G.R. No. L-2068 Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 43 L. ed. 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.

922; or which
BUSTOS v. LUCERO
TUASON, J.:
"The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor
will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of
his right to confront witnesses. As a matter of fact, preliminary
investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing
the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause
to a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose of
the constitutional question pleaded in the application for certiorari.
Heeding  the wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the  While Section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to
subject.
It is contended that Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court[1] infringes Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.[2] It is
said that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and
impairs substantive rights.
We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that Section 11
of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a
substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates
substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the
law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J. 27; 52 C. J. S.
1026.)
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares
what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for
committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which
provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime
is to be punished. (22 C. J. S. 49.) Preliminary investigation is
eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a
criminal prosecution.
changes the place of trial, Gut v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed. 573;
or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new
one in its stead. See Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382, 38 L. ed.
485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570."
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the
right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the
witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance
as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in
the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of
due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be
done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can
not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.
cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to
present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to
be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and
at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only
stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still
enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a
preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that
this formality is frequently waived.
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable
of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree.
(Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F. 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult
to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power
over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the
substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that
boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P. 1102.) This
being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should
step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in
a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates
only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the
Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of
procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This
power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete
and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different
rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones.

As a rule of evidence, Section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. The motion is denied.
Evidence - which is "the mode and manner of proving the competent
facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in
dispute in judicial proceedings" - is identified with and forms part of
the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress
obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal
procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci,
154 So. 419, 179 La. 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been
incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down Section 11
of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole
code of evidence embodied in these Rules.

In Beazell vs.. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 L. ed. 216, the United States
Supreme Court said:
"Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect
that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in
the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386,
390, 1 L. ed. 648, 650; Cummings v. Missouri, Wall. 277, 326, 18 L.
ed. 356, 364; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed.
507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443. And there may be procedural
changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available
under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, or
which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to
fall within the constitutional prohibition. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S.
221, 27 L. ed. 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S.
343, 42 L. ed. 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620. But it is now well settled
that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence,
which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only
in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not
prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of
persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the
disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto
law. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 575, 28 L. ed. 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202, 4
Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of
evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the
accused evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson v.

G.R. No. 17584             March 8, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by
striking him with automobile that he was driving, the herein appellant
was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence and
was sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional,
and to pay the costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging
that the court below committed four errors, to wit:
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the
appellant was being prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the
Philippine Legislature and that the Act is unconstitutional and gave no
jurisdiction in this case.
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the
presentation of the evidence in the case, if not before, for the reason
that said Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional and the proceedings had in
the case under the provisions of the Act constitute a prosecution of
appellant without due process of law.
3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over
the person of the accused and over the subject- matter of the
complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime
charged and in sentencing him to one year and one day of prison
correccional and to the payment of costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have
examined the record and find that the conclusions of the trial judge, as
contained in his well-written decision, are sufficiently sustained by the
evidence submitted.
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour
on a highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to
pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side of the road
and a heap of stones on the other side where the were two young boys,
the appellant did not take the precaution required by the circumstances
by slowing his machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that
under the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order
to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did
occur, as his automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was
instantly killed as the result of the accident.
These facts are so well established in the records that there cannot be a
shade of doubt about them.
Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that they
deal with the fundamental questions as to whether or not Act No.
2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid
and constitutional.
This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in
General Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the Philippine
Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend General Orders No.
58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have
the character of constitutional law. Said section 2 provides as follows:
All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United
States against the persons charged with the offenses. (G. O. No. 58,
sec. 2 ).
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the
Philippine Island is made the plaintiff in this information, contains the
following provisions in section 1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight,
series of nineteen hundred, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of
the People of the Philippine Islands against the persons charged with
the offense."
Let us examine the question.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not
incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of
the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the Subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they
may be carried into execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would
probably never be understood by the public. (M'Culloch vs. Maryland
[1819], 4 Wheat., 316, 407; 4 L. ed., 579.)
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States,
each States, each State has the authority, under its police power, to
define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal
procedure.
The states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of
discretion in creating and defining criminal offenses. . . .
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws if it prescribes a different procedure in the case
of persons in like situation. Subject to this limitation, however, the
legislature has large measure of discretion in prescribing the modes of
criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins vs. Johnston,
237 U.S., 502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter
Co. vs. Minnesota, 218 U.S., 57; 30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930;
Lynn vs. Flancders, 141 Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
This power of the States of the North American Union was also
granted to its territories such as the Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the
territories and possessions of the United States may be exercised by
that body itself, or, as is much more often the case, it may be delegated
to a local agency, such as a legislature, the organization of which
proceeds upon much the same lines as in the several States or in
Congress, which is often taken as a model, and whose powers are
limited by the Organic Act; but within the scope of such act is has
complete authority to legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon all
subjects within the police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)
The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from Congress.
By act of Congress their power extends "to all rightful subjects of
legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States;" and this includes the power to define and punish
crimes. (16 C. J., 62.)
And in the exercise of such powers the military government of the
army of occupation, functioning as a territorial legislature, thought it
convenient to establish new rules of procedure in criminal matters, by
the issuance of General Orders No. 58, the preamble of which reads:
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil liberties of the
inhabitants of these Islands, the criminal code of procedure now in
force therein is hereby amended in certain of its important provisions,
as indicated in the following enumerated sections. (Emphasis ours.)
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and its
intention is to give to its provisions the effect of law in criminal
matters. For that reason it provides in section 1 that:
The following provisions shall have the force and effect of law in
criminal matters in the Philippine Islands from and after the 15th day
of May, 1900, but existing laws on the same subjects shall remain
valid except in so far as hereinafter modified or repealed expressly or
by necessary implication.
From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of this
General Order do not the nature of constitutional law either by reason
of its character or by reason of the authority that enacted it into law.
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order
was made its own by the Congress of the United States for, as a mater
of fact, this body never adopted it as a law of its own creation either
before the promulgation of Act No. 2886, herein discussed, or, to our
knowledge, to this date.
Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of
statutory law, the power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident,
even if the question is considered only on principle. Our present
Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the subject of our
inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government as a
legislative body.
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines the
legislative branch of our government has undergone transformations
and has developed itself until it attained its present form. Firstly, it was
the Military Government of the army of occupation which, in
accordance with international law and practice, was vested with
legislative functions and in fact did legislate; afterwards, complying
with the instructions of President McKinley which later were ratified
by Congress (sec. 1 of the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers
of the Military Government were transferred to the Philippine
Commission; then, under the provisions of section 7 of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it
functioned as a colegislative body with the Philippine Commission.
Finally, by virtue of the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law, the Philippine
Commission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the Philippine
Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus was formed
the present Legislature composed of two Houses which has enacted the
aforesaid Act No. 2886.
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends
General Orders No. 58. The Philippine Commission, at various times,
had amended it by the enactment of laws among which we may cite
Act No. 194, regarding preliminary investigation, Act No. 440 relating
to counsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary investigations
by justices of the peace of provincial capitals. Later on, and before the
enactment of Act No. 2886, herein controverted, the Legislature had
also amended this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No.
2677 regarding appeals to the Supreme Court of causes originating in
the justice of the peace courts and by Act No. 2709 which deals with
the exclusion of accused persons from the information in order to be
utilized as state's witnesses.
These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as
well as by our present Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the
powers of the said legislative bodies as the successors of the Military
Government that promulgated General Orders No. 58.
No proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature had,
and had, the power to enact and amend laws. (U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil.,
7.) That it has the power to legislate on criminal matters is very
evident from the wording of section 7 of the Jones Law which says:
That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when
not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter,
modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this
Act as it may from time to time see fit.
It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of
sovereignty. This assertion is right; but it is also true that by reason of
the principle of territoriality as applied in the supression, of crimes,
such power is delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such
as territories. As we have seen in the beginning, the territorial
legislatures have the power to define and punish crimes, a power also
possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of
sections 7, already quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial
governments are local agencies of the Federal Government, wherein
sovereignty resides; and when the territorial government of the
Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it does so by virtue
of the authority delegated to it by the supreme power of the Nation.
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of the
several States of the Union and incorporated territories like Porto Rico
and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the case with the Philippines, which is an
organized territory though not incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 181-205.)
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration. As a
matter of fact, the crimes committed within our territory, even before
section 2 of General Orders No. 58 was amended, were prosecuted and
punished in this jurisdiction as is done at present; but then as now the
repression of crimes was done, and is still done, under the sovereign
authority of the United States, whose name appears as the heading in
all pleadings in criminal causes and in other judicial papers and
notarial acts.
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form 1 of
section 784 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in criminal causes the
constant practice followed in this jurisdiction established its use; and
in notarial matters its use is provided by section 127 of Act No. 496.
This long continued practice in criminal matters and the legal
provision relating to civil cases and notarial acts have not been
amended by any law, much less by Act No. 2886, the subject of the
present inquiry.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the
Philippines prescribing the name to be used as party plaintiff in
criminal cases.
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined
and in a transitory stage, is, in our opinion, responsible for the fact that
there is no positive provision in our constitutional law regarding the
use of the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, as party
plaintiff, in criminal prosecutions, as is otherwise the case in the
respective constitutional charters of the States of the Union and
incorporated territories — a situation which must not be understood as
depriving the Government of the Philippines of its power, however
delegated, to prosecute public crimes. The fact is undeniable that the
present government of the Philippines, created by the Congress of the
United States, is autonomous.
This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all
judicial actions, the case at bar being one of them; as an example of
such autonomy, this Government, the same as that of Hawaii and Porto
Rico (People of Porto Rico vs. Rosaly y Castillo [1913], 227 U.S.,
270; 57 L. ed., 507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be sued without its
consent. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil.,
311; L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p. 27, ante.) The doctrine, laid
down in these cases, acknowledges the prerogative of personality in
the Government of the Philippines, which, if it is sufficient to shield it
from any responsibility in court in its own name unless it consents
thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative in law, to give
that government the right to prosecute in court in its own name
whomsoever violates within its territory the penal laws in force
therein.
However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the
complaint in criminal matters, it is within the power of the Legislature
to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as long as the
constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of the nature of
the accusation is not violated.
Under the Constitution of the United States and by like provisions in
the constitutions of the various states, the accused is entitled to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him . . .
It is within the power of the legislatures under such a constitutional
provision to prescribe the form of the indictment or information, and
such form may omit averments regarded as necessary at common law.
(22 Cyc., 285.)
All these considerations a priori are strengthened a posteriori by the
important reason disclosed by the following fact — that the Congress
has tacitly approved Act No. 2886. Both the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, section 86, and the Jones Law, last paragraph of section 19,
provide that all the laws enacted by the Government of the Philippines
or its Legislature shall be forwarded to the Congress of the United
States, which body reserves the right and power to annul them. And
presuming, as legally we must, that the provisions of these laws have
been complied with, it is undisputed that the Congress of the United
States did not annul any of those acts already adverted to — Nos. 194,
440, 490 (of the Philippine Commission), and 2677, 2709 and the one
now in question No. 2886 (of the present Legislature) — all of which
were amendatory of General Orders No. 58. The Act now under
discussion (No. 2886) took effect on February 24, 1920, and the
criminal complaint in this case was filed on May 10, 1920. The silence
of Congress regarding those laws amendatory of the said General
Order must be considered as an act of approval.
If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial legislation
the reasonable inference is that it approves such act. (26 R.C.L.,
679; vide Clinton vs. Englebrcht, 13 Wall., 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco
vs. Forbes, 228 U.S., 549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57 [L. ed.], 960; Nixon
vs. Reid, 8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A., 315.)
Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of
the People of the Philippine Islands as plaintiff in the title of the
information constitutes a vice or defect, the same is not fatal when, as
in the present case, it was not objected to in the court below.
An indictment must, in many states under express statutory or
constitutional provision, show by its title or by proper recitals in the
caption or elsewhere that the prosecution is in the name and by the
authority of the state, the commonwealth, or the people of the state,
according to the practice in the particular jurisdictions; but omissions
or defects in this respect may be supplied or cured by other parts of the
records, and the omissions of such a recital or defects therein, even
when required by the constitution or by statute, is a defect of form
within a statute requiring exceptions for defect of form to be made
before trial. (23 Cyc., 237, 238.)
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as
amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same character as the
provisions of a constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is
not violative of any constitutional provisions and that the court a quo
did not commit any of the errors assigned.
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being
furthermore sentenced to the accessory penalties prescribed in article
61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 213023
MICHAEL C. GUY, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
RAFFY TULFO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO,
JR., JANET BAY, JESUS P. GALANG, RANDY HAGOS,
JEANY LACORTE, and VENUS TANDOC, Accused-Appellants
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The degree of freedom by which journalists operate to uncover and
write the news is an indication of the current state of our country's
democracy. By freely obtaining vital information on matters of public
concern, citizens become socially aware and well-equipped to
participate in different political processes to exercise their rights
enshrined in the fundamental law. Journalists are the sentinels who
keep watch over the actions of the government. They are the eyes and
ears of the citizenry. In today's digital age, the work of journalists is
held to a higher standard more than ever. Beyond the multitude that
participate on social media, they have value as part of a profession that
should be trusted with the truth.
Nevertheless, the probing done by journalists must be made "with
good motives and for justifiable ends[.]" 1 The protection afforded by
the Constitution2 to the press is not carte blanche that allows
journalists to abandon their responsibility for truth and transparency. It
is incumbent upon them to exercise a high degree of professionalism
in their work, regardless of the subject of their stories.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Court
of Appeals June 13, 2014 Amended Decision 4 in CA-G.R. CR No.
33256.
On March 24, 2004, an article entitled "Malinis ba talaga o naglilinis-
linisan lang (Sino si Finance Sec. Juanita Amatong?)" 5 was published
in Abante Tonite, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.6
Written by Raffy T. Tulfo (Tulfo), the article reported that a
certain Michael C. Guy (Guy), who was then being investigated by
the Revenue Integrity Protection Service of the Department of
Finance for tax fraud, went to former Department of Finance
Secretary Juanita Amatong (Secretary Amatong)'s house to ask
for help.7 Secretary Amatong then purportedly called the head of the
Revenue Integrity Protection Service and directed that all the
documents that the Revenue Integrity Protection Service had obtained
on Guy's case be surrendered to her.8 The article read:
Ang mga tanong ngayon, may katotohanan kaya ang akusasyon ni
Salanga laban kay Amatong? Nagsasabi naman kaya ng totoo si
Amatong nang itanggi niya ang akusasyon ni Salanga laban sa kanya?
Narito ang isang balitang natanggap ng SHOOT TO KILL mula sa
isang mapagkakatiwalaan at A-1 source na kung saan ay inarbor ni
Amatong sa kanyang mga tauhan ang isang negosyanteng
iniimb[e]st[i]gahan ng DoF dahil sa katiwalian sa tax refund. Narito
ang kwento at kayo na ang bahalang manghusga kung sino ang may
kredibilidad, si Amatong o si Salanga?
Noong March 20, 2004, Sabado ng hapon pumunta ang isang
negosyanteng nagngangalang Michael Guy sa bahay ni Amatong. Si
Guy ay iniimb[e]st[i]gahan ng mga tauhan ng Revenue Integrity
Protection Service (RIPS) ng DOF dahil sa kahinahinalang mga tax
refund na natanggap nito mula sa BIR simula 1998 hanggang 2003.
Problemado si Guy sapagkat natunugan niyang iniimbestigahan na
siya ng RIPS. Ito'y matapos magpadala ng sulat ang RIPS sa Central
Bank at hinihingi rito ang lahat ng mga transaksyon ng kumpanya ni
Guy sa lahat ng mga bangko. Ang nakatanggap ng sulat sa Central
Bank ay kakilala ni Guy.
Noong Sabado ng hapon din, ayon sa aking source, tinawagan ni
Amatong ang hepe ng RIPS para hilingin dito na ihinto imbestigasyon
laban kay Guy at isurender sa kanyang opisina ang lahat ng mga
dokumentong nakalap ng RIPS laban dito!!!9
Claiming that the article had tainted his reputation, Guy filed before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City a Complaint-Affidavit
against Tulfo and the following representatives of Abante
Tonite's publisher, Monica Publishing Corporation: (1) Allen
Macasaet; (2) Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr.; (3) Janet Bay; (4) Jesus P.
Galang; (5) Randy Hagos; (6) Jeany Lacorte; and (7) Venus Tandoc
(collectively, Macasaet, et al.).10
For this Court's resolution are the following issues:
First, whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for an award of
actual damages;
Second, whether or not petitioner Michael C. Guy is entitled to moral
damages; and
Finally, whether or not he is entitled to exemplary damages.
The Petition is partly meritorious.
appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal
the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.51 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Similarly, in Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. v. Piccio:52
Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a
criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused,
it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect
representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the
principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action
is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining
witnesses. For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real
parties in interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can
represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this
Court. In view of the corollary principle that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the
party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case
not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is perforce
dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may,
however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only
insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. He may also
file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of
the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil
aspect of the case.53 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

I
"Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the
criminal."43 This notion is rooted in the fundamental theory that when
a criminal act is committed, two (2) different entities are offended: (1)
the State, whose law has been violated; and (2) the person directly
injured by the offender's act or omission. 44 As explained in Banal v.
Tadeo, Jr.:45
Here, petitioner's sole purpose is to question the amount of damages
awarded by the Court of Appeals. He neither disputes nor challenges
the Court of Appeals Amended Decision on respondents' criminal
liability. He only intends to protect his interest in the civil aspect of the
case. Accordingly, petitioner has the legal standing to file this Petition
even without the intervention of the Office of the Solicitor General.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the

fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is
also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying
this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits
a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he
lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had
violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. . . . While an act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to
civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it
caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can
readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by
law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability
only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury
to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or
injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is
not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough
that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of
whether or not it also causes material damage to another. 46 (Citations
omitted)

Nevertheless, the private offended party's interest in a criminal case is

limited to the civil liability arising from it. 47 It is a fundamental
principle in remedial law that if the trial court dismisses the case or
renders a judgment of acquittal, the private offended party cannot
appeal the criminal aspect of the case. 48 Only the Office of the
Solicitor General can represent the State in actions brought before the
Court of Appeals or this Court.49 In People v. Santiago:50

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the

State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended
party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may
be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only
the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO
GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales,
Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and
Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who
eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount
of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to
pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner,
and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio
Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During
the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be
rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants,
except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose
instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the
then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on
the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision
in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of
P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the
appellate court certified this case to us for review. 6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome
Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was
awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord,
Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities.
Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and
Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a
nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the
Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew
brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to
the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station,
the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same
night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the
Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay
Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to
stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the
latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly
occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad
only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The
group stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno
inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the
immediate surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22, 1981, at around
7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a
photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further
investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back
that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in
Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio
Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara,
Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident, were already
there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno
continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise
taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall
of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about
11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made
with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built
and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the
lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right
axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm
right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in
length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm,
right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior
aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border
of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the
right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to
the thoracic cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the
level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the
right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of
the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left
armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward
the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the
anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length,
medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with
portion of large intestine and mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the
shoulder, right, directed downward to the aspex of the light thoracic
cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the
medial portion of the medial border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the
posterior aspect of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the
posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of
the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the
lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large
intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs
(sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED,
STABBED (sic), INCISED AND PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16)
wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal
organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales
appeared before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and
voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention
and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of
Lloyd Peñacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C.
headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already
detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the
Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for
murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of
Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The
information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and
AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as
follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of
Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused with four other companions whose
identities are still unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-
pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping
each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate
intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were provided
at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple
wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report
attached to the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused
the immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both
entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose
Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's
widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the
prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended
Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused
Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr.,
Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused
except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural
Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of
the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla;
Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy
Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo
of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and
Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of
the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22,
1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings
revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four
(4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds,
and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while
admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all
the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim,
nevertheless opined that due to the number and different
characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two
instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C.
operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation they
respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada
testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of
her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events
surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales
to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other
matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged
eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave
his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay
Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by
one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While
passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00
o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted
him to approach the place where the shouts were emanating. When he
was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of
banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging
upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd
Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly
recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were
through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body
and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was
situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria
then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related
what he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to
sleep. 27 Huntoria explained that he did not immediately report to the
police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October
1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he
allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his
father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made
him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's
widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled
from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of
Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to her
what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of
her honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied
participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was
located some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31 when
the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it
after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his
house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the
testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone
appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the
basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness,
and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In
upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein
accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July
27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing
the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit,
considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If
Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the
deceased, it was only because the assailant were moving around the
victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think
that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his
life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442,
450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a
criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the
initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information
about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or
dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been
judicially declared not to affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had
known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in
good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33,
July 18, 1984) He said that he could not think of any reason why
Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility.
is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of
alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by
the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate
court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-
appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248 is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. As there was no mitigating
or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been
brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death,
the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in
accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court. (E.g., People v. De
la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31
(1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R.
No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by
the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we
find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime
charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities
leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force
in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the
crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the
scene is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various
blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there
was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather
unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two
versions proferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of
blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to
which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it,
the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses,
there would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom
or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would
provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape
asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version
that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth,
then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other
place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the
other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused
Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to
state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that
Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge
by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto
never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing
of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C.
investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an
investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal
complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd
Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that
the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two
or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility
that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr.
Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta
Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the killing
appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive
testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be
fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall
discuss more the significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant
by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a
meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused,
including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd
Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21,
1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed
behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from
where the crime was being committed. According to him, he
recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was
then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and
hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria
admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did
the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by
each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and
the stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as identified by
you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this
Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant
movement, I could not determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is
rapid. I only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I
cannot determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw
the hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked
Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who
did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify
the weapons used because according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and
specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing
of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial
court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal
liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under
Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is
nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by
inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by
indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was
the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the
ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is
incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is
through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are
felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act
or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the
Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission
incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both
found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any
bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external
world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act"
committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to
the body of the victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that
he did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this
principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the
appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know
what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of
specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed.
Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds
out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there
are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of
the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this
one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he
took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why
not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that
time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this
argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable,
that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all
the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them.
And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable, that all
the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have
been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and
honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that
the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with
the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished
by the fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight
long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981.
While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police
authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect
his credibility,41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an
alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility
doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one who was mute for eight
months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly
witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that
he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There
is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody.
And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the
accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that
except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already
under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still free and
around; they were not yet named in the original information, 45 thus the
supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and present
when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed
by the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased.
In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was
because the victim was also his landlord.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you
saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told
Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was
haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim was also my
landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim. 46
x x x           x x x          x x x
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our
socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood,
if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the
land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden
to their landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves
with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported
eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to
the conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife,
Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a
perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate
himself with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is
especially so because the need to get into the good graces of his
landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased
to be employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services
would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved
quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered
and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the
protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him
employment and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the
foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an
unreliable witness, to say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged
participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada
doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the
Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and
insulated by their adult children from any possible physical and
emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who
are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the
aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the
appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim
was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's
residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we
seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of
aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta),
not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing
of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate
circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the
appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory.
Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for
if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be
sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de
oficio.
G.R. No. 101797 March 24, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant.
CARLOS DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO
ASMOLO, TEODULFO DAGUING, FEDERICO SIMPRON,
BIENVENIDO SIMPRON and DIDOC BONGCALOS (all at
large), accused.
PUNO, J.:
In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were
charged with the crime of Kidnapping with Murder before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. 1 They were
Abundio Roluna, Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto
Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron
and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of
Baybay, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with the
use of firearms and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously hogtie and kidnap one
Anatalio Moronia and take him away to a place unknown up (to) this
time whereat said victim was killed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted.
The other seven (7) accused remain at large.
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado
Sombilon and Buenaventura Nogalada, both of whom were residents
of barangay Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte.
CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around
seven o'clock in the morning, he was on his way to sitio Bungabungan
in barangay Amguhan to attend to the pasture of his carabao. At a
distance of thirty (30) meters, he saw his neighbor, Anatalio Moronia,
stopped in his tracks and taken captive by accused Abundio Roluna.
Roluna was then accompanied by seven (7) other persons. viz: Didoc
Bongcalos, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo
Daguing, Carlos Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo and Paterno Daguing.
Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while his companions
were carrying short firearms. Using an abaca strip, he saw Carlos
Daguing tie up the hands of Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did
not shout for help and proceeded on his way. With the exception of his
wife, he did not inform anyone about what he saw that fateful day. 2
BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the
testimony of Sombilon. He testified that on said day, at around nine
o'clock in the morning, he came from his farm in barangay Monterico,
Baybay and was on his way home to barangay Amguhan. At a distance
of about twenty-five (25) meters, he saw Moronia walking along a
human trail in barangay Amguhan, with his hands tied by a rope
behind his back. Moronia was followed by accused Roluna, Carlos
Daguing and five (5) other persons whom he did not recognize.
Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while Carlos Daguing was
armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada immediately left the place. 3
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never
seen or heard from.
At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and alibi.
Roluna claimed that on May 24, 1984, Danilo Noroño, a cousin of his
wife, went to their house in barangay Amguhan. They were informed
by Danilo that Iluminada Cortines y Noroño, his wife's grandmother,
was bedridden and seriously ill. He and his wife immediately
proceeded to Iluminada's house in barangay Banahaw, Baybay, Leyte.
As soon as they arrived, he gathered some herbal plants for Iluminada.
He boiled these plants and regularly applied them on Iluminada's body.
He and his wife attended to Iluminada for three (3) weeks. After
Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they returned to their home in
barangay Amguhan. 4 His testimony was corroborated in substance by
his wife, Teresita Roluna and his grandmother-in-law, Iluminada
Cortines de Noroño.
Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and
Nogalada, harboring ill-feelings against him, testified falsely and
implicated him in the disappearance of Anatalio Moronia. He claimed
that in 1983, he and Sombilon had a dispute over a cara y cruz game
held in their barangay. Sombilon was then drunk and he, as chairman
of the Kabataang Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon but the latter got
mad at him. Since then, they have not talked with each other.
Nogalada on the other hand, also had a grudge against him. In 1982,
they had an altercation during a volleyball game held during the
barangay fiesta. 5
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, 6 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Abundio Roluna y Elhig
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping
With Murder. As kidnapping (and serious illegal detention) is
penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and murder with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, under Article 48 of the
Code, the herein accused should be punished with the maximum of the
more serious crime, hereat the supreme penalty of death. Considering
that the Constitution of 1987 does not allow the imposition of the
death penalty, however, herein accused is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of
the law, and to indemnify the heirs of Anatalio Moronia the sum of
P30,000.00. He is credited with the full period of his detention in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
except if he did not sign an agreement to obey the prison laws, rules
and regulations at the inception.
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal.
In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant points and stresses
that the corpus delicti was not duly proved by the prosecution. He
submits, inter alia, that considering that the body of Anatalio
Moronia was never found, Moronia's questionable and
unexplained absence and disappearance should not be blamed on
him for the alleged victim, in all probability, may still be alive.
In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia's death and
the culpability of accused-appellant were sufficiently established by
the evidence. The People relies on the disputable presumption
provided under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four (4) years.
Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that fateful day of
May 27, 1984. During this time, Moronia, with his hands tied at the
back, was accompanied by eight (8) armed men. Clearly, he was then
in danger of death. Since that day until the date of the trial (or for a
span of six years), Moronia has not been seen or heard from. The
People urges that these circumstances raised a presumption that
Moronia has been killed by accused-appellant and his companions.
The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances proved by
the prosecution are sufficient to establish the death of Anatalio
Moronia, and; (b) if in the affirmative, whether or not accused-
appellants and his companions could be held liable therefor.
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime
and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been
actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the
actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged. 7 The corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2)
things, viz: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of
the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the
cause of this act or result. 8
Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this case?
Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last
seen on May 27, 1984 with his hands tied at the back and accompanied
by eight (8) armed men undoubtedly shows that his life was then in
danger or peril. Coupled with the fact that Moronia has been absent
and unheard from since that time until the trial of this case (or a total
of six years), a presumption of death was sufficiently raised. This is in
consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four (4) years.
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be
enough to hold accused-appellant responsible for the death of
Moronia.
In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the
conviction of the accused for murder although the body of the victim
was not found or recovered. In said case, we ruled that in case of
murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body of the
victim or show where it can be found. It is enough that the death and
the criminal agency causing death is proven. The Court recognized
that there are cases where the death and intervention of the criminal
agency that caused it may be presumed or established by
circumstantial evidence.
However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at
bench. In the Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4)
armed accused forcibly take the victim from his house to a lake,
beating him up all the way to the boat. While sailing, the accused
continued ill-treating the victim until the latter died. The body of the
victim was never found.
In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they
merely saw one of the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of
Moronia. He was then taken in the direction of barangay Monterico
and was never seen or heard from since. At no point during the trial
was it ever established that any of the eight (8) accused beat up
Moronia or in any way laid a violent hand on him. Nogalada even
testified that he did not hear any shot fired by any of the eight (8)
armed accused 10 so as to warrant a reasonable conclusion that
Moronia was killed by accused-appellant or any of his co-conspirators.
Indeed, even the possible motive of accused-appellant and his group
for abducting Moronia was not definitively established. To be sure, the
circumstances proved are insufficient to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption
under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would apply,
but only insofar as to establish the presumptive death of Moronia.
Whether accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia is a
different matter. The Rules did not authorize that from this disputable
presumption of death, it should be further presumed that the person
with whom the absentee was last seen shall be responsible for the
subsequent unexplained absence/disappearance of the latter. The
conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping
with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts
established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence
presented by the prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day
are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accused-
appellant for the death of Moronia.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused is
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. No less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required to convict him. On the whole, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution would not prove beyond a
shadow of a doubt that accused-appellant should be convicted for the
serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was
proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was
established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention
under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the
crime, more than three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its
commission. Thus, since the generic aggravating circumstance of
band 11 attended the commission of the crime and there being no
mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period as maximum and prision mayor as minimum
should be imposed on accused-appellant. 12
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal
detention and is meted an indeterminate sentence from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum. 13 Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133541             April 14, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
RICKY QUIMZON, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the decision1 dated December 17, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case
No. Bn-92-7-2924, finding appellant Ricky Quimzon 2 guilty of murder
and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated July 28, 1992, appellant and three other
persons, namely Salvacion Lacsarom, Canoto Cabero 3 and Edgardo
Detona4 were charged with the crime of murder allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of March, 1992, in the Municipality of
Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another with treachery and abuse of
superior strength, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, strike, stab and wound one
Marlo Casiong with short bolos locally known as ‘pisao’ which
accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and
inflicting upon the said Marlo Casiong with fatal wounds on the
different parts of his body which caused his death shortly thereafter.
Contrary to law.5
Appellant "surrendered" to the police authorities on August 18,
19946 while his other co-accused remain at-large. When arraigned on
September 28, 1994, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered
a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. 7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
On the night of March 7, 1992, victim Marlo Casiong, his sister
Emolyn Casiong, and one Rommel Redoña were at the social hall of
Burauen, Leyte attending a benefit dance. Around 11:30 of the same
evening, while dancing with one Salvacion Lacsarom, Marlo
accidentally bumped his cousin, herein appellant Ricky Quimzon.
Emolyn and Rommel, who were then dancing with each other and
were about one meter away from Marlo and Salvacion, witnessed the
incident. Thereafter, while the dance continued, Salvacion held
Marlo’s hand and invited him to go outside the dance hall as she had
something important to tell him. Thereupon, Marlo asked Emolyn to
stay put because he was coming back. Feeling apprehensions about it,
Emolyn and Rommel followed Salvacion and Marlo as they went out
of the dance hall. Emolyn noticed that Canoto Cabero, Edgardo
Detona and appellant Ricky also went out of the hall in a hurried
manner thereby overtaking them (Emolyn and Rommel). Outside the
social hall, Emolyn heard Salvacion say "ito na" then saw her push
Marlo towards the group of Canoto, Edgardo and Ricky. Canoto then
grabbed Marlo by the wrist and repeatedly stabbed him with a short
bolo locally known as pisao. Edgardo followed suit by stabbing Marlo
twice at the back. Despite being wounded, Marlo was able to get away
from Canoto and Edgardo and walked fast towards the nearby health
center. Marlo was about to reach the gate of the health center when
Ricky, who was behind Marlo, held the latter’s hands. Marlo tried to
free himself from the clutches of Ricky but in the course of his
struggle he fell down. Thereupon, Ricky rode on the back of Marlo
and repeatedly stabbed him on his back. Emolyn and Rommel shouted
for help prompting an unidentified person to throw stones and utter,
"that is enough". Thereafter, Canoto, Edgardo and Ricky fled. With the
help of some persons, Emolyn brought Marlo to the Burauen General
Hospital but Marlo died before reaching the hospital. 8
In denying criminal liability, appellant interposed the defense of alibi.
He claims that he does not know Salvacion Lacsarom, Canoto Cabero
and Edgardo Detona. He denies that he stabbed Marlo Casiong.
Appellant testified, as follows: He could not have been at the scene of
the crime when the incident happened as he was in Barangay Patag
attending another benefit dance. He arrived at Barangay Patag around
7 o’clock in the evening of March 7, 1992 and stayed there until 7
o’clock of the following morning. Barangay Patag is 18 kilometers
away from the poblacion of Burauen where Marlo was killed and can
only be reached by riding a horse or a carabao or by hiking for five
hours. He only came to know of the death of Marlo when he went to
the poblacion of Burauen. He was included as one of the accused
because he refused to testify in favor of the prosecution. 9
Alfredo Rellesiva, then Barangay Chairman of Barangay Patag,
Burauen, Leyte; and Mauro Lobriquinto, then second Barangay
Councilor of Barangay Candag-on, corroborated appellant’s alibi.10
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the evidence of the prosecution
having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
Court hereby renders the conviction of the accused Ricky Quimzon of
the crime of Murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. The crime currently is punishable by RA 7659 classifying
Murder as heinous crime to which the death penalty is to be imposed.
However, the crime was committed on March 7, 1992 and the
effectivity of RA 7659 is January 1994. This act therefore cannot
apply in the case at bench.
Two qualifying circumstances are alleged in the Information; namely,
treachery and abuse of superior strength. However, the latter
circumstance is absorbed by the former.
There is no other aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. The penalty
therefore to be applied is reclusion perpetua being the medium of the
penalty from minimum which is the maximum of reclusion temporal to
death.
The accused is therefore sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua.
On the civil aspect, the defense admitted the expenses incurred for the
wake and burial of the victim and neither did he controvert the moral
damages suffered by the mother of the victim. The accused is ordered
to pay the sum of P53,000.00 as actual expenses for the wake and
burial, and P75,000.00 as moral damages payable to the mother of the
victim Erlinda Casiong.
The Philippine National Police and the NBI are urged to exert efforts
to bring the at large co-accused to justice for their complicity in the
crime. Furnish them a copy. Meanwhile, until they are placed under
the custody of the law, archived the case.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, the present petition with the following Assignment of Errors.
I
IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITHOUT A
CORPUS DELICTI.
II
IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF EMOLYN CASIONG THE
LONE PROSECUTION EYE WITNESS, LEADING TO THE
CONVICTION OF APPELLANT ON THE CRIME CHARGED IN
THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE.12
In support of his first assigned error, appellant contends that the
testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Adelaida Asperin on the report of
the autopsy conducted on the body of the victim Marlo Casiong was
designed to prove the corpus delicti. Appellant, however, claims that
Dr. Asperin is incompetent to testify, as she was not the one who
personally examined the body. Instead, it was a certain Dr. Amparo
Villanueva who conducted the autopsy on the body of Marlo Casiong.
Appellant asserts that the trial court should have regarded the
testimony of Dr. Asperin as inadmissible for being hearsay; and, in the
absence of such testimony, the prosecution would not have been able
to prove the corpus delicti.
A review of the oral and documentary evidence presented before the
trial court reveals that it was indeed Dr. Amparo Villanueva, not Dr.
Adelaida Asperin, who conducted the autopsy taken on the body of
Marlo Casiong. As the attending physician, Dr. Villanueva was the
one who signed the autopsy report.13 In fact, Dr. Asperin herself
admitted in her testimony that she never saw the victim, Marlo
Casiong, and that it was Dr. Villanueva who conducted the autopsy
and was the one who prepared the autopsy report. 14 However, Dr.
Villanueva died before the prosecution was able to present her as
witness.
Nonetheless, even if Dr. Asperin is an incompetent witness as to the
autopsy report and her testimony could not have probative value for
being hearsay, we still find that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish by competent evidence the corpus delicti in the instant case.
Corpus delicti is defined as the body, foundation or substance upon
which a crime has been committed, e.g. the corpse of a murdered
man.15 It refers to the fact that a crime has been actually
committed.16 Corpus delicti does not refer to the autopsy report
evidencing the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim nor the
testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy or medical
examination.17 It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result
has been proved, for example, a man has died and (b) that some person
is criminally responsible for the act.
Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies
and offenses.19 While the autopsy report of a medico legal expert in
cases of murder or homicide is preferably accepted to show the extent
of the injuries suffered by the victim, it is not the only competent
evidence to prove the injuries and the fact of death. 20 It may be proved
by the testimonies of credible witnesses. Even a single witness’
uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor.21
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that the testimony of
Dr. Asperin is not indispensable in proving the corpus delicti. Even
without her testimony, the prosecution was still be able to prove
the corpus delicti by establishing the fact that the victim died and that
such death occurred after he was stabbed by appellant and his co-
accused. These facts were established by the testimony of prosecution
witness Emolyn Casiong.22
The question that remains, therefore, is whether the trial court erred in
giving credence to Emolyn’s testimony over and above the testimonies
of the defense witnesses.
In his second assigned error, appellant questions Emolyn’s credibility
as a witness by pointing out that Emolyn did not execute an affidavit
regarding the events that she allegedly witnessed on March 7, 1992;
that she did not present herself as a witness during the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Burauen, and
that she only appeared as a witness when the case was already being
tried before the trial court. Appellant posits that Emolyn’s delay,
which consisted in her failure to execute an affidavit and her belated
appearance as a witness, puts the trustworthiness of her testimony in
serious doubt.
We are not persuaded by appellant’s arguments.
When the credibility of witnesses is in issue, appellatte courts ....
generally defer to the findings of the trial court, considering that the
latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the COURT:
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.23
Q Who is the police who said because you are the sister of the victim
you cannot have an affidavit?
It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of a
witness is a function that is best discharged by the trial judge whose
conclusion thereon is accorded much weight and respect that will not A The Chief of Police Nuevarez, the one who prepared the affidavit of
be disturbed on appeal unless a material or substantial fact has been Rommel was sir Juanico.
overlooked or misappreciated which if properly taken into account
could alter the outcome of the case.24 ATTY SAY:

After going over the records of the case, we find no compelling reason Q Will you still insist that Nuevarez refused to take your affidavit
to disturb the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility because you are a sister of the victim?
of Emolyn. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, we find that she took no
delay in relating the killing of her brother to the police authorities. A Yes, sir.
Emolyn testified that shortly after the killing of her brother, she
submitted herself for investigation before the police authorities of
Burauen, Leyte. However, the chief of police informed her that she Q Even if we present Nuevarez in the witness stand you will still
could not execute an affidavit because she is a sister of the victim, but insist?
if the court would need her, then she can execute an affidavit.
Unschooled on the rules on evidence, it is but natural for Emolyn to A Yes, sir.
have readily accepted the explanation of the chief of police. In her
direct examination, she testified, thus:
Q Is it not a fact that your affidavit could not be taken because you
were still in Manila?
Q Now, shortly after the killing of your brother were you investigated
by the police in connection with the killing of your brother?
A I was in Burauen, Leyte when that incident occurred.

A We were investigated by the Chief of Police of Burauen, Leyte.

Q But one thing is you have been in Manila?

Q When you said ‘we’, to whom are you referring?

A I went to Manila in 1994 already I went after Rommel Redoña.

A Me and Rommel Redoña because we were the companions of my

Q The deceased Marlo Casiong was a very close, aside from being
brother Marlo Casiong.
your brother you were very closely associated with him?

Q It is clear now that only you and Rommel Redoña were the
A Yes, sir.
companions of Marlo Casiong on that fateful evening?

Q And you want to do anything for him?

A Yes sir.

A I will do everything because I was there when the incident took

Q In the course of your investigation by the Chief of Police of Burauen
place.26
relative to the killing of your brother, was that investigation conducted
on your person reduced into writing?
As to her apparent delay in testifying, Emolyn explained that she
would not have appeared as a witness if Rommel Redoña testified.
A The Chief of Police told me that when needed I might be
However, she clarified that she only appeared as a witness when the
investigated by the Court, I was not asked to execute an affidavit, it
case was being tried by the trial court because she was left with no
was only Rommel Redoña who executed an affidavit.
choice but to testify in place of Rommel Redoña who told her that he
no longer wanted to be a witness because he was being threatened by
Q So no affidavit was made by the police when you were investigated? appellant, to wit:

A None because the Chief of Police informed me that Rommel Redoña
would only be the one to execute an affidavit but if the Court would
need me then I will execute an affidavit because I am a sister of the
victim and I may not be allowed.25
And on her cross-examination, to wit:
Q What was your purpose in going after Rommel Redoña in Manila?
A Because a subpoena reached us informing us that the one who killed
my brother had already been apprehended and because he was one of
the eye witness I have to fetch him in Manila and I even went there
twice and my mother went there third time, only last November.

Q Being the witness will you tell us were you the one who reported Q Do you know the reason why he went to Manila despite the fact that
this incident to the police? he is one of the witnesses in this case?

A My mother. A When I went to Manila I met him and he told me Molin I really
cannot testify because I have been threatened by Ricky and company.
Q Being an alleged eye witness did you submit yourself for
investigation by the police? ...

A My affidavit was not prepared because according to the chief of
police of Burauen, Leyte I cannot have my affidavit because I am the
sister of the victim and only Rommel Redoña was prepared.
Q Sister of whom?
RE-CROSS BY ATTY. SAY:
Q Now since Rommel Redoña refused to testify you have to testify
despite the fact that you were told by the chief of police Nuevarez that
you cannot testify in this case being a sister of the victim?

A Marlo Casiong.
A The chief of police there Nuevarez told me that if ever I will be
needed by this Court I could testify but only, my affidavit cannot be
prepared then because I was the sister.
Q Then how did you know that the court needed your testimony?
COURT:
Q Were you subpoenaed by the Court?
A No.
ATTY. SAY:
Q So it was not the court actually required your testimony because you
did not receive subpoena?
A I did not receive any subpoena but Rommel Redoña whom I met
many times was firm that he cannot testify because he would be killed
by the accused and because it was only the three of us, Rommel,
myself and the victim who went to the dance.
Q It is only reason why you testified in this case because Rommel
Redoña has manifested that he will not testify?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q So if Rommel Redoña would have testified in Court you do not need
to testify?
A I will not anymore because I have no affidavit.
Q It was your lawyer Atty. Adaza who adviced you to testify in this
case?
A He did not, because we could not find any other witness I have to
testify.
Q Your lawyer did not advice you to testify?
A No, Your Honor.
Q Your lawyer did not say that you are not qualified to testify in this
case because you are a sister?
A No, Your Honor.
Q So you are testifying to substitute only the testimony of Rommel
Redoña?
A Yes, your Honor, because Rommel Redoña did not want to testify
anymore and we could not find any other witness and since I was with
them when the incident occurred, I testified here. 27
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that the apparent delay in Emolyn’s appearance as a
witness is explained by the fact that while a complaint against
appellant and his co-accused was filed as early as May 7, 1992, the
case was archived because all the accused remained at-large. 28 It was
only on August 18, 1994 that appellant was arrested, which
sufficiently explains why Emolyn was only able to appear as a witness
on February 21, 1995.
Appellant further attacks the veracity of Emolyn’s testimony by
calling our attention to some purported inconsistencies and
improbabilities in her account of the events that took place prior to and
during the stabbing of Marlo. Appellant contends: It could not have
been possible for Emolyn to overhear the conversation that took place
between Salvacion and Marlo while they were dancing because the
music was loud, the beat was fast and furious, and Emolyn was
engrossed in her dancing. It was impossible for Emolyn to hear
Edgardo Detona, Canoto Cabero and appellant ask permission from
their respective dancing partners before going out of the dance hall
because Emolyn went out of the dance hall ahead of them. Emolyn
failed to accurately recall the sequence of events that led to the
stabbing of Marlo. She could not have witnessed Marlo’s stabbing as
she admitted that it was dark where the incident took place.
We are not convinced by appellant’s contentions.
First, it is not improbable for Emolyn to overhear the conversation
between Salvacion and Marlo while they were dancing because she
(Emolyn) testified that she was just one meter away from Salvacion
and Marlo at that time. The fact that they were dancing, that the music
is loud and that there is another couple between them and her does not
discount the possibility that she could have heard them talking. Given
the above circumstances, it is expected of Salvacion and Marlo to have
raised their voices in order to hear each other, which then enabled
Emolyn to hear their conversation.
Second, while Emolyn admitted that she and Rommel started to go out
of the dance hall ahead of Edgardo, Canoto and appellant, she
sufficiently explained that she was able to hear the three men talk to
their respective partners because she was still near them when they
asked permission from their partners. Emolyn explained thus:
Q How about Canuto Cavero when he went out together with Ricky
Quimson, Edgardo Detuna, did Canuto Cavero also leave his partner?
A He told his partner to wait for a while because he will be going out.
Q How about Edgardo Detuna he also left his partner when he went
out?
A He also told his partner to wait for a while because he will be going
out.
Q And likewise, Ricky Quimson also told his partner to wait for a
while because he will be going out?
A Yes.
Q So, in other words the three gentlemen Canuto Cavero, Edgardo
Detuna and Ricky Quimson left their partners because they will be
going out for a while?
A Yes.
Q You are sure of that, you cannot be mistaken?
A I will not be mistaken.
Q You are very sure because you heard each one of them, Canuto
Cavero, Edgardo Detuna, and Ricky Quimson left their respective
partners and told them, ‘Wait because I am going out for a while’, you
cannot be mistaken.
A Yes because we were close to each other. 29
As to who went ahead of whom, Emolyn satisfactorily explained as
follows:
Q In other words it is very clear that after Salvacion Lacsarom and
your brother left you immediately followed because you were were
deeply alarmed leaving inside the hall Edgardo Detuna, Canuto Cavero
and Ricky Quimson?
A Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero were already outside ahead of
us.
Q Do you mean to tell us that Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero left
the hall ahead of Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong?
A The two, Canuto Cavero and Edgardo Detuna were able to reach
outside ahead of Marlo Casiong and Salvacion Lacsarom because they
walked fast.
Q But the fact is, Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong left the
dancing hall ahead of everybody?
A They went out ahead but they were overtaken by Canuto Cavero and
Edgardo Detuna.
Q So it is not correct to say that you were the one who immediately
followed Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong because according to
you Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero followed Salvacion Lacsarom
and Marlo Casiong, you were not the one who immediately followed
the pair but Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero, is that correct?
A No because Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero were faster and
they went out the shorter way while I followed Marlo Casiong and
Salvacion Lacsarom who took a little slower in going out.
...
Q How about Ricky Quimson, was he still dancing when you
immediately followed Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong
outside?
A He was already outside the dancing hall because he followed Canuto
Cavero and Edgardo Detuna.
Q But he was behind Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero?
A Yes.30
Third, we find that the alleged probabilities and inaccuracies
committed by Emolyn in recounting the events that took place prior to
and during the stabbing of Marlo refers to trivial matters that do not
refer to material points and do not detract from Emolyn’s clear and
positive testimony that she saw appellant and the other accused stab
and kill her brother.
Settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not
affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the
weight of their testimony.31 In fact, such minor flaws may even
enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized
falsities.32
Fourth, while Emolyn testified that it was dark inside the dance hall, it
is also clear from her testimony that the stabbing took place outside the
hall and there were fluorescent bulbs near the places where Marlo was
stabbed by Canoto, Edgardo and appellant. When cross-examined, she
testified as follows:
Q How many times did you meet the accused in dances?
A Several times because we meet at dances whenever there is one.
Q This incident happened outside the dancing hall, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q But the alleged bumping of Ricky Quimson by Marlo Casiong
happened inside the dancing hall?
A Yes.
Q And it happened while the dance was going on?
A The dance was in progress but the four of them went out. 33
Emolyn testified further:
Q What kind of light was illuminating the dancing hall?
A Fluorescent bulbs.
Q How many fluorescent lamps were there?
A There were two outside and one was at the gate of the health center
and one at the gate of the dancing hall.
Q How far was the nearest fluorescent lamp where the first stabbing of
the victim was made?
A Witness points to a distance which indicated 4 meters when
measured.
Q How high was the fluorescent lamp from the ground?
A About 2 meters and 35 cms. high from the floor.
Q At the health center where Marlo Casiong was attacked by Ricky
Quimson, how far was the fluorescent light?
A Witness points to a distance which indicated 4 meters when
measured.
Q How about the lamp from the ground, how high?
A The same height, about 2 meters and 35 cms. from the ground. 34
We have held that kerosene lamp, flashlight, even moonlight or
starlight may, in proper situations, be considered sufficient
illumination.35 In the instant case, the fluorescent bulbs situated near
the places where appellant and his companions attacked Marlo enabled
Emolyn to witness the killing of her brother.
Thus, we reiterate the well-entrenched rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, the factual findings of the trial court should be
respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment
on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when
they testified and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying.36
Appellant interposes the defense of alibi. However, alibi, like denial, is
an inherently weak defense as it is easy to concoct and difficult to
prove.37 While appellant’s testimony is corroborated by defense
witness Rellesiva and Lobriquito, the trial court correctly gave more
probative weight to the lone testimony of prosecution witness Emolyn
who positively identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
crime.
Appellant’s defense of alibi fails in the face of Emolyn’s positive
identification of him as one of her brother’s killers. Positive
identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent,
especially where such identification is credible and categorical. 38 The
defense of denial is unavailing when placed astride the undisputed fact
that there is positive identification of the felon. 39
We affirm the trial court’s finding that there was treachery in the
killing of Marlo. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. 40 The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission with no risk to the aggressor. 41 In the present
case, Marlo accepted Salvacion’s invitation for them to go outside the
dance hall on the impression that the latter has something important to
tell him. He has no inkling of any impending danger on his life as he
even told his sister, Emolyn, to wait for him because he will be coming
back.42 Outside the dance hall, as soon as Salvacion pushed Marlo
towards them, Canoto and Edgardo immediately attacked him without
warning, inflicting wounds on the front and back portions of his body
with the use of bolos. Although this initial assault on Marlo was
frontal it may still be considered treacherous because the attack was
sudden and unprovoked. There is no evidence showing that the attack
was preceded by any exchange of words or any untoward incident
between the assailants and Marlo, sufficient to warn Marlo of the
impending attack on him. The mode of execution was in such a
manner that Marlo was left with no opportunity to repel the attack or
avoid it. Moreover, he was unarmed while all three assailants were
carrying deadly weapons. The treachery continued when appellant
held the hands of Marlo as the latter was running away from the initial
stabbings of Canoto and Edgardo, rode on Marlo’s back when the
latter fell down and repeatedly stabbed Marlo who had already been
rendered weak by the multiple stab wounds inflicted by Edgardo and
Canoto. Appellant attacked Marlo from behind and repeatedly stabbed
Marlo when he was already in a defenseless position.
In any criminal prosecution, the only requisite is that the prosecution
proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof that, excluding
the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind.43
...
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the perpetrator of the
crime of Murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Applying the express provision of the aforequoted Article 68 and
pursuant to Article 61, paragraph 2, of the same Code, to wit:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties. - . . .
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in
Article 71 of this Code.
...

the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal or 12 years and 1 day to

Hence, we uphold the trial court’s judgment declaring appellant guilty
of murder beyond reasonable doubt. The attendant circumstance of
treachery qualified the killing to murder as defined under paragraph 1,
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Since treachery attended the
killing, abuse of superior strength alleged in the Information is
absorbed by said circumstance.44
Aside from abuse of superior strength, no other aggravating
circumstance was alleged and proved by the prosecution.
In a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide open for
review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned,
that may be found in the appealed judgment.45
20 years.
Considering the actual penalty to be imposed upon appellant, as
prescribed by law, is not reclusion perpetua or death, appellant is
entitled to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 50 Thus,
from the penalty of reclusion temporal, one degree lower is prision
mayor or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years from which will be drawn the
MINIMUM period of the indeterminate sentence; while pursuant to
paragraph 2, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, in the absence of
any modifying circumstance, the penalty prescribed by law should be
imposed in its medium period, or anywhere between 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months, as the MAXIMUM period
of the indeterminate sentence.

It appears in the Commitment Order, dated August 14, 1994, issued by

the Municipal Trial Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Burauen,
Leyte, that appellant "voluntarily surrendered to SPO1 Josefino
Agustin of PNP Burauen, Leyte on August 18, 1994". 46 An
examination of the records reveals that it can not be considered as a
mitigating circumstance. For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply
with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and
(3) the surrender is voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity
and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either
because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them
the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture. 47

The "surrender" of appellant was far from being spontaneous and

unconditional. The warrant of arrest is dated June 17, 1992 and all the
accused, including appellant, remained at-large, which prompted the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte to archive
the case.48 It took appellant two years before he finally "surrendered"
to the police. In between said period, appellant, through counsel, filed
a Motion to Fix Bail Bond49 without surrendering his person to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Records do not reveal that the motion
had been acted upon by the trial court. This act of appellant may be
considered as a condition set by him before he surrenders to proper
authorities, thus preventing his subsequent act of surrendering from
being considered as a mitigating circumstance.

Moreover, we noted in the Motion to Fix Bail Bond, filed on July 9,

1992, that counsel for appellant alleged that appellant "is barely 15
years of age". When appellant was called to the witness stand on
August 2, 1996, or four years thereafter, appellant asserted that he was
21 years old. The stabbing incident took place on March 7, 1992, thus
placing appellant to be 17 years old, a minor, when he committed the
crime. The records do not show that the prosecution refuted
appellant’s minority; and absent any evidence to the contrary, the trial
court should have applied in favor of appellant the benefits under
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of

age. –

G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. HERMINIO VIDAL, JR. Y UAYAN @ "PATO,"
ARNOLD DAVID Y CRUZ @ "ANOT," CIPRIANO REFREA,
JR. Y ALMEDA @ "COBRA," RICARDO H. PINEDA @
"PETER," EDWIN R. BARQUEROS @ "MARVIN," AND
DANIEL YASON@ "ACE," Accused.
HERMINIO VIDAL, JR. Y UAYAN @ "PATO," AND ARNOLD
DAVID Y CRUZ @ "ANOT," Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated February 24,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06206,
which affirmed with modification the Judgment 2 dated February 6,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Biñan City, Laguna
(RTC), finding accusedappellants Herminia Vibal, Jr. y Uayan @ Pato
(Vibal) and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot (David) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of the complex crime of Direct
Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos. 17646-B and 17647-B,
and one (1) count of Direct Assault with Frustrated Murder in
Criminal Case No. 17648-B.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Vibal and David, together with accused Cipriano Refrea, Jr. y Almeda
@ Cobra (Refrea), Ricardo H. Pineda @ Peter (Pineda), Edwin R.
Barqueros @ Marvin (Barqueros) and Daniel Yason @ Ace (Yason)
were charged with two (2) counts of the complex crime of Direct
Assault with Murder and one (1) count of Direct Assault with
Frustrated Murder in an Information dated July 4, 2007 and two
Amended Informations dated March 9, 2009, respectively, the
accusatory portion of each reads:
Criminal Case No. 17646-B
Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Murder
That on or about the 10th day of May 2005, in the City of Sta. Rosa,
Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another with treachery and evident
premeditation and while conveniently being armed with firearms, with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
attack, assault and shoot Mayor Leon C. Arcillas with the said
firearms, knowing fully well that he was a City Mayor of Sta. Rosa
City, a person in authority, and while in the performance of his duty as
such, thereby inflicting the latter fatal injuries on the head and other
parts of his body that caused his instantaneous death to the damage and
prejudice of his surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17647-B
Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Murder
That on or about the 10th day of May 2005, in the City of Sta. Rosa,
Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another with treachery and evident
premeditation and while conveniently armed with firearms, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack,
assault and shoot Police Officer 2 Erwin B. Rivera with the said
firearms, knowing fully well that he was a police officer and an agent
of person in authority, and in the performance of his duty as security
escort of Mayor Leon C. Arcillas, thereby inflicting him injuries on
different parts of his body that caused his instantaneous death to the
damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17648-B
Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Frustrated Murder
That on or about the 10th day of May 2005, in the City of Sta. Rosa,
Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another with treachery and evident
premeditation and while conveniently armed with firearms, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack,
assault and shoot Police Officer 3 Wilfredo B. Almendras with the said
firearms, knowing fully well that he was a police officer and an agent
of person in authority, and in the performance of his duty as security
escort of Mayor Leon C. Arcillas, thereby inflicting him injuries on
different parts of his body, thus accused performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the accused, that is by timely medical attendance on said Police
Officer 3 Wilfredo B. Almendras to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on May 13, 2009, appellants and accused Refrea,
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Accused Yason entered a
plea of not guilty to the charges during his arraignment on April 6,
2010. Accused Ricardo Pineda and Edwin Barqueros have not been
arraigned yet as they are still at-large. Pre-trial with respect to Vibal,
David and Refrea was terminated on October 22, 2009. While pre-trial
with respect to Yason was terminated on June 22, 2010. Thereafter,
joint trials on the merits followed.
During trial, Refrea died and as a consequence, he was dropped as one
of the accused. Meanwhile, Yason's demurrer to evidence was granted
by the RTC which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal cases as
against the said accused.
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the
prosecution in this wise:
On May 10, 2005, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, PO3
Wilfredo Almendras, together with PO2 Binmaot and PO2 Erwin
Rivera, and two (2) other civilian escorts, was with Mayor Leon
Arcillas at the 2nd floor of the Municipal City Hall of Sta. Rosa City.
The police officers were assigned as security escorts of the Mayor.
Mayor Arcillas was then solemnizing marriages. The ceremony
ended at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning. The Mayor then
proceeded to the Office of the Commission on Audit (COA) located at
the same floor. While they were going out of the room where the
ceremony was conducted, PO3 Almendras noticed that they were
being followed by two (2) young kids. After spending a moment in
the COA office, the group then proceeded to the Office of the Mayor.
On their way to said Office, gunshots were fired on them. PO3
Almendras was not able to pull out his gun since there was a rapid fire
coming from their front and back. He, PO2 Rivera and the Mayor
sustained gunshots wounds. The three (3) fell to the ground. While on
the floor, PO3 Almendras heard three (3) more gunshots before he felt
dizzy. Thereafter, PO3 Almendras and Mayor Arcillas were brought to
the hospital.
At that time, SPO1 Victoriano Peria, received a call from an unknown
caller reporting that a shooting incident took place inside the
Municipal building.
Upon reaching the municipal hall, he saw Mayor Arcillas bloodied and
being carried out by several men and was put inside the vehicle. In the
second floor, he saw PO2 Erwin Rivera lying near the door already
dead, while the other victim PO3 Almendras was brought to the
hospital.
The team searched the whole building of the City Hall for possible
apprehension of the culprits, but to no avail. Thus, Regional Director
P/Chief Supt. Jesus Versoza created a special investigating task force
composed of the NBI, CIDG, Regional Intelligence Unit, SOCO and
Laguna Investigation Division to conduct an investigation to ascertain
the identity of the assailants.
During the investigation, Cipriano Refrea appeared and told
SPO1 Peria that accused-appellants Vibal and David were his
companions when the killing transpired. Refrea pointed to them as
the gunmen. After knowing from Refrea the identity of accused-
appellant Vibal, SPO1 Peria asked his whereabouts. He came to know
that accused-appellant Vibal was presently detained at the Trece
Martirez. SPO1 Peria, together with the other policemen visited
Vibal, and when asked about his participation on the shooting incident,
he at first denied his participation, but later on admitted to his
participation.
With respect to the identity of accused-appellant David, they came to
know that he was detained at GMA, Cavite.
In his investigation, SPO1 Peria was able to ascertain that Vibal,
David and Refrea were members of the gang called Royal Blood
Gangsta.
Dr. Roy A. Camarillo, the medico-legal officer of the Regional Crime
Laboratory at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, conducted the
autopsy of the cadaver[s] of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera. Based
from the medico-legal report, Mayor Arcillas sustained three (3)
gunshot wounds, the fatal of which are the 2 gunshots in his head. PO2
Rivera, on the other hand, sustained two (2) gunshot wounds, on the
nape and chest, the latter being the fatal one that caused the death of
the victim.
PO3 Almendras was examined and found to have fracture at the left
forearm and weakness of the right hand.3
Version of the Defense
The defense, on the other hand, relates its version of the facts in this
manner:
On 10 May 2005 at 10:00 o'clock a.m., accused ARNOLD DAVID
was at Tanay, Rizal, where he has been staying since October 2004 as
requested by his father because he was accused of murder in a gang
war that happened at GMA, Cavite. He was then arrested on 19
December 2006 in connection with a case in GMA, Cavite, where he
was brought somewhere blindfolded. On 2 January 2007, SPO1 Peria
arrived and showed him photographs of the gang, but he denied he was
in these. He denied knowing Cipriano Refrea, Jr. prior to his arrest,
knowing only the latter at the police station.
Accused HERMINIO VIBAL, JR. likewise denied participation in the
incident that happened on 10 May 2005. He claimed that on that date,
at 10:30 o'clock a.m., he was at GMA, Cavite, with his family,
including his sister, LORELYN CORONEL, and did not leave until
afternoon. In February 2006, he was arrested and detained at the
Cavite Provincial Jail in relation to prior cases. In December 2006,
SPO1 Peria visited him and asked about the death of Reynaldo Cesar,
to which Vibal denied. SPO1 Peria later took Vibal's photograph and
left. He was visited again by SPO1 Peria and asked if he had any
participation in the death of Mayor Arcillas. Again, Vibal denied.
SPO1 Peria once again visited Vibal, this time with PO3 Almendras.
The latter asked Vibal if he knew him, but Vibal could not answer as
he was sick at the time. He was again photographed. In January 2007,
he was again visited by SPO1 Peria and PO3 Almendras, who were
now with Cipriano Refrea, Jr. and who was asked to point at Vibal.
Another photograph was taken of Vibal. Prior to this meeting, Vibal
did not know who Refrea was.4
The RTC Ruling
In its Decision, dated February 6, 2013, the RTC found Vibal and
David guilty of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused HERMINIO U. VIBAL, JR. y UAYAN and
ARNOLD DAVID y CRUZ, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder (2 counts) and direct
assault with frustrated murder. Accordingly, they are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 17646-B and 17647-B, reclusion perpetua
P75,000.00 as civil liability ex-delicto in each case; 2) P500,000.00 in moral damages
2) In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, the indeterminate penalty ranging from
and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. As civil liability, accuse
damages.
On the other hand, the cases against accused Ricardo Pineda and
Edwin Barqueros are sent to the archives pending their arrest.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC concluded that all the elements of the offenses charged were
satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. It rejected the twin defenses
of denial and alibi interposed by appellants in the light of the positive
identification of them by prosecution witness PO3 Wilfreda
Almendras (PO3 Almendras) as the culprits to the dastardly deeds.
The RTC added that the manner by which the appellants committed
the felonious acts revealed a community of criminal design, and
thereby held that conspiracy exists. Lastly, the RTC ruled that evident
premeditation and treachery attended the commission of the crimes
which qualified the killing of Mayor Leon Arcillas (Mayor Arcillas)
and PO2 Erwin Rivera (PO2 Rivera) to murder.
Not in conformity, Vibal and David appealed the February 6, 2013
RTC Decision before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On February 24, 2016, the CA rendered its assailed Decision
upholding the conviction of Vibal and David for two counts of the
complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos.
17646-B and 17647-B but held that the said appellants are criminally
liable only for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case No. 17648-B, the decretal portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
The Judgment dated February 6, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Biñan City, Laguna is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that the dispositive portion thereof is to read as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 17646-B, accused-appellants Herminia Vibal, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime of direct assa
perpetua without eligibility for parole. Accused-appellants are ordere
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000,00) as civil indemnity; Seve
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and Twenty-Five
(2) In Criminal Case No. 17647-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime of direct assa
perpetua without eligibility for parole. Accused-appellants are ordere
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000,00) as civil indemnity; Seve
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and Twenty-Five
(3) In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime of direct assa
imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correcci
appellants are ordered to pay private complainant PO2 Wilfredo B. Alm
Thirty to
Thousand
the heirsPesos
of the(P30,000.00) as exemplary
victims in each case; damages; and
 elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused
(4) Accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are further ordered to pay interest on all
has been positively identified.
damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court held that the credible testimony of PO3 Almendras
is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellants for the crimes
charged. It likewise debunked appellants' denial and alibi declaring
that the same were not satisfactorily established and not at all
persuasive when pitted against the positive and convincing
identification by PO3 Almendras, who has no ill motive to testify
falsely against them. According to the CA, the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not adequately
established by the prosecution. Finally, the CA ruled that the
appellants should be held liable only for the complex crime of direct
assault with attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 17648-B because
the prosecution failed to prove that the gunshot wound inflicted upon
PO2 Almendras was fatal.
Undaunted, appellants filed the present appeal and posited the same
lone assignment of error they previously raised before the CA, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS' POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS WHEN THE FACTS OF THE CASE SHOW THAT
THERE ARE DOUBTS CONCERNING THE ALLEGED POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION.7
8
In the Resolution  dated March 29, 2017, the Court directed both
parties to submit their supplemental briefs, if they so desire. On May
29, 2017, the accused-appellants filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of
Supplemental Brief)9 averring that they would adopt all their
arguments in their Appellant's Brief filed before the CA. On June 27,
2017, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Manifestation10 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental brief
as its Appellee's Brief had sufficiently ventilated the issues raised.
Accused-appellants principally contend that the CA gravely erred in its
over-reliance on the problematic identification provided by
prosecution witness/private complainant PO3 Almendras. They insist
that PO3 Almendras could not have properly seen and identity the
assailants at the time of the shooting incident because after he was
shot, he felt dizzy and lost consciousness. Also, they brand Almendras'
identification of them as the culprits to be dubious considering that it
was only made more than a year after the incident. Appellants argue
that their respective defenses of denial and alibi assume significance
because the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt
the identities of the authors of the crime.
Accordingly, the decisive question that begs an answer from the Court
is whether the identification of the culprits by eyewitness PO3
Almendras was reliable and positive enough to support the convictions
of the appellants.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence
adduced by the parties, the Court finds this appeal to be absolutely
without merit.
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two
things: (1) the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of
the crime for which the accused stands charged, and (2) the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. 11 When a crime is
committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no
conviction even if the commission of the crime is established. 12 Apart
from showing the existence and commission of a crime, the State has
the burden to correctly identify the author of such crime. Both facts
must be proved by the State beyond cavil of a doubt on the strength of
its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. 13
Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable
doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived
of his life, liberty or even property. As every crime must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, it is also paramount to prove, with the same
quantum of evidence, the identity of the culprit. It is basic and
In the case at bench, the RTC and the CA were one in declaring that
the identification of appellants Vibal and David as the gunmen based
on the recognition of PO3 Almendras was clear, worthy of credence
and has met the requirements of moral certainty. The Court agrees, and
finds no cogent reason to disturb this conclusion of the RTC as
affirmed by the CA.
The cause of the prosecution draws its strength on the positive
identification by PO3 Almendras, pinpointing to appellants Vibal and
David as the perpetrators of the gruesome killing of Mayor Arcillas
and PO2 Rivera and who inflicted gunshot wounds upon him. PO3
Almendras vividly recounted before the RTC the appellants' respective
positions and participation in the shooting incident, having been able
to witness closely how they committed the crime, more so because
the crime happened in the morning when conditions of visibility
are very much favorable. He had a close and unobstructed view of
the incident and was able to take a good glimpse and recognize the
faces of the gunmen as the same two young males he saw earlier in the
day following his group. Hailed to the witness stand, PO3 Almendras
stuck to the essentials of his story, and without any hesitation, pointed
to Vibal and David as the two culprits, which thus eliminated any
possibility of mistaken identification. Jurisprudence recognizes that
victims of crime have a penchant for seeing the faces and features of
their attackers, and remembering them.14
The following testimony of PO3 Almendras shows beyond cavil that
he saw the faces of the appellants as the two young males who
followed them from the room where Mayor Arcillas solemnized the
mass wedding, and who later open fired at them:
Q: What time did the solemnization of the marriages end?
A: At 10:00 o'clock sir.
Q: After the solemnization of marriages did you observe anything
unusual?
A: There was sir. When we were going out, I observed that there were
2 young kids (2 bata) following us.
Q: Did you recognize those 2 kids?
A: Yes, sir.15
xxxx
Q: From the COA office where you stayed for a while, where did you
go?
A: We were about to go to the office of the Mayor. (Papunta sa office
ni mayor.)
Q: As you were going to the Office of the Mayor was there anything
unusual that happened?
A: There was sir.
Q: What was that?
A: Suddenly I heard gunshots.
Q: What happened when you heard gunshots?
A: I was about to pull out my gun but there was a rapid fire so I was
not able to draw my gun.
Q: In relation to where you were at that time, where did the gunshots
come from?
A: In front and at the back sir.
Q: To whom?
A: I was the one who was shot first and the other bodyguard was shot
next.
Q: Who was that person?
A: Erwin Rivera sir.
Q: You stated earlier that the shot came in front and behind whom?
A: Because we were walking together at that time and the shot came in
front and back.
Q: Together with whom?
A: Mayor Leon C. Arcillas, Erwin Rivera and me sir.
Q: Where was then the Mayor at the time when you heard the
gunshots?
A: He was in between me and Erwin Rivera.
Q: What did you notice after hearing the gunshots with respect to the
Mayor?
A: "Nagbagsakan na kami." (We three fell down)
xxxx
Q: Who fired the shots if you know?
A: The two kids sir, the 2 young male(s).
Q: Who are these 2 kids that fired the shot in relation to the 2 kids you
noticed earlier when you were going out of the room where the Mayor
solemnized marriages?
A: Arnold David and Herminigildo Vibal.16
xxxx
Q: If you will see these persons again, will you be able to identify
them?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would you kindly look inside the court room and tell us if they are
present inside the court room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly point to them?
xxxx
Interpreter
The two accused identified to by the witness, when asked of their
names, answered Arnold David and Herminigildo Vibal. 17
Verily, PO3 Almendras had seen the faces of Vibal and David when
they committed the crimes on that fateful morning of May 10, 2005,
albeit brief, but enough for him to remember how they look like.
Experience dictates that precisely because of the startling acts of
violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can recall
with a high degree of reliability the identities of the criminals and how
at any given time the crime has been committed by them. 18 It is
important to note that PO3 Almendras identified Vibal and David as
the gunmen without any presumptions or suggestions from the police
or the court at the trial.
This Court fails to discern any improper motive which could have
impelled PO3 Almendras to maliciously impute to appellants such
serious crimes and hence, his testimony is worthy of evidentiary
weight. Further, as an actual victim, PO3 Almedras is naturally
interested in vindicating the outrageous wrong done to his person.
His natural interest in securing the conviction of the perpetrators
would strongly deter him from implicating persons other than the real
culprits. Otherwise, the latter could escape with impunity the strong
and just arm of the law. Absent any evidence showing any reason or
motive for prosecution witness to perjure, the logical conclusion is that
no such improper motive exists, and that his testimony is entitled to
full faith and credit.19
Vibal and David are clutching at straws in insisting that PO3
Almedras' identification of them as the gunmen is improbable and
should not have been accorded credence since it was made only after
the lapse of more than a year from the time the shooting incident
occurred. A perusal of the records would readily disclose that no
unreasonable delay can be attributed to PO3 Almedras. We quote with
approval the observation of the CA on this score:
Appellants' attempt to discredit the testimony of private complainant
by pointing out that there was a delay of one (1) year before he
identified appellants as the gunmen is of no moment. As correctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, private complainant
was not in a position to identify who shot him and killed Mayor Leon
Arcillas and PO2 Erwin Rivera immediately after the incident. Private
complainant was rushed to the hospital because of gunshot wounds
and was confined for around a month. Moreover, the investigation
took a long time and appellants were not immediately apprehended.
Private complainant, however, asserted that he remembers the faces of
the shooters and was, in fact, able to identify both appellants when he
finally saw them.20
Having ascertained that herein appellants are the gunmen, the Court
shall now proceed to the determination of their criminal liabilities.
The courts a quo are correct in ruling that appellants are liable for the
complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos.
17646- B and 17647-B. Direct assault, a crime against public order,
may be committed in two ways: first, by "any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition;" and second, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance."21
Appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of
which are: 1) that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; 2)
the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties
or on the occasion of such performance; and 3) the accused knew that
the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused
must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party
as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. 22
Here, Mayor Arcillas was a duly elected mayor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna
and thus, was a person in authority while PO2 Rivera and PO3
Almendras were agents of a person in authority. There is no dispute
that all of the three victims were in the performance of their official
duties at the time of the shooting incident. Mayor Arcillas was inside
the Sta. Rosa City Hall officiating a mass wedding, and thereafter,
while he was walking along the hallway from the COA office to his
office, he was shot and killed. Victim PO2 Rivera and private
complainant PO3 Almendras were likewise performing their duty of
protecting and guarding Mayor Arcillas at the time of the shooting
incident. Appellants' conduct of attacking the victims inside the Sta.
Rosa City Hall clearly showed their criminal intent to assault and
injure the agents of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in
authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of Direct
Assault with murder or homicide. 23 Here, treachery qualified the
killing of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera to murder. Treachery also
attended the shooting of PO3 Almendras. There is treachery when the
following essential elements are present, viz.: (a) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of attack employed by him. 24 The essence of
treachery lies in the suddenness of the attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring the commission of the offense without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.25
In the case at bench, the shooting was deliberate and without a
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner. Mayor Arcillas, PO2
Rivera and PO3 Almendras were absolutely unaware of the imminent
deadly assaults, and were for that reason in no position to defend
themselves or to repel their assailants. Vibal and David, who were
armed with guns, suddenly appeared in front and at the back of Mayor
Arcillas, PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almedras and shot the three victims.
The gunshots that came from the front of the victims were fired by
Vibal, while those that came from behind them were fired by
David.26 Said manner of attack clearly revealed appellants' deliberate
design to thereby ensure the accomplishment of their purpose to kill or
injure the three victims without any possibility of their escape or of
any retaliation from them.
Conspiracy is very much evident from the actuations of the appellants.
They were synchronized in their approach to shoot Mayor Arcillas and
his group. The concerted efforts of the appellants were performed with
closeness and coordination, indicating a single criminal impulse - to
kill the victims. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts
of the accused themselves when these point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest. 27 The
ascertainment of who among appellants actually hit, killed and/or
caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Where
conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in the present case, all the In Criminal Case No. 17648-B for the complex crime of Direct Assault
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and with Attempted Murder, the penalty to be imposed on appellants
character of their participation because, in contemplation of law, the should be that for Attempted Murder, which is the more serious crime.
act of one is the act of all.28 The penalty for Attempted Murder is two degrees lower than that
prescribed for the consummated felony under Article 51 of the RPC.
The Court affirms the conclusion of the CA that the appellants should Accordingly, the imposable penalty is prision mayor. Applying the
be held criminally liable for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be taken from the
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 17648-B. It is well-settled penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its
that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or years while the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and
mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical assistance, one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, the maximum
the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide period of the imposable penalty. This Court deems it proper to impose
depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances on the appellants the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. 29 But, if the (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and
wounds sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted
homicide.30 Coming now to the pecuniary liabilities, the Court finds that the award
of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages in Criminal
Here, the use of firearms and the manner of the commission of the Case Nos. 17646-B and 17647-B should be increased to P100,000.00
crime by the appellants unmistakably show that they intended to kill each, while the award of temperate damages should likewise be
PO3 Almendras and that treachery was present. However, no evidence increased to P50,000.00 being consistent with our pronouncement
was adduced to show that the nature of gunshot wounds sustained by in People v. Jugueta.36 In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, the Court finds
PO3 Almedras was sufficient to cause the latter's death without timely it apt to award civil indemnity, in addition to moral damages and
medical intervention. We note that the attending physician of PO3 exemplary damages, the amount of which should all be fixed at
Almendras was not called to the witness stand to testify on the gravity P50,000.00 each in line with existing jurisprudence. 37 Further, six
or character of the gunshot wounds inflicted on the said victim. Also, percent (6%) interest per annum shall be imposed on all damages
no evidence was introduced to prove that PO3 Almendras would have awarded to be reckoned from the date of the finality of this judgment
died from his gunshot wounds without timely medical attendance. until fully paid.38
Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would
be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused Court of Appeals, dated February 24,2016 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not 06206 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
frustrated, murder.31
1.) In Criminal Case No. 17646-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr.
The Court agrees with the CA that the modifying circumstance of
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault w
evident premeditation did not attend the commission of the offenses.
of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole. Further, they are or
Here, the records are bereft of any proof, direct or circumstantial,
the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral
tending to show a plan or preparation to kill by appellants Vibal and
temperate damages.
David as well as when they meditated and reflected upon their
decision to kill or/injure the three victims and the intervening time that
elapsed before this plan was carried out. Accordingly, the
circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be presumed against
appellants. To qualify a killing to murder, the circumstances invoked
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself and cannot be
deduced from mere supposition.32
2.) In Criminal Case No. 17647-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr.
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault with
Appellants simply raise denial, which is inherently weak and cannot
Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole. Further, they are orde
prevail over the positive identification made by prosecution witness
amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral d
PO3 Almendras that they were the gunmen. Moreover, an affirmative
temperate damages.
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness, 33 as in this case.
Appellants' defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. In order that alibi
might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been
somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be
shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere
within the vicinity of the crime scene. 34 Appellants miserably failed to
3.) In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr.
discharge this burden. Besides, the prosecution was able to present a
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault with
photograph taken by prosecution witness Mercedita De Jesus, the
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, a
official photographer during the solemnization of the mass wedding,
maximum. Further, they are ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
prior to the shooting incident which showed appellant Vibal at the
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,00
background. Said picture proves that Vibal was at the Sta. Rosa City
Hall on May 10, 2005 which thus effectively belied his claim that he
was at his residence in GMA, Cavite on that day.

When the offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for
the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. 35 For the
complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos.
17646-B and 17647-B, the graver offense is Murder. Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for the penalty of reclusion
4.) Accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and Arnold Da
perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty
of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this Decis
should have been death. However, considering that the imposition of
damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines"; the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed
upon appellants. In addition, the qualification "without eligibility for
parole" should be affixed to qualify reclusion perpetua pursuant to
A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC. Thus, the CA has properly imposed upon SO ORDERED.
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.

G.R. No. 130487               June 19, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-
appellant by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in
Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. 1 We nullify the proceedings in the
court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant
Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the crime of murder for the
killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The Information
reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of
Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ,
being then armed with a butcher's knife, with intent to kill one
ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy
place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by
stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said
weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to
"Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab
Wound" as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by
Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to the
damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P.
MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential
damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
2
Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994.  cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's counsel,
the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital." It was alleged that accused-appellant could not
properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a
mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was
confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in
Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the
issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital. 3
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu
proprio, propounded several questions on accused-appellant. Finding
that the questions were understood and answered by him
"intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day. 4
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the
court on accused-appellant's behalf. 5
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas
Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City who issued the
death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto
Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco,
one of the policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4)
Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victim's sister. The prosecution established
the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. John's Cathedral,
Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of
Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand people.
At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down
the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the front rows.
While the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went
up and walked towards the center of the altar. He stopped beside the
Bishop's chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful,
sat on the Bishop's chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto
Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-
appellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested him
to vacate the Bishop's chair. Gripping the chair's armrest, accused-
appellant replied in Pangasinese: "No matter what will happen, I will
not move out!" Hearing this, Santillan moved away. 6
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security
guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near accused-appellant and told
him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at
the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap accused-
appellant's hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again,
Mararac tapped the latter's hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about
to strike again when suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his
back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left
throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried
to stab him again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant
looked up and around him. He got up, went to the microphone and
shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one can beat me here!). He
returned to the Bishop's chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded
and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar. 7
Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic
outside, received a report of a commotion inside the cathedral.
Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-
appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on
a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and
advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped
the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy
Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the
confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant to
pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief
Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each other. Chief
Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-appellant. The police
came and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather scabbard
tucked around his waist. 8 He was brought to the police station and
placed in jail.
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the
hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. He died of
wound." 9 He was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one
just below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy
reported the following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal
space, left, 1 1/2" x 1 1/2" penetrating. The edge of one side of the
wound is sharp and pointed.
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, 1/2" x 1/4" x
1/2". The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper
and lower lobe of the left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was
severely cut. 10
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of
court, filed a "Demurrer to Evidence." He claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence of
the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful
aggression by the victim when he tapped accused-appellant's hand
with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have sufficient
ability to calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound
mind. 11
The "Demurrer to Evidence" was opposed by the public prosecutor. He
alleged that the accused "pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound
mind;" that after he made the first stab, he "furiously continued
stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off undeterred by the
fact that he was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was being
conducted;" and the plea of unsound mind had already been ruled upon
by the trial court in its order of January 6, 1995. 12
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F.
Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector
Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was
confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to
determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some
other institution. The other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable
with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. He
tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see his family. 13
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to
the jail warden's letter. He reiterated that the mental condition of
accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless a
competent government agency certifies otherwise, the trial should
proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper person to
determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not. 14
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the
"Demurrer to Evidence". 15 Accused-appellant moved for
reconsideration.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26,
1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a "Motion to Confine
Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination."
Appellant's counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been
exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the
top of his voice and cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel;
that appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates
had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of being
attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping,
appellant took out all his personal effects and waste matter and burned
them inside the cell which again caused panic among the inmates.
Appellant's counsel prayed that his client be confined at the National
Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General
Hospital. 16 Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One, dated
February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden,
Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge informing him of
appellant's irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order
for the immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accused-
appellant. 17 The second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed
to Inspector Llopis from the Bukang Liwayway Association, an
association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by
the president, secretary and adviser of said association, informed the
jail warden of appellant's unusual behavior and requested that
immediate action be taken against him to avoid future violent incidents
in the jail. 18
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the
order denying the "Demurrer to Evidence." The court ordered accused-
appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996. 19
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel
presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, 20 a resident
physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General
Hospital, and accused-appellant's medical and clinical records at the
said hospital. 21 Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined
at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he
suffered from "Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—
schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type;" 22 and after four (4)
days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and
mental condition. 23 The medical and clinical records consisted of the
following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer,
Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH referring
accused-appellant for admission and treatment after "a relapse of his
violent behavior;" 24 (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the
BGH; 25 (3) the consent slip of appellant's wife voluntarily entrusting
appellant to the BGH; 26 (4) the Patient's Record; 27 (5) the Consent for
Discharge signed by appellant's wife; 28 (6) the Summary and
Discharges of appellant; 29 (7) appellant's clinical case history; 30 (8) the
admitting notes; 31 (9) Physician's Order Form; 32 (10) the Treatment
Form/medication sheet; 33 and (11) Nurses' Notes. 34
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the
prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and in view of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not
offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P50,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing
actual expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 25
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE STABBING TO DEATH OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS
ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY
CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE. 36
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally
liable for a felony committed by him. 37 Under the classical theory on
which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is
human free Will. 38 Man is essentially a moral creature with an
absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. 39 When he
commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed
to have been done voluntarily, 40 i.e., with freedom, intelligence and
intent. 41 Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for
wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. 42
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every
person is of sound mind 43 and that all acts are voluntary. 44 The moral
and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person. 45 This presumption,
however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is
insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability. 46
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the
law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement
in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted
during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane
when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the
court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment
until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused
does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is
followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution. 47
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 48 The accused must
be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." 49 He
must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. 50
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes
insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and
positive evidence. 51 And the evidence on this point must refer to the
time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution. 52
To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a
reasonable period both before and after that time. 53 Direct testimony is
not required. 54 Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense. 55 Circumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by
overt acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be
evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these conform to
the practice of people of sound mind. 56
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was
afflicted with insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The absence of
direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability
that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of
Crisanto Santillan 57 attached to the Information, there are certain
circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that
appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties
when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to
go up to the altar and sit in the Bishop's chair while the Bishop was
administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a
jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for
appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to
stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all
the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least
attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the
microphone and, over the public address system, uttered words to the
faithful which the rational person would have been made. He then
returned to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
Accused-appellant's history of mental illness was brought to the court's
attention on the day of arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant
moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that his client
could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due to his mental
condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12,
Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. — The arraignment shall be
suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x           x x x          x x x
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof
he appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition of such
nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the
court must suspend the proceedings and order the mental examination
of the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order
such confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full
possession of his mental faculties at the time he is informed at the
arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the
process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full
import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea thereto. 58
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion
of the trial court. 59 And the test to determine whether the proceedings
will be suspended depends on the question of whether the accused,
even with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair trial. This rule
was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the
proceedings against an accused person on the ground of present
insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of
the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such
suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused
would have a fair trial, with the assistance which the law secures or
gives; and it is obvious that under a system of procedure like ours
where every accused person has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be
so particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no
advocate but himself. 60
In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accused's "present
insanity" or insanity at the time of the court proceedings is separate
and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of commission
of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the
defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime's commission.
"Present insanity" is commonly referred to as "competency to stand
trial" 61 and relates to the appropriateness of conducting the criminal
proceeding in light of the defendant's present inability to participate
meaningfully and effectively. 62 In competency cases, the accused may
have been sane or insane during the commission of the offense which
relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found
incompetent to stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time
as he may be found competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a
defense; it merely postpones the trial. 63
In determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, the test is
whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, understand
the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his
defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate with, and
assist his counsel to the end that any available defense may be
interposed. 64 This test is prescribed by state law but it exists generally
as a statutory recognition of the rule at common law. 65 Thus:
[I]f is not enough for the . . . judge to find that the defendant [is]
oriented to time and place, and [has] some recollection of events, but
that the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him. 66
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1)
whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel
with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and
(2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and
his relation to it. 67 The first requisite is the relation between the
defendant and his counsel such that the defendant must be able to
confer coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation of the
defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings. 68
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the
protection of the accused, rather than of the public. 69 It has been held
that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make
a just defense for his life or liberty. 70 To put a legally incompetent
person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the
constitutional rights to a fair trial 71 and due process of law; 72 and this
has several reasons underlying it. 73 For one, the accuracy of the
proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who
cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what
information is relevant to the proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is
not in a position to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in
a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the
right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing
witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial
result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as
there are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding
which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is
his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an
incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in
a manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the
defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally
impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is
essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a
conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its
character as a reasoned interaction between an individual and his
community and becomes an invective against an insensible object.
Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being
punished, a comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his
understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may
not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal
of institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the
state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its
significance. 74
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should
be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. 75 Mere
allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or
circumstances that raise a "reasonable doubt" 76 or a "bona
fide doubt" 77 as to defendant's competence to stand trial. Among the
factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendant's irrational
behavior, history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities,
previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the
defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue
of competency in a particular case. 78
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the
arraignment on the ground of accused's mental condition, the trial
court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on
appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared:
x x x           x x x          x x x
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge
asked questions on the accused, and he (accused) answered
intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born, he
answered, in Tayug.
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the
questions asked of him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 79
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked
by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent
enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116
speaks of an unsound mental condition that "effectively renders [the
accused] unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto." It is not clear whether accused-appellant
was of such sound mind as to fully understand the charge against him.
It is also not certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The plea
of "not guilty" was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial
court "because of his refusal to plead." 80
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of
accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist
or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of
determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine the
accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant
case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-
appellant, especially in the light of the latter's history of mental illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in
the judge's mind of accused-appellants competency to stand trial,
subsequent events should have done so. One month after the
prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the
trial judge informing him of accused-appellant's unusual behavior and
requesting that he be examined at the hospital to determine whether he
should remain in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial
judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellant's counsel
filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and
Psychiatric Examination." Attached to this motion was a second letter
by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-
complaint of the members of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the
city jail. Despite the two (2) attached letters, 81 the judge ignored the
"Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
Examination." The records are barren of any order disposing of the
said motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to
present his evidence. 82
Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e.,
schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a "lifetime illness" and that this
requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses. 83 After accused-
appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned to
the hospital, not even for a check-up. 84
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel
manifested that accused-appellant was waiving the right to testify in
his own behalf because he was "suffering from mental illness." 85 This
manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after
the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial
court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-
appellant's state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment
and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical
examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and
sentenced him to death!
Sec. 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a
"mental examination." 86 The human mind is an entity, and
understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a
large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. 87 Thus,
an intelligent determination of an accused's capacity for rational
understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive
diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make through
observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric
diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be
determined by the trial court. By this time, the accused's abilities may
be measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon
him. 88
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and
properly made, it may have served a dual purpose 89 by determining
both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the
offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of
insanity made immediately after the commission of the crime served as
one of the bases for the acquittal of the accused. 90 The crime in the
instant case was committed way back in December 1994, almost six
(6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it
impossible for us to evaluate appellant's mental condition at the time
of the crime's commission for him to avail of the exempting
circumstance of insanity. 91 Nonetheless, under the present
circumstances, accused-appellant's competence to stand trial must be
properly ascertained to enable him to participate, in his trial
meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court
effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial.1awphil The trial court's
negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process;
and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be
nullified. In People v. Serafica, 92 we ordered that the joint decision of
the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a quo for
proper proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2) counts
of murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of
"guilty" to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We found that
the accused's plea was not an unconditional admission of guilt because
he was "not in full possession of his mental faculties when he killed
the victim;" and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary
medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of
commission of the crime. 93
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D
convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to
death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the
conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a
determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further
proceedings.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 159418-19               December 10, 2003
NORMA DE JOYA, PETITIONER,
vs.
THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY AND HON.
RUBEN A. GALVEZ AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BATANGAS
CITY MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH
I, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Norma de Joya
praying for her release from the Batangas City Jail on the claim that
her detention was illegal.
The Antecedents
The petitioner was charged separately with violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Municipal Trial Court In Cities in
Batangas City. The docket numbers and accusatory portion of each of
the Informations reads:
Criminal Case No. 25484
That on or about September 28, 1994 at Batangas City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, well-knowing that she does not have funds in or credit with
the Solid Bank, Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to Flor
Catapang de Tenorio, Solid Bank Check No. 040297 postdated to
October 28, 1994 in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND (₱150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to apply on
account or for value, but when said check was presented for full
payment with the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, the same was dishonored by the drawee
bank on the ground `account closed,' which in effect is even more than
a dishonor for insufficiency of funds, and despite notice of dishonor
and demands made upon her to make good her check by making
proper arrangement with the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full
directly to Flor Catapang de Tenorio, accused failed and refused to do
so, which acts constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the
damage and prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in
general and of Flor Catapang de Tenorio in particular in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
...
Criminal Case No. 25773
That on or about October 17, 1994 at Batangas City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, well-knowing that she does not have fund in or credit with
the Security Bank and Trust Company, Batangas Branch, Batangas
City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw,
make and issue to Resurreccion T. Castillo, Security Bank and Trust
Company Check No. 038111 postdated to October 24, 1994 in the
amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(₱225,000.00), Philippine Currency, to apply on account or for value,
but when said check was presented for full payment with the drawee
bank within a period of ninety (90) days from the date of the check,
the same was dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of
`account closed,' which in effect is even more than a dishonor for
insufficiency of funds, and despite notice of dishonor and demands
made upon her to make good her check by making proper arrangement
with the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full directly to
Resurreccion T. Castillo, accused failed and refused to do so, which
acts constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the damage
and prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in general and
of Resurreccion T. Castillo in particular in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
When arraigned in both cases, the petitioner, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty. While trial was going on, the petitioner jumped
bail. No evidence was thereby adduced in her defense in any of the
two cases.
On December 14, 1995, the trial court promulgated its decision in
Criminal Case No. 25484. The petitioner and her counsel failed to
appear despite due notice. The decretal portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Norma de Joya guilty of
the crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and hereby
sentences said accused to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year and
to indemnify the offended party, Flor Catapang Tenorio, in the sum of
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (₱150,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency.
SO ORDERED.3
On March 21, 1997, the decision in Criminal Case No. 25773 was
likewise promulgated in absentia. The decretal portion of the said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Prosecution having satisfactorily established the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby
sentences herein-accused Norma de Joya of imprisonment of ONE (1)
YEAR and to pay complainant Resurreccion Castillo of the amount of
TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (₱225,000.00)
PESOS by way of damages.
SO ORDERED.4
The petitioner remained at large and no appeal was filed from any of
the said decisions. In the meantime, the Court issued Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 on November 21, 2000 enjoining
all courts and judges concerned to take notice of the ruling and policy
of the Court enunciated in Vaca v. Court of Appeals 5 and Lim v.
People6 with regard to the imposition of the penalty for violations of
B.P. Blg. 22.
After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested while she was
applying for an NBI clearance. She was forthwith detained at the
Batangas City Jail on December 3, 2002. On July 28, 2003, the
petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court of
Batangas City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-
2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
and to order her release from detention. The public prosecutor opposed
the motion. In an Order dated August 15, 2003, the trial court denied
the motion on three grounds: (a) its decision convicting the petitioner
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become final and executory;
hence, could no longer be amended to change the penalty imposed
therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and (c)
the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but
merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform imposition of
fine.
Hence, the petition at bar.
The petitioner posits that SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the
penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only
the imposition of a fine. The trial court was mandated to apply SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively conformably with Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code citing the ruling of this Court in United
States v. Pacrose.7 The petitioner prays that the Court declare her
detention illegal and order her release from the Batangas City Jail.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
contending that:
1)
THE TWO (2) JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION AGAINST THE
PETITIONER HAD LONG ATTAINED FINALITY AND COULD
NO LONGER BE MODIFIED.
2)
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 AS MODIFIED BY
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 DID NOT DELETE
THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT IN BP 22 CASES.8
The OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Abarquez v. Court of
Appeals.9
The petition has no merit.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that
the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. – If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the
final judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City,
convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the
petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner's reliance
of our ruling in Ordonez v. Vinarao10 that a convicted person is entitled
to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law,
citing People v. Simon,11 is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided
for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No.
12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should
benefit her has no basis.
First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence,
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular
applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and
not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-
2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent
behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the
courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the
circumstances of the accused – whether he acted in good faith or on a
clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence – and such other
circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes
relevant to the penalty to be imposed. The Court thus emphasized that:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay
down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided
for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the
legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of
preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22
such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the
more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of
whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is
the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment
as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;
The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and
taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the
interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.12
B.P. Blg. 22 provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment
or both fine and imprisonment as follows:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1)
year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount
of the check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.13
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a
single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a
penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both
fine and imprisonment.
In providing for alternative penalties in B.P. Blg. 22, Congress took
into account the principal objectives of the law, namely, the
prohibition on the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious
effects on public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless
checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in
the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also
an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property
but an offense against public order.14
However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in
mind that Philippine penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and
has adopted features of the positivist theory of criminal law. The
positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum
total of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is
expressed. The adoption of the aspects of the theory is exemplified by
the indeterminate sentence law, Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code (impossible crime), Article 68 and Articles 11 to 14, not to
mention Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (penalties for heinous
and quasi-heinous crimes). Philippine penal law looks at the convict as
a member of society. Among the important factors to be considered in
determining the penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship
towards his dependents, family and their relationship with him; and (2)
his relationship towards society at large and the State. The State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but
also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other
social ends.15 The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The
penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be
reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life and
rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the
community. The court has to consider not only the primary elements of
punishment, namely, the moral responsibility of the convict, the
relation of the convict to the private complainant, the intention of the
convict, the temptation to the act or the excuse for the crime - was it
done by a rich man in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor man in
the extremity of his need? The court must also take into account the
secondary elements of punishment, namely, the reformation of the
offender, the prevention of further offenses by the offender, the
repression of offenses in others. 16 As Rousseau said, crimes can be
thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties which, from the
benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften than to inflame those
on whom they are imposed. 17 There is also merit in the view that
punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much
punishment of innocence.18
In this case, even if the Court applies SC Admin. Circular No. 12-
2000, as revised, retroactively, the petition must nevertheless be
dismissed. The petitioner did not offer any evidence during trial. The
judgment of the court became final and executory upon her failure to
appeal therefrom. Worse, the petitioner remained at large for five long
years. Were it not for her attempt to secure an NBI clearance, she
would have been able to elude the long arm of the law.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 108135-36 September 30, 1999
POTENCIANA M. EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), respondents.
 
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of
the Sandiganbayan dated September 11, 1992 in Criminal Case Nos.
14208-14209 finding petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 268, paragraph 4 of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
Tanduay Distillery Inc., is a company engaged in the manufacture and
sale of rum, gin, vodka and other spirits. On September 17, 1987,
Tanduay filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) an
application for tax credit in the sum of P180,701,682.00 representing
alleged erroneous payments for ad valorem taxes covering the period
January 1, 1986 to August 31, 1987. Attached to the application was a
schedule of ad valorem taxes 1 allegedly paid by Tanduay with
supporting confirmation receipts. The application was filed with the
Specific Tax Office of the BIR headed by Aquilino T. Larin.
Tanduay anchored its claim for tax credit on the ground that it is a
rectifier which is liable for specific taxes and not ad valorem taxes,
citing a BIR ruling in a case involving Distilleria Limtuaco and Co.
Inc. The ruling states that rectifiers are considered as extensions of
distillers inasmuch as they purchase alcohol from distillers without
prepayment of the specific tax. Since specific tax should be paid by the
distiller before its removal from the place of production, the burden of
payment therefor is shifted to and assumed by the rectifier.
In its application for tax credit, Tanduay stated that it is a rectifier with
Assessment No. A-1-8 and a compounder with Assessment No. A-1-8-
A, although compounding is only incidental to rectification of its
products. Consequently, before the tax credit being sought by Tanduay
could be granted, the BIR's Tax and Alcohol Division, headed by
Teodoro D. Pareño, had to verify first whether Tanduay's products are
distilled spirits or compounded liquor based on how they are
manufactured. To do this, Justino Galban, Head of the Compounders,
Rectifiers and Repackers Section under the Alcohol and Tax Division,
had to look into the technical process for the manufacture of rum, gin,
vodka and other intoxicating beverages of Tanduay. If it is determined
that the products can be properly classified as distilled spirits based on
how they are manufactured, then Tanduay could properly claim for a
tax credit on its payments of ad valorem taxes in accordance with
Section 121 of the NIRC and the Limtuaco ruling that rectifiers, as an
extension of distillers, are subject to specific and not ad valorem taxes.
Finally, it had to be verified by the Revenue Accounting Division
(RAD) headed by petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista whether
Tanduay actually paid the P180,701,682.00 as ad valorem taxes to the
BIR which it claims it paid.1âwphi1.nêt
On September 23, 1987, Larin, in a marginal handwritten note,
directed Pareño to prepare a request to the Revenue Accounting
Division (RAD) for the authentication of the confirmation receipts
covering the tax payments sought to be credited. Accordingly, a
memorandum, signed by Larin, was sent to the RAD headed by
petitioner Evangelista requesting verification and authentication
whether the amounts reflected in the confirmation receipts submitted
by Tanduay were actually paid to the BIR as ad valorem taxes.
Larin's a Memorandum was received by the Records and
Administrative Section (RAS), a unit under RAD, on September 24,
1987. In due course, RAS made the necessary verification on the basis
of its records and prepared the corresponding verification 2 in the form
of a 1st Indorsement to the Specific Tax Office on September 25,
1987. The indorsement, which was signed by petitioner Evangelista,
contained a listing of two hundred thirty seven (237) confirmation
receipts in various amounts under two categories designated with Tax
Numeric Code (TNC) 3011-0011 and TNC 0000-0000. A total of 149
confirmation receipts covering P102,519,100.00 were listed as tax
payments under TNC 3011-0011 and a total of 88 confirmation
receipts covering P78,182,582.00 were listed as tax receipts under
TNC 0000-0000.
A memorandum was thereafter prepared by Galban as Chief of the
Compounders and Rectifier's Section addressed to Pareño describing
the technical aspects of Tanduay's manufacturing process. Galban
made no recommendation, however, as to the validity of Tanduay's
claim. On October 13, 1987, Pareño sent a memorandum to Larin
recommending that the request for tax credit of Tanduay Distillery,
Inc. be given due course on the ground that Tanduay as a rectifier is an
extension of the distiller and its products are subject of the payment of
specific tax and not ad valorem tax. On same date, Larin signed a
memorandum for the Deputy Commissioner of the BIR recommending
that the claim of Tanduay Distillery Inc., for the alleged erroneous
payment of ad valorem taxes in the amount of P180,701,682.00 be tax
credited as in the case of Distilleria Limtuaco and Co. Inc.
On October 13, 1987, Eufracio D. Santos, Deputy Commissioner of
the BIR, approved the recommendation made by Larin in his
memorandum and thereafter signed Tax Credit Memo No. 5177 in the
amount of P180,701,682.00 in favor of Tanduay Distillery, Inc. The
approval was based on the following:
1. The memorandum of the Assistant Commissioner for Specific Tax
Office, Aquilino T. Larin;
2. The memorandum of the Chief of Alcohol Division, Teodoro D.
Pareño; and
3. The 1st indorsement/certification issued by Chief of Revenue
Accounting Division, herein petitioner Potenciano M. Evangelista. 3
Immediately after the approval of Tax Credit Memo No. 5177,
Tanduay availed of the tax credit on various dates covering the period
from October 19, 1987 to June 20, 1988. 4 However, on June 22, 1988,
a certain Ruperto Lim wrote a letter-complaint to BIR Commissioner
Bienvenido Tan, Jr. alleging that the grant of Tax Credit Memo No.
5177 in favor of Tanduay was irregular and anomalous. More
specifically, Lim pointed out that Tanduay had paid only
P73,614,287.20 5 by way of ad valorem taxes to the BIR from January
1, 1986 to August 31, 1987 and not P180,701,682.00 as claimed.
Deputy Commissioner Santos, in approving TCM No. 5177, failed to
notice that petitioner's 1st indorsement contained a listing of TNC
indicating tax payments received from Tanduay under two
categories, i.e., TNC 3011-0011 and TNC 0000-0000. As earlier
mentioned, a total of 149 confirmation receipts were listed as tax
payments under TNC 3011-0011 while a total of 88 confirmation
receipts were listed as tax payments under TNC 0000-0000. Deputy
Commissioner Santos admitted that while he knew that there was a tax
numeric code for the kind of tax paid, he did not know which
particular numbers corresponded to a particular tax revenue. These
codes are contained in the "Handbook of Tax Numeric Code of the
Revenue Sources," wherein it is stated that TNC No. 3011-0011 stands
for specific tax on domestic and distilled spirits, TNC No. 3023-2001
for ad valorem on compounded liquors and TNC No. 0000-0000 for
unclassified taxes. Had Deputy Commissioner Santos looked these up
in the Handbook, he would have known that Tanduay was not entitled
to the whole sum of P180,701,682.00. Santos, however, contended that
the practice of using numeric tax codes is for the purpose of checking
remittances of payments by the banks which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the RAD. He claimed that he merely relied on the
certification of his subordinates, inasmuch as his work was merely
confirmational.
On January 3, 1990, two informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro D. Pareño, Justino
E. Galban, Jr. and petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista for violation of
Section 268, Par. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC),
docketed as Criminal Case No. 14208, and for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 14209.
Sec. 268, par. 4 of the NIRC reads:
Sec. 268. Violations committed by government enforcement officers —
Every official agent or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or
any other agency of the government charged with the enforcement of
the provisions of this Code, who is guilty of any of the offenses herein
below specified, shall upon conviction for each act or omission, be
fined in the sum of not less than five thousand pesos but not more than
fifty thousand pesos or imprisoned for a term of not less than one year
but not more than ten years or both;
xxx xxx xxx
4. Those who conspire or collude with one another or others to defraud
the revenues or otherwise violate the provisions of this Code.
On the other hand, Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act states:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers — in addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
e. Causing any undue injury to any party including the government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
Upon arraignment, all the accused including petitioner Evangelista
pleaded not guilty. They raised the defense that no undue injury had
been caused to the government and no unwarranted benefits had been
accorded to Tanduay inasmuch as Tanduay had already fully
reimbursed the BIR of the availments found to have been unjustified
or improper in the amount of P73,000,000.00 and had, additionally
paid P11,000,000.00 by way of penalties, or a total of P84,000,000.00.
Petitioner Evangelista, for her part, did not deny having issued the 1st
indorsement. However, instead of taking the witness stand, she, like
her three co-accused, refused to testify and opted to present as
evidence in her behalf the following paragraphs from her letter of
explanation dated November 21, 1988 to BIR Commissioner
Bienvenido Tan which read as follows:
Confirmation receipts do not contain any information as to the kind of
tax or TNC. Thus, there can never be any verification and certification
as to kind of tax. What can only be verified/certified by this Division
as required in existing orders is the fact that the total amount of each
CR were remitted to the BIR by the collecting bank on the given date.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Tanduay Distillery. I did not know at the time I signed
the indorsement what the TNC therein stand for because I was
informing (sic) was that payments were received by BIR. I just became
curious to know its meaning and verify the same from the Handbook
of Tax Numeric Codes of Revenue Sources, 1985 when a certain Atty.
Villavicencio called me up to his Office at the Internal Security
Division some two weeks ago to ask questions on the subject
indorsement.
In her letter, petitioner also categorically stated that, "Upon signing of
this indorsement/certification I or whoever is head of this Division, for
that matter, do not know what TNC stands for." 6
On September 18, 1992, Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro D. Pareño and
petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista were convicted and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of 4
years, 8 months and 1 day by way of minimum to 6 years and 8
months by way of maximum, and a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) each in Criminal Case No. 14208; while in Criminal
Case No. 124209, Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro D. Pareño and petitioner
Potenciana M. Evangelista were convicted and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of
9 years and 1 month to a maximum of 12 years. The penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office was likewise imposed
upon the three accused. Justino Galban was acquitted inasmuch as his
only participation was the preparation of the memorandum describing
Tanduay's manufacturing process as rectifier and compounder of
liquors.
Petitioner Evangelista was convicted on the basis of the 1st
indorsement issued by her which the Sandiganbayan condemned as a
"studied non-response" to Larin's query as to how much the BIR
actually received as payment for ad valorem taxes from Tanduay. The
Sandiganbayan held that Evangelista's indorsement could have been
explicitly and directly responsive because Larin's memo was clear and
the purpose for his query was specific: How much was paid by
Tanduay to the BIR by way of ad valorem taxes for the purpose of
computing the amount properly creditable to Tanduay for refund?
However, Evangelista's response merely enumerated a set of
confirmation receipts with the corresponding TNC numbers despite the
fact that several employees of the Bureau were not well acquainted
with the use and meaning of TNCs. Petitioner's ambiguous reply,
according to the Sandiganbayan, permitted her superiors to equivocate
as to its meaning which resulted in the improper grant of tax credits to
Tanduay. The Sandiganbayan thus concluded that the gross negligence
of the petitioner and its confluence with the acts of accused Larin and
Pareño in recommending the approval of Tanduay's application for tax
credit adequately proved conspiracy among them.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
Sandiganbayan, Evangelista filed the instant petition contending that
the 1st indorsement was issued after proper verification of the data
given to the RAD against available records of the division. Petitioner
claims the certification issued was patterned after the prescribed
format as a routine response to an official request of the Assistant
Commissioner for Excise Tax Office. Petitioner insists that she could
not be held liable because there was no mention in the 1st indorsement
that the payments made by Tanduay Distillery Inc. were actually
for ad valorem taxes for which it could claim tax credit in the sum of
P180,701,682.00.
On November 29, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
manifestation and motion in lieu of comment recommending the
acquittal of petitioner. The Manifestation stated that: "Although
petitioner herself may not have known the exact kind of taxes covered
by the TNC reflected in her 1st Indorsement, this does not in any way
make her guilty of gross negligence. Her duty was purely ministerial in
nature, that is, to report all data pertinent to Tanduay's tax payments on
file with RAD. She was not duty-bound to report her personal
perception, understanding or conclusion regarding the significance or
meaning of the data she had reported. It was Larin and Pareño's duty to
do so." 7
In view of the position taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion
for leave of court to file comment which was granted. In its comment,
the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor
sought petitioner's conviction on the ground that the decision of the
Sandiganbayan on the two cases filed against her is in accord with
applicable jurisprudence and supported by factual evidence.
We find no reason to overturn petitioner's conviction for gross
negligence.
Before 1969, internal revenue taxes were designated by descriptive
words. This, however, proved to be unsatisfactory inasmuch as tax
data could not easily be stored and processed by the computer,
resulting in delayed compilation and retrieval of the data.
In the case at bar, petitioner is the head of the Revenue Accounting
Division (RAD). Under Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-84, one
of the functions of the said division is to "Confirm and certify as to the
correctness of payment and other informations verified from
accounting records and documents." As head of the RAD, petitioner
holds an extremely sensitive position, whose certification to the
payments received by the Bureau from taxpayers determines whether
the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or a tax credit. Despite her sensitive
position, however, and despite her own admission from the pleadings
that the use of TNC instead of word descriptions to identify and record
tax payments were made mandatory since 1969, petitioner claims that
she practically had no idea what the TNC meant until a year after
having issued the 1st indorsement, when investigation regarding the
tax credits given to Tanduay was well under way. Petitioner further
claims that there was no way she could have verified whether the
payments made by Tanduay were for ad valorem taxes because the
confirmation receipts do not contain any information as to the kind of
tax paid by the taxpayer nor the requisite TNC.
We are not impressed.
A payment order, which contains the particular kind of tax to be paid
and the corresponding TNC, is issued to a taxpayer to be presented by
him to the bank where he pays his taxes. When the payment order is
presented, a confirmation receipt is issued by the bank evidencing
payment of the tax. Although it is not stated in the confirmation
receipts what kind of tax is being paid by the taxpayer nor the TNC,
the BIR's copy of the confirmation receipt is usually attached to the
original copy of the Payment Order (PO) which in turn specifies the
kind of tax paid and the TNC. Since petitioner's division is the
repository of all accounting records of the Bureau, it should have
copies of the payment orders for the corresponding confirmation
receipts and therefore petitioner could have easily verified what kind
of taxes were covered by the payments made by Tanduay from
January 1, 1986 to August 31, 1987. Moreover, petitioner's claim that
there were no pertinent records, codes and references that could be
used to distinguish the confirmation receipts as either for ad
valorem or specific tax is belied by the denial of her immediate
superior, Melchor Ramos, who stated that the RAD has in its
possession the monthly Alpha List of Taxpayers issued in 1986 as well
as the collection report by agent banks (Abstract of Collection thru
Banks) for the same year which were prepared by the Revenue
Information System Service, Inc. (RISSI) based on the confirmation
receipts transmitted to them by the field offices and the PO/CR
Monitoring Division. Petitioner's immediate superior added that these
records contain the TNC of every receipt listed therein and thus it
would be very easy to identify the kind of tax paid by the taxpayer by
simply referring to the Handbook on Numeric Tax Code. 12
Clearly, petitioner's alleged lack of knowledge as to what TNC meant
was grossly inexcusable if not improbable considering that the use of
TNC to record tax payments received by the Bureau is directly
connected with the duties of her office. If there is anyone in the.
Bureau who was expected to have a working knowledge of the TNC, it
should have been petitioner because the use of TNC was precisely
meant to facilitate the recording of the tax payments received by the
Bureau for verification purposes. Petitioner as head of the Revenue
Accounting Division was called upon to verify whether the schedule of
payments submitted by Tanduay in support of its application for tax
credit were payments for ad valorem taxes. Petitioner had submitted a
list of payments made by Tanduay with the corresponding bank
account nos., amounts and TNC Nos., as required by the Memorandum
Circular. But, as admitted by petitioner herself, she had not the
slightest idea what TNC meant, despite the fact that they are mandated
by the Bureau to use it accordingly in identifying and recording tax
payments.
We have a situation where the Head of the Division, which is in charge
of recording tax payments received by the Bureau and whose
certification is relied upon by the Bureau in the granting of tax credits,
does not even know or care to know what are the kind of tax payments
received by the Bureau. For all intents and purposes, petitioner issued
an indorsement certifying a whole schedule of payments made by the
taxpayer without a specification of the kinds of taxes since she did not
have any idea what TNC meant. It could not even be said that
petitioner made an error of judgment in answering Larin's query with
an enumeration of TNCs instead of opting for a more explicit response
since petitioner, not having any idea as to what the TNCs meant, could
not have couched the statement of her 1st Indorsement in any other
way. She could not have made a more explicit answer to the query of
Larin inasmuch as she did not even know or care to find out whether
the BIR actually received payments for ad valorem taxes from
Tanduay. Clearly, there is no doubt that petitioner was grossly
negligent in discharging her duties. As defined in the case
of Alejandro v. People, 13 gross negligence is "negligence
characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care
which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their
own property." The test to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated in this wise: "Did the defendant in doing
the negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be exercised by the discreet paterfamilias of
Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that." 14
Petitioner asserts that there was nothing untruthful in the certification
she issued regarding the tax payments received by the BIR from
Tanduay. Petitioner further claims that the first endorsement was
patterned after the standard format used by the division whenever a
request is made for verification of payments and she could not be
faulted for adhering to the mandate of the various memoranda issued
regarding the use of TNCs.
Admittedly, the use of TNCs to record tax payments is mandated by
various memoranda issued by the Bureau. Petitioner, however, as
previously stated, never exerted any effort to find out what the TNCs
meant. Had she been more circumspect, she would have appreciated
the significance of her certification. She would have known that
Tanduay was not entitled to the whole amount of P180,701,682.00 it
was claiming as tax credit. She would have been forewarned of the
implied consequences of her certification and could have accordingly
informed her superiors and her co-accused whether Tanduay was
really entitled to a tax credit at all or not. That her co-accused were
mandated to know what TNC meant is beside the point. Petitioner, by
the position she occupies, is mandated to know the kind of taxes for
which payment is made by the taxpayer claiming a refund before she
issues a certification because it is on the basis of this certification that
it is determined whether tax credits should be granted at all. Certainly,
the petitioner held a sensitive position with a function that could
hardly be classified as ministerial. As head of the division which is
supposedly in charge of encoding payment received by the Bureau
from taxpayers and who is supposedly expected more than anyone to
know the meaning of the TNC, petitioner issued an indorsement
containing cryptic codes which she admittedly did not know the
meaning of and expecting her superiors, who were not even in charge
of recording tax payments and who relied on her certification, to be
familiar with.
Significantly, in the separate appeal of petitioner's two other co-
accused to this Court, entitled Pareño vs. Sandiganbayan and the
People of the Philippines, 16 we ruled that "the acts of petitioners and
that of Evangelista may be considered concerted only because they
performed interrelated functions but there is no actual proof that
conspiracy existed between the parties."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 14208 convicting petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista of
violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code is
REVERSED and petitioner is accordingly ACQUITTED. The decision
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14209 convicting
petitioner of violation of R.A. 3019 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) years and one month as minimum to twelve (12) years as
maximum. The penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office
is likewise imposed on her. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
To facilitate the preparation of statistical and other management
reports, the BIR adopted the Tax Numeric Code System under which a
numeric code stands for kinds or classes of tax and their applicable
rate. For this purpose, a "Handbook on Tax Numeric Codes of the
Revenue Sources," was issued for BIR use. 8 Under this system, TNC
No. 3011-0011 was made to stand for "specific tax on domestic
distilled spirits," 9 TNC No. 3023-2001 for ad valorem on
compounded liquors, 10 and TNC No. 0000-0000 for unclassified
taxes. Under various BIR Revenue Memorandum Orders and
Circulars, the use of TNC instead of word descriptions to identify and
record tax payments was made mandatory. 11 It may not be amiss to
note at this point however that despite the fact that the use of TNC to
identify and record tax payments was made mandatory, it had become
obvious during trial that not all employees of the BIR were well
acquainted with the meanings of the TNC. Even Deputy
Commissioner Santos who approved the Tax Credit Memo and the
BIR Commissioner himself, Bienvenido Tan, were not familiar with
the corresponding TNC numbers for a particular revenue. Not
surprisingly, petitioner and the three other accused claimed they too
were unaware of the meaning of TNC.

Petitioner cannot take refuge in the claim that the 1st indorsement was
issued in the usual format as a routine response to an official request of
the Commissioner of Excise Tax after it has verified the data given to
them against available records of the division. We fully concur with
the observation of the Sandiganbayan that —

to begin with, nobody has demonstrated that the text of the first
indorsement of the Tanduay matter and on the Limtuaco matter were
the correct responses to the query made by Larin. As aforesaid,
nobody, whether for or from the accused, testified.

And since nobody actually testified on any of the documents of the

accused — not even her boss, Assistant Commissioner Melchor S.
Ramos — so that a full clarification could be had thereon, this court
cannot be deemed to accept his written statements unqualifiedly.

While petitioner was grossly negligent in her duties for which she
could be held liable under R.A. No. 3019 (e), petitioner may not be
held liable for violation of Section 268(4) of the National Internal
Revenue Code inasmuch as it has not been proven that there was an
actual agreement between her and her co-accused to grant unwarranted
tax credits to Tanduay. What is punished in said Sec. 268(4) is the act
of conspiring and colluding to defraud the government of revenues. It
is well entrenched in our jurisprudence that conspiracy must be shown
to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the
offense itself. Absent any act or circumstance from which may be
logically inferred the existence of a common design among the
accused to commit the crime, the theory of conspiracy remains a
speculation not a fact. 15

G.R. No. L-34105 February 4, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIMOTEO CABURAL, CIRIACO YANGYANG, BENJAMIN
LASPONIA, and LEONIDE CABUAL, accussed,TIMOTEO
CABURAL and CIRIACO YANGYANG, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Benjamin A. Gravino for private respondents.
Abdon A. Arriba counsel for defendant-appellants.
RELOVA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte, dated June 4, 1970, convicting Timoteo Cabural of
the crime of Robbery with Rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and, convicting Leonide Cabual,
Benjamin Lasponia and Ciriaco Yangyang of the crime of Robbery
and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
Prision Mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the
sum of P9,435.50, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay proportionately the costs of the proceedings.
The statement of facts in the brief filed by the People of the
Philippines is as follows:
... [A]t about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 14, 1960, three
masked men entered the building of the Kim San Milling in Palao City
of Iligan thru an opening of the roof above the kitchen that was being
repaired and forced themselves inside a room where Pua Lim Pin
Bebencio Palang, Sy Chua Tian and Siao Chou were sleeping (tsn, pp.
78-82, May 31, 1965; tsn, pp. 141-148, June 13, 1961). The masked
men, at gunpoint, hogtied the four occupants of the room and
commanding them to lie on the floor, face down, were all covered with
blankets (tsn, pp. 82-83, Ibid). The inmates of the room heard That the
cabinets were being ransacked (tsn, p. 82, Ibid). As this was going on,
one of the men approached Pua Lim Pin to ask him if he could open
the safe to which he answered in the negative as he was a mere
employee of the firm (tsn, p. 83, May 31, 1961). An hour later, one of
the men approached Sy Chua Tian (also See Chou Kian tsn, p.
89, Ibid) and told him: 'now is 3:30, if by 4:00 the safe is not open we
will kill you.' (tsn, p. 94, Ibid.)
As this was going on, another episode was taking place inside the next
room where the maids were sleeping (tsn, p. 91, May 31, 1961).
Restituta Biosano Panchita Maghanoy and Agripina Maglangit have
retired at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 13, 1960,
after their chores were performed (tsn, p. 91, Ibid, tsn, p. 10, May
7,1961; tsn, p. 13, May 29,1961; tsn, p. 25, Ibid). At about 2:00
o'clock the following morning, they were awakened by two persons,
one holding a pistol and the other holding a hunting knife. Like the
fate of the four inmates of the other room, the maids were all hogtied,
made to lie on the floor, face downward, and were all covered with
blankets (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 29, 1961).1äwphï1.ñët The two then left
the room (tsn, p. 29, Ibid). After two hours later, one of the two men
re-appeared in the room and after discovering that Agripina Maglangit
had freed her hands, he showed anger and remarked that he would
separate her from the rest. With his pistol pointed at her, he took her
outside the building to a secluded place within the Kim San
Compound (tsn, pp. 30-33, Ibid.). Here, with her hands tied, she was
made to lie down flat on the ground face upwards. He then raised her
skirt, tied down her panties, and had sexual intercourse with her. She
was unable to resist him and fight back because at the time she had lost
her strength not to mention the fact that she was deprived of the use of
her hands that were both tied together. The rape having been
consummated, he pulled her left arm so she could stand up. He then
left her (tsn, pp. 33-35, Ibid.).
Agripina Maglangit recognized the features of the man that raped her.
She Identified her rapist to be the accused Timoteo Cabural (tsn, pp.
36-39, Ibid.).
At about four o'clock that morning (September 14, 1960) all the
intruders must have left because the four men that were hogtied in the
other room noticed complete silence They each struggled to free
themselves which they succeeded. Maghanoy lost her Alosa 15-jewel
watch costing her P65.00 (tsn, p. 22, May 29, 1961); Sy Chua Tian
(See Chou Kian lost his Omega automatic wrist watch valued in the
amount of P385.00 that was snatched from his wrist by one of the
robbers, besides his wallet containing P264.00 in paper currency (tsn,
p. 85 and p. 95, May 31, 1961). After the robbers left, the inmates
discovered the cash and some personal belongings in the total amount
of P9,435.50 were transported by the robbers (tsn, pp. 29-36, Oct. 23,
1961; tsn, pp. 120-125, June 13, 1961).
The accident having been reported, both the local police as well as the
Philippine Constabulary stationed in Iligan conducted their
investigation. In the course of the investigation, members of the
Philippine Constabulary found a.30-caliber carbine with 4 magazines
and a .45 caliber pistol well wrapped in a banca at the shore behind the
house of the accused Benjamin Lasponia This led to the investigation
of Lasponia who subsequently admitted the crime and pointed to his
companions that night. On September 18, 1960, Benjamin Lasponia
signed a confession before Assistant Fiscal Leonardo Magsalin,
Exhibits B, B-1, B-2, and B3 at the PC headquarters in Iligan (pp.
1025-1028, Vol. III Rec.). He confessed to the last detail his
participation in the crime. On September 19, 1960, the accused
Leonide Cabual subscribed to an affidavit before the same Fiscal
.Magsalin regarding his participation and that of -his co-accused in the
robbery of Kim San Milling in the early morning of September 14,
1960, Exhibits C, C-1, C-2, C3 and C5 (pp. 1029-1034, Vol. III,
Record (l). Ciriaco Yangyang followed. He subscribed his confession
before Special Counsel Dominador Padilla in the Office of the City
Fiscal of Iligan on September 26, 960, Exhibits H, H-1 and H2 (pp.
1036-1038, Vol. III, Record, See complete testimony of Eustaquio
Cabides, tsn, pp- 52-72, July 17, 1969).
On September 21, 1960, (1) Timoteo Cabural, alias Romeo alias Tiyoy
(2) Benjamin Lasponia; (3) Leonide Cabual alias Eddie; (4) Ciriaco
Yangyang; (5) William Tate alias Negro; (6) Fausto Dacera and, (7)
Alfonso Caloy-on alias Pablo, were charged before the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte of the crime of Robbery in Band with
Rape, in an information filed by the City Fiscal of Iligan City. The
crime charged was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about September 14, 1960 in the City of Iligan Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
in company with one Fred Ybañez alias Godofredo Camisic and one
John Doe, who are still-at-large, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, and armed with deadly weapons, all
unlicensed, to wit: carbines, revolvers, tommy guns, garand rifles and
knives, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent of gain and by means of violence against and intimidation of
persons, and with the use of force upon things, to wit: by passing
through an opening not intended for entrance or egress, enter the main
building and office of the Kim San Milling Company, an inhabited
building, and once inside, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal, rob and carry away therefrom, the following
personal properties, to wit:
Cashmoney.........................................................
Wrist watch 'Technos'......................................
Gold Ring............................................................
Sunglasses.........................................................
Four pieces of golden bracelets......................
Chinese gold ring with dark blue stone.........
One gold ring with brilliant stone...................
One Chinese gold necklace with red stone...
One pair of earrings Chinese gold with.........
red stone.......................................................
Three pairs of earrings with pearls................
Four Chinese gold rings with stones of........
different colors.................................................
Sweepstakes tickets.........................................
One American gold Lady's ring.....................
with dark pink stone...........................
Four men's rings...............................................
One and a half dozens handkerchiefs..........
Lady's wrist watch..........................................
Three ladies watches......................................
One men's watch.............................................
One Chinese gold necklace...........................
One Lady's wrist watch..................................
One Chinese gold necklace...........................
One Men's wrist watch...................................
One Men's wrist watch 'Tugaris'...................
Knife..................................................................
One Men's wrist watch...................................
Omega' Seamaster...........................................
with a total value of P9,435.50, belonging to the Kim San Milling
Company, Bebencio Palang, Agapito Tan, Restituta Boisano Panchita
Maghanoy, Catalina Boisano Pua Lim Pin and Sy Chua Tian to the
damage and prejudice of the said owners in the said sum of P9,435.50,
Philippine currency; and that on the occasion or by reason of the said
robbery, the above-named accused except William Tate alias Negro,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one Agripina Maglangit, a woman, by means of
violence and intimidation and against her will.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 294 paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18 and Article 296 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 12, Section 3,
with the following aggravating circumstances, to wit: that the said
offense was committed during night time and by a band; that it was
committed with the use of disguise; and that it was committed with the
use of a motor vehicle.
Upon arraignment, the defendants pleaded not guilty. However, during
the course of the trial, three (3) of the accused, namely: William Tate
Fausto Dacera and Alfonso Caloy-on were dropped on petition of the
City Fiscal and trial proceeded against the four (4) remaining accused,
namely: Timoteo Cabural, alias Romeo Cabural; Benjamin Lasponia,
Leonide Cabual and Ciriaco Yangyang. As aforesaid, Cabural,
Lasponia, Cabual and Yangyang were convicted. Benjamin Lasponia
did not appeal; however, Cabural, Yangyang and Cabual did and
claimed that the trial court erred:
I.
IN HOLDING THAT THE AFFIDAVITS OR EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED BENJAMIN LASPONIA,
LEONIDE CABUAL, AND CIRIACO YANGYANG WHICH WERE
NOT OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE, VIOLENCE,
INTIMIDATIONS AND THREATS AND SERIOUS
MALTREATMENTS ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE AND
THEREFORE COULD BE A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE
CONVICTIONS OF ACCUSED.
II.
IN HOLDING THAT EVEN IF IN THE EXECUTION OF SAID
AFFIDAVITS OF CONFESSIONS BY THE THREE ACCUSED
SOME PERSONAL INCONVENIENCE WERE MADE BY THE PC
SOLDIERS BUT BECAUSE THE CONTENTS OF SAID
CONFESSIONS ARE TRUE SAID EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE AND COULD
BE MADE A LEGAL, BASIS FOR THE CONVICTIONS OF ALL
ACCUSED.
III.
IN HOLDING THAT THE THREE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS BY THREE ACCUSED BEING INTERLOCKING
CONFESSIONS IS ENOUGH AND SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THEIR CONVICTIONS ON PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT;
IV. A He raised my skirt.

IN HOLDING THAT THE THREE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF THREE ACCUSED INTERLOCKED WITH
EACH OTHER EVEN IF INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE
BECAUSE OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE, VIOLENCE,
INTIMIDATION, ETC. IS ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN THE
CONVICTION OF ACCUSED TIMOTEO CABURAL BECAUSE
HE WAS SUFFICIENTLY IdENTIFIED BY VICTIM AGRIPINA
MAGLANGIT AS HER RAPIST;
V.
Q At the time he was raising your skirt, what was your position?
A I was lying down with face upward.
Q After he had raised your skirt, what happened next, if any?
A When my skirt was raised and since I have no more strength
because (as demonstrated by the witness), her laps were numb, he took
off my pantie.

IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE FOR THE Q How did your laps happen to be numb?
CONVICTIONS OF ACCUSED REACHED THE LEGAL
STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS A Because my laps were pushed so that I cannot move.
REQUIRED BY LAW.
Q What particular part of your body did he push to numbness?
On October 14, 1971, this Court granted the motion of Leonide Cabual
to withdraw his appeal (p. 60, rollo). A My laps.

Appellant Cabural declared that from 2:00 in the afternoon of Q After he had taken off your pantie, what, if any, did he do?
September 13, 1960 to 3:00 in the early morning of September 14,
1960, he was playing mahjong with Virginia Cruz Maruhom and one
Gomer in the store of Ason in Maigo, Lanao del Norte which is about A I feel that he had what he wants.
37 kilometers from Iligan City and would take about two (2) hours by
us or about one (1) hour by car to negotiate the distance between the Q What do you mean by that?
two places; that he could not have been present at complainant's place
at 2:00 in the morning of September 14, 1960 when the robbery took
A To disgrace my honor.
place; that he was brought to the Philippine Constabulary
Headquarters in Iligan City by PC soldiers on September 15, 1960 and
was subjected to all kinds of torture; and that after he was severely Q How did he disgrace your honor?
maltreated, including the 7-Up treatment and threatened with pistol, he
was asked to sign an affidavit. Despite his insistence that he was A He had sexual intercourse.
innocent he was induced to sign a statement after he was told: "if you
obey us you may get free" and that "if you confess we will protect
Q How long did he have that sexual intercourse with you?
you."

A I do not remember how long because of my fear.

Ciriaco Yangyang also denied participation in the commission of the
crime considering that at that time he was in Barrio Mentering
attending the counting of votes for the muse of the barrio fiesta. He Q Did he finish having sexual intercourse with you?
was reading the ballots cast for each candidate at the microphone. It
was only in the following morning of September 14, 1960 when he A Yes, sir.
returned to Maigo.
Q After he had that sexual intercourse with you, what happened next,
The Identity of appellant Timoteo Cabural as the rapist of Agripina if any?
Maglangit is established in the testimony of the latter as follows:
A (As demonstrated by th witness, her left Arm was pulled to stand
Q After that man had told you that you would be separated from the up)
rest, what happened next, if any?
Q Were you able to stand up?
A I was brought outside.
A Yes, sir.
Q What do you mean by 'outside?'
Q After you have stood up, that man where, if any, did he go?
A I was brought outside of the office of the Kim San .
A I did not notice where the man go but I went back to our room.
Q After you have been taken outside, what happened, if any?
Q Upon your arrival to your quarters, what, if any, did you do?
A I was threatened and I was forced.
A I told my companions.
Q How were you threatened?
Q Who were they?
A He pointed to me his pistol and let me lie down.
A They were Restituta Biosano, Pena Maglangit, Catalina Biosano
Q This place where he threatened you and made you lie down outside,
was this place near to the place where you had slept?
Q That man who had sexual intercourse with you, is he here now in
the courtroom?
A It is very far but it is within the compound of the Kim San
A Yes, sir.
Q After he had threatened you and made you lie down, what, if any,
did you do?
Q Will you please point him out?
A (Witness went down from the stand and went to the accused seated
in the courtroom and pointed to the accused Timoteo Cabural). (tsn.
pp. 32-35, May 29, 1961 hearing)
We agree with the lower court that Cabural alone was responsible for
the rape on Agripina. There is no evidence that his co-appellant
Yangyang and the other malefactors made advances on her. Besides,
the extra-judicial confessions of Lasponia (Exhibits B, B-1, B-2 and
B3 Leonide Cabual (Exhibits C, C-1 to C-5 and Ciriaco Yangyang
(Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2) point to appellant Cabural as the
mastermind and the role each of them would play (as in fact they did)
in the commission of the crime. Their interlocking confessions indicate
how they would go to the scene of the crime, the manner by which
they would enter into the premises of Kim San Milling Company and,
as aptly observed by the trial court, the details which only the
participants could amply give.
Further, accused Cabual and Lasponia were sworn by Fiscal Leonardo
Magsalin who instructed the PC investigators to leave the room so that
they (Cabual and Lasponia) would be able to speak their minds freely.
Fiscal Magsalin testified that said accused readily and without
hesitation signed their respective extra-judicial confessions.
Finally, We find no merit in the alibis interposed by appellants Cabural
and Yangyang. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief:
The fact that Cabural played mahjong with Virginia Cruz Maruhom
and a certain Gomer at the store of Ason in Barrio Maigo from 2:00
P.M. of September 13, 1960 to 3:00 A.M. of September 14, 1960 is no
guarantee that he could not be at the scene of the crime (Kim San
Milling Company, situated in Palao a 37-kilometer stretch which could
be negotiated in one hour by car (tsn., p. 8, Sept. 20, 1966).
Considering the confessions of Lasponia, Cabual and Yangyang all
pointing to Cabural as the one in control of the vehicle utilized in the
commission of the crime, the conclusion is not hard to reach that his
presence at the scene of the crime is much likelier than at Maigo.
Otherwise stated, appellants failed to show the plausibility and verity
of their alibis and the crime is aggravated by dwelling and nighttime.
As aforesaid, the trial court convicted Timoteo Cabural of the crime of
robbery with rape, which is penalized by Article 294(2) of the Revised
Penal Code, by reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua.
Effective August 15, 1975 (or subsequent to this date), Presidential
Decree No. 767 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
"when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons.
In People vs. Perello, Jr., 111 SCRA 147, it was mentioned that "[t]he
Chief Justice and the herein ponente (Justice Ramon C. Aquino) are of
the opinion that article 335 cannot be applied to robbery with rape and
that that offense should be penalized under article 294(2) in which
case reclusion perpetua should be imposed. As the accused was
charged with a crime against property, he should not be convicted of a
crime against chastity, a private offense. (See People vs. Olden, L-
27570-71, September 20, 1972, 47 SCRA 45)." However, also in the
same case, "Justices Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar believe that
article 335 should be applied to this case. (See People vs. Carandang,
L-310102, August 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259, People vs. Mabag, L-
38548, July 24, 1980, 98 SCRA 730; People vs. Arias, L-40531,
January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 303; People vs. Boado, L- 44725, March
31, 1981, 103 SCRA 607; People vs. Canizares L- 32515, September
10, 1981; People vs. Pizarras L-35915, October 30, 1981).
The writer of this decision is of the opinion that in robbery with rape,
the accused should be penalized under Article 294(2) of the Revised
Penal Code because it is a crime against property and not a crime
against chastity a private offense.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. With costs against both appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
 
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
My concurrence in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Relova
is full, entire, and complete. Nonetheless, I wish to express my
gratification that this Court by a decisive vote 1 sustains the basic
postulate in both civil law and common law jurisdictions, expressed in
the maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. It is undoubted,
therefore, that unless there be a radical change in the thinking of the
Court, it is Article 294(2) not Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
that calls for application in the crime of robbery with rape. 2 As noted
in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Aquino in People v.
Perello: 3 "Effective August 15, 1975 (or subsequent to this case)
Presidential Decree No. 767 imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death 'when the robbery accompanied with rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons.' That increased penalty cannot be retroactively applied to this
case. 4 As such offense of robbery was committed before that date, it is
Article 294(2), before its amendment, that supplies the governing rule.
The applicable law then is clear and explicit. It defined the offense and
prescribed the penalty. The doctrine announced in Lizarraga
Hermanos v. Yap Tico 5 by Justice Moreland, in categorical language
comes to mind. Thus: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our
judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them." 6 There is relevance too to this excerpt
from Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company
Credit Union Inc. v. Manila Railroad Company: 7 "The applicable
provision of Republic Act. No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself.
There is no ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-
appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower
court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That
cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly
appertains to the legislative branch. 8
Nothing more appropriately appertains to the legislative branch than
the definition of a crime and the prescription of the penalty to be
imposed. That is not a doctrine of recent vintage. It is traceable
to United States v. Wiltberger, 9 an 1820 America. Supreme Court
opinion. No less than the eminent Chief Justice Marshall spoke for the
Court. To quote his exact language: "The rule that penal laws are to be
construed strictly is perhaps not much less old than construction itself.
It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals;
and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the
legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the
court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment." 10 That
ruling was followed in the Philippines in a 1906 decision, United
States v. Almond. 11
So it has been in the Philippines since then. It was the same Justice
Moreland who in United States v. Abad Santos  12 promulgated in
1917, gave expression to a variation of such a fundamental postulate in
this wise: "Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No person
should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them,
nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made
so by the statute." 13 The same year, Justice Carson in United States v.
Estapia  14 in rejecting the contention that the application of a penal
provision even if not covered by its terms should be viewed by the
judiciary as commendable, conducive as it is to the repression of a
reprehensible practice" pointed out: "To this it should be sufficient
answer to say that neither the executive nor the judicial authorities are
authorized to impose fines and prison sentences in cases wherein such
fines and prison sentences are not clearly authorized by law, and this
without regard to the end sought to be attained by the enforcement of
such unauthorized penalties."15
It is to be admitted that from the standpoint of logic alone, there is
much to be said for the view that since rape under certain
circumstances is penalized with death, it is an affront to reason if
robbery with rape carries with it a lesser penalty. The latter offense is
far more reprehensible, ergo it must be punished at least with equal if
not more severity. It is from that perspective that in People v.
Carandang 16 while the penalty imposed is that of reclusion
perpetua there were two separate opinions one from Justice Teehankee
and the other from the late Chief Justice, then Justice, Castro. They
would apply Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Retired Chief
Justice Makalintal, now Speaker of the Batasan Pambansa, then Acting
Chief Justice, concurred in the separate opinion of the late Chief
Justice Castro. Less than a year before, however, in September of
1972, Carandang being a 1973 decision, he penned the unanimous
opinion in People v. Olden  17 affirming the joint judgment of a Court G.R. No. 151258               December 1, 2014
of First Instance of Davao in two cases, one of which was robbery in
band with multiple rape. It was not the death sentence that was ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
imposed but reclusion perpetua. 18 That case is certainly later vs.
than People v. Obtinalia 19 decided in April of 1971, where, in a per PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
curiam opinion, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code was applied,
although the offense for which the accused were found guilty was x-----------------------x
robbery with rape. It is, therefore, re-assuring that with the decision of
this case, the uncertainty which has beclouded the issue of the
appropriate imposable penalty has been removed. G.R. No. 154954

One last word. The maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
lege has its roots in history. It is in accordance with both centuries of vs.
civil law and common law tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO
coronary to a regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
the essence then that while anti-social acts should be penalized, there ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT
must be a clear definition of the punishable offense as well as the TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III,
penalty that may be imposed a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
the legislative body, and the legislative body alone. So MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO,
constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on jurisdiction rather ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
than guvernaculum.The judiciary as the dispenser of justice through PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA,
law must be aware of the limitation on its own power. PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE
GUZMAN, Respondents.
Such a concept calls for undiminished respect from the judiciary. For it
is the department by which the other branches are held to strict
accountability. It sees to it, in propriate cases of course, that they are x-----------------------x
held within the bounds of their authority. Certainly, the judiciary is not
devoid of discretion., It can, to paraphrase Cardozo, fill in the gap and G.R. No. 155101
clear the ambiguities. To that extent. it is free but, to recall Cardozo
anew, it "is still not wholly free. [A judge] is no to innovate at FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his vs.
own Ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
consecrated principles." 20
x-----------------------x
Tersely stated, the judiciary administers justice according to law. This
is by no means to imply that in the case at hand, justice according to
law is at war with the concept of justice viewed from the layman's G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
standpoint. The system of criminal law followed in the Philippines,
true to the ways of constitutionalism, has always leaned toward the GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
milder form of responsibility, whether as to the nature of the offense or vs.
the penalty to be incurred by the wrongdoer. 21 Where, as in this case, MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, such a principle is CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and
impressed with greater weight. ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of
Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is
nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining
matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters
include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of
Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda
(Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr.
(Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of
who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the
probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that
allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.

Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or

Clarification filed by petitioners People of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa);
and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively,
Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February
2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal
liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the
verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA
Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused
therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision 4 in a separate but related case
docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel
Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano
(Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated.
Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding
petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and
SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 –
finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead,
Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined
and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly
and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto
in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of
1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of
12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.
Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et
al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally,
pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in
G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of
the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of
intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity
members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding
the present case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the
Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez
III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix
Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some
members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the
Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the
initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical
beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites
were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were
brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received
threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes
alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the
Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to
them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of
Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol
Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes
during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows
on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and
the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time,
the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes
were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They
were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s
principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be
hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived
the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically
and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same
manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After
a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded
that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon
and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes
to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny
received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him
sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of
intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of
physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried
by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then
slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by
Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially,
Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was
just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really
feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed
his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm.
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the
following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi) 1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,
Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim,
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez) Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas,
and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual guilt
was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman) Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.)
– were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuriesand
16. Antonio General (General) sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim) Villareal– were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo) an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of
reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada) severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay
the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340
dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima) Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez) reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial.
25. Adel Abas (Abas)

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
were individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against the
remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in
abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal
Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks
after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993,
Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the
finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then
passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining
25 accused, viz:
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration 7 in
connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and
Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and
Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to
speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to
assert that right within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that,
unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents Escalona et
al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that
the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She
again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the
lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there
were a number of incidents attributable to the accused themselves that
caused the delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the
balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the
accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101
(Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees
with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et al.
had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the
felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it
concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was
through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed
should have been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to
Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that the
nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the
accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo
and culpaby considering the act as one committed with malicious
intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in
such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the
lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG
asserts that their acquittal may also be reversed despite the rule on
double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists
that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like their
other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the
former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions
contributed to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining
to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially
seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their
criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned. According to
respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the CA
rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal
liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable
sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable
sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they have already been
discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them
closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their
Applications for Probation on various dates in January 2002 11 pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the
Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their respective
Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their
completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from
probation and declared the criminal case against them terminated on
various dates in April 2003.13
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of
their respective Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders
granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and
declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they
maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed
into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived their
right to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to
speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have
corresponded to that for intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and
conditions of their probation discharged them from their criminal
liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them
DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances
and legal assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial
Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already
been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations,
which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that
in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to
speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them
amounted to an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration
thereof would result in a violation of their right against double
jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the
accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that
the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It
must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse
of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of
its very power to dispense justice." 18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence. 19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision,
and petitioner’s arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA
gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy trial
of the accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by
the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion
of petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the OSG with respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments raised
therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in
its original Petition for Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the
act complained of was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious
intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the actions
of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed
by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by
means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result
of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised
Penal Code expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit
an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing
or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in
those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which
a deliberate malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is
our exhaustive discussion on the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code
belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens
rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do
what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is
necessary that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements
of freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on
which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the
purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It
does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while
intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving
power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the
"purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the
other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous,
and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements
taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must
refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of
mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional
felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or omission
be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and
"with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the
other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a
vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional
felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires
the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously
with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi–
cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must
not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If
death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent –
but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles
262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical
injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se,
the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises
from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis
consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found
guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under
the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or
wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of
certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries
per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make
a man guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction
of physical injuries, absentmalicious intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of
criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that
are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3
thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done
without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution
or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the
danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast,
simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave
fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing
an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the
law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the
mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies
with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line
of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the
individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is
bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury.
In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that
may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to
the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to employ more or
less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each
particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the existence of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused
can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of
culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that
the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to the
present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or
negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already
amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated
the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of
culpaon the one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the
other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them. The
penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the
imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties
outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically
invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act
accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are
statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We
have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon
and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi
in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the
imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions
of respondents Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v.
Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions, 21 respondents insist that the previous verdict
of the CA finding them guilty of slight physical injuries has already
lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of the
probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they
argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our
Decision in Tan v. People 23 to support their contention that the CA
judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained
finality, as the former had timely filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or
a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for
certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory
until after the matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a
criminal judgment once the accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of
convictionmay, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived
in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)
(Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 25 and Section 1 of Rule 122, 26 it
can be culled from the foregoing provisions that only the accused may
appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief
being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This
rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
edict27 against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be
exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment
in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability.
Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying
for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and
executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth
reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is
likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a
complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability;
after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of
conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only
the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he
had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and
prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government
who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government
would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier
of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had
attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power
and resources are once again employed against the defendant’s
individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal
does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of
reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in
Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal
judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on
double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to
cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that
issued the criminal judgment. 29 The reasoning behind the exception is
articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in
the manner done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the
review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional
grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no
jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether
there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the
decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule
65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of
the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of
a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or
to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s Decision in
Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a
criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we
point out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the
modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for
certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and separate from the
main case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the
accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule
65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its
jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is nomodification
of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call
for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the
ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition,
any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence
of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of
Rule 120 must be that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the
court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition.
Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment
only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular
appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if
that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find
no irregularity in the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R.
No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the
wrong court. Part and parcel of our criminal justice system is the
authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case
before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal
to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it. 31 That
power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment,
impose a punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a
sentencein accordance with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation
applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130.
Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take cognizance
of the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the
criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that originally
rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch
121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for
reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases
supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an
application for probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and
sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial
court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime
of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City
RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et
al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any
special authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation
had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC
Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the CA issued
a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
the ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners
therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez. 36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their
probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not
with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to choose
the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under
Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely
procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings
were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the
case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction
over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has
been properly instituted. 37 If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment
or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The
execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party
is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the
entire case the moment the other party’s time to appeal has
expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease –
including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the
moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the
appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have
the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before
it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant
thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the appellate court
until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by
any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall
be executed except by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a
court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense charged
becomes final under any of the following conditions among
others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the
accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal
ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally
satisfied or served; or when the accused applies for probation. When
the decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered in
the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously appealed
to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be
attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the
clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. 44 The court of
origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action.
It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter of
the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution
thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet
relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective
applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the CA48 and the records were still with that court. 49 The CA
settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August
2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson et al. had filed
their applications with the trial court. 50 In September 2002, or almost a
month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October
2002 granting the probation applications, 51 the OSG had filed
Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the
CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments
by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November
2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a
comment thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and
motions, we eventually required all parties to file their consolidated
memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA until they
were elevated to this Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no
jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson et al. It had
neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place
them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare
the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis
a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded
one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or
both – to which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time
they applied for it. Probation 58 is a special privilege granted by the
state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their
liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their
acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state
affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby
making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the
major purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop
themselves into law-abiding and self respecting individuals, as well as
to assist them in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the
accused. Rather, it is an act of grace orclemency conferred by the state.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of
persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should
not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any
of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of
the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should
benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
(Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation
applications of Tecson et al. 60 It points out that when they appealed to
the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made
themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as
follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
(Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender
must not have appealed the conviction. 61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v.
Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of whether a
convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has
imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on
lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable
limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum
term of eight years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage
of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation after
the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8
months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and
ruled that the accused was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed
an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of
the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any
distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all
offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their
reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking
probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the
accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of
probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation
only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from
non-probationable to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders discharging Tecson et al.
from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration
of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of
Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et
al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as
they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that
respondents were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to
suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their
conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of
arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable
limits for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them
ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and
despotic use of authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very
power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting
the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter
discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders,
resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for
having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement
in Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights
are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor
bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of
it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has
already been extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation
and the eventual termination of the criminal case against them by
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the
following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344
of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal
rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at
all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents
cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised
Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case. One of the
hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the execution
of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence with
another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia: 67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is
rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a
final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the nature of
a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the
supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied
with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated.
(Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People, 68 we revisited our ruling in
Franciscoand modified our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility
for probation of those who appeal their conviction is concerned.
Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned
Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all:69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who
appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from
availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it
will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s
annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him.
More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense
and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s
judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel
will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment
with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets
the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in
Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between
Franciscoand this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have
allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between
appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say, "By taking this
appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the
trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that
would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly
diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It
remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to
apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right
penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have
afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of
probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in
Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege
to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes
within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many
cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused
not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months
maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation. No one
could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right
had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed
his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair
to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty
that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed
by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and
found Tecson et al.ultimately liable for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its
maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión
correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares
is more favorable to Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to
apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the
same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch
130, which granted the Applications for Probation, we cannot
disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and
conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually
been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation,
the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent
probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation
at this time and in determining the terms, conditions, and period
thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical
error in the minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused
Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any of the
parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex
proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth
sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of
the "penalty next lower" than that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), 70 the phrase
"and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be
removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive
portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of
four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum. In this instance,
we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent
to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a
corresponding accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a
court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27
thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as
reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before the prison
sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL. 72 This determination
is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an
indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on
the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically allude to the actual
"penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence" 74 set by a court. We
believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on
the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same
offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the
minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict
may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison
term.76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty
for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccionalin its medium
period. As this provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a
penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the
aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately
imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty 78 of
four years and two months of prisión correccional.79 Pursuant to
Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión
correccional automatically carries with it 80 the following accessory
penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory
penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it that
of suspension from public office, from the right tofollow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen
months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this
article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their
principal penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four years and two
months81 or until they have served their sentence in accordance with
law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of
conviction becomes final.82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds
18 months, they shall furthermore suffer a perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the
RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever
deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular
election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to
hold any public office.83 Any public office that they may be holding
becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment. 84 The aforementioned
accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a
pardon.85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without
prejudice to a grant of probation, shouldthe trial court find them
eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon, 86 the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as
well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point in
Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing
defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of
probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal
penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the
paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with
her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon
Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is
not even disqualified from running for a public office because the
accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for
the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation,
the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the
court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R.
Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning
G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr.,
and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding that
Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned
Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation
proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments
issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent
Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for
probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the
Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of
our Decision dated 1 February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and
one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first paragraph
thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisi6n correccional, as maximum."
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 9726. December 8, 1914. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARSON
TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
C. W O’Brien, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Corpus, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. LIBEL AND SLANDER; PUBLICATION; EDITOR, AUTHOR,
PROPRIETOR, MANAGER. — Section 6 of the Libel Law (Act No.
277) provides a punishment only for the "author, editor, or proprietor,"
for the publication of a libel in a newspaper. In the present case no
person was represented to be either the "author, the editor, or the
proprietor" of the newspaper in which the alleged libel was published.
The proof shows that the defendant was the "manager." There was not
a word of proof showing that as "manager" he was the author of the
article published or the editor or the proprietor of the newspaper. The
"manager" of a newspaper may be the author of the articles published
or the editor or the publisher of the newspaper. His exact relation to
the newspaper or publication is a matter of proof. He can not avoid
responsibility as the "author, editor, or proprietor" by using some other
term or word, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author, editor, or
proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper or
publication can not avoid responsibility by simply calling himself the
"manager" or "printer." He can not wear the toga of "author, editor, or
proprietor" and hide his responsibility by giving himself some other
name. While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper
are terms well defined, the particular words "author, editor, or
proprietor" are not material or important, further than they are words
which are intended to show the relation of the responsible party to the
publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or
denomination.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J. :
This was an action for criminal libel.
The complaint alleged:
"That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor,
being then and there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer,
and publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain
daily bilingual newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish
languages, and known as the ’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large
circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United
States and other countries in all of which both languages are spoken
and written, having as such the supervision and control of said
newspaper, did then and there willfully, feloniously, maliciously, and
with intent to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation of one
Ramon Sotelo as member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a
private individual, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and procure to be
composed, printed, edited, published, and circulated in said
newspaper’s issue of the above mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a
certain false and malicious defamation and libel in the English
language of and concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as
follows. :
"‘OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. —
CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOW CIVIL SUIT.
"‘Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of
the party after a family disagreement. Sensational statement sworn to.
Mystery of Calle O’Donnell fire solved and papers served.
"‘Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company.
"‘The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance.
"‘The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire.
"‘The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy
was a success.
"‘The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and
Eugenio Martin in connection with the fire that destroyed house No.
2157 Calle O’Donnell on April 4.
"‘The case in question is a sensational one to say .he least, and the
court is being petitioned to set aside the ruling and cite the parties to
show cause why they should not be cited to answer charges of
conspiracy to defraud.
"‘On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O’Donnell was
destroyed by fire. The house was insured for P5,000, the contents for
an additional P5,000, with the West of Scotland Insurance Association,
of which Lutz & Co. are the local agents, with an additional P1,500
with Smith, Bell & Co.
"‘The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the
agents of the insurance companies and the matter apparently dropped
from the records.
"‘Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out
which resulted in sensational statements to the effect that the
destruction of the property had been an act of incendiarism in order to
collect the insurance. Then there was an investigation started and it
resulted in sworn statements of the three persons above mentioned.
"‘Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the
sworn statements and the parties are cited to appear in court and show
cause.
"‘The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was
supposed to be in the house at the time of the conflagration and which
was paid for by the insurance agents, sworn statements having been
made that it was destroyed in the fire, was in a certain house in
Montalban, where it was identified upon the sworn statements of the
above mentioned. Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is
the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the
burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be
brought as well as against the original owners.
"‘Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was
seen last night and asked for a statement as to the case. Mr. Burke
refused to talk on the case and stated that when it came to trial it would
be time enough to obtain the facts.
"‘The present action came before the court on a motion of Attorney
Burke to set aside the judgment, which, in the original case, gave the
owners of the property judgment for the amount of the insurance.
"‘Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the
notarial returns to the same were made yesterday afternoon, the sworn
statements as to the burning of the house being in the hands of the
sheriff.
"‘It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil
proceedings instituted to recover the funds in the case entitled on the
court records, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the
west of Scotland Association, Limited, No. 10191 on the court records.
"‘It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs
in the recent suit brought against Ex Governor W. Cameron Forbes for
lumber supplied for his Boston home.’
"That in this article is contained the following paragraph. to wit:
"‘ . . .Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of
the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of
the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as
well as against the original owners,’ by which the said accused meant
to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and there
was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and so was
understood by the public who read the same; that the statements and
allegations made in said paragraph are wholly false and untrue, thus
impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of the said offended
party as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private
individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Contrary to law."
Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not
guilty, was tried, found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by
the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, to pay a fine of P200. From that
sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following
assignment of error:
"First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible
for and guilty of the alleged libel.
"Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the
proprietor and publisher of the ’Manila Daily Bulletin.’
"Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article was
libelous per se.
"Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while
finding that there was no malice.
"Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article
referred to attorney Ramon Sotelo.
"Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for
the plaintiffs in case No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published."
After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented
by the appellant, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first and
second assignments of error.
In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the
United States and England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a
crime here unless it is made so by law. Libel is made a crime here by
Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission. Said Act
(No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the
particular conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the
persons who may be guilty of such crime. In the present case the
complaint alleges that the defendant was, at the time of the publication
of said alleged article "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer,
publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual newspaper, etc., known as the
’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large circulation throughout the
Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries."
It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting
editor, proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher." From an
examination of said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides that:
"Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial
publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained
in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully
as if he were the author of the same."
By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who
may be liable for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that
it only provides for the punishment of "the author, editor, or
proprietor." It would follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that
the defendant in the present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor"
of the newspaper in which the libel was published, he can not be held
liable.
In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that — "No
person is represented to be either the ’author, editor, or proprietor.’"
That statement of the Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record.
There is not a word of proof in the record showing that the defendant
was either the "author, the editor, or the proprietor." The proof shows
that the defendant was the "manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted
of the crime charged against him, unless it is shown by the proof that
he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in some way directly
responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter
contained in said alleged libelous article. The prosecution presented
the newspaper, the "Manila Daily Bulletin," for the purpose of
showing the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the only
proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the
defendant had to the publication of the libel in question. From an
examination of the editorial page of said exhibit, we find that it shows
that the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the "Bulletin
Publishing Company," and that the defendant was its manager.
There is not a word of proof in the record which shows what relation
the manager had to the publication of said newspaper. We might, by a
series of presumptions and assumptions, conclude that the manager of
a newspaper has some direct responsibility with its publication. We
believe, however, that such presumptions and assumptions, in the
absence of a single letter of proof relating thereto, would be
unwarranted and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an
opportunity to present proof upon that question. Either because he had
no proof or because no such proof was obtainable, he presented none.
It certainly is not a difficult matter to ascertain who is the real person
responsible for the publication of a newspaper which is published daily
and has a wide circulation in a particular community. No question was
asked the defendant concerning his particular relation to the
publication of the newspaper in question. We do not desire to be
understood in our conclusions here as holding that the "manager" or
the "printer" may not, under certain conditions and proper proof, be
held to be the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. He may
denominate himself as "manager" or "printer" simply, and be at the
same time the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper. He can
not avoid responsibility by using some other term or word, indicating
his relation to the newspaper or the publication, when, as a matter of
fact, he is the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the same. His
real relation to the said publication is a matter of proof. The Solicitor-
General, in his brief, says that the defendant used the word "manager"
with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law places
the responsibility for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor, or
proprietor of any book, etc." Had the prosecuting attorney in the trial
of the cause believed that the defendant, even though he called himself
the "manager" was, in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of said
publication, he should have presented some proof supporting that
contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that
simply because a person connected with the publication of a
newspaper who calls himself the "manager" or "printer" may not, in
fact and at the same time, be the "author, editor, or proprietor." The
"author, editor, or proprietor" can not avoid responsibility for the
writing and publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself
the "manager" or the "printer" of a newspaper. That, however, is a
question of proof. The burden is upon the prosecution to show that the
defendant is, by whatever name he may call himself, in truth and in
fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. The courts
cannot assume, in the absence of proof, that one who called himself
"manager" was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor." We might
assume, perhaps, that the ’’manager" of a newspaper plays an
important part in the publication of the same by virtue of the general
signification of the word "manager." Men can not, however, be
sentenced upon the basis of a mere assumption. There must be some
proof. The word "manage" has been defined by Webster to mean "to
have under control and direction; to conduct; to guide; to administer;
to treat; to handle." Webster defines "manager" to be "one who
manages; a conductor or director; as, the manager of a theater." A
manager, as that word is generally understood, we do not believe
includes the idea of ownership. Generally speaking it means one who
is representing another as an agent. That being true, his powers and
duties and obligations are generally defined by contract. He may have
expressed as well as implied powers, but whatever his powers and
duties are they must be dependent upon the nature of the business and
the terms of his contract. There is no fixed rule which indicates
particularly and definitely his duties, powers and obligations. An
examination into the character of the business and the contract of his
employment must be made for the purpose of ascertaining definitely
what his duties and obligations are. His exact relation is always a
matter of proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution in a case like the
present, to show that whatever title, name or designation the defendant
may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of
the newspaper. If he was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor," he
can not escape responsibility by calling himself the "manager" or
"printer." It is the relation which he bears to the publication and not the
name or title which he has assumed, which is important in an
investigation. He can not wear the toga of author or editor and hide his
responsibility by giving himself some other name. While the terms
"author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined,
the particular words "author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or
important, further than that they are words which are intended to show
the relation of the responsible party to the publication. That relation
may as well exist under some other name or denomination.
For the foregoing reasons. therefore, there being no proof whatever in
the record showing that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or
the proprietor" of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower
court must be reversed, the complaint dismissed and the defendant
discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de officio. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 180016               April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito
Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification
the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
(1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral
Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private
complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to
casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the
same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence,
he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring
for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's
bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a
receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within
a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting
the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When
private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the
former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but
to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of
estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one
Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00;
one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-
baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of
Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency,
under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the
proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold,
said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to
defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from
complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to
his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the
proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the
accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the
amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone
testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense
presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized,
as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio
Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans
to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with
private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in
1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that
the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence
against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of
jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating
circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2)
MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS
MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the
amount of ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal
of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment
dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46,
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison
term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty
of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional
₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed
with this Court the present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE
LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING
ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS
VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY
DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE
OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE
RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED,
IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS
MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND
TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF
UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT
OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2)
VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH
HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND
APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST
THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to
object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently
established the designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime
charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive,
and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the
trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. 4 Petitioner is of the opinion that
the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He
now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive
issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the
trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked
as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records
show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in
court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that
petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the
prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having
signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were
offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the
formally defective Information filed against him. He contends that the
Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry
were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime
occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in
finding that the Information was substantially complete and in
reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in
the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true
that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the owner 6 and that the
time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading
of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule.
That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or
about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the
prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule
requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a
material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is
the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the
commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein
charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does
not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said
date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should
have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance
with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to
claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred
against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money
or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c)
that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party
on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand
by the offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court
disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was
able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he
gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items
with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this
transaction could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is
what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked
him where the items are and he promised me that he will pay these
amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him
partially or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was
demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. 11 The
specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query
as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that
demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The
appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form
of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a
written demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise,
the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired
about the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was
tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to
the existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that
failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however,
be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at
bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was
able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private
complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the
proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed
to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period
despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the
latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is
questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule
that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment
on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which
merely rely on the records of the case. 15 The assessment by the trial
court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. 16 Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their
testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence,
the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was
deliberating on this case, the question of the continued validity of
imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up.
The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the
money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code.
Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this
question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to
refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution.
Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to
give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that
graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey
M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later
heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L.
Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the
matter, this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the
value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be
remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching
upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however,
does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be
repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of
excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act
which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of
penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. 18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts
bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds
it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is
not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by
law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first
except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law
but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The
remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the
execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the
reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to
provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 19 Guillermo B.
Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to
report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to
be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla
poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except
those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does
not deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction,
the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the
execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All
that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the
Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. 20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired
Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina
C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code, 21 echoed the
above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian
principle that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the
courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties
fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon
conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not
severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law
may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of
the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty
falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual
punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief
Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against
property be based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is
equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would
result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the
penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if
the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be
adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC,
a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be
so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier
cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the
present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject
penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we know,
the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the
further commission of those punishable acts which have increased
tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those
who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original
minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature
lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered
the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act
may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the
present penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the
proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the
provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but
does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos
but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but
does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value
does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is
committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the
next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed
5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the
five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50
pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the
offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the
difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his
family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-
provision states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the
penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years
and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty
imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law,
the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the
minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum
period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender
qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period
and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the
minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum
period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period
under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty
imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in
the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of
the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the
crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum
amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be
imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no
longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the
thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would
be modified but the penalties are not changed:
1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to
₱2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor
medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to
₱1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional medium and to
prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).24
3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional
medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum
(2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum
to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would
also be modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to
₱2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to
₱1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision
correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). 26
3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional
minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our
esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under
Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 27 which has
four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does
not rest on substantial distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been
substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first
requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa
involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however,
this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals ₱142,000.00
would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of
millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates
requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing
conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no DEAN DIOKNO:
longer exist today.
....then....
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and
declares the incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for JUSTICE PERALTA:
violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that
should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the
crime exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as
questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to
exercise their inherent power to legislate laws. DEAN DIOKNO:

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the No, Your Honor.
IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
xxxx
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of
JUSTICE PERALTA: Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be DEAN DIOKNO:
struck down as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
No, Your Honor.
DEAN DIOKNO:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and
unusual punishment. The Court cannot do that.

JUSTICE PERALTA: DEAN DIOKNO:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the Could not be.
amount is more than Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
DEAN DIOKNO:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the
incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void
should be filled by Congress. DEAN DIOKNO:

JUSTICE PERALTA: Yes, Your Honor.

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos ...
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of
Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in
additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right? excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory Yes, Your Honor.
interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Ah ...
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the
law...
Thank you.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
x x x x29

But if we de ... (interrupted)

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v.
Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme
Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional
provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of
the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three
things must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a
specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense,
and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed
on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious
crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and
(3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present
case, because in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the
penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into
account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for
uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for
the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00
fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist
statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual
antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that
the imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the
rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic
servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will
essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by
her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member
of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and
safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent
betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of
imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful
acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment
are dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by
adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For example,
in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the
amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not
exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than
six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but
is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property
embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government
loses money due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following
the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00 (under the existing
law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act
of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by
public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section
3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally
defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to
15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This
should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public
official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or
property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force
upon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing
unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the
penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty
of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage
caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we
increase the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the
ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the
thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in
entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the
crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this
kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00
now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with
violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty.
Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished
with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the
intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it
is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but
likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the
highest penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the
damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of
the damage will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable
by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of
the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto
menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
more than ₱200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or
cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become
₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under the
existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under
this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature
despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony
penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC. 33 Unless
we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications
on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision,
either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally
feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that
may also be affected by the proposal, such as those that impose
imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the
damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the
National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of
real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313
(Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of
swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other
deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article
331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings).
Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such
as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar
offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer),
Article 218 (Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article
219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before
leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It
will also affect crimes which are punishable by special penal laws,
such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering,
collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without
license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of
qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal
Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is,
again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in
the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft,
will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far
as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on
Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative
because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and Special Laws, and other related provisions of these
laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine
its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law
that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to
conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code
by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties
imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of
the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public
hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due
proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the
questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which
will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend
the Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the
Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now
pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal
Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to
archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political,
socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s
conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in
such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it
should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the
law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its
terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give
effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its
intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from
encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the
Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of
the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a
penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when
appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter;
such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability
not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his
death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants
of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as
a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the
damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which
in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity.
Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to
pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of
civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be
contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken
which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain
crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity
awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would
sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from
Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards
of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a
ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 39 of the
Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be
awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of
moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long
as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the
offense committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all
penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not
they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that
should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply
the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other
interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio
Carpio’s opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should be
declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the
penalty corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the
actual amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however,
from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of
Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A
conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when
every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties
different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic
twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs
counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the
dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue
of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been
questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more
cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was
re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No.
9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on
the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of
Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was
through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death
penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of
the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court
cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty
emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative
of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties
were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is
settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly
and not collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the
issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount,
and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as
cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be
in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, determined utilizing all of those economic terms.
disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be
within the prohibition.44 JUSTICE PERALTA:

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or Yeah, but ...
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that
the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it
cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to PROFESSOR TADIAR:
come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass
shock the moral sense of the community."45 upon and peg the value to One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend JUSTICE PERALTA:
the law and adapt it to our modern time.
Yeah.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely
adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value of PROFESSOR TADIAR:
money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors
and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and
deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and ... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be JUSTICE PERALTA:
painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a
wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing
That is legislative in nature.
law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks
sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies
and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. PROFESSOR TADIAR:
This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even
Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit: That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

xxxx JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA: Yeah, okay.

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine PROFESSOR TADIAR:
the value of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to
PROFESSOR TADIAR: adjust, to make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the
legislature.
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Per capita income.
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
JUSTICE PERALTA: Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to
dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in
order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should
Consumer price index.
not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but
consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for
PROFESSOR TADIAR: inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into
consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in
Yeah. circumstances" in its decisions.

JUSTICE PERALTA: Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving
into the validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different
from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons,
Inflation ... which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like
in the case of People v. Pantoja. 47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code
PROFESSOR TADIAR: mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.
Yes.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief
JUSTICE PERALTA: Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to
prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as
extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the
factors? Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to
civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which
PROFESSOR TADIAR: is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is
truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the
value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is
silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged
the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is
not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA
modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in
its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each
additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in
Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code provides:
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its
primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt
Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws.
While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial
fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on
prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November
5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently,
the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5,
2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph
(b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum,
to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: Decision be furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Department of Justice.
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the
12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 SO ORDERED.
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not

three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the
division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of
time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of
the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum,
medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión

correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided
into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be
deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 50 of the
RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which
exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be
within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year
shall be added to the penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00
defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total
penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than

the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each
additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and
21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7
years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8
years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty

prescribed by law for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next
lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods.

G.R. No. 217874
OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolution1 dated February 2, 2015 and Decision 2 dated November 13,
2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed, with
modification, the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 7, Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crime
of malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 15722-R.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC), Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served as an
accounting clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the position
of Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as
cashier, disbursement and collection officer. 3 As such, petitioner
received cash and other collections from customers and clients for the
payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special message fees.
The collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the
DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City
Branch.4
On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA), conducted a cash examination of the
accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by her superior, Sherelyn
Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit slips dated September
19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of ₱11,300.00
and ₱81,348.20, rcspectively.5 Upon close scrutiny, she noticed that
said deposit slips did not bear a stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it
machine validated. Suspicious about what she found, she and Narag
verified all the reports and other documents turned-over to them by
petitioner.6 On the basis of said findings, Narag sent a letter to the LBP
to confirm the remittances made by petitioner. After adding all the
deposits made and upon checking with the teller's blotter, Nadelline
Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no deposits were made
by petitioner for the account of DOTC on September 19, 1996 for the
amount of ₱11,300.00 and November 29, 1996 for the amount of
₱81,340.20.7
Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez,
instructed the bank's teller, Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct their own
independent inquiry. It was discovered that on September 19, 1996,
the only deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao
office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP.8 This prompted Lopez to
write to petitioner informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances
were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that
petitioner duly accounted for the ₱81,348.20 remittance but not for the
₱11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the
whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the
COA Regional Director who, in turn wrote to the LBP for
confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit
on September 19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the
DOTC.9 Thus, the COA demanded that she pay the said amount.
Petitioner, however, refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint
for malversation of public funds against petitioner with the Office of
the Ombudsman for Luzon which, after due investigation,
recommended her indictment for the loss of
₱11,300.00.10 Accordingly, petitioner was charged before the RTC of
Baguio City in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honourable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer,
being then the Disbursing Officer of the Department of Transportation
and Communications, Baguio City, and as such an accountable officer,
entrusted with and responsible for the amount of ₱1 1,300.00 which
accused received and collected for the DOTC, and intended for deposit
under the account of DOTC with the Land Bank of the Philippines-
Baguio City, by reason of her position, while in the performance of her
official functions, taking advantage of her position, did then and there,
wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully misappropriate or consent, or
through abandonment or negligence, permit other persons to take such
amount of ₱11,300.00 to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of two
(2) COA auditors, namely, Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as well as
three (3) LBP employees, namely, Rebecca Sanchez, Catalina Ngaosi,
and Nadelline Orallo.12 In response, the defense presented the lone
testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia Paraiso,
went to the LBP Baguio branch and personally deposited the exact
amount of ₱11,300.00 with accomplished deposit slips in six (6)
copies.13 Since there were many clients who came ahead of her, she
decided to go with her usual arrangement of leaving the money with
the teller and telling her that she would just come back to retrieve the
deposit slip. Thus, she handed the money to Teller No. 2, whom she
identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her return at around 3 o'clock in
the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies of the deposit slip from
Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no acknowledgment mark on it.
Being contented with the initials of the teller on the deposit slips, she
returned to her office and kept them in her vault. It was only during the
cash count conducted by auditor Lopez when she found out that the
said amount was not remitted to the account of the LBP. When
demand was made on her to return the amount, she requested that she
be allowed to pay only after investigation of a complaint of Estafa that
she would file with the National Bureau of Investigation against some
personnel of the bank, particularly Catalina Ngaosi. 14 The complaint,
however, was eventually dismissed.15
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered convicting accused Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and
hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision
mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days
of prision mayor as maximum period to reclusion temporal maximum
period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱11,300.00.
Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification.
Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to the
government the amount of ₱11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of the filing of
the Information up to the time the same is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.16
Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon
motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it
has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
petitioner occupying a position lower than Salary Grade
27.17 Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen,
then appealed the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated
November 13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's judgment
of conviction but modified the penalty imposed, the dispositive
opinion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that the indeterminate
penalty to be imposed on the accused should be from 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days
of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties
under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only
6% shall be imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to be restored by
the accused.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21,
2009 alleging that during the trial before the RTC, her counsel was
unable to elicit many facts which would show her innocence. Said
counsel principally failed to present certain witnesses and documents
that would supposedly acquit her from the crime charged. The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the motion in a Resolution dated
August 31, 2010 on the ground that evidence not formally offered
before the court below cannot be considered on appeal. 19
On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration became final and executory and was recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgments. 20 On July 26, 2013, petitioner's new
counsel, Atty. Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen
the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the
Execution.21 In a Resolution22 dated December 4, 2013, however, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the execution of the
judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the following
requisites for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be before
finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the
judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only
after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or
further evidence should be terminated within thirty (30) days from the
issuance of the order.23
Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of
the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying for a
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent Resolution, that the
case be reopened for further reception of evidence, and the recall of
the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013. 24 In a Resolution dated
February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the petition for lack of
merit. According to the said court, the motion is clearly a third motion
for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a rehash of those
raised in the two previous motions. The claims that the accused could
not contact her counsel on whom she merely relied on for appropriate
remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has additional evidence
to present, were already thoroughly discussed in the August 31, 2010
and December 4, 2013 Resolutions. Moreover, the cases relied upon
by petitioner are not on point.25
On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the
following arguments:
I.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS FILED OUT OF TIME
CONSIDERING TI-IE EXTRAORDINARY AND EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE.
II.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER
SHOULD HER MOTTON FOR REOPENING BE GRANTED, WAS
PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING
THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND THE PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER ARE
CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND THIRD MOTIONS TO
THE DENIAL OF THE DECISION.
Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received
the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying her
Motion for Reconsideration. This is because notice thereof was
erroneously sent to said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La
Trinidad, Benguet, despite the fact that it was specifically indicated in
the Motion for Reconsideration that the new office is at the Public
Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan, following her counsel's
appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her counsel was not
properly notified of the subject resolution, the entry of judgment is
premature.26 In support of her assertion, she cites Our ruling in People
v. Chavez,27 wherein We held that an entry of judgment without receipt
of the resolution is premature.
Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the
necessary evidence for her defense due to the fact that the odds were
against her. Because of this, she asks the Court to relax the strict
application of the rules and consider remanding the case to the lower
court for further reception of evidence. 28 In particular, petitioner seeks
the reception of an affidavit of a certain John L. Ziganay, an
accountant at the Depaiiment of Science and Technology (DOST), who
previously worked at the DOTC and COA, as well as two (2) deposit
slips. According to petitioner, these pieces of evidence would show
that the ₱11,300.00 deposited at the Lagawe branch of the LBP was
actually the deposit made by petitioner and not by a certain Lanie
Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests. This is because the
₱11,300.00 deposit made by Cabacungan consists of two (2) different
amounts, which, if proper accounting procedure is followed, shall be
recorded in the bank statement as two (2) separate amounts and not
their total sum of ₱11,300.00.29 Thus, the Sandiganbayan's denial of
petitioner's motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and
whimsical since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent
a miscarriage.
Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion to
reopen and petition for reconsideration are considered as a second and
third motion for reconsideration, and are thus, prohibited pleadings.
This is because the additional evidence she seeks to introduce were not
available during the trial of her case.
The petition is devoid of merit.
At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent Office
of the Special Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an improper
remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available,
a party aggrieved by a cou1i order, resolution or decision must first
correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he
intends to assail.30 It bears stressing that the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 31 If
the Order or Resolution sought to be assailed is in the nature of a final
order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise,
the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.32 Petitioner, in the instant case, seeks to assail the
Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated December 4, 2013 and February 2,
2015 wherein said court denied her motion to reopen the malversation
case against her. Said resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose
the proceedings completely. The instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 is, therefore, improper.
Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the
Court still cannot grant the reliefs she prays for, specifically: (1) the
reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December 4, 2013 and February 2,
2015 Resolutions denying her motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration; (2) the reopening of the case for further reception of
evidence; and (3) the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26,
2013.33
First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel
was not properly notified of the August 31, 2010 Resolution as notice
thereof was erroneously sent to her old office address, the entry of
judgment is premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner has no one but
herself to blame. Time and again, the Court has held that in the
absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the
parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record. 34 It
is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system for the
receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to
inform the court officially of a change in his address. 35 If counsel
moves to another address without informing the court of that change,
such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the finality of
the decision. The court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of
the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own
whether or not the counsel of record has been changed and who the
new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or holds
office.36
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the
court of the change in her office address from Poblacion, La Trinidad,
Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in Tayug, Pangasinan. The
fact that said new address was indicated in petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration does not suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to
the court. As previously stated, courts cannot be expected to take
notice of every single time the counsel of a party changes address.
Besides, it must be noted that petitioner even expressly admitted
having received the subject resolution "sometime in September or
October 2010."37 Easily, she could have informed her counsel of the
same. As respondent posits, it is not as if petitioner had no knowledge
of the whereabouts of her counsel considering that at the time of the
filing of her Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel was already
with the PA0.38 Moreover, the Court cannot permit petitioner's reliance
on the Chavez case because there, petitioner did not receive the
resolution of the Court of Appeals through no fault or negligence on
his paii.39 Here, however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject
resolution was mainly attributable not only to her counsel's negligence
but hers, as well. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to remind
litigants, who are represented by counsel, that they should not expect
that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their
case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel for
what is at stake is their interest in the case. It is, therefore, their
responsibility to check the status of their case from time to time. 40
To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for
Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the Sandiganbayan's November
13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's ruling convicting her of
the crime of malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Said
resolution became final in the absence of any pleading filed thereafter,
and hence, was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on June
26, 2013. Subsequently, on July 12, 2013, petitioner, through her new
counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of
Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution, which was denied
through the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated December 4,
2013.41 Undeterred, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration
with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for
the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was
likewise denied in the Sandiganbayan's February 2, 2015 Resolution.
It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3)
year period from the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration to act
upon the malversation case against her through the filing of her urgent
motion to reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion may very well be
prompted only by her realization that the case has finally concluded by
reason of the entry of judgment. Stated otherwise, the Court is under
the impression that had she not heard of the recording of the August
31, 2010 Resolution in the Book of Entries of Judgments on June 26,
2013, petitioner would not even have inquired about the status of her
case. As respondent puts it, the urgent motion to reopen appears to
have been filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal via a
petition for review on certiorari before the Court.42 On this
inexcusable negligence alone, the Court finds sufficient basis to deny
the instant petition.
Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her
motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since
the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage has
no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing
jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the reopening
a case: (l) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or
upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
(4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the
presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
within thirty days from the issuance of the order.43
But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that
the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction
already cripples the motion.1âwphi1 The records of the case clearly
reveal that the August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become
final and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry
Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Moreover, petitioner's supposed
predicament about her former counsel failing to present witnesses and
documents should have been advanced before the trial court. 44 It is the
trial court, and neither the Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which
receives evidence and rules over exhibits formally offered. 45 Thus, it
was, indeed, too late in the day to advance additional allegations for
petitioner had all the opportunity to do so in the lower court. An
appellate court will generally not disturb the trial court's assessment of
factual matters except only when it clearly overlooked certain facts or
where the evidence fails to substantiate the lower court's findings or
when the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 46
Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the
Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner
when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen especially in view of the
fact that the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound and
appropriately based on the evidences presented by the parties. On this
score, the elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public
officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were
public funds or prope1iy for which he was accountable; and (4) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails
to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal
uses.47
As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner's defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia
Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject ₱11,300.00 deposit to
the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the money
went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one, Paraiso was
never presented to corroborate her version. For another, when
questioned about the subject deposit, not only did petitioner fail to
make the same readily available, she also could not satisfactorily
explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation, all that
is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable
officer had received public funds, that she did not have them in her
possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could not
satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.48 Thus, even if it is assumed
that it was somebody else who misappropriated the said amount,
petitioner may still be held liable for malversation. The Comi quotes,
with approval, the trial court's ruling, viz.:
Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount
of ₱11,300.00 and the corresponding deposit slip with the Bank
Teller Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the deposit slip later,
is to be believed and then it came out that the said ₱11,300.00 was
not credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank and was
in fact missing, still accused Hernan should be convicted of
malversation because in this latter situation she permits through
her inexcusable negligence another person to take the money. And
this is still malversation under Article 217.49
Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its
Decision, thus:
Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina
Ngaosi who misappropriated the amount and should therefore be held
liable, as the accused would want to poltray, the Court doubts the
tenability of that position. As consistently ruled by jurisprudence, a
public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not
use public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit,
but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. The accused, by
her negligence, simply created the opportunity for the
misappropriation. Even her justification that her deposits which
were not machine-validated were nonetheless acknowledged by the
bank cannot fortify her defense. On the contrary, it all the more
emphasizes her propensity for negligence each time that she
accepted deposit slips which were not machinevalidated, her only
proof of receipt of her deposits. 50
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's
finding that petitioner's motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration are practically second and third motions for
reconsideration from its Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under the
rules, the motions are already prohibited pleadings under Section 5,
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court due to the fact that the grounds raised in
the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash of those raised in
the two (2) previous motions filed before it. These grounds were
already thoroughly discussed by the Sandiganbayan in its subject
resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the Sandiganbayan, in the law of
pleading, courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the
substance, not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a
pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the court
should be guided by its averments. 51 Thus, the fact that the pleadings
filed by petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with
Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay Execution and Petition for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of
the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment does not exempt them
from the application of the rules on prohibited pleadings.
Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is
grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and
the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some
definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render
its execution unjust and inequitable. 52 None of the exceptions is
present in this case.
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes
final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right
to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his
case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the
"life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the
losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the
courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to
this litigation.53
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary
to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June
26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of evidence,
however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the penalty
imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the
land. When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may
sit en bane and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance
warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability. The same is
in line with Section 3(c),55 Rule II of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of law are
acted upon by the Court en bane. To the Court, the recent passage of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount
or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based
and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for
the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal
Code" as Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable
to the crime charged herein is an example of such exceptional
circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides:
SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act.
No. 1060, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
malversation docs not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00).
xxxx
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property
embezzled.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel
situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner
herein, has already become final and executory and yet the penalty
imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law.
Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified
respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the
sentencing being favorable to the accused, 56 she may even apply for
probation,57 as long as she does not possess any ground for
disqualification,58 in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A.
No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968,
otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As
Amended. allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event that
she is sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of not
more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction imposing a
non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment
is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty. 59
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may
suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the
Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of
Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed
the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount
involved herein is ₱11,300.00, which does not exceed ₱40,000.00, the
new penalty that should be imposed is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2)
years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years. The Court,
however, takes note of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender appreciated by the Sandiganbayan in favor of
petitioner.60 Hence, taking into consideration the absence of any
aggravating circumstance and the presence of one (1) mitigating
circumstance, the range of the penalty that must be imposed as the
maximum term should be prision correccional medium to prision
correccional maximum in its minimum period, or from two (2) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day, to three (3) years, six (6) months,
and twenty (20) days, in accordance with Article 64 61 of the RPC.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the minimum
term that should be imposed upon petitioners is anywhere within the
period of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum
with a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and
four (4) months. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20)
days prision correccional, as maximum.
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private
counsels, and such other officers of the law are hereby advised to
similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by
reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case.
Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the
imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft,
estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief,
malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent
upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been
reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence
of existing circumstances attending its commission. For as long as it is
favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find application
regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the
judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has
already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be
entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser
sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous
sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the
modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the
interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing
of an action before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case
rather than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.
Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of
the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and
favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the
reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is
to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties
to be imposed.
Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and
Correctional Institution for Women are hereby ordered to determine if
there are accused serving final sentences similarly situated as the
accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and
communicate with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to
represent and file the necessary pleading before this Court in behalf of
these convicted accused in light of this Court's pronouncement; (2) For
those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive
imprisonment, either the cases against them are non-bailable or cannot
put up the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the old law,
their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary
pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing trial in the RTC
or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply for bail, for
their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where the accused are
undergoing preventive imprisonment pending trial or appeal, their
respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary pleading if
the accused have already served the minimum sentence of the crime
charged against them based on the penalties imposable under the new
law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate release in accordance with
A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC or the Guidelines For Decongesting Holding
Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of Accused Persons To Bail And To
Speedy Trial; 62 and (4) Lastly, all courts, including appellate courts,
are hereby ordered to give priority to those cases covered by R.A. No.
10951 to avoid any prolonged imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED. The Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision
dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum term, to three (3) years, six (6) months,
and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum term.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for dissemination to the First and Second Level
courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the appellate courts, the
Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public
Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the
National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance, and
appropriate action.
Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines,
and the House of Representatives, be furnished copies of this Decision
for their information.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169364               September 18, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE
SAGARANO y MEFANIA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even
as Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven composed music, or
Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so well that all the
hosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to say, here lived a great street
sweeper who did his job well.
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005
Order1 of Branch 11, Davao City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil
Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents’ Petition for Certiorari
and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code
unconstitutional.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were
charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18, 2003,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003
and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao
City. The Informations, read:
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City,
without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable
purpose.2
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are
vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the
physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to
some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or
places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets
without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame;
ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other
articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or
uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or
justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit,
habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles
shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos,
and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from
200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents
filed separate Motions to Quash 3 on the ground that Article 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
In an Order4 dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the
motions and directed respondents anew to file their respective counter-
affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on
vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power and
justified by the Latin maxim "salus populi est suprem(a) lex," which
calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the
greater number, thus:
Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the
State. An authority on police power, Professor Freund describes
laconically police power "as the power of promoting public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." (Citations
omitted). In fact the person’s acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by
the police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin
maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex" (the god of the people is the
Supreme Law). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to
the interests of the greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit of the
arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex "A" lucidly
shows that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the
reports that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the
two accused (among other women) were wandering and in the wee
hours of night and soliciting male customer. Thus, on that basis the
prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case. Thus, in the
interest of substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be
given their day in Court: the prosecution proof of the crime, and the
author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the accused in the
indictment can’t be categorized as a crime.5
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting
police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior
surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be
frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors.
Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the
crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence.1avvphi1
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, 6 directly
challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming
that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart
from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of
violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage
persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They
likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection
clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor
and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification.
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that
pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,7 the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases
and not to penal statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be
presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to
overcome this presumption.
On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order
granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the
instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of
the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared unconstitutional and the
Order of the court a quo, dated April 28, 2004, denying the petitioners’
Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to dismiss
the subject criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.
SO ORDERED.8
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that
the law is vague and it violated the equal protection clause. It held that
the "void for vagueness" doctrine is equally applicable in testing the
validity of penal statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville,9 where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, the trial
court ruled:
The U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for striking down the
Jacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance are equally applicable to paragraph
2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being "found
loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support" offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to
who should be arrested and who should not.
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes
particularly in these times of recession when there are many who are
"without visible means of support" not by reason of choice but by
force of circumstance as borne out by the high unemployment rate in
the entire country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly
no other reason than the fact that he cannot find gainful employment
would indeed be adding insult to injury.10
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection
clause of the Constitution, the trial court declared:
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our
situation at present runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the
constitution as it offers no reasonable classification between those
covered by the law and those who are not.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which
are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe
penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.
Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code offers no guidelines or any
other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visible
means of support by force of circumstance and those who choose to
loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy
legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality. 11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE12
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality;
that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,13 the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only
and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that
respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute,
failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by the
Courts; and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the
promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police power.
On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of
the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. They insist that Article 202
(2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due
process and the equal protection of the laws; that the due process
vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness
doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and
void on its face; and that the presumption of constitutionality was
adequately overthrown.
The Court finds for petitioner.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties
is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state
to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature
may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and
lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been
abridged.14 However, in exercising its power to declare what acts
constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with
reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may
have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is
his duty to avoid.15 This requirement has come to be known as
the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."16
17
In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,  the Court recognized the
application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in
appropriate cases. The Court therein held:
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the
dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a
long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a
facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant
Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections
10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 – the provisions upon which
petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering
provisions which are alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to
the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory. 18
The first statute punishing vagrancy – Act No. 519 – was modeled
after American vagrancy statutes and passed by the Philippine
Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in
force in this country up to December 31, 1931 did not contain a
provision on vagrancy.19 While historically an Anglo-American
concept of crime prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by the
Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised Penal
Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. – The following are
vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the
physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to
some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or
places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets
without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame;
ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other
articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or
uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or
justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit,
habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article
shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos,
and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from
200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which
defines a vagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-
public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country
or the streets without visible means of support. This provision was
based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined
"vagrant" as "every person found loitering about saloons or
dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the
country without visible means of support." The second clause was
essentially retained with the modification that the places under which
the offense might be committed is now expressed in general terms –
public or semi-public places.
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of
Article 202 (2), take support mainly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville 20 case, which in
essence declares:
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is
that "[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U.
S. 453.
Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the
law give fair notice of the offending conduct. See Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81.
In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where
the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed.
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States
v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.
The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in
business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws;
and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning
and impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from being
caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent
to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91;
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra.
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by
modern standards, are normally innocent. "Nightwalking" is one.
Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night's
wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the "habitual"
wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, "common night walkers."
We know, however, from experience that sleepless people often walk
at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.
Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once
that "loafing" was a national virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it
should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.
xxxx
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been
extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The qualification
"without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for innocent acts.
Persons "neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their
time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or
served" would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city
clubs.
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a
burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be "casing" a place for a holdup.
Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally
of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for
numerous crimes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the
amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in
the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities
have been, in part, responsible for giving our people the feeling of
independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These
amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the
right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They
have encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating
silence.
xxxx
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one
in this ordinance, those convicted may be punished for no more than
vindicating affronts to police authority:
"The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of
human troubles before the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is
the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of
conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and
convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other
immediate solution." Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.
xxxx
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus
not on the lack of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of
the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville
police. Caleb Foote, an early student of this subject, has called the
vagrancy-type law as offering "punishment by analogy." Such crimes,
though long common in Russia, are not compatible with our
constitutional system.
xxxx
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or
frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their
wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future
criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption
in these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in
the bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course,
vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets
making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law
implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the
Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that
even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law,
evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well
as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together. 21
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed
Jacksonville ordinance "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute;"
and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of
discriminatory law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville
ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give fair notice of
what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because
under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.22 This principle is of Spanish origin, and we
adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under
American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that
admits of exceptions.23
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on
account of specific provisions thereof, which are not found in Article
202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance Code § 257) provided,
as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging;
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or
plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons
neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but
habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children
shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court
shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance
unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as nightwalking,
wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or
minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were
declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in
Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) – "any person found
loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping
or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support" – from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be "persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object." But these two acts are still not the same: Article
202 (2) is qualified by "without visible means of support" while the
Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling "without any
lawful purpose or object," which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court
to constitute a "trap for innocent acts."
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 24 Thus, as with any
other act or offense, the requirement of probable cause provides an
acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be
abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be
violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents,
echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands
of the police to make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the
constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than
certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility. 25
Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away
with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for, absent this
requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making
the arrest.26
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its
citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. The
constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an
impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It
protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against
unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from
being irreversibly cut off from that domestic security which renders
the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable. 27
As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities
have been conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents
prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause
requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved
by respondents’ trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a
source of police abuse in their case.
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has
ever been made upon the constitutionality of Article 202 except now.
Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks
become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-
your-car" boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers,
gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond
decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and parks
have become the training ground for petty offenders who graduate into
hardened and battle-scarred criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with
reports of innocent and hardworking people being robbed, swindled,
harassed or mauled – if not killed – by the scourge of the streets. Blue
collar workers are robbed straight from withdrawing hard-earned
money from the ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held
up for having to use and thus exhibit publicly their mobile phones;
frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent
passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the
streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed, if not
abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves, pickpockets and
snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the old are
swindled of their life savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con
artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester and panhandle
pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-
abiding drivers and citizens at risk of running them over. All these
happen on the streets and in public places, day or night.
The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having
to ply them each day, or else we can never say that we have performed
our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid the streets of the
scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency and
morality in them.
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202
(2) belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain minimum
standards of decency, morality and civility in human society. These
laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they
have also come to be associated with the struggle to improve the
citizens’ quality of life, which is guaranteed by our
Constitution.28 Civilly, they are covered by the "abuse of rights"
doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code
concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part, that any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.29 This provision is, together with the succeeding articles
on human relations, intended to embody certain basic principles "that
are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings
and for the stability of the social order."30
In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is
intended to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to
discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession
of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action
in court to assert their claims. 31 Any private person may abate a public
nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without
committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. 32
Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts – from
public indecencies and immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly
conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to
society’s basic sensibilities and their adverse effect on the quality of
life of the people of society. For example, the issuance or making of a
bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public
order that must be abated. 33 As a matter of public policy, the failure to
turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust
receipt or to return said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be
abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. 34 Thus, public nuisances
must be abated because they have the effect of interfering with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property by members of a
community.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither
does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of
public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or
unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances
as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered
constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes
persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which
orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a
justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the
community.
Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws
unconstitutional, the State should train its eye on their effective
implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives
difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets in the
wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their
trade in the trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens
late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets.
Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy
intersections. Prostitutes wait for customers by the roadside all around
the metropolis, some even venture in bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed
men loiter around dark avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens.
Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and establishments
for their next hit. The streets must be made safe once more. Though a
man’s house is his castle,35 outside on the streets, the king is fair game.
The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost,
Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. When
confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every
court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution
bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every
reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.36 The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is
based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each
department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments.
The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined
to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted.37
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is
vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. 38 As an obvious
police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a
constitutional light.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch
11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Special Civil Case No.
30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and
115,717-C-2003 thus continue.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN
DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents.
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily
denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection
and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were
led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan
de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to
Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private
respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No.
3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS
PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO
ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO
BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:
Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation
of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be
issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of
casino within the city limits.
Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by
any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business
establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for
casino operation and other gambling activities.
Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business
permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following
penalties, to wit:
a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first
offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day
b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second
offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of
One (1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses.
Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from
publication thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance
No. 3375-93 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO
AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990
against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another
Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of
CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance
No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel
existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and
allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of
CASINO;
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art.
99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local
Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall
enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and
general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity
pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and
moral welfare of the community;
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled
that:
Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan
de Oro is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the
following penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the
proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the operation,
conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure
thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1)
year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of
the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person
responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of
gambling CASINO.
Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its
publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it
was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals
declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to
prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was
denied on July 13, 1993. 2
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit the
establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the
City's territorial limits.
2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found
in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean
"illegal gambling."
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are
therefore invalid on that point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial
to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with
the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al.
v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in
disposing of the issues presented in this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help
centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land
and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court
sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits
of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-
earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of
Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is
empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local
Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under
what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:
Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The
Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city
as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient
and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose
appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places,
vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of
houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance,
fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug
addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate
properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of
the general welfare. 5
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos
because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the
people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the
Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local
government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not
only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue.
Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D.
1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to
prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to
it by the Local Government Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of
local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of
the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to
strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government
units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social
problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence
of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best
expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line
with the policies of the State.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the
local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other
prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and
roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would
have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and
other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have
easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local
government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling
within their territories, including the operation of casinos.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the
effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only
a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of
inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the
PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code
insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions,
pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect
of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in
the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local
government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the
lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful
and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of
this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the
vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper
upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the
old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the
immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869
(which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating
PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not
illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests
of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it
sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may
prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may
prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and
horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the
merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom,
morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary
but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments,
to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That
function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are
answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will
ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the
validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall
do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own
convictions on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the
following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government
Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less
than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such
games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the
section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a
word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we
conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with
"and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as
referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited
games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem
quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the
petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and
the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from
this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene
P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they
prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate
a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious
answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have
changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against
a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local
Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national
lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really
repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense
that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the
local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by
the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can
change or repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While
insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are
actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all
intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all
power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its
operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government
unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary
but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as
used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government
units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which
in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under
this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to
regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local
government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them
by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist
except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer
be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue
through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the
repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision
which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof
which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869
is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is
reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order
No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby
repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees,
orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning
the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939
regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No.
5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No.
144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741;
Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree
Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed
and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it
governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar
as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2,
16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,
73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16
of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly
presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed
on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law,
this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a
sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending
rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law
will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two
statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear
to each other the relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On
the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is
mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of
Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the
Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment
or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for
measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are
tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR
charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has
in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to
the fiscal problems of the government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute
against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must
exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws
deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of
the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869
and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the
other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This
is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem
at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all
kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be
read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of
gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized
gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal
gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the
Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the
distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear
indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following
this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as
authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San
Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at
the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in
question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate
P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the
public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain
games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status
of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use
of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy
motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not

contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place,
and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers
and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath
of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may
destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is
some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a
single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so
great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations
in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are
concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature. 11

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power
to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still
includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for
the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the
welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of
the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy gain,
obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and
that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v.
Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be
stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the
limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the
brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must
recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to
legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and
impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can
be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the
touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here.

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all

games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D.
1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which
empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those
forms of gambling prohibited by law.

.R. No. 225442
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN
(SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN
NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO
DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for
herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT
BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR
JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by
MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality
of the curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon
City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary
restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert
Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their
respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from
implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this
case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra
vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344, 2 or the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew
ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of
minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments
in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances
on minors through police operations which were publicly known as
part of "Oplan Rody."3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances
were respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa
Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled
"Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing
Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang
Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated
June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through
Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours
from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay
Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of
Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated
October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through
Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance
Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from
10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for
Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014
(Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances). 8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young adults and minors that
aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of
the rights and welfare of the youth and minors 10 - filed this present
petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;
and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in
rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In addition,
petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no
clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension
depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and
based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged
curfew violator.14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain
provisions indicating the activities exempted from the operation of the
imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with
evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover
the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why
minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the
legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. 15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass
the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for
employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their
purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during
curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral
welfare of children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance,
particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA
9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes
on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and
admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties
contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be
imposed on minors for curfew violations.21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to
impose curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose
them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the
rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists,
less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this
regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of
CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular
visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting
children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the
government can impose more reasonable
sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education
seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew,
and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether
or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this
case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition,
questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the
hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and
standing to warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the
concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that
were legally demandable and enforceable." 25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and
prohibition filed before the Court "are the remedies by which the grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be
determined under the Constitution." 27 It was explained that "[w]ith
respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed
not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,]
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of
the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC
Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 29 it was expounded that
"[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated
to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power
and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a
ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed
Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts'
expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew
Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and
Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the
ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the
provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of
parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila
Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA
9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on
minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse
of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the
law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. " 31 In light of the
foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition, although these governmental actions
were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies
to assail the constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments,
the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct
resort to this Court is justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first
be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction
with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the
Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct
invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set
out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is
of paramount importance and immediately affects the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people,"33 as in this case.
Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with
the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In
this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two (2)
requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional
or in the expanded setting - is the presence of an actual case or
controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical
or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent
jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction
under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely
requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it
is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual
justiciable controversy in this case given the evident clash of the
parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances
impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the
Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on
their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave
abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its
expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication,
considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until
the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported
threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or
hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the
determination of whether those assailing the governmental act have the
right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication.
[Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental
act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material - an
interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act- as
distinguished from being merely incidental or general." 41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance,
he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of
two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely
travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of
parents to rear their children. Related to the first is the purported
conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of
the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas
(Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's
right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the
petition was filed before this Court, 44 and, hence, a proper subject of
the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of
apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand,
petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua,
Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo)
admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore,
beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of
the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as
a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the
Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children as
they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s
and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been
infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father,
Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the
petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But
Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his
primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his
minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently,
has no legal personality to bring an action in court. 45 Even assuming
that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed
to allege that it was authorized by its members who were affected by
the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their
behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal
interest in the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing
only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel,
but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing
requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a
number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the
requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is
involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able
to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the
Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the
suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that
they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act."46
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of
juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is
this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right
of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is
also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to
regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly,
this case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore,
impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the
standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of
this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel
and of parents to rear their children, this Court must first tackle
petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for
vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void
for not containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves
the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out
their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in
these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark
Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that
the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders
based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily.
Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance
requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that
nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for
proof or identification of the child to show his age. 47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine
is improper, considering that they do not properly identify any
provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its
vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the
public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly.49 The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due
process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.
In one case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty,"
which may involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and
"substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process
uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so
obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its
prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication.
Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This
perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due
process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional
provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness." 50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement
parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert
any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit
or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of
enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the
implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of
policy that are best left for the political branches of government to
resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not
the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather,
petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled
enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that
allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular
conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that
ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because agents of
the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law
permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was
ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective
basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application
based on individual impressions and personal predilections. 52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous
standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but
rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected
minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any
vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down
under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no
sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is
true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these
parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the
prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing
ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases
supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew
Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344)
repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law. 53 Pursuant to
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, 54 minors caught
in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore,
covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that
"[c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites for the
validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary
implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in
conjunction with related statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and
Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may
therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew
Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of identification
establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of
the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done ethically and
judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard
these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the
erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void
for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their
Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the
rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard,
they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether
minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed
to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is
primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in
imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling. 57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's
policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children
(i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the
development of their moral character are characterized not only as
parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that parents are
not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their
children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority
conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the
State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually
grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation.
For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for
additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child
for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of
moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and
inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young
people into mature, socially responsible citizens." 59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children." 60 In Ginsberg v. New
York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing
of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our
Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not
only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier
"primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in
the upbringing of their children. 63 The rationale for the State's
deference to parental control over their children was explained by the
US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children
justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their
own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. But an additional and more
important justification for state deference to parental control over
children is that "the child is not [a) mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be
stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to
the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may
act to promote these legitimate interests." 66 Thus, "[i]n cases in
which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to
public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these
legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right
to control the upbringing of their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated
to support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties. State
authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary
to parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court
acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors,
viz. :
[Where minors are involved, the State acts as  parens patriae. To it
is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual
who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care
of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after
their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be
recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid
parents in the moral development of their children, 70 and, thus,
assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental
obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors,
especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to
the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and
others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility
for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed
to aid parents in their role of promoting their children's well-being. As
will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further
compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile
safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail
limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children.
Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience,
are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal
elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental
decisions during this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances
apply only when the minors are not - whether actually or
constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their
parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference
to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of
parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered
authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they
are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of
parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents'
prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without
parental accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this
respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of
discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force
parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their
minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to
bring up his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances
positively influence children to spend more time at home.
Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities
to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v.
City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the
city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew
would promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew
aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the
perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of
those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who
prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the
streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are
no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional
reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental
rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional
for violating the parents' right to rear their children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the
liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates
the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even
if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of
juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are other
less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest. 78 In
addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours.79
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed any
transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-
related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v.
AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained
that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases," 81 viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a
facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court,
that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it
marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;"
deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on
the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the
overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two
[(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression. "'85
In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was
opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of
overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern
Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due
process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of
overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of
free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to
examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental
right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely
from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. 89 It is
a right embraced within the general concept of liberty. 90 Liberty - a
birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion 91 and the
right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to
live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the
ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and
exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and religion. 93 The inter-relation of
the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly
rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech,
assembly, and association require one to move about, such movement
must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that
First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the
law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has
eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to
worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to
the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for
any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the
streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are
sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with
freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest
justify restrictions even if made against fundamental rights.
Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. 95 As the 1987
Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose limitations on the
exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are
provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the
promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime,
inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences
and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to
reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal
system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford
special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, 98 as amended, RA
977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA
9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603, 107 as
amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which
explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils
may prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be
warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew
ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local
authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew
ordinances (as what respondents have done in this case) and enforce
the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides
sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict
the minors' exercise of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to
minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this
Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those
of adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody of
another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the
State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent,
restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs
concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the
right to engage in gainful employment. 113 With respect to the right to
travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel
to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their
parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader
authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of
adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-
being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on the
minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not
generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications
for the differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These
are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature
manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child
rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally
are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to
adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and
their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental
to them. x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of
their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State
commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and
from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the
parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court
acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as
compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all
that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers
within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for
such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more
especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from
other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the
[streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately
designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether
against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious
scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the
primary use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers
for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work
or in other things, this difference may be magnified. 121 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the
minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on
reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial
scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications. 122 The strict
scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights,
but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on
gender and legitimacy. 124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all
other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal
system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny
test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized
that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that
the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not
trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny. 128 In Nunez v. City
of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews
implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether
strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that
rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that
the analysis of those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed,
however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus,
minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because
the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when
applicable, warrant differential analysis of the constitutional rights of
minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not
establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of
minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather,
the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state
has a compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors
than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in
regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe that
[a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on
minors' fundamental rights. x x x.
According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x
x.130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration
of the peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-
a-vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their
well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed
government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of proving
that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State
interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the
interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include
constitutionally declared policies. 133 This Court has ruled that
children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for
them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest of the
state for which some individual liberties must give way. 135 As
explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a
compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on
adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight
this compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their
welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate
objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors
during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce -
if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to
insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even
include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the
Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on
minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of
their proper care and guidance, education, and moral development,
which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become
vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school
youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of
notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private
roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups
without lawful purpose or justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal
that minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the
evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions
of city ordinances and national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate
the movement of minor children during night time by setting
disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their
development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children,
there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of
youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the
face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident
elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering
their nefarious activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer, 137 as regards the
information gathered by the City Council to support its passage of the
curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our
own eatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US
court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement
policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children
to make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left
unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its
curfew would materially assist its first stated interest-that of reducing
juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of
information from many sources, including records from
Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news
reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national
crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis of
such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping
unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a
safer community. The same streets may have a more volatile and
less wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on
the streets at night children face a series of dangerous and
potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use
narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into
membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could
be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal
influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as
adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the
point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their
home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its
curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with
criminal influences, the City was directly advancing its first
objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime. 138 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local
governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in
their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes
involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their
respective localities.139
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact
curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general
welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to
substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with
respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the
enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court
now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew
Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means
to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement
of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the
fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from
pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional
rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal
or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the
State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental
regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard
applies to regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom
to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious,
or civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be
narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the
minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights. 143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance
unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in
unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their
religion and to free speech.145 It observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone
Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic
Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant
Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New
[Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would
prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from
taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned
services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could
not even attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30
(which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to
repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of
many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in
an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the]
exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and
returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or
voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions,
this Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-
discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do
not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the
coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their
parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running
lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c)
night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment,
are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.;
and (d) those working at night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit:
(a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who
attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific
barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew
hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents,
guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those
involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors
from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve,
Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the
barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day,
Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday. 147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn
in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of
overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both
ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and
to travel at night from school or work.148 However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila
Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the
minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus,
unduly trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is
apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila
Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as
discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church
activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or
nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities;
thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears
stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations,
other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social,
emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not
exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew
during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits
minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang
gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario
depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the
minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively
curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for
minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to
voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble
and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage
in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason
to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during
curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's
compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at
night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These
legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable
relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not
narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited
exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely
stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially
determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are
inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental
rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely
ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite
the presence150 of any separability clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2)
ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional
rights. It provides the following exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following
circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony,
religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their
school or organization wherein their attendance are required or
otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable
to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as
verified by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation
such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law
enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity,
or going to or returning home from the same place of employment
activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied
by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official
school, religious, recreational, educational, social, community or
other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
school, or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or
when the minor is going to or returning home from such activity,
without any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or that
he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions
under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to
sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items
uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both
official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or
church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by
these items given that the minors' attendance in the official
activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the
curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free
exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City
Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even during
curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows
the minor-participants to move to and from the places where these
activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the
Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised
activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who
publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger
is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes
his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate
activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely
observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case,
parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should
be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense.
As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this
exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic
premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary
to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes,
the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing
judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors
who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due
to their incapability to fully understand the import and consequences
of their actions. In one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is
on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are
as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years
deserve its protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of
full rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State's
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile
crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City
Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions
and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no
way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful
exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or
modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the
regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this
case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it
was raised - to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in
relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s
or guardian under Section 8 thereof, 154 does not impose any penalty on
the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor,
along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty
and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or
guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in
addition to the fine imposed therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila
Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the
age and frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth
violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction
shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth offender and
ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising
parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18)
years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a
warning about the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent
violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment
of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by
the PunongBarangay with the office of the City
Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly
impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community . service; (b)
reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d)
imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status
offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense
or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered
an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by
local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as but
not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-
smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited
to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy,
littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection
of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said
violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to
any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody
of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as
a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The
ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as
counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the
parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment
of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar
conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized
(i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition
of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without
penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer
usually in the form of imprisonment or fine"; 158 "[p ]unishment
imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate
or negligent act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction -
such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or
privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law." 160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean
that all the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are
without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local
governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such
as community-based programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of
the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a
valid form of intervention program that a local government (such as
Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to
promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service
programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they
promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and
social stigma caused by jail detention.
In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and
compliance with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give
them the opportunity to become productive members of society and
thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their
community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise
consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a
formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the
minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or
friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or
oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n
authoritatively issued warning or censure"; 164 while the Philippine Law
Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke,
warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an
expression of authoritative advice or warning." 165 Notably, the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning
or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based
programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not
punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and
conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally
inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what
actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand
and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the
minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal
reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of
lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice
law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and
formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by
his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a
warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and
public pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation
committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to
sternly warn the erring individual including the public against
repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject
the erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp
disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence
explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty, 170 hence, prohibited by
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute
penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws
and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and
unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on
children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus,
for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on
minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila
Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language
of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the
other hand, the impositions of community service programs and
admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute
penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have
passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State
has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the
Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides
for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the
Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable
minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the
prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the
State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to
include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment
and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner
of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local
government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared
unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City
Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance
with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's
penal provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on
minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence,
following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the
law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court
hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government
of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local
government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of
2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148560               November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full

fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast
powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he
draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond
which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity"
must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social
interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and
liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in
enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold
fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or

collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the

State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity
and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate
a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom
and inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic

collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a
new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the
imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process,
the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured,
enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular
and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as
the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its
members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably
followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority
that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be

prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that
the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the
Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to
due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner

to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2
and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,

business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise
or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised
Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime
of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim.
Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659;
(b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs.
3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 ( Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No.
26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees);
(d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal
Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias
(CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand
of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with
respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim.
Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to
prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under
which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for
the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim.
Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based
was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information
for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the
Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5)
days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18
September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for
certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
(b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate
crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to
due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is
a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the
validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is
the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection
for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden
for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based
on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch -
the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly
rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of
the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what
is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in
determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the
fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act
with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being
a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly
possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as long
as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality
of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided
on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not
sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe
environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and
palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must
be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental
law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily
on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can
be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded,
will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to
sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and
well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine
the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c)
by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by
establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by
taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least ₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that
would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes
is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of
acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of
the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of
the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB,
Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,'
together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of
R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES
BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS,
BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION,
OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF
FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-
accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda
T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS
OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(₱130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO
HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise
tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.
7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie
'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES &
JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL
GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS,
MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,102,965,607.50) AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION
SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF
SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT
IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-
PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as
there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that
the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key
phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two
1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These acts.
omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination,
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
due process.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not
rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining two.
them;6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the REP. GARCIA: A series.
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to
so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we
the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes.
That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the
words "combination" and "series:" REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two
combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to misappropriations....
obscure individual characters.
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one combination. Series.
after another in spatial and temporal succession.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be
understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the REP. GARCIA: Yes.
legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080
or the Plunder Law:
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON

REP. GARCIA: Yes.
JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder.
We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
number one and something else are included, how about a series of
the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, will these be included also? REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series. DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

REP. ISIDRO: Series. SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes
"one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big
amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series. series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED
by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series."
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

REP. GARCIA: Yes. SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more
of the acts mentioned in this.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
REP. GARCIA: Two.
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or
many; two or more.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted
under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there
should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by
existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to
at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration
provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to
the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more
overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids
on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar.
(1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive
meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater
pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the
law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there
must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve
said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall
unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which
the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if
there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used
by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of
a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a
fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under
the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 10 But the doctrine does not
apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable
to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities. 11 With more reason,
the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. 12 It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as
in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr.
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that
the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity."15 The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application
only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of
penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words"
and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought
to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to
the conduct of others."19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is
that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that
this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them
down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of
the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies,
and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put
into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact
on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis
of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever
way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly
and only as a last resort,"25 and is generally disfavored. 26 In determining
the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are
alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light
of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported
ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at
length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where
none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific
precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in
relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take
more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being
one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware
that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and
sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if
only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to
declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so
imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that
case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that
the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no
common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e),
violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence
while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of  The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these
phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment
charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or
official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate
reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D.
Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public
officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal
provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private
party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified,
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or
ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in
its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section
unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory
that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation
of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts
constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a
pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic
mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the
accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 29 The use of the "reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is
critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This
"reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the
realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged. 30 The following exchanges between
Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the
deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are
elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON
RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our
criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not
work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount
committed, say, by falsification is less than ₱100 million, but the
totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million since there is
malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion,
theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information
needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime
charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the
things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants,
pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was
charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the
prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that
in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I
feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For
instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only
₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate
₱1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required
under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is
just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving
an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element
beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the
crime is that the amount involved is ₱100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total
amount would be ₱110 or ₱120 million, but there are certain acts that
could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these
transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then
there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any
manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond
any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the
crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the
import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving
an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each
and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed
by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To
illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for
plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury.
The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being
sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond
reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least
₱50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical
conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise,
such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).
Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This
conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would
be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The
prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and
conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the
establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is
his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime
of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it
the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be
convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the
Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes
enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the
crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section
4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of
Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays
down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of
Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged,
it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of
the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid
Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not
have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a
very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be
avoided by the prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential
elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in
Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them.
Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and
unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the
prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural
measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is
only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even
without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what
is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to
engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting
for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the
reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest
of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the
law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more
than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability
clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions
to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from
being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all
the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of
each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can
best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that
plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus,
he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the
element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement
of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void,
petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during
the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to
convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or
scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it
is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's
view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to
this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to
commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough
if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the
acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in
the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to
believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as
principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws
as saying what they obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in
se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are
punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring
to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are,
by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken
or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to
completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim
or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving
minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than
three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or
threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme
of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state
finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical
rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population,
the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle
the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality
that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the
psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form
of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no
less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified
bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government officials, employees or officers, that their
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and
damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it
does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though
they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law
(B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to
the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the
amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to
say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this
long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People
v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid
stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect,
assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene
profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more
elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly
contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the
increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the
Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues
of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a
malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional
fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to
the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this
nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of
interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the
highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among
our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the
clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices,
shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152259             July 29, 2004
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal
indictment prior to plea and trial, however they may be named or
identified -- whether as a motion to quash or motion to dismiss or by
any other nomenclature -- delay the administration of justice and
unduly burden the court system. Grounds not included in the first of
such repetitive motions are generally deemed waived and can no
longer be used as bases of similar motions subsequently filed.
Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain
presidential relatives who "intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government."
This provision is not vague or "impermissibly broad," because it can
easily be understood with the use of simple statutory construction.
Neither may the constitutionality of a criminal statute such as this be
challenged on the basis of the "overbreadth" and the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrines, which apply only to free-speech cases.
The Case
1  'MOTION TO QUASH AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT'.
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the November 20, 2001 2 and the March 1,
20023 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 13736.
The first Resolution disposed thus:
"WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby
DENIED. The arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of the case
shall proceed as scheduled."4
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
"[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information
before [the anti-graft court] charging the accused [with] violation of
Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019, 5 as amended. The Information
reads:
'That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29,
1975, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the
Sandiganbayan], said [petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E.
Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and therefore, related to
the latter by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there
wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose
of promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or that of others, intervene
directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled
corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company
(BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is
owned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the
NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its
ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and
facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants
and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer
Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its
equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the
amount of P5,000,000.00.
'Contrary to law.'
"On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first 'MOTION TO
DISMISS AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT' claiming that no valid
preliminary investigation was conducted in the instant case. He asserts
that if a preliminary investigation could be said to have been
conducted, the same was null and void having been undertaken by a
biased and partial investigative body.
"On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division,
issued an order giving the accused fifteen days to file a Motion for
Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
"[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order. On January 21, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed
the petition for failure to show that [the Sandiganbayan] committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order.
"On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor a Motion to Quash.
"On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III
Victorio U. Tabanguil, manifested that the prosecution had already
concluded the reinvestigation of the case. He recommended the
dismissal of the instant case. Both the Deputy Special Prosecutor and
the Special Prosecutor approved the recommendation. However,
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and directed the
prosecutors to let the [petitioner] present his evidence in Court.
"Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second
"On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack
of merit.
"On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a 'MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE MOTION TO DISMISS'. On June 29, 2001, the
[Sandiganbayan] admitted the motion and admitted the attached (third)
Motion to Dismiss.
"The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:
'I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW
OF [PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATED DURING THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING
WAYS:
'A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS
CONDUCTED IN THE INSTANT CASE; AND
'B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED
BY A BIASED AND PARTIAL INVESTIGATOR
'II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS VIOLATED
'III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973
CONSTITUTION, [PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
'IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN
EXTINGUISHED BY PRESCRIPTION'"6
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by
petitioner, except the third one, had already been raised by him and
passed upon in its previous Resolutions. 7 In resolving the third ground,
the anti-graft court pointed out that Section 17 of the 1973
Constitution became effective only in 1981 when the basic law was
amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention had been committed on
or about 1975, the amended provision was inapplicable to him. 8
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan passed upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled
that his right to a preliminary investigation was not violated, because
he had been granted a reinvestigation. 9 It further held that his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not trampled
upon, either, inasmuch as the Information had set forth the essential
elements of the offense charged.10
Hence, this Petition.11
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our
consideration:
"Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction
– Impropriety
I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite
clear and incontrovertible evidence that:
A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because its
vagueness violates the due process right of an individual to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him;
B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because it
violates the due process right of an individual to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved;
C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation against him was violated;
D. The constitutional right to due process of law of petitioner x x x
was violated during the preliminary investigation stage in the
following ways:
[i] No valid preliminary investigation was con-ducted for Criminal
Case No. 13736; and
[ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a biased and
partial investigator.
E. The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription; and
F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution,
petitioner x x x is immune from criminal prosecution.
And
II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner['s] x x x right to
equal protection of the laws."12
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of
Republic Act 3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is
vague; (3) whether there was a valid preliminary investigation; (4)
whether the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is immune from criminal
prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973
Constitution.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Constitutionality of Section 5,
Republic Act 3019
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for
the first time in the Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss. Attached to his December 7, 2001 Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order denying his Motion to Dismiss was this
Supplemental Motion which was, in effect, his third motion to
quash.13 We note that the Petition for Certiorari before us challenges
the denial of his original, not his Supplemental, Motion to Dismiss.
Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000,
petitioner could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial.
Had reconsideration been turned down, the next proper remedy would
have been either (1) a petition for certiorari 14 -- if there was grave
abuse of discretion -- which should be filed within 60 days from notice
of the assailed order;15 or (2) to proceed to trial without prejudice to his
right, if final judgment is rendered against him, to raise the same
questions before the proper appellate court. 16 But instead of availing
himself of these remedies, he filed a "Motion to Dismiss" on June 19,
2001.
of
Repetitive Motions
There is no substantial distinction between a "motion to quash" and a
"motion to dismiss." Both pray for an identical relief, which is the
dismissal of the case. Such motions are employed to raise preliminary
objections, so as to avoid the necessity of proceeding to trial. A motion
to quash is generally used in criminal proceedings to annul a defective
indictment. A motion to dismiss, the nomenclature ordinarily used in
civil proceedings, is aimed at summarily defeating a complaint. Thus,
our Rules of Court use the term "motion to quash" in criminal, 17 and
"motion to dismiss" in civil, proceedings.18
In the present case, however, both the "Motion to Quash" and the
"Motion to Dismiss" are anchored on basically the same grounds and
pray for the same relief. The hairsplitting distinction posited by
petitioner does not really make a difference.
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a
prohibited second motion to quash. A party is not permitted to raise
issues, whether similar or different, by installment. The Rules abhor
repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to preliminary
objections, and trial would never commence. A second motion to
quash delays the administration of justice and unduly burdens the
courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that grounds not raised in the first
motion to quash are generally deemed waived. 19 Petitioner's "Motion to
Dismiss" violates this rule.
Constitutionality of
the Challenged Provision
If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be
dismissed outright. However, given the importance of this case in
curtailing graft and corruption, the Court will nevertheless address the
other issues on their merit. Petitioner challenges the validity of Section
5 of Republic Act 3019, a penal statute, on the ground that the act
constituting the offense is allegedly vague and "impermissibly broad."
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth 20 and the
vagueness21 doctrines have special application only to free-speech
cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza explained the reason as
follows:
"A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected
speech. The theory is that '[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech
and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed
to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
xxxxxxxxx
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is
that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out,
'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant.'"22 (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law
unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." 23 While mentioned in
passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find
direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,24 the
Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the
equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v.
Comelec25 decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute.
Finally, Santiago v. Comelec26 held that a portion of RA 6735 was
unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not
because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result
in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached
the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the
usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit
decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual
concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by
the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:27
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought,
and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required
line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of
statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct
with which the defendant has been charged.28
As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must
be examined only "as applied" to the defendant, herein petitioner, and
should not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.
The questioned provision reads as follows:
"Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for
the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the
third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-
President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in
any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to
the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is
related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same
line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already
existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor
to any application filed by him the approval of which is not
discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but
depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or
regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed
in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession."
Petitioner also claims that the phrase "to intervene directly or
indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
Government" is vague and violates his right to be informed of the
cause and nature of the accusation against him. 29 He further complains
that the provision does not specify what acts are punishable under the
term intervene, and thus transgresses his right to be presumed
innocent.30 We disagree.
Every statute is presumed valid. 31 On the party challenging its validity
weighs heavily the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. 32 Any
reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in
favor of its constitutionality. 33 To doubt is to sustain, as tersely put by
Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,34 the
rationale for the presumption of constitutionality was explained by this
Court thus:
"The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions
and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in
the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To
doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the
joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has
been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted." 35
In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such
presumption. This Court has previously laid down the test for
determining whether a statute is vague, as follows:
"x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
It can only be invoked against that species of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving
clause or by construction.
"A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 36 But the doctrine does not
apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable
to certain types of activities. The first may be 'saved' by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities. 37 With more reason,
the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, as in this case.
"The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. 38 It must be stressed, however, that the
'vagueness' doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as
in all other statutes."39
A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,40 in which the Court said
that there was nothing vague about a penal law that adequately
answered the basic query "What is the violation?" 41 Anything beyond
-- the hows and the whys -- are evidentiary matters that the law itself
cannot possibly disclose, in view of the uniqueness of every case. 42
The question "What is the violation?" is sufficiently answered by
Section 5 of RA 3019, as follows:
1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree of the President of the Philippines, the
Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business,
transaction, contract or application with the government.
Applicability of
Statutory Construction
As to petitioner's claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court
agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily
be understood through simple statutory construction. The absence of a
statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render the law
"void for vagueness," if the meaning can be determined through the
judicial function of construction. 43 Elementary is the principle that
words should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.
"x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them;44 much less do we have to define every word
we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its
will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will
not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long
as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act x x x.
"x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words
of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,45 unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. 46 The
intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed."47
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary
acceptation, which is to "to come between." 48 Criminally liable is
anyone covered in the enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any
person who intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the government. As we have explained, it
is impossible for the law to provide in advance details of how such
acts of intervention could be performed. But the courts may pass upon
those details once trial is concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness
of intervene is not a ground to quash the information prior to the
commencement of the trial.
In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and
that in any event, the "overbreath" and "void for vagueness" doctrines
are not applicable to this case.
Second Issue:
Allegedly Vague Information
Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene,
petitioner further contends that the Information itself is also
unconstitutionally vague, because it does not specify the acts of
intervention that he supposedly performed.49 Again, we disagree.
When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the
remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill
of particulars.50 The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is Section
9 of Rule 116, which we quote:
"Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before
arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to
plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects
of the complaint or information and the details desired."
The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with
sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being
charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. 51 The
particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what is meant by the information. 52
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be
alleged in the information, 53 matters of evidence -- as distinguished
from the facts essential to the nature of the offense -- need not be
averred.54 Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be
alleged are to be determined by reference to the definition and the
essential elements of the specific crimes. 55
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the
elements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated
sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe the offense committed
by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to prepare an
intelligent defense. Details of the acts he committed are evidentiary
matters that need not be alleged in the Information.
Third Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary
investigation when he questioned before this Court in GR No. 128317
the Sandiganbayan's Order giving him 15 days to file a Motion for
Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.56 Citing Cojuangco v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,57 he undauntedly averred that he was deprived of his right
to a preliminary investigation, because the PCGG acted both as
complainant and as investigator.58
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the
power to conduct a preliminary investigation, the latter could not do so
with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" in cases in which it was
the agency that had gathered evidence and subsequently filed the
complaint.59 On that basis, this Court nullified the preliminary
investigation conducted by PCGG and directed the transmittal of the
records to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of
the Information against herein petitioner. True, the PCGG initiated the
present Complaint against him; hence, it could not properly conduct
the preliminary investigation. However, he was accorded his rights --
the Sandiganbayan suspended the trial and afforded him a
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The procedure outlined
in Cojuangco was thus followed.
The Sandiganbayan's actions are in accord also with Raro v.
Sandiganbayan,60 which held that the failure to conduct a valid
preliminary investigation would not warrant the quashal of an
information. If the information has already been filed, the proper
procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while
the preliminary investigation is being conducted or completed. 61
Fourth Issue:
Prescription
The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to
Quash filed by petitioner with the Sandiganbayan on October 8,
1999.62 Such issue should be disregarded at this stage, since he failed
to challenge its ruling debunking his Motion within the 60-day period
for the filing of a petition for certiorari. A party may not circumvent
this rule by filing a subsequent motion that raises the same issue and
the same arguments.
Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by
petitioner is utterly unmeritorious. He points out that according to the
Information, the offense was committed "during the period from July
16, 1975 to July 29, 1975." He argues that when the Information was
filed on July 12, 1989, 63 prescription had already set in, because the
prescriptive period for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is only ten
(10) years from the time the offense was allegedly committed. The
increase of this prescriptive period to fifteen (15) years took effect
only on March 16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
195.64
Act No. 3326, as amended, 65 governs the prescription of offenses
penalized by special laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
"Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.
"The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy."
Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously
reckoned the prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019
(committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution) from
the discovery of the violation.66 In Republic v. Desierto, the Court
explained:
"This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale,
in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto. In the said recent case, the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of the Philippines were
charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA
No. 3019, by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, created by then President Fidel V. Ramos to investigate
and to recover the so-called 'Behest Loans', where the Philippine
Government guaranteed several foreign loans to corporations and
entities connected with the former President Marcos. x x x In holding
that the case had not yet prescribed, this Court ruled that:
'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known the violations of RA No. 3019 at the
time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
'beneficiaries of the loans.' Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that
the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in
OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery
of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
xxx      xxx      xxx
'People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated there stands
reiteration: In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws
are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for
this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the
special law is not known at the time, the prescription begins to run
only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature
of the constitutive act or acts.' (Italics supplied)
"There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case
and the present one which lead us to apply the ruling of the former to
the latter. First, both cases arose out of seemingly innocent business
transactions; second, both were 'discovered' only after the government
created bodies to investigate these anomalous transactions; third, both
involve prosecutions for violations of RA No. 3019; and, fourth, in
both cases, it was sufficiently raised in the pleadings that the
respondents conspired and connived with one another in order to keep
the alleged violations hidden from public scrutiny.
"This Court's pronouncement in the case of Domingo v.
Sandiganbayan is quite relevant and instructive as to the date when the
discovery of the offense should be reckoned, thus:
'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government,
the aggrieved party, to have known the violations committed at the
time the questioned transactions were made because both parties to the
transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetuate fraud against
the government. The alleged anomalous transactions could only have
been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the
original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted
from office. Prior to said date, no person would have dared to question
the legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence, the counting of
the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of
the offense, which could have been between February 1986 after the
EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was
filed.'"67
The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case.
The general rule that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the crime cannot apply to the present case. It is not
legally prudent to charge the State, the aggrieved party, with
knowledge of the violation of RA 3019 at the time the alleged
intervention was made. The accused is the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos' brother-in-law. He was charged with intervening in a sale
involving a private corporation, the majority stocks of which was
allegedly owned by President Marcos.
Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously
dared question the legality of the sale or would even have thought of
investigating petitioner's alleged involvement in the transaction. It was
only after the creation68 of PCGG69 and its exhaustive investigations
that the alleged crime was discovered. This led to the initiation on
November 29, 1988 of a Complaint against former President Marcos
and petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Consequently, the filing of the Information on July 12, 1989 was
well within the prescriptive period of ten years from the discovery of
the offense.
Fifth Issue
Immunity from Prosecution
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he
allegedly served as a high-ranking naval officer -- specifically, as
naval aide-de-camp -- of former President Marcos. 70 He relies on
Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which
we quote:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure.
Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or
by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
"x x x             x x x             x x x"
As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not
applicable to petitioner because the immunity amendment became
effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in 1975.
In Estrada v. Desierto,71 this Court exhaustively traced the origin of
executive immunity in order to determine the extent of its
applicability. We explained therein that executive immunity applied
only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to
shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal
acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must
therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer
sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and
their close relatives "are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any
other trespasser."
In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. 72 On the
contrary, it acted prudently, in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., in the result.
Corona, J., on leave. G.R. No. 178552               October 5, 2010
Tinga, J., in the result. Please see separate opinion.
Chico-Nazario, J., no part. Ponente of assailed SB Resolutions. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK,
INC., on behalf of the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State
Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of

Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and
Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, 2 petitioner

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government
organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen,
taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on
July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-
Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and
Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers 3 who
are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.

The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for
Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA),
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned
Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity,
Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees
(COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY),
Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students
(LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya
(PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT),
Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham,
represented by their respective officers, 4 and joined by concerned
citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido
Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB,
Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry
Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo,
Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and
Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 178581.

On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations

Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa
Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for
Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church People’s
Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective
officers5 who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.

On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),

Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL), 6 Senator Ma. Ana
Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and Wigberto E. Tañada
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
179157.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST),

other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern
Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing on
September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the
BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs
Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National
Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government
Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as
members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise
impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support
agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of
Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP,
Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational
Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of
particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just
the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 10
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites,
which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 11
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive
Secretary12 summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right
or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question,
it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action,
and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the
military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving
the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether
different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and
societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be
elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR,
petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to
"close security surveillance by state security forces," their members
followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military
build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies
of the [S]tate."14
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have
yet to show any connection between the
purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY,
SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD
and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like
the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of
tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National
People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is
tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the
procedure under the law.15 The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R.
No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of
petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits
of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced
by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are
generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known,
and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.
As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety
of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of
common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact
which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact
of which the court has no constructive knowledge. 16 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of
judicial notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate
their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has
been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any
claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-
called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R.
No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the
CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of
specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their
organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist
organization, the United States of America 17 (US) and the European
Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf
Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the
joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt
the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations.19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed
before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA
organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under
RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now.
From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have
conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much
less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by
Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael
Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume
peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the impediments
thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and
NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering
the policy statement of the Aquino Administration21 of resuming peace
talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask
for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied
organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct
and specific interests in the questions being raised.22 Of recent
development is the filing of the first case for proscription under
Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before the
Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf
Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to
the Abu Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a
prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges
against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion
charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin
Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA,
and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan
Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners
Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita
Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being
front organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-
organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP,
KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.26
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for
petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the
enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another,
rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment
of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a
person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no
relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be
overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none
of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of
locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP
zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to
those arrested or detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not,
however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with
standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate
under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and
duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even
a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been
the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi.
Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of
"political surveillance," the Court finds that she has not shown even
the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking
in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator
Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being respectively a human rights
advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these
gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty.
Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the
issues they raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be
settled early" and are of "far-reaching implications," without mention
of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been
charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights
advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with
locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger
of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law’s enforcement. To
rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus
standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general
public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as
taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an
exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, 28 whereas
citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the
proceeding.29
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the
individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the
assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a
direct and personal interest is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an
actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 30 (emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.32
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC33 cannot be more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy
must be justiciable—definite and concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the
pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right,
on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must
concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be
premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events. 34 Similarly,
a petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to operate
a radio or television station has been denied or granted by the
authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely
wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem. 35
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v.
Commission on Elections36 for failure to cite any specific affirmative
action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed
resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections, 37 to rule
on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely
on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim
Code and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy
between real litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or
anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence
of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a
basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is
qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to
enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. 38
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute,
challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible
threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and
undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking
relief."40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to
assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C.
§2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of material support to
organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist
organizations. They claimed that they intended to provide support for
the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the
merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged
prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do,
as there would then be a justiciable controversy. 42
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed
to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No
demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing
one.
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and
supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations,
the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its
function.43
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas
for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double
contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official
are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. 44
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not
avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and
merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the
exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. 45 Allegations of
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech
cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly
excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad
the definition of the crime of terrorism 46 under RA 9372 in that terms
like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-
vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case
since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA
9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is
imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to
assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea
of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases.
They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word
"intervene" in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that
"the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application
only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes."50 It added that, at any rate, the challenged
provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not
vague.51
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a
vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election
offense53 under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the
therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language. 54
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion 55 of
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court
found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free
from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two
doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an "as-
applied" challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal
statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its
validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision,
reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application
only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of
penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which,
by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the
vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on
its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff
who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is
that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently,
there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-
Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them
down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of
the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies,
and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put
into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact
on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis
of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever
way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly
and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining
the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are
alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light
of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring
supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-
applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of
due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of
abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth
do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.58
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected.59
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied"
challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.60
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle 61 in his concurring
opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a
facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot
thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by
the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise
of which should not at all times be abridged. 62 As reflected earlier, this
rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an
"in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or
dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 63
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a
criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an ‘on-its-
face’ invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed." 64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free
speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be
facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may
be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism
against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the
same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial
power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a
penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would,
essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before
it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial
challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the State ’s
ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that
can hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute
on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is
vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to
him.65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only
to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial
type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court , that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it
marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute  "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of
the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring
suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to
remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court,
in at least two cases, 67 observed that the US Supreme Court has not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
"transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression."71
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of
"terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent charge against them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not
preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder
Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there
was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety." 72 It
stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due process  typically
are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant."73
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do
not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of
the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's
facial validity."
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated
defendants’ claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague,
developing a doctrine hailed as "among the most important guarantees
of liberty under law."75
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the
due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality
of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, 76 the Court brought the
doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-
payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal
recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and
the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in
the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the
therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to
permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited
Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the
offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special
penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates
a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful
demand" in the definition of terrorism77 must necessarily be
transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must
first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand."
Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of
the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing
of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt
criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or
conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in one
U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on
discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer
to take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means
that the law should be analyzed as one regulating speech rather than
conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the
criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially
harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not
speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the
expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element
of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in
most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has
never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the   conduct was, in
part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically
impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade
as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious
to society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct,
because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct. 80 Since speech is
not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial
analysis.1avvphi1
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a
vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the
therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the
pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said
cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on
its face and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-
enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness
grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of
prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual
charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a
limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is
thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial
power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s
future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used
as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L.
PESIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE
NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S.
MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the
Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No.
626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and
forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one
province to another.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers,
transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2,
1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with
Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial
veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised
Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued
under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three
certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command
attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen
and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of
Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor
of Sipocot.
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the
carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated
by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station
commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian.
The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order
No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be
distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of
Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1).
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for
replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at
P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be
executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo
Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later
transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of
action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic
Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against
the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
regulation published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
(People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank
of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110
Phil. 150.)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica
de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad
con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of
having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six
months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by
this Court because the circular was published in the Official
Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the
circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A
because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a
penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be
informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette
before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971,
37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security
System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve the
enforcement of any penal regulation.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive
orders having general applicability should be published in the
Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document which
shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general
applicability and legal effect."
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the
Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when
approved by the Department Head and published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of
Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial
veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs
Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order
No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be
cognizant of such an executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the
carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients
of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they
cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound
by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor
Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture
and dispersal of the carabaos.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation
and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents
Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the
requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to
possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or
Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant
to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P.
DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is
sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184,
197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358,
359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491,
503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050,
1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279,
1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840,
1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136,
141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204,
205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299,
301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367,
370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488,
498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281,
1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-
1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-
1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-
492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544,
549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51,
59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433,
436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning
of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of
a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest
for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910
case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the
general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is
for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public
rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object
of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show
that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a
private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for
the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports
the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this
character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous
to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the
reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and
reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which
surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no
other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law
officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases
of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners
herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other
person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General,
the government officer generally empowered to represent the
people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date
of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but
not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered
in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders
and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may
be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall
determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic
has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time
when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by
the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of
the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated,
much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain
ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads:
"There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall"
used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from
such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of
policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the
same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some
other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they
shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions SO ORDERED.

which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general

application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-
with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among
the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.

Esteban  9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees

prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact
which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it

appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019
to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino,
ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is

[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners,
v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant
to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P.
DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS;
ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF LAWS MADE TO
ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND
TO INFORMATION. — The categorical statement by this Court on
the need for publication before any law be made effective seeks to
prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to
the people their constitutional right to due process and to information
on matter of public concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the
disclosure or a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had
not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the
decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect."
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask
the following questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication" ?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should
be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that
the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed
first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should
therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official
Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in
only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a
Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution
and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in
view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules
of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for
the interval administration of a government agency or for particular
persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary
must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the
decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as
follows:
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the
parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened
or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in
his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication
in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The
general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may
be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would
be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of
penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-
penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.cralawnad
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person
knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It
is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy
or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say,
the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel
or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required.
This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant
motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the
least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This
is once again an open society, with all the acts of the government
subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance.
This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with
sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the
authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it
according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their
right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to
the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint,
parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined
shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
SO ORDERED.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices
were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six
others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the
people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
indicating where it should be made, 11 It is therefore necessary for the
present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this
matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary
vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be
made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and
limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this
kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing
law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law,
and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a
law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our
function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to
interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that
under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a
different period provided by the legislature.chanrobles law library

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as

soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article
2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the
parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of

G.R. No. 187587               June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 promulgated on 29 April 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos
P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military
reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William
McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort
Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)
issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national
shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani,
which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine
Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded
barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition
under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a
handwritten addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette 3 on 3 February 1986, without the
above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino
(President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially
reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded
Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation
No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the
provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172,
was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some
areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General
Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of
illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng
Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission
on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1)
the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-
13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and
disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision
of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land
Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the
subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners
Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention
substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by
NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot
7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution 6 granting
the Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable
and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was
therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further,
considering that Proclamation No. 2476 was done while the former
President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended,
repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus,
Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced
Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987
when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina
AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code,
publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that
when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is
no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be
taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 8 Finally, she
maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the
addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation
No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field
of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution
dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to
reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24
January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division
rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January
24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP
Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed
herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are
likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing
their respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO.
2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN
BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY
PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS
NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO.
172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND
OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS
BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT
>INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY
VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS
NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE
OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN
ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS
INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO.
2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western
Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege
that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in
the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public
land when he made a notation just below the printed version of
Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not
included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified
and disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In
relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has
otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a
different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the
completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does
not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with.
The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the
landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion
to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened
or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in
his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication
in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The
general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may
be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would
be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of
penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-
penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy
or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which
the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather
than disclose information on this vital law.
xxxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to
the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint,
parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot
rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476
as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force
and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other
official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie
evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos
intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the
law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when,
evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon.
Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean,
however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting
the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of
the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of
our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or
lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not
arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these
Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that
would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is
AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated
17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite
respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND
DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami,
Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-
profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a
declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7
of its petition, petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to
propagate its ideology and program of government, which materials
include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner
intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the
Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it
quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it
violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of
expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that
the questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process,
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly
and equal protection clauses; for the same is designed to prevent the
clear and present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the
prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal protection of
the laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing
of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal change for all
candidates, and the independence of the delegates who must be
"beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience," are interests
that should be accorded primacy.1chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the
pronouncements in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales. 2
The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex
post facto law is likewise untenable.
An ex post facto law is one which:.
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;chanrobles
virtual law library
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed;chanrobles virtual law library
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed;chanrobles virtual law
library
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense;chanrobles virtual law library
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; andchanrobles virtual law library
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 3chanrobles
virtual law library
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto
laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which
are given retroactive effect.4chanrobles virtual law library
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of
R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only
for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those
perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely
insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall
apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23
directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was
approved on August 24, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and
paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional.
Without costs.
G.R. No. 145184               March 14, 2008
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON
BEHEST LOANS, represented by PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT through ATTY.
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
OMBUDSMAN; DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES' MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
AND OFFICERS AT THE TIME - RAFAEL SISON, JOSEPH
TENGCO, ALICE REYES, VICENTE PATERNO, JOSEPH
EDRALIN, ROBERTO ONGPIN, VERDEN DANGILAN,
RODOLFO MANALO; BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PHILIPPINES, INC.
QUERUBE MAKALINTAL,* AMBROSIO MAKALINTAL,
VICENTE JAYME, ANTONIO SANTIAGO, EDGAR QUINTO,
HORACIO MAKALINTAL, ALFREDO DE LOS ANGELES,
JOSE REY D. RUEDA, RAMONCITO MODESTO, GERARDO
LIMJUCO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,
(the Committee), representing the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), through Atty. Orlando L. Salvador (Atty.
Salvador) filed this Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the
September 3, 1999 Resolution1 of the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-0-95-0443, dismissing the criminal complaint filed against
private respondents, and the June 6, 2000 Order 2 denying its
reconsideration.
On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative
Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans (Committee), which reads:
WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest";
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"The right of the state to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel";
WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees, or other
forms of financial accommodation granted, directly or indirectly, by
government owned and controlled bank or financial institutions, at the
behest, command or urging by previous government officials to the
disadvantage and detriment of the Philippine government and the
Filipino people;
ACCORDINGLY, an "Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON
BEHEST LOANS" is hereby created to be composed of the following:
Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government - Chairman
The Solicitor General - Vice-Chairman
Representative from the
Office of the Executive Secretary - Member
Representative from the
Department of Finance - Member
Representative from the
Department of Justice - Member
Representative from the
Development Bank of the Philippines - Member
Representative from the
Philippine National Bank - Member
Representative from the
Asset Privatization Trust - Member
Government Corporate Counsel - Member
Representative from the
Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation - Member
The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:
1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers,
including the principal officers and stockholders of the borrowing
firms, as well as the persons responsible for granting the loans or who
influenced the grant thereof;
2. Identify the borrowers who were granted "friendly waivers", as well
as the government officials who granted these waivers; determine the
validity of these waivers;
3. Determine the courses of action that the government should take to
recover those loans, and to recommend appropriate actions to the
Office of the President within sixty (60) days from the date hereof.
The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department,
bureau, office, agency, instrumentality or corporation of the
government, or any officer or employee thereof, for such assistance as
it may need in the discharge of its function.
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions
of the Committee were subsequently expanded by including in its
investigation, inventory and study all non-performing loans, whether
behest or non-behest. It likewise provided for the following criteria
which might be utilized as frame of reference in determining a behest
loan, to wit:
1. It is under-collateralized;
2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
3. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like
presence of marginal notes;
4. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are
identified as cronies;
5. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
6. Use of corporate layering;
7. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought;
and
8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan
in that while both may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-
recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal liability.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for its
investigation, including the loan transactions between Comptronics
Philippines, Inc. (CPI), now Integrated Circuits Philippines (ICPI), and
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee
determined that they bore the characteristics of a behest loan as
defined under Memorandum Order No. 61. Consequently, Atty.
Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Committee, and representing
the PCGG, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn
complaint3 for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
Concerned Members of the DBP Board of Governors, and Concerned
Directors and Officers of ICPI, namely, Querube Makalintal,
Ambrosio C. Makalintal, Vicente R. Jayme, Antonio A. Santiago,
Edgar L. Quinto, Horacio G. Makalintal, Alfredo F. delos Angeles,
Josery D. Ruede, Manuel Tupaz, Alberto T. Perez and Gerardo A.
Limjuco (private respondents).
Atty. Salvador alleged that ICPI applied for an industrial loan (foreign
currency loan) of US$1,352,400.00, or ₱10,143,000.00, from DBP.
The loan application was approved on August 6, 1980 under DBP
Board Resolution No. 2924. Atty. Salvador claimed that there was
undue haste in the approval of the loan. He also alleged that prior to its
approval, ICPI was granted an interim loan of ₱1,786,000.00 to cover
the project’s initial financing requirement. He added that the ICPI’s
industrial loan was under-collateralized and ICPI was undercapitalized
at the time the loan was granted. ICPI’s paid up capital by then was
only ₱3,000,000.00, while the appraised value of the machinery and
equipment offered as collaterals was only ₱5,943,610.00. Atty.
Salvador concluded that ICPI was undeserving of the concession given
to it, and the approval of the loan constitutes a violation of Section 3(e)
(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
On March 13, 1996, Atty. Salvador filed a Supplementary Complaint
Affidavit,4 to include in his complaint ICPI’s interim loan of
₱1,786,000.00, which he claimed was granted with undue haste and
without collateral, except a promissory note and comfort letter signed
by DBP Chairman Rafael Sison. He added that the stockholders,
officers and agents are identified cronies, since the Chairman of the
Board – Querube Makalintal – was, at the same time, the then Speaker
of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. He named Rafael A. Sison, Jose
Tengco, Alice Ll. Reyes, and Casimiro Tanedo as the ones responsible
for the approval of the loan who should, thus, be charged, along with
the officers and directors of ICPI, for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
After evaluating the evidence submitted by the Committee, the
Ombudsman issued the assailed Memorandum, finding that:
After going over the record, we find no probable cause to warrant the
filing of the instant case in court.
To start with, the cause of action has prescribed.
The loan in [question] was entered into between ICPI and DBP
sometime in August 1980, while the complaint was filed on February
17, 1995 only, or after the lapse of almost fifteen years. Under Section
11, RA 3019, offenses committed before March 16, 1982, prescribed
in ten (10) years.
The transaction was duly documented and the instruments drawn in
support thereof were duly registered and open to public scrutiny, the
prescriptive period of any legal action in connection with the said
transaction commenced to run from the date the same was registered
sometime in 1980.
xxxx
Complainant’s allegation that the questioned loans were not covered
by sufficient collaterals is negated by the evidence on record. It
appears from the Executive Summary attached to the complaint that
ICPI loans were secured by the following, to wit: (a) Machinery and
Equipment to be acquired valued at ₱5,943,610.00; (b) The Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation guarantee up to 70%
of the proposed DBP loan or ₱7,100,000.00; (c) By the Joint and
several signatures with ICPI, Philippine Underwriter Finance
Corporation; Atrium Capital Corporation, Mr. Ambrocio and Querube
Macalintal. The value of the machineries and equipment and the
amount guaranteed by Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation have a total amount ₱13,043,610.00. ICPI’s paid up
capital in the amount of ₱3,000,000.00 was also considered as
additional security. The aggregate value of ICPI’s securities was
therefore ₱16,043,610.00, while the total amount of loans granted was
only ₱10,143,000.00. Clearly, therefore, the loans granted to ICPI
were not undercollaterized (sic).
Moreover, ICPI had an authorized capital stock of ₱10 Million of
which ₱3 Million had been paid up or more than 25% of the
authorized capital. It cannot be said that the corporation is
undercapitalized.
In fine, the questioned loans were not considered behest loans within
the purview of Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992
(Broadening the Scope of the Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans Created Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 13, dated
October 8, 1992).
Finally, the aforesaid Administrative and Memorandum Orders both
issued by the President in 1992, may not be retroactively applied to the
questioned transactions which took place in 1980 because to do so
would be tantamount to an ex post facto law which is proscribed by
the Constitution.5
Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the instant complaint be, as
the same is hereby, DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.6
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the Ombudsman denied
the same on June 6, 2000.7
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Before tackling the issues raised by the petitioner, this Court takes
notice of a serious procedural flaw. Joseph Edralin, Roberto Ongpin,
Verden Dangilan and Rodolfo Manalo were impleaded as respondents
in this petition. However, they were not made respondents in the
proceedings before the Ombudsman. Neither was there any allegation
in the sworn-complaint and supplementary complaint executed by
Atty. Salvador before the Ombudsman that Edralin, Ongpin, Dangilan
and Manalo had any participation in, or were responsible for, the
approval of the questioned loan. As such, they cannot be made
respondents for the first time in this petition. Accordingly, we dismiss
the petition as against them.
With the procedural issue resolved, this Court now comes to the issues
raised by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that (i)
the offenses subject of its criminal complaint had prescribed; (ii)
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex
post facto laws; and (iii) there is no probable cause to indict private
respondents for violation under Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The computation of the prescriptive period for offenses involving the
acquisition of behest loans had already been laid to rest in Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 8 thus:
[I]t was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to
have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned
transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans."
Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for
the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were
charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission
thereof and not from the day of such commission.9
The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto, 10 wherein the
Court explained:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the
February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not
have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992
after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans.11
The Sworn Statement filed by Atty. Salvador did not specify the exact
dates when the alleged offenses were discovered. However, the
records show that it was the Committee that discovered the same. As
such, the discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8,
1992, the date when the Committee was created. The complaint was
filed on February 17, 1995, less than three (3) years from the
presumptive date of discovery. Thus, the criminal offenses allegedly
committed by the private respondents had not yet prescribed when the
complaint was filed.
Likewise, we do not agree with the Ombudsman’s declaration that
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot
be applied retroactively to the questioned transactions because to do so
would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an
action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent
when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates
a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the
legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the defendant;12 or (e) which assumes to regulate civil rights
and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when exercised was lawful; or (f) which deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.13
The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against
the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;
or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.14
Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans and provides for its composition
and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand, simply
provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest
loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex-post facto
laws.
Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada, 15 in which petitioner raised the
issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 in his motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision, we had occasion to
state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on
the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in delving into the constitutionality of the
subject administrative and memorandum orders.
Now, on the merits of the case.
Private respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e)(g) of
R.A. No. 3019. The pertinent provisions read:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of officers or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
Petitioner asserts that the loan transaction between DBP and ICPI bore
the characteristics of a behest loan. It claims that the loan was under-
collateralized and ICPI was under-capitalized when the questioned
loan was hastily granted. Petitioner believes that there exists probable
cause to indict the private respondents for violation of Section 3(e)(g)
of R.A. No. 3019.
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those
in public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that
belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. 16 The Ombudsman is
empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether
probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have
committed the crime as defined by law. As a rule, courts should not
interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power, exercised
through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine
the presence or absence of probable cause, except when the finding is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.17
For one to have violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the following
elements must be established: 1) the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2) he must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and 3) he must have caused undue injury to any party,
including the government, or given any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference, in the discharge of his
functions.18 Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per
se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law. It is required
that the act constitutive of bad faith or partiality must, in the first
place, be evident or manifest, while the negligent deed should be both
gross and inexcusable. Further, it is necessary to show that any or all
of these modalities resulted in undue injury to a specified party. 19
On the other hand, to be liable under Section 3(g), there must be a
showing that private respondents entered into a grossly
disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government.
Petitioner did not satisfy either criterion.
It is clear from the records that the DBP officers studied and evaluated
ICPI’s request for an interim loan and an industrial loan, and they were
convinced that ICPI was deserving of the grant, considering the
viability and economic desirability of its project. Petitioners failed to
demonstrate that DBP did not exercise sound business judgment when
it approved the loan. Neither was there any proof that the conditions
imposed for the loan were specially designed in order to favor ICPI.
The Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every
person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which springs from the
fountain of good conscience.20 Well-settled is the rule that good faith is
presumed. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in
good faith in the performance of his duties.
Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable, absent a
clear showing that he was motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. 21 "Bad faith" does not simply connote bad
moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent, or ill will. It partakes of the
nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for
ulterior purposes.22 Petitioners utterly failed to show that private
respondents’ actions fit such description.
Neither was there any convincing proof offered to demonstrate that the
contracts were grossly disadvantageous to the Government, or that
they were entered into to give ICPI unwarranted benefits and
advantages.
Petitioner asserts that ICPI was undeserving of the accommodation
given by DBP. To support this allegation, petitioners quoted a portion
of the credit evaluation report, which reads:
Investigations conducted by DBP’s Credit Department revealed
adverse findings on ICPI and Mr. Gene Vicente Tamesis, who until
recently, has been the principal stockholder and executive officer of
subject Corporation. x x x Mr. Tamesis, however, has since transferred
all of his shareholdings to Mr. Ambrosio G. Makalintal. Aware of Mr.
Tamesis’ unfavorable credit standing, ICPI’s management has, further,
caused him to yield his position as Chairman of the Board in favor of
Mr. Querube C. Makalintal, former Justice of the Supreme Court and
presently Speaker of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. 23
But we note that the said credit investigation report goes further, and
states:
With the responsible management of the Makalintals and the
conversion of substantial liabilities of ICPI into equity (subject-firm’s
major creditors, namely, Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation
and Atrium Capital Corporation have both agreed, in principle, to
convert their claims into equity), the corporation can now operate on a
clean credit slate and stands a good chance of meeting its credit
obligations.24
There is, thus, no solid basis for petitioners to claim that ICPI did not
deserve the concession given by DBP.
Contrary to what petitioner wants to portray, the contracts between
ICPI and DBP were not behest loans. ICPI was not under-capitalized
and the loan was not under-collateralized at the time of its approval.
Likewise, the approval can hardly be depicted as one done with undue
haste.
The records show that in 1979, Atrium Capital Corporation and
Philippine Underwriter’s Corporation agreed on the conversion of their
₱8,500,000.00 worth of creditor’s equity into capital stocks.25 Then, in
1980, the individual stockholders paid their respective subscriptions
amounting to ₱3,000,000.00, thereby increasing ICPI’s paid up capital
to ₱11,500,000.00 as of April 23, 1980.26 This belies petitioners’ claim
that, at that time, ICPI was under-capitalized.
Similarly, the industrial loan was sufficiently collateralized at the time
of its approval. It was granted on the condition that the assets intended
for acquisition by ICPI would serve as collateral. The Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PEFLGC) also
guaranteed 70% of the loan extended. ICPI was further required to
assign to DBP not less than 67% of its total subscribed and outstanding
voting shares, which should be maintained at all times and should
subsist during the existence of the loan. As additional security, ICPI’s
majority stockholders, namely, Integrated Circuits Philippine, Inc.
(ICP) of Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation, Atrium
Corporation (AC), Ambrosio G. Makalintal and Querube Makalintal
were also made jointly and severally liable to DBP. DBP was also
given the right to designate its comptroller in ICP. 27
Petitioner’s insistence that DBP excluded the joint and several
liabilities of the majority stockholders of ICP and AC and of Querube
Makalintal has to be rejected. It is true that DBP’s Industrial Project
Department recommended the amendment of this condition. However,
no proof was offered to prove that the DBP Board of Directors
approved such recommendation.1avvphi1
Petitioner also points to the alleged non-implementation of the
guarantee by PEFLGC to demonstrate that the loan was under-
collateralized at the time of its approval. But the evidence 28 presented
shows that the PEFLGC approved the guarantee, although the approval
lapsed in 1985. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that, at the time of the
approval of the loan, there was a guarantee by PEFLGC. Besides, even
if we exclude as security the guarantee of PEFLGC, the loan still had
sufficient collaterals at the time of its approval.
The contention that the loan was hastily granted also fails to persuade.
The supplemental complaint alleged that the interim loan was granted
on April 6, 1980. However, there was no allegation, much less proof,
as to when ICPI applied for this interim loan. In the absence of such
proof, we cannot conclude that the same was hastily granted.
Neither does the industrial loan appear to have been hastily granted.
Admittedly, the interim loan granted on April 6, 1980 formed part of
ICPI’s application for industrial or foreign currency loan in the amount
of US$1,352,400.00. Logically then, we can assume that ICPI’s
application was filed earlier than April 6, 1980, the date of the
approval of the interim loan. DBP, however, approved the industrial
loan only on August 6, 1980. The processing period of more than four
months is inconsistent with the claim that the loan was hastily
granted.29
In sum, petitioner does not persuade us that the contract between ICPI
and DBP was a behest loan.
Finally, we note that petitioner did not specify the precise role played
by, or the participation of, each of the private respondents in the
alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019. No concrete or overt acts of the
ICP’s directors and officers, particularly of Mr. Querube Makalintal,
were specifically alleged or mentioned in the complaint and its
supplement, and no proof was adduced to show that they unduly
influenced the directors and concerned officials of DBP. Neither were
circumstances shown to indicate a common criminal design of either
the officers of DPB or ICPI, nor that they colluded to cause undue
injury to the government by giving unwarranted benefits to ICPI.
The Ombudsman can hardly be faulted for not wanting to proceed with
the prosecution of the offense, convinced that he does not possess the
necessary evidence to secure a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Memorandum
and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-95-0443, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-18208             February 14, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE
CONDE, defendants-appellants.
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellants.
Attorney-General Villareal for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 6th day of May, 1921, a
complaint was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, charging the defendants with a violation of the Usury Law
(Act No. 2655). Upon said complaint they were each arrested,
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. The cause was finally brought on for
trial on the 1st day of September, 1921. At the close of the trial, and
after a consideration of the evidence adduced, the Honorable M. V. del
Rosario, judge, found that the defendants were guilty of the crime
charged in the complaint and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of
P120 and, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with the provisions of the law. From that sentence each of
the defendants appealed to this court.
The appellants now contend: (a) That the contract upon which the
alleged usurious interest was collected was executed before Act No.
2655 was adopted; (b) that at the time said contract was made
(December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in force in the Philippine
Islands; (c) that said Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the
1st day of May, 1916, or four months and a half after the contract in
question was executed; (d) that said law could have no retroactive
effect or operation, and (e) that said law impairs the obligation of a
contract, and that for all of said reasons the judgment imposed by the
lower court should be revoked; that the complaint should be dismissed,
and that they should each be discharged from the custody of the law.
The essential facts constituting the basis of the criminal action are not
in dispute, and may be stated as follows: (1) That on the 30th day of
December, 1915, the alleged offended persons Bartolome Oliveros and
Engracia Lianco executed and delivered to the defendants a contract
(Exhibit B) evidencing the fact that the former had borrowed from the
latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the terms of said
contract, the said Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco obligated
themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the rate of five per cent
(5%) per month, payable within the first ten days of each and every
month, the first payment to be made on the 10th day of January, 1916.
There were other terms in the contract which, however, are not
important for the decision in the present case.
The lower court, in the course of its opinion, stated that at the time of
the execution and delivery of said contract (Exhibit B), there was no
law in force in the Philippine Islands punishing usury; but, inasmuch
as the defendants had collected a usurious rate of interest after the
adoption of the Usury Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2655),
they were guilty of a violation of that law and should be punished in
accordance with its provisions.
The law, we think, is well established that when a contract contains an
obligation to pay interest upon the principal, the interest thereby
becomes part of the principal and is included within the promise to
pay. In other words, the obligation to pay interest on money due under
a contract, be it express or implied, is a part of the obligation of the
contract. Laws adopted after the execution of a contract, changing or
altering the rate of interest, cannot be made to apply to such contract
without violating the provisions of the constitution which prohibit the
adoption of a law "impairing the obligation of contract." (8 Cyc., 996;
12 Corpus Juris, 1058-1059.)
The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to
perform their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land,
morals or public order. That law must govern and control the contract
in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect
its validity, construction, or discharge. Any law which enlarges,
abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties,
necessarily impairs the contract itself. If a law impairs the obligation
of a contract, it is prohibited by the Jones Law, and is null and void.
The laws in force in the Philippine Islands prior to any legislation by
the American sovereignty, prohibited the Legislature from giving to
any penal law a retroactive effect unless such law was favorable to the
person accused. (Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.)
A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or disability, or
giving a new right of action, must not be construed as having a
retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that the laws in
force at the time the contract was made must govern its interpretation
and application. Laws must be construed prospectively and not
retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be
rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted
then the obligations of a contract might be impaired, which is
prohibited by the organic law of the Philippine Islands. (U.S. vs.
Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, 39 Phil., 552; Aguilar vs. Rubiato and
Gonzales Vila, 40 Phil., 570.)
Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are
prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done
before the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. In the
present case Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done before
the law was adopted, a criminal act, and to make said Act applicable to
the act complained of would be to give it an ex post facto operation.
The Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will make an
act done before its adoption a crime. A law may be given a retroactive
effect in civil action, providing it is curative in character, but ex post
facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is
favorable to the defendant.
For the reason, therefore, that the acts complained of in the present
case were legal at the time of their occurrence, they cannot be made
criminal by any subsequent or ex post facto legislation. What the
courts may say, considering the provisions of article 1255 of the Civil
Code, when a civil action is brought upon said contract, cannot now be
determined. A contract may be annulled by the courts when it is shown
that it is against morals or public order.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and so decide,
that the acts complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime
at the time they were committed, and therefore the sentence of the
lower court should be, and is hereby, revoked; and it is hereby ordered G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978
and decreed that the complaint be dismissed, and that the defendants
be discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
ordered. vs.
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de
Oro City), and CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.

Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr.,

Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for petitioner.

Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar Puerto.

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the jurisdiction of a city court in estafa cases.

On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto

with estafa in the city court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued
on October 16, 1974 two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4, 966.
63 (Criminal Case No. 32140).

City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted
that the accused had waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. He directed that the case be elevated, for trial, to the
court of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court.

Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of

Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII, in its order of
February 3, 1977 returned the case to the city court because in its
opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two
courts and, the city court, as the first court which took cognizance of
the case, should try it.

Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in

his order of April 21, 1977 directed the re-elevation of the case. His
view is that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance because estafa committed by the accused is
punishable by prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No.
818 which took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article
315 of the Revised Penal Code.

That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for certiorari

filed in this Court on May 27, 1977 by the office of the city fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro City.

We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has
original jurisdiction over it. The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is
punishable under article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum or four months
and one day to two years and four months.

The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to

ten years, imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to
swindling by means of issuing bouncing checks which was committed
or after October 22, 1975.

That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed by

Puerto on October 16, 1974. To apply it to Puerto would make the
decree an ex post facto law. Its retroactive application is prohibited by
articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code and section 12, Article
IV of the Constitution.

The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because the
penultimate paragraph or section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended
by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, provides that "judges of city
courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try
parties charged with an offense committed within their respective
jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six
years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both."
As section 87 itself shows, that jurisdiction is concurrent with the court
of First Instance which is empowered to try "all criminal cases in
which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six
months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos" (Sec. 44[f], G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
Judiciary Law. See People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70
SCRA 531). PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
It was not necessary for the city court to have conducted the HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court
preliminary investigation of the case. The filing of the information by of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias
the fiscal presupposes that he had conducted the requisite preliminary LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy
investigation pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Republic Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
Act No. 5180, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 77.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance, returning the
case to the city court, is affirmed and the two orders of the respondent Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
city judge, elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, are set
aside. The city court is directed to try the case. No costs.
CASTRO, J.:p
SO ORDERED.
I. Statement of the Case

Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-

Subversion Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines and other "subversive associations," and punishes any
person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself
with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other
similar "subversive" organization.

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of

the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co
in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de
Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima
facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the
corresponding information. The twice-amended information, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:

That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality

of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became
an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow
the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing
in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government
under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of
recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said
Communist Party of the Philippines.

That in the commission of the above offense, the following

aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:

(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to
public authorities;

(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.

(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity.

Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a

bill of attainder.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed

with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others
with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an
information was filed, which, as amended, reads:

The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly

designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the
Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above
entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias
TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE,
ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE
alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose
identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No.
1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as
follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and
thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-named
accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined
and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined
in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER
MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts
joined and/or remained as a member and became an officer and/or
ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but
also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist
Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such
officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive
organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously
commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and
stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take
up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious
conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of
the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused
conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused
delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in
arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal
means; and toward this end, the said accused organized, among others
a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La
Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an
armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious propaganda,
conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to
established in the Philippines a Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA,
together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and
others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious activities in San
Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or
by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist
Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure
or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the
statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague;
(3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof;
and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its
resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the
grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard,
and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The
Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil
action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of
attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. 3 Its essence is
the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of
guilt.4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining
legislatures to rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative
usurpation of the judicial function. 7 History in perspective, bills of
attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition
is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a
burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a
bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the
court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the
Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and
grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act,
the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and
assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP
without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally,
according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is
whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the
law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a
presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope
to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it
does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the
members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply
to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4,
against membership in the outlawed organization. The term
"Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of
the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same
purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on
conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S.
Federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder
and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent
parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve —
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or
similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other
employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical
or custodial duties) of any labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the
Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and
penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso
facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of
the governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court
of the United States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of
attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce
Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting
interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring
about political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded
the authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set
forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who
commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and
characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate
political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts and
juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified
acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in
no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared
characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without
incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6
L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That
case involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering
the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action
organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64
Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of
"Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set
forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially
directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or
foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement
referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to
advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat
989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of
attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups
upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but
instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board has
determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-
action organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to be
so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has
sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the
activities in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act.
If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these activities, after
it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate
means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be
totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone,
without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established.
The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined
the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to
further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government
by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under
the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless
imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in
the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy,
which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who
participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would
be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership
devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the
Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must
be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal
objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires
that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific
intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by
"overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct
from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the
latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal
objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not
activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A
statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting
firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the
basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be
subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the
national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound
society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and
punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which
fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even
if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku
Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace
Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor
affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of
the Communist Party and that they are not members of any
organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force
or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this
Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or
to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those
who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the
United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from
exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of
further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a
finding that they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or which made
it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer
or employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of
attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the
legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed
fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York
legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society
with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any
person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to
register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its
operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the
statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan
while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic
societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme
Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the
Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited
and reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a
difference between the two classes of associations shown by
experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency
on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose
and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal
rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on
the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the
courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the
included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this
organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by
hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the
minds of the people;" and later said of the other class: "These
organizations and their purposes are well known, many of them having
been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and
secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of
the peace or interfering with the rights of others." Another of the
courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association
or organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises
activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of
our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and
later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful
purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders
Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted
special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them
beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third court, after
recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and
observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially
demonstrated," — meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent orders,
labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and,
while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified
their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was
readily available including the published report of a hearing, before a
committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th Congress
relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan.
If so it was advised — putting aside controverted evidence — that the
order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with
additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A.
orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited to native-
born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and
printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full
adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted
of its member an oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and
in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to
be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an
enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was
conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and
stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving
for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the
administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at times it
was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its
members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the
object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the
Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In
1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the
"overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to
establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to
that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs.
Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth
organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing
the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the
existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms
to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged
in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order
that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of
attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach
past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of
attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter
observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable
because of its ex post facto features. This is the historic explanation for
uniting the two mischiefs in one clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex
post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of
attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post
facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it
cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which
provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office
or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office
or department thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within
five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised,
advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective,
become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association,
organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches or has within
said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States
of America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application
of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter
provision insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-
year period to its effective date. We assume that under the Federal
Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars
from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its
adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of
the Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing
so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable
regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an
employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which
petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare
general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and
eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any
further payment of compensationto named individuals or employees.
Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background,
the statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby
assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the
statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that
the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact
that the conduct which it regulates is describedwith such particularity
that, in probability, few organizationswill come within the statutory
terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as
harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is found to be
engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of
legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the regulated
conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering
thecourse of their own present activities, there can be no complaintof
an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion
Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein
applies only to acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only
those who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves
with,become or remain members of the Communist Party of
thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any subversive
association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere
members of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time
of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging
themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their
membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such
renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from
penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot
inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act
that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy
for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis
for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather
to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of
expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they are
thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise
mustbe justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe
reason why before enacting the statute in question Congressconducted
careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a
political party, is in fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the
purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject
to alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of
the Philippines constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the
security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion,
national in scope but international in direction,posed by the
Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities,there is urgent
need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if,
instead of making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress
omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial
magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper account of the
distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor
Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per
cent of alcohol would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether
this standard has a reasonable relationto public health, morals, and the
enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating
beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by
rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether
thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the
statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the
Constitution. Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan
ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of
judgment for weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts
which are relevant to the legislative judgment — will not be canvassed
save to determine whether there is a rationalbasis for believing that
they exist, while adjudicativefacts — those which tie the legislative
enactment to the litigant — are to be demonstrated and found
according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this
Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a
court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements
this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S.
Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-
action organizations" are controlledby the foreign government
controlling the worldCommunist movement and that they operate
primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist
movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative
findings and reject them....They are the productof extensive
investigation by Committes of Congress over morethan a decade and a
half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly
cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we
accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress
of the threatwhich Communist organizations pose not only to existing
governmentin the United States, but to the United States as asovereign,
independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of Congress to
regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative
findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the
"ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other
value, "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from
armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As
Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a
'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without force
where the existing structure of government provides for peaceful and
orderly change. We rejectany principle of governmental helplessness
in the face of preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to its
logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it
isnot within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended
tooverthrow the government by force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly
described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the
rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as
distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient
basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as
has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the
organization; and when membership is acceptedor retained with
knowledge that the organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the
one accepting or retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes
himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because
section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and
overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the
function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in
section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts
prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that membershipin the
Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas"
clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not
only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other
illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto
be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent
and other illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of
peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not
speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use
ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent
with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely,
"establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the
Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien power."
What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos:
"The language used by the appellant clearly imported anoverthrow of
the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain
and obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood.
The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the
whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the
Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of
adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the
appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to
overthrow the Government by force, violence orother illegal means.
Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is
infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the
Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial
as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding
considerationsof national security and the preservartion of
democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in
many respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion
Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group,
or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the
overthrow or destruction of any such governmentby force or violence;
or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society,
group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof —
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than
twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the
United States or any department or agencythereof, for the five years
next following his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs.
United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere
concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further
established that a combination to promote suchadvocacy, albeit under
the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is not such association
as is protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why
membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a
group engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should receive
anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that
Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof
accommodating the exigencies of self-preservationand the values of
liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the
legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that threat may
best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not
to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the
first instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation,
"whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an
effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order and
individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case
isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom the
conflict and its resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
power; (b) that the accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did
so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the
CPP continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to
declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country
under thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined
theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or
remaining a member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of
any other subversive association: weleave this matter to future
determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is
set aside, and these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo
for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.

What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is

the last proviso of section 4 which reads:

And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to
overthrow the Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the
government of any of its political subdivisionsby force, violence,
deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of placing such
Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination
of any lien power, shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision
mayor with allthe accessory penalties provided therefor in the same
code.

It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly

membership in the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar
associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow
the national or any local governmentby illegal means, even if their
intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime,
evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an aliencommunist
power, but under an alien democratic power likethe United States or
England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain,
Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."

The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe

Communist Party of the Philippines and SimilarAssociations,
Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short
title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the
statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin
general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a
foreign totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not
merely subversion by Communistconspiracies..

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents,

and need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it
indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences
of the proposed lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical
construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and
reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the
Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion

Act, we cannot overemphasize the needfor prudence and
circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive
area of freedom of expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the
following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the
Act.The Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may
affect liability, must establish the following elementsof the crime of
joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive
association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist

Party of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to
overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish
in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign