CONSTATINO ACAIN VS.
IAC, VIRGINIA FERNANDEZ AND ROSA as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs
DIONGSON
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
FACTS:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial
Court a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for
the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary. Acain died
leaving a will in which petitioner and his siblings were instituted as heirs.
Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the
latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings
for merely being a universal heir and the widow and the adopted daughter
have been pretirited.
The motion was denied by the trial judge. The appellate court granted the
private respondents petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring
into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and cannot pass
upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate
RULING:
No. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited
only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon
to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
will. In Nuguid v. Nuguid, the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on
the ground of absolute preterition. The probate court acting on the motion
held that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the
petition without costs, which was duly approved by the Supreme Court.
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void
coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court
could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of
the will was resolved.
FELIX AZUELA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO,
SUBSTITUTED BY ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006
FACTS:
Felix Azuela filed a petition for probate of a notarial will purportedly executed
by Eugenia E. Igsolo notarized on June 10, 1981. Petitioner is the son of the
cousin of the decedent. The will consisted of two (2) pages written in the
vernacular Pilipino.
Geralda Castilla, attorney-in-fact of the legitimate heirs opposed the probate
of the will claiming that it was forgery and asserted that the decedent was
actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs. She also argued that the will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that
decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the
will was not properly acknowledged.
The RTC admitted the will to probate. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. The CA noted
that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the
will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notarial will be admitted probate
RULING:
No. A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of
pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose
attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not
contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective.
Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all
three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of
the Civil Code, which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin,
and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses,
it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of
the Clerk of Court.
Upon examination of the will, the following deficiencies were revealed:
1. The attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will.
There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space
having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the
attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was
left uncomplied with. In Uy Coque, the Court noted that the purpose of
requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is
obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal
of a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions
of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of
sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and
changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages.
If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation
clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new
pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the
margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty.
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which
the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of
the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the
will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of
an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many
pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just
witnessed and subscribed to.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply
with the formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the
inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article
805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same
formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the
forgery or intercalation of notarial wills. Compliance with these
requirements, however picayune in impression, affords the public a
high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had
decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established
in the will. The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the
cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testator’s
incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.
2. The attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear
on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of
the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before
the notary public.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The
attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of
the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures
at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.

If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom
thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a
will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or
all of the witnesses.
3. The will also failed to comply with the requirement under Article 806 that
"every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of
this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated
from the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a
separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this
case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with
Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.
4. The decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will
on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-called "logical
end" of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered
correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic
numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that
these two requirements be construed as mandatory. Taken in isolation,
these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to
a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of
this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be
of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by
whoever executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from
makes the probate denial inexorable.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO
CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR,
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO DE MOLO, vs.
FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO
G.R. No. L-32328 September 30, 1977
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of
residence.
Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto,
niece and nephews, respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that
decedent died intestate, commenced an intestate proceeding. In the course
of said intestate proceeding, the heirs executed an extrajudicial Partition of
the estate whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the
proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each.
A document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last with and
testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Art of the Art of
First Instant of Iloilo. It appears that Aldina Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto,
Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named as heirs but Maloto Casiano and
Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said with which are bigger,
different and more valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial
partition. The said will also allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees
and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic
Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
The heirs who received greater and the legatees/ devisees share filed a
motion for reconsideration, annulment of the proceedings and allowance of
the last will and testament. The other heirs opposed the motion. The CFI of
Iloilo denied the motion for it was filed out of time.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the probate court has the authority to hold that the
will has been revoked
2. Whether or not the petition for probate is barred by prior judgment
or order (res judicata)
RULING:
1. No. The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for the probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto. Indeed, the
motion to reopen was denied because the same was filed out of
time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate
estate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. The
probate court in stated in its order that "Movants should have filed a
separate action for the probate of the Will." The more appropriate
remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for
petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the
alleged with in question.
2. No. The special proceedings already instituted is not a bar to the
present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator
of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges vs. THE
HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO
GR Nos. L-27860-L-27896, March 29, 1974
FACTS:
Charles Hodges and Linnie Hodges were spouses. Both executed similar wills,
where the decedent’s entire estate shall go to the surviving spouse and that
spouse may do whatever s/he pleases, with the condition that when the
surviving spouse likewise passes away, the residual estate shall pass on to
the surviving brothers/sisters of the (first) decedent.
Linnie Hodges died ahead of Charls. Charles was the named administrator in
Linnie’s will. As administrator, Charles was allowed by the probate court to
do several acts of administration, including continuing the business run by
Charles and Linnie.
Charles made annual reports to the probate court and at some point he
allegedly renounced all the inheritance he got from Linnie in favor of Linnie’s
siblings. Shortly after this alleged renunciation, on December 25, 1962,
Charles died without having ever liquidated or closed or distributed Linnie’s
estate.
Upon Charles’ death, Avelina Magno was named administratrix of Linnie’s
estate and as Special Administratrix of Charles’ estate. Nothing else
happened in Linnie’s estate henceforth. (Avelina was assigned because she
was the one employee closest to the spouses and she had been with them
for more than a decade.) Avelina carried on acts of administration in both
estates until she was joined by Charles’ brother, Joe Hodgens, as co-
administrator in Charles’ estate.
Avelina and Joe were subsequently replaced by several other individuals until
only PCIB was appointed sole administrator .
Both proceedings in Linnie’s and Charles’ estates proceeded independent of
each other — Avelina acting as administrator for Linnies’s estate and PCIB
for Charles’.
Both administrators hired lawyers and eventually had to pay substantial
amounts out of the estate. Both proceedings went on independently until
such time that conflicts arose between administrators with respect to
safekeeping the properties, liquidating the estate, etc.
The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by PCIB against
the court which handled both estate proceedings. The judge (Escolin) kept
approving motions apparently from both estates, which led to confusing or
even conflicting issues.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there exists, still, Linnie’s estate (on the theory that her
estate is practically closed since she bequeathed everything to her
husband)?
2. If so, how much does she still have that would go to her siblings?
Are the siblings entitled to anything (on the theory that the will
contained substitutions)?
3. Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.
RULING:
1. Yes, Linnie’s estate still exists and the proceedings therefor have not
closed.
While it is true that Linnie adjudicated her entire estate to Charles, she still
had her own estate for which the proceedings in which Avelina is
administratrix could proceed. Linnie’s estate consists of those properties
which are her part in the conjugal partnership. However, given the murky
factual circumstances, the Court cannot make a final determination which of
the properties in the conjugal partnership belong to Linnie’s estate.
The law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of
Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. —
When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration,
the allowance to the widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable
to the estate in accordance with law have been paid, the court, on
the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign
the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled,
and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as
to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
 No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed
ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of
distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those
entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until
after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been
paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually
issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested
party or parties, and not of the court.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed
her whole estate to her husband and gave him what amounts to full powers
of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time
the condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go
to her brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to
Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose of
during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his
motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as suggested
by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any
degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what
would remain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend
that the testamentary provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any
part of the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other words,
irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his motions,
as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders
granting said motions, even in the terms in which they have been worded,
could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication
unto Hodges of the whole estate of his wife. None of them could have
deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will.
2. Yes. LINNIE’s siblings (or representatives) are entitled to LINNIE’s estate
which should not be less than one-fourth of the community estate at the
time of her death , minus whatever CHARLES may have gratuitously
disposed of during his administration and as sole heir. If CHARLES sold
the properties for consideration, such consideration shall continue to
form part of LINNIE’s estate.
However, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and
sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether
upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16
of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges
had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be
held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from
his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the
record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a
final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the
first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate,
however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this
stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the
terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their
conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during
his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the
uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained
earlier, have beengratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of
third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by
PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the
Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would
be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of
her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
3. Yes. It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be
proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the
testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, that which should
be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any
other time.
The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her
brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend
on
(1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of
Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by
Magno, and
(2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively
renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances
presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as
 of now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether
of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore,
reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first
instance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated.
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ VS. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE
GR No. 76714 June 2, 1994
FACTS:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York,
U.S.A. together with their three children. Dr. Cunanan executed a last will
and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and
personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated". In the
event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his
children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He
appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael
G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Her wife also made a will containing
the same provisions as that of his husband.
Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire
that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and
substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the
probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New
York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary were issued in his favor. Subsequently, the mother of the wife
and the petitioner in this case filed with the RTC of Bulacan a petition for
reprobate and asked to be the special administratrix of the couple’s estate in
Bulacan. Letters od special administrations. The heirs of the husband then
filed a notice of appearance and requested that they be notified of the
proceedings. Petitioner claimed that they were not entitled to notice because
they were not heirs, and that they had already been probated abroad.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the will of the spouses will be allowed in the Philippines
2. Whether or not the Cunanan collaterals are entitled to be notified of the
testate proceeding
3. Whether or not the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses be probated
jointly
RULING:
1. Yes. Petitioner failed to prove two facts but was allowed to present
evidence on the matter.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which
have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the
due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and
(5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of
wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which
the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
2. Yes. The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate
of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule
27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated
abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that
is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance
with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the
executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to
petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for
proving the wills.
Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court
shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
 3. Yes. There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of
the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent
Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in
singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that
there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the
Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view
overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding."

A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result
in the delay in the administration of justice.

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In the case at
bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills
contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all
probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint
probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch
to bear the seeds of future litigation.