt. Mimesis leads to the acquisition of practical knowledge. Habitual
knowledge, stemming from early actions, can develop over longer periods of t_ime as
the result of experience, and operate as a future point of departure for further ;ict10ns. It
cannot be sufficiently understood logically and conceptually, for practical knowledge
is not analytical or re.gimented knowledge but a knowledge of action.
Attempts to understand social practices unamhiguously have faltered due _to the
tact that social interchanges are often opcn-cmlcd and vague; their interpretation IS,
however. aenerallv ascribed a looic and claritv which are not actually present at the
moment of intercl;anee. and which are, in fact: not needed. Social actions are usually
oriented in the field ~f bodily processes, occupying a symbolically organised field of
meaninf!, without them being made less ambiguous. With the help of social mimesis an
unambiguous practical body knowledge is acquired, from which a great part of our so-
cial lives is developed. Social mimesis is multi-faceted, contradictory, and thcory-
resi,tant. Directions for life arc not onlv learnt thmu!:'h the mimesis of living examples
am! rituals and ritual formation. Thcv ~an also be c;vered through the introduction or
representations which arc generated- by art, literntme and science. Reference points
consist therefore not only in the real, but also in imaginary social actions, representa-
tions and pictures.
Gestures
Ccsturcs c:m be understood as hody movement. belonging to a person's most impor-
tant Corms of expression and representation. Since human bodies are always histor!·
cal ly and culturally shaped. their gestures too have to be read just as much 111 their
historical and cultural context. 1 The attempt to understand gestures as universal lan-
guages of the body has failed. Historical and ethnological studies show how ~ifferently
gesture:; arc interpreted in different cultures. The more iconic the character of a gesture
is, the more it is understood by people in a variety of cultures. The more symbolic the
character is, the more its understanding requires a particular cultural background.
Gestures are significant movements of the body, which are directed by an inten-
tion. Their forms of expression and representation cannot, however, he reduced to th.eir
underlying intention. The difforence between gestures as expression and representation
I Bremmer/Roodenburg 1992.
94
of body, and the semantic meaning or gestures cannot be made to disappear. In the
figuration of gestures, there is a meaning which transcends their language based inter-
pretation and which can only be understood by a mimetic process, in which the gesture
is internally or externally performed.
Gestures play an important role in verbal communication and social interaction.
They communicate something, which is impo11ant in social psychology and ethnology.
Hall. for example. has done interesting research on proxemics, which shows how the
individual develops symbolic space with his body in a way that corresponds to )10w he
deals with distance. 2 In the context of kinesics research on bodv movement Bird-
whistell has analysed codes of non-verbal communication. 3 Morri; has cxarni~ed the
distribution of gestures in Europe; he has analysed the way gestures are produced and
the context they arc used in, discovering ,imilarities and differences.'r Calbris has de-
veloped a semiotic of gestures. which includes detailed ir:iformation on the use of ges-
tures in different areas of life in different parts of France.) As far as J know there is, as
yet. no comprehensive study on educational gestures, on their specific character, their
role in the educational process, their relation lo teacher behaviour and to different edu-
cational institutions.
The language of gesture, however, is older than the spoken or written language.
From a historical point of view there is no doubt gestures contributed considerably to
the creation of spoken language. Even today gestures help us to articulate emotions.
thoughts and sentences. They help us to understand the meaning of the spoken J;in-
guage and of social behaviour and arc essential elements in human communication.
Since they are a means of body expression and presentation, they are often uncon-
scious and therefore much less controlled than spoken language.
In contrast to mimic expn:ssions of the body. gestures can be learnt and sh;ipcd
through practice. Whereas in mimics it is hardly possible to separate expression from
emotion, or form from content, gestures are based exactly on the differences between
these aspects. Thus, gestures can be shaped intentionally. Perfect gestures express a
high degree of 'artificial naturalness· and suggest the interrelationship of emotional
content and body expression.
Gestures are also essential for the performance and arrangement of rituals. In relig-
ious. political and educational rituals, where the aspect of representation is imporiant.
the mi.1·c-en-scene 3nd the atTangement or adequate gestures are or centr::il import3ncc.
Since gestmes are forms of body-focused expression. the social subject can come
to know himself by the under:;tanding of his own gestures. Insofar as a· social subject
can perceive himself in gestures from inside and outside, he experiences himself in ·this
incorporation of interior and external. In the use of gestures in social situations, corpo-
ral being can be transfctTed in the active mode of having one's body. In a mimetic re-
lationship to his gestures the social subject experiences himself in these presentations.
In mimics and gestures the social subject expresses himself and experiences the reac-
tions of others to these forms of expression. The iconic and corporal language of ges-
tures is the result or a historical and cultural process; this language shapes the individ-
2 llall!Y59.
3 Birdwhistell 1954; 1970.
4 MorrisetaL 1979.
5 Calbris 1990.
95
uaL who at \he same time continuously modifies the language. With the mimetic ac-
quisition of gestures the social subject participates in corporal and iconic traditions,
which he can creatively apply in new social situations. A corporal figuration is ex-
pressed in gestures whilst in the performance of gestures, an internal relation to oneself
and a mediated relation to the world comes into existence. In the corporal character of
a gesture the emotional and the corporal side can hardly be distinguished.
Gestures play an important role in the process of civilisation and human self-do-
mestication. Most social institutions develop specific sets of gestures. The demands
social institutions make on the usi:: of specific gestures in an institutional context forces
an individual to behave in particular ways. To take a very characteristic historical ex-
ample. we could look at gestures in the world of monasteries. 6 Here, the novice had to
unlearn the daily gestures from his secular life and repbce them by a newly acquired
set or gestures, which qualified him for his new tasks and his new way of life. By ac-
quiring these specific gestures the novice turns into a monk. ln this transformation
proc.;css he changes important parts of his character and turns into a new person. The
performance of new gestures is not a superficial change. Since these new gestures ex-
press the iucorporatio11 of new values, attitudes and feelings, they can be understood as
signs of profound changes. By learning a new _['csture language, the individual is made.;
ready for a new life.
Processes of similar importance take place when a young child enters school and
turns into a pupil. By acquiring gesture and ritual competence the child fulfils the insti-
tutional expectations of the school. By doing so the child comes to know whnt certain
gestures mean and how it is supposed to react to them. ln the course of these processes
the child c1cquires the practical knowkclgc of how to behave in the institution. By
doing so, it becomes an accepted member of the institution. The child becomes aware
of the institutional hierarchy and power structure and learns how to cope with these.
(3esturc is one way in which institutions an: able to express their social power - in
this casc, by making people perform institutionally acceptable gesturcs. Where people
fuil to live up to institutional expectations. this is seen as a criticism of the institution
by the representatives of that institution and often results in sanctions being taken.
Therefore, the acquirement of gesture and ritual competence and of practical gesture
and ritual knowledge is an important educational goal to help young people to cope
with institutions successfully.
The menning of gestures, however, does not only change in relation to space nnd
time. There are nlso di!Tcrcnces rclaku to grnuer mid socinl class, age and cultural
b:ickground. Indeed, gender differences are created in part through the use of different
sets of gestures. According to some studies there are differences in the wav women
traditio;nlly sit. which spa~c they occupy, how they :mange their legs etc. Si;nilar dif-
ferences have been discovered in relation to the way women speak, eat, drink. and so
on. These findings lrnve however been suhject to differing interpretations.
The central point is that gestures express the central values of a society and provide
knowledge of mental strnctures. They accompany the spoken Jan_['uage but also have
an 'indcrcndcnt lirc'. Their meaning is often multidimensional. Sometimes they com-
plement the spoken word by focusing on single aspects, by relativising the spoken
6 Schmitt 1990.
96
word or contradicting it. A person's gestures ollen relate more closely to his feelings
than language does. Where language is consciously controlled, gestures are often co~-
sidered a more reliable expression of feelings.
But to read and to decode gestures they have to be perceived mimetically. Whoever
perceives a gesture, understands it by recreating it internally in imagination and so
grasping its specific corporal expression and representation. Although gestures are
m~aningfol and c_an be ana)ysed as such, it is only mimetic reproduction which permits
a full understand mg of th err sensual, emotional and symbolic content. This is also true
of the misc en s~enc of gestures. Mimetic reproduction helps to assimilate the specific
corporal exp:essrnn_ ot an other ~erson and it is the mimetic recreation of his gestures
that allows hrs specific corporeality to be perceived. In the mimesis of another person's
gestures, an encounter with the corporal world of the other person's expression and
presentation takes place and with it, the sensual experience of the other becomes pos-
sible. Coming to know another person's world of expression and presentation is often
cxperienced as enriching and pleasurable, since it proviues the individual with the ex-
perience of the outside world. The mimetic process is thus a way of enlarging the in-
dividual's_wor_ld, leading to wide-ranging experiences outside his own interiority.
In s_oc1al situatwns, gestures help to communicate menning. They express feelings
and articulate sentunents. 1 hey are corporal-symbolic presentntions and, when per-
ceived, produce unconscious effects. It is precisely this unconscious character of their
effects, which makes them so dficient.
Rituals
Soci~l rituals. are_ made possibk by mimetic action and behaviour. One important rea-
son !or this Iles m the except10nal nature of the social performances, in which social
exchnnges arc staged and performed. At the same time, rituals and ritualisation arc
mimetic vers_ions of previous ~nactments. Those employed in the ritual process have
the opportumty to alter these ntua]s according to their own social context. A relation-
ship to social history is established on such occasions of change; the opportunity exists
to modify crentively some of these relationships and simultaneously to provide for the
incorporation of future mou_ifications._ Rituals may be thought of as 'winuows' through
which onc_ cai: observe social dynamics, but ulso as windows which enable people to
create, mamtam and alter their cultural environment.
Rituals and ritualisation can be examined in terms of religion, mythology and cul-
ture (Mnx Mueller, Herbert Spencer, James Frnzer, Rudolf Otto) and with regard to the
funct_ional context of the social strncture (Fustel de. Coulangcs, Emile Durkheim). Jn
addn10n to these, they can also be read as kxts: think, for instance, of the significance
of rituals for cultural symbol-making and social communication (Victor Turner, Clif~
ford Geertz, Marshal Sahlins). The following discussions on the operation of mimesis
and ritual belong within this context.
Y ct first, however, we need to clarify the differences between various forms of
rituals. What is important here is the difference between rituals that mark distinctive
life stages, and t_hose which are de~ermined by the calendar. To the former belong 1ire·
stages such as birth, puberty, mamage, divorce and death, including the rituals occur-
97
ring in the over-determined symbolic actions at times of increased status, for example, and the creation of ~n inter1:1ediary state of emptiness, through which the person pre-
at the end of school attendance, studies, or a promotion to a higher position. This type pares for a new social 1dcnMy. _In Wester~ cultures, similar intermediary rites of pas-
of ritual is restricted to individual, family and smaller groups. In the past, rituals used scige take place such as umvers1ty graduat10n, although their expression and intensitv
to be fixed. There was little leew;iy for interpretation. Nowadays, in contrast, when are reduced. The. examination situation - upon which these relv, , C"n " "or
,, ms · tance t1e 111-·'
customs arc handed down, it largely falls to the individual to decide to what extent he tcrpretcd _as a kmd of humiliation of the pupil. This is rewarded by the new status of
wants to, or can, alter or reinvent the ritual. In any case, the individual components are 'non-pupil' ?r 'non-student'. The intensity and the aims involved differentiate the
still restrictive in the way they function despite an enlargement of the possibilities for characters of _these rites. The question is therefore, how can we adequately examine the
interpretation. Such restriction is apparent in the great personal effort it takes in order concepts of ntuaL rites and ritualised behaviour. ·
to avoid certain ritual and ritualised actions. . On, first imprcssio_n it _app_ears that ritt_rnls are used as a form of social practice
Calendar rituals function in the same way, except that they arc carried out by larger which 1s a strategy of socrnl mtcraction differentiated from other social interactions
groups of individuals. These ritmls demand a large degree of comprehension of social through a stream of particular characteristics. Many of these characteristics me con-
mimesis, but even so, the possibilities for individual decision-making in the field of text-dependent and can only be generalised ,vithin set boundaries. It hardlv seems
ritualistic action is greater than it used to be. Having said this families with smal I chil- possible to grasp the comp_lcxity of these rituals, something which has alway; pushed
dren will find that it is not always easy to celebrate Christmas in a radically different the researcher~ to their hm1ts. In the context of sacred rituals, these can be understood
way: traditional social forms demand that family and individuals submit to, and act as ac~10ns ,vhic)i are n:qrnrcd, however, in order to develop their sacred and social
with tradition, from year to year, and from generation to generation. mearnn?. Behet, attitudes, symbols, and myths can exist without ritual, but without
In such situations, it is .ipparent how the mimicry of social forms makes use of all these, ntual cannot exist. Nevertheless it is prim;:iri]y actions in which somethino is
available individual mimetic deviations and arrangements. The 'elbow room' tlrns portrayed and expressed, and in which it pays to create parallel collective ideas ofbe-
created makes possible, at least. the individual appropriation of ritual. If there were no lief: whi~h can_ be experienced and_ confirmed through validation. Representations of
changes and marked personal differences from various cultures and historical periods, social hie provide the mdividual with the possibility to participate in ritual. T o h
then one might assume that actions were simply copied or simulated, rather than being . . .I I d h 1· . o~et er,
md1v1c ua s pro ucc t c re 1g10us and social continuity and traditions, on which ;Itera-
mimetically interpreted. This, however, would not be mimetic behaviour, and therefore tions and historical changes encroach.
would not have the social results one can expect from such behaviour. The reaffirma- In the symbolism of a ritual,_ the experienced world and the imaginary world con-
tion of the ritual by the 'performing' group exists through a mimetic relationship to verge and appcm as a smglc environment. This allows the ritual fo act both as a model
collective cultural tradition. This is what produces the effect of cohesion which. in the taken from the world and applied to the world. On one hand, the ritual refers to the so-
end. has an effect on the future of the communitv. cial and psychological_ reality, wl11~h itself refers back to the ritual. Jn this way social
Van Gennep goes a step further in underst~nding the functions and structures of and psychologtc~l reality ts given tom1 and meaning. Rituals act as the embodi~cnt of
ritual in his thoughts on the rites of passage (rites de passage). 7 He defines them as h_eli_cf attitudes, ideas and myths: through expression and portrayal, they are the matc-
rites, which accompany place, condition, position or shifts from one life stage to the nahsat1on and rea!Jsat10n and bndge the dichotomy between action and thought. Ritu-
other. These foll into thn;e phases, namely that of separation, threshold. and incorpora- als arc over-determmed symbolic actions which in themselves can be interp;ctcd het-
tion. During the first phase, individuals or groups release themselves from an earlier erogeneously and in a multiplicity ofwavs.
social strncture or from a series of cultural conditions. In the second phase, the inter- Rituals provide the m~ans for the c;:pression of social power structures and thev
mediary, transitional, and threshold phase push one into an ambivalent situation in frequentlv
. . , act as wavs · ,o1 maintaining
. - and confirming existino
· "' "soci·a1
, "rt.i uc tures. A-s
which neither the past nor the anticipated foture situation can be presented. 1n the third Levi-Strauss and Bourd1cu have, pomted out ' power structures' bo 1·,,c the oppeaiancc
" . 1·
• < , V 0
phase, the new connections and the period of transition are completed. c:xpressmg a n~tural order but m fact conceal the conflict between culture and nature
The threshold phase is particularly pertinent when considering rituals of intermedi- a conflict contmually reappearing in the medium of ritua!. 8 According to Bourdieu,
ary life stages and the processes of social mimesis. Insecurity and ambiguity arc typical rituals can contribute . . to social change if thev_ break , throuoli
" the 'n"tti-ral'
" , · taxonom1c ·,
characteristics of the period of transition between a lower to a higher life stage. I-Jenee, order. and can ate! m the development of a new 'cultural' order. Thev nc era!], _
· - 1 · . _ ,-, n , \ con
for example, during the rites of puberty in tribal societies, there is a demand for un- tnbutc to a. success 1u assoc1at10n with 01Jposing -· _ orderino S"stcins
" -', sticli a- t ·
s na ure, cu -l
usual conduct. Humility, silence, the renunciation of food and drink, tortures to the ture or social systems.
body, and humiliation are exercised as a means of submitting to the authority of the . Victor Turner has also repeatedly pointed out the innov:itive character of ritual.
greater society. Diverse forms of humiliation are conceived as a preparation for the which has been so frequently overlooked. 9 As an attempt to strengthen and establish
bter increase in status. One could actually speak of an educational theory of _the cultural order one has to address the disorder-elements- wh'ich res. 1·ct
,, ord,ermg.
· T umer
threshold state. Central to this st.ate is the destruction of the person's previous identity,
8 Bourdieu 1972: 1997,
7 Van Gennep 1961. 9 Turner 1969,

98.
QQ.
describes these dimensions by using the terms 'liminality', 'anti-structure' and 'com-
munitas '. These terms describe dimensions creating an essential supplement to the
result of ritualisation - the hierarchical and consolidated social strncture. Liminal or
anti-structural communitv indicates an 'unstructured or rudimentary structured and
relatively undifferentiated living community'. Thus social life can be understood as a
dialectic process between differentiation and homogeneity, between imbalance and
balance, between the past and the here and now. In this respect rituals serve to generate
liminal situations in the transition from one point of social strncture to another. Due to
this process. rituals play an essential part in determining the ri.:lationships of social
structure; existing social identity is disintegrated, and prcparntions are made for the
future identity.
With the attempt to make the invisible visible, the ambivalent character of ritual
corresponds to the respective preservation and alteration of social strnctures. They can
contribute as much to the reinforcing of power strnctures as they can to their alteration.
They require the maintenance of traditional forms, but they also provide the opportu-
nity to develop variations. Resistance rituals in particular arc where we find ways of
fashioning and expanding new fonns. In times of political hostilities, for example, or
generation gap struggles, rituals with no previous existence are invented and applied.
Their effect lies in their innovative character, where the innovations bind society to-
gether, just as traditional rituals do. Such innovative rituals mark a demarcation line
between themselves and other societies and groups and allow a sense of community, its
aims am! lifestyle, to be created. The social effect lies in using the same rituals to em-
body a range of differences in mrnning and feeling and thus to permit members of the
society both homoucneity and difference.
Rituals have n;uch i~ common with other cultural representations as cultural pcr-
fonnances, such as for example, sports events or theatre productions. Like these, they
embodv symbolic contents in 'traditional' form and behaviour at.set times and in fixed
places: with a beginning, a definite duration and an end. They portray the symbolic
contents for the 'actors' and their observers. Rituals organise and convey cultural con-
tent through particular actions and behaviour, and connect these actions with thoughts
which plan, modify and interpret the rituals.
Social situations and 'social dramas' arc frequently portrayed in ritual action and
thus articulate the most important values in a culture, values which arc often so poorly
understood bv its members. Throm:h ritual. thosi.: values become visible and tangible.
It matters little whether the values -arc considered to be of great worth or not. The de-
cisive fact is whether the members of the soci8.I ritual pcr-formance contribute to the
ritual and its articulation. Both the participants in the ritual perfom1ancc and the non-
active audience make a sense of connection to one another possible, generating both
sensations and feelings. The effective performance relics on the phenomena of collect-
ive experiences of emotion rnther than isolated ones, with the concomitant feeling of
the generation of a sense of community. Collectively accepted actions and forms of
conduct are developed in ritual. These show how one can act communally, and they
achieve effect throuuh mimetic means when the individuals somewhat distance them-
selves from their o~ behaviour. They are social actions, controlled by symbolic inter-
pretations. They demonstrate, and are therefore irreducible. Rituals have the ability to
make something visible, to reveal something, to dramatise and to allow the audience to
100
take part in the performance. They possess a particular ability to enahlc a mediation of
intensive emotions.
On the one hand, although rituals arc productions created with dramatic ekrm:nts.
there have been attempts to make clear to actors nowadays, that these rituals are shown
in order lo create an effect on the audience, and not necessarily on the actors them-
selves. On the other hand. there are cases where those creating the action are them-
selves the subjects addressed by the ritual. This does not mean however that those not
directly involved in the performance of the ritual have no role to play in its effect. In
many tribal societies, however, this type of distinctive feature has its limits: rather than
addressing those creating the ritual, it is the ancestors, gods, nature and the cosmos
who are being addressed.
Despite these_ differences, it makes sense to speak of a list of analogous traits pos-
sessed by both ntuals mid drama and sec ritual and drama as two forms or 'cultural
performance·, possessing the same basic framework. The clements which mark their
shared form arc, for example, their temporal nature, their collective manner of experi-
ence, the publtc access to them. and their power to alter not only the way people under-
stand them, but also to alter themselves. ln both forms of production, those pai1icipat-
ing become caught up in a type of self-oblivion which knows no past and no future.
For those involved in ritual action, the focus is on the here and now, thereby gencratinl'.
both great intensity of experience and pleasure in a kind of inner flow. ~ ~
Thi_s !low induces_ feelings of strong presence and inner satisfaction. Mihaly Csik-
szcntmihaly1 has studied these more closely, examining the character of self determi-
nation. and developed the concept of 'flow cxpcricncc'. 10 This 'flowing' of thi.: inner
feelings of those particip;iting in the ritual is of central import,mcc in th: arrarn:iemcnt
and continuity nr the scenic organisation since it helps create a sense of satisfaction
and a feeling of belonging. This is where the mimetic abilities of members ol socictv
arc essent_ial: they m:ikc the adjustment of the participators with 0ne another possibl~
and thcrclore create tlus common or socially founded '!low experirnce'. This tendencv
to create sucial similarities occurs through a sensual-bodily-mimetic 'infceti 0 n' an~I
can. in some_ cases lead to a. suspension of individual control and responsibility. Mi-
metic behav10ur becomes r:11m1cry: the potential for community grounding ritual can
then change however. and simply become a drive to conformitv in the individual
Bernusc rituals consist of coded acts ·which one can al~o understand as ·scenic
metJph_orieal portra?•ab, ll~cy can be read in the same way ::is a text. This view, sup-
ported m Ben1amm s read mg of the future cif texts, is rather a later form of 'readirni'
the world. Sense and meaning gener:ncd through the scenic porlraval of similariti~s
and corresponding elements arc produced mimetically in the und~rstanding of th~
world, and in the reading of rituals. Even in cases of ·what Ben_ic1min refers to ~1 s 'non-
scnsual similarities', the reading o t' rituals can generate order, sense and meaning_
There :ire further points to consider when viewing rituals as being 'read'. Firstlv.
rituals arc overly determined structures of meaning in which every scene. each scenic
element. each symbol and every gesture only becomes understandable in the context of
the entire ritual. This ritu;il arr:\!1gement is designed like a text, whose individual parts
only achieve their full meaning through the full textual arrangement. The reading can
JO Csikszcntniihalyi 1985.

occur through the ritual action, the spectators or other factors. There exists therefor~ a
structural parallel between the textually organised ritual and its !nterpreted readi~g
from scientists and spectators. The reading is mimetic. Through this process of social
adaptation during the ritual's scenic portrayal, the ritual becomes absorbed ~y t~e
viewer who relives it and its meaning. An understanding of meaning generated m this
manner becomes fused with the existing premises of the mimetically acting spe~tators
and interpreters. Thus, one sees rituals as initially producing mimetic processes m par-
ticipators and audience, which then create the various impressio~s afterw~rds.
Just like other forms of social exchange, rituals possess bodily, scenic, expressive,
spontaneous, and symbolic facets; they are regular and routine, non-instrum~ntal a~d
efficient. Ambiguous; they generally combine the variable with the contrad_1ctory m
their.scenic portrayal. On one hand, they repeat scenic arrangements, and with them,
traditional orders and structures with their particular power strnctures. On the other
hand, they create new, spontaneous and innovative energy. Some examples would be
resistance rituc1ls;youth sub-cultures, and life-style rituals.
Rituals and the process of ritualisation can thus be understood as social
'producers', as an essential element in society. Repetition routine, scenic arrangei:nents,
symbolic character and expression - these become the founding elements of social ac-
tiori, cultures of performance and community.
102
7
Imagination and the Mimesis of Images
.
Mimetic processes apply to the outer world, be it objects, other people, social situ-
ations, or works of art, literature and music. The imagination helps them to produce,
reproduce and change the different types of images. In diverse mimetic processes im-
ages develop into educational processes. The German word bilden means to develop,
. to form, to shape, as well as to educate. Thus, Bi/dung - education - is connected to
the idea of forming. To educate is to shape according to a mental picture or image -
the German word for picture, 'das Bild', would confirm this association. For a long
time, despite its relevance, educational science largely ignori:d the significance of im-
ages. With the 'iconic tum' however, this appears to have changed. 'What is an im~
age?' has at last become a fascinating question in cultural studies, and has also more
recently become a focus for research in educational science. What do the mental pic-
tures one has of childhood contain? What preconceived images do we have of the gap
between generations, of school or of the organisation oflearning? For a long time, the
connectil;ll between sight and the creation of images and inner pictures aroused little
interest. Moreover, the relation between phylogenetic and ontological images, between
collective and individual pictures or their sequence and strncture was largely ignored.
The question connects vision with image ;ind fantasy, body with culture and history.
How does an individual's imagination, his 'inner world of pictures', relate to a cultural
picture-world or collective imagination? These questions point to the historical and
cultural, ed].lcational and anthropological foundations of-upbringing and education and
thus open the way to a whole new field of investigation in education.
Imagination and the Power of Picturing
Imagination is certainly one of the most mysterious of human faculties. 1t permeates all
levels of life, manifests itself in many different ways, yet, tangible only in its concrete
manifestations, seems to defy clear definition. Imagination refers to the ability to pic-
ture objects in one's mind, even when the objects themselves are not there, in other
words to the faculty of inner vision. Imagination is first referred to as a concept in
Plato's Politeia. In book ten of The Republic, painting is defined as the imitation of 'an
appearance as it appears' 1• According to Aristotle, 'phantasia lies in our own power
[when we] call up a picture, as in the practii.:c of mnemonics by the use of mental im-
I pros to phainnmenon, os phainelai.
103

ages'. Fantasy is 'that in virtue of which an image (phantasma) arises for us'.2 The
Romans replaced the concept of 'phantasia' with 'imaginatio'. 'Jmaginatio' refers to
the active power of internalising pictures, of imagining. Fantasy and imagination sig-
nify the human ability to internalise outside images, in other words to transform the
outside world into an inside world, as well as the faculty of creating different origins
and meanings for those internal picture-worlds.
In imagination, inside and outside worlds overlap. Both Maurice Merleau-Ponty
and Jacques Lacan have emphasised the importance of this schismatic structure for
perception and the creation of images. Any concept of sight that assumes a self-identi-
cal object and an 'empty' seeing subject must rail. There is always already something
in seeing, 'something to which we could not be closer than by palpating it with our
look; things we could not dream of seeing "all naked" because the gaze itself envelops
them, clothes them with its own flesh ( ... ) the look ( ... ) envelops, palpates, espouses
the visible things. As though it were in relation of pre-established harmony with them,
as though it know them before knowing them, it moves in its own way with its abrupt
and imperious style, and yet the views taken are not desultory - I do not look at chaos,
but"at things - so that finally one cannot say if its is the look or if it is the things that
command'3• Not only in sight is there an overlap between our sense perception and the
outside object that our sense perceives, but also in touch and hearing and above all in
smell and taste.
Thus, human vision is not unconditional. On the one hand, we see an anthropo-
morphous world on the basis of the physiological conditions in our head. On the other
hand; our vision is determined by historical, anthropological and cultural factors. Thus,
for example, the invention and spread of writing has affected our sight to the extent
that we really no longer see in the same way as in oral culture. Similarly, our percep-
tion is affected by the new electronic era and the processes of acceleration associated
with it. As research in Gestalt psychology has shown, imagination plays a part in the
simplest of perception such as for instance complementary vision. The same can be
said for a person's cultural frame of reference, which attributes meaning to the things
he sees. All seeing is both made possible and limited by history and culture. It is there-
fore changeable, contingent and open to the future.
For Lacan, sight is rooted in imagination. He attributes imagination to a pre-lin-
guistic physical state, in which the individual is not yet aware of his own insufficien-
cies and limitations. According to this view, imagination is rooted in the early stages of
an individual's life, when at first the infant has such a strong sense of identification
that it does not yet perceive the mother as 'different' from itself. The infant is fasci-
nated by the physical wholeness of its mother's body, which it perceives as a mirror of
its own sense of completion and power. Yet, this very experience of its mother's per-
fection soon·Jeads the infant to become aware ofits own incompletion and dependency
on others. There too, in the experience of incompletion and finality, lie the origins of
the sexual subject. For Lacan, the imaginary, with its world of pictures, pre-orders the
symbolic world oflanguage. Picking up on this view Cornelius Castoriadis defines the
relation between the two realms as follows: 'The imaginary has to use the symbolic not
2 Aristotle, De anima Ill, 3.
3 Merleau-Ponty 1968, pp.131-133.
104
only to "express" itself (this is self-evident), but to "exist", to pass from the virtual to .
anything more than this. The most elaborate delirium, just as the vaguest and most se-
cret phantasy, is composeq of "images", but these "images" are there to represent
something else and so have a symbolic function. But, conversely, symbolism too
presupposes an imaginary capacity. For it presupposes the capacity to see in a thing
what it is not, to see it other than it is. However, to the extent that the imaginary ulti-
mately stems from the original faculty of positing or presenting oneself with things and
relations that do not exist, in the form of representation (things and relations that are
not or have never been given in perception), we shall speak of a final or radical imagi-
nary as the common root of the actual imaginary and of the symbolic. This is, finally,
the elementary and irreducible capacity of evoking images. ' 4 .
Despite major differences in his argument, Arnold Gehlen's attempt to locate
imagination points in a similar direction: 'we ( ... ) find the concept of the "primal
imagination" ( ... ) manifested in the detritus of our dreams, or in the periods of concen-
trated vegetative processes, in childhood, or in the contact between the sexes; in other
words, wherever. the forces of developing life announce themselves. There are, amid
ever-changing images, certain primal visions or images of the overall purpose of life,
which senses within itself a tendency toward a higher form, a greater intensity of cur-
rent, so to speak. An immediate vital ideality exists, a tendency in the substantia
vegetans toward a higher quality or quantity (whereby it should be noted that the right
to make this distinction remains questionable).' 5 Gehlen interprets fantasy as the pro-
jection of surplus drive. Yet might not fantasy pre-exist the surplus drive in order for
the 'life drive to find satisfaction in its images' 6? In any case Gehlen clearly links
imagination to human incompletion, residual instinct and the gap between stimulation
and reaction. It is therefore connected to human need, drive motion and desire for satisc
faction, though not solely. Human flexibility and openness~to-the-world confirm the
need for cultural shaping. Imagination's part in this process is so central that one might
justifiably refer to man as a 'being of imagination (Phantasiewesen) as well as a being
of reason (Vernu,iftwesen)' 7• .
Despite differences in their points of view and .arguments, Gehlen and Castoriadis
agree that the imaginary is a collective faculty through which society and culture, as
well as individuality, are revealed. Developing Merleau-Ponty's later work on the
schism between human body and perception, Jacques Lacan went on to show the ex-
tent to which the imaginary influences the everyday perception of any social subject.
Magic - Representation - Simulation
Pictures and images are always ambiguous. The su~picion that they originated long be-
fore the development of consciousness, out of fear ofdeath or fear of having to .die, is
perhaps not too wide of the mark. Dietmar Kamper suggests that the.pu_rpose ofimages
is to cover up the wound at the root of human existence. Yet this goalis unattainable:
4 Castoriadis 1987, p. 127.
5 Gehlen 1988, p. 316.
6 FIUgge 1963. p. 93 (trans. A. Lagaay).
7 Gehlen 1988, p. 309.
:cs
every attcmpt to com;cul a memory is at the same time a reminder. Thus, all mental
pictures are in essence 'sexual', even though their motive may he deeply religious.
With Roland Barthes, we may call images 'death of the subject'. Through fear, pictur-
ing plays a central part in distraction from human desire. 'It stands for original sin. At
first, imagining serves to reassure the individual that regardless of uncertainties, its
mother's voice will always be there. It accompanies us from the sacred to the banal.
For indeed, reproduction is an important step in the overcoming of fear. The original
image is supposed to get lost in imagining ... but it remains. ' 8
From the point of view of cultural science, there arc three di ffcrent kinds of image:
image as magical presence,
image as mimetic representation,
image as technical simulation.
There arc of course many overlaps between these different kinds of image, yet still.
distinguishing them enables the identification of different sometimes contradictory
iconic cliaractcristics. Magical, cult, and sacred images date back to an em when im-
ages had not yet become works of art. Hans Belting considers these in his book Like-
ness and Presence: A History of the Image Before the Era of Art. 9 However, he deals
exclusively with presentational cult pictures since the end of the Antique age. Images
that impart magical presence to thc gods we call divine figures or icons. These can be
found for instance in archaic cultures. Early depictions of fertility goddesses engraved
in clay or stone belong to this kind. In his highly acclaimed book, The Anthropological
Strnctzire of the Imaginary, Gilbert Durand designs a cosmos of images, many of
which arc 'magical'. 10 He distinguishes an 'order of day' and an 'order of night', dedi-
cating a section of the book to each category. The third section deals with images that
stem from what he calls 'transcendental fantasy'. Durand's attempt to characterise and
structure collective pictorial imagination highlights thc fluidity of transitions from im-
ages as presence to images as representations. Philippe Seringe's study of symbols in
art, religion and every day life points in a similar direction. 11 The distinction between
presence and representation is blurred. Seringe provides a brief inte11Jretation of ani-
mals pictured in imagination. From images of farm yard and domestic animals (such as
bulls, cows, horses, donkeys, lamb, ram, goats, cats, dogs, rabbits) to other land ani-
mals (elephants, camels, etc.), the realm of the imaginary extends to birds and fish as
well as plants (the Tree of Life, palm trees, cedar trees, oak; llowcrs. ros<.:s, lilies, lotus;
cereal, fruit, etc.). The imaginary also encompasses the cosmos and the elements with
images of fire and light, of smoke, clouds and dew, water, earth, rock, caves and grot-
loc:s, air, sun, etc. Images of constructions (palaces, houses, gardens, gates, sculptures)
as well as more abstract things (names, numbers, spirals, labyrinths) also belong to the
realm of the imaginary, highlighting time and again the 'in between' nature of images.
In illustrating the world. in turning it into pictures, images turn the world into a home
8 Kamper 1997, p. sn (trans, J\, Lagaay).
9 Belting 1994.
10 Durand 1994.
I I Seringe 1985.
106
for humans. For what could be more threatening than a world without images. whi;:rc
any image would be engulfed and destroyed by either darkness or blinding li;ht?
Plato describes images as representations of things that they thems;lv~s are not.
Images show something, express or describe something, relate to something. In Plato's
view, painters an~ P?ets do not_ create, like God. ideas or objects; they merely present
the appearance ot thrngs. Parntrng and poetry are not limited to the artistic presentation
of things, but rather, to the artistic presentation of the appearances of things. Thus it is
not their business to portray ideas or truths, but to represent fantasies, semblances' and
appearances as these appear. This explains why in principle the realm of paintin~ and
mimetic poetry 1s the realm of the already visible. 12 Here we arc speaking of the im-
ages and illusions of creative mimesis, where the difference between the model and its
representation is insignifi~ant. The aim is not to create similarity but to show the sem-
blance of an appearance.'-' For Plato, art and aesthetics constitute a domain, in which
the artist or poet is master. The artist cannot however create being as such, and docs
not share the truth claim to which philosophy is bound, and which lies at the basis of
t~e Republic. Thus, :he _realm of art and aesthetics is attributed a certain independence
from the mterests o1 philosophy, the search for truth and knowledge, and the question
of what is good and beautiful. Consequently however, it is excluded from the Republic
that docs not accept the incalculable natur<.: of art and poetry.
Processes of artistic creation aim at the outward shaping of an internal im:we as
pictured hy the painkr or poet. The model. according to which a created ima~c is
shaped. bemg of a different nature than the <.:rcation, progressively dissolves in the de-
velopment or that image. Throughout the process, changes, omissions, additions and
other such deformations occur, so that in the end. there is only a limited resemblance to
the original idea. The models of an artist's images and drafts are mostlv unknown·
either they have been lost or forgotten, or they never <.:xistcd. At the centre-of'thc artis~
tic process an image emerges which, although related to models and earlier imaucs. is
created through transformation and innovation. -
What is the relation between the model (Vurhild) and its likeness (Abbi/cf)'! Docs
the ~ormcr_crc~le the latter? Ho:v are we to understand the connection? Already in an-
t1qm1y, Ph1dia s celebrated dep1ct1on of Zeus led to speculation about whether there
was a model, and i r so. where'l Since there cannot have been a precedent however th is
image of Zeus must have been new. It must have emerged in the ,vorking of the 1~1ate-
rial, through the artistic process itself. Anyone who sees the statue will recognise the
image, even though there is no earlier model of 'Zeus' that one migl{t know.
Zuckerkandl went so far as to claim that evcrv work of art is 'an image in :carch of a
model, cre,1ted in order to find within the human spirit its model, and thus fulfil its
purpose, that of becoming an image'. 14 The image is not unambiguous; it is more of a
question than an answer. A question put through the work of art. and to which the ob-
server may_answer in m~ny diffe:ent ways. The structure of the work of art conjures up
im3ges, str!ngs of mcan'.ng and mterprctations which 3ll contribute to its complexity.
The 1rnrnel1c terms are displaced: the work of art is no longer seen as the imitation of a
12 Plato, Polireia, 598a.
13 Zimbrich 1984.
14 Zuckerkandl 1958, p. 233 (trans. A. Lagaay).
107
certain model. Rather, there is a certain relationship of representation, of imitation
between the work of art and the observer.
Technical simulation determines the third, new kind of image. There is a growing
tendency today to turn everything into image. Even the most opaque bodies are trans-
formed, lose their non-transparency and spaciousness, become see-through and tran-
sient. Processes of abstraction lead to images and pictures. They arc everywhere;
nothing is more alien and overpowering. Images make 'real things' disappear.
Besides the printing of texts, more so than ever in the history of humankind, are an
incalculable numhcr of images constantly being recorded and distributed. Photographs,
films and videos have become tools, gradually contributing to a common memory of
images. Whereas texts need to be supplemented by the necessary participation of one's
imagination, one's capacity to picture, imagination on the other hand, is now being re-
stricted by the production of 'picture texts'. While the number of people actually pro-
ducing the images is constantly decreasing, ever more people passively consume these
unstimulating ready-made pictures.
Pictures and images constitute a particular kind of abstraction. Their flat two-
dimensional nature is at odds with, indeed eliminates, the multi-dimensional space
around them. The electronic character of television pictures allows for ubiquity and
acceleration: at the speed of light, images can be transmitted simultaneously around the
world. Consequently, the world is miniaturised, experienced explicitly as ~ succession
of images. Pictures and images constitute a new form of product, which can be sub-
jected to market principles. They become marketable products even when the objects
to which they relate are not themselves tradable goods.
Caught in constant exchange with each other, images are mimetically interrelated.
Fragments of images are picked up and put together differently, creating fractal images
that in tum form new wholes. They move and refer to each other at a rate of accelera-
tion that m:ctkes them resemble each other in 'mimesis of speed'. Their two-dimen-
sional plancncss as well as their electronic and miniaturising qualities makes different
images come to resemble each other. A fundamental restructuring of present-day pic-
ture-worlds is thus underway, creating a kind of promiscuity of images.
Images !:,'Tab the observer by the scruff of his neck and immerse him in a whirlpool
of impressions that threaten to drown him. Both fascinating and terrifying, images dis-
solve things and transport you into a world of appearances that you cannot escape. This
leads to an inseparable connection between power and invasion. The world, both po-
litical and social, is al:stheticised. Images look for models to tum into, transforming
through this mimetic process, into new fragmented images, divorced of any frame of
reference. Fascinating, these images lead into an ecstatic game involving simulacra and
simulations: never-ending differentiation parallels an implosion of difference~ unlim-
ited similmity. The images themselves constitute the legacy (McLuhan) in a world of
appearances both fascinating and delightful.
Contaminating like a virus, pictures and images multiply at the speed of light. Ivfi-
metic processes produce ever-new images, creating a world of appearances further and
further removed from 'reality'. As a world of art and poetry, this world of appearances
is not subordinate to the realm of politics. Rather, it tends to rob other 'worlds' of their
reality content, turning them too into worlds of appearance. Life is aestheticised. More
and more images are produced to which no reality outside of them corresponds. This
:08
finally leads to an image-game where everything is possible; political questions are
subordinate. This tendency towards a 'culture society' (Kulturgesellscha/t) is ambiva-
lent: if everything is but a game of images, arbitrariness and non-commitment arc un-
avoidable. The picture-worlds created in this self-relating mimetic process lead in turn
to the aesthcticisation of life. As the realms merge, the distinction between life and art.
imagination and reality seems to dissolve. Life becomes a model for the world of ap-
pearances, which itself becomes a model for life. The visual develops hypcrtrophically:
cvcrvthing turns transparent: space capitulates to image-like surface; as if there were
but the present tense of acl:cil:ratcd images, time is conclensed. Images attract attention
and desire. above and beyond all differences. Yct at the same time, by always referring
to something absent they evade desire. People and things yearn for dissolution in im-
ages ... Desire fires into the emptiness of electronic signs.
Images arc becoming simulacra. Thus, political debates arc often led solely for the
purpose of being transmitted on television. What appears as a political controversy has
actually been carefully geared towards being presented in images. Television pictures
are ::i medium for political debate; this aestheticisation of politics is unavoidable. The
viewer watches the simulation of a political controversy that is set up to appear
authentic. Yet nothing but the simulation itsl:lf is authentic! The viewer's convictions
and expectations arc manipulated: everything is devised in and for a world of appear-
ances. If this succeeds then so does the controversy. Only as simulation can the in-
tended politie::il effect be achieved in television. ln fact, such rn::ikc-believc is often
mure effective than 'real' political discussion.
Simulacra arc on the look out for models, which they themselves create. They have
become trademarks that influence the character of political controversy. It is gradually
becoming impossible to draw a line between reality and simulacrn; the dissolution of
this bound::iry leads to new pcrvasions and overlaps. Mimetic processes circulate mod~
cl:.i. copies and after-images. Images no longer aim to rcscmbk models but to resemble
themselves. The same applies to people: the individual strives to become like !1imself.
a mimetic result that c:rn only be achieved against the background of extensive di ffcr-
cnccs within one same subject. Mimesis becomes the dctnmining power of 1mai'es.
their fractal multiplication in a world of appearances.
The Inner \Vorld of Images
A social subject's inner wodcl of images is defined a) by a culturally conditioned
collective imagination, b) by the unmist::ik:.ible and unique images from his own indi-
vidual history. and c) by the amalgamation. overlap, and mutual transformation of
thcsl: two image worlds. In recent years, l:ducational research in biography has gained
important insights into the role and function of these inner picture-worlds. In what
follows. I propose to distinguish seven types of images in the inner pictme-worlcl:
reg11/ntors of behaviour. orientating i'.110ges. images of desire. of 1vi!/. of memon. mi-
metic images and archetypal images. 10
15 Fliiggc 1963. p.155 (trans. A. Lagaay).
15)9
 connect to failure and success. In remembering, memory images resurrect the past and,
Images as regulators of behaviour
soothe from the inexorability of time.
The question is if, and if so then to what extent are structures or patterns of behaviour
inherited. Undisputed is the gap between stimulation and reaction in humans, yet this
Mimetic images
does not exclude the possibility of influence through inherited images or patterns of
behaviour. In recent years, ethnology has made significant progress in understanding
Real people or imaginary images can serve as models for human behaviour. Plato re-
how trigger-images can affect such elementary human behaviour as eating and drink-
ferred to the fact that as models, images stimulate our own mimetic capacity. Acconl-
ing,-reproduction, and the raising of new generations.
ing to him, humans - especially children and youths - cannot resist the urge to imitate.
Therefore, in terms of a theory of education, Plato's view was that one should con-
sciously exploit images that it would be of value to imitate, and carefully exclude any
Orientating images
which could have a 'bad influence. Aristotle on the other hand believed people ouo-ht
b
to
be able to learn resistance through confrontation with undesirable images. These op-
Through socialisation and upbringing, thousands of images are transmitted to young
posing views have re-emerged over the relevant debate about the effects of violenc(;
people to guide and orientate them and enable them to lead their lives. Many of these
depicted in modern media. 16 ,
images are very clear, catchy, easily reproduced, and therefore socially speaking,
extremely effective. They are public images, shared by many. They connect people,
conferring on them a sense of community, affiliation. and belonging. Globalisation ex-
tends these networks of images far beyond the borderlines of national cultures, creating Archetypal images
trans-national forms of consciousness.
c. G. Jung defines the relevance of archetypal images as follows: 'Every great experi-
ence in life, every profound conflict, evokes the treasured wealth of these images and
brings them to inner perception; as such, they become accessible to consciousness only
Images of desire
in the presence of that degree of self-awareness and power ofundcrst.inding which en-
ables a man also to think what he experiences instead of just living it blindly. In the
Drive-determined fantasies and images of desire tend to be similar in structure, though
latter event he actually lives the myth and the symbol without knowing it.' 17
their concrete expressions often vary. These images are cmcially important for the ad-
Jung's somewhat dubious account for the origins of archetypes and_ 'collective un-
justment of human behaviour and dreams. They often aim at the satisfaction of desire
conscious' ought not prevent .us from recognising the fact that every culture develops
though at the saine time contain the knowledge that wishes cannot all come true.
powerful models and images of fate that influence the course of human action through
dreams and cultural events.
Fantasies of will

Whereas images of desire are directed towards having and enjoying, fantasies of will
tend to be projections of doing. Such will-determined desire expresses human surplus
drive, the root of human work and culture.
Memory images
Me~ories ·determine a person's particular character. They are partly accessible and
mampulable, partly unavailable to the interventions of consciousness. Some originate
in perception; others are based on imagined situations. Images from memory combine
with new perceptions and contribute to shaping these. They arc the result of a selection
process, whereby unconscious effacement and consciously motivated forgetting (e.g.
forgiveness) both play a role. Memories constitute a person's history, they are linked lO
the different times and places of his life. Memory images relate to pain and happiness,
Conclusions
Human flexibility is illustrated in the fact that the inner image-world can take on so
many different forms. All are the result of imagination, which encompasses all levels
of human life, whether in perception and feeling, or in thinking and doing. Even hu-
man eccentricity is due to imagination, for it refers to the capacity to position oneself
outside of-oneself, and from there, to relate back to oneself. Such self-reflection is
often expressed in the relation of images to images. Images manifest one's capacity to
picture; their different figures show cultural multiplicity. This is shown in the above-
mentioned different kinds of imagery. Images reveal magic, representation and simu-
lation, changing the character of these, while affecting the quality of the imagination
they articulate.
16 Gebauer/Wulf I 993: 1998.
17 Jung 1964. r- 272.

111 ·
110
 Education involves working reflectively with images. This implys not reducing an
image to its meaning, but rather 'bending it backwards'. 'turning it round': lingering
with the image and perceiving it as such; recollecting in one's mind its qualities of
shape and emotion and letting these take effect; protecting the image from too hasty an
interpretation through which it would be transformed into language and meaning, yet
as an image, drained and emptied; bearing out uncertainty, ambiguousness, complex-
ity, without calling for clarity. The meditation of images: imaginary representation of
something absent, mimetic creation and change within the current of inner images.
Education requires one to work on one's inner imagery, not only to bring it out in
speech. but also to let it in its image-content unfold and develop. To deal with images
is to expose ouest:lf to their ambiguousness. In order to do this, one must get in line
with an image ancl offer it full attention. With the powers of one's imagination, one
must create the image as an inner picture, protecting it from other inner images that
tlow in; with the powers of concentration and thought. one must 'hold on' to the im-
age. for an image to emerge is the first step, to hold on to it, to work with it, to let it
unfold in imagination arc further steps towards consciously dealing with images. To
reproduce or create an image in imagination, to carefully linger with it, is no smaller an
achievement th,m that of interpreting it. The duty of education is to bring together
these two ilspects of working with imagery.
112
Part Three
Global and Intercultural Education
Of relevance to current changes in education are the processes involved in the unifica-
tion of Europe and globalisation. Not only are concepts of education being influenced
bv issues related to the unification, but also contemporary education3l discourses, as
\;,ell as the practical handling of education are being transformed. As the concept of
Europe gradually becomes reality, education is no longer a matter to be dealt with ex-
clusively by each nation-culture or state. Rather, it must become an intcrcultural re-
sponsibility. involving careful consideration of the similarities and differences between
the different European cultures, nations and ethnic groups. Increased mobility within
the European Union has resulted in a proliferation of the phenomena of youth violeuce,
raising the cruci31 question of how to tackle racism. nationalism or hostility towards
forcig~ 1ers. In answering this, it is particularly important to avoid reducing violence to
-its physically obvious manifestations. This may be more difficult than it appears. Vio-
lence is ahvays directed towards the 'other'. Une ofthe strategies ofpn.:vcntion against
violence is therefore to intensify one's dealings with the other both outside and inside
of onesdf. In realising and learning to accept that the other can never be folly under-
stood, much is achieved lo avoid violence against him. Thus, the other is a focus of
intercultural and global edurntion, This poses the question of how globalisation affects
issues of education. ls it possible at present to think of a universally applicable educa-
tional framework? What problems would such an 3tlempt pose'1 ls it possible in this
context. to avoid the danger of reducing the individual to the universa!'7 Indeed, does
the individual have a right to resist subordination to the general? No doubt these issues
will 3!so become relevant in the realm of schools and universities, leading beyond in-
ternational co-operation to new patterns of intercultural collaboration where greater
knowledge and new forms of action and behaviour can take root.
113
 8

Youth Vio]ence

Increasing mohility in the context of Europeanisation and globalisation has given rise
to a mixing of different ethnic groups, which often leads to difficulties for minorities
especially and sometimes results in acts of violence involving the youth in particular.
This is not. however, the only cause of youth violence. The following chapter attempts
to shed light on the multiple reasons for youth violence. But first a vivid example
which was to stir up many emotions.
'Kni\'€S against insults. German schoolboy violently attacked by Turkish youths'. -
Headline to the story of one of the most brutal incidents in recent years; the story was
briefly repo11ecl hut never really analysed. 'A group of Turkish youihsfrom W<'sl-Rerli11
attacked o 15 year old German boy in the eastern clislricl of Friedrichs/win, as /w was
rm his way home ji-om school. The offenders did not know their victim. They ·were out
011 a mission to take vengeance for a friend who complained of being discriminated
a2,oi11st at school. The rnemv: "East Germans". However they couldn't get the ones
tl;e)I were supposed to bcot up. so instead the gong took hold of the first G1:rrnan minor
lh~y could lay their hands 011. They beat him with bars carried on their bikes: two of
the-m held him drrwn ll'hile the others assaulted him. Then thev ran away leaving their
victim on rhc grmmd. An eight hour emergency opera/ion saved his life, hut tlze hov
will ncvcrful!y recover.' 1
W c often hear cases like this reported from the USA, hut they me now occurring
with increasing frequency in the fast growing multicultural cities of Europe. Since re-
llnification in Germany, there have been an increasing number of xenophobic, right
wine extremist criminal offences, especially in the new federal states (Ncue Lander).
Acc71rdin2 to the latest statistics, of the 11 720 offences recorded in 1997, 790 were
violent oti'ences. of which 462 registered as xenophobic acts of violence.
Over the past few years in Germany, people have become particularly sensitised
towards three kinds of violence: a) Violence within thefamily, b) Violence againstfnr-
eigners. c) Youth violence. Intensive discussion of these topics (violence against
women and children, right-wing radical violence against foreigncrs, 2 and the growing
mcasiire of violence committed by youths) has turned violence into a new theme for
public debate as well as scientific rese;irch. 3 Taking over from the interests of the

Tagespiegel 12th/l3th April 199& (trans, A. Lagaay).

2 Heitmeyer 1992a; b.
3 Wimmer/Wulf/Dieckmann 1996; Dieckmann/Wimmer/Wulf 1997,

ll5
p~ace and environmental movements4 of the seventies and eighties, new discussions of
violence have led to new theories and explanations. An example is the way people
have explained the growth in xenophobia that became especially apparent after the
unification of Gerrriany, in the attitudes and behaviour of young people especially in
the new federal states.
The following theoretical outlines are frequently drawn upon to explain racist
xenophobic acts ofyouth violence:
- Socio-economic reasons: high unemployment rates and the consequent social de-
dassing of youths; problems related to the transition to a capitalist market-orien-
tated s~ciety and the• necessary (partly unsuccessful) processes of modernisation;
imperfections related to the new system: in particular, unfairness of distribution.
- Political reasons: with the dissolution of the socialist system, and the drastic reor-
. ·ganisation required, new challenges have appeared which many young people have
been unable to meet. Instead of these new challenges being successfully dealt with,
· often destructuralisation and destabilisation are the result.
- Socio-psychological reasons: socialisation has been deficient. Due to the changed
conditions of society, many youths are disorientated and in need of guidance. This
·-however, is unavailable: in many cases, peer groups have disintegrated; models to
look up to have disappeared. All that is left is bitter, emotional void and for many, a
crisis ofidentity.
- Cultural sociological reasons:· many youths have experienced the disintegration of
values they were familiar with. New values accompany the drastic social changes
· taking· place. However, many of these Western values put pressure on the individ-
' ual, in a way many· are not used to and cannot handle. This can lead to a crisis in
· meaning and result in serious misconduct.
- Educational reasons;· some young people fail to come to terms with the changing
challenges of adolescence. Often, the loss of previous figures of authority can lead
to· a certain normative uncertainty and a lack of prospects; learning difficulties and
··social exclusion· are the consequences. · ·
This theoretical framework seemed to explain the fact that after the Wall came down,
extreme right wing acts of violence escalated above all in East Germany. Unlike West
Gerinany, the need· for- modernisation could be applied to the whole of the former
German Democratic-Republic and not only to particular individuals or to isolated so-
cial groups scattered around the country. Moreover, structurally, it seemed at first to be
a youth problem, since it was. above all young people who were involved in the acts of
violence. This was easily explained by the fact that young people are more affected by
unemployment, loss of prospects and fear of the future.· The change of system that
}'.oung people of the East"'.ere faced with was said to result in the general destabilisa-
t10n and destructuralisation of their whole social fabric; not just in a disintegration of
values and a crisis of meaning. ·
· · The above interpretation must however be called into question. Why for instance,
should individualisation due to modernisation necessarily result in the dissolution of
4 Galtung 1971.; 1997.
116'
family ties, and social. disintegration? Why should this provoke hostility towards for-
eigners, and even violence against them? Moreover, it is often assumed that socia_l and
nonnative integration counter the unwanted side effects of individualisation. Is this
really true? We must indeed doubt the pre-fabricated connections suggested in the
above 'programme of explanations'. 'Unsuccessful individualisation' can surely not
suffice to explain hostility and violence against foreigners, any more than efforts to
socially and morally integrate people (or the idea thereof) succeed in eradicating these
failures.
Empirical investigations confirm our reasons to doubt the validity of 'modernisa-
tion theories'. It is true that over 80%-ofviolent offenders are under 25 years of age;
evidence shows that 35% are even younger than seventeen. Yet since the events in
Rostocl,, where adults were seen applauding the racist crimes of the youth, it. has
become evident that hostility towards foreigners is not ayouthproblem. Neither, since
Molln and Solingen, is it any longer plausible to assume that the problem is typically
East German. There are of course reasons why feelings of exclusion and a certain
violent tendency are more visible in the new Federal States of the East than elsewhere.
Relevant empirical studies in youth research have produced a series of descriptive
results which suggest that a) hostility towards foreigners is more common amongst
youths with low levels of education, from families with low levels of education;, b)
oirls are less xenophobic than boys; c) it is easier to find- racist attitudes amongst
;ouths in the East than in the West. So far, the theory that right-wing extremii;t ten-
dencies are somehow connected to unemployment; social disadvantages or lack of
prospects has not been proved. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary: youths well
integrated in the working world, hold more radical views and are quicker to resort to
violence than others. The theoretical assumption that difficult living conditions explain
a tendency to take on authoritarian nationalist views could not be verified._ Ne_ither
could empirical studies at all confirm the suggestion that.East German youths be more
likely to exhibit authoritarian characteristics. . _.
However, these empirical results leave many questions open and cannot be taken
over uncritically. Most importantly, the investigations fail to relate sufficiently to the
original theoretical hypotheses. In terms of methodology, they are also inadequate. It is
still unclear why hatred and violence are so often directed against foreigners, when a
much bigger social threat is posed by the far. more numerous Gennans, living in.similar
social conditions. This is inadequately explained. Sometimes the foreigners themselves
are presented as the reason for violence; other times they are the arbitrary objects of ri-
val-fear and boredom; yet again they might appear as the unlucky victims of those who
themselves were subject to structuralvicHence.Altematively, strangers and foreigners
are made scapegoats, responsible for society) v_iolence of which they are also thi; vic-
tims. Perhaps a. collective political unconsciousness automatically. steers.- unfocussed
aggression and an absence of political awareness towards the 'perfect' victim-object. .
The empirical research in question is.unable to-explain.the roots of aggression-and
violence. For the sake of clarity, and because of certain methodological requirements,
it significantly reduces the complexity of the problem. Indeed, to relate someone's
violence to a lack of recognition in that person, to an absence of emotional security, to
frustration, fear, or a need for orientation, is to blatantly over-simplify the issue. In
addition, one should not consider violence against foreigners to be an exclusively·
117
 cases, an act of violence, thoug~ ~egatively j~d~ed,. may secure the middle or _long"
German'problern, for itcxists, in different constellations, in other European countries term survival of the species. Jnd1v1dually altrm~t1c a~ts on t~e o~er hand can serve a
as well. · genetic or species-defined egoism. Seen from t~11s pomt ofv1ew, v10l~nce as a dcstruc-
In order to do justice to the complexity of violent phenomena, the aforementioned . fiorce can hardly be distinwished
t1ve ,, from
. v10lence
. .as a constructive
. . force. .Only a
studies and explanations must incorporate central anthropological dimensions. These context-related analysis can provide a more differentiated evaluat10n of the different
may not be directly related to racist violence, but they present another perspective on
forms. ·
the issue and thereby shed new light on present understandings. S .imi·1arly from a systemic perspective, there are always forces that threaten a sys-
Violent phenomena must be regarded in the appropriate cul:ural and historical . f .. b h .
tern's existence. These can appear unexpectedly, in the form o surpnsmg e aviour.
contexts. These define exactly what a society considers violent. Is a matter of dispute In ord er to Prevent these forces from destroying the .whole system, the·dsystem reacts by
whether one should assume - as does Norbert Elias - that processes of civilisation nec- 'b d · '
intensifying its control mechanisms. An increase m cf~orts to avo1Th a h surpn_ses
essarily lead to emotional distancing and therefore to progressively more violent so- however leads in tum to a multiplication of the endangenng powers. us: t e stronger
cieties. The ethnologist Peter Duerr for instance, would disagree.5 the controls are to protect the system, the greate~ the forces become t~at aim to change
· As a cultural and historical phenomenon, violence is subject to cultural and his- an d ·d e~orm c. 1· t . In order· to further our understandmg~ of the issues ofv1olencc . as well. as
torical change. J\t the same time, what we consider violent depends on a relation be- ticl orgams · at" 10 n of
- .svstems , we must consider the consequences of this· paradox1q1l
·
tween our imaginary and the relevant cultural and historical phenomena. Thus, our
situation. . . - , · , I ·d
definition of violence is subject to two kinds ofhistorico-cultural detennination. No living creature or system is 'selfless'. Rather, _111s a ccrlam _egmsm_ - re ate
Acts of violence are an extremely complex phenomenon. Both the perpetrators as · 1me · t "or self-preservation - that produces violence and counter-v1olcncc. In
to t h e ms ,, · . . . . , .
,veil as their onlookers invest every act with different feelings and sensations. Such order to avoid reducing the concept of violence to its v1s1ble_:namfestatlons, o~e m _ust
1 1
strong mimetic effects are at work in every act of violence, that one can hardly resist - ate and account for the 'positive violent' aspects of 11e, systemic orgamsa 10n,
mcorpor . _ · . d
being'fascinated. As a consequence, one can either follow Platonic argument in the be- the relation between sexes and gcneratmns, as _well as hum_an rel~t10ns to nature an
lief that one should forbid public represrntmions of violence, or, in an Aristotelian self. Violence then takes on a new anthropological complexity. :his exte~ded conc~p~
tradition, hold the view that one should encourage discussions about violence, in order d certainly somewhat obscures the concept of violence (m compa1:1son to when
to allow individuals to effectively confront the issue. It is still an open question, tua I fi1e I . . ,, th Id
·Jt 1s
• 1·1m1·1e d to 1·ts• explicit manifestations)' · '
yet 1t 1s necessary, ,or .
o crw1sc ,
we wou·.
whether from the point of view of the individual as well as the community as a whole, to conceive as forms of violence those forms descnbed as structural v10-
either of these attitudes to violence is more effective. not b e a bl e , . 8 , 1. . 1 , (B ct· )9
Jenee' (Galtung), 7 'founding violenc~ (Girard),, or _symbo 1c ;~o ence, our 1~u,.
Research in social science tends to reduce the complexity of violent phenomena. · y· 1 e has been defined as ·will to powtr (Nietzsche), force ot destruction , or
1oenc _ · .. 1.,, d ..
Jne subject is presented as if its definition were clear and one already knew not only · ' (Freud)
'deal l1 d rive . · Although it tends to occur when mmmmrn 1,e con ..1t10ns are
the exact origins of violence but how science can understand and control the phenom-
1.etck"mg, VI·olence is also disguised .
in more socially acceptable forms as amb1tton, com-
. . • b d" h .
ena. -1· ess or rivalry Violence 1s expltc1t m cases where human o 1es· are urt, mut1-
· Discussions of this kind often overlook the fact that many acts of violence occur so
pet1 1ven · . · . ·· 1 · h
l t d destroyed. It occurs arbitranly. unpredictably, by chance. n war, m t e
to speak wizhout reasim. 6 They arise in certain situations, often unexpectedly, sponta- a e or · dreams violence disables reason and the m · d"1v1·ctua l' s contro1 over ac1·1011. It
neously, and are uncontrollable. Sometimes, it is as if violence could have been just as
masses, 111 , , - h kn
· "th a certain human desire to take risks - one s attraction towards t e un own
easily avoided. Afterwards, neither the perpetrator nor the victim really understands mixes w1 . . - 1 h "fi ·i·
dden Both magnetically attractive and repulsive, v10 ence orr1 1es, tern 1e_s,
what happened. It often feels like 'a stranger' committed the act. and su · .. · d · 1· ·
· tes Violence is one of the cond1t10ns for human existence an socia 1sat1on,
an d j .ascma - · .
'These considerations point to new perspectives on the question of so-called youth d as such it cannot be overlooked or avoided. . . _
violence - perspectives that shake the foundations of certain social scientific assump- an Expanding the concept of violence in this way may seem to squash ou~ ~ope ot
as
tions well as any too optimistic hope that violence can be controlled. , . , 0111111
cve1 ovt:rc
· g the problem. This does not mean that we should not take polit1cal and
~ . . , d · d · I h
'· As already pointed out by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud, violence is inherent · I t· n against violence • But to consider violence a merely. un • es1re socrn . p e-
soc1a ac 10 · •
to any human social community. Culture has to dci with rrnouncing drives and desires; , nd base any counter strategy on a reduced and over-s1mphfied conception of
nomena a · . d" ~ · I ·
if is deeply linked to asceticism and discipline, to violence against others as well as ble m is utterly unsatisfactory. A comprehensive understan mg ot v10 ence 1s
ourselves. Our capacity to be violent is perhaps· what enabled the human race to sur-
vive. Biologists ·talk of a ceriain 'genetic self-interest' involved in human behaviour.
h
t e pro - · ·
necessarv in order to handle the vmlent potential mherent to a s,~cta
· ·
dividual;. Clearly, in the light of the present threat posed by host1 1ty towar s ore1gn-
11
grm~r
. I d.
fian . In-

They consider its moral evaluation to be a question of cultural values. In extreme

7 Galtung 1971.
5 Duerr 1993.
8 Girard 1998.
6 Wimmer, c. r. Grundlose Anmer~ungen iiber den gegcnwiirtigen Diskurs iiber Gewalt, in Wimmer/ 9 Bourdieu J999iBourdicu/Passeron 1973.
Wulf/Dieckmann 1996. pp. 7-65.
Il9
118

ers and racist violence, the demand for quick political and social action is both under-
standable and necessary. It provides politics with an urgently needed legitimization and
develops models for socially engaged behaviour. Yet, so far we still cannot tell how
effe~tive socia~ and educational interventions are in the fight against hostility towards
foreigners, ~e1sm nnd violence. At any rate, success will depend on how our under-
standing of violence does justice to the complexity of the phenomena.
_· Reason cannot comprehend how some people are the innocent victims of violence,
simply because of foreign looks or different ethnic or religious origins. The mind bog-
gles. Attempts to explain· such acts of violence by looking into the life stories of the
perpetrators may shed some li~t on.the motives, but fall short of really explaining the
phen_omena. ?ne notable fact m the case of youth violence is that perpetrators often do
not tullyreahse the consequences of their actions. Uninhibited brutal behaviour of the
kin~ involved in such violence, is only rarely followed by any 'kind of empathy for the
v1ctJ~s. Instead, offenders seem inexplicably, frighteningly anaesthetised, incapable of
sensmg the damage and pain they have caused.
. · History ~as shown the extent to which humans are capable of performing acts of
mcred1ble v10lcnce, without feeling the slightest bit of sympathy for their victims.
~hen the restraining effects of prohibitions and rituals are suspended, a kind of excep-
tional, e11:er?ency situation emerges where extreme fonns of violence are suddenly
poss1~le: This is for instance how massacres escalate, their only goal being· the de-
structl?n and slaughter of helpless victims: the blood baths of colonial conquests, the
utroc1t1es of war and civil war, the human carnage of genocide. Massacres are acts of
unbridled brutality, where perpetrators let all hell loose· there arc no limits no re-
straints; th~re is ?o capacity to stand back. Excess stim~lates the perpetrator: makes
him l~se_ himself m drunken madness, there is no possible bridge to the helpless hopt:-
less v1ct1m: Collective violence leaves its unlucky victims no means of escape. This
~md of~nbroke? d~structiv~ness has vi_olence itself become the sole aim and meaning.
· omethmg ofth1s kmd ofv10lence for-its-own-sake was apparent in the case oftbc as-
saulted boy quoted to begin with.
· The~c are many such cases of gruup violence. Usually, some kind of social crisis
(rooted 111 unemployment, social and cultural identity problems, a Jack of prospects,
etc.) provides the background for a person who is somehow different to be chosen as a
scapegoat, ~nd blamed for everything that is wrong. What the group might have in
common with that person is not perceived. Instead, the scapegoat's difference justifies
its _exclusion and the person is blamed and victimised, turned into an object against
which the group can callously, violently unburden their frustration. an<l arnier. 111 The
fact t~at the ~capegoat is considered responsible for the social crisis 'legiti~ises' the
group s_ abusive trcati_nent of that person. Moreover, in a group, an individual cau dis-
tance himself from his own· responsibility: the act of violence is not his own but the
mob's ~oing. !he ?ifferences between· the individual members of a group 'are sus-
pen<lc~, ": a mn~e'.1c proces~, a~~ an anonymous '_mass subject' carries out the vio-
lence. Smee this mass subJect 1s the one performing the act - and not the individual
as such -- often the individuals involved do not even have any sense of wrongdoing.
10 Girard 1989.
11 Canetli 1998.
120
This way of projecting life problems and violence on to a scapegoat_ and then .delegat-
ing one's actions onto a 'mass subject' are mechanisms which allow for such acts of
violence to occur, but which, in order to be effective, depend on the people involved
not seeing through them. · ·
Many people get a thrill out of seeing others tormented and hurt. The gladiator
fights in the stadiums of the Roman Empire, the Aztec ritual sacrificing. of prisoners,
the almighty Indian despots who had people executed in order to relish their own sur-
vival; these are all examples of how a certain pleasure can be got out of the spectacle
of other people's suffering and death. If this were not the case, films such as Apoca-
lypse Now or .Jurassic Park would not be so successful. Beyond the horror people
sense in the face of arbitrary and grim acts of violence, something attracts them even
against their own will. The fascination created by violence, war and catastrophe is at
the same time attraction and disgust. But what is it that fascinates about violence? Is it
the display of seemingly unlimited power over the body. and life of another person?
Does such violence make a person forget his own vulnerability and mortality? Is it _the
desire to have the power to destroy someone else's life, instead of being destroyed
oneself? For violence to fascinate, it must itself have power over the perpetrators or
onlookers: violence itself excites. It captivates, intoxicates, repulses, terrifies and de-
lights. A collective excitement develops, turning acts of violence into a.kind of unstop-
pable stage act where fear itselfbeeornes thrilling. When this happens there is no pro-
tection. Sometimes the borders between perpetrators and onlookers are suspended and
onlookers become perpetrators. The hooligans are a relevant example ofthis. :.
When reading studies on violence one is struck by the following: most investiga-
tions focus more closely on the violent perpetrator than on the victim. The question of
his motives is raised, as well as how to work against these. But very rnrcly is any inters
est shown into the effects of violence on the victim. What does it mean to be helplesslv
at the mercy of someone's violence? What exactly are the short and long term eons;-
quenccs of sometimes unimaginable physical and psychological injuries? To be at the
hands of arbitrary violence, to have suffered the pain induced, turns the victim's own
body into a problem for that person. Sometimes a victim will reject his own body be-
cause of the inescapable pa.in that it incorporates. This can result in the victim express-
ing self-hatred, for he is afraid and has suffered pain, humiliation and helplessness in a
way that he cannot forget. 12 . .
With this in mind, Christian morality could be seen as an attempt to reject archaic
pre-Christian values in order to control the sinister side of humans, the one that gets
pleasure out of destruction. European history has shown only too clearly the diff'icultv
of such an attempt to stem human violence. Ye~, its shortcomings and inadequacies ar~
no argumrnt against the endeavour. In the Christian religion, one can sec hope (as d~es
Girard) of interrupting the cycle that is created when one act of violence must neces-
sarily be aven~ed by another, etc. For if it were possible to forgive one ·s enemy's ag-
gression, the v10lent cycle could be broken. 13 . _ . . _ ..
If_violence fascinates be~ause ~t is ~onnected to fantas!es of greatness, to self-~g-
grand1 sement, to the hope oJ cscapmg v10lence oneself by mil icting it, it is no wonder
12 Sofsky 1996.
13 Girard 1998.
121
that attempts to explain it away and argue against it prove to be so difficult. If violence
9
is a kind of shapeless force of destruction, with different connections in every situ-
ation, expressed in so many phenomena, then of course it is often hard or indeed
hopeless to try to resist its engulfing nature. Despite so many attempts in theology,
philosophy and science to understand how violence arises, time and again our knowl-
edge is thwarted. Every attempt to explain violence seems to have a provisional, hypo- The Other
thetical quality that its mysteriously ample scope is unable to dissolve. Since violence
as an energetic force can hardly be distinguished from other human forces, but arises in
particular situations and constellations out of a transformation of shapeless energies, it
is especially difficult to explain how violence originates. Violence is a possibility of
human behaviour, a virtual component of the human world that can always be sum-
moned and renewed. Insofar as violence often means violence against other people, understanding our rela-
Whoever suffers or witnesses violence, experiences the vulnerability and fragility tion towards that which is other plays an important role in attempts to achieve peaceful
of human life. Western democratic societies are committed to stemming and channel- human inter-relations. For every society, for every social subject, contact with the
ling the violent potential between people, whether it is economically, politically or so- other constitutes an essential condition. The human body is connected to and depend-
cially conditioned. With its monopoly ovc:r violence, the State plays a central role in ent on others for conception, sustenance and socialisation. Much of what an individual
this: When its monopoly is questioned in any way, political order is disturbed. When experiences is related to others, from gestures and rituals to participation in games and
rituals of social interaction are somehow suspended, eruptions of violence may occur, the exchange of gifts. Mimetic behaviour is always directed towards another individ-
for which certain individuals or groups are made accountable: When in situations like ual. A person comes both to resemble others, as well as to realise the limits to which
these, mechanisms of violence-regulation fail, the relative absence of violence in another person can ever be fully related to or understood. The following aspects shall
every-day life is shattered. be considered:
Cases of open, unbridled violence lead one to doubt the success of human progress.
Unstoppable wars involving terrible atrocities, ruthless attacks against nature, make the ineluctable other,
one realise the profound vulnerability of human life and how it is constantly threat- difference and otherness,
ened. Becoming aware of the destructive side of human development makes it possible _ reduction and repression,
to confront issues of social and individual violence, even when there is no hope of get- foreign others,
ting rid of the problem once and for all. Perhaps insight into the limits of controlling mimetic approaches.
violence is one of the conditions for making cons1ructive progress individually and
socially in this realm. · There is a constant ambivalence in the relationship between self and other: it oscillates
between success and failure. A successful encounter ,vill benefit both self anu other,
whereas its failure will work to the detriment of both.

The Ineluctable Other

ln his essay on education, Rousseau speaks of how, in order to be happy. eve1y indi-
vidual is dependent on others. Human existence is both relative and collective, for our
true , l' is never quite within us. It is impossible to really be content or enjoy ourselves
without it always having something to do with others. 1 People need others not only to
lead happy Jives, but also in order to find pleasure in themselves. !'--n individu~I cannot
choose to do without other people. Even to retreat from contact with others, still means
living in relation to them. Others enable an individual to perceive his own existence.
This is due to our ability to direct our senses and emotions towards people otherwise
unknown to us. We cannot live without being touched. spoken to, and looked at by

1 Rousseau 1993.

122
 others, without their representations within us. The other is a mirror in which we see
discover, and investigate our o,vn selves. It allows us to perceive inner representation;
of ?urselvcs and_ thu~ to develop consciousness. This dependency on other people and
their represcntat10ns 1s what makes human reality fundamentally social.
In ord_er lo have its existence confirmed and be able to grow, an infant needs to feel
t?e ~ttent1on_ and tou_ch of the other, through its parents. A child's state of 'incomple-
t10n 1s manifest m its dependency on its parents and their compensatory behaviour.
Only through parental care can a child free itself from its initial sense of inferioritv.
The child's capacity to imitate is stimulated by its sense of inequality in relation to
grown-ups; it yearns to relate to and resemble the other. This mimetic process is
encouraged by the parents' reciprocal mimetic behaviour, which in tum satisfies the
child's demand for recognition, and encourages activities that lead to its fulfilment. A
person's sense of belonging to a family and a community is rooted in this initial inter-
play between parent and child. · complementary relation to that which is other. Nei:her can an i~di_vidual be conceived
At hirth, a child is already predisposed towards a social existence. In the infant's
early development, this predisposition is diversified and specialised. Touch and atten-
t10n constitute a form of pre-verbal exchange between parents and child. Speech and
visual contact communicate to the child a sense of the other. Through being spoken to
a~d looked at, the child also experiences its own existence. Playing with his parents or
with Nhcr people of reference, a child makes his first enquiries into the world, and
early forms of odf-<1wan:ness are developed. Language enables the child to enter the
world of the other. Mimeois plays an essential role in these stages or earlv childhood
development. As in the physical interplay between parents and- children, ,in their ex-
changes of touch, visual contact and ritual behaviour, mimetic processes are mutual.
When parents attend to their child, it responds with mimetic reactions that elicit in tum
a response from the parents, and call for more attention and input. A sense of commu-
na! togetherness, resulting from this kind of interplay, is the environment in which a
child will develop its essential farnllics: seeing, touching rememberino and speaking.
Without the parents' example, there would be no stimul;1s to imitatio~'. Parents sho~v
"the_ child what to do, and encourage or acknowledge its performance by their reactions.
fhis exchange is what transforms the cl1ild into a social being. The child realises its
dependency on others, and experiences other people's recognition of its own existence
as a necessary condition for life. In the mimetic relation between itself and others, the
structure of a child's personality is developed. Features of others are adopted and come
to ovcr~ay_ the c~ild's archaic self. They connect with it. Through experiencing the
people m its environment - the challenges, interests and desires that they present - a
chi_ld neates Hs own self-image, which will continue to develop throughout the course
ofit~ life. This self-image formed out of the responses that the child receives from oth-
ers, is created according to mimetic processes that take place between it and them.
Human mteraction is not bound to the present. When for instance people of differ-
ent ages live together, exchange is inter-generational. Through language, both spoken
and \~'ntten. as well as customs, human exchange reaches back into the past whilst
pomtmg towards the future. The young build on the cultural achievements of the older
gcnc_rations._ l-~urnan existence in lime increases the individual's dependency on a com-
'.11u?1~Y- Ind1v1dual self-sufficiency, autonomy and sovereignty are all but illusion, An
md1V1dual needs a community in order to grow and mature. Without the sense of being
i24
connected to a wider group, people would be isolated and paralysed. This fact of
human incompletion makes mutual recognition a necessity for the members of a com-
rnunitv.2 Recognition is what makes an individual find his place within the community,
and b~comc a social being. If an individual fails to receive the amount of recognition
he needs. he will feel marginalised and excluded and become 'invisible'. Loneliness
and bitterness are the consequences.
The other plays a constitutive part not only in the development and well being of
an individual, hut also in the development and well being of every group, community
and culture. It is counterpart to a person's sense of self and identity, to that which he
considers his own. Borderlines and patterns of ordering create the differences accord-
ing to which an other is identified._ Historical and cultur;il contexts, and !he symbolic
order define why someone 1s perceived as other. In the same way as one ·s concept of
'self' is necessarily dependent on one's concept of 'foreign', so an individual is in
without the other, nor can the other be conceived without the md1v1dual.
The split inherent in the huma11 constitution enables people to relate to themselves.
Reflexivity is the condition for our perception of others. A person's sense of the other
laraely depends on his attitude. Human flexibility makes for a great multiplicity of
for~ 1 s. that the other can take. The process of relating oneself to internal as well as ex-
ternal 'others' defim'S whom a subject perceives as other. The other can be seen in
many different figures: in that which is considered foreign, enemy, or mad; in th<':
ghostlv, evil, or unsettling: in the other gender, or the sacred. In cases like these. there
is an ;vcrlap between concrete forms of otherness, and a more extreme, abstract other.
In fact. every concrete form of otherness points towards a more indefinable, elusive,
radical other. In the case of God for instance, ~he superimposition of ii personified
other with :111 abstract other is p;irticularly clear.' Such overlaps can be seen in other
figures as well. The multiple forms the other can take arc a result of the symbolic order
of language.
Difference and Otherness
Under the banner of egalitarianism, European civilisations have often shown the clan-
aerous tendency to annihilate foreign differences through assimilation. The prevailing
:ssumption is that other countries and cultures should not renrnin different, but trans-
form in order to become part of a world-culture defined by Europe. Even between
countries within Europe, this assumption has prevailed. Throughout history, various
countries have claimed to be the measure per sc for a European spirit and have wanted
to lav down the criteria for a European civilisation and world culture. at the cost of
European and \\' orld wars. Instead of valuing _the unique characteristics of each cu_l-
tun:, and strengthening such cultural features, European nations have tended to give 111
to the dangers of sacrificing the particular to the general. It is now, therefore, more
relevant than ever to :icccpt the particularities of every culture and encourage these to
2 Todorov 1989.
3 Otto 1963.
125
 th Se others be known. To experience an other's foreignness, one must
blossom. For surely, only on the basis of a supportive attitude towards the differences
l
only t1en can ° - -. If F
d 1·scover ·m<l get to know the other w1thm oncse . or no m 1v1 na 1-
· d' ·ct I ·s
of other countries and people will it ever be possible to discover and develop a sense of
bc preparecIto There ' . h
are a]wavs contradictory parts to a person, eac possessmg a w1
· · ·11
ever on l Y one. · · d' t· d t fee
transnational community. -- Altl 11 a ,uhicct will try to suppress its maJor contra 1c ions an )C r ,
Despite national diffen:nces, similar social conditions have meant that European
ot its own.
- d
ioug • - J •
· · 1 freedom is thwarted by heterogeneous dnve 1mpu ses an regu a-
· 1 d I
countries have much in common. They share the same democratic structure, economic time an agalm, I ~er to perceive itself the T must acknowledge and include those
system, as well as many cultural traditions. Life expectancy and living standards are tory norms. n or ·tself This is also a necessary ' con d"1t1on
- 1or
c:
any to 1eran t or op e n ,ap -
exclu de d parts o f 1 ·
also much the same. These points in common are often the basis upon which different
roach towards others. -l -
countries communicate, connect and unite. Many factors, including the New Media, p . b self ·ind other are complicated by the fact that neat 1er 1s a
Relations ctween ' . . , b
have contributed to this European 'common ground'. With the mass media reporting . t ft)' Man)' forms of the other arc mcluded m the make up of a su -
clearly sepata c en ' . . 1i· . d" "d 1
the same events throughout Europe, the same infom1ation is spread. Events can simul- · .· t· only outside the T otherness is also wit m every 111 1v1 ua -
J·cct : Far from ex1s mg ' ' h cl t ·ct,
taneously take place and he broadcast in images and reports. People's perception is . . l' · t lised others mav impede that person s approac towar sou s1 c
An md1v1dua s Ill erna " . . l " l I . I
shaped by the high speed at which information travels, by the multitude of images, and - rd ground for the subject outside of the ot 1er, 1or t 1e ot 1er 1s a -
the process of miniaturisation (through T.Y etc.). Om aesthetic sense is the media rep- others. There is no _so~ v/thin it Yet what the other is, and how it is seen, is not solely
s already contame 1 ·
resentation of the world we perceive. Processes of abstraction and pictorial representa- waY· h, . b" t The impressions the other makes of itself, thoug11 not neces-
d,cp enclcnt on t c su Jee. ·, - - the image
llv decisive in dcterrrnmng · c1n m· d"1v1·ct ua I h·dS o r
tion have intensified. The emergence of a perception moulded by the media facilitates
sarily homogeneous, arc equa - .
the globalisation of attitudes, values and knowledge. This, in tum, leads to the globali-
sation of products, money and signs, thus intensifying the dynamics of industrialised it. . t be conceived without otherness. The subject, fragmented, yet irrc-
societies, whose aim it has been to reduce the 'unknown particular' to something more .Iclent1tv
- -. cannort .. Jar character, is in constant relation lo c1 mu 1t1-
· facete d o ti1er. T wo
duc1ble m its pa icu . .
general and familiar. ·ts plav a part in this relat10nsh1p:
In the face of this movement towards the general, it is important to strengthen that further aspec '.
which is 'other', and support the particularities of every given culture. Surely, cultural - . · ever)' individual. of the connection between otherness and
The umqm; nature, m . - d . )·
multiplicity i:; a European characteristic worth preserving. Instead of conceiving cul- . . (d t " h individual's particular life circumstances an expenence, etc._,·
identity ue O cac · d t 'fi · '
ture as a homogeneous unit, it is better to think of it as a conglomeration of deep di!~ · I ·storv of what is defined as 'self or 'own·, as oppose o orc1gn ,
The respective 11 ·; _
ferences, as a plurnlity of ways of being and belonging, as deep diversity. This new as well as the history of relation between them. ·
um.lcrstanding of cultun: is a consequence of the world's decentralisation, and the frag-
mentation or cultures. Valuing deep diversity could contribute to reducing negative - 55h , is necessarily also to question one's self, and vice versa, then
l f to questrnn
.
ot emc
h th,
.. f lf . .
ncccssarilv involves processes o se -exammat1on, se -
1t·
feelings and aggression towards that which is foreign, and encourage attitudes that are
d standm 0 t e O er "' ; - · · · ·
more open towards others. For surely, in accepting differences lies the essential condi- un er ' c d t As the 'forciim' becomes more tam1!tar, there 1s an m- ·
·r and eve Iopmen. - - . .
tion for creating intcrcultural consciousness. Only real knowledge and acceptance of recog~1 ion 'e of self-estrangement or self-foreignness. As the world is progressrvcl?'
the differences of others can open the way for understanding, friendship and co-opera- creased sens d b , 1· banished the danger arises that m foture we will only ever
tified an t e cxo JC • , - d d 1
tion. - There arc three m;iin dimensions to our reception of those we consider others: demys_ · ' f rsclves People will then lack the possibility to grow an eve op
meet hkenc~ses o ou t ·t··,-th the unfami!iGr and foreign. Ifthc loss of that which is
. ov1ded by con ac \\ I d I .
- The first concerns our value judgements. How do we regard the members of a for- that 1s pr h d velopmcnt then surelv it must be protected. Sud en Y it
.
foreign
endangers uman e
-
, - , ,
d r. ·1·,ar·ise that which is known and sateguard one sown sc -
11,
eign culture'! Do we feel attracted to them or put off? What are the consequences of · portant to c1am1 - . . ' . .
these perceptions and feelings'.l becomes 1111 · · t to preserve the foreinn withm us, as well as the foreign-out-
. . css The attcrnp "' I I
The second dimension rnncerns approaches to the other. What possibilities are there toreig1:n - · d b ,. luable counter-movement to the global tendency to eve out
side of us, coul c a \a
for communicative contact? Do people look for contact with those who are seen as
different; do thev desire to be close to them? Can one identifv with the others and difference~- . . 1. . . de up through amalaamation with the other, then unly too
S .incc mdiv1dua. 1tv· 1s ma cc of the foreion
- o _ _ _
lead to the Joss of the md1v1dual. Every
assimilate oneself with them'.! Do not some people even subl;rdinate themselves to
-·1 ould the d1sappcaran "'. . ,. 1·.. h t
the other in a kind of euphoria about that which is foreign'.! east Y c bl, driving-force requires self-assurance, that 1s, to rea 1sc w a
. d- . dual 's unappeasa c
m ivi S lf .
h t l ·s and what he wants to become. e -conceptrnn, se -con--
If
Thirdly, to what extent do ,ve really know those we perceive as different, and how
I become w a ie I ' ' . l
substantial is our knowledge of them'.! This is especially relevant in situations where he ia~ ·. ' lf-rcflcction all play a part. This kind of knowledge 1s on y ever tem-
-in· fact there is no contact with the other. struction, and se h hout the course of one's lite. In Les Faw.: lvlonneyeurs,
and changes
poraTY, . fi
t roug · · · · b Th.
·ndividual as only ever that which 1t believes 1tselfto e. 1s
d , Gide de mes an I • th . Id
All three complementary dimensions acknowledge the other's separate nature, To An re 1 , th 1 ·t often seems as if the being that I am m e evening wou
accept others we must overcome ourselves; This takes a: certain amount of courage, yet changes so constant Y a 1
127
126
 ties. Some events are contingent even though they may result from someone's actions,
not_r~cognise the one that I had been in the morning. Nothing is more different to an for it is not possible to say beforehand how or why something develops one way and
md1v1dual than itself. not another. 'Contingent is that which is neither necessary nor impossible; that which
There _is no_ better key to an open attitude towards others than to be aware of one's can be the way it is (or was, or will be) yet would also be possible otherwise. Thus, the
own non-1dent1ty. Confrontation with foreign cultures, with the other in one's own concept encompasses that which is given, experienced, perceived, expected, thought
culture, and with the foreigner in our own person, teaches us to perceive and think and fantasised in terms of a possible otherness; it refers to the horizon of possible
tram . the other's . uIS c h ange o f perspective
po·III t o f \ ,-icw. ·1--,,· · should prevent us from too modifications. It presupposes the world we know, docs not therefore refer to the realm
easily·. , _ " the 'fore1gn
rcducmo · ' t o lh at w h'1ch 1s · our own. In order to see from the other of"absolute possibility", but to that which in reality could have been otherwise.' 4 This
pomt of view, I n:iust develop hcterologic:al thinking, that is, suspend my sense of self definition could also be regarded as a description of contemporary reality, in which the
and contempl~te it through the other person's eyes. Central to this is the relation be- other plays a constitutive role. To face an other is to confront contingencies, and can
tween that which 1s familiar and the 'foreign', the relation between knowledge and ig- therefore never be completely planned because the outcome is partially accidental and
norance,
. . , certamtv _ . . and uncert·a1·ntv• . Proces ses o f d e- t ra d.1t1ona · 1·1smg
· and ind1viduahsmg· · · remains therefore unpredictable. Contingencies create new possible perceptions of the
life,_ difJerentiation and globalisation have meant that much of our everydav life. oth- , foreign' and 'self that in turn point to unknown horizons and new structures of
erwise
. taken . tor . '°0 ranted' , Irns
· · b ecn ca II ect mto · quest10n,· demanding individual • ·
retlcc- thinking. The process of recognising contingencies, in enabling one to acquire a _con-
t1on and dec1s1on · Yet , tl11·s d oes no t necessan·ty mean a gam · ·rn freedom
,- ··
Conditions sciousness of the virtual, allows for new approaches to the other.
under which a decision can be ma· d,e arc o t'ten not wit· )1m · the control of an· 111rl1v1dual. · · ·
ln the realm of environmental issues for instance, the individual mav be able to make
envuomnentally_ conscious decisions, yet these will have little imp;et on the macro-
Reduction and Repression
structures ot. socretv• , which real])' cJet cnmnc · tl1e qua 1·1ty of the cnv1ronrncnt. ·
Cha11°e '° m our · understand1· · ' ng o f rea ,, 1·1
1 Y n.:su ]ts ·111 new perceptions · of· what 1s · fore1· °n Discourse on the other must take into account the psychological, epistemologieaL and
arid .other. _ .Realitv- .has· never bc"n ~ .so unre 1·ia bl e. 1n ant1qu1ty,
· · reality - was 1rres1st1ble
· - · cIII cultural aspects that are respectively associated with the traditions of egocentrism, lo-
th e imn_1ediacy of its appearance; in the Middle Ages. its trnth was guaranteed hv God: . 5
aocentrism and ct Imocentnsm.
the. Enlightenment
•. had' swer,·o-
l e1'°n R eason ct·1ctate ones , conception · -and handlmg · • of re- b Although it seemed for a while as if the other were gradually being unveiled and
ality; but. todav• , rnlit)' ' is· co ns t mete d an d mtcrpretecl,
· and one's experience of-it fra 0 - demystified. this has not proved to be true. Things, situations and people, right in the
rnentcd and heterogeneous -~ · - I-I·avmg · one , s own . construction . .
and mtcrpretat1on . ot, the"' centre of our everyday well-known familiar world, arc becoming increasingly foreign
world means confrontinob the c ons t1uc · ,1·ion an d ·mtcrpretat1on · of others. Plurnlitv · 1s · a and unknown. Standards of living that one expected to remain secure and familiar_ are
11eccssarv - consequence
. 0 f d · fragmentc d perception · of reality. · No sinelc view -of the bcin" called into question. Admittedly, the strategy that consisted in demystifying the
world can claim to he excl , us1ve · . ly lrm:·, , every .mterpretat1on . 1s . !united
. ~ bv the view of unk;mvn other through increasing understanding, has succeeded in making many for-
others. , One's . own
· exper·c
., 1 nee. , o f th e \,or. ld 1s . t1rns complicated . bv the fact • that other . things seem more familiar and replaced people's insecurity and fear with confi-
people • . s 111terprctal10ns 'and 1 c oncep 1ions
· must be taken mto . account - as possible alter- eign
dence and trnst. Yet this sense of secunty · 1s · l; un d.cmcatI1 1t
· o fiten on l y super fi1cm · (an d
native~. at its margins), feelings of fear and danger ar~ still strong. The ges'.ure of' making-thc-
. ,· ,As , the, world .becomes . · more comp l ex . . .
. . anc1 opaque, the mcl1v1dual .
feels mcreasmglv . world-familiar' has not fulfilled our cxpectat1ons. Instead, mcreas1I1g the realm of the
insecure.
. Uncertarnt1es· and in s e cunues · · depen <l on a person ' s outside · environment
· :
his familiar has meant expanding the sphere of the unknown. Knowing more about it does
mncr world, . as well as· on · the· rel a1·1011 b c,1ween outside - and rnside. . . H.e mav try to over- ake the world any less complex. In fact, the more we know about phenomena and
t
come , . this ·sense ,· of vulne ra, bTt 1 1 }, hY trymg - to appear certain and self-assured. - - vet this no m
connections, · we do not k·now. T 1mc an d agam,
the more there is · ignorance
· exposes the
I
c ocs u P f or ti1e d eep 1oss ol, security within. Besides, ·any - pro-
. not, per±cctly
. . make ' limits of knowledge as well as the limits of human action based upon that knowledge.
I
c· ,am1cd
.,. certamt) • 1 1s relativ'
. . • c:, a11cl II, b d ·
usua ':, ase on the arbitrary exclusion of altema- Thou ah attempts are often made to reduce the other to a concept of 'sameness', it can-
ti .-cs.
social
1
. \\. hat .an 111<l1v1dual dec·1d es t o exc·] uJ e ·1s d ctermined by his psvchologicc1I and
s1tuat1on ~ norms,
a;
no t
such be overcome. The other expresses itself in the centre and at the boundaries
·ct .,
. , . , .as· well 'as b ), t}ie power structures of soc1etv . and the · • values.
ftbe familiar, and demands to 6e cons1 ereu.
Hlcolugics and discourses that characterise it. · 0 Elias, Foucault and Beck have described in detail the processes involved in the

------
ln a world where multiple conccp , t s of rea 1·1ty and science · arc at work. in terms of (tution of the modem subject and the emergence of egocentrism. 6 'Technologies
the. "'development 'n a d h an di'mg o1- Ill · d"1v1dual
· and social knowledge the experience of of theI Self arc involved •m the cl evel oprnent o f su b.Jects. 7 M any o f t I1ese strategies
cons . are
d
il1ert'nce
. , takes· or1 aw I10I e new ct·1mcns10n · o±..importance. Without some knowledae
of difference,
. . there can be no conslrue. 11ve · approach to foreign . . cultures. The notion bof 4 Luhmann 1984, p. 152 (!rans. A. Lagaay).
c~ntm_ge_ncy is relevant here. Something is contingent if it could also have been other- 5 Waldenfels 1990.
wise, _if it seems unplanned or to have occurred by chance, even though it might have 6 Elias 1976; foucaull I 975; Beck el al. 1995.
been influenced by actions - In o•,.er u1 w ords, contingency
. . the scope of open poss1b1h-
1s . .. 7 Martin 1988.
129
128
 · th ·rn Whatever fails to fit, remains outside the subject's field of pcr-
linked to the idea of a self-contained self, which, as the subject-bound centre of action, corp_oratcd mto . ~I t·. Tl1ere is no possible movement towards the other. Amaze-
t 11 and ass1m1 a 10n. · d
is called to lead its own life and develop its own biography. Yet the lJOWanted side ef- cep 10 f rvel al the New World arc all that result. The umque an
t d a sense o ma · fd
fects of a self-sufficient subject are manifold. Often, the self-determining subject foils men an , f tl e world is compared to and reported m tenns o ream
dinarv appearance o 1 . . , d · t
in the act of self-determination. In addition, other forces that arc not bound to the same extraor ., ·ct Id .. drowned in dreamy dcscnptlon. To won er is o
. The actual outs1 e wor is . .
principles can counteract self-determination and the hope of autonomous action. The images. " . f ords _ the stumbling recourse to the old ch1valne fables
· both the 1a1 1urc o w . .
subject's constitution is constantly ambivalent insofar as its inherent egocentrism expenene~ . f .. · si·nce seeing brinos no assurance that the objects of sight ac-
d the !allure o v1s1on, . o d I.
constitutes on one hand, a survival, appropriation and power strategy, and on the other. - an t ·. · "act an obstacle that blocks any movement towar st 1e
II ·st , 10 Amazemen 1s 111 1, • . · ••
a tendency to reduce and level out differences. The subject's attempt to reduce the tua y ex1 . 'fi th b·ect's sense of excitement m the face of the unknown. I he
h d intcns1 !CS C SU J . · h·
other lo its usefulness, functionality and availability seems to both succeed and foil. ot er an. . blocked movement is a distance between the subject and the other t at
This insight opens new horizons for dealing with the other, as well as new fields of result of this b' ' d ,s·re to overcome the boundary between them. There are two
. I tes the ·su dJect .s e I c is to develop representations and figurations
stnnu a
• t· h h
o t e ot er,
knowledge and investigation. 1 0
possi e 'bl ways to O t us.
. , n th be transformed and thus more easily dea t wit · 1 · I1. At -
As a consequence of logocenlrism we perceive and deal with the other according to . h' h the 'foreign can en , . .
the rules ofreason. We only really let into our field of vision lhat which is capable of mto w JC h IC ti througl1 discourse as well as wntten representations are
proac t 1e o 1cr · ' .
reasoning or shaped by reason; everything else is excluded and belittled. He who tempts 1O ap . ,. f acceptance of the other may be achieved that enc om-
. . d This way, a 1orm o , . . , .
stands on the side of reason is necessarily right. This is valid even for the reduced rea- oi this or er. 'd . . otl1er as well as the other w1thm oneself and the ,am1 1-
b O th the outs1 e 1ore1gn ' •. d
son of functional rationality. Thus, parents stand above children, civilised people above passes . . . , d literarv representations. the other becomes the self an
. I fiaurat1ve d1scursne an - . . ' . t bl
the primitive, and the healthy above the sick. Those who possess reason arc superior to rnr. n 10 ' h Tl e alternative is to emphasise the other s msurmoun a e
f becomes·. t11e ot er. 1
those who possess only pre-forms or weak fom1s of reason. The more a person's lan- these I h th , not be transformed. 'The movement here passes
. . 111 this case, t e o er can ·
guage or reason differs from the general, the more difficult it is to approach and d1fiercnce. • _ • • !etc estrangement: for a moment you sec yourself con-
h ·dent1f1cat1on to comp ' . · h.
understand that person. Nietzsche, freud, Adorno, and many others have criticised throug J . h, b t ti en you make the other become an alien ob.iect, a t mg,
founded with the ot er, u 1 . '11 .
reason's self-satisfied status, and pointed out that people live in all kinds of ways that d strov or incorporate at will.
reason cannot fi.1lly comprehend. that you can e. - . 1 ors' recourse. They could not bec1r the difference that
·1 . ,as the Spams 1 conquer . I "' I
Throughout history, the ethnocentric tradition has also resolutely subjugated all 1 115 v. • - d did thev want to. Instead, they preferred, mdeed t 1cy 1c t
tl· ves reprcsente , nor - , d f
forms of otherness. Todorov, 8 Grccnblatt 9 and others have analysed the processes in- the na · . f the native's ,vorld. The conquerors· ream o owner-
ti d 10 take possession o .
volved in the deslruction of foreign cultures. One of the most horrific examples is the compe e I try's laiid and oold to the bodies and souls of its pcop 1c, yet
, d d to t 1e COUil ' O '
colonisation of Latin America in the name of Christ and the Christian kings. Conquer- ship exten e 'bl h l destrnction Only when destroyed "'.·ould the Ne,v World
ly possi e t roug 1 · , . 1
ing the continent meant eradicating the cultures there. Even on first coming into con- it wa_s _on i~ss. What was left over was then at the con~uerors d1s~osa . . .
tact with them, the conquerors demanded, on pain of enslavement or dec1th, that the lose its othcrr . d t k possession of the natives was, tor the Spamsh, a way ot pro-
natives conform to their beliefs. With incredible force they asserted their own beliefs T 0 d e·stroy an fa c th unknown the)' feared. F1ct1t1ous · .. reports o f canm'b a 1·ism ·
· themselves rom e , · k'll d d
and values, as if to create a world devoid of otherness. Th~ir power-thirsty strategy of tectrng . . xpression of the conquerors own fear of bemg 1 e , e-
th natives \verc an e, . . . h f h .
reasoning enabled the invaders to instigate the eradication of the natives. The indige- among e. . Jved an d ass1m1 . -1a t t:,ct . Their rhetoric tone of d1seust at the s1g t o t e so-
d c • • •

nous people failed to understand that the Spaniard's behaviour was scrupulously calcu- voured, isso t t to distance themselves from the1r own fascmation
, nibals' was an at emp . .
lated c1nd that they used their language to mislead them: friendliness was not what it called can . 1 0 stroving them was another way of creatmg a distance
h · d I genous peop c. e , . · t
seemed;· promises were not used to make agreements, but to mislead· and deceive with t e m and could be conceived as a strategy_ for self-protection ~nd surv1va .
others. Every act served another purpose than that which was purported. The interests between them, . , \\'av of destroving the1r unbearable otherness, and thus
. · the natives \\as a , - - . .
of the crown, the missionary duty of Christianity, and 'inferiority of the natives' were Erad1catmg ti ·se posed. The conquerors took into their possession
. th, threat tIiey o 1erw1 .. d
claims used to legitimise colonial behaviour. Greed and economic motives were kept obliteratmg c Id ·d disposed of it at their will: there was no oppos1t1on, no e-
silent and indeed barred from the conquerors own self-image or vision of the world. everythmg they _cou ' an t th mselvcs with ownina and exploiting the land's riches
h v did not conten e .
also cager to convert the natives to thclf own re 11g-
O • .
Columbus was only ahlc to perceive in the natives that \Vhich he already knew. He bate. Yel t e_
. . the conquerors were . . . . . . 1
only saw signs in their world that he could refer back to things familiar to him, ones and v,mnen. _ . . th ·r StlbJ·ugation by clmmmo the others 1magmat1on. n-
b I thus tma1ismg e1 _, "' - . - .. d
that he could read, classifi1, and interpret in terms of his own frame of reference, like ious sym O 5 : If · hment throuoh openness towards 1orc1gncrs, occup<1t1un an
d of seckmg sc -enric c
the Procrustean bed, into which everything foreign is packed, so as to fit the given
·stea ti· on v1erc the sa d rcsu lt s.

--
structure, The other is covered over by the subject's own images and symbols, and in- desuuc ' _ .

8 Todorov 1989. 10 Greenblatt 1991, p, 133,

11 Greenblatt t 991, p, 135.
9 Greenblatt 1991.
131
130
 Egocentrism, logocentrism, and ethnocentrism interrelate and mutuallv reinforce
each other as strategies for transforming the other. Their common aim is t; assimilate
the '_foreign' or 'other' to that which is not foreign, that is, to the self, and thereby
erad1_cate it. _The processes involved can be observed on many levels. Not only is the
mult1tud_c: of cultures destroyed as a consequence, but so also arc the lives of many
people living_ in_ societies that are forced lo change and conform. The situation is par-
ticularly tragic m cases where local or regional cultures have been eradicated, but no
other cultural values introduced that would help the people come to terms with their
ch,mgecl conditions.
Foreign Others
Cultural anthropology secs itself as a science concerned with the foreign. In recent
years, there has been a widening epistemological debate about the other. How can it be
thought, understood and represented? For a long time, it was assumed that the other
co~ld be clearly recognised, understood and appropriately represented. This is now
bemg callee!_ into que~tion. How, tor instance, when one is bound to one's own point of
view and crnena, 1s 1t possible to represent a forci01 culture accurately without miss-
ing :he culture's own self-conception? ls the repres~ntation of a culturc.'s 'self-concep-
tion_ at nil an adequate way to investigate it? Are there not ahvays parts of a society's
reality left out by its own 'self-conception'? What is this reality? How can it be under-
sto~d'I Can it be grasped by the representations associated with objectified research?
Which aspects of a culture's reality do investigators perceive, and \~'hich arc distorted
or left out of their field of vision by their very methods of enquiry? To what extent is
the ethnologist's image of the 01her in fact merely his m,vn repr~sentation, that is, a
mere _constructi~n of the foreign? Even if this is only partially true, the fundamental
question must still be raised as to what extent every science in fact creates the object of
its enquiry. Case studies constitute a central method of ethnologic research. Informa-
tion is gathered according to a process \Vhereby the ethnologist p;rticipatcs in the other
culture and records l11S observations in a written fieldwork account. Although in cul-
tural anth:opology, participatory observation and wrilten descriptions of th; other in
case studies still play a central part, we are now more aware of the reductions that stem
from working in this way. Indeed, observing under these concliticms means the other is
only ever seen in a particular way. Whatever the other expresses is 'read' like a text
?nd l_atcr ~~nsfor'.11ecl into a written account. The ethnologists' task is to provide a
thick dcsu 1pt10n , yet understandmg and description of the other culture onlv ever
P:occcds_ from the other's text structure to the textual representation thereof 12 This
krnd of tightly phenomenological description is bound to the conditions that a) mani-
testations a_nd forms of expression of the other can be read and interpreted like a text;
b) tln~;eadmg can then be t'.anslatecl into a written form of text that tnily represents the
other. To 4ucst1on the validity oftbese conditions is to potentially reduce the signifi-
cance and truth-value of material gathered in this way.
12 Geertz 1983.
13 Clifford/Marcus 1986.
132
Hermeneutic culturnl anthropology faces the danger of dissolving that which is dif-
ferent. that is, reducing the 'non-identical to a general concept of understanding
whereby the foreign is appropriately deformed and therefore mistreated in order to fit a
universally positive method of hermeneutic appropriation' 14. In gaining insight into the
differences of other cultures, science must avoid the temptation to flatten them v;ith
general concepts. Hermeneutic ethnology approaches the world of the other through
;eadings and interpretations: but in so doing, it also focuses on the relation between the
other and the scientist, that is. between the ethnologist's frame of reference and the
other culture. The interpreter is drawn into the interpretation. Hermeneutic cultural
nnthropology involves methods of objectif)'ing, as well as methods of reflecting world
and self~refcrences. This leads to an ethnnlogy o( the self, of crucial complementary
importance to any ethnology of the other.
In ethnology, the other emerges at the crossing between cultural analysis and a
more general theory of human beings, as well as in ethnographic translation and
description. In the introduction to Argonauts of the ffiestern Pacific, Malinowski pro-
posed three mutually complementary methods of objectification: 15
the documentation of statistical data collected through surveys and observ:itions,
with the aim of working out rules and regular patterns.
the svstematic and continuous recording, in a fieldwork joumnl, of observations
made, of the behaviour of the people one is studying,
the collection of typical narratives, expressions and magic formula.
These procedures turn the other into 'au intimate and systematic object of scientific
observation: "'othering" through uistancing, contextualising, and enclosing (holism)'. 16
In his role as ethnologist, ?vlalinowski would work out a summarised representation of
the foreign society: as an outsider, he was able see the relevance of the characteristics
he observed. Malinowski then became a translator, chronicler, and spokesperson for
the foreign cultures he stucliecl; but in all these different functions, there was still no
interactive process at work hclw<.:en the researcher and the representatives of the for-
ei2.n culture. Only as ethnologist could he be active and creative. Monographs were the
fo;m of text best suited to lvlalinowski's attitude and research, and they have remained
a central form of ethnographic tcxtualisation, objectification and representation. In his
work 011 the other, Malinowski's hit upon the difficulties that all knowledge of the
other must confront: the problem of constituting the object; the paradoxical relation
between closeness and distance, particularity and generality; and the ethnologist's
double role as ficlu worker and author. These difficulties have since led ethnology to
reflect upon questions of textuality and discourse, as well as to experiment ·with new
forms of representation.
Clifford Geertz has contributed largely to discussions on the other and its possible
re resentations. His work has been essential to the hermeneutic turn in c11/t11ral an-
th~opologv. Instead of the study of behaviour. the study of foreign life and world clc-
14 Berg/Fuchs 1993, p. 20 (trans. A. Lagaay).
15 Cf. Malinowski 1953.
16 Berg/Fuchs 1993. p. 20 (trans. A. Lagaay).
133
 signs has become central. What si "fl . . the questioning of authoritative images of individual cultures as presented by ethnol-
their feelings and actions? How ~~ cance and- importance do people attribute to ogy' .20 Representatives of an indigenous anthropology have been growing in number,
importance arise out of a comb_cant_ esef ~on~ect1ons be described? Significance and yet epistemologically, their works are still largely rooted in Anglo-Saxon- cultural an-
. ma 10n o md1vidu 1 • t · .
derstandmg between tradition and ,. . a m erpretahon and collective un- thropology. In the 1970s and 80s, what was diagnosed as a 'crisis of the subject' in
nev, mterpretatwn- they , II .
therefore public Central to thi' k" d f , are socia y constituted and human science, and soon resulted in a 'crisis of the object', also had its effects on those
· s m o research · th · .
systems according to which p I fr is e mterpretation of the svmbolic who emphasised the other's right to speak and be heard. Privileged access to other
world. Research focuses less o eop e I ~m- oth~r cul~ures perceive and interp;et their
cultures could no longer be taken for granted, They too were confronted with the cru-
tations of their actions than (inn tpheopb: s i_nd1V1dual mtent10ns and their own interpre- cial problems of constituting the object and representing the other, as well as questions·
. . • e o ~ect1ve meaning 0 f th · · · .
The aim 1s to investigate what 1 . e1r mtentrnns and actwns. relating to the ethnologist's subjectivity and control. ·.
. va ues meanings and . t . f b .
available in another culture Th" . • onen at10ns o chav1our are
. . · 1s mvo1ves employi · . .
descnptrnn' of actions and con . ng appropriate concepts ma 'thick
versations whereb th b
content of that which is describ d Th' . '. Y e o server concentrates on the Mimetic Approaches
wri.tten account not the actual e · 1 "si~ificance of someone's speech is fixed into a
' ora event itself that 15 · h
spoken act into a text requires a rt . d' '. , t e speech act. To transform a
Mimesis has gained increasing significance in the study of one's approaches to the
speaker's emotional and niental ~ct ai~ 15t ~cmg on the part of the observer from the
· · m ent10ns F1xatio · ·· · other. In ethnology, Frazer was one of the first to note this. In T~e Golden Bough, he
a spoken act from the time and I b · · · . n m wntmg suspends the content of begins his explanation of 'sympathetic magic' by differentiating between 'imitative
· P ace ound conditi f k - .
the speakers are no longer pl . 11 . ons O a spo en s1tuat1on. Because magic', based on the law of similarity, and 'contagious magic', based on the law of
absfractcd, anci its content th11ys1cady orl scemcally present, their language becomes
- · is ma e re cvant to d"ffi ~ contact. Their .functions are defined as follows: 'Ifwe analyse the principles of thought
pomt ~t~nology thus turns into a fonn of ,mai:Y 1 erent addressees. At this on which magic is based, they will probably be found to resolve themselves into two:
cxtract·1ts structure deci"ph·e ·t . ethnogr<1phy, or the attempt to read a text,
. . ' r 1 s meanmg and r d h first, that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and, second, that
an. ethnographic iext. The id t· b . en er t e results of these processes in
· ca o emg able to r'ad It i·k things which have once been in contact with each other continue to act on each other at
social behaviour. institutions and iradition c • cu ure J ·e a text and interpret
a distance after the physical contact has been severed. The fonner principle may. be
phors and metonymies all becom I s as such is central. Language games, met3-
.· . · e re evant to the an J • Th fi . called the Law of Similarity, the latter the Law of Contact or Contagion. From the first
t10n 1s to look at what accord· . th . a ysis. e irst level of mterpreta- of these principles, namely the Law of Similarity, the magician infers that he can pro.:
Th e. results · '
then uiiderao a hi· uh 1 1 f. mg to e ethnologist th I b ·
, e peop e emg studied have said.
. o ' '" er eve o mte t t" · . duce any effect he desires merely by imitating it: from the second he.inlers that what-
sonal constructions fictions·a~nd . . . rpre a ion m which the ethnologist's per-
, . ' cnt1c1sms play a ce t I I G . ever he does to a material object will affect equally the person with whom the object
nolog1sts wnte and work on· th . n ra roe. enerally speakmo eth-
. · . e translation of oth It "' c . was once in contact. whether it formed part of his body or not. ' 21 . .
own culture. How the nroc ·s d . er cu ures 1or the members of their In the realm of magic, mimesis can serve to exercise power over the othe;. Simi-
• · •• · . r- c scs escnbed here act1i 11 · ·
IS a matter of debate to ·what t . , . . a Y proceed JS an open question. it
tl1e" qua11ty . .and kind of a exh. ent m his own ca·sc s t ud"1es a·eertz actuallv achieved larity is the condition for a successful magical. act. It strengthens the relation, cr.eated
;,. .. · . pproac towards the oth · d . · . by the magician, between two objects, situations, or people. Magical influence over
ior which he stands But th . . . er, an representation of the foreign
·. . . . · - ere 1:0 no doubt abo t th · . ' something is achieved by effectively copying or representing it. Belief in the magic is
t1ve. s: a new literarv methodol . 1 . u e consequences ol the new perspec-
• · - , 0 ' ogica and ep1sten101 · I · essential for it to work. However, Frazer was wrong to emphasise similarity pe_r se .as
1n _cultural anthropology, with fruitful r · og1~a consc10usness has developed the central condition for magical effects created through mimesis. Similarity as such is
. ', If there was a problerrntic split be~:1~:s for t?e s_c1~nce and its lev:l o~reflec!ion. not important. What matters is the connection between a representation, and the figure
ski s work, and if Geertz tri'ed to d . . , n subJecttvity and obJecttv1ty m Mal mow-
. . o JUslJcc to th· d'ffi 1 · . . on which it is based, in other words, the creation of a relation between two ·worlds:.
cle, then as a result there has b . d ts I cu ty with the hermeneutic cir- Mimetically relating my 'world' to the 'world' of the other constitutes a form of ap-
' een a emand for th th , , · .
room. The other sneaks b?"k ha b e o er s v01ces to be given more
• · . • " ' c s ecome the pro f . . . . proach to th;.: other. ·
mtemat1onal ethnolog·), 17 Ace d" . . gramme o an important direction m Taussig illustrates this with the example of the Cuna figurines, many of which,
I · . · or mg to this move11 t th
c aim, through its own laneuag th" · · . . :en, e other must attempt to re- through dress and appearance, are made to look like the white-skinned colonisers. 22
The· extent of this eildeavo;r re:ch e ::ressmn of ns su~jectivity and representation.
Toe mimetic act of representing the white colonisers in the form of figurines is a way
tacks·and appea]sl8 via the dee es . om Franz Fanon s fundamentally political at-
. · · · onstrnct1on of We t h, . . of reducing their size and threatening character. Magical performance then enables the
the other - and the criticisms th f 1. s em cgemomc discourses that fixed Cuna to actually exert power over the white men whom they otherwise perceive as
ereo w uch tend to do the samc'9 -, right through to

17 Nandy 1983. 20 Berg/Fuchs 1993, p. 67 (trans. A. Lagaay).

18 Fanon 1964.
21 Frazer I 924, Vol. II, p. 52.
19 Said 1978.
22 Taussig 1993.
134 135
 . · . · is the simultaneous approach towards, and distancing from
hat constitutes m1mes1s · . d h b
over-powering. There arc numerous examples in the literature of cultural anthropology w ' · · · the indecisiveness of the m-betwccn - a ancc on t c or-
of how the other is approached through representation. Through the act of creating of a th nk.nown remammg m . . · Id b-
e u ' If d tlie other Any attempt to remam on either side wou e a
representation, one's feelings and attitudes towards the other can be expressed and de- der I .m e between onese ,. ·
an ·
,- 11 er of the self or of the other - and would put an end to t11c
form of transgression - GI 1 ·
scribed. The other is transferred into one's own symbolic world where one's relation-
ship to it can be personified. Something becomes visible in the representation that may mim .
. ctic movement.
. h 5 to the other range between the extremes o Sey a an L iary-
f 11 d ~l
not have been easily graspable before. Thus, to create a representation of the white • M1met1c approac c · · If Tl ,
. If b d 11 ment to the other, and its reduct10n to these . 1ere arto, on
man is not merely to imitate him, but rather, to enter into a mimetic act, out of which bd15 between se -a an o . . . h h h h'd
' h bl' . d-out faces of projective xenoph1ha, and on t e ot er, t e 1 e-
t! ie One hand t e lisse - -h · ·
something new arises. The mimetic act is not a mere reproduction, but a creative ac- b' Botli sides necessarily avoid real contact wit or examma1ion
ugs of xenop 10 ia. .
tion. Producing figures of the ·white men is a way of coming to terms with their for- ous m h - ·t case differences arc overlooked, rn the second, they are not
eignness. Hidden behind the representation of the other are emotions such as irritation, 0t
- th other In t e 1irs · · h. l ·
e · . b h ses something is sacrificed: either the self or that w 1c 1 1s
insecurity, and the desire to control the fascinating unknown by keeping it within the allowed. But m loll eta n'cw rclatior;s or discoveries. At most, xcnophilia allows for
boundaries of one's own symbolic world. In mimetically representing the white men as fioreign. · Ne1thcr a ow or . · · , t· h,
. f ti other The person fads to look beyond his imagi:: o t c
d d expenence o 1e . . . .d f
others, 1he Cuna arc not interested in understanding the motivations behind the white a re uce : d . arid does not seek contact \Vith the foreign outsi c o
1 d !11s relate emo 1wns, . . .·
people's behaviour, or the values and symbols of their culture. Their concern is rather ot ier an , b xposed to the ambivalence of rmmet1c approaches. It the
to express and portray the sif,'Tlificance and meaning of the whites for the Cuna. The
· · ae· he refuses to e e. . . . ·
this 1mao , _ _ 1 . c1· ·idual's "Xpectations and desires, h1s projected attract10n
t:·1-toti.1ltilt1em1v ~, , .
mimetic act of creating these representations constitutes for the Cuna a way of appro- other ai s . . ti·o11 ··rid animosit)' and later produce the same fcelmgs m the
priating the whites both imaginatively and symbolically. This stems from their need to
. n turn mto reJec u , . h l
ma) soo . . . , 1 f imosity and violence develops. Both sides react tot e rn-
clarify their relationship to them. h A mnnetic spira o an h h . .
ot er._ e other otentially intensifying the scale of violence throng t eir r:a~tions.
tv!any different forms of representation constitute mimetic approaches towards the trcJ ot th 'p h , · netic crisis' a scapeiwat is sought to blame and v1ct!l111se.
dcr to overcome t e mu ' ~ . t
other. Not only do texts and images play an important part, but also gestures and ritu- In or . ·f . . 1 e on to ,such scapegoc1ts , a soc1etv
O • 15 mhercnt v10 enc , attempts to recrea e
als, games and barter. ln the creation of representations, self and other are combined. In proJCC mb i l , broken The mechanisms at work here cannot be broken
· l rder that 1as 6 c:en · cl·
There is always a performative side to any representation of the other: something is the socrn o . 1 I . ti ougl1 them Until then there can be no un<lcrslan mg.
portrayed, depicted or personified. Mimetic energies are such that a representation is
·1 th eoplc mvo vec sec If ~ . ' .
untJ e P II ,· f, ·ced images of hatred prevent accurate perception, as
. · and mutna y ri::m 01 · • . . , .
never merely the copy of an original, but something different, the creation of a new Pr0Jcct1ons .h d ex~m1·nation of the other. The second way ot 'm1ssmg the
tact wit an ," ' If b
world, Often a representation will depict an otherwise undeveloped concept of the we! I as con . . ·t d'ffiereilce This too .imounts to a refusal to let oncse c
. . to fail to perceive 1 s i · .
other, and portray the 'unportrayable'. In such cases, mimesis itself invents the figure othe1 is ' . . . , Difference remains unbearable. The person only sees m
d to mimetic processes. .
of a representation, tha1 is, creates the very object it imit<1tes. expose . t l e~d)' knows To assimilcite oneself to the other 1s seen as
h ti1at wh1c 1 1c aIr " · · . .
In mimetic processes, the foreign is drawn into the logic and dynamic of one's own the ot er, ,, . own existence The onlv wav out is to either belittle It or
o rous as a threat to one s . , . ., . ,
imaginary world, and therefore transfom1ecl. As representation, the other is not exactly clan"'e ' . b ·truct the possihilitv of mimetic advances. ·
made into the self, but it becomes a figure in which self and foreign are mixed: a.figu- ·t and there 1ore o :; ·· - . ·
destroy· 1 '['. ' pproac.: l1es _ t owar els tllc other are conctantlv ~ • ambivalent. They can .either
ration ol !he i11-berwce11. The creation of this 'in between• gains significance in one's !'vfime JG a f If enri· chment , or misfire and lead to the destruction of
d . d be a source o sc - . .
contact with the other. Mimetic representation makes it possible not to fix or incorpo- succee .in Tl t , of one's contact with others oscillates between deterrrn-
rate the foreign. but to keep it in its ambivalence as something both familiar and un- l f . d other 1c na urc · .
both se an · . t· Su'cccsful approaches to, or attempts to deal with the
known. Mimetic movement works like a dance between the foreign and that ,,-hich is
. d non-cktermma 10n. c; 0 • • ,
nation an 1 , , 1 t t which one mana 2 es to v,c1thstand the sense of msecu-
, . dpendont1ccxen o ~ . d
one's 'own', resting neither with the self, nor with the unknown, but oscillating be- tore1gn, e · . ti , otherrless Neither ,elf nor other should be conceive
. f d with t11e o 1er s · · .
tween them. Representations of the other are contineent· thcv need not be the way they nty when ac_e t . II" disconnected units. Instead, both the fore:gn and the
arc, but could also be represented otherwise. Mime~c r~ove~1ent is therefore open; the - lf-con1c11ned, or mu u~ ! . . . t· h
as se . . . ,n complex and fraomentary relations. Ansmg out o t e
figuration it creates depends on the play of imagination and on the social and symholic ·1· consist lil t1ieir m, 0 · · · · d d
Fann iar · · .. . . d difference this mimetic relat10n 1s h1stonc an etcr-
contexts. No form of representation or figuration is necessary. Many difforent, hetero- d I rocesses ot 1m1tat1on an ,. ,-
ua P ct· to p;:irticular contexts and times.-"
geneollS forms are conceivable. Mimetic movement defines which figures will be mined accor mg '
danced, which forms of the game will be chosen. Mimesis of the other is an aesthetic
experience involving a game with the unknown into which the self may expand. In it,
one's self comes to resemble the other. Mimesis is a sensory event that can involve all
the senses. It does not mean 'falling' or melting into the foreign. This would involve a
different kind of effort on behalf of the self; it would mean equating oneself with the
other, mimicking the foreign, and would result in a certain loss of the self. Rather, 23 Gebauer/Wulf 1998.
137
136-
 10

The Globalisation of Education

The expansion of the European Union involving ever more European countries means
education in Europe can no longer simply be seen as a national undertaking but has be-
come an intercultural task. 1 The core question in this growth is how geographical, re-
gional and national differences and similarities in education and training will be dealt
with. On the one hand, there is a need to maintain cultural differences between the
various countries within Europe as one facet of the rich multiplicity of the continent;
on the other hand, the political, economic and cultural developments in Europe entail
the need for a common approach. .
In the face of the globalisation of important areas o(life as well as world\vide po-
litical, economic, and cultural integration the need for such a common approach is
greater than ever. In the long term, such developments will increase the tension be-
tween the local and the global, with people increasingly seeing themselves as members
of a global village with joint responsibility for the fate of the planet, and yet at the
same time being unwilling to give up their attachment to a local and national context.
Conflicting values and a sense of insecurity are the consequences. At present, we can
distinguish two tendencies within societal development, contrary but at the same time
inseparably entwined, which. are_ both central requ_irements _for shaping education
within Europe: one tendency 1s d1rected towards an mcrease m individualisation, the
other towards an increase in globalisation. The highly differentiated societies within
Europe give each individ~al _t~e ch~nce to live h_er/his own _l!fe, ye~ simultaneously
force this choice on each md1v1dual.· The contradictory conditions ot present-day so-
cialisation are contained ·within this requirement: each one ofus is supposed to live an
individual life under societal conditions, which, however, are not subject to the indi-
vidual's control. Thus, the demand made is to organise one's own life, with the expec-
tation that one organises it successfully. Each is to choose his own biography'; each is
to actively create his own life, to construct it, to take up the responsibility for it being a
success. In this scenario. tradition plays a subordinate role; what is expected is self-
determination and self-realisation.

I WulfJ995.
2 Beck 1997. _ _ . _ _ . .
3 Consider the increasing significance of ~1ography :csearch m educat1on~I science. For an overview
f relevant theoretical and 111ethodolog1cal questions and the connection between biography re-
~carch and education in the German context, see Kriiger/Marotzki 1998.

139
 . In addition, there is also the tension between the universal and the individual, nation state." For one thing, nation states incrensingly delcgak decision-making to
which needs to be readjusted in the processes of education. On the one hand olobali- supra-national bodies. A further reason for the los_s of sovereignty_ is that multination~I
sation i~fluences most areas of human endeavour creating similarities acros~ ~ultural conglomerates disempower nation states by playmg one_ off aga1_nst_ l~c oth~r 111 this
bound~nes; on the other hand, it encourages resistance against the levelling of differ- process. Thus, for example, they develop their product~ m countnes with a !ugh level
~nces m the ~ame_ofthe individual's uniqueness and integrity. Finally, education in the of technological know-how, manufacture the products 111 _low-:vage countnes, and pay
-1 st cer~tury 1s hcrng drawn into the conflict between tradition and modernism or post- tax in countries with low tax-rates. Through dcstroymg Jobs m the country the com-
modern ism: hmv can one remain open to changes both now and in the future without pany is based in, and through tax-saving measures, tl:e company burdens the state with
betraying one's own cultural tradition? How can the various developmental dynamics increased costs for constantly new unemployed Vih1le simultaneously the loss of tux
be related to one another and adjusted one against the other'/ And which role do the paid severely limits the sta_te's ab!lily to produ_cc the financial means needed. The strat-
modem media play ill this development? e ,y pays off for multmat1onals 111 terms of mcreased profits. However, as a consc-
Th~ radical pluralism of worldviews and educational concepts has created an in- q~~nce there is a lack of funds available for the areas of education, health and social
crease m the complexity of educational thought and action, bringing in its wake, more ·welfare.
than ever before, greater insecurity about the goal of education, and individual and so- Globalisation ]ends to distances being overcome, and brings with it the knowledge
c_ictal ~levelopment. How1c:ver, such insecurity should not only be considered as a threat of previously unknown, far-distant cultural and_socictal are_as. 7 These are no longer the
smce it also generates the _willingness to question one's own values, perspectives and discrete territories which go to nrnke up the nation_ s~ate, \V1th all its borders and border
actions 111 a more open-rmn<led way. The willingness to ref1ect on one's own funda-
mental beliefs leads to greater openness towards the other towards other models of
cducat_ion_ and other ways oflifc. In the world at present with the new developments of
~::t trols since the new media of telephone, telcv1s1on, and comp~ter can travel over
distances at close to the speed of light: space is shrinking. 8 And only limited
means, both financial and temporal, are_ now ncc_cled to_ overcome d1stan~e. Images, the
globalisat1on, r~g10nalisation and localisation, this greater openness toward the other "'ore! and mass tourism all brmg the distant mto our near cnv1ronmcnt. Th..:
spo ken n ' ( . . . . . .
and the foreign 1s of central importance. traditional order of space and t1_me, ol d\stant a_n? ~car,_ of strange a~d fam11Iar 1s be-
The_ prcs~nt-day far-reaching societal change characterised as 'globalisation' is a coming destroyed, with new mixes _and 1mpun\ics b_cmg cre~ted. l he transnatwnal
m~lll-d1mens1onal process, with economic, political, social and cultural effects, which world society is not to be characterised by homogene'.ty and simple strncturcs but by
will alter the relationship between the global and the local, regional and nntional state mu [ t1p · J'citv
1 _,
di.f'(erences and complexity. 'Planet Earth may well be depicted as man-
,J . . . .
level. In considering this process, we can distinguish the following as the most impor- kind's 'I Icimat' in space and these imag~s finnly anchored deep 111 our mn~r 1conogr~~
tant changes Vilth regard to education:'1 1 hy and imagination, nonetheless these images do not :ay that the Emih 1s cconom1c
Shortage_ of work: This npplies, above all, to less-qualified jobs. The shortage will ~allY, culturally or politically homogen0US nor ~hat It IS mt\Je p;ocess Ol becoming SO:
remam despite the hopes bound up with a changeover to service industries. For in- The. world has, in fact, many cultural, cconormc, and poht1cal lransna/1u11al c:c:11/res
crcasmg numbers of people, the deep-rooted connection between the mcanino oflife as and in these are creakd various_globa/ scenanos \~hethcr m /echnologzcCll or financial
a social being and work will cease to be viablc. 5 This, however is not the o;Iv chan°e , or in images, cvmm11111ca/wn or m the media.·
w~ ar~ facing. The fixed link between many training program~cs and partic~lar jobs
ar.:asGlobalisation of cultures: One needs to give · up the 1·d ea o f nnagmmg
· · · ed ucat10nas ·
will d1ssolvc as there is an increasing recognition of and encouragement of key qua!ifi- · which takes place exclusively within an upturned airtight 'container' cx-
sorne tillllo 0
. - . . ..
callons like the ability to co-operate, reflect, and innovate, coupled wi!h the drive to - , »ri·no the territorv of one s111glc nation state. The various ongms, npproaches
actly o.;o,e "' • .~ . . .
achieve, -with, in addition, strengths in intercultural and media areas. As well as con- es of a culture are such thnt 1t makes more se11se to imagme them overlappmg
an d fiocus . . I ' I 1· , . <l b
veymg knowledge in specific areas, education will have to contribute more to the de- . h ll , lobal reoional and local all mter-connected. T 1e term g oca ism , cumc y
wit 1c g ' · "' . . . . .
velopment of those qualities which help to shape those constantly growing areas out- Roland Robertson, expresses this layering of the global with _the local, of the um versa!
side the, ':·orld of work. In order to master the ever-more complex connecti;ns between . l ti paiiicular whercbv new forms of cultural and social aggregates arc created
wit 1 1e ' · . . . .
areas ol life and work arising from glohalisation, there is thus a need for greater, rather . 1 re to a 12.reat extent nutonomous. This ovcrlappmg and mterdependence ol var-
than less, mvestmcnt m education. wh1c 1 a ~ · d I · · · · · J• b
. lt , J elements does not make an mdcpen ent cu tur3f umty cx1stmg m 1tsc 1, ul
ied cu ur,1 - , . . . . .. .
. The red1:crion in importance of the nation state: If in many areas of the world the , thi.: intense culturnl mult1pl!c1ty Ill the cond1t1ons of our lives through the com-
creates -·
, turY The more exactly we try to locate t11c commona 11t1es. t e more we w1 see
h ·11
nation st ate is lh_e primary carrier of culture and education, globalisation today leads to .
a general reduction mocen .· . fd. .. . \'.
d' . . of ·a na 1·1011 s t at es_
' unportancc
· an d thus to genernlly clrnngmg
· con- th; diversities. Yet precisely through the percept10n o _1vers1t1es. ~re commona 1t1es
itrnns for cducat10n. There are a vanety of reasons for the loss of sovereignty of the , 0 e likelv to cmeroc. Thus. there w!ll he new mixes of different cultural cle-
olten m r - "

6 Wulf 1998.
4 Beck 1997. 7 Liebau/Miller-Kipp/Wulf 1999.
8 Bilstein/Miller-Kipp/Wulf 1999.
5 See above Part I, chap. 3, 'Work as Gesture and Ritual'.
9 Castells 1996.
140 141
 ments. The new tasks facing education are to be found within this process: the devel- t. The demands made by these processes in globalisation and individualisation
opment of new accounts of the other, new reference points, and new transnational sa 100 · · · 1·1sa1Ion· o f ch"ld1 ren an d
h ave a sus tained and lasting effect on the . education and socrn
. . tirom th"1s are mam·r,o ld , as are t h e
loyalties and alliances. Ecological and peace movements have developed initial forms onalities and diversities ansmg
teenagers. The Comm .
of transnational associations together with the corresponding actions by segments of -ntended side effects of the educatmnal processes. .
the population. uni
Curiosity and the Foreign in Today's Education: Wit· l1m
JJ< · t I1e socta · 1 ~n d cu ltura1,
Today the processes of globalisation pervade all areas of life and have increased reated by globalisation, the increasing contact to and confrontation with the
processes C . 1o . . f: ·1 ·
the complexity of life-worlds and the ways in which people live. They have an intlu- · b omes more and more important. As we have seen, success or at ure m
en~e on the young generation through, above all, new media, new ways of communi- forezgn ec
dealing with the foreign is a decisive factor in dete~ining e qua 1ty o h e .. n as ar
th 1· f "fi I f;
cation, and the world market; these processes make their effect felt across all cultural t . on is supposed to prepare the next generatmn for the challenge of hfe under
differences, however great, though what they achieve is similarity, not sameness. as ed uca 1 • f h · d b
. - tal ditions which are globally m the process o c ange. a more intense e ate
soc1e con . . I • k
There would be resistance against an attempt to reduce similarity to sameness in order · - h b th the foreign and foreigners belongs to one of the mcrcasmg y important tas s
withl O
to ~m~oth over differences, and within this framework one would justifiable try to
wit n ed uca t'on i •
Yet what is foreign and what is familiar? Where do the commonali-
• • • • .
mamtam the value of the integrity and uniqueness of the particular. In view of this de- · d diversities lie when we consider what 1s foreign and what 1s own? · . ·
velopment, education has to occupy itself increasingly with the task of supporting ties an · in task of education will be to awaken curiosity · · ab out th e fiore1gn · an d
Th e ma . d Th' . h ..
you~g people in meeting the demands which have developed from the enormous ex- - · · 1 "thout sacrificin2. it to mere superficial knowle ge. 1s 1s t e prereqms1te
mamtam 1 w1 - • •
pans1~n ofknowledge and help them unfold their personal abilities through knowledge.
ofmakmg an e
. ,ncounter with the foreign more an ennchment and less a threat. One of
• . • . .
expenment and experience. Thus, they will be bdtcr able to cope with the increased · tant thouah most difficult tasks facmg education 1s how to encourage
the most 1mpor '°' . . . •
complexity of life and better able to organise and make decisions about their own lives. . - th unknown and develop methods of heunst1c learnmg. When reforms m
In .this situation, one of the most difficult tasks within education is balancing the de- interest in e h" d · h J
- planned differences in the value of measures ac 1eve m t e onger or
educat10n are , . . . h h .
m~ndfo~ eq_uality of opportunity and the need/or competition: equality of opportunity uld be taken into account, since what 1s effective m t e s ort-term 1s
brmgs with 1t the demand for special resources to promote socially disadvantaged chil- shorter-term Sho . d · . b .·
· t·"ectual in the long-term and vice versa. Thus, e ucat10n nee. ds to e·
frequent Iy me 1 ' • • . •
dren -whereas the support needed for life in a competitive society demands the devel-
C •

rspecl!ve ofhfelon" learning which should be planned ,md ap-

Iooke at rom the Pe
d f " . , . . . .
opment of skills needed for self-assertion. The former aims at developing solidarity, . d. ly This will itself involve developmg a vancty of forms oflearnmg.
the la~er at i~dividuality. These two goals are frequently seen as mutually exclusive, Phed accor ·
mg . .
nd Di'lemmas in Education: Education today 1s mfluenced by vanous
. . .·
allowmg no simple compromises to be made.
Tenszons a . . .
tensions,. conflict formations and dilemmas: · ·
The Scenario of the Future? The Increase of Individualisation and Globalisation:
At present, we can distinguish two main tendencies within societal development. con-
1 In the Iong t enn ,
tensions will increase hetween the local and the global. with peop.
. . • .. .
le
t:ary QU~ at the same time insepsrably entwined, which are both central requirements · · ,] seeing themselves as members of a glohal village with JOmt respon~
P . . .c tie f:ate of the planet and yet at the same tune em 2. unw1-11mg
rogressive y . b . - · · ,
for shapmg education: one tendc.:ncy is directed towards an increase in individualisa- to _-gl\'e up·
sibt11ty 1 or 1 , • - . ·.
ti?n, the_ other !?wards an increase in globalisation, In many parts of the world many th . ttachment to a local and nal!onal context. - ·· ·
highly differentiated societies give each individual the chance to live her/his own life, elf a · between the universal and the individual needs to be readjusted in the
yet simultaneously force this choice on each individual. The contradictory conditions 2 · The tension d
, of education too. Rather than the tendency towar s a g o a 1sat1on o · 11e
I b 1· · f·1·s-:
of present-da~ socialisation arc contained within this requirement: each one of us is nrocesses -
- ·t d to areas such as economics an
d po11llcs,
.-
t
· process 1s
111s • a 1so tak-mg
being 11m1 e
y•.
. • .
supposed to hvc an individual life under societal conditions which. however are not
lace w1·th'111 culture and education • ·
On the one hand, globalisation mfluences most
. . . . - .
subject to -the individual's control. Thus; the-demand made'is to 0 ;-ganise o~e's own P f h an endeavour creatmg s1m1lant1es across cultural boundanes and; on.
life, with the expectation that one organises it successfully. In this s-cenario, tradition areas O um encourages resistance agamst · the leve · 11·mg o· f d"ffi I erences m t e
· h
the ot her hand , . . . .
plays a subordinate role; what is expected is self-determination and self-realisation. Of th e individual's uniqueness and mtegr1ty. · ·
: The abilities to reflect and make decisions has become the most important qualities name · h ti· ·
·t 'ntury education will be drawn mto t e con ict etween tra 1 10n and b· d"t· ·
3 In the nex ce , . . . . h . .
tor the way we organise· our lives and the decisions we make. Life, nowadays. for · · r post-modernism bringing with 1t questions like: ow can one remam
moderm s m o . . , . .
many people is a life in a material world without reference to transcendence. Each in- oth now and in the future without betraymg one s own cultural
dividual is solely responsible for the difficulties arising in their own situation and any
open to c han ges b .
. • ? How can the various developmental dynamics be related to one another.
errors made in dealing with them. . . ted one against the other? And wh"1ch roIe do . the mo dem med"ta. pIay .m
trad1t1on.
and ad~us . .
· On the other hand, growth in individualisation is increasingly determined by the
this development?
pro_cesses of ~lo~a(isation. The result is a reciprocal n:lationship: the present-day forms
of mcreas~d md1v1dualisation have become possible through globalisation processes,
yet gloha1Isat1on processc.:s, in turn, require a growth and intensification in individuali-
10 Dibie/Wulf 1998.
142 143
 and skills in order to develop a conduct of life, which is more productive_ Here, the
4. There is an increasing tension between long-term and short-term considerations, i.e. humanities and their knowledge arc of central importance both in achieving these aims
\~hat makes sense from a _short-term perspective might be \vrong when looked at and reforming education and society. There is, moreover, a need for developing com-
!rom a long-term perspective. Many of the financial cuts in education would fall petence in acting socially within different social areas. Education has to focus on the
. mto this category. improvement of memory, reflection, imagination, health, communication skills and the
5. Within education~! reforms, the tension between the need for competition and the particular needs and abilities of the individual social subject.
conc~m for equality of opportunity cannot be overcome once and for all. All the Given that there are 900 million illiterates and 130 million children without the op-
sol~t1ons offered are merely simplifications of the problem. Within the framework portunity to visit school, greater efforts are needed to improve basic education without
ofhfel?ng learning, there is a need to balance the three forces of 'competition', 'co- reducing secondary and university education. International efforts have to be increased
opcrat1on' and 'solidarity'. · in order to help poor countries extend the quantity and quality of education. The suc-
6. The extraordinary expansion of knowledge creates a tension between itself and hu- cessful introduction of educational reforms depends on the commitment shown_ by
man beings' capacity to assimilate it. The educational system, therefore, has to sup- communities - including parents, teachers, principals, the general public and the inter-
port young people to help them cope with the challenges inherent in acquiring new national community. The report stresses that, for the success of educational reforms,
knowledge as ~ell as helping them develop their own personal proficiency. decentralisation and the active participation of teachers are both crucial. ·
7. There 1s a tension ben:veen the spiritual and the material. Only if education can bal- The report recommends the international community take the following steps: _
ance the potential conflict between the spiritual and the material, can it help young
people adequately to prepare themselves for life in modem or late modem societies. educate women and girls for equality,
give one quarter of all development aid of international organisations as support in
Th~ ai_m of education ought to be to enable young people to balance these tensions in
their_ hves and contribute towards the shared future of mankind. Education needs to be education,
allow no reduction of debts and credits if the finances for the educational sec{or_
c_ons1dered as a process of life-long· learning and as a value in itself. Although educa-
have been reduced,
t1011 has to accept • the challenoes c emcruinrr
b 1c- firom soc·1eta) , econom1ca· I an d po 1·1·
1 1caI introduce worldwide modem information technology,
deYelopments, it ought not to he reduced only to those. Furthermore, education has to increase consideration on NGO's for international co-operation.
resist
. the economisation ofth'e e ducc1, 1·10na I t-1e Id and encourage an awareness that there
1s more to education _ than me r el Y econo1111c · cons1"deratmns. · ·
Through education, young The UNESCO report of the Dclors commission consists of the following chapters;
people need to be prepared for the diversity and heterogeneitv fo~md in the different their titles indicate the character of the programme they are proposing:
regions of the world. ·
Learning· . · the treasure wz"th·in. In th'1s s1tuat1on · · of growing societal and educational From the local community to a world society. Worldwide interdependency and
co~plexity, UN~SCO has Jir~sented a report on education in the 20th century, which globalisation have a strong influence on the daily life of most people. This situafio,n
delmeates four pillars oflearnmg: learning to know, learning to do learning to live to- is a challenge to culture, education and society. There is a danger of the gap increas-.
gether, learning to be. Leaming ought to be based on living toge[her with others and ing further between a minority of human beings, who can creatively shape _these
help to shape communal lives constructively and in the spirit of peace and social jus- new conditions of life and the majority of human beings, who are helpless vis a vis
tice. Mutual understanding is to be encouraged and skills needed to form one's life these innovations.. Finally, an improvement of mutual understanding, responsibility,
productively are to be fostered and developed. Of particular importance among the and solidarity is needed, to which educatioi;i can contribute. . ·
many
, -
0
tv1°es
_- · of knowled
. ge is · "fi1c knowledge required for shaping societal
· tl1e scn.:nt1 _ From social cohesion to democratic participation. Educational policy must take_ a
chan..,c. •· The_ development·ofth»
. v con1pete
- . nee to· ac ·tm· various
· ·
societal · to be en-
areas 1s broad perspective; it should not contribute to the social exclusion of individuals and
courage~. 1 hu_s, such demands are directed to the specific skills and needs of the indi- population groups. Ed_ucation o~ght_ to combine, on the one hand, societal demari.ds
viduals,
.. . . . ,o
. . their health_, memor" ;, r"fl
c ec t·10n, 1magmat1on
· · · and aesthetic · and commumca- · and, on the other, an tnd1V1dual · s right to personal development Education cannot
ttve a~il!ties. ~u_ch learning ought to contribute to the multidimensional concept of solve the.central societal problems, but it can help to cope with them better. Schools
e~uc~tion, avo1~m~ the economisation of education; this is a dominant perspective in fulfil their societal tasks only when also they contribute to the education of minority
vtewmg e~ucation m what is often referred to as the neo-liberalism of the capitalistic groups. An education dev~lopi?g. demo~racy: citizenship and civil behaviour has to
world society. · · · · take place in all schools, smce 1t 1s precisely m school_ that students can learn demo-
._ Ma~y hopes f~r improvement have centred on the UNESCO report's main con- cratic behaviour, including the understanding of the other and how to make compe-
ctpts • ol the . leammo-
, "" socict,·' J and 'J'i' _1 e)ong Jcammg' · • fior everyone. with · the requ1s1te
· · tent judgements. Education needs to assist ~tudents and adults to develop the
ad3ustments
.. . m torm 'and cont ent...,or m · d.1v1··d ua I ab·1· · and potential.
1 1t1cs · Leammg · shotil d cultu~.:il prerequisites necessary for the structuring of information and the under-
be• related
• to people Iivin too tl1getherand conn t ·b ute to sliap1112
· this· construct1velv
· ·m tl1e
standing of their historical context.
spmt ofpeacc and •soci·t\ ' •1
- tI"tt"
0 ce. Th e aim . ~
· nee d s to he to improve ·
mutual understandmg .
]45
144
 - ·From economic growth to human development. A new concept of development is
·needed, generating a framework within which actual living conditions can better be
taken into consideration. More research is needed on the future of work and changes
in the world of work caused by technological developments. The relation between
· policies of development and education need to be reconsidered and improved. Fur-
ther efforts are needed for the enlargement and improvement of basic education in
all areas of the world.
The four pillars of education. The four pillars of learning to know, learning to do,
learning to live together, and learning to be should all lead to a better general and
focused education. There needs to .be further development of skills which would en-
. able people to act adequately in.different local, regional and international situations.
Mutual esteem and the ability for competent co-operation ought to be developed and
· therefore there is a concomitant need for many different types of knowledge and
ways of learning and acting in the educational system.
- ·Learning throughout life. Strategies oflifelong learning have to be developed since
more and more competence is expected from the social subject. This in tum entails
. the development of adequate programmes and strategies within a learning society.
- From basic education_ to university. Worldwide efforts in education need to be fo-
.. cused on basic educational skills with special attention given to primary education
and the teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic. Such a worldwide concern for
· ·basic education would take into consideration the specific conditions of different
countries and populations. Furthermore; there will still be a need for writing and
reading programmes for illiterates. To help transmit basic scientific knowledge,
better curricula are required. _The teacher student ratio has to be improved or com-
. pensated for by new teaching technologies, Within the context of lifetime learning,
·· secondary school education ought tei be reconsidered, with educational counselling
' used to help improve educational opportunities and social justice. On the tertiary
level,- universities should be able to teach the specific knowledge required for social
::and economic life nowadays; in addition, they should be equipped well enough to
·. prepare students for university careers. Universities should be open to all those who
meet !he entrance requirements. On the university level, there ought to be more in-
. ' :tematmnal: co-operation, ·although each university should retain its autonomy in
teaching and-research. On the level of both secondary and university education,
·. there ought to be a large variety of programmes available. ·
- Teachers in search of new perspectives. Teachers, in many areas of the world, find
themselves both economically and socially disadvantaged. Both of these aspects
·need to be changed in order for teachers to be able to fulfil their important societal
task: Co-operati~n between different sites of learning and differently qualified peo-
ple _is needed to improve the variety of learning and education processes in various
· societal areas.
Si~ce the outcome of schooling depends largely on the quality of the teachers,
contmuous teacher in-service training is needed. A national and international ex-
change ~f teachers can considerably help in _two ways: by helping students cope
better with the demands of society today and improving the feeling of solidarity
. · between the generations.
146
Choices for education: The political factor. The quality of the educational system
influences the orientation and quality of society and therefore there is a need for
public debate on educational issues, which involves decision makers in it. The qual-
ity of educational institutions is improved through decentralisation and relative auto-
nomy. The state and the community should remain responsible for education with
finance provided by the state and the public. Private support is desirable, but cannot
by itself replace the state or the community. The financing of education has to take a
lifelong perspective into account Educational technologies offer more possibilities
than are at present in use.
International co-operation: educating the global village. Today, international co-
operation is needed in the field of education. Investments in education are invest-
ments in the future of the society. There should be explicit positive support for girls
and women in education. New information technologies should be developed and
improved. One aim of international co-operation ought to be the internationalisation
of curricula and the use of new technologies. NGOs should co-operate ,to improve
educational development.
It is not my aim here to offer a detailed critical review of the UNESCO Report of the
Delors Commission on the future of education. Nevertheless, I feel it would be useful
to raise a few questions which may serve as a point of departure for a more substantial
critique, such a critique being understood as an attempt to improve the report's rele-
vance for education and schooling in different part of the world: . .
To what extent does the report fulfil its intention to create a general perspective _fo1
human development on the basis ofleaming and education?
Isn't the report itself - in spite of the contributions from different parts of.the work
in the Epilogue - too European centred and in need of further elaboration to be rele·
vant for educational planning and practice in Asia, Africa and South-America? ..
Doesn't the universal character of the report reduce its relevance for the differen·
regions of the world and wouldn't a regionally more specific report be a better helJ
for the improvement of education and schooling? . . .
Aren't the underlying philosophical and anthropological assumptions about the per-
fectibility of human beings too optimistic? And isn't that optimistic view itself 1
handicap for practical educational work, since it tends to give practitioners a. bac
conscious, which might in tum paralyse their innovative energy?
Whoever considers education in the next century runs ·the risk, as in the UNESCO re-
port, of over-stressing the utopian side of educational thinking and doing. The optimis·
tic hope in the perfectibility of young people transforms the nature of their reality, 1
reality equally characterised by resistance and incorrigibility. A large number of edu-
cational reforms have shown that young people are not prepared merely to let them-
selves be led in the direction which the older generation believes is right for- them. Ir
addition, the problem of unwanted educational side effects ensures that the gap· be-
tween such utopian hopes and wishes and the reality of educational practice can neve1
be fully overcome. Educational theory and practice will forever be confronted with thii
discrepancy since it lies at the very heart of human existence.
.:..:..:-,
,.
 Outlook

Educational Anthropology: A New Perspective on Education

Historicity, Culturality, Trans-Disciplinarity

Our considerations so far have shown clearly that education is not possible without
assumptions about humans or without anthropology. The human images implied in
education and the connected ideas of educational anthropology differ considerably
according to particular historical and cultural situations. Worldwide new demands on
education thus underline the importance of anthropological research into the respective
historical and cultural foundations of education and socialisation. In view of the com-
plexity of current social and individual developments, it is vital that historico-eduea-
tional anthropology develop on an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary level as wel
as on the level of European or global co-operation, and furthermore, that its effects or
the understanding of education and educational behaviour be evaluatecl. After havinf
elucidated the fruitfulness of educational anthropological research and reflection· in thi
three examples 'Perfectibility·, 'Social and Educational Mimesis' and 'Global and In-
tercultural Education', we will now tum to research in the field of history and his-
torico-anthropology, and analyse possihilities for further devclopmeut.
Recent years have seen the emergence of a new interest in educational anthropol
ogy. Much of the work born of this new wave of interest is, however, notably differen
from previous studies in this field. Three terminological groups can be said to hav1
characterised this change: historicity and p/11ralitv, culturality and inler-culruralif)
multi- and trans-disciplinarity. The combined result of these elements has been a mov,
towards historico-cducational anthropology, the current and future development o
which is revealed in the context of historico-anthropological research in history an,
cultural science. The present article aims to provide a general overview of the evolu
tion of educational anthropology. Our study will focus on the following:

the historico-educational turn in anthropology,

_ the emphasis on double historicity, and the relevance of historical anthropolog
within historical research.
the cultural and inter-cultural nature of historico-educational anthropology withi
cultural studies.
the trans-disciplinary and transnational character of historical anthropology.

14
 The Historico-Educational Tum in Anthropology theory of learning, in which human beings are considered in terms of their abilities7 ;
and as a theory of individual development. 8 lt was in tum conceived as a sub-discipline
Sin~e th~ early d_ays of modem ~ducational science in the seventeenth century, and es- of anthropology9, and as an area of inter-focultative communication. 10
pecially m the eighteenth and nmeteenth centuries, anthropology and education have Loch 11 and Bollnow 12 distinguish 'educational anthropology' from 'anthropologi-
been closely co_nnected. Different conceptions of what constitutes human flexibility, cal education.' Bollnow considers 'educational anthropology' as an integral and basic,
human complet10n and perfection have defined the educational theories of Rousseau empirically determined anthropology that treats educational phenomena from the point
Campe, Kant, Pestalozzi, Humboldt, Herbart and Schleiermacher. Between J750 and of view of their relevance for questions that aim at a general understanding of humans.
1850 anthropological research developed into a constitutive feature of cducation. 1 In Attempts to emphasise the educational relevance of anthropology fall under this_ cate-
accordanc~ with his anthropological assumptions on the concept of nature, society and gory, as well as investigations into the human need for education. Works belonging to
human bemgs, Rousseau developed an experimental programme for the education of the category 'anthropological education' are those that propose to work out the anthro-
the natural human being. According to Kant, the task of education is to work out the pological relevance of educational science and contribute to a phenomenology of edu-
~nthropological difference between human existence and one's sense of moral duty. cation. This distinction between educational anthropology and anthropological educa-
Man only ?ecomes human thro~gh education. He is nothing more than what education tion has not, however, been widely accepted.
mak_es o_f~m~. lnso~ar as edu.cat10n teaches a man some things and lets others develop More sustained interest has been shown in the idea of an 'anthropological perspec-
m him, 1t is impo~s1ble to _tell the extent of his talcnts.' 2 For his theory of education, tive in education', according to which various starting points can be related-to eacl:i
~umboldt emphasised the importance of the ineluctability of the individual, its neces- other and compared. Bollnow defines this perspective as follows: 'we are not talking_ol
sity_ to co~fro~t- and _work out the ~orld, and the anthropological connection between the foundation of a new discipline, nor of a particular branch that would have a partic.u-
language, mdividuahty and education. Schleiermacher's view of the indecisiveness of lar task within the general realm of education, but rather, of a particular perspectivf
anthropologica! co~ditiot?S l~ads to a theory of upbringing and education that takes into that is to run throughout, yet which does not itself carry a particular characterisati()r
account
h fi , thed h1stoncal quality of . educational
. reality (E"rz1e
· hungswir· kl"1c hke1"t), an d that would bring individual educational questions together in a new light. The anthro-
t ere :1rc oes not define educat10nal aims according to normative anthropological as- pological perspective has no system-generating function as such( ... ), but what it does
sumpt1ons.3 is to work out individual aspects of anthropological connections seen from particulai
In Germany, throughout the fifties, sixties and seventies the field of educational •
pomts o 1- view.
• ,13
. . _ .
anthropology con_sisted ~f many different approaches. The s~bject was neither clearly If we try to systematise educational anthropological thought from the fifties_ to th1
separate from ph1losoph1cal anthropology , nor from th e an th ropo Iog1es · of oth er sci-
· seventies, five different positions emerge. Two additional perspectives characterise th(
ences
.
such as psycholo"v
. . _b,,
socioloo)'
b ,
b" I d. · 4 ·
10 ogy, me 1cme, and theology. Neither was 1t
· developments of the eighties and nineties.
fundamentally
. d1stmgu1shable . from other pos ·
11 ·
1ons w·th" d t" I ·
1 m e uca 10na science. Ed uca-
tJonal anthropology was perceived alternately as the a th I · l ~ d f f 'I. The integral position considers human beings in terms of homo educandus et_ edu
education;5 as em irical !h . . . n ropo og1ca ioun a_10n o
. . .• P_ . eory and phllosophtcal category analys1s; as the basis for a
6 cabi!is: man is a teachable being, in need of education (Flitner, Roth. Liedtke). ·
2. The philosophical position regards man as undetermined hy instincts. Man is ·:
I Wulf 1996a.
wholly undetermined question, an 'open system' _(Bollnow, Derbolov,Loch).
2 . Kant. 1982, p, 699. 3. The phenomenological perspective views man as homo disrinctus, that is, define,
3, In the twentieth century in Germany th I · · · · as either adult, child, teacher, pupil, father, mother ... (Langeveld, Rang, Lassahn).
N hi ;: 1 · p .. 1 . 1 . ' an ropo og,cal mvest1gat1ons were pursued by Hermann
4. The dialectic-reflexive point of view regards human beings as zoon politikon, tha
0 :•s '." agogisc ie Me~chenlamde (see Nohl 1929), Otto-Friedrich Bollnow. in his hook
_ in
Wesen rltr St1mmungen (sec Bollnow 194 J)
1968) 0th · . - • an
d H · · ·· ··
emnch Dopp-Vorwald (see Dopp-Vorwald
is, in terms of social and individual self-realisation (Buber, Levinas, Adorne
· er attempts to establish educational th I ti Klafki). .
educational sc,·enc· · 1 d M . an ropo ogy as a undamental and integral parl of
e me u e artrnus J Langev 'id' A 1 . ., . 5. The implicit position considers human beings as imago hominis: man appears i1
work bv Andreas Fl" . : c S 1111ropo1ng,e ues Kun/es (1964) as well as
h. 1 ' 1 • ' · itner ( 1963 ), He 11 mch Rotl1 (1966; 19 71 ), and Werner Loch ( I963; I96&). The the mode of images (Scheuer]).
6e1h~:~P; 1;;tnttopolo~rcal works of Max Scheler (1928), Helmuth Plessner (1928) and Arnold
( ) 5 rongly rnflu:nced educational anthropology between 1955 and 1975. Schcler's
d
WOf s accuratelv sum up their premj, . 'I ·
. h fi . ae. n our approximately ten thousJnd year old history. we
are 1now mkt e rr st age rn which man has become completely and fully "problematic"· in which he 7 Loch I 980.
no onger nows what he is yet at th · ' S Derbolav I 980.
. • e same trme knows that he does not know' (Scheler 1955,
p. 62 • trans. A . LaFaay) In the face of th d -1 f . . 9 Bleidick 1967.
· ft, . d ' 0
• • • e eta, o sc1rnl1fic knowledge, educational anthropologv
1s o en III anger of forgetting this wise insight. · 10 Schilling 1970.
4 GadamerNogler 1972-74. 11 Loch 1963, p. 82.
5 Liedtke 1980. 12 Bollnow 1980, p. 45.
6 Zdarzil 1980. 13 Bollnow I 980. p. ·19 (trans.,~.. Lagaay).

150
15
 6. Th_e t_extural point of view conceives the human being as anagram. Man becomes
po1et1cal text (Derrida, Foucault, Geertz).
7. The J?_lural-hisrorical position views man as homo abscondilus. People arc consid-
ered m terms of plurality, reflexivity and double historicity (Kamper and Wu!C
Wiinsche, Mollenhauer. Lenzen, \\lulf).' 14
Of the various positions of educational anthropology in the fifties, sixties and seven-
ties, the following points of criticism emerged, leading, amongst other things, to the
development of liiotorico-edueational anthropology. 15 One objection was that tradi-
twnal cducat_ional anthropology failed to consider sufficiently its own historical and
~ocial cond1t1ons. Not enough thought had been put into the mutual relation between its
lundamental concepts ancl the social developments on which these depend. This was
true of terms such as 'openness', 'plasticity', and 'determination'. Furthermore,
a11hough educational anthropology took into account the historicitv of its own endeav-
ours, it did not sufficiently emphasise the 'double historicity' factor. ·History', more-
over. was considered in terms of th<.: history of arts and ideas (i.e. the rcar'm of hu-
111:mitics), but not in terms of social and societal historv. or thi; historv of mentalities.
Another objection was of the prevailing assumption \;ithin educ::itio1;::il anthropology
that one could simply ms_crt mto the context of educational science the anthropological
knowledge of the huma111t1_cs. and integrate it into a general body of knowledge, which
would be ot relevance to issues of upbringing and education. This was said to create
intcr-disciplinarv knowledge. Yet the question of how to integr.:ite appropriately into
the concerns of cdueat10n, the knowledge acquired within another discipline, was Jell
open. _lncleed, it 1s extremely doubtfol whether one can speak of a wholeness or :rnthro-
pological knowledge. Moreover, the claim that educational anthropology has anything
to state about the m_1turc of humans_ children, or educators, is extremely prnhkmatic. 1"
ln _general_ such cl:rnns about human beings tend to refer exclusively to an abstrnctecl
bemg (white_ European, male) or to children and educators of similar cultural circles,
in ?thcr words lead to_ un~cceptable generalisations involving p:micular fictions and
cl:ums to power. In claurnng to concern itself with humanitv as a whole and the asso-
ciated cont_ingc~cics and_ continuities, early educational anthropology 1:ndcd to disrc-
gar_d the s1gmflcance ol notions of difference, discontinuitv ancl pluralitv. Tt either
clmmed to be able to make statements about the nature of hu;nan beings in.general. or
to gain universal_ t:rnpirical knowledge about people in the context of their upbringing
and educati?_n. Either way, educational anthropology failed to consider the constructerl
character oJ its O\:'n ide:is, premises and concepts. Educational anthropology could also
be criticised for its exclusively philosophical or scientific orientation· neither did it
take into account 1,·t,,1··1r" 'Sth e1·JC f'orms o 1· ,mow
~ ' J or ue. ,. · · research - de-
ledge, nor was its
O
. •_ .
spite alt1rmations_ to the contrary - empirically oriented. Representatives or educational
anthropology attributed almost universal validity to their concerns and frames ofrelcr-
ence .. the limits of :vhich they did not rctlect. Educational anthropology tended to re-
_uard itself as a pos1t1vc anthropology. Insight into the impossibility or normatiYe :m-
14 Wulti'Zirfas t994, p. 19 (trans, A. Lagaay).
15 Wulf 1994; p. 19 (trans. A. Lagaay).
16 Kamper/Wulf 1994.
152
thropology, and the discovery of the fruitfulness of negative and dcconstructivc an-
thropologies, were only later to emerge. Indeed only later did anthropological critieisrr
itself become a constitutive part of educational anthropology.
Plurality and Historicity
\Vhereas biological anthropologies aim to identify and study universal human charac-
teristics, historico-educational anthropology emphasises the historicity of that which i~
studied, as well as the historicity of the subject undertaking the study and their researct
questions and methods. Thus, historico-educational anthropology underlines the doubl{
historicity of its endeavours, which, although equully relevant to biological anthropol-
ogy, the latter tends to overlook. Genetics. ethology, and socio-biology all aim to gair
knowledge ahout humans that goes beyond time and cultural conditions. In so doing
they tend to neglect the historicity and cultural determination of their own question,
and methods, as wdl as the historicity - proven in evolution theory - of their objects o
investigation. 17 Similarly, in aiming to state general truths about humans, philosophica
anthropology, inspired by biological anthropology. overlooks the historical condition
alitv of its assertions.
-Research in the realm of historical anthropology has led to a new understanding o
history. 10 Historical anthropology complements the history of events, as well as struc
tural ~nd social history. Whereas factual history concentrates on the multiplicity an<
dynamics of historical actions and events, structural or social history deals with eco
n~mic, social and political struclurcs. In his famous book about the Mediterranean
Braudel adds to these forms of history the idea of a geographicallv conditioned dee1
structure, or geuhistoirc. 19 To understand the changes in this field, one must take int<
account the considerable time span (longuc durec) in which things developed. The an
thropoJogical tum in historical science has meant a change in oricntation, 20 . whercb:
the social structures of social reality. as well as subjective moments in the behaviour. o
social subjects are thematised. 21 'History always occurs in the interplay between previ
ouslv stated structural conditions (lifo, production and power relations. etc.) and th,
stru~turnlising practices (interpretations and actions) of the agents. ' 22 This develop
ment has led to the creation of several new journals. 23 Many of the works published i1
these stem from the school of the Anna/es, wilh its three generations or historians: I
Febvre and Marc Bloch: 2) Fernancl Brauclel, Ernest Labrousse, Pierre Ch:mnu, Em
17 W,ikctils 1990; F.ihl-Eibesfeldt 1988; Meier 1938: Dawkins 1989.
I 8 Dressel 1996.
19 Brnudcl 1995.
20 Burke 1'192: Je Certeau 1991; Braudcl ct al. 1990: LcGoffl978: 1988.
2t Erbe 1979: Siissmuth 1984: Rtise11 1989; Habermas/Minkmar l'N2: Middell/Sarnmlcr 1994: Cor
rad/Kessel 1994.
22 Dressel 1996. µ. I 63 (trans. 1\. Lagaay).
23 E.g. Post and !'res cm: Comparalin- St111lies in Sncict.l' ond Hisl01y; .Journal of /111erdiscipli11m
History; Saeculum: Jahrbuch for Universalgeschichle; Zeitschrift fur Historische Anthropologi1
and with a slightly different orientation, Paragrana. Internationale Zeitschrift for Historische Ai
thropologie.
15
 manuel LeRoy Ladurie; 3) Philippe Aries, Georges Duby; Jacques Le Goff, Arlette talities emerge under specific social and cultural conditions; they pre-structure the so-
Farge, Roger Chartier, Michel Vovelle, and Fran9ois Furet. 24 cial behaviour of social subjects without completely determining it. Mentalities are
Recent developments have led to a new direction in historical research, oriented open to changes and historical evolution. Insofar as upbringing and education are in-
towards people's fundamental situations and elementary experiences towards 'consis- volved in maintaining and changing people's mentalities, historical research into men-
tent, anthropological conditions' (Peter Dinzelbacher), towards 'basi~ human phenom- tality is of great significance to historico-educational anthropology, to the history of
ena (Jochen Marti~), a~d t?wards 'elem_enla1?' human modes of behaviour, experience education, as well as to the general science of education.
a~d fundame~tal s1tuat10ns (Hans Medick), m other words, to a considerable expan- Historicising human phenomena often considered unchangeable has allowed for a
sion of qucstmns, themes and methods of research. As opposed to the anthropologies new kind of openness towards human history. There is a growing awareness of histori-
that emphasi~e the univers~I cha_racter_ofhuman fundamental phenomena, the purpose cal conditionality and the changeability of anthropological structures, as well as the
of the _new held of studt 1s to mvest1gate the specific historico-cultural character of historical and cultural variety of human occurrences. This focus has created a new in-
each given phenomenon. - J No longer is there talk of the invention of childhood in the terest in historical and cultural differences, and consequently, an awareness. of 'the
earl~ modern_ age 26, ~ut rather, of childhood in a particular place, at a particular histori- history from below', calling in tum for research into themes and circles of people that
cal tune_ and_ ma part1~ular culture. 27 Especially good examples of research into histori- were previously excluded. To this end, new sources are discovered and investigated
c_al detail with the claim of it being universally relevant are provided in LeRoy Ladu- with new kinds of questions. This is well illustrated in the works of the 'New Histori-
ne' s w~rk ,vfon,taillou. Cathars and Catholics in a French Village 1294~1324,28 and cists' _; 4
Carlo Gmzburg s The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a 16th Century Milfer. 29
Re~~arc~ into historical change in 'human elementary experience' or the history of
mentalities is. o~en much !e~~ detailed. 30 This is generally due to the inadequacy of Culturality
sources t~at Ii:111t the possibility of historical knowledge. However, it is not the only
reason. Hi st oncal knowledge emerges from the tension between events and narration, Within historical anthropology, there has been a large expansion in the realm of rele-
b~twee~/eality a_nd fiction, between structural history and the narrative accounts of vant themes, and a new diversity of research strategies. One of the reasons for this-is
h1storv· · 'there 1s no border!· b · . . 32 ,
. ,' . me etween narrat10n and descnpt10n': Accounts of the fact that historical anthropology is not a systematic anthropology but rather, an
5t
hi ory are al_w~ys a form of controlled fiction and construction. Peter Dinzelbacher anthropology of differences and possibilities. In the interplay between differences and
has shown tln~-rn his_Europiiische Mcntalitatsgeschichte which describes human ele- possibilities, culture becomes a central factor. With its ·redisc~very' and ~ew assess-
mentary expene~ces m three articles on Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Modern ment of culture,-historical anthropology has given nse to a considerable variety of con-
Age., !he foll~~rng themes are d~alt with: individuality/family/society; sexuality/love;
bod) c1 nd soul, illness; ~tages of life; dying/death; fears and hopes· happiness pain and
cepts and terms. This has been furthered by the reception of European cultural anthro-
luck· work and celebrations· com · ti' · h · ' ' pology by Anglo-Saxon research. 35 . · ·. · .
.' , . , mumca on, t eforczgn as opposed to the self; power; These investig;itions can be seen as part of the effort to develop a cultural science
law, nature1env1ronment; space· time/history The · t t d th h. · t ry of·
I. , . ' • purpose 1s o s u y e 1s o that crosses the bound::iries of individual disciplines. 36 Indeed, cultural science is now
menta . ity, _as the . the contents and mod es of th'mk'mg and fiee1·mg th at d e-
. totality of used as the generic term for multi-, inter- and trans-disciplinary research in the-Arts
termme a certam commumty at a certain time M t I"ty ·r,- · If· f ',J
The fact that historical ch . h . en ~ ~ mam ests itse m ac ion . and 1-lumanities, within whose realm, historico-anthropological research is of central
_ . ange m t e realm of mentalities only ever takes place over a · rt ance .37
very long tnnc has often been emphasised Far fr t · . 1 d ffbl ks t I" 1mpo ·· . . . . _ · .
ties -are mutuall . t r k d d . . ' om ,~~ng c ose o . oc. , men a i- Before looking more closely at the centr::il d1mens1ons of a h1stonco-anthropolog1-
. . h Y m er m e an permeable. Mentaht1es shape actions m concrete cal concept of culture, let us clarify the character of research in this field with a brief
s1tuat10ns; t ey contain orientation and 1 • • • • • •
.. . . cec1s10n makmg signals for social bdrnv1our. description of a series of relevant studies entitled Logic and Passion that were under-
I hey are specific to particular cultures, classes and groups.-Like forms of habit, mcn- taken in the eighties. The project consisted of twelve studies, concerning and investi-
24 Burke 199 I. gating the emergence and significance of present day lasting cultural changes, as well
25 van Diilmen 1995; Liidtke/Kuchenbuch 1995; Daniel 1993; Martin 1994; Medick 1989; Brown ;s perspectives for future de~clopments. Ir;. eontras_t to the work: ~f ~istorico-31:1thro-
1991. . pology within the field of history, these mtemat1onal, trans-d1sc1plmary studies of
26'Arii:s 1965.
historical anthropology' strongly emphasise the significance of philosophical analysis
27 Baader 1996.
28 LeRoy Ladurie 1978.
and reflection of the chosen anthropological themes.
2'.1 Ginzburg 1992.
30 Raul ff 1989. 34 Veeser 1989.
JI Lenzen 1989; Muller/Rusen 1997. 35 Kertzcr/Saller 1991: Borneman 1992; Herzfeld 1997; Ingold 1996.
32 Koselleck 1990, p. 1 I 3 (trans. A. Lagaay). 36 Brackert/Werfclmeycr 1990: frUhwald et al. 1991; Aug.:; 1994; Hansen 1993: 1995: Hartrn~nn/Ja-
33 Dinzelbacher 1993, XXL nich 1996; Bohme/Scherpe 1996; Konersmann 1996; Kramer _1997 ._ . ·
37 Wulf 1997.
'.54
155
 The starting point of the research is the realisation of the inadequacy of abstracted
anthropological norms, yet despite this the persistent desire to enquire into human
structures and phenomena. There is a certain tension in these investigations between
history and human sciences. They can neither totally be seen as contributions to the
history of anthropology as a discipline, nor as the contribution of history to anthropol-
ogy. Their concern is far more to relate the historicity of their own perspectives and
methods to the historicity of the objects of their study. Their results belong therefore to
the realm of human sciences, yet, because inspired by a critique of anthropology
founded in historical philosophy, the studies give rise to the formulation of new pa_ra-
digmatic questions. Despite their focus on European cultures, there is the undcrlymg
assumption that in principal historical anthropology should be limited to neither par-
ticular cultural contexts nor particular epochs. Rather, reflection on the historicity of
historical anthropology opens up the possibility of overcoming both a certain Euro-
centrism within human sciences, as well as a merely anliquated interest in history, thus
enabling unsolved problems of the present to be considered.
Acknowledging the epistemological achievements or scientific disciplines as well
as of philosophy, the studies in Logic and Passion deal with such themes and problems
as: the 'body', the 'senses'; 'time', 'soul', 'love', the 'beautiful', the 'holy', the 'world',
and 'silence'. 33 The aim is to overcome the boundaries of different disciplines, all d
formulate trans-disciplinary questions, objects of investigation and methods of at
proach. Authors from over thirty different scientific disciplines have been involved m
the research, their collaboration aiming to increase the sophistication of their knowl-
edge. Whilst taking into account the fact that much of the knowledge we have of cul-
tural science is attached to national traditions of culture, thought and science that have
grown out of historical processes, the works mentioned attempt, Lhrough continuous
collaboration that crosses national boundaries, to develop trans-national discourses that
accept heterogeneity and difierence. These studies have stimulated other cultural sci-
entific investigations in many subjects within the realm of social sciences and humani-
ties, and they have had a lasting ir;fluence on educational anthropology.
Nowhere has this influence been clearer than in the historico-educational tum
within educational anthropology. In the course of this development, educational an-
thropology has acquired the central notions of historicitv and oluralitv, and taken an
orientation towards cultural studies. This has led both t~ the d,iscoverv and investiga-
tion of numerous new questions and themes that are of fundamental rel~vancc to issues
of upbringing aml education, 39 that in tum point to new perspectives on the central
38 Kamper/Wulf 1982-1992.
39 Die Seele uls Puliti!.um (Sonntag 1988): Der Andere 1md die Spruche (Wimmer 1988); D,mkrn als
Ethos und Uethnde (Oauk 1989); Melancholie, Fiktion. Histurizitat (Lenzen 1989); Technik uNci
Kiirper (Derr 1990); Karper zmd Gcschlechr (Hoppe 1991); Mimesis. Culture. Art, Societv (Ge-
bauer/Wulf 1995); Priisenz der Ewigkeit. Eine Anrhropologie des G/iicks (Zirfas 1993); Praxis ,md
Asthelik (Gcbm1er/W11lf 1993): Theorien des Schenkens (!Zost 1994); Piidagogische Anthropologie
und Evu/11/ion (Uher 1995): Aisthesis!Asthctik (Mollenhauer/Wulf 1996); Das zivilisiertc Tier. Zur
historischen Anrhropologie der Gewalt (Wimmer/Wulf/Dieckmann 1996); Violence. Nationalism,
Racism, Xenophobia (Dieckmann/Wimmer/Wulf 1997); Spiel, Ritual, Geste. Mimetisches Han-
deln in der sozia/en Welt (Gebauer/Wulf 1998).
156
concepts of education, its institutions and fields of prnctice. 40 Studies in this reulm
stand o_ut in t~eir double histo_ricity, plurality and cultural scientific character. Whereas
the notions ot double h1stonc1ty and plurality have often been defined, there has been.
as yet, no adequate definition of culture within the context of historico-eclucationai
anthropology. Indeed, recent expansion of the concept of culture (mention of. for in-
st~ncc, free-time culture. subculture. cultural industry, food culture, the culture of en-
terprise, love culture. funeral culture. etc.) has made any attempt to define it all the
more difiicult. 1n the !'ace of this development, there is a danger that the term 'culture·
rm1y lose its capacity to differentiate. Considering the fumlamcntal importance or the
notion or culture wi_thin the _rc_a!m of historico-educational anthropology, it is right
thereiore, to begm with some m1tial dcfimtions of the term.
Sartre has a very general concept of culture in mind when in Les A1ots he writes·
'Cul!ure doesn't save anything or anyone, it doesn't justify. But it's a product of man:
he. projects
. .
himself
, 41 . .----,
into it. he: recognises himself in it:
. .
that critical mirror alone
(.
0- 1·1·.
crs-
him l11s image._ Liehlen, on the other hand, unclerlmes the productive aspect of cul-
tun:. Man, as a 'being full of deficiencies'. yet open to the world and llcxiblc, is forced
'to create himself and his world, which is the meaning of culture'. The benefit of this
view is that 'il avoids the ( ... ) separation between action and thought, between ·'so-
ciety" and "culture'', and contributes therefore to the foundation of a social theory that
might at last succeed m abandomng this dualism. Thus all forms of human action could
fx: seen as a whole, that is. as always simultaneously instrumental and practicalistrnte-
gic, as signiJ-ying, as 11cll as necessarily "spiritual" and thcrdore "cultural" through-
out'-12 ~
Despite the consistency of this conception, its weakness lies in a certain Jc1ck of
eoncn:tcness within Gehlen's work, To poinl out that human beings create themselves_
even physiologically, through culture. may be true and relevant, but it is not sufficient.
More satisfactory is a perspective in cultural anthropology that considers the mul-
tiple differences bdm:en h\1man cultures. This. however, 'makes the drawing of a line
between what is natural. universal, and constant in man and what is conventional. local
and variable extraordinarily difficult, In fact. it suggests that to draw such u line is to
falsify the human situation. or c1t least to misrender· it seriously.' 43
1-Iuman beings arc not to be found 'behind' the diversity or their historical and
cultural t:xpressions, but far more within these. The attempt to idcntifv 'marriaec · _
'family'. or ·trade' as cultural universals, implies a high level of abstr~ction. and is
therefore onl_Y ,relatively productive __ Carefol investigation of these kind of social phe-
nomcr1ci in d1fterent cultures shows its extraordinary variety, and provides information
about the multiple forms of culture and ways of being. ·out of ,uch reformulations or
the concept of culture and or the role of culture in human life comes, in turn, a dciini-
40 For examples ,of the fruitfulncS'., of an historico-anthropological pcrspecti\'c a;id method within
education:il science, sec: ,\frtholngie clcr f.:inclhcit and Vatcrschafl (Lenzen 1985: J 'l91 ): Jch-!den-
!itdl. Z,rischcn Fiktion 1111d 1'm1srrnktio11 (Stross 1991): Die pcidagogische Umgct, 1111 ,, (Gohldi
i 993): ,,{sth,·rischc Sozwlisarion uml Erzichung (Sclrnmacher-Chilla 1995): Rildimg ~nd Schrifr
(Sting 1998): (;cdtichrms rmd !/rld1111g (D1eckm:inn/Sting/Zirfas 1998).
41 Sartre 1964, p. 2:,4.
42 Rehberg 1990, p. JO I (trans. A. Lagaay).
43 Geertz 1993, p. 36.
157
 tion of man stressing not so much the empirical commonalities in his behaviour, from
place to place and time to time. but rather the mechanisms by whose agency the
breadth and indeterminateness of his inherent capacities are reduced to the narrowness
and specificity of his actual accomplishments. ( ... ) Undirected by culture patterns -
organised systems of significant symbols - man's behaviour would he virtually un-
governable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions. his experience
virtually shapeless. Culture. the accumulated totality of such patterns, is not just an
ornament of human existence but - the principle basis of its specificity - an essential
condition for it. ' 44
Sahlins' inquiry into the mechanisms according to which cultural patterns are de-
velop1;;d points in a similar direction. He emphasises the fact that 'the cultural schc:mt:
is variously inf1ccted by a dominant site of symbolic production, which supplies the
major idiom of other relations and activities'. He concludes that there is 'a privileged
institutional locus of the symbolic process, whence emanates a classificatory grid im-
posed upon the total culture'. The peculiarity of Western culture is 'the institutiorn1li-
sation of the process in and as the production of goods'. Thus, our cnlture stands in
contrast to a ·primitive' world 'where the locus of symbolic differentiation remains
social relations. principally kinship relations, and other spheres of activity an: ordered
·by the operative distinctions of kinship' .45
Rather than assuming cultural homogeneity, historical and ethnological research
emphasises the multitude of cultures. working with a more differentiated concept o(
culture. This is all the more true the more a particular studv is concerned with concrete
cultural practices such as rituals, gestures, games, and festivities. Unlike what has been
claii:necl for ::i long time in cultural anthropology, it is not sufficient to read ditTercnt
c~lturcs as a text:"16 what is of higher interest is the inquiry into pcrforrnative dimen-
sions of cultural production. how these are represented and expressed in practical ritual
knowleclge."17 /\ consequence of this ·performativc turn' is an incre:isecl interest in the
swging 0 ( social events and performances. The significance of ritual acls as a f<mn of
social behaviour is thus newly discovered. Not o~ily texts mid works of art are con-
ccivecl as cultural expressions or representations. but also rituals and other forms or
social behaviour. How people organise their lives and how they acquire the practical
knowledge they nenl in order to do so has thus become one of the central questions of
research in cultural science, to which historical anthropology of the kind that uses eth-
nographic methods can largely contribute. 48
. T~is new focus on pe,:(ormance within cultural science has opened new perspcc-
tin:s l,:r histonco-cclucmional anthropology. There has been for instance a rediscovery
ol the importance of ritual behaviour in the context or upbringing and education. The:
negative e\·aluation of the social function of rituals as put forward in the I 970s is not
,1,1 C,ecrtz ibid. pp. 45-4(,.
45 Sahlins 1976. p. 211.
46 Clifford/\'1arcus 1986; Berg/Fuchs 1993.
,\7 Bourdicu 1999; 1997: Gebauer/Wulf 1993: 199S; 1998; Paragrnna 1998.
4~ Within the interdisciplinary research group entitled 'Cullur~~ of the Perfonnative · currently being
und_ertake~ at the ~ree Un!ve~sity in Berlin, I am leading a project to study the emergence of the
social 111 rituals usmg qualitative methods. Our focus is on family rituals, school as a ritual institu-
tion and the 'socialisation' of the screen media by youths with the help of media. ·
1°58
satisfactory. Rituals and ritual behaviour play a complex socialising role. This is true
of families ancl school as well as of the ritual handling of new media and youth rituals.
ln this context, ritual behaviour is seen as a complex form of social action carried out
or performed by the members of a community. one that expresses. represents or creates
their community or society as well as can contribute to change and development. From
the point of view of historico-educational anthropology, it is of pm1icular interest to
consider how the physical, scenic, expressive, and socially productive aspects of a rit-
ual arc shaped, how processes of inclusion and exclusion proceed, and how societal
relations of power and hierarchy arc created and transformed.
Growth in our awareness of the diversity of cultures and the central rok culture
plays in shaping life circumstances lrns also resulted in an increase in the importance of
the foreign in historical anthropology. This is true of both diachronic and syn chronic
research. The experience of foreignness is indispensable for the attempt to find out
anything about the mentalities of people of another historical time. It is this that allows
fo; the particularities of human phenomena under investigation to be understood. One
major difliculty for historical researchers is that they must work with sources that they
themselves have not created and have no inDw.:11cc upon. Their possibilities arc limited
to considering the available sources from different perspectives, evaluating them in
new constellations and with different questions in mind. Insofar as they arc interested
in establishing the particular character or tlie people they are studying, rcflcctilm on the
difference between their own situation and the hi,,torical circumstances of the people
being studied is a determining foctor in the quality of the historical reconstruction. Re-
construction of this kind creates ·contrast images' to phenomena of one's own time
and can tht:rcforc contribute to a more accurate perception of present day phenomena.
Researchers in ethnology. on the other hand. largely create their own sources. There is
a multitude of problems conncctcd lo the work of representing and processing as text.
the linguistic and visual data that one has acquired throughout a period of fieldwork. lf.
at the time of the fieldwork, the ethnographic researcher was in close contact with the
people being studied, the resulting text will usually be written at a different time and
place, away from the actual people it is concerned with. The researchers own frame of
reference. his preferences and competence me all determining factors when it comes to
tr:msforrning into text observations and the results of inquiries and surveys. In recent
vears in ethnology. widespread and intensive discussion on issues ol' methodology
J1 avc shown that consciously grasping and observing the otherness of the foreign, ancl
reflecting the transformation of this experience in a text constitute important femures
or ,mthropologieal work.' 19
Manv studies in cultural science. carried out in the realm of historico-educational
anthrop,;logy are basi:d on current problems or questions. In order to work out their
themes. these studies make use of l1istorieal features or occasionally make comparisons
with similar constellations in other cultures. Some historico-anthropological works
study questions and connections that have been forgotten throughout the course of
history. Others attempt, through ethnographic eyes, to reformulate and thus understand
afresh educational behaviour in its cultural conditionality. For all these investigations.
experience of the foreign is essential.
49 Jay 1984; Berg/Fuchs 1993.
159
 Current proce"se f · t ·u · · · E · ·
. . .' ~ 0 m ccratwn m ·uropc reqmre an especially thorough approach abandoning a familiar field, can one find new ways of.thinking, discover new forms of
to the foreign. In this context, ·upbringing and education have ·become intercultural investigation and research. Ginzburg's aforementioned contribution to historical bio-
tasks, ;vh~rc contra~~ and comparisons are redefined. 50 This is only accelerated by the graphy~research and LeRoy Laduric's inquiry into mentalities in the village ofMontail-
globahsati?n ~f politics, economy and culture which results in the overlap and mixture lou are attempts of this kind. Another example is Clifford Geertz's postulation of the
?f that ~hich 1s considered global, national, regional and local, engendering a growth method of 'thick description', and his clarification ofthc principle through description
m multipl?' br?~cn cultures. 51 In this context, it is important to avoid infringing the and analysis of cock fighting in Bali: this study opened up valuable new dimensions
c:~e~ne:s Implicit 1? cult~ral contingency, for 'culture ... is the protection ofpossibili- for ethnographic and social scientific research. 54 Yet the crossing of borderlines is
t1cs, the breadth of its horizon, our recompense for contingency· 52 -
often controversial. Some literary academics as well as social scientists have been op-
posed to the use of literary texts for the study of social phenomena, and against includ-
in o into the realm of research people's subjective perceptions and feelings. Whereas
Trans-Disciplinary Research
th; former fear that to exploit texts in this way could result in their more valuable aes-
thetic qualities being disregarded, the latter doubt the scientific value of literary
.i:
The 0 wth of interest in 'historical anthropology', both in the social sciences and hu-
mamt1es as ,vcll as in philos1phy h " It cl · ·
expression, preferring to lay emphasis ~n the i~comparable value o!
qua~ti~ative and
• l , as reJu e man expans10n of themes methods and qualitative empirical research. In educat:on~l science there wa.s, at t~rst,_ s1~1lar _doubt
research ~erspect1ves. One ~spect of this has been a move towards muiti-. inter- and as to the sense and appropriateness ofusmg image sources for mvest1gat1on mto 1ssqes
trnns-disciplinary research. 5·' Many of the themes do not come under the branch of of educational anthropology. However, the fruitfulness of such sources is now undis-
knowledge of a particular discipline. Which academic subject for instance would en- puted.55
compass topics such as the body a ct -- •
. . . n senses, space and tune, violence and desire? Ifthc There is much to be gained from conceptual and methodical exchange between the
crossmg of_boundanes 1s a relatively common phenomenon within the social sciences disciplines relating to historico-anthropology. To confirm this, here are two examples.
and humaml1cs 1t is an eve · d' - ·
. . , . n more m 1spensable teature of historical anthropology. In choosing to avoid making general statements about 'the nature of man', but instead,
Not only are boundanes crossed h 't h · ·
. w en I comes to t e choice and tn:atment of topics, researching the variety of human cultures in space and time, the notion of comparison
but also when 1t comes to rri 'tl1 d • d d ·
. . e 0 s an proce ures of mvestigation. Emphasis not on as a methodical tool in historical anthropology has gained much weight and impor-
one hi story but on a m~ltitude of histories, not on one culture but on a host ofdifkrent tance. Amongst historians, Marc Bloch was one of the first to underline the fruitfulness
culture~,. not on one science but a on plurality of sciences leads to an anthropological is
of comparison. 56 It also highly valued as a method for research in literature c1nd .cul-
c.~,~f!lexity t~at reaches_ ~ar beyond the possibilities of a single science. Although as- tural anthropology. Until nmv however in historico-educational. the notion of compari-
si,,.r'.mg k~O\vlcdge to d11ferent academic subjects has proven to be successful much is son has held a subordinate role. The second example for the fruitfulnes:,; of inter-dis:-
achieved m cultural science bv o , · t · h · '
. .. " V<.:1 s eppmg t ese boundanes. New ways of question- ciplinary exchange can he Sl:en in both what might be called the.ethnologic lens, and
nd
i~g a recogmsmg often only emerge at the margins of a discipline or at the intersec- the relevance of cultural anthropologicfie/dwork. Many historians and social scientists
tion between neighbourino sul ·e t Th · '
. " JJ cs. ere ts much to be 0 ained from a trans-discipli- arc convinced ofthc value of an ethnologic angle on issues relevant to their work. For
nary research movement th t · . " "
. . . a encourages new quest10ns, themes and. methods within in estranging that which is familiar, one is forced to tread cautiously, and new ques-
.each smgle suh1ect.
tions and perspectives arc engendered. Ginzburg considers every investigator to be a
There is n~ strictly limited a f t d · · ·
.. . .
h 1stonco-educat10nal . . rea o s u y relatmg to h1stoncal anthropology and kind of ethnographer. 57 Isaac makes use of the fundamental terms and metaphors of
anthropolo N 'th · 1
f . gy. e1 er IS t 1ere a general or pre-determined bodv
1
ethnology, and uses ethnographic methods to create a historical case study entitled 'the
o research methods m these field Th b' f h' . .-
d . . . s. · e o ~ect o a 1stonco-anthropological inquiry 1s runaway slave' .58 At the centre lie _the structures of every day life and concepts such as
_e~crmrned accordmg to the particular question. Identifyinu and making nee of mate- 'exchange', 'the significant other', or 'power and authority'. Issues are studied relating
nba_' as "".ell as ch~osing a particular method of research are involved i~ con;tituting the to dramaturgy, the staging and performance and roles of the historical 'actors' . 59 In t_he
o Jcct·ot stud · S , · · · I · . .
. · .. ) · mcc m prmcip e, anythmg relating to humans can be made the start- field of history, the reception of etlrnologic questions and methods of study is a clear
nd
i~g pomt a material of historico-anthropological research. the spectrum of possible expression of the permeability of boundaries between disciplines and represents in the
t emes and methods is necessarily open. Of course, when research leaves the safe
context of an established discipline with its proven criteria for content and method. it is
bou nd tu make itself vulnerable and open to criticism. Yet, only in venturing out of or
54 White (1991; 1994) goes even further, noting the central roleoftiction in the writing of history,
50 Wulf I 995; I 998. 55 Mollenhauer 1983: 1986.
51 ~e~~b:.
00
9,; 7; G_upta/Ferguson ( 997: Hutchinson/Smith J 996; Featherstone 1995: Apradurai 1996:
~rb199J, Alexander/Seidman 1993; Bruner 1996 ,
56
57
58
Bloch 1994.
Ginzburg 1994.
Isaac 1980. .
52 Konersmann 1996, p. 354 (trans. A. L · )
'>3 Wulf 1997. · agaay · 59 Akiko Moro's (1995) study of a graveyard in Kl!rnten and his resulting contribution to family re-
search would not have heen possihle without the reception of the ethnographic perspective.
160
1_61
 . 1 · Further reaching inter- and trans-disciplinary co~operation, (nvolv-
realm of cultural anthropology·, the realisation ·of the importance of historical dimen- · ~ducationa sc1~nce.fi on other fields is a task yet to be achieved in anthropolog1cal re-
mg representatives : 1 .. . .
sions for studies in cultural anthtopology. 60 · h ·thin cducatwnal science. .
Reaching further than examples of inter-disciplinary mutual exchange is Paul searc WI d. n the future progress of historico-educational anthrop?lo_gy_. three impor-
Veyne's proposal for an 'all encompassing history'. His idea is that sociology and eth- Re~ar I gl . , I concerns relating to multi-, inter- and trans-d1sc1plmary research
tant ep1stemo og1ca
nology only developed because history was too much limited to the past, and disre-
stand out:
garded the present. Veyne identifies two conventions at work in this process. The first
convention was to recognise no other history than that of the past, and there was no ·e ot· the expansion of questions. themes and methods of research is
One consequenc . . Th" . I t
guarantee for the memory of that which :was lost. Recognition and understanding of the even :from a paradigmatic point of view, plurality 1s a necessity. _1s 1s re eva~
present were taken for granted. The second convention was to only ever consider the that h h1·storical anthropology in history, historico-anthropolog1cal works m
to rcsearc on . . .
as well as to investlgat1ons . · educationa
w1thm · l anth ropoIogy. .
history of a particular nation, concentrating on its particular character and its evolution tltura I s tu 1es
d · · t · f
in time and space: Greek history, French history, history of the 16th century, ctc. 61 CL /obalisation of politics, economy and culture h~s cr~ated new mternux ures o
Veyne dismisses the postulate of the unity of time and space that until now so re- The g h' ·h . local reoional national and global, winch, m the context of European
stricted the writing of history. Instead, he envisages a trans-disciplinary realm of study th~t w ic isf ·111cr:'1si~g imp' ortance to issues of education (cf. Wulf 1995; 1998~.
in which traditionally separate disciplines are united. In this way one may avoid the
umtv are o
. ' • I th opologv ' d ct·
can contribute largely to our un erstan mg an m .
d · vest!-
Educat1ona an r " . d I · I
shortcomings of any too purely empirical sociology, of a kind of ethnology too limited . f these developments. From the point of view of metho , sync 1romc am
oat1on o .
to the study of foreign cultures, and the limitations of a reduced writing of history. d. h onic comparisons are esscntrnl tasks. . .·
In the realm of historical anthropology that is oriented towards cultural science, zacl r ·n the German-speaking realm of educational anthropology, httle 1mpor-
Unt1 now, 1 • th fi ld f
Logic and Passion made steps towards inters and trans-disciplinary research. It en- l aid on dhnographic procedures. Yet developments m e 1e . o
1ance lias t)een ' h' . h .
deavoured to choose its themes and questions in such a way as to prevent any one sci- . ric and educational biography research already suggest that t 1s _1s c ~ng1?g.
entific discipline from claiming unique responsibility for the topic. Scientists and lnSlo t· ethnographic methods for the study of biographies, educational mstltu-
The
. use d ducational gestures and rituals opens whole new d"1mens10ns
O ·
ofk_n owl -
researchers from many different fields contributed to understanding the historico-
anthropological phenomena in question. Some of the works remained strictly related to trnns, an 'Ed e ,·anal ethnograph"' 63 . an<l 'quallfa/1ve
• • · ti1e ,ea
researc h in · l m of- up-
edge. . 11ca t .r . • d . I
particular fields of study, thus contributing to the multi-disciplinary aspect of the . . d ducalion'6 4 constitute important research procedures fore ucat10na
brmgrng un e , .
general effort. Others were conceived from the start to be inter-disciplinary, taking into anthropology. · · ··
account questions and knowledge from various fields ofresearch. Yet other investiga-
tions -'- described as trans-disciplinary - hover at the margins of various fields of re-
search or indeed move between them. 62
Gumbrecht's and Pfci:ffer's studies in the context of Poetics and Hermeneutics can
also be said to have stimulated the development of historico-educational anthropology,
although from the point of view of the people involved and the content of the studies,
there are many overlaps with the international trans-disciplinary studies on Logic and
Passion. In addition, one must count the collaboration of biologists, ecologists, histori-
ans, sociologists, psychoanalysts, and literature academics working in the realm of

60 Geertz 1983: Wolfl981; Sahlins 1985.

61 Veyne 1996.
62 Thour.h less anthropologically oriented, Gumbrechfs and Pfeiffer's multi-, inter- and trans-disci-
rlinary studies ( 1986: I988; 1991) in cultural science on the topics Sryle, Malcriality in Co111muni-
cation, and Paradoxes, Dissonances and Breakdowns point in a similar direction. So too do the
various Jtrnlti-, inter- and trans-disciplinary studies published under the title Poetics and Herme-
neutics. The spectrum of topics includes Nochahmung ,md lllusion (Imitation and Illusion, JauB
1964); lmmanente Asthetik - Asthetische Reflexion (Iser I 966): Die nicht m2hr schonen KunSle
(.lauG 1968); Terror und Spiel (Fuhnnann 1971); Geschichte - Ereignis und Erzdhlung (Koselleck/
Stempel 1973); l'osi1ionen der Negalivitiil (Weinrich 1975); Text ,md /Jpplikalion (Fuhrmann/
JauB/Pannenberg 1981); Funktione11 des Fikliven (Henrich/Jscr I 983): Das Geciprach (Stierle/War-
ning 1984); Epochenschwellen und Epochenbewu/Jtsein (Herzog/Koselleck 1987); Jndividualiliil , · rlColby/Swcdcr I 99~. • ,. .
(Frnnk/1-laverkamp 1988); Memoria (HaverkamplLachmann 1993); Das Ende (Stierle/Warning 6j Jesso_ . · 1 19 94· Friebertshiiuser/Prengel 1997.
61
c" Denz111/L111co n '
I 996) .
16
· ]62
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n of chapters one, two and three.

176