Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rule 59-Receivership
Rule 59-Receivership
has jurisdiction over petitioners' claims, the administrative policy of any court or
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board tribunal. 1 It is determined by the averments of
(HLURB) or the Securities and Exchange the complaint and not by the defense
Commission (SEC)?" The collateral issue to contained in the answer. Hence, the
14
be addressed is "assuming that the HLURB jurisdictional issue involved here shall be
has jurisdiction, may the proceedings therein determined upon an examination of the
be suspended pending the outcome of the applicable laws and the allegations of
receivership before the SEC?" petitioners' complaint before the HLURB.
For their part, petitioners argue that the Presidential Decree No. 957 (The Subdivision
complaint referring to rights of way, water, and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree)
open spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, was issued on 12 July 1976 in answer to the
security and respondent's interlocking popular call for correction of pernicious
corporations that facilitated circumvention of practices of subdivision owners and/or
its obligation involves unsound real estate developers that adversely affected the
practices. The action is for specific interests of subdivision lot buyers. Thus, one
performance of a real estate developers' of the "whereas clauses" of P.D. No. 957
obligations under P.D. No. 957, and the relief states:
sought is revocation of the subdivision
project's registration certificate and license to WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal
sell. These issues are within the jurisdiction of that many real estate subdivision
the HLURB. Even if respondent is under owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their authority to hear and decide "cases on
representations and obligations to unsound real estate business practices;
provide and maintain properly claims involving refund filed against project
subdivision roads, drainage, owners, developers, dealers, brokers or
sewerage, water systems, lighting salesmen and cases of specific performance."
systems, and other similar basic Executive Order No. 90 dated 17 December
requirements, thus endangering the 1986 renamed the HSRC as the Housing and
health and safety of home and lot Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 15
buyers. . . .
The boom in the real estate business all over
Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 957 empowered the the country resulted in more litigation between
National Housing Authority (NHA) with the subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers
"exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real with the issue of the jurisdiction of the NHA or
estate trade and business." On 2 April 1978, the HLURB over such controversies as
P.D. No. 1344 was issued to expand the against that of regular courts. In the
jurisdiction of the NHA to include the following: cases that reached this Court, the ruling has
16
broker or salesman. Court ruled that the HLURB, not the RTC, has
(Emphasis supplied.) jurisdiction over the complaint of lot buyers for
specific performance of alleged contractual
and statutory obligations of the defendants, to
Thereafter, the regulatory and quasi-judicial
wit, the execution of contracts of sale in favor
functions of the NHA were transferred to the
of the plaintiffs and the introduction in the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
disputed property of the necessary facilities
(HSRC) by virtue of Executive Order No. 648
such as asphalting and street lights.
dated 7 February 1981. Section 8 thereof
specifies the functions of the NHA that were
transferred to the HSRC including the
In the case at bar, petitioners' complaint is for they would have when they bought real estate
specific performance to enforce their rights as from it.
purchasers of subdivision lots as regards
rights of way, water, open spaces, road and Neither may petitioners be considered as
perimeter wall repairs, and security. having "claims" against respondent within the
Indisputably then, the HLURB has jurisdiction context of the following proviso of Section 6
over the complaint. (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended by P.D.
Nos. 1653, 1758 and 1799, to warrant
The fact that respondent is under receivership suspension of the HLURB proceedings:
does not divest the HLURB of that
jurisdiction. A receiver is a person appointed
1awphil
[U]pon appointment of a management
by the court, or in this instance, by a quasi- committee, rehabilitation receiver,
judicial administrative agency, in behalf of all board or body, pursuant to this
the parties for the purpose of preserving and Decree, all actions for claims against
conserving the property and preventing its corporations, partnerships or
possible destruction or dissipation, if it were associations under management or
left in the possession of any of the parties. It
19
receivership pending before any court,
is the duty of the receiver to administer the tribunal, board or body shall be
assets of the receivership estate; and in the suspended accordingly. (Emphasis
management and disposition of the property supplied.)
committed to his possession, he acts in a
fiduciary capacity and with impartiality towards In Finasia Investments and Finance
all interested persons. The appointment of a
20
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court
24
receiver does not dissolve a corporation, nor defined and explained the term "claim" in
does it interfere with the exercise of its Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended,
corporate rights. In this case where there
21
as follows:
appears to be no restraints imposed upon
respondent as it undergoes rehabilitation
We agree with the public respondent
receivership, respondent continues to exist
22
As alleged in the Complaint, through clever 18. Gainful Assets Corp., Class B
schemes, the wealth that should go to the
coffers of the government, which should be 19. Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc.
deemed acquired for the benefit of the
Republic, went to the defendants in their own 20. Luzon Stevedoring Corp.
individual accounts-some, however, through
conduits or corporations. The property 21. Amalgamated Motors (Philippines), Inc.
supposedly acquired illegally was specifically
set out in a list appended to the Complaint as 22. Philippine National Construction Corp.
Annex A. For instance, Jose L. Africa, one of
the defendants, allegedly channelled the ill- 23. Consolidated Tobacco Industries of the
gotten wealth in shares of stock in twenty (20) Philippines.5
corporations, to wit:
Another defendant, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr.,
1. Security Bank and Trust Company allegedly channelled ill-gotten wealth into
shares of stock in fifteen (15) corporations,
2. SBTC Trust, Class A, Account No. 2016 namely:
3. SBTC Trust, Class A, Account No. 2017 1. Ozamis Agricultural Development, Inc.
10. Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. 8. Silangan Investors & Managers, Inc.
e of) Roberto Benedicto 464 (revertedBesides the complaint for Injunction, POTC
to the Republic)
also filed a complaint for Mandamus against
Ponce Enrile the Republic before the Sandiganbayan to
compel the PCGG to return POTC's Stock
e of) Potenciano Ilusorio 16 (reverted to the Republic)
and Transfer Book and Stock Certificate
Booklets. The case was docketed as Civil
Pursuant to its power to sequester and to Case No. 0148.
avoid further dissipation of the sequestered
properties, the PCGG appointed a On 13 May 1993, the Sandiganbayan granted
comptroller, who controlled the disbursement the Mandamus, and the Decision became
of funds of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. At the final and executory.
same time, in a Memorandum by the PCGG
11
dated 24 October 2000 to the Bangko Sentral On 28 June 1996, Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio
ng Pilipinas (BSP), the PCGG informed the (Ilusorio), one of the defendants in the Civil
BSP that in all cash withdrawals, transfer of Case No. 0009, entered into a Compromise
funds, money market placements and Agreement with the Republic. Out of 5,400 or
disbursements of POTC and PHILCOMSAT, 40o/o of the shares of stock of POTC in the
the approval of the PCGG appointed names of Mid-Pasig Land Development
comptroller is required. The Memorandum Corporation (MLDC) and Independent Realty
was to be disseminated to all commercial Corporation (IRC), the government recovered
banks and other non-bank financial 4, 727 shares or 34.9% of the shares of stock.
institutions performing quasi-banking Ilusorio, on the other hand, retained 673
functions. shares or 5% of the shares of stock.
The Compromise Agreement was approved Motion dated 28 February 2005, which
16
the Sandiganbayan directed the Corporate Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
Secretary of POTC to issue within ten (10) denied in a Resolution dated 2 August 2006.
18
hereby DISMISSED.
Arguments of POTC and PHILCOMSAT
SO ORDERED. (Citations omitted)
15
power is merely provisional. The POTC and sequestration shall automatically be lifted. In
PHILCOMSAT cite Executive Order No. 1, the case at bar, there was no judicial action
Section 3, which grants the PCGG the power filed against POTC and PHILCOMSAT. There
to take over sequestered properties has never been any appropriate judicial action
provisionally, such that, after the sequestered for reconveyance or recovery ever instituted
properties have been finally disposed of by by the Republic against POTC and
the proper authorities, the writ shall be lifted. PHILCOMSAT.
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Roberto S. individual stockholders is not a suit against the
Benedicto, Juan Ponce Enrile, and corporation.
Potenciano Ilusorio.
Proceeding from the foregoing, as POTC and
Failure to implead POTC and PHILCOMSAT PHILCOMSAT were not impleaded, there is
is a violation of the fundamental principle that no longer any existing sequestration on POTC
a corporation has a legal personality distinct and PHILCOMSAT. The sequestration order
26
about in this case, as the writ issued against XVIII of the Constitution, if no judicial action
Aerocom, to repeat, is invalid for reasons has been filed within six (6) months after the
hereinbefore stated. Ergo, the suit in Civil ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the writ of
Case No. 0009 against Mr. Nieto and Mr. sequestration shall automatically be lifted.
Africa as shareholders in Aerocom is not and Note must be made of the fact that we do not
cannot ipso facto be a suit against the here touch our previous holding that Civil
unimpleaded Aerocom itself without violating Case No. 0009 was filed within the 6-month
the fundamental principle that a corporation period. We now say that such
has a legal personality distinct and separate notwithstanding, and as shown by the facts on
from its stockholders. Such is the ruling laid record, the POTC and PHILCOMSA T were
down in PCGG v. Jnterco reiterated anew in a not impleaded in the Civil Case.
case of more recent vintage - Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corp. and II
Allied Banking Corp. where this. Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Ricardo J. For one more reason should this Petition be
Francisco, hewed to the lone dissent of Mr. granted. This concerns the shares in
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in the very same petitioner corporations of Potenciano Ilusorio
Republic v. Sandiganbayan case herein covered by the Compromise Agreement
invoked by the PCGG, to wit: entered into between Ilusorio and PCGG,
which was upheld by the Court in Republic of
xxxx. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan, the decision in
which is now final and executory.
The basic tenets of fair play and principles of
justice dictate that a corporation, as a legal a. Sequestration is merely provisional
To effectively recover all ill-gotten wealth pending litigation. In a receivership, the
34
amassed by former President Marcos and his property is placed in the possession and
cronies, the President granted the PCGG, control of a receiver appointed by the court,
among others, power and authority to who shall conserve the property pending final
sequester, provisionally take over or freeze determination of ownership or right of
suspected ill-gotten wealth. The subject of the possession of the parties. In sequestration,
35
present case is the extent of PCGG's power to the same principle holds true. The
sequester. sequestered properties are placed under the
control of the PCGG, subject to the final
Sequestration is the means to place or cause determination of whether the property was in
to be placed under the PCGG's possession or truth ill-gotten. We reiterate the disquisition of
control properties, building or office, including this Court in BASECO:
business enterprises and entities, for the
purpose of preventing the destruction, By the clear terms of the law, the power of the
concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise PCGG to sequester property claimed to be
conserving and preserving the same until it "ill-gotten" means to place or cause to be
can be determined through appropriate placed under its possession or control said
judicial proceedings, whether the property property, or any building or office wherein any
was in truth "ill-gotten. "
28
such property and any records pertaining
thereto may be found, including "business
However, the power of the PCGG to enterprises and entities," - for the purpose of
sequester is merely provisional. None other
29 preventing the destruction, concealment or
than Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(c) dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and
expressly provides for the provisional nature preserving, the same - until it can be
of sequestration, to wit: determined, through appropriate judicial
proceedings, whether the property was in
c) To provisionally take over in the public truth "ill- gotten," i.e., acquired through or as
interest or to prevent its disposal or a result of improper or illegal use of or the
dissipation, business enterprises and conversion of funds belonging to the
properties taken over by the government of Government or any of its branches,
the Marcos Administration or by entities or instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or
persons close to former President Marcos, financial institutions, or by taking undue
until the transactions leading to such advantage of official position, authority
acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by relationship, connection or influence, resulting
the appropriate authorities. (Emphasis
30 in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner
supplied). and grave damage and prejudice to the State.
xxx. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
36
The aforesaid provision mandates the The sequestration order issued against the
Republic to file the corresponding judicial Palm Companies is therefore deemed
action or proceedings within a six-month automatically lifted due to the failure of the
period (from its ratification on February 2, Republic to commence the proper judicial
1987) in order to maintain sequestration, non- action or to implead them therein within
compliance with which would result in the the period under the
automatic lifting of the sequestration order. Constitution. However, the lifting of the writ
The Court's ruling in Presidential Commission of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to
on Good Government v. the main case since the same does not ipso
Sandiganbayan, which remains good law, facto mean that the sequestered properties
reiterates the necessity of the Republic to are, in fact, not illgotten. The effect of the
actually implead corporations as defendants lifting of the sequestration will merely be the
in the complaint, out of recognition for their termination of the government's role as
distinct and separate personalities, failure to conservator. In other words, the PCGG may
do so would necessarily be denying such no longer exercise administrative or
entities their right to due process. Here, the housekeeping powers, and its nominees may
writ of sequestration issued against the assets no longer vote the sequestered shares to
of the Palm Companies is not valid because enable them to sit in the corporate board of
the suit in Civil Case No. 0035 against the subject company. (Emphasis supplied,
43
The motion for reconsideration filed by herein A counterclaim is defined as any claim for
petitioners, praying that the bond posted by money or other relief which a defending party
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. in behalf of may have against an opposing
herein private respondents be made liable for party. However, the general rule that a
6
damages suffered by petitioners, was denied defendant cannot by a counterclaim bring into
by respondent court in its resolution dated the action any claim against persons other
January 30, 1989. Hence, this petition. than the plaintiff admits of an exception under
Section 14, Rule 6 which provides that "when
The issues raised by petitioners for resolution the presence of parties other than those to the
are whether respondent court committed original action is required for the granting of
serious errors of law amounting to grave complete relief in the determination of a
abuse of discretion and/or excess of counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall
jurisdiction: order them to be brought in as defendants, if
jurisdiction over them can be obtained." The
1. In excluding from the case and inclusion, therefore, of Cardenas in petioners'
exculpating from liability respondent counterclaim is sanctioned by the rules.
Ricardo P. Cardenas, an
indispensable party; The next question to be resolved is whether
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
2. In deleting from the decision of the person of Cardenas. It has been held that a
court a quo the awards for guarding counterclaim stands on the same footing as,
fee and unrealized profits; and and is to be tested by the same rules as if it
were, an independent action. Hence, the
7
to the original action, may not be impleaded copies of both the answer and the motion to
by petitioners in their counterclaim on the declare herein private respondents in
ground that a counterclaim cannot be filed default. Respondent Mobil filed an
10
against a person who is not an actual party to opposition to the motion to declare them in
the litigation. In effect, what respondent court default, alleging that they, the private
is saying is that the trial court did not acquire respondents herein, may not be so
jurisdiction over the person of Cardenas, declared. The court below agreed with
11
hence he cannot be held jointly liable with private respondents' reasoning therein that a
Mobil Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, Mobil for compulsory counterclaim being involved, the
short). On the contrary, petitioners submit that issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed
Cardenas is an indispensable party since he automatically joined by the allegations of the
complaint, hence the complaint itself stood as Besides, as earlier discussed, in Mobil's
the answer to defendant's counterclaim. opposition to the motion for a default order, it
Consequently, the trial court denied the categorically stated that petitioners'
motion to declare the herein private counterclaim is compulsory in nature, which
14
respondents in default. 12
was likewise the view of the trial court and the
precise reason why it denied said motion.
It is noteworthy that Cardenas did not file a Private respondents are now estopped from
motion to dismiss the counterclaim against claiming otherwise. In the recent case of Sun
him on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. While Insurance Office, Ltd., et
it is a settled rule that the issue of jurisdiction al. vs. Hon. Asuncion, et al. involving the
15
may be raised even for the first time on rule on payment of docket fees in ordinary
appeal, this does not obtain in the instant actions, the rule was affirmed and made to
case. Although it was only Mobil which filed an apply specifically to permissive counterclaims
opposition to the motion to declare in default, only, thereby excluding compulsory
the fact that the trial court denied said motion, counterclaims from its purview.
both as to Mobil and Cardenas on the ground
that Mobil's complaint should be considered As to the second assigned error, the finding of
as the answer to petioners' compulsory the Court of Appeals that no sufficient and
counterclaim, leads us to the inescapable substantial evidence exists to warrant an
conclusion that the trial court treated the award of guarding fees and unearned profits
opposition as having been filed in behalf of is conclusively binding on this Court, for failure
both Mobil and Cardenas and that the latter of private respondents to show that the
had adopted as his answer the allegations appellate court acted with grave abuse of
raised in the complaint of Mobil. Obviously, it discretion or erred in making such finding.
was this ratiocination which led the trial court Fundamental is the rule that findings of fact of
to deny the motion to declare Mobil and the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed
Cardenas in default. Furthermore, Cardenas unless shown to have been rendered with
was not unaware of said incidents and the arbitrariness, nor are any of the
proceedings therein as he testified and was jurisprudentially accepted exceptions thereto
present during the trial, not to speak of the present in this case.
fact that as manager of Mobil he would
necessarily be interested in the case and Anent the issue on the surety's liability upon
could readily have access to the records and the replevin bond, we do not believe that
pleadings filed therein. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. should be made
liable thereon. As correctly observed by
By adopting as his answer the allegations in respondent court, "the damages awarded by
the complaint which seeks affirmative relief, the trial court were based on Articles 19 and
Cardenas is deemed to have recognized the 20 of the New Civil Code and not on the
jurisdiction of the trial court over his person deprivation of personal properties subject of
and submitted thereto. He may not now be the replevin bond. Moreover, no judgment
heard to repudiate or question that was entered for the return of the properties
jurisdiction.
13
subject of the replevin bond to the defendant,
the latter never having raised the issue of
Mobil likewise questions the jurisdiction of the rightful possession to the said properties." 16
Branch 16.
We, therefore, find and so hold that private
On October 17, 2005, Judge Renato A.
respondent Ricardo P. Cardenas should be
Fuentes3 issued an Order of Seizure4 against
held jointly and severally liable with his co-
22 motor vehicles allegedly owned by the
respondent Mobil Philippines, Inc. for having
complainant. On the strength of the said
acted in bad faith by impeding and preventing
order, Andres was able to seize two of the
the award of the dealership to petitioners
subject motor vehicles on October 17, 2005;
through fraudulent means.
four on October 18, 2005, and another three
on October 19, 2005, or a total of nine motor
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from vehicles.5
is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that respondents Mobil Philipines, Inc. and
In his Affidavit-Complaint6 against Andres
Ricardo P. Cardenas are held jointly and
before the Office of the Court Administrator
severally liable to herein petitioners Marino
(OCA), Hao alleged that Andres gave undue
and Lina Joel Sapugay.
advantage to Zenaida Silver in the
implementation of the order and that Andres
SO ORDERED. seized the nine motor vehicles in an
oppressive manner. Hao also averred that
Andres was accompanied by unidentified
armed personnel on board a military vehicle
SECOND DIVISION which was excessive since there were no
resistance from them. Hao also discovered
A.M. No. P-07-2384 June 18, 2008 that the compound where the seized motor
vehicles were placed is actually owned by
Silver.7
KENNETH HAO, complainant,
vs.
On October 21, 2005, in view of the approval Police Office. Andres also maintained that no
of the complainant’s counter-replevin bond, form of harassment or oppression was
Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio8 ordered Andres committed during the implementation of the
to immediately cease and desist from further order, claiming that the presence of the
implementing the order of seizure, and to policemen was only for the purpose of
return the seized motor vehicles including its preserving peace and order, considering there
accessories to their lawful owners.9 were 22 motor vehicles specified in the Order
of Seizure. Andres added that he exercised
However, on October 24, 2005, eight of the no discretion in the selection of the policemen
nine seized motor vehicles were reported who assisted in the implementation of the
missing. In his report,10 Andres stated that he order, much less of those who will guard the
was shocked to find that the motor vehicles seized motor vehicles.
were already missing when he inspected it on
October 22, 2005. He narrated that on Andres disputed the allegation that he
October 21, 2005, PO3 Rodrigo Despe, one neglected his duty to safeguard the seized
of the policemen guarding the subject motor vehicles by pointing out that he placed all the
vehicles, reported to him that a certain motor vehicles under police watch. He added
"Nonoy" entered the compound and caused that the policemen had control of the
the duplication of the vehicles’ keys.11 But compound where the seized motor vehicles
Andres claimed the motor vehicles were still were kept.
intact when he inspected it on October 21,
2005. Andres likewise contended that after the
unauthorized duplication of the vehicles’ keys
Subsequently, Hao reported that three of the was reported to him, he immediately advised
carnapped vehicles were recovered by the the policemen on duty to watch the motor
police.12 He then accused Andres of vehicles closely.14 He negated the
conspiring and conniving with Atty. Oswaldo speculations that he was involved in the
Macadangdang (Silver’s counsel) and the disappearance of the seized motor vehicles
policemen in the carnapping of the motor as he claims to be the one who reported the
vehicles. Hao also accused Andres of incident to the court and the police.
concealing the depository receipts from them
and pointed out that the depository receipts As to the allegation of undisclosed depository
show that Silver and Atty. Macadangdang receipts, Andres maintained that he never
were the ones who chose the policemen who denied the existence of the depository
will guard the motor vehicles. receipts. He said the existence of the
depository receipts was immediately made
In his Comment13 dated March 3, 2006, known on the same day that the subject motor
Andres vehemently denied violating Rep. Act vehicles were discovered missing. He even
No. 3019 and committing gross neglect of used the same in the filing of the carnapping
duty. case against Silver and her co-conspirators.
Andres denied implementing the Order of Finally, Andres insisted that the guarding of
Seizure in an oppressive manner. He said he properties under custodia legis by policemen
took the vehicles because they were the is not prohibited, but is even adopted by the
specific vehicles ordered to be seized after court. Hence, he prays that he be held not
checking their engine and chassis numbers. liable for the loss of the vehicles and that he
Andres likewise denied that he was be relieved of his duty to return the vehicles.15
accompanied by military personnel in the
implementation of the order. He claimed that After the OCA recommended that the matter
he was merely escorted by policemen be investigated, we referred the case to
pursuant to the directive of Police Senior Supt. Executive Judge Renato A. Fuentes for
Catalino S. Cuy, Chief of the Davao City investigation, report and recommendation.16
In his Investigation Report17 dated September Judge Fuentes also observed that Andres
21, 2006, Judge Fuentes found Andres guilty appeared to be more or less accommodating
of serious negligence in the custody of the to Silver and her counsel but hostile and
nine motor vehicles. He recommended that uncooperative to the complainant. He pointed
Andres be suspended from office. out that Andres depended solely on Silver in
the selection of the policemen who would
Judge Fuentes found numerous irregularities guard the seized motor vehicles. He added
in the implementation of the writ of that even the depository receipts were not
replevin/order of seizure, to wit: (1) at the time turned over to the defendants/third-party
of the implementation of the writ, Andres knew claimants in the replevin case but were in fact
that the vehicles to be seized were not in the concealed from them. Andres also gave
names of any of the parties to the case; (2) inconsistent testimonies as to whether he has
one vehicle was taken without the knowledge in his possession the depository receipts.20
of its owner, a certain Junard Escudero; (3)
Andres allowed Atty. Macadangdang to get a The OCA disagreed with the observations of
keymaster to duplicate the vehicles’ keys in Judge Fuentes. It recommended that Andres
order to take one motor vehicle; and (4) be held liable only for simple neglect of duty
Andres admitted that prior to the and be suspended for one (1) month and one
implementation of the writ of seizure, he (1) day.21
consulted Silver and Atty. Macadangdang
regarding the implementation of the writ and We adopt the recommendation of the
was accompanied by the latter in the course investigating judge.
of the implementation. Judge Fuentes
observed that the motor vehicles were Being an officer of the court, Andres must be
speedily seized without strictly observing aware that there are well-defined steps
fairness and regularity in its implementation.18 provided in the Rules of Court regarding the
proper implementation of a writ of replevin
Anent the safekeeping of the seized motor and/or an order of seizure. The Rules,
vehicles, Judge Fuentes pointed out several likewise, is explicit on the duty of the sheriff in
instances where Andres lacked due diligence its implementation. To recapitulate what
to wit: (1) the seized motor vehicles were should be common knowledge to sheriffs, the
placed in a compound surrounded by an pertinent provisions of Rule 60, of the Rules of
insufficiently locked see-through fence; (2) Court are quoted hereunder:
three motor vehicles were left outside the
compound; (3) Andres turned over the key of SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff.–Upon
the gate to the policemen guarding the motor receiving such order, the sheriff must
vehicles; (4) Andres does not even know the serve a copy thereof on the adverse
full name of the owner of the compound, who party, together with a copy of the
was merely known to him as "Gloria"; (5) application, affidavit and bond,
except for PO3 Despe and SPO4 Nelson and must forthwith take the
Salcedo, the identities of the other policemen property, if it be in the possession
tapped to guard the compound were unknown of the adverse party, or his agent,
to Andres; (6) Andres also admitted that he and retain it in his custody. If the
only stayed at least one hour each day from property or any part thereof be
October 19-21, 2005 during his visits to the concealed in a building or enclosure,
compound; and (7) even after it was reported the sheriff must demand its delivery,
to him that a certain "Nonoy" entered the and if it be not delivered, he must
compound and duplicated the keys of the cause the building or enclosure to be
motor vehicles, he did not exert his best effort broken open and take the property
to look for that "Nonoy" and to confiscate the into his possession. After the sheriff
duplicated keys.19 has taken possession of the
property as herein provided, he
must keep it in a secure place and Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with
shall be responsible for its delivery regard to the proper disposal of the property.
to the party entitled thereto upon
receiving his fees and necessary It matters not that Silver was in possession of
expenses for taking and keeping the seized vehicles merely for safekeeping as
the same. (Emphasis supplied.) stated in the depository receipts. The rule is
clear that the property seized should not be
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the
sheriff.–If within five (5) days after sheriff must retain custody of the seized
the taking of the property by the property for at least five days.23 Hence, the act
sheriff, the adverse party does not of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles
object to the sufficiency of the bond, or immediately after seizure to Silver for
of the surety or sureties thereon; or if whatever purpose, without observing the five-
the adverse party so objects and the day requirement finds no legal justification.
court affirms its approval of the
applicant’s bond or approves a new In Pardo v. Velasco,24 this Court held that
bond, or if the adverse party requires
the return of the property but his bond …Respondent as an officer of the
is objected to and found insufficient Court is charged with certain
and he does not forthwith file an ministerial duties which must be
approved bond, the property shall be performed faithfully to the letter. Every
delivered to the applicant. If for any provision in the Revised Rules of
reason the property is not delivered to Court has a specific reason or
the applicant, the sheriff must return it objective. In this case, the purpose
to the adverse party. (Emphasis of the five (5) days is to give a
supplied.) chance to the defendant to object
to the sufficiency of the bond or the
First, the rules provide that property seized surety or sureties thereon or
under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered require the return of the property by
immediately to the plaintiff.22 In accordance filing a counterbond.…25 (Emphasis
with the said rules, Andres should have waited supplied.)
no less than five days in order to give the
complainant an opportunity to object to the In Sebastian v. Valino,26 this Court reiterated
sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or that
sureties thereon, or require the return of the
seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, the
This, he failed to do.
property seized under a writ of
replevin is not to be delivered
Records show that Andres took possession of immediately to the plaintiff. The
two of the subject motor vehicles on October sheriff must retain it in his custody
17, 2005, four on October 18, 2005, and for five days and he shall return it to
another three on October 19, 2005. the defendant, if the latter, as in the
Simultaneously, as evidenced by the instant case, requires its return and
depository receipts, on October 18, 2005, files a counterbond.…27 (Emphasis
Silver received from Andres six of the seized supplied.)
motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles
on October 19, 2005. Consequently, there is
Likewise, Andres’ claim that he had no
no question that Silver was already in
knowledge that the compound is owned by
possession of the nine seized vehicles
Silver fails to convince us. Regardless of who
immediately after seizure, or no more than
actually owns the compound, the fact remains
three days after the taking of the vehicles.
that Andres delivered the vehicles to Silver
Thus, Andres committed a clear violation of
prematurely. It violates the rule requiring him
to safekeep the vehicles in his custody.28 The the order to return the seized vehicles
alleged lack of facility to store the seized ineffectual to the prejudice of the complaining
vehicles is unacceptable considering that he owners.
should have deposited the same in a bonded
warehouse. If this was not feasible, he should It must be stressed that as court custodian, it
have sought prior authorization from the court was Andres’ responsibility to ensure that the
issuing the writ before delivering the vehicles motor vehicles were safely kept and that the
to Silver. same were readily available upon order of the
court or demand of the parties concerned.
Second, it must be stressed that from the Specifically, sheriffs, being ranking officers of
moment an order of delivery in replevin is the court and agents of the law, must
executed by taking possession of the property discharge their duties with great care and
specified therein, such property is in custodia diligence. In serving and implementing court
legis. As legal custodian, it is Andres’ duty to writs, as well as processes and orders of the
safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence, court, they cannot afford to err without
when he passed his duty to safeguard the affecting adversely the proper dispensation of
motor vehicles to Silver, he committed a clear justice. Sheriffs play an important role in the
neglect of duty. administration of justice and as agents of the
law, high standards of performance are
Third, we are appalled that even after PO3 expected of them.29 Hence, his failure to return
Despe reported the unauthorized duplication the motor vehicles at the time when its return
of the vehicles’ keys, Andres failed to take was still feasible constitutes another instance
extra precautionary measures to ensure the of neglect of duty.
safety of the vehicles. It is obvious that the
vehicles were put at risk by the unauthorized Fifth, as found by the OCA, we agree that
duplication of the keys of the vehicles. Neither Andres also disregarded the provisions of
did he immediately report the incident to the Rule 14130 of the Rules of Court with regard to
police or to the court. The loss of the motor payment of expenses.
vehicles could have been prevented if Andres
immediately asked the court for an order to Under Section 9,31 Rule 141 of the Rules of
transfer the vehicles to another secured place Court, the procedure for the execution of writs
as soon as he discovered the unauthorized and other processes are: First, the sheriff
duplication. Under these circumstances, even must make an estimate of the expenses to be
an ordinary prudent man would have incurred by him; Second, he must obtain court
exercised extra diligence. His warning to the approval for such estimated expenses; Third,
policemen to closely watch the vehicles was the approved estimated expenses shall be
insufficient. Andres cannot toss back to Silver deposited by the interested party with the
or to the policemen the responsibility for the Clerk of Court and ex officio sheriff; Fourth,
loss of the motor vehicles since he remains the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount
chiefly responsible for their safekeeping as to the executing sheriff; and Fifth, the
legal custodian thereof. Indeed, Andres’ executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses
failure to take the necessary precaution and within the same period for rendering a return
proper monitoring of the vehicles to ensure its on the writ.
safety constitutes plain negligence.
In this case, no estimate of sheriff’s expenses
Fourth, despite the cease and desist order, was submitted to the court by Andres. Without
Andres failed to return the motor vehicles to approval of the court, he also allowed Silver to
their lawful owners. Instead of returning the pay directly to the policemen the expenses for
motor vehicles immediately as directed, he the safeguarding of the motor vehicles
opted to write Silver and demand that she put including their meals.32 Obviously, this practice
up an indemnity bond to secure the third-party departed from the accepted procedure
claims. Consequently, due to his delay, the provided in the Rules of Court.
eventual loss of the motor vehicles rendered
In view of the foregoing, there is no doubt that by the parties to a suit or the citizenry in our
Andres failed to live up to the standards judicial process. Those responsible for such
required of his position. The number of act or omission cannot escape the disciplinary
instances that Andres strayed from the regular power of this Court.
course observed in the proper implementation
of the orders of the court cannot be Anent the allegation of grave abuse of
countenanced. Thus, taking into account the authority (oppression), we likewise agree with
numerous times he was found negligent and the observations of the investigating judge.
careless of his duties coupled with his utter Records show that Andres started enforcing
disregard of legal procedures, he cannot be the writ of replevin/order of seizure on the
considered guilty merely of simple negligence. same day that the order of seizure was
His acts constitute gross negligence. issued. He also admitted that he took the
vehicles of persons who are not parties to the
As we have previously ruled: replevin case.36 He further admitted that he
took one vehicle belonging to a certain Junard
…Gross negligence refers to Escudero without the latter’s knowledge and
negligence characterized by the want even caused the duplication of its keys in
of even slight care, acting or order that it may be taken by
omitting to act in a situation where Andres.37 Certainly, these are indications that
there is a duty to act, not Andres enforced the order of seizure with
inadvertently but willfully and undue haste and without giving the
intentionally, with a conscious complainant prior notice or reasonable time to
indifference to consequences in so deliver the motor vehicles. Hence, Andres is
far as other persons may be guilty of grave abuse of authority
affected. It is the omission of that (oppression).
care which even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff,
on their own property.…33 (Emphasis it is his duty, in the absence of any
supplied.) instructions to the contrary, to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness to
…Gross neglect, on the other hand, execute it according to its mandate. However,
is such neglect from the gravity of the prompt implementation of an order of
the case, or the frequency of seizure is called for only in instances where
instances, becomes so serious in there is no question regarding the right of the
its character as to endanger or plaintiff to the property.38 Where there is such
threaten the public welfare. The a question, the prudent recourse for Andres is
term does not necessarily include to desist from executing the order and convey
willful neglect or intentional official the information to his judge and to the plaintiff.
wrongdoing.34 (Emphasis supplied.)
True, sheriffs must comply with their
Good faith on the part of Andres, or lack of it, mandated ministerial duty to implement writs
in proceeding to properly execute his mandate promptly and expeditiously, but equally true is
would be of no moment, for he is chargeable the principle that sheriffs by the nature of their
with the knowledge that being an officer of the functions must at all times conduct
court tasked therefor, it behooves him to make themselves with propriety and decorum and
due compliance. He is expected to live up to act above suspicion. There must be no room
the exacting standards of his office and his for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and
conduct must at all times be characterized by deputy sheriffs as officers of the court have
rectitude and forthrightness, and so above conspired with any of the parties to a case to
suspicion and mistrust as well.35 Thus, an act obtain a favorable judgment or immediate
of gross neglect resulting in loss of properties execution. The sheriff is at the front line as
in custodia legis ruins the confidence lodged representative of the judiciary and by his act
he may build or destroy the institution.39
However, as to the charge of graft and SO ORDERED.
corruption, it must be stressed that the same
is criminal in nature, thus, the resolution
thereof cannot be threshed out in the instant
administrative proceeding. We also take note
THIRD DIVISION
that there is a pending criminal case for
carnapping against Andres;40 hence, with
more reason that we cannot rule on the G.R. No. 182963 June 3, 2013
allegation of graft and corruption as it may
preempt the court in its resolution of the said SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON
case. AGNER, Petitioners,
vs.
We come to the matter of penalties. The BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK,
imposable penalty for gross neglect of duty is INC., Respondent.
dismissal. While the penalty imposable for
grave abuse of authority (oppression) is DECISION
suspension for six (6) months one (1) day to
one (1) year.41 Section 55, Rule IV, of the PERALTA, J.:
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service provides that if the respondent is This is a petition for review on certiorari
found guilty of two or more charges or counts, assailing the April 30, 2007 Decision1 and May
the penalty to be imposed should be that 19, 2008 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals in
corresponding to the most serious charge or CAG.R. CV No. 86021, which affirmed the
count and the rest shall be considered as August 11, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional
aggravating circumstances. Trial Court, Branch 33, Manila City.
In the instant case, the penalty for the more On February 15, 2001, petitioners spouses
serious offense which is dismissal should be Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a
imposed on Andres. However, following Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in
Sections 5342 and 54,43 Rule IV of the Uniform favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract provides,
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil among others, that: for receiving the amount
Service, we have to consider that Andres is a of Php834, 768.00, petitioners shall pay Php
first-time offender; hence, a lighter penalty 17,391.00 every 15th day of each succeeding
than dismissal from the service would suffice. month until fully paid; the loan is secured by a
Consequently, instead of imposing the penalty 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and
of dismissal, the penalty of suspension from an interest of 6% per month shall be imposed
office for one (1) year without pay is proper for for failure to pay each installment on or before
gross neglect of duty, and another six (6) the stated due date.4
months should be added for the aggravating
circumstance of grave abuse of authority On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all
(oppression). its rights, title and interests in the Promissory
Note with Chattel Mortgage to ABN AMRO
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Abe C. Savings Bank, Inc. (ABN AMRO), which, on
Andres, Sheriff IV, RTC of Davao City, Branch May 31, 2002, likewise assigned the same to
16, GUILTY of gross neglect of duty and respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.5
grave abuse of authority (oppression) and
is SUSPENDED for one (1) year and six (6) For failure to pay four successive installments
months without pay. He is also from May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002,
hereby WARNED that a repetition of the same respondent, through counsel, sent to
or similar offenses in the future shall be dealt petitioners a demand letter dated August 29,
with more severely. 2002, declaring the entire obligation as due
and demandable and requiring to pay
Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged circumstances, their relation to each other and
vehicle immediately upon receiving the to the whole, and the probabilities of the
letter.6 As the demand was left unheeded, situation.11 Time and again, We stress that this
respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action Court is not a trier of facts and generally does
for Replevin and Damages before the Manila not weigh anew evidence which lower courts
Regional Trial Court (RTC). have passed upon.
A writ of replevin was issued.7 Despite this, As to the second issue, records bear that both
the subject vehicle was not seized.8 Trial on verbal and written demands were in fact made
the merits ensued. On August 11, 2005, the by respondent prior to the institution of the
Manila RTC Br. 33 ruled for the respondent case against petitioners.12 Even assuming, for
and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally argument’s sake, that no demand letter was
pay the amount of Php576,664.04 plus sent by respondent, there is really no need for
interest at the rate of 72% per annum from it because petitioners legally waived the
August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs necessity of notice or demand in the
of suit. Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, which
they voluntarily and knowingly signed in favor
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of respondent’s predecessor-in-interest. Said
of Appeals (CA), but the CA affirmed the lower contract expressly stipulates:
court’s decision and, subsequently, denied the
motion for reconsideration; hence, this In case of my/our failure to pay when due and
petition. payable, any sum which I/We are obliged to
pay under this note and/or any other
Before this Court, petitioners argue that: (1) obligation which I/We or any of us may now or
respondent has no cause of action, because in the future owe to the holder of this note or
the Deed of Assignment executed in its favor to any other party whether as principal or
did not specifically mention ABN AMRO’s guarantor x x x then the entire sum
account receivable from petitioners; (2) outstanding under this note shall, without prior
petitioners cannot be considered to have notice or demand, immediately become due
defaulted in payment for lack of competent and payable. (Emphasis and underscoring
proof that they received the demand letter; supplied)
and (3) respondent’s remedy of resorting to
both actions of replevin and collection of sum A provision on waiver of notice or demand has
of money is contrary to the provision of Article been recognized as legal and valid in Bank of
14849 of the Civil Code and the Elisco Tool the Philippine Islands v. Court of
Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,13 wherein We held:
Appeals10 ruling.
The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that
The contentions are untenable. one incurs in delay or is in default from the
time the obligor demands the fulfillment of the
With respect to the first issue, it would be obligation from the obligee. However, the law
sufficient to state that the matter surrounding expressly provides that demand is not
the Deed of Assignment had already been necessary under certain circumstances, and
considered by the trial court and the CA. one of these circumstances is when the
Likewise, it is an issue of fact that is not a parties expressly waive demand. Hence, since
proper subject of a petition for review under the co-signors expressly waived demand in
Rule 45. An issue is factual when the doubt or the promissory notes, demand was
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood unnecessary for them to be in default.14
of alleged facts, or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence, considering Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v.
mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence Escobido15 that prior demand is not a condition
and relevancy of specific surrounding precedent to an action for a writ of replevin,
since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of doubt – is required in view of the criminal
the Rules of Court that requires the applicant nature of the case, We found insufficient the
to make a demand on the possessor of the mere presentation of a copy of the demand
property before an action for a writ of replevin letter allegedly sent through registered mail
could be filed. and its corresponding registry receipt as proof
of receiving the notice of dishonor.
Also, petitioners’ representation that they
have not received a demand letter is Perusing over the records, what is clear is that
completely inconsequential as the mere act of petitioners did not take advantage of all the
sending it would suffice. Again, We look into opportunities to present their evidence in the
the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, proceedings before the courts below. They
which provides: miserably failed to produce the original cash
deposit slips proving payment of the monthly
All correspondence relative to this mortgage, amortizations in question. Not even a
including demand letters, summonses, photocopy of the alleged proof of payment
subpoenas, or notifications of any judicial or was appended to their Answer or shown
extrajudicial action shall be sent to the during the trial. Neither have they
MORTGAGOR at the address indicated on demonstrated any written requests to
this promissory note with chattel mortgage or respondent to furnish them with official
at the address that may hereafter be given in receipts or a statement of account. Worse,
writing by the MORTGAGOR to the petitioners were not able to make a formal
MORTGAGEE or his/its assignee. The mere offer of evidence considering that they have
act of sending any correspondence by mail or not marked any documentary evidence during
by personal delivery to the said address shall the presentation of Deo Agner’s testimony.19
be valid and effective notice to the mortgagor
for all legal purposes and the fact that any Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases,
communication is not actually received by the one who pleads payment has the burden of
MORTGAGOR or that it has been returned proving it; the burden rests on the defendant
unclaimed to the MORTGAGEE or that no to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff
person was found at the address given, or to prove non-payment.20 When the creditor is
that the address is fictitious or cannot be in possession of the document of credit, proof
located shall not excuse or relieve the of non-payment is not needed for it is
MORTGAGOR from the effects of such presumed.21 Respondent's possession of the
notice.16 (Emphasis and underscoring Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage
supplied) strongly buttresses its claim that the obligation
has not been extinguished. As held in Bank of
The Court cannot yield to petitioners’ denial in the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Royeca:22
receiving respondent’s demand letter. To
note, their postal address evidently remained x x x The creditor's possession of the
unchanged from the time they executed the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage up to been discharged by payment. A promissory
time the case was filed against them. Thus, note in the hands of the creditor is a proof of
the presumption that "a letter duly directed indebtedness rather than proof of payment. In
and mailed was received in the regular course an action for replevin by a mortgagee, it is
of the mail"17 stands in the absence of prima facie evidence that the promissory note
satisfactory proof to the contrary. has not been paid. Likewise, an uncanceled
mortgage in the possession of the mortgagee
Petitioners cannot find succour from Ting v. gives rise to the presumption that the
Court of Appeals18 simply because it pertained mortgage debt is unpaid.23
to violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the
Bouncing Checks Law. As a higher quantum Indeed, when the existence of a debt is fully
of proof – that is, proof beyond reasonable established by the evidence contained in the
record, the burden of proving that it has been repossession, bonding fees and other
extinguished by payment devolves upon the incidental expenses to be proved
debtor who offers such defense to the claim of during the trial; and
the creditor.24 The debtor has the burden of
showing with legal certainty that the obligation 3. Ordering defendants to pay the
has been discharged by payment.25 costs of suit.
Lastly, there is no violation of Article 1484 of Plaintiff also prays for such further reliefs as
the Civil Code and the Court’s decision in this Honorable Court may deem just and
Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corporation v. equitable under the premises.27
Court of Appeals.26
The Court therein ruled:
In Elisco, petitioner's complaint contained the
following prayer: The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are
alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that judgment one bars the exercise of the others. This
be rendered as follows: limitation applies to contracts purporting to be
leases of personal property with option to buy
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION by virtue of Art. 1485. The condition that the
lessor has deprived the lessee of possession
Ordering defendant Rolando Lantan to pay or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of
the plaintiff the sum of ₱39,054.86 plus legal applying Art. 1485 was fulfilled in this case by
interest from the date of demand until the the filing by petitioner of the complaint for
whole obligation is fully paid; replevin to recover possession of movable
property. By virtue of the writ of seizure issued
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION by the trial court, the deputy sheriff seized the
vehicle on August 6, 1986 and thereby
deprived private respondents of its use. The
To forthwith issue a Writ of Replevin ordering
car was not returned to private respondent
the seizure of the motor vehicle more
until April 16, 1989, after two (2) years and
particularly described in paragraph 3 of the
eight (8) months, upon issuance by the Court
Complaint, from defendant Rolando Lantan
of Appeals of a writ of execution.
and/or defendants Rina Lantan, John Doe,
Susan Doe and other person or persons in
whose possession the said motor vehicle may Petitioner prayed that private respondents be
be found, complete with accessories and made to pay the sum of ₱39,054.86, the
equipment, and direct deliver thereof to amount that they were supposed to pay as of
plaintiff in accordance with law, and after due May 1986, plus interest at the legal rate. At
hearing to confirm said seizure and plaintiff's the same time, it prayed for the issuance of a
possession over the same; writ of replevin or the delivery to it of the motor
vehicle "complete
PRAYER COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF
ACTION with accessories and equipment." In the event
the car could not be delivered to petitioner, it
was prayed that private respondent Rolando
1. Ordering the defendant Rolando
Lantan be made to pay petitioner the amount
Lantan to pay the plaintiff an amount
of ₱60,000.00, the "estimated actual value" of
equivalent to twenty-five percent
the car, "plus accrued monthly rentals thereof
(25%) of his outstanding obligation, for
with interests at the rate of fourteen percent
and as attorney's fees;
(14%) per annum until fully paid." This prayer
of course cannot be granted, even assuming
2. Ordering defendants to pay the cost that private respondents have defaulted in the
or expenses of collection, payment of their obligation. This led the trial
court to say that petitioner wanted to eat its respondent pursued, commenced or
cake and have it too.28 concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial
court, therefore, rightfully granted the
In contrast, respondent in this case prayed: alternative prayer for sum of money, which is
equivalent to the remedy of "exacting
(a) Before trial, and upon filing and fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is
approval of the bond, to forthwith no double recovery or unjust enrichment30 to
issue a Writ of Replevin ordering the speak of. 1âwphi1
ABAD, OMAR ABAS, HANAPI ABDULLAH, accompanied by Plaintiffs Bond for Manual
ROJEA AB ABDULLAH, ABDULLAH Delivery of Personal Property issued by 7
This is a petition for review Delivery Receipt showing that the court
11
on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside sheriff took possession of 228 certificates of
the July 9, 2008 Decision and the January 21,
1
title from GFSME.
2011 Resolution of the Court of
2
Branch 16, Davao City (RTC), in Civil Case On December 20, 2001, DBP and GFSME
No. 28,721-01. filed their Joint Motion to Order Plaintiffs to
Return Titles to Defendants DBP and
GFSME. After Abad, et al. filed their
13
The Antecedents
opposition, the RTC issued the Order, dated 14
The Subject Motion against the Bond THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
BLIND ADHERENCE TO AND STRICT
Due to the non-delivery of the certificates of APPLICATION OF SECTION 20, RULE 57
title by Abad, et al., DBP filed OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
its Motion/Application to Call on Plaintiff's PROCEDURE. 21
praying for the release of the bond issued by Petitioner DBP argues that it could not have
CBIC to answer for the damages it sustained anticipated that Abad, et al.
as a result of the failure to return the 228 (respondents) would not abide by the writ of
certificates of title. execution; hence, prior to such failure of
execution, it would be premature to claim for
The RTC Ruling damages against the bond because DBP had
not yet suffered any consequential damages
In its Order, dated May 17, 2004, the RTC with the implementation of the writ of seizure;
denied the subject motion explaining that the and that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of
resolution of the motion was no longer part of Court was not applicable as the damages
its residual power. It pointed out that although resulting from the improper issuance of the
there was indeed an order to return the 228 writ of seizure occurred only after the
certificates of title to DBP, it was not made as unjustified refusal of respondents to return the
a result of a trial of the case, but as a titles despite the order from the RTC.
consequence of the order of dismissal based
on improper venue. In its Comment, dated August 11, 2011,
22
which do not involve any matter litigated by on the difference between a dismissal with
the appeal; to approve compromises; to prejudice and one without prejudice:
permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order
execution pending appeal in accordance with We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from
Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the a dismissal without prejudice. The former
withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are disallows and bars the refiling of the
done prior to the transmittal of the original complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said
record or the record on appeal, even if the of a dismissal without prejudice. Likewise,
appeal has already been perfected or despite where the law permits, a dismissal with
the approval of the record on appeal or in
24 prejudice is subject to the right of appeal.1âwphi1
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the Here, the RTC dismissed the replevin case on
plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, the ground of improper venue. Such dismissal
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; is one without prejudice and does not bar the
refiling of the same action; hence, it is not
(i) That the claim on which the action is appealable. Clearly, the RTC did not reach,
founded is unenforceable under the provisions and could not have reached, the residual
of the statute of frauds; and jurisdiction stage as the case was dismissed
due to improper venue, and such order of
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the dismissal could not be the subject of an
claim has not been complied with. appeal. Without the perfection of an appeal,
let alone the unavailability of the remedy of
Section 5 of the same Rule, recites the effect appeal, the RTC did not acquire residual
of a dismissal under Sections 1(f), (h), and (i), jurisdiction. Hence, it is erroneous to conclude
thereof, thus: that the RTC may rule on DBP's application
for damages pursuant to its residual powers.
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject to the
right of appeal, an order granting a motion to Equity cannot supersede the
dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Rules of Court
section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the
same action or claim. DBP admits that it filed the application for
damages after the order of dismissal had
become final and executory. In seeking relief executory, with due notice to the attaching
from this Court, however, it invokes equity and creditor and his surety or sureties, setting forth
argues that a strict application of Section 20, the facts showing his right to damages and
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court would prejudice the amount thereof.
its right to recover damages arising from the
improper attachment of the certificates of title. If the judgment of the appellate court be
favorable to the party against whom the
DBP, however, must be reminded that equity, attachment was issued, he must claim
"which has been aptly described as a 'justice damages sustained during the pendency
outside legality,' is applied only in the absence of the appeal by filing an application with
of, and never against, statutory law or, as in notice to the party in whose favor the
this case, judicial rules of procedure. The
30
attachment was issued or his surety or
pertinent positive rules being present here, sureties, before the judgment of the appellate
they should preempt and prevail over all court becomes executory. The appellate court
abstract arguments based only on equity." As
31
may allow the application to be heard and
the Court has stated in Lim Tupas v. decided by the trial court. [Emphases
CA, "[ e]motional appeals for justice, while
32
supplied]
they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot
justify disregard of the mandate of the law as In other words, to recover damages on a
long as it remains in force. The applicable replevin bond (or on a bond for preliminary
maxim, which goes back to the ancient days attachment, injunction or receivership), it is
of the Roman jurists - and is now still necessary (1) that the defendant-claimant has
reverently observed - is 'aequetas nunquam secured a favorable judgment in the main
contravenit legis.'"
33
action, meaning that the plaintiff has no cause
of action and was not, therefore, entitled to
Accordingly, the CA did not commit any the provisional remedy of replevin; (2) that the
reversible error when it applied the rules of application for damages, showing claimant's
procedure in resolving the issue at hand. right thereto and the amount thereof, be filed
in the same action before trial or before
The application for damages appeal is perfected or before the judgment
was belatedly filed becomes executory; (3) that due notice be
given to the other party and his surety or
Section 10, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court sureties, notice to the principal not being
provides that in replevin cases, as in sufficient; and (4) that there should be a
receivership and injunction cases, the proper hearing and the award for damages
damages to be awarded to either party upon should be included in the final judgment. 34
for damages bars the filing of a motion for a agrees that the creditor, after proceeding
writ of seizure, a writ of execution or any other against the principal, may proceed against the
applicable remedy. DBP, from the beginning, guarantor if the principal is unable to pay.
had already perceived the attachment to be Moreover, he contracts to pay if, by the use of
improper; hence, it could have easily filed an due diligence, the debt cannot be made out of
application before the judgment became the principal debtor.39
executory.
Further, it may file an action for damages
In Jao v. Royal Financing Corporation, the
36
based on Article 19 of the New Civil Code
Court precluded the defendant therein from against respondents for unlawfully taking the
claiming damages against the surety bond certificates of title, which served as security
because it failed to file the application for for their loan. In Globe Mackay Cable and
damages before the termination of the case, Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the 40
xxx The dismissal of the case filed by the This article, known to contain what is
plaintiffs-appellees on July 11, 1959, had commonly referred to as the principle of
become final and executory before the abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
defendant-appellee corporation filed its motion must be observed not only in the exercise of
for judgment on the bond on September 7, one's rights, but also in the performance of
1959. In the order of the trial court, dismissing one's duties. These standards are the
the complaint, there appears no following: to act with justice; to give everyone
pronouncement whatsoever against the surety his due; and to observe honesty and good
bond. The appellee-corporation failed to file faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
its proper application for damages prior to primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
the termination of the case against it. It is exercise, the norms of human conduct set
barred to do so now. The prevailing party, if forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
such would be the proper term for the though by itself legal because recognized or
appellee-corporation, having failed to file its granted by law as such, may nevertheless
application for damages against the bond become the source of some illegality. When a
prior to the entry of final judgment, the right is exercised in a manner which does not
bondsman-appellant is relieved of further conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
liability thereunder. [Emphases supplied] 37
and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the
Thus, the RTC has indeed no residual wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
jurisdiction on DBP's claim for damages. while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for
the government of human relations and for the
Remedies maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally,
an action for damages under either Article 20
The Court is not unmindful of the plight of
or Article 21 would be proper. [Emphasis41
Petitioner argues that when respondent The sole issue for this Court's resolution
paid Asuten on September 3, 2004, the is whether or not petitioner Milagros P.
indemnity agreement was no longer in Enriquez should be made liable for the
force and effect since the bond expired full amount of the bond paid by
on February 24, 2004.33 She claims that respondent The Mercantile Insurance
the indemnity agreement was a contract Co., Inc. as surety, in relation to a
of adhesion, and that respondent previous case for replevin filed by
"intended the agreement to be so petitioner.
comprehensive and all-encompassing to
the point of being ambiguous." 34 I
Petitioner contends that even assuming Replevin is an action for the recovery of
that the indemnity agreement could be personal property.39 It is both a principal
enforced, she should not have been held remedy and a provisional relief. When
liable for the full amount of the bond. utilized as a principal remedy, the
Citing Rule 60, Section 2 of the Rules of objective is to recover possession of
Court, she argues that a judgment on personal property that may have been
replevin is only "either for the delivery wrongfully detained by another. When
of the property or for its value in case sought as a provisional relief, it allows a
delivery cannot be made and for such plaintiff to retain the contested property
damages as either party may prove, during the pendency of the action.
with costs."35 In Tillson v. Court of Appeals:40
.... Rule 59
Receivership
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the
applicant files with the court where the ....
action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person Section 2. Bond on appointment of
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by receiver. — Before issuing the order
the court, to the effect that the appointing a receiver the court shall
applicant will pay to such party or require the applicant to file a bond
person all damages which he may executed to the party against whom the
sustain by reason of the injunction or application is presented, in an amount
temporary restraining order if the court to be fixed by the court, to the effect
should finally decide that the applicant that the applicant will pay such party all
was not entitled thereto. Upon approval damages he may sustain by reason of
of the requisite bond, a writ of the appointment of such receiver in case
preliminary injunction shall be issued. the applicant shall have procured such
.... appointment without sufficient cause;
and the court may, in its discretion, at
Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or any time after the appointment, require
for motion of dissolution of, injunction an additional bond as further security
or restraining order. — The application for such damages.
for injunction or restraining order may
be denied, upon a showing of its Section 3. Denial of application or
insufficiency. The injunction or discharge of receiver. — The application
restraining order may also be denied, may be denied, or the receiver
or, if granted, may be dissolved, on discharged, when the adverse party files
a bond executed to the applicant, in an requirement that the bond for a writ of
amount to be fixed by the court, to the seizure in a replevin be double the value
effect that such party will pay the of the property. The bond functions not
applicant all damages he may suffer by only to indemnify the defendant in case
reason of the acts, omissions, or other the property is lost, but also to answer
matters specified in the application as for any damages that may be awarded
ground for such appointment. The by the court if the judgment is rendered
receiver may also be discharged if it is in defendant's favor. In Citibank, N.A. v.
shown that his appointment was Court of Appeals:58
obtained without sufficient cause.
.... It should be noted that a replevin bond
is intended to indemnify the defendant
Rule 60 against any loss that he may suffer by
Replevin reason of its being compelled to
surrender the possession of the disputed
.... property pending trial of the action. The
same may also be answerable for
Section 7. Proceedings where property damages if any when judgment is
claimed by third person. — If the rendered in favor of the defendant or
property taken is claimed by any person the party against whom a writ of
other than the party against whom the replevin was issued and such judgment
writ of replevin had been issued or his includes the return of the property to
agent, and such person makes an him. Thus, the requirement that the
affidavit of his title thereto, or right to bond be double the actual value of the
the possession thereof, stating the properties litigated upon. Such is the
grounds therefor, and serves such case because the bond will answer for
affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter the actual loss to the plaintiff, which
has possession of the property and a corresponds to the value of the
copy thereof upon the applicant, the properties sought to be recovered and
sheriff shall not be bound to keep the for damages, if any.59
property under replevin or deliver it to
the applicant unless the applicant or his
agent, on demand of said sheriff, shall Any application of the bond in a replevin
file a bond approved by the court to case, therefore, is premised on the
indemnify the third-party claimant in a judgment rendered in favor of the
sum not less than the value of the defendant. Thus, the Rules of Court
property under replevin as provided in imply that there must be a prior
section 2 hereof. In case of judgment on the merits before there
disagreement as to such value, the can be any application on the bond:
court shall determine the same. No
claim for damages for the taking or Rule 60
keeping of the property may be Replevin
enforced against the bond unless the
action therefor is filed within one ....
hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the filing of the Section 9. Judgment. — After trial of the
bond.57 (Emphasis supplied) issues, the court shall determine who
has the right of possession to and the
value of the property and shall render
However, there is a rationale to the judgment in the alternative for the
delivery thereof to the party entitled to notice to the party in whose favor the
the same, or for its value in case attachment was issued or his surety or
delivery cannot be made, and also for sureties, before the judgment of the
such damages as either party may appellate court becomes executory. The
prove, with costs. appellate court may allow the
application to be heard and decided by
Section 10. Judgment to include the trial court.
recovery against sureties. — The
amount, if any, to be awarded to any Nothing herein contained shall prevent
party upon any bond filed in accordance the party against whom the attachment
with the provisions of this Rule, shall be was issued from recovering in the same
claimed, ascertained, and granted under action the damages awarded to him
the same procedure as prescribed in from any property of the attaching party
section 20 of Rule 57. not exempt from execution should the
bond or deposit given by the latter be
insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the
The Rules of Court likewise require that award.
for the defendant to be granted
the full amount of the bond, he or she
must first apply to the court for Forfeiture of the replevin bond,
damages. These damages will be therefore, requires first, a judgment on
awarded only after a proper hearing: the merits in the defendant's favor,
and second, an application by the
Rule 57 defendant for damages. Neither
Preliminary Attachment circumstance appears in this case. When
petitioner failed to produce the van,
.... equity demanded that Asuten be
awarded only an amount equal to the
Section 20. Claim for damages on value of the van. The Regional Trial
account of improper, irregular or Court would have erred in ordering the
excessive attachment. — An application forfeiture of the entire bond in Asuten's
for damages on account of improper, favor, considering that there was no
irregular or excessive attachment must trial on the merits or an application by
be filed before the trial or before appeal Asuten for damages. This judgment
is perfected or before the judgment could have been reversed had petitioner
becomes executory, with due notice to appealed the Regional Trial Court's May
the attaching party and his surety or 24, 2004 Order in Civil Case No.
sureties, setting forth the facts showing 10846. Unfortunately, she did not.
his right to damages and the amount Respondent was, thus, constrained to
thereof. Such damages may be awarded follow the Regional Trial Court's
only after proper hearing and shall be directive to pay Asuten the full amount
included in the judgment on the main of the bond.
case.
II
If the judgment on the appellate court
be favorable to the party against whom This is a simple case for collection of a
the attachment was issued, he must sum of money. Petitioner cannot
claim damages sustained during the substitute this case for her lost appeal in
pendency of the appeal by filing an Civil Case No. 10846.
application in the appellate court, with
In applying for the replevin bond, since respondent made the extent of
petitioner voluntarily undertook with liability "so comprehensive and all-
respondent an Indemnity Agreement, encompassing to the point of being
which provided: ambiguous."63
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 61 of the New
Rule 61: SUPPORT PENDENTE Rules of Court and after giving
LITE due regard to the necessities
of the plaintiff Dorotea Mejia
and her children, Rachel San
Juan and Jeffrey San Juan,
SECOND DIVISION
the application for support
pendente lite is hereby
G.R. No. L-59906 October 23, 1982 granted, and the same is fixed
at P2,500.00 a month
BUENAVENTURA SAN JUAN, petitioner, commencing from January 1,
vs. 1982 to be paid to the plaintiff
HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, Judge of on or the 5th day of each
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and month until this case is finally
DOROTEA MEJIA, respondents. adjudicated. This is without
prejudice to any judgment for
Francisco D. Lozano for petitioner. support in arrears due the
plaintiff if the evidence will so
Manuel Valenzuela in his own behalf. warrant after trial.
SO ORDERED.
Ermita) was then the Executive Secretary; Sec. Atienza, Lozada informed his family that
Avelino Razon (Razon), the Director General he was returning from Hong Kong on 5
of the Philippine National Police (PNP); Angel February 2008 on board Cathay Pacific Flight
Atutubo (Atutubo), the Assistant General No. 919, bound to arrive in Manila at 4:40
Manager for Security and Emergency p.m. on the same day. 12
National Economic Development Authority through the departure area of the airport and
(NEDA) Secretary Romulo Neri (Sec. Neri) into a car waiting for them. They made him sit
15
sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial alone at the back of the vehicle, while a man,
consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter 4
whom he later discovered to be respondent
avers that during the course of his Valeroso, took the passenger seat and was
engagement, he discovered several always in contact with other
anomalies in the said transaction involving individuals. Lozada observed that other cars
16
country for a purported official trip to London, instructed Lozada to pacify his wife, petitioner
as announced by then DENR Secretary Lito Violeta, who was making public statements
Atienza (Sec. Atienza). In the Petition, Lozada
8
asking for her husband’s return. 19
the Senate issued an Order dated 30 January Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting
2008: (a) citing Lozada for contempt; (b) police protection. 21
Lozada requested that he be brought home to protection. Thereafter, former Presidential
31
Pasig, but the men were allegedly compelled Spokesperson Michael Defensor (Sec.
to deny his request on account of unidentified Defensor) supposedly came and requested
security risks. Eventually, however, the
22
Lozada to refute reports that the latter was
vehicle turned around and drove to Libis, kidnapped and to deny knowledge of alleged
Quezon City. The group stopped at The anomalies in the NBN-ZTE deal. Sec.
Outback restaurant to meet with certain Defensor then purportedly gave Lozada
individuals, who turned out to be Atty. Antonio ₱50,000 for the latter’s expenses. 32
On 6 February 2008, at around 10:00 a.m., cases for hearing on 14 February 2008. 36
Court a Petition for Habeas Corpus, docketed never illegally deprived of his liberty and was,
as G.R. No. 181342 (the Habeas Corpus at that time, no longer in their custody. They
case). Arturo likewise filed before this Court a
28 likewise averred that, beginning 8 February
Petition for a Writ of Amparo, docketed as 2008, Lozada had already been under the
G.R. No. 181356 (the Amparo case), and supervision of the Senate and, from then on,
prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of had been testifying before it.
38
detained by any of the petitioners pray that this Court remand the
respondents. Considering that petitioners
44
case to the CA for further hearings and
failed to question the dismissal of the Habeas reverse the latter’s Orders: (a) denying the
Corpus case, the said dismissal had lapsed Motion to Issue a Subpoena Ad Testificandum
into finality, leaving only the Amparo case and (b) dropping former President Arroyo as a
open for disposition. respondent. Petitioners raise the following
issues:
Thereafter, Lozada filed a Motion for
Temporary Protection Order and Production of (1) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in
Documents, while Arturo filed a Motion for
45
ruling to dismiss the petition for a writ
Production of Documents. Additionally, Arturo
46
of amparo and deny Petitioners’
also filed a Motion for the Issuance of prayer for a Temporary Protection
Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation Order, inter alia, because there is no
of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse Parties substantial evidence to prove that the
Romulo Neri, Benjamin Abalos, [Sr.], Rodolfo right to life, liberty or security of Jun
Valeroso, "Jaime" the Driver and Other Lozada was violated or threatened
Respondents. Respondents opposed these with violation. This rule is not in accord
motions. The CA denied the Motion for the
47
with the rule on the writ of amparo and
Issuance of Subpoena on the ground that the Supreme Court jurisprudence on
alleged acts and statements attributed to Sec. substantial evidence[.]
Neri and Benjamin Abalos (Abalos) were
irrelevant to the Amparo case, and that to (2) Whether the Ponencia erred and
require them to testify would only result in a gravely abused its discretion by
fishing expedition. The CA likewise denied
48
prematurely ruling that the testimony
Arturo’s subsequent Motion for of witnesses which Petitioners sought
Reconsideration. 49
to present and who are subject of the
Motion for Issuance of Subpoena ad
In its Resolution dated 5 March 2008, the CA testificandum were irrelevant to the
dropped former President Arroyo as a Petition for a Writ of Amparo in a way
respondent on the ground that at the time the not in accord with the Rules of Court
Petition in the Amparo case was filed, she and Supreme Court decisions.
was still the incumbent President enjoying
immunity from suit. Arturo filed a Motion for
50
(3) Whether the Court a quo erred in
Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its
51
using and considering the affidavits of
Resolution dated 25 March 2008. 52
respondents in coming up with the
questioned decision when these were
On 12 September 2008, the CA rendered its not offered as evidence and were not
Decision denying petitioners the privilege of subjected to cross-examination. This
the Writ of Amparo and dismissing the ruling is not in accord with the Rules of
Petition. The CA found that petitioners were
53
Court and jurisprudence.
(4) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in I. Whether the CA committed an error
dropping as respondent Pres. Gloria in dropping former President Arroyo
Arroyo despite her failure to submit a as a respondent in the Amparo case.
verified return and personally claim
presidential immunity in a way not in II. Whether the CA committed an error
accord with the Rule on the Writ of in denying petitioners’ Motion for the
Amparo. 55
Issuance of a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
asserts that petitioners failed to adduce III. Whether petitioners should be
substantial evidence, as the allegations they granted the privilege of the writ of
propounded in support of their Petition were amparo.
largely hearsay. The OSG also maintains that
56
others, that: (a) Lozada voluntarily asked for as a response to the alarming cases of
security and protection; (b) Lozada willingly extrajudicial killings and enforced
submitted himself to the company of the police disappearances in the country, it serves both
escorts; (c) Atutubo merely accompanied him preventive and curative roles to address the
to pass through the contingency route said human rights violations. It is preventive in
customarily provided to VIP passengers, that it breaks the expectation of impunity in
public figures, foreign dignitaries, and the like; the commission of these offenses, and it is
and (d) Atutubo only performed his job to curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
ensure security and maintain order at the punishment of perpetrators by inevitably
airport upon the arrival of Lozada. 58
leading to subsequent investigation and
action.63
failed to discharge their own burden to prove aimed at addressing these serious violations
that they exercised extraordinary diligence as of or threats to the right to life, liberty and
public officials. Petitioners also maintain that
59
security, it cannot be issued on amorphous
it was erroneous for the CA to have denied and uncertain grounds, or in cases where the
65
their motion for subpoena ad testificandum for alleged threat has ceased and is no longer
being irrelevant, given that the relevancy of imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be
66
evidence must be examined after it is offered, granted judiciously so as not to dilute the
and not before. Finally, petitioners contend
60
extraordinary and remedial character of the
that the presidential immunity from suit cannot writ, thus:
be invoked in amparo actions. 61
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by speculated to have referred to her, and (b)
the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for Sec. Defensor told Lozada that "the President
purposes less than the desire to secure was ‘hurting’ from all the media frenzy," there
71
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the is nothing in the records that would sufficiently
basis of unsubstantiated establish the link of former President Arroyo to
allegations. (Emphasis supplied.)
67
the events that transpired on 5-6 February
2010, as well as to the subsequent threats
Using this perspective as the working that Lozada and his family purportedly
framework for evaluating the assailed CA received.
decision and the evidence adduced by the
parties, this Court denies the Petition. Second issue: Denial of the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum
First issue: Presidential immunity from suit
This Court, in Roco v. Contreras, ruled that
72
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear
enjoys immunity from suit during his or her that the person or documents sought to be
tenure of office or actual presented are prima facie relevant to the
incumbency. Conversely, this presidential
68 issue subject of the controversy, to wit:
privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a
non-sitting president even for acts committed A subpoena is a process directed to a person
during his or her tenure.69
requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or trial of an action or at any
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to investigation conducted under the laws of the
the present action, as well as the filing of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.
original Petition and the issuance of the CA
Decision, occurred during the incumbency of In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of
former President Arroyo. In that respect, it subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad
was proper for the court a quo to have testificandum and subpoena duces
dropped her as a respondent on account of tecum. The first is used to compel a person to
her presidential immunity from suit. testify, while the second is used to compel the
production of books, records, things or
It must be underscored, however, that since documents therein specified. As characterized
her tenure of office has already ended, former in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine
President Arroyo can no longer invoke the Vegetable Oil Company:
privilege of presidential immunity as a defense
to evade judicial determination of her The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects,
responsibility or accountability for the alleged like the ordinary subpoena ad
violation or threatened violation of the right to testificandum with the exception that it
life, liberty and security of Lozada. concludes with an injunction that the witness
shall bring with him and produce at the
Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case examination the books, documents, or things
still results in the denial of the Petition on the described in the subpoena.
issue of former President Arroyo’s alleged
responsibility or accountability. A thorough Well-settled is the rule that before a
examination of the allegations postulated and subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court
the evidence adduced by petitioners reveals must first be satisfied that the following
their failure to sufficiently establish any requisites are present: (1) the books,
unlawful act or omission on her part that documents or other things requested must
appear prima facie relevant to the issue rooted from the involvement of Lozada in the
subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); said government transaction, the testimonies
and (2) such books must be reasonably of Sec. Neri or Abalos are nevertheless not
described by the parties to be readily prima facie relevant to the main issue of
identified (test of definiteness). (Emphasis
73
whether there was an unlawful act or omission
supplied.) on the part of respondents that violated the
right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.
In the present case, the CA correctly denied Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible
petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of error in denying the Motion for the Issuance of
Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground Subpoena Ad Testificandum.
that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to
be presented during trial were prima facie Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ of
irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court amparo
a quo aptly ruled in this manner:
A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to
The alleged acts and statements attributed by life, liberty and security of Lozada
the petitioner to Neri and Abalos are not
relevant to the instant Amparo Petition where Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of
the issue involved is whether or not Lozada’s Amparo requires the parties to establish their
right to life, liberty and security was claims by substantial evidence, or such
75
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to threshold reveals the clear intent of the
induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. framers of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to
Further, Neri, Abalos and a certain driver have the equivalent of an administrative
"Jaime" are not respondents in this Amparo proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in
Petition and the vague allegations averred in addressing amparo situations. 77
to prove that they were installed or ordered upon this contention in Yano v. Sanchez, to85
The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that The protective writ of amparo is a judicial
the detention of Parker was legal. Parker then
1 remedy to expeditiously provide relief to
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals violations of a person's constitutional right to
(CA). The CA affirmed the RTC and found that life, liberty, and security, and more
Parker failed to prove that she was a Filipino specifically, to address the problem of
citizen to warrant judicial intervention through extralegal killings and enforced
habeas corpus. The CA gave weight to the
2 disappearances or threats thereof. Section 1
Certification dated 20 June 2015 issued by of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
the Office of the Consular Affairs of the DFA
that there is "no available data" regarding any Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of
record/information from the year 1990 amparo is a remedy available to any person
onwards of Philippine Passport No. whose right to life, liberty and security is
:XX5678508. Parker no longer appealed the violated or threatened with violation by an
denial of the issuance of the writ of habeas
unlawful act or omission of a public official or involuntary disappearance." Further, elements
employee, or of a private individual or entity. constituting enforced disappearance as
defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and down by this Court, viz:
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Emphasis (a) that there be an arrest, detention,
abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
supplied) ·
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that (b) that it be carried out by, or with the
the writ of amparo covers extralegal killings authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
and enforced disappearances or threats State or a political organization;
thereof Enforced disappearance is defmed
4
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge remove Parker from the protection of the law
the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of for a prolonged period of time. As the Bureau
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared of Immigration explained, Parker has a
person, which place such a person outside pending criminal case against her in Davao
the protection of the law.6 City, which prevents the Bureau of
Immigration from deporting her from the
In Navia v. Pardico, this Court clarified that
7 country.
with the enactment of RANo. 9851, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary
anchored, not only on the constitutional right disappearance, or any threats thereof, that
to life, liberty, and security, but also on a would warrant the issuance of the writ of
concrete statutory definition of "enforced or amparo. For the issuance of the writ, it is not
sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It Callo contends that Parker's life is
is even not sufficient to allege and prove that endangered in the Immigration I Detention
a person has disappeared. It has to be shown Facility because of the threats against her by
by the required quantum of proof that the her co-detainees and the living conditions of
disappearance was carried out by, or with the the facility which pose health problems for
authorization, support or acquiescence of the Parker. Unfortunately, these allegations - even
government or a political organization, and if proven - will not support the issuance of a
that there is a refusal to acknowledge the writ of amparo. To repeat, the remedy of a writ
same or to give information on the fate or of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is
whereabouts of the missing persons. In this
10
meant to balance the government's awesome
case, Parker has not disappeared. Her power and to curtail human rights
detention has been sufficiently justified by the abuses. The writ .covers extralegal killings
14
Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan emphasized the importance of the exclusive
Parker and Danielle Nopuente are two and successive order of who can file a petition
different persons. In particular, we give weight for a writ of amparo. We held:
to the fact that the DFA issued a certificate
verifying that there is no available data on Petitioners finally point out that the parents of
Passport No. XX5678508, which was the Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite
Philippine passport used by standing to file the amparo petition on behalf
Parker. Moreover, the Certificate of Live
11 of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in
Birth, which purportedly shows that Parker
12 the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn
was born in the Philippines on 21 March 1975 and Karen merely indicated that they were
of Filipino parents, was only registered on 4 "concerned with Manuel Merino" as basis for
January 2010. There was no explanation filing the petition on his behalf.
given as to why Parker's birth was registered
only after almost 35 years. Moreover, Callo Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
only alleges facts from the year 2005, provides:
allegedly for purposes of brevity. We do not
13
see any reason why facts surrounding the The petition may be filed by the aggrieved
existence of Parker should only be presented party or by any qualified person or entity in the
from 2005. In fact, the only period that is following order:
thoroughly discussed about her is from 2010
to 2011. To prove that Parker and Nopuente (a) Any member of the immediate family,
are two different persons, the life and namely: the spouse, children and parents of
existence of Parker should have been alleged the aggrieved party; (b) Any ascendant,
and proven since birth. In this case, there is descendant or collateral relative of the
no allegation nor any proof as to who Parker aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree
was, or what she had been doing, before of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
2011. Taking all these circumstances into mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
perspective, Parker had failed to sufficiently
prove that she is a different person from
Danielle Nopuente.
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, treatment of Parker in said detention center. A
association or institution, if there is no known petition for the writ of amparo is not the proper
member of the immediate family or relative of action to resolve such issues.
the aggrieved party. 1âwphi1