No. Case Title (GR no.

, Facts Issue Ruling ProvRem

Decision made by (en Doctrine
banc, etc), ponente) Involved

1 G.R. No. 214864, March Sometime in November Whether the ten- YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the term of the perfected contract has already expired. Doctrine: A
22, 2017 2000, PPA, through its year period has PPA avers that its 10-year cargo-handling contract with NIASSI already expired on January 3, 2011, after preliminary
PHILIPPINE PORTS Pre-qualification, Bids already the lapse of 10 years from the date when said contract was perfected. In turn, PPA concludes that it can no injunction is in
AUTHORITY (PPA) VS. and Awards Committee prescribed longer be directed to formally execute another contract with NIASSI, since such a directive would unduly the nature of an
NASIPIT INTEGRATED (PBAC) accepted bids despite the lengthen the term of the cargo-handling contract contrary to the intention of the parties. ancillary remedy
ARRASTRE AND for a 10-year contract to mandatory to preserve the
STEVEDORING operate as the sole injuction. While the Court agrees with PPA’s submission that the perfected contract has already expired, the Court status quo during
SERVICES INC. (NIASSI) cargo handler at the port   clarifies that such expiration is not because of the mere lapse of 10 years reckoned from the date when the the pendency of
of Nasipit, Agusan del YES same was perfected. To hold as such would be to feign ignorance of the events that transpired thereafter, the main case.
Norte (Nasipit Port). which led to the institution of this very Petition. As a necessary
Subsequently, PBAC consequence,
issued Resolution No. It bears emphasizing that PPA assumed the management and operations of the cargo-handling services at matters resolved
005-2000 Nasipit Port on two separate instances- first, by virtue of its letter dated December 6, 2004 revoking the last in injunction
recommending that the extension of the HOA, and second, by virtue of the April 2005 RTC Order lifting the preliminary mandatory proceedings do
10-year cargo-handling injunction granted in NIASSI’s favor. The IO-year term of the perfected contract must be deemed interrupted not, as a general
contract be awarded to during the periods when PPA assumed management and control over NIASSI’s cargo-handling operations. rule, conclusively
NIASSI as the winning Clearly, the 10-year term of the perfected contract had already expired, leaving the R TC with nothing to determine the
bidder. enforce. merits of the
However, instead of main case or
formally executing a decide
written contract, NIASSI Finally, it bears stressing that PPA issued the Notice of Award on December 21, 2000. To compel PPA to controverted
requested PPA to issue formally execute a 10-year cargo-handling contract at this time on the basis of conditions prevailing nearly facts therein.67

a Hold-Over Authority two decades ago would certainly be unreasonable and iniquitous. Generally,
(HOA) in its favor, in *Please see note below cells findings made in
view of CASCOR’s injunction
pending protest proceedings are
(CASCOR was one of subject to the
the bidders for the cargo outcome of the
handling contract at main case which
Nasipit Port - CASCOR is usually tried
protested because 2 of subsequent to
the stockholders of the injunction
NIASSI are legislators proceedings.
who, by law, prohibited
from having any direct
or indirect financial
interest in any contract
with the government or
any of its agencies
during the term of their
office). PPA granted
NIASSI’s request and
issued a HOA dated
August 1, 2001,
effective until October
31, 2001, “or until [such
time] a cargo handling
contract shall have been
awarded, whichever
comes first.”
Meanwhile, the Office of
the Government
Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) issued Opinion
No. 028, series of2002
on February 7, 2002
(OGCC Opinion) which
confirmed the authority
of PP A to bid out the
cargo-handling contract
and affirmed the validity
of the award in NIASSI’s
favor. Despite this, the
HOA was subsequently
extended several times
upon NIASSI’ s request.
The last extension of the
HOA appears to have
been issued on October
13, 2004, for a term of
six months.
However, barely two
months after the last
extension of the HOA,
PPA, through its
Assistant General
Manager for Operations,
Benjamin B. Cecilio
(Cecilio), issued a letter
dated December 6,
2004 revoking the
extension. In said letter,
Cecilio advised NIASSI
that PPA received
numerous complaints
regarding the poor
quality of its services
due to the use of
inadequately maintained
equipment. Cecilio
further relayed that PPA
would take over the
cargo-handling services
at the Nasipit Port
beginning December 10,
2004. As a
consequence, NIASSI
filed a petition for
injunction with Prayer for
the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction (WPI) with the
RTC which was
eventually granted on
March 18, 2005. This
WPI enabled NIASSI to
operate as the cargo
handler for 14 days. On
April 12, 2005, however,
the said WPI was
dissolved in view of
PPA’s motion for
reconsideration to the
issuance of the WPI in
favor of NIASSI. On
August 10, 2006, the CA
reinstated the WPI ruling
that the RTC’s
dissolution of the same
is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion
since it did not conduct
any hearing with
respecto to PPA’s
motion for
reconsideration.
For its part, PPA
argued, among others,
that NIASSI was not
entitled to the issuance
of the injunctive writ
because it had no legal
 right to continue
providing cargo-handling
services at Nasipit Port,
considering that PPA
has no existing cargo-
handling contract with
NIASSI.PPA concludes
that it can no longer be
compelled to formally
execute a contract with
NIASSI upon finality of
the Amended Decision,
since the term of the
perfected contract
already expired on
January 3, 2011, 10
years after PPA
received notice of
NIASSI’s conformity to
the Notice of Award.The
HOA and its subsequent
extensions constituted
partial fulfillment thereof.

2 [ G.R. No. 196864, July Spouses Dulnuan W/N the CA NO Reqs. for the
08, 2015 ] obtained loans from committed grave issuance of a
SPOUSES VICTOR P. Metropolitan Bank and and serious error (WPI and TRO) WPI
DULNUAN AND Trust Company in overlooking A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the (1) there exists a
JACQUELINE P. (Metrobank) the undisputed protection of substantive rights and interests.  An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary clear and
DULNUAN, As a security for the fact that the injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the unmistakable
PETITIONERS, VS. loan obligations, the petition for the applicant to the relief demanded.  The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous right to be
METROPOLITAN BANK Spouses Dulnuan WPI was filed irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated.   Its protected;
& TRUST COMPANY, executed a Real Estate during the sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case is heard fully. (2) this right is
RESPONDENT. Mortgage (REM) over a redemption   directly
parcel of land covered period and no (Status Quo. In case ma ask usab) threatened by an
by TCT No. 46390 bond had been   act sought to be
registered under their posted to The status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. The enjoined;
names and located at La warrant the status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. A preliminary injunction should not (3) the invasion
Trinidad, Benguet with issuance. establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship of the right is
an area of 392 square between them. material and
meters.   substantial; and
Spouses Dulnuan Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary (4) there is an
incurred default and injunction. urgent and
therefore the loan   paramount
obligations became due
and demandable.
On 22 April 2008,
Metrobank filed an
application for extra-
judicial foreclosure
proceedings over the
subject property before
the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet. 
After due notice and
publication, the
mortgaged property was
sold at a public auction
where Metrobank was
declared as the highest
bidder after tendering
the bid of
P6,189,000.00, as
shown in the Certificate
of Sale.
 
Before the expiration of
the one-year redemption
period allowed by law,
Metrobank filed a
Petition for the
Issuance of Writ of
Possession
On 30 September 2008,
the Spouses Dulnuan
instituted a Complaint
seeking the issuance of
a temporary restraining
order and preliminary
and final injunction and,
for the annulment of
extra-judicial foreclosure
and real estate
mortgage
The complaint alleged
that the mortgage
constituted over the
property is null and
void because at the
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is necessity for the
established: writ to prevent
  serious and
(a)  That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in irreparable
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance damage.
of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
 
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
 
(c)  That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
 
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that
(1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined;
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and
(4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
 
The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of the right and its actual or threatened violations. 
Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against the right must be
shown.
 
(Were the spouses able to establish the essential requisites for the issuance of the WPI? No.)
The court a quo cannot enjoin Metrobank, at the instance of the Spouses Dulnuan, from taking possession
of the subject property simply because the period of redemption has not yet expired.  As the highest bidder
in the foreclosure sale upon whom a certificate sale was issued by the sheriff, Metrobank has the right to
be placed in possession of the subject property even during the redemption period provided that the
necessary amount of bond is posted. 
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during
(with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. The non-expiration of
the period of redemption shall not preclude the purchaser from taking possession of the property
provided that the necessary is posted.  The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended.  In the case at bar, Metrobank manifested its willingness to post a bond but its application for the
issuance of the writ of possession was unjustly denied by the RTC.
 
A pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure does not stay the issuance of a writ of
possession.  
Without prejudice to the final disposition of the annulment case, Metrobank is entitled to the writ of
possession and cannot be barred from enjoying the property, possession being one of the essential
attributes of ownership.
 time the agreement was  
entered on 18 October Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and
2000, no contract of whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary
loan was yet executed despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a
by the parties.  positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In other words, there is  
no principal obligation When the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and,
upon which the ancillary therefore, the issuance of injunctive writ is improper. Herein, the Spouses Dulnuan failed to show that
contract of mortgage they have clear and unmistakable right to the issuance of writ in question.
was attached to.  
  Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in reversing the injunction issued by the RTC.
RTC issued issued a The record shows that Metrobank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the subject
Temporary Restraining realties as a consequence of the Spouses Dulnuan’s default on their mortgage obligation. As the highest
Order and set the bidder at the foreclosure sale, Metrobank can exercise its right of possession over the subject realty, and the
hearing for the issuance issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the bank from occupying the property in question, is
of Writ of Preliminary erroneous.
Injunction.
3 December 2008 RTC
issued an Order
enjoining Metrobank
from taking possession
of the subject property
until the final disposition
of the annulment of
mortgage case. 
14 January 2011, the
Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision
reversing the questioned
Orders and declared
that the issuance of the
writ of preliminary
injunction is unjustified
under the
circumstances.

3 G.R. No. 170038               Petitioner granted loan Whether or not

July 11, 2012 to the respondent. The RTC is correct No. We find that the RTC abbreviated the proceedings and precipitately granted the respondents’ application SEC. 5.
CHINA BANKING debt was secured by a when it granted for injunctive relief. The RTC did not conduct a hearing for reception of a "sampling" of the parties’ Preliminary
CORPORATION, real estate mortgage. WPI to respective evidence to give it an idea of the justification for its issuance pending the decision of the case on injunction not
Petitioner,vs.SPS. HARRY However, respondent respondent? the merits. It failed to make any factual finding to support the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
35
granted without
CIRIACO and ESTHER defaulted in paying the since it did not conduct any hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or notice; exception.
CIRIACO, Respondents. loan which prompted TRO. The RTC conducted the March 22, 2000 and April 24, 2000 hearings on the respondents’ omnibus - No preliminary
petitioner to foreclose motion only – whether to admit the amended complaint and whether to hold a hearing on the respondents’ injunction shall
 the property mortgaged.
BRION, J.: application for a writ of preliminary injunction. be granted
Respondent filed a without hearing
petition for injunction to and prior notice
enjoin petitioner from to the party or
consolidating the persons sought
property. The petition to be enjoined. If
was denied for being it shall appear
moot and academic. from facts shown
by affidavits or by
On a separate date, the verified
respondents filed a application that
complaint with the RTC great or
of La Trinidad, Benguet, irreparable injury
Branch 63, for would result to
Cancellation of the applicant
Consolidation of before the matter
Ownership over a Real can be heard on
Property, Specific notice, the court
Performance, and to which the
Damages. They again
12
application for
questioned the preliminary
redemption price of the injunction was
foreclosed property. made, may issue
ex parte a
In response, petitioner temporary
filed its Answer with restraining order
Compulsory to be effective
Counterclaim, denying only for a period
the allegations of the of twenty (20)
respondents’ complaint. days from service
on the party or
The respondent, on person sought to
March 16, 2000, filed an be enjoined,
Omnibus Motion for except as herein
Leave to Amend provided. Within
Complaint and to Admit the twenty-day
Attached Amended period, the court
Complaint as well as must order said
Motion for Hearing on party or person to
the Issuance of a Writ of show cause at a
Preliminary Injunction specified time
and/or Temporary and place, why
Restraining Order the injunction
(TRO), with a notice of should not be
 hearing on the omnibus granted. The
motion scheduled on court shall also
March 22, 2000.The determine, within
respondents sought to the same period,
amend the complaint to whether or not
allege further that fraud the preliminary
attended the injunction shall
consolidation of title in be granted, and
the petitioner’s favor and accordingly issue
to include a prayer for the
the issuance of a writ of corresponding
preliminary injunction order.
and/or TRO to enjoin the
petitioner from disposing
of the foreclosed
property or taking
possession thereof.

RTC granted the motion

of the respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner
opposed the decision
and filed motion for
reconsideration. The
latter motion was denied
and granted the writ of
preliminary injunction
without hearing.

Aggrieved, the petitioner

then filed a Rule 65
petition for certiorari with
the CA, arguing that the
RTC gravely abused its
discretion in precipitately
granting the
respondents’ application
for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction
without any hearing.

4 Petitioner: BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS., 1.     Respondents Whether or not Yes Injunction
vs. Respondent: HON.
JUDGE AGAPITO L. Spouses Silverio et.al. the RTC erred should not
HONTANOSAS, JR., filed a case against BPI in the issuance issue except
REGIONAL TRIAL to seek the declaration of the writ of 1.     The RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the upon a clear
COURT, BRANCH 16, of the nullity of the preliminary foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and unwarranted. showing that
CEBU CITY, SILVERIO promissory notes, real injunction.  the applicant
BORBON, SPOUSES estate and chattel 2.     The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the respondents was improper. has a right in
XERXES AND ERLINDA mortgages and esse to be
FACULTAD, AND XM continuing surety a. They had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the protected, and
FACULTAD & agreement they had performance of their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of that the acts
DEVELOPMENT executed in favor of the the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan sought to be
CORPORATION petitioner. secured be unpaid. enjoined are
violative of such
Ponencia: FERNANDO, J. 2.     They further sought b. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the right. A
damages and attorney’s mortgagee to exact payment. In fact, they did not dispute the petitioner’s allegations that preliminary
fees, and applied for a they had not fully paid their obligation. injunction
temporary restraining should not
order (TRO) or writ of c. Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by them in order to stave off the determine the
preliminary injunction impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on their claim that they had been compelled merits of a case,
to prevent the to sign pre-printed standard bank loan forms and mortgage agreements. or decide
petitioner from controverted
foreclosing on the facts, for, being
3.     Injunction only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until
mortgages against a preventive
the rights of the parties can be settled. The respondents failed to prove that they would suffer an
their properties. remedy, it only
irreparable injury. Fear of potential loss of possession and ownership, or facing a criminal
seeks to prevent
prosecution did not constitute the requisite irreparable injury that could have warranted the
3.     The complaint threatened
issuance of the writ of injunction.
alleged that the wrong, further
respondents had injury, and
4.     As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction – whether
obtained a loan from the irreparable harm
preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal prosecution. But there are extreme
petitioner, and had or injustice until
cases in which exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, including:
executed promissory the rights of the
notes binding parties can be
a.     When the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
themselves solidarily. settled.
constitutional rights of the accused;
and constituted real
estate mortgages on
b. When it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
several parcels of land
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
in favor of the petitioner;
and that they had been
c.     When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
made to sign a
continuing surety
d.     When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
agreement and a chattel
mortgage on their
Mitsubishi Pajero as e.     When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
security.
f.      When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
 4.     The petitioner g.     When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
required them to issue
postdated checks to h.     When it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
cover the loan under
threat of foreclosing on i.      When the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
the mortgages. (

5.     Petitioner filed its j.      When there is clearly no prima faciecase against the accused and a motion to
answer with affirmative quash on that ground has been denied.
defenses and
counterclaim, as well as k.     However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil Case No. CEB-26468
its opposition to the came under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of the writ of
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal complaints for violation
preliminary injunction, of BP No. 22 against the respondents was unwarranted. 
contending that the
foreclosure of the DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
mortgages was within its MODIFIES the decision promulgated on July 9, 2002 by annulling and setting aside the writ of preliminary
legal right to do. injunction in Civil Case No. CEB-26468 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City for being
devoid of factual and legal bases; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City to proceed
6.     A motion to dismiss with dispatch in Civil Case No. CEB-26468; and DIRECTS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
was filed by Petitione,
but was denied. RTC
granted the application
for Preliminary
Injunction.

7.     Petitioner appealed
to the CA. CA affirmed
the RTC decision. 

5 ROSARIO E. Petitioner and Whether or not A Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the A Writ of
CAHAMBING, Petitioner respondent Victor the grant of existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount Preliminary
vs. VICTOR ESPINOSA Espinosa are siblings Preliminary necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that Injunction to
and JUANA ANG, and the children of Injuction was the very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of issue, the
Respondent G.R. No. deceased spouses proper. action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the following
215807, SECOND Librado and Brigida prevention of multiplicity of suits.  requisites must
DIVISION, January 25, Espinosa, the latter be present, to
2017, PERALTA, J. bequeathing their Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case, rests in the wit: (1) the
properties, among  (YES) sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of existence of a
which is Lot B or Lot evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive clear and
354 with an area of determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be unmistakable
1,341 square meters, interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion.  right that must
more or less, situated
in Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, to the
said siblings in the
same deceased
spouses' respective
Last Wills and
Testaments which
were duly probated.  established a clear and unmistakable right to a commercial space heretofore occupied by Jhanel's
Deceased Librado and
Brigida bequeathed
their respective shares
over Lot 354 to
respondent Victor
Espinosa, however,
Brigida subsequently
revoked and cancelled
her will, giving her
one-half (1/2) share
over Lot 354 to
petitioner. Brigida
Espinosa and
respondent Victor
Espinosa, after the
death of Librado
Espinosa, entered into
an Extrajudicial
Partition of Real Estate
subdividing Lot 354
into Lot 354-A, with an
area of 503.5 square
meters adjudicated to
Brigida Espinosa, and
Lot 354-B, with an area
of 837.5 square
meters, adjudicated to
respondent Victor
Espinosa, who
eventually obtained a
certificate of title in his
name. petitioner filed a
complaint against
respondent Victor
Espinosa and his
be protected,
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and and (2) an
whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is urgent and
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion paramount
amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act necessity for
at all in contemplation of law.  the writ to
prevent serious
In this case, respondent court correctly found that private respondent Victor Espinosa had damage.
Indubitably, this
Pharmacy. He had an existing Contract of Lease with the pharmacy up to December 2009. Without Court has
prejudging the main case, it was established that, at the time of the issuance of the status quo order likewise
dated April 16, 1998, Jhanel's Pharmacy was recognized as one of private respondent Victor stressed that
Espinosa's tenants. In fact, petitioner identified only Pacifica Agrivet Supplies, Family Circle, the very
Ariane's Gift Items and Julie's Bakeshop.  foundation of
the jurisdiction
to issue a writ of
As such, pursuant to the status quo order, it is private respondent Victor Espinosa who must injunction rests
continue to deal with Jhanel's Pharmacy. Correspondingly, the commercial space occupied by
in the existence
Jhanel's Pharmacy must be deemed to be under the possession and control of private respondent of a cause of
Victor Espinosa as of the time of the issuance of the status quo order. 
action and in
the probability
The right of possession and control is a clear right already established by the circumstances of irreparable
obtaining at that time. Hence, petitioner's act of entering the premises of Jhanel's Pharmacy, injury,
through her sons, is a material and substantial violation of private respondent Victor Espinosa's inadequacy of
right, which act must be enjoined.   pecuniary
compensation,
and the
prevention of
multiplicity of
suits.
 
Sine dubio, the
grant or denial
of a writ of
preliminary
injunction in a
pending case,
rests in the
sound
discretion of the
court taking
cognizance of
the case since
the assessment
and evaluation
representative, of evidence
respondent Juana towards that
Ang, for, among end involve
others, the annulment findings of facts
of the Extrajudicial left to the said
Partition of Real court for its
Property which was conclusive
docketed as Civil Case determination.
No. R-2912.  Hence, the
exercise of
At the time of the filing judicial
of the complaint, the discretion by a
same building had court in
twelve (12) lessees, injunctive
four (4) of whom pay matters must
rentals to petitioner, not be interfered
namely: Pacifica with except
Agrivet Supplies, when there is
Family Circle, Ariane's grave abuse of
Gift Items, and Julie's discretion. 
Bakeshop. Petitioner
alleged that Grave abuse of
respondent Juana Ang discretion in the
prevailed upon issuance of
Pacifica Agrivet writs of
Supplies not to renew preliminary
its lease contract with injunction
petitioner but to enter implies a
into a contract of lease capricious and
with respondent Victor whimsical
Espinosa instead. exercise of
judgment that is
 According to equivalent to
petitioner, respondent lack of
Juana Ang also jurisdiction, or
threatened to do the where the power
same thing with Julie's is exercised in
Bakeshop. Clerk of an arbitrary or
Court, acting as despotic
Commissioner, issued manner by
an Order dated April reason of
16, 1998 directing the passion,
parties to maintain the prejudice or
status quo. personal
respondent Victor aversion
Espinosa filed an amounting to an
Application for the evasion of
Issuance of a Writ of positive duty or
Preliminary Injunction to a virtual
with Prayer for the refusal to
Issuance of a perform the
Temporary Restraining duty enjoined,
Order dated March 3, or to act at all in
2009 against petitioner contemplation
alleging that the latter of law. 
violated the status quo
ante order by allowing
her sons to occupy the
space rented by
Jhanel's Pharmacy
which is one of
respondent Victor
Espinosa's tenants.
Respondent Victor
Espinosa, through his
attorney-in-fact,
private respondent
Juana Ang, alleged
that petitioner's sons
constructed a
connecting door
through the partition
separating their
cellular phone shop
from Jhanel's
Pharmacy and that the
contract of lease
between the latter and
respondent Victor
Espinosa is still
subsisting, hence, the
entry by petitioner's
sons into the
pharmacy's
commercial space
disturbed the status
quo ante. 

Thereafter, the RTC,

on September 22,
2009, issued an Order
for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary
injunction, the
dispositive portion of
which reads as
follows: IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING, the
defendant's prayer for
the issuance of a writ
of preliminary
injunction is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, upon
defendant's filing,
within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof, of
the injunction bond in
the sum of fifty
thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00)
conditioned on
defendant's paying all
damages, the plaintiff
may sustain by reason
of this injunction in
case the Court should
finally decide that the
defendant is not
entitled thereto, let a
writ of preliminary
injunction issue
enjoining or
restraining the plaintiff
and all those claiming
rights under her from
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019
– UST FACULTY OF
CIVIL LAW 569
disturbing the
possession of the
defendant to the
leased premises or the
"status quo ante" until
after this case shall
have been decided on
the merits and/or until
further orders from
this Court. SO
ORDERED... 

petitioner filed a
petition on certiorari
under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, with
the CA imputing grave
abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC
when it granted the
application for the
issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
filed by respondent
Victor Espinosa.
According to
petitioner,
respondents
themselves violated
the status quo ante
order when they
wrested the space
rented by Pacifica
Agrivet Supplies from
petitioner's control
and that there was no
compliance with the
requisites for the
issuance of the writ of
preliminary
injunction. 

In particular, petitioner
avers the following
contentions: (1) the
damage claimed by
respondents is
quantifiable at
P12,000.00 per month,
hence, not irreparable;
(2) respondent, Victor
Espinosa is at best a
co-owner of the
subject property, while
respondent Juana Ang
is a stranger, and a co-
owner cannot exclude
another co-owner,
hence, respondent
Victor Espinosa's right
is not clear and
unmistakable; (3) there
is no urgency involved
because the
application for
injunction was filed
more than one year
after the incident in
question; (4) contrary
to the conclusion of
the CA, the space
occupied by Jhanel's
Pharmacy was
voluntarily
surrendered to
petitioner by the
lessee; and (5) the CA
committed grave legal
errors when it failed to
correct the RTC's
issuance of the writ of
preliminary
injunction. 

Respondents argue
that they did not have
sullied hands when
they applied for the
writ of preliminary
injunction. They also
point out that the
issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction
was strictly in
accordance with the
 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure. 

6
ZUNECA Natrapharm, an all- Whether or not We hold that the issues raised in the instant petition have been rendered moot and academic given the
PHARMACEUTICAL, Filipino pharmaceutical the present RTC’s December 2, 2011 Decision on the merits of the case.
AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR company, manufactures petition had
VENUS ARAIN, M.D. DBA and sells a medicine become moot Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both preliminary and permanent injunction. Section 1, Rule 58
ZUNECA with generic name and academic in provides for the definition of preliminary injunction:
PHARMACEUTICAL, “CITICOLINE” for heart view of the RTC
Petitioners, v. and stroke patients, and Decision on the SECTION 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
NATRAPHARM, INC., marketed under the main case which stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a
Respondent. trademark “ZYNAPSE” ruled in favor of person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts,
obtained from the Natrapharm. in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
VILLARAMA, JR; J.; Intellectual Property
Office under Certificate  
of Trademark
Registration No. 4-2007- On the other hand, Section 9 of the same Rule defines a permanent injunction in this wise:
005596 granted on
November 24, 2007. On  
the other hand, as early
as 2001, and unknown SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. — If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled
to Natrapharm, Zuneca to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction
Pharmaceutical, perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or
ArramAnain and/or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
Venus Arain, had been
selling a medicine  
imported from Pakistan,
an anti-convulsant under A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence
the generic name submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or
“CARBAMAZEPINE” complete for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
under an unregistered injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a court
trademark, “ZYNAPS”, when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on
pronounced the same the merits is commenced or terminated.
as “ZYNAPSE”.
Natrapharm claims that By contrast a permanent injunction, based on Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, forms part of the
Zuneca is selling judgment on the merits and it can only be properly ordered only on final judgment. A permanent injunction
Zynaps in drugstores all may thus be granted after a trial or hearing on the merits of the case and a decree granting or refusing an
over the country where injunction should not be entered until after a hearing on the merits where a verified answer containing
Zynapse is also sold, denials is filed or where no answer is required, or a rule to show cause is equivalent to an answer.
has serious and
disfiguring side-effects, As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any interlocutory order, cannot survive the
and the sale of the same main case of which it is an incident; because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and
in drugstores may give effect after the decision in the main petition.
rise to medicine
switching. When
Natrapharm issued a
cease-and-desist letter
to Zuneca pointing out
its claims, the latter
refused to heed its
demand, pointing out
that it had been issued
by the Bureau of Food
and Drugs a Certificate
of Product Registration
as early as 2003, which
allowed them to sell
CARBAMAZEPINE
under the trademark
“ZYNAPS”. Natrapharm
then filed a complaint
against Zuneca for
trademark infringement
for violation of RA 8293
with prayer for
temporary restraining
order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction,
citing Section 122 of RA
8293 which gives it
exclusive right to use
the name “ZYNAPSE”
and to exclude others.
Zuneca argued
otherwise, averring that
it enjoyed prior use of
the brand name
“ZYNAPS” by virtue of
the Certificate of
Product Registration
issued by the BFAD in
2003. On March 12,
2008, the RTC denied
the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction,
citing the reasons when
it first ruled on the denial
of issuance of a
temporary restraining
order, that is, that
Zuneca had prior right
over the mark. The RTC
reasoned out that
Natrapharmcannot avail
of injunctive relief.
Though the holder of a
valid trademark, it may
not invoke ascendancy
or superiority of its CTR
(Certificate of
Trademark Registration)
over the CPR (certificate
of product registration),
as the latter is evidence
of Zuneca’s prior use.

On petition for certiorari

to the CA, the latter
initially affirmed the RTC
order, but reversed itself
on motion for
reconsideration by
Natrapharm. Thus,
Zuneca elevated the
case to the Supreme
Court. In the meantime,
on December 2, 2011,
the RTC rendered a
decision on the main
case, ruling in favour of
Natrapaham. Because
of this development,
Natrapaham moved to
dismiss the petition
before the Supreme
Court, arguing that the
RTC Decision was a full
adjudication on the
merits of the main issue
of trademark
infringement. It
contended that the
 present petition is moot
and academic, it only
involving an ancillary
writ. Zuneca believes
otherwise, since the
RTC decision had not
yet attained finality, thus
the present petition had
not been rendered moot.

7 G.R. No. 217617 The Issuance of

CARMELITA T. Elisio Borlongan, Jr (1)   Is the (1)   Yes. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the respondent bank from continuing in the a TRO/WPI is
BORLONGAN, Petitioner, (Elisio) and his wife issuance of a possession and consolidating the ownership of the subject property, petitioner's right to be not a
vs.BANCO DE ORO Carmelita own a TRO/WPI proper afforded due process will unceasingly be violated. prejudgment of
(formerly EQUITABLE property located at in the instant A writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing that there exists a right to be the main case
PCI BANK), Respondent. Pasig City (subject case? protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate an established right.
VELASCO, JR, J.: property). While Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary For a court to
processing the papers (2)   Was the injunction, viz: decide on the
for the prospective sale service of propriety of
of the property, they summons Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction issuing a TRO
discovered that the proper? may be granted when it is established: and/or a WPI, it
same has become the must only
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
subject of an execution inquire into the
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
sale in a civil case. The existence of two
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either for a limited
civil case was initiated things: (1) a
period or perpetually;
by BDO for a sum of clear and
money against Tancho (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts unmistakable
Corporation, the complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or right that must
principal debtor wherein (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to be protected;
Carmelita was also do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of and (2) an
impleaded being a the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and urgent and
board of director of the tending to render the judgment ineffectual. paramount
corporation and who necessity for
supposedly signed Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a the writ to
security agreements to WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and prevent serious
guarantee the unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount damage.
obligations of the necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
corporation. Summons
The issuance of a TRO/WPI is not a prejudgment of the main case. Petitioner has a clear and unmistakable
should be
The summons of all right that must be protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject property but her
personally
defendants was constitutionally protected right to due process before she can be deprived of her property.
served on a
addressed to Tancho defendant.
 When summons
Corporation located at (2)   No. The performance of official duty was not regular. The essence of due process lies in the reasonable cannot be
Fumakilla Compound. opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense ; she served
The records of the case must be properly served the summons of the court. In other words, the service of summons is a vital and personally
showed that BDO indispensable ingredient of due process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the
9
within a
already foreclosed summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.  10
reasonable
Fumakilla Compound as period of time,
early as August 21, As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When summons cannot be served substituted
2000, following personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted service may be resorted to. Service of summons service may be
Tancho’s failure to pay by publication can be resorted to only if the defendant's "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be resorted to.
its obligation. ascertained by diligent inquiry."  Service of
Understandably, the summons by
summons remained It is, therefore, proper to state pursuant to the relevant sections of Rule 14 of the publication can
UNSERVED as “the Rules of Court provide that the hierarchy and rules in the service of summons are be resorted to
defendants are no as follows: only if the
longer holding office at (1) Personal service; (Sec 6) defendant's
the compound” after a (2) Substituted service, if for justifiable causes the defendant cannot be served "whereabouts
SINGLE ATTEMPT at within a reasonable time; and (sec. 7) are unknown
PERSONAL SERVICE. (3) Service by publication, whenever the defendant's whereabouts are unknown and and cannot be
The court then approved cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. ( sec14) ascertained by
the motion by BDO to   diligent inquiry."
serve summons by Simply put, personal service of summons is the preferred mode. And, the rules on The relevant
PUBLICATION. The the service of summons other than by personal service may be used only as sections of Rule
next year, BDO filed an prescribed and only in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the 14 of the Rules
ex-parte Motion for the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts of Court.
attachment against the have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed
defendants including before substituted service may be availed.  
Carmelita which was
granted by the court. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to
The service of summons personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month) which eventually resulted
against the subject in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
property was unserved preferably on at least two different dates. 
and so BDO caused the
publication of the alias The summons was served on the petitioner by publication. Yet, the circumstances surrounding the case do
summons. And so the not justify the resort. Clearly, there was no diligent effort made to find the petitioner and properly serve her
case proceeded without the summons before the service by publication was allowed. Neither was it impossible to locate the
the participation of residence of the petitioner and her whereabouts.
Carmelita. When the
property was subject to
an auction, the property
was sold to BDO, who
was the highest bidder.

Upon discovery of the

sale of the property,
 Eliseo executed an
affidavit of adverse
claim and filed a
complaint for Annulment
of Surety Agreements,
Notice of Levy on
Attachment, Auction
Sale and Other
Documents. He alleged
in his Complaint that the
subject property is a
family home that
belongs to the conjugal
partnership of gains he
established with his
wife. He further averred
that the alleged surety
agreements upon which
the attachment of the
property was anchored
were signed by his wife
without his consent and
did not redound to
benefit their family.
Thus, he prayed that the
surety agreements and
all other documents and
processes, including the
ensuing attachment,
levy and execution sale,
based thereon be
nullified. Carmelita also
prayed for a TRO and/or
Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

8
SPOUSES SILVESTRE On August 28,1997, the WON petitioners YES
O. PLAZA AND ELENA CA ruled that among the failed to show
Y. PLAZA v. Plaza siblings, namely: proof that they The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable rights to be protected by the writ; the present action
GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, Aureliano, Emiliana, are entitled to has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of the main action
ELEODORA VDA. DE Vidal, Marciano, and the writ of
MARTINEZ AND VICKY Barbara, Barbara was preliminary As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the petitioners despite the latter's
SAYSON GOLOSENO. the owner of the subject injunction. reimbursement of Tuazon's purchase expenses. Because they were never owners of the property, the
G.R. NO. 172909, agricultural land. The petitioners failed to establish entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction.  "[T]o be entitled to an
MARCH 5, 2014  decision became final injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of
and executory and preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
Barbara's successors, protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant's right or title is
respondents Guillermo doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive
Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. relief is not proper."
de Martinez and Vicky
Sayson Goloseno, have Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, 2013, the question of issuance of
continued occupying the the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the
property. question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it. A writ of
preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the
On September 14, 1999, determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal
Vidal's son and therefrom notwithstanding.
daughter-in-law, the
petitioners, filed a Wherefore, the Court denies the petition.
Complaint for Injunction,
Damages, Attorney's
Fees with Prayer for the
Issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary
Restraining Order
against the respondents
and the City
Government of Butuan.
They prayed that the
respondents be enjoined
from unlawfully and
illegally threatening to
take possession of the
subject property.
According to the
petitioners, they
acquired the land from
Virginia Tuazon in 1997;
Tuazon was the sole
bidder and winner in a
tax delinquency sale
conducted by the City of
Butuan on December
27, 1996.
In their answer, the
respondents pointed out
that they were never
delinquent in paying the
land taxes and were in
fact not aware that their
property had been
offered for public
auction. Moreover,
Tuazon, being a
government employee,
was disqualified to bid in
the public auction, as
stated in Section 89 of
the Local Government
Code of 1991. As
Tuazon's participation in
the sale was void, she
could have not
transferred ownership to
the petitioners. Equally
important, the
petitioners merely
falsified the property tax
declaration by inserting
the name of the
petitioners' father,
making him appear as a
co-owner of the
auctioned land. Armed
with the falsified tax
declaration, the
petitioners, as heirs of
their father, fraudulently
redeemed the land from
Tuazon. Nonetheless,
there was nothing to
redeem as the land was
not sold. For these
irregularities, the
petitioners had no right
to the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining
 Order prayed for against
them.

The RTC denied the

prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,
and ordered that the
possession and
occupation of the land
be returned to the
respondents. The RTC
found that the auction
sale was tainted with
irregularity as the bidder
was a government
employee disqualified in
accordance with Section
89 of the Local
Government Code of
1991. The petitioners
are not buyers in good
faith either. On the
contrary, they were in
bad faith for having
falsified the tax
declaration they
redeemed the property
with.

The CA affirmed the

RTC's ruling, found the
petitioners guilty of
forum shopping,
dismissed the case.
Hence, petitioners filed
the present petition for
review on certiorari with
this Court to challenge
the CA rulings.

9 G.R. No. 206808-09, FACTS: ISSUE:  HELD:  Yes. A writ of

September 07, 2016 Whether or not preliminary
 the dismissal of injunction is an
In 2004, the President petitioners' A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the order granted at
LOCAL WATER Gloria Macapagal- principal action judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or any stage of an
UTILITIES Arroyo enacted for certiorari, acts. It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a action or
ADMINISTRATION Executive Order (E.O.) prohibition and cause of action in itself. The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during proceeding prior
EMPLOYEES No. 279, where all mandamus filed the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the to the judgment
ASSOCIATION FOR concerned government with the RTC result of the main action.21 Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the or final order,
PROGRESS (LEAP), agencies and resulted in the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein requiring a party
MELANIO B. CUCHAPIN instrumentalities of the automatic pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. or a court,
II, GREARDO* G. PERU, water supply and dissolution of the agency or a
ROLAND S. CABAHUG, sewerage sector, which ancillary writ of It is well settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to person to refrain
GLORIA P. VELASQUEZ, includes, among others, preliminary preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to from a particular
ERLINDA G. the Local Water Utilities injunction issued appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or act or acts. It is
VILLANUEVA, TEODORO Administration (LWUA), by the same threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of merely a
M. REYNOSO, were directed to pursue court? the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. It persists until it is dissolved or provisional
FERNANDO L. and implement reform until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. remedy, adjunct
NICANDRO, JOSEPHINE objectives and policies. to the main case
P. SIMENE, LAMBERTO It particularly provided subject to the
R. RIVERA, REYNALDO for the rationalization of Indubitably, in the present case, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the RTC based on its latter's outcome.
M. VIDA, and RUCTICO** LWUA's organizational finding that there was a need to protect petitioners' rights to security of tenure during the pendency of the It is not a cause
B. TUTOL, Petitioners, v. structure and principal action. After trial, however, the lower court found, among others, that, in questioning the of action in itself.
LOCAL WATER operations. constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 279, 366 and 421 as well as Resolution No. 69 of the LWUA Board of Trustees, The writ is
UTILITIES petitioners failed to establish the existence of an actual case or controversy which is ripe for judicial provisional
ADMINISTRATION On April 13, 2005, determination. Thus, the RTC dismissed the principal action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. because it
(LWUA) and DEPA President Arroyo issued constitutes a
E.O. No. 4216 The principal action having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of temporary
specifying LWUA's core preliminary injunction issued by the RTC is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been measure availed
PERALTA, J.:
functions and providing served, the appeal from the main case notwithstanding. In this regard, this Court's ruling in the case of of during the
for shifts in its policy Unionbank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals is instructive, to wit: pendency of the
direction, functions, action and it is
programs, activities and x x x "a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary ancillary because
strategies. Cognizant of injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction," it is a mere
the effect of the regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or incident and is
rationalization of the appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a dependent upon
functions of LWUA, the judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general the result of the
E.O. gave LWUA rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. main action.
personnel the option to Being an ancillary
either remain or retire, or auxiliary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. 
or be separated from remedy, it is
government service. available during
the pendency of
Pursuant to the the action which
provisions of E.O. No. may be resorted
421, then LWUA to by a litigant to
Administrator Lorenzo preserve and
 protect certain
Zamora came up with rights and
Task Force 421 and its interests therein
Action Team, charged, pending
among others, with the rendition, and for
duty of preparing the purposes of the
LWUA's staffing pattern ultimate effects,
and the corresponding of a final
plantilla positions therein judgment in the
as directed by E.O. No. case.
421. The Action Team,
on the other hand, was
given the responsibility
of reporting to the Task
Force and assisting it in
the execution of its
duties and
responsibilities. Among
the appointed members
of the Action Team was
herein petitioner Melanio
Cuchapin II, who was
then the Chairperson of
petitioner LWUA
Employees' Association
for Progress (LEAP).
Subsequently, Task
Force 421 was able to
come up with a staffing
pattern, consisting of
467 plantilla positions
which it submitted to the
LWUA Board of
Trustees for approval.

On April 18, 2006, the

LWUA Board of
Trustees issued Board
Resolution No. 69 which
approved the staffing
pattern proposed by
Task Force 421.
Thereafter, the
approved staffing
pattern was submitted to
the Department of
Budget and
Management (DBM) for
review and approval.
DBM approved 447
plantilla positions out of
the 467 proposed
positions, twenty were
excluded.

On October 18, 2006,

LWUA issued Office
Order, the immediate
implementation of the
following: (a) posting of
the DBM-approved
staffing pattern; (b)
finalization by the
Staffing Committee of
the staffing guidelines to
be submitted to the
Management and the
Board of Trustees for
approval; and (c)
finalization by the Task
Analysis Committee of
the job descriptions
under the rationalized
LWUA structure.

On October 19, 2006,

petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari,
prohibition and
mandamus with prayer
for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction
with the RTC of Quezon
City. Alleging that LWUA
and DBM acted with
grave abuse of
discretion in adopting
and implementing the
reorganization plan of
LWUA, petitioners
prayed that LWUA and
DBM be restrained from
implementing the
following: (1) DBM-
approved staffing
pattern; (2) Resolution
No. 69 of the LWUA
Board of Trustees, and
(3) E.O. Nos. 279, 366
and 421, on the ground
that petitioners will
suffer injustice and
sustain irreparable injury
as 233 LWUA
employees face
immediate and outright
dismissal from service.

Respondents filed their

respective Oppositions
to the petitioners' prayer
for TRO and/or
preliminary injunction.

After hearing, the RTC

issued its assailed
Order7 granting
petitioners' prayer for
the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
and restraining the
respondents from
enforcing and effecting
the assailed questioned
DBM-Approved Staffing
Pattern.

LWUA and DBM then

filed separate special
civil actions for certiorari
with the CA questioning
the subject RTC Order
 and Resolution. These
petitions were
subsequently
consolidated. On August
28, 2012, the CA
granted the petition and
reversed and set aside
the RTC decision.

Hence, this petition.

10 AGOO RICE MILL From October 1993 to WON ARMC is No.

CORPORATION October 1995, the entitled to an
(represented by its ARMC obtained from injunctive In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that no agreement was forged between the ARMC and
President, Kam Biak Y. the LBP a Term Loan for remedy? the LBP on the restructuring of the ARMC’s loans at the time the LBP filed an application to extra-judicially
Chan, Jr.), Petitioner.  P2M and two Short- foreclose the ARMC’s mortgaged properties; the proposed loan restructuring was not approved by the LBP
vs. LAND BANK OF THE Term Loan Lines because the  ARMC failed to offer an additional collateral sufficient enough to cover its outstanding loan with
PHILIPPINES, (STLL’s) amounting to a the bank. 
Respondent. total of P15M. These
G.R. No. 173036      loans were secured by  
September 26, 2012 real and chattel
mortgage over the
ARMC’s four "Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a
commercial lots, certain act.  It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and   as   an   incident   in   the  
including their main   action." 
improvements and its  
rice mill machineries For   an   injunction   to   issue, the   following   essential requisites must be present: 
and generator. (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and 
  (2) the act against which the injunction is directed to constitute a violation of such right. 
ARMC made several
partial payments to A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or
cover the loans’ one that is actual or existing. Such right must be clear and unmistakable, and not contingent,
interests, but found it abstract or future rights, or one that may never arise.   
difficult to fully settle its
loan obligations on time The ARMC filed a complaint for injunction against the LBP on the ground that the latter’s then impending
due to the company’s foreclosure of its mortgaged properties was in violation of its contractual and property rights, particularly the
financial liquidity right of the ARMC to have its outstanding loan restructured by the LBP.  
problems caused by the  
negative effect of the The ARMC alleged that the LBP acted in bad faith and in wanton disregard of its commitment to restructure
government’s rice the former’s loans when it hastily filed for extrajudicial foreclosure while negotiations for the loan
importation in 1996 on restructuring were still on-going.  The existence of the ARMC’s claimed right to the loan restructuring,
its sales of rice and however, was not clearly established by the ARMC. 
problems brought by the  
El Niño phenomenon in Thus, the ARMC, then, had   no   actual   right   to   protect   or   to   enforce   against   the   LBP.   It   failed
the region’s rice to   satisfy   the   first requisite, i.e., the existence of a clear and unmistakable right for the issuance
production. of an injunction.
 
The ARMC, through its
President Mr. Kam Biak
Y. Chan, Jr., requested
the LBP for an extension
of time to pay its
obligations.
 
Still foreseeing its
inability to pay its
obligations on the
requested date, the
ARMC wrote the LBP for
the renewal of its loans,
particularly the ₱
15,000,000.00 STLLs. 
 
The LBP allegedly
replied with the advice
to have the loans
restructured instead of
renewed.
 
The LBP informed the
ARMC that the bank’s
Domestic Banking Loan
Committee has agreed
to require an additional
collateral from the
ARMC; Otherwise, the
LBP would be forced to
pursue legal action.
 
In its letter, LBP wrote to
the ARMC regarding the
latter’s failure to comply
with the LBP’s required
offer of an additional
collateral or to pay its
due obligations. The
LBP informed the ARMC
that noncompliance
would result in the
referral of the matter to
the bank’s Legal Office
for appropriate action.
 
In default of payment,
LBP sent the ARMC a
Final Notice of Payment,
informing the ARMC that
it had filed, on the same
date, an application for
the extrajudicial
foreclosure of ARMC’s
mortgaged properties
with the Office of the Ex-
Officio Sheriff of San
Fernando City, La
Union.
 
Consequently, the
ARMC, thru   its  
president, filed with the
RTC a complaint for
Injunction with
application for a   Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
and TRO. 
 
The RTC, La Union,
issued a 72–hour
Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) directing
the Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff of La Union to
cease and desist from
proceeding with the
foreclosure sale. The
following day, the RTC
ordered the extension of
the TRO for seventeen
(17) days.
 
The RTC ordered the
proceedings suspended
in view of the parties’
 manifestation to have
the case amicably
settled. The
contemplated
settlement, however,
failed. Thus, the RTC
proceeded with the
hearing on the issuance
of the writ of preliminary
injunction.
 
In a decision, the RTC
found no merit in the
ARMC’s complaint for
injunction.  Contrary to
the allegation that the
LBP reneged on its
commitment to
restructure the ARMC’s
loans, the RTC found
that the LBP never
agreed to the ARMC’s
proposed restructuring.
 
ARMC filed with the CA
application for the
issuance of Writ of
Prelim Injunction and
TRO to enjoin the
foreclosure sale but the
same was denied by the
CA. Motion for
reconsideration was
filed and the same was
also denied. 
 
Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

11 REPUBLIC OF THE The case at bar stems WON the Yes.

PHILIPPINES, from a complaint for issuance of Writ   
represented by LT. GEN. damages (main case), of Preliminary The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is justified. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancilliary or
JOSE M. CALIMLIM, in with prayer for the Injunction is preventive remedy that is resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no
his capacity as former issuance of a writ of justified? other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is issued by the court to prevent threatened or
Chief of the Intelligence preliminary injunction, continuous irremediable injury to the applicant before his claim can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.
Service, et al, filed by private Its aim is to preserve the status quo ante until the merits of the case can be heard fully, upon the applicant’s
Petitioners,  respondent Dante showing of two important conditions, viz.: (1) the right to be protected prima facie exists; and, (2) the
vs.HON. VICTORINO Legaspiagainst acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
EVANGELISTA, in his petitioners Gen. Jose M.  
capacity as Presiding Calimlim, Ciriaco Reyes It is crystal clear that at the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, mere prima facie
Judge, Regional Trial and Maj. David Diciano evidence is needed to establish the applicant’s rights or interests in the subject matter of the main
Court, Branch 223, before the Regional Trial action. It is not required that the applicant should conclusively show that there was a violation of his
Quezon City, and DANTE Court (RTC) of Quezon rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main case. Thus, an applicant for a writ is required
LEGASPI, represented by City. only to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. 
his attorney-in-fact, Paul    
Gutierrez, Respondent. Private respondent Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of preliminary injunction may be
G.R. No. 156015. August Legaspi is the owner of issued when it is established:
11, 2005 a land located in Bigte,  
Norzagaray, Bulacan (a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
and petitioner Calimlim, the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
representing the acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
Republic of the  
Philippines, and as then (b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
head of the Intelligence litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
Service of the Armed  
Forces of the Philippines (c) that a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
and the Presidential suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
Security Group. subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
   
Petitioner Calimlim In the case at bar, we find that respondent judge had sufficient basis to issue the writ of preliminary
entered into a injunction. It was established, prima facie, that Legaspi has a right to peaceful possession of his land,
Memorandum of pendente lite. Legaspi had title to the subject land. It was likewise established that the diggings were
Agreement (MOA) with conducted by petitioners in the enclosed area of Legaspi’s land. Whether the land fenced by Gutierrez and
one Ciriaco Reyes. The claimed to be included in the land of Legaspi covered an area beyond that which is included in the title of
MOA granted Reyes a Legaspi is a factual issue still subject to litigation and proof by the parties in the main case for damages. It
permit to hunt for was necessary for the trial court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of the main
treasure in a land in case in order to preserve the rights and interests of private respondents Legaspi and Gutierrez.
Bigte, Norzagaray,  
Bulacan. Reyes, IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned Orders of the trial court are AFFIRMED. The presiding judge of the
together with petitioners, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to proceed with dispatch in hearing the main case for
started, digging, damages.
tunneling and blasting  
works on the said land
of Legaspi, and
petitioner Calimlim
assigned about 80
military personnel to
guard the area and
encamp thereon to
intimidate Legaspi and
other occupants of the
area from going near the
subject land.
 
Legaspi executed a
special power of
attorney (SPA)
appointing his nephew,
private respondent
Gutierrez given the
power to deal with the
treasure hunting
activities on Legaspi’s
land and to file charges
against those who may
enter it without the
latter’s authority.
Legaspi agreed to give
Gutierrez 40% of the
treasure that may be
found in the land.
 
Gutierrez then filed a
case for damages and
injunction against
petitioners for illegally
entering Legaspi’s land,
then Executive Judge
Perlita J. Tria Tirona
issued a 72-hour
temporary restraining
order (TRO) against
petitioners.
 
The case was
subsequently raffled to
the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 223, then
presided by public
respondent Judge
Victorino P. Evangelista.
Respondent judge
issued another 72-hour
TRO and a summary
hearing for its extension
was set.
 
Petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss contending:
first, there is no real
party-in-interest as the
SPA of Gutierrez to
bring the suit was
already revoked by
Legaspi and, second,
Gutierrez failed to
establish that the
alleged armed men
guarding the area were
acting on orders of
petitioners. Petitioners
also filed a Motion for
Inhibition of the
respondent judge on the
ground of alleged
partiality in favor of
private respondent.
 
After due hearing, the
trial court granted
private respondent’s
application for a writ of
preliminary injunction
based on its findings
that (1) the diggings and
blastings appear to have
been made on the land
of Legaspi, hence, there
is an urgent need to
maintain the status quo
to prevent serious
damage to Legaspi’s
land; and, (2) the SPA
granted to Gutierrez
continues to be valid.
 
On even date, the trial
court issued another
Order denying
 petitioners’ motion to
dismiss and likewise
denied petitioners’
motion for inhibition.
 
On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial
court.  Hence this
petition.

12 Case 12: G.R. No. FACTS: ISSUE: RULING In every

207938      Evy Construction
October 11, 2017 purchased a parcel of
EVY CONSTRUCTION land (TCT No. 134890)
AND DEVELOPMENT in Lipa, Batangas from
CORPORATION, Linda N. Ang (Ang) and
Petitioner  Senen T. Uyan
vs. (Uyan).1âwphi1 They
VALIANT ROLL executed a Deed of
FORMING SALES Absolute Sale, which
CORPORATION, was duly notarized. At
Respondent the time of the sale, no
lien or encumbrance
LEONEN, J.: was annotated on the
title, except for a notice
of adverse claim filed by
Ang. 4
The Register of Deeds
annotated a Notice of
Levy on Attachment on
the title of the subject
property. This
5
annotation was by virtue
of the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment issued by
RTC San Fernando,
Parnpanga in a Civil
Case No. 13442 -
Valiant Roll Forming
Sales Corporation v.
Angeli Lumber and
Hardware, Inc., and
Linda Ngo Ang. Two (2)
6
1)W/N petitioner 1)     NO. application for
Evy Construction Injunction is defined as "a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain provisional
and from doing a certain act." It may be filed as a main action before the trial court or as a provisional remedy
32 33
injunctive relief,
Development in the main action.34
the applicant
Corporation was The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction must establish
denied due which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of the actual and
process when its course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or existing right
application for a mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final sought to be
writ of injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary protected. The
preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary applicant must
injunction was injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists also establish the
denied in the until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. (Bacolod urgency of a
same City Water District v. Hon. Labayen) writ's issuance to
proceeding as its A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte "to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the prevent grave
application for a application for preliminary injunction [,] which cannot be issued ex parte." Otherwise stated, a trial court
38
and irreparable
temporary may issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior hearing for a limited period of 72 hours "if the injury. Failure to
restraining order; matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and in-eparable injury." In this
39
do so will warrant
2)W/N the trial instance, a summary hearing, separate from the application of the preliminary injunction, is required only to the court's denial
court committed determine if a 72-hour temporary restraining order should be extended. 40
of the application.
grave abuse of A trial court may also issue ex parte a temporary restraining order for 20 days H[i]f it shall appear from facts Moreover, the
discretion in shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant application for the
denying before the matter can be heard on notice." The trial court has 20 days from its issuance to resolve the
41
issuance of a writ
petitioner Evy application for preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the application for preliminary injunction during of preliminary
Construction and this period, the temporary restraining order is deemed to have expired. Notably, the Rules do not require
42
injunction may be
Development that a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction be conducted during this period. denied in the
Corporation's While Rule 58, Section 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary hearing in every application for
43
same summary
application for temporary restraining order regardless of a grant or denial, Rule 58, Section 5 requires a hearing only if an hearing as the
injunctive relief. application for preliminary injunction is granted. Thus, Section 5 states that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall application for the
be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined." Inversely stated, issuance of the
an application for preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing separate from temporary
that of the summary hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. restraining order
In this case, the November 9, 2009 hearing was denominated as a "hearing on the application for temporary if the applicant
other encumbrances
were also annotated on
the title.
7
Evy Construction
registered the Deed of
Absolute Sale with the
Register of Deeds. New
title (TCT No. 168590)
was issued in its name;
however, it contained
the annotation of the
prior Notice of Levy on
Attachment, as well as a
Notice of
Attachment/Levy upon
Realty and a Notice of
Levy on Preliminary
Attachment.
Subsequently, RTC
rendered a Decision in
Civil Case No. 13442 in
favor of Valiant Roll
Forming Sales
Corporation (Valiant). A
Writ of Execution and a
Notice of Levy were
issued against the
subject property.
Evy Construction filed a
Notice of Third-Party
Claim in Civil Case No.
13442, informing the
court that it had already
filed with the sheriff an
Affidavit of
Title/Ownership, in
accordance with Rule 57
of the Rules of Court. 10
Valiant posted an
Indemnity Bond of
₱745,700.00 to answer
for any damages that
Evy Construction may
suffer should execution
of the RTC Decision
restraining order and preliminary injunction." Petitioner's counsel was allowed to present its arguments and
44 45
fails to establish
its witness but conceded that the issues before the trial court were legal in nature. Thus, the trial court
46 47
requisites for the
resolved that there was no need to present the witness, which petitioner's counsel accepted without entitlement of the
objection. writ.
Petitioner cannot insist on a separate hearing for the application for preliminary injunction, considering that it
accepted that its application would be submitted for decision without the presentation of its witness. The trial
court did not find any need to conduct a further hearing on the application for preliminary injunction since
petitioner was unable to substantiate its entitlement to a temporary restraining order. In any case, even if a
separate hearing was granted, petitioner would have presented the same arguments and evidence in the
November 9, 2009 hearing. Thus, there can be no denial of due process if the party alleging it has already
been granted an opportunity to be heard.
2)     NO.
Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction "is an order granted at any stage of an action
or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts" or an order "requir[ing] the performance of a particular act or acts." It is an
49
ancillary relief granted by the court where the main action or proceeding is pending. 50
In order to be granted the writ, it must be established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring perforn1ance of
an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 51
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is considered an "extraordinary event," being a ''strong arm of
equity or a transcendent remedy." Thus, the power to issue the writ "should be exercised sparingly, with
52
utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation." 53
An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with "actual and existing substantial rights" or rights in esse.
54
Further, the applicant must show "that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage." Thus, the writ will not issue to
55
applicants whose rights are merely contingent or to compel or restrain acts that do not give rise to a cause of
action.56
In this case, the inevitable and the very issue of which between petitioner and respondent has the better
right over the property is yet to be resolved.
Respondent's attachment liens dated September 18, 2007, October 2, 2007, and November 8, 2007, if valid,
may have been superior to whatever right petitioner may have acquired by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, which was only registered on November 20, 2009. However, the validity of the liens and the validity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale are factual matters that have yet to be resolved by the trial court. The trial court
must also determine whether or not respondent had prior knowledge of the sale.
Thus, no injunctive writ could be issued pending a final determination of petitioner's actual and existing right
over the property.1âwphi1 The grant of an injunctive writ could operate as a prejudgment of the main case.
Even assuming that there is already a final determination of petitioner's right over the property, petitioner still
proceed. 11
By virtue of the Writ of
Execution issued in Civil
Case No. 13442, the
failed to prove the urgent and paramount necessity to enjoin the Register of Deeds from making further
annotations on TCT No. 168590.
Petitioner prays for the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent grave and irreparable damage to its
reputation as a real estate developer. Indeed, injunctive relief could be granted to prevent grave and
65

Sheriff issued a Notice irreparable damage to a business entity's goodwill and business reputation. Injury is considered irreparable
66

of Sale on Execution of if "there is no standard by which [its] amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy." The injury must
67

Real Property of Ang's be such that its pecuniary value cannot be estimated, and thus, cannot fairly compensate for the loss. For 68

properties, including the this reason, the loss of goodwill and business reputation, being unquantifiable, would be considered as
subject property A grave and irreparable damage.
Certificate of Sale was However, in applications for provisional injunctive writs the applicant must also prove the urgency of the
eventually issued to application.1âwphi1The possibility of a grave and irreparable injury must be established, at least tentatively,
Valiant as the winning to justify the restraint of the act complained of. It is "[a]s the term itself suggests ... temporary, subject to the
74

bidder of the subject final disposition of the principal action." Its sole objective is "to preserve the status quo until the merits can
75

property. be heard." 76

Evy Construction filed
with the RTC Lipa City,
Batangas its Complaint
for Quieting of
Title/Removal of Cloud,
Annulment of Execution
 [T]he grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in the sound discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end
involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. (Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of
Samut)
The court's discretion is not interfered with unless there is a showing that the grant or denial was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. 82

Sale and Certificate of The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, denied petitioner's application for the issuance of a temporary
Sale, and Damages, restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioner would still have sufficient
with application for relief in its prayer for damages in its Complaint. In the event that the annotations on petitioner's title are
83

temporary restraining found by the trial court to be invalid, petitioner would have adequate relief in the removal of the annotations
order and/or preliminary and in the award of damages. Therefore, the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion.
injunction. 14
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
It prayed for the
issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the
Register of Deeds from
compelling it to
surrender its copy of
TCT No. 168590 and
from annotating any
further transactions
relating to Civil Case
No. 13442. 15

Evy Construction
claimed that it would
suffer great and
irreparable injury if the
Register of Deeds were
restrained from
compelling it to
surrender the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT
No. 168590. It claimed
that potential investors
interested in developing
the property "[would]
back out of their
investment plans if there
[was a] cloud of doubt
hovering over the title on
the property." 16

RTC: issued an Order

denying the application
for the issuance of a
temporary restraining
order for having no legal
basis. Evy
Construction's MR was
likewise denied. Hence,
it filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court
18

of Appeals.
CA: held that Evy
Construction failed to
sufficiently establish its
right to the issuance of a
temporary restraining
order.; that Evy
Construction failed to
sufficiently establish that
it would suffer grave and
irreparable injury if
additional recording and
annotation of further
transactions, orders, or
processes relating to the
sale of the property to
Valiant were made on
the title. It observed that
the grounds raised
already touched on the
merits of its Complaint,
resolution of which
would amount to
prejudgment of the
case; that Evy
Construction could still
sue for damages if the
trial court eventually
finds that the sale of the
property to Valiant was
invalid. It also reminded
Evy Construction that it
had the remedy of
proceeding against the
indemnity bond posted
by Valiant for any
damages it might suffer
as a result of the sale. 21

Evy Construction’s MR
was denied. Hence, this
Petition 23

Petitioner’s argument: It
was denied due process
when its application for
preliminary injunction
was denied in the same
summary proceeding as
the denial of its
application for a
temporary restraining
order;  that it was
entitled to the injunctive
writ applied for since
"real estate
development is an
industry built on trust
and public perception.'';
that the doubt cast by
the auction sale and its
annotation to the title
caused investors to
withdraw their
investments from
petitioner's housing
development project,
despite the expenses it
already incurred; that
the issuance of an
injunctive writ is
necessary to prevent
further damage since its
"business reputation
and goodwill as a real
estate developer, once
tarnished and sullied,
cannot be restored; that
respondent's indemnity
bond in the amount of
₱745,700.00 was not
only inadequate
compared to petitioner's
investment in the
property; it was
immaterial since it would
be insufficient to restore
buyer and investor
confidence in the project
or in petitioner's
competence and
reputation as a property
developer. 28

Respondent counters:
that the application for
preliminary injunction
was never actually set
for hearing or resolved
by the trial court; thus, it
was misleading for
petitioner to argue that it
was denied due process
by the trial court; that
petitioner failed to
establish the requisites
for the issuance of a
temporary restraining
order and that petitioner
still had adequate
remedies in the
indemnity bond; that
petitioner already
touches on the merits of
its Complaint before the
trial court, which

13
G.R. No. 182758               Severino
May 30, 2011
LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. HEIRS OF SEVERINO
LISTANA, Respondents.
effectively prejudges the
case.
Whether or not The Petition is unmeritorious
Listana (Listana) owned the LBP’s
a 246.0561-hectare injunction bond In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr., the Supreme Court reinstated the order of the
parcel of land in may be RTC to allow the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction pending the final determination of the just
Inlagadian, Casiguran, withdrawn.  compensation case. An applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a bond executed to the party or
Sorsogon. Listana person enjoined, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may
voluntarily sold the sustain by reason of the injunction. Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court states:
property to the
government, through the SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. — A
Department of Agrarian preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
Reform, under Republic
Act (RA) No. 6657.  The xxxx
Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or
Board (DARAB) of proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be
Sorsogon commenced fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all
summary administrative damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining
proceedings to order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
determine the amount of approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
just compensation for
the property. The Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court ruled that neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have
DARAB set the amount jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge and declared that the warrant of arrest is invalid, the bond for the
at P10,956,963.25 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction still subsist for any incidental damages that Listana may suffer in case that LBP
ordered petitioner Land is not entitled for the writ. As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the ₱5,644,773.02 bond shall answer for the
Bank of the Philippines damages Listana may sustain if the courts finally uphold the ₱10,956,963.25 just compensation set by the
(LBP) to pay Listana the DARAB. The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage due to the
same.  injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it.
On 18 June
1999, the Provincial
Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD)
issued a writ of
execution ordering Land
Bank Manager and
Agrarian Operations
Center Head Alex A.
Lorayes (Lorayes) to
pay Listana. Lorayes,
however, refused. Thus,
on 2 September 1999,
Listana filed with the
PARAD a motion for
indirect contempt
against Lorayes.
Meanwhile, LBP filed
with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52 of
Sorsogon City, acting as
special agrarian court
(SAC), a petition for
judicial determination of
the amount of just
compensation for the
property. 

The PARAD
granted Listana’s motion
for indirect contempt
and ordered the arrest
of Lorayes. LBP filed
with the RTC a petition
for injunction with
application for the
issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
enjoining PARAD from
implementing the
warrant of arrest against
Lorayes. The RTC
enjoined the PARAD
from implementing the
warrant of arrest
pending final
determination of the
amount of just
compensation for the
property. LBP posted a
₱5,644,773.02 cash
bond. Listana filed with
the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The
Court of Appeals set
aside the orders of the
RTC. The case reached
to the Supreme Court
(Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Listana,
Sr). The Supreme Court
set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals
and reinstated the
decision of the RTC
enjoining the PARAD
from implementing the
warrant of arrest
pending final
determination of the
amount of just
compensation for the
property. The Supreme
Court ruled that neither
the PARAD nor the
DARAB have jurisdiction
to decide the contempt
charge filed Listana. The
issuance of a warrant of
arrest was
unconstitutional, being
that it is beyond the
power of the PARAD
and the DARAB. 

Based on the
Supreme Court’s
decision, herein
respondent, LBP filed to
the RTC a motion to
withdraw the
₱5,644,773.02 cash
bond. The RTC denies
LBP’s  motion  and
argued that the cash
bond did not become
moot and academic
upon the finality of the
 Supreme Court’s
decision. This is so
because the underlying
reason for the posting of
the cash bond still
remains despite the
decision of the Supreme
Court upholding the
unconstitutionality of the
order of arrest issued by
PARAD. LBP filed a
motion for
reconsideration, which
was denied by the RTC.
When the case elevated
to the Court of Appeals,
the Court dismissed
LBP’s petition and
affirmed in toto the
RTC’s decision. 

14
G.R. No. 190134               Between the Whether or not The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
July 8, 2015  periods March 25, 1996 the CA, in
to July 13, 2000, denying          Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a temporary restraining order may be issued
SPOUSES ROGELIO and petitioners executed petitioners’ only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by verified application that great or irreparable injury
SHIRLEY T. LIM, Agusan eleven (11) real estate application for a would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be hear. Thus:
Institute of Technology, mortgages and chattel writ of
represented by DR. mortgage in favor of preliminary      Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary
SHIRLEY T. LIM, respondent First injunction, injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
President and as Consolidated Bank committed grave enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by verified application that great or
Attorney-in-Fact of FELIX (hereafter private abuse of irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice,
A. CUENCA, MARY ANN respondent bank), discretion the court which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a
M. MALOLOT, and REY through its branch in amounting to temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service
ADONIS M. MEJORADA Butuan City. Private lack of on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said
Petitioners, respondent bank jurisdiction. twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time
vs. admitted that Agusan and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether
HONORABLE COURT OF Institute of Technology or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding
APPEALS, TWENTY- paid the aforementioned order.
SECOND DIVISION, loans except for the 7 , th

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, 8 and 11 loans.

th th
From the foregoing, it is clear that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there
MINDANAO STATION; Petitioners failed to exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there
SHERIFF ARCHIBALD C.
VERGA, and his
DEPUTIES, Regional religiously pay said
Trial Court, Branch 33, loans as they became
Hall of Justice, Libertad, due and demandable,
Butuan City; and FIRST hence, private
CONSOLIDATED BANK, respondent bank was
Respondents. forced to file for an
application for Extra-
judicial Foreclosure of
Real Estate Mortgage
and Chattel Mortgage
on December 28, 2000.
must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial, and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the present case, we find that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’
application for preliminary injunction and TRO. As aptly held by the CA, it neither appears from the facts
shown by the TRO application that great or irreparable injury would result to petitioners before the matter
can be heard, nor did they show any clear and positive right to be entitled to the protection of the ancillary
relief of TRO as they only claim that debts would have been paid had respondent bank not impose
astronomical interests on its loans.

In response,
petitioners filed an
action for revocation and
annulment of real estate
mortgage and chattel
mortgage with plea for
the issuance of a
temporary restraining
order and preliminary
injunction with the
Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Butuan City.
Petitioners alleged that
the contracts of
mortgage could not be
foreclosed because
Agusan Institute of
Technology had already
full paid its obligation
with private respondent
Bank if the latter did not
charge exorbitant and
excessive interests and
penalties in the
computation of all
payments made by the
former. Interesting to
note, however, that
despite petitioners’
claims regarding
overpayments of their
loan obligations, no
documentary evidence
was ever attached to
the complaint proving
that indeed there were
overpayments made
and when it were
actually made. After
proper hearing on
petitioners’ application
for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction,
the RTC issued the writ
ordering private
respondent Bank to
desist from foreclosing
the said contracts of
mortgage and the trial
on the merits ensue. On
December 28, 2007, the
RTC rendered a
decision lifting the writ of
preliminary injunction
and ruling in favor of
private respondent
Bank. Dissatisfied,
petitioners appealed to
the CA.

In a Resolution
dated July 2, 2009, the
CA denied petitioners’
appeal with prayer for
the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.
The CA held that
injunction is an
extraordinary remedy to
be resorted to when
there is a pressing
necessity to avoid
injurious consequences
that cannot be remedied
 under any standard
compensation. To be
entitled to an injunctive
writ, the applicants must
show, inter alia, the
existence of a clear and
unmistakable right and
an urgent and
paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent
serious damages. The
CA held that is neither
appears from the facts
shown by the TRO
application that great or
irreparable injury would
result to petitioners
before the matter can be
hear, nor did petitioners
show any clear and
positive right to be
entitled to the protection
of the ancillary relief of
TRO. Petitioners filed a
motion for
reconsideration,
however, the same was
denied.

15
G.R. No. 162716            
On [October 8, 2001], Whether or not No.
September 27, 2006 the Board of Directors of the Writ of
NAPOCOR issued Preliminary Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides thus:
Honorable Secretary Board Resolution No. Injunction
EMILIA T. BONCODIN of 2001-113 amending issued was "Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted
the Department of Board Resolution No. proper. when it is established:
Budget and Management 99-35 which granted the
(DBM), petitioner, Seniority in Position '(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
vs.NATIONAL POWER Pay. Board Resolution consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
CORPORATION No. 99-35 granted a requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
EMPLOYEES step increment to all '(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
CONSOLIDATED UNION qualified NAPOCOR during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(NECU), respondent. officials and employees '(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is

who have been in their
position for ten (10)
years effective calendar
year 1999. On the other
hand, Board Resolution
No. 2001-113 reduced
the ten (10) year
requirement to three (3)
years.
"On [November 12,
2001], then President of
NAPOCOR, Jesus
Alcordo, issued Circular
No. 2001-51 providing
for the implementing
rules and regulations of
Board Resolution No.
2001-113. On May 6,
2002, the NAPOCOR
Officer-in-Charge,
President and Chief
Executive Officer,
Roland Quilala, issued
Circular No. 2002-22
providing for additional
guidelines relative to the
implementation of the
step increment based on
length of service in the
position to qualified
NAPOCOR officials and
employees.
"On [November 26,
2001], petitioner
furnished a letter
addressed to Mr.
Alcordo informing the
latter that NAPOCOR's
request for clearance to
implement Joint CSC-
DBM Circular No. 1, s.
1990 which is the basis
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.'"
To be entitled to a writ of injunction, a party must establish the following requisites: (a) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; (b) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 15
The question of whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued is addressed to the sound
discretion of the issuing court. The grant of the writ is conditioned on the existence of the movant's clear
16
and positive right, which should be protected. It is an extraordinary peremptory remedy available only on
17
the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3 of Rule 58.
A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law." 18
Absent any clear and unquestioned legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ would constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent, abstract or future rights whose
19
existence is doubtful or disputed. It cannot be grounded on the possibility of irreparable damage without
20
proof of an actual existing right. Sans that proof, equity will not take cognizance of suits to establish title or
21
lend its preventive aid by injunction. 22
From the foregoing conflicting claims of the parties, it is obvious that the right claimed by respondent as its
basis for asking for injunctive relief is far from clear. The validity of the circulars and board resolution has
been put into serious question; more so, in the light of Napocor Board Resolution No. 2002-81, which was
issued precisely to rectify the previously issued resolution and circular. While respondent's claimed right is
not required to be conclusively established at this stage, it is nevertheless necessary to show -- at least
tentatively -- that it exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction as that raised by
petitioner. In our view, respondent has failed to comply with this requirement.
31
The enforcement of the suspension order and Resolution No. 2002-81 would effect the rollback of the
salaries of Napocor employees receiving more than the two-step increments. True, their enforcement would
be prejudicial to respondent members' interest, but merely showing this fact is not sufficient. It must also be
established that the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right that must be protected. Thus, a finding
that the applicant for preliminary injunction may suffer damage not capable of pecuniary estimation does not
suffice to support an injunction, when it appears that the right to be protected is unclear or is seriously
disputed. 3
As has been held, there is no vested right to salary increases. There must be a lawful decree or order
35
supporting an employee's claim.
In the present case, because the validity of their implementation was fundamentally assailed, the step
increments enjoyed by the Napocor employees could not have ripened into vested rights. In brief, it is
seriously contended that, because they were granted without the required DBM approval, no vested rights to
the step increments could have been acquired.
The terms and conditions of employment of government employees are governed by law. It is the 36
legislature and -- when properly given delegated power -- the administrative heads of government that fix the
terms and conditions of employment through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations. 37
While government instrumentalities and agencies are trying their best to alleviate the financial difficulties of
their employees, they can do so only within the limits of budgetary appropriations. The exercise of
management prerogative by government corporations are limited by the provisions of the laws applicable to
them. Subject to state regulation in particular is a public utility like Napocor, its income, and the amount of
38
money available for its operating expenses including labor costs.
of Board Resolution No. The respondent has not justified the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction by proving its clear and
2001-113 cannot be positive legal right to the step increments. The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the Resolutions of the
given due course for trial court dated September 25, 2002 and October 29, 2002.
lack of legal basis. In
essence, petitioner
holds that the grant of
step increment based on
length of service is an
additional benefit under
a different name since
NAPOCOR has already
been granting seniority
pay based on the length
of service as embodied
in the Collective
Negotiation Agreement
(CNA). In addition,
petitioner said that the
grant of step increment
is not applicable to the
salary plan of
NAPOCOR considering
its higher salary rates
[compared with that of
the existing government
pay plan]. Lastly,
petitioner told Mr.
Alcordo of the budget
implication of the grant
of said proposal which
she estimated to cost as
high as Eighty Four
Million Pesos
(P84,000,000.00).

"Based on the
petitioner's foregoing
letter, the Corporate
Auditor of NAPOCOR,
Norberto Cabibihan,
issued a Memorandum
[dated June 5, 2002] to
Roland Quilala,
NAPOCOR Officer-in-
Charge, enjoining him to
suspend/stop payment
of the step increment as
embodied in NPC
Circular No. 2001-51
dated [November 12,
2001], [effective July
2002]. He also
requested the
suspension of the
implementation of NPC
Circular No. 2002-22
dated [May 6, 2002]. He
warned that succeeding
payments of the step
increment shall be
automatically
disallowed.

"On [June 21, 2002], Mr.

Quilala issued a
Memorandum enjoining
concerned officials to
suspend the processing
of the succeeding step
increment based on
length of service
resulting from the
application of Sections
2.2 (c) and 2.2 (d) of
Circular No. 2002-22.

"On [July 24, 2002], the

NAPOCOR Board of
Directors issued Board
Resolution No. 2002-81
revising the
implementation of the
Step Increment, the
pertinent portion of
which provides for:

'1) Pure seniority

benefits counted as one
(1) step increment for
every three (3) years of
service in the present
position, covering from
years 1994 up to 2001
or two (2) steps
increment only;

'2) Rollback of basic

monthly salary for NPC
personnel who have
been recipients of the
step increase due to
length of service in their
present position in
excess of the two steps
increment granted in the
above paragraph to
qualified employees and
officials, and Corrective
Salary Adjustment
(CSA) effective
September 1, 2002; and

'3) No payback by the

NPC officials and
employees who were
granted salary
differentials covering the
period October 2001 up
to August 2002.
Approval of all this and
the above benefits will
be sought from the
Office of the President,
Malacañang, upon
assurance by the
Secretary of the
Department of Budget
and Management (DBM)
that a favorable
endorsement in support
thereof will be made, x x
x and are hereby
approved; x x x'

Believing that NPC

Circular Nos. 2001-51
and 2002-22 are within
the bounds of law and
that they have already
acquired a vested right
in it, [respondent
National Power
Corporation Employees
Consolidated Union
(NECU) filed a Petition
for Prohibition with
Application for
TRO/Preliminary
Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City on [August
27, 2002].

"On [August 30, 2002],

public respondent
[Judge Percival Mandap
Lopez, of Branch 78,
Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City] issued an
Order granting private
respondent's prayer for
the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining
Order and setting the
hearing of the
application for the
issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on
[September 9, 2002].

The CA found no cogent

reason to disturb the
conclusions reached by
the lower court. Hence,
this Petition.
16 BENITO GOLDING,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. Golding (petitioner) Whether or not YES.
HIPOLITO BALATBAT, alleged that he was the the issuance of
SERAPIA BALATBAR owner of a piece or injunction  
and ESTEFANIA parcel of land and that against the
BALATBAT, defendants. Balatbat (the defendant was The remedy by injunction is the proper remedy to prevent repeated trespass upon real property.
HIPOLITO BALATBAT, defendants) were proper
appellant. illegally and maliciously  
Marcelino Lontok for interfering with the
appellant. petitioner’s possession The following facts are established:
of said land.  The
petitioner prayed for  
both a preliminary and
permanent injunction.  1) Record shows that the defendants had such notice
The preliminary
injunction was issued.  2) It is sufficient to say that he himself admitted that he had violated the terms of said injunction and
Each of the defendants attempted to excuse by claiming to be the owner of such property
was served with the
copy of the complaint  
and the issued
preliminary injunction. Moreover, the court deemed it proper to make the following observations:
   
None of the 1) Injunction should not be granted to take property out of the possession and control of one party
defendants answered and to place it in the hands of another whose title has not been clearly established by law.
the petition within the
time fixed by law, thus 2) It should not be issued except upon condition that no other ordinary, speedy and adequate
the petitioner presented remedy is available to avoid or repair the damage done, or which may be done by a new violation of the
a motion for a judgment plaintiff’s rights.
by default, which was
granted.  The case was
3) That an injunction, while it resemble the interdictal actions of the Spanish law, is wholly distinct
set down for hearing
therefrom
and judgment was
rendered enjoining the
* accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's
defendants their agents
possession of the property is illegal abinitio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where
and representatives to
the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess
desist in their acts of
– Javier v. Veridiano G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994 (NOT CITED IN THIS CASE)
whatever character
which molested or
4) The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of
tended to molest the
irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity
plaintiff in the peaceful
of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of
enjoyment of the
injunction should be refused
possession of his
property.
5) Injunctions to prevent trespass and the illegal interference with the possession of land should not
  
Later, plaintiff
presented an affidavit
alleging that the
defendant had
maliciously and illegally
and by means of
violence committed acts
in violation of the terms
of said injunction. 
Balatbat confessed that
he was guilty of violation
of said injunction but
attempted to excuse his
acts upon the theory
that he was the owner of
the parcel of land.  He
was found guilty and
was imposed a fine.
be granted, when the plaintiff's title is in dispute and has not been established at law, until the question of
title is settled in a proper proceeding brought for that purpose.
6) There are cases, however, where an injunction may be granted in order to preserve the status
quo of property until the title can be determined in a proper action. But even then it should not be granted ex
parte. The defendant should be given an opportunity to be heard.
7) The remedy by injunction is never the proper remedy to deprive a person of the possession of property. If
the person in possession is in possession illegally there exist other adequate, speedy and summary
remedies — forcible entry and detainer and ejectment.
In the present action had the defendants appeared when they were cited so to do and alleged
and showed that they were in possession of the land in question as owners thereof, the action would
have resolved itself into one of ejectment, and a motion properly presented and properly supported
to dissolve the temporary injunction would have been denied. Of course, upon the theory of the
plaintiff, as presented in the record, that he was the owner of the land in question and in possession
thereof — and that fact not having been denied — and that the defendants were mere trespassers
thereon and were illegally and maliciously interfering and molesting the plaintiff in his quiet and
peaceable enjoyment of the possession of his property, then injunction was the proper remedy for
the purpose of preventing a repetition of said illegal acts.

  The remedy by injunction is the proper remedy to prevent repeated trespass upon real
property. But the trespass which will be enjoined must be of such a nature that an action for
On appeal, he alleged damages will not adequately compensate the loss occasioned thereby.
the following:

1) That he had not been

duly notified of the
injunction

2) That inasmuch as the

lower court had issued
the injunction; it is not
just for it to consider the
questions presented for
a violation of the same

3) That there was no

proof showing that the
defendant had violated
the terms of said
injunction
17
G.R. No. L-10572 Judgment appealed Whether or not No. Definition of
Injunction
December 21, 1915 from in this case the issuance of
perpetually restrains and the preliminary Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual remedies. The origin and history Injunctions, as
FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL prohibits the CIR injunction of the writ of injunction show that it has always been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as here defined, are
and STEWART TAIT, (defendant) and his against the distinguished from the common course of the law to redress evils after they have been consummated. No of two kinds;
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. deputies from collecting defendant is injunction issues as of course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and when there is no adequate preliminary and
and enforcing against proper final. The former
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, remedy at law. may be granted at
Collector of Internal the plaintiffs and their any time after the
Revenue, defendant- property the annual tax.  The mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by virtue of which it is imposed, is unconstitutional, does commencement
appellant. It also enjoins the not authorize a court of equity to restrain its collection by injunction. There must be a further showing that of the action and
defendant from before final
there are special circumstances which bring the case under some well recognized head of equity judgment, and the
Attorney-General destroying or removing jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or a cloud upon title to real estate will latter at the
Avanceña for appellant. any sign, signboard, result, and also that there is, as we have indicated, no adequate remedy at law. termination of the
billboard, the property of trial as the relief
the plaintiffs, for the or part of the
Aitken and DeSelms for Section 84 of Act No. 82 provides that "No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax relief prayed for
appellees. reason that such assessed under this act until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against (sec. 162).
billboard is, or may be him, . . . ." This inhibition was inserted in section 17 of Act No. 83 and applies to taxes imposed by provincial
offensive to the sight.  It boards. The inhibition was not inserted in the Manila Charter until the passage of Act No. 1793, effective Any judge of the
decrees the cancellation October 12, 1907. Act No. 355 expressly makes the payment of the exactions claimed a condition precedent Supreme Court
of the bond given by the may grant a
to a resort to the courts by dissatisfied importers. preliminary
plaintiffs to secure the injunction in any
issuance of the Section 52 of Act No. 1189 provides "That no courts shall have authority to grant an injunction restraining action pending in
preliminary injunction the collection of any taxes imposed by virtue of the provisions of this Act, but the remedy of the taxpayer that court or in
granted as soon after any Court of First
who claims that he is unjustly assessed or taxed shall be by payment under protest of the sum claimed from Instance.
the commencement of him by the Collector of Internal Revenue and by action to recover back the sum claimed to have been
this action. illegally collected." A preliminary
injunction may
The issuance of the preliminary injunction against the defendant is not proper also be granted
by a judge of the
Court of First
Instance in
actions pending
in his district in
which he has
original
jurisdiction (sec.
163). But such
injunctions may
be granted only
when the
complaint shows
facts entitling the
plaintiff to the
relief demanded
(sec. 166), and
before a final or
permanent
injunction can be
granted, it must
appear upon the
trial of the action
that the plaintiff is
entitled to have
commission or
continuance of
the acts
complained of
perpetually
restrained (sec.
171). These
provisions
authorize the
institution in
Courts of First
Instance of what
are known as
"injunction suits,"
the sole object of
which is to obtain
the issuance of a
final injunction.
They also
authorize the
granting of
injunctions as
aiders in ordinary
civil actions.

We have defined
in Davesa vs.
Arbes (13 Phil.
Rep., 273), an
injunction to be
"A "special
remedy" adopted
in that code (Act
190) from
American
practice, and
originally
borrowed from
English legal
procedure, which
was there issued
by the authority
and under the
seal of a court of
equity, and
limited, as in
other cases
where equitable
relief is sought, to
those cases
where there is no
 "plain, adequate,
and complete
remedy at
law,"which will
not be granted
while the rights
between the
parties are
undetermined,
except in
extraordinary
cases where
material and
irreparable injury
will be
done,"which
cannot be
compensated in
damages . . .

18 Facts: Issue: Ruling: ProvRem

G.R. NO. 147861 Whether or not No, it is not valid, and the preliminary injunction against PPA’s take over must be lifted. Doctrine:
November 18, 2005 In the late 1990's, then the issuance of a The requisites to
President Joseph E. Estrada justify an injunctive
writ of
issued a directive for the relief are: (a) the
PHILIPPINE PORTS modernization of the North preliminary existence of a right in
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, Harbor towards unification and injunction esse or the existence
v. PIER 8 ARRASTRE & rationalization of all facility against PPA's of a right to be
STEVE-DORING operators and service protected; and (b) the
takeover of port
providers. As the government
1 act against which
SERVICES, INC., agency vested with the services is valid. injunction is to be
Respondents. authority "to coordinate, directed as a violation
streamline, improve, and of such right. A
G.R. NO. 155252 optimize the planning, preliminary injunction
development, financing, is proper only when
construction, maintenance and the plaintiff appears to
PHILIPPINE PORTS operation of ports, port be entitled to the relief
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, facilities, port physical plants, demanded in his
v. THE COURT OF all equipment used in complaint.
connection with the operation
APPEALS (FORMER
of a port" and "[t]o supervise,
2

Ninth Division) and PIER P.D. No. 1818

control, regulate, construct,
deprives the courts of
8 ARRASTRE & maintain, operate, and provide
jurisdiction to issue
STEVEDORING such facilities or services as
any preliminary
are necessary in the ports
SERVICES, INC., injunction or
vested in, or belonging to the
Respondents. temporary retraining
Authority," it fell upon the PPA
3

order on essential
to implement the presidential
government projects,
TINGA, J.: edict. However, the plan for
including arrastre and
modernization, which required
stevedoring
the North Harbor to be run by
operations.
a single entity, encountered
strong opposition including
resistance from North Harbor

19
G.R. No. 207412               The petitioners enrolled
August 7, 2013
FLORD NICSON
CALAWAG, PETITIONER,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES VISAYAS
AND DEAN CARLOS C.
BAYLON,
RESPONDENTS.
x-------------------
----x
G.R. No. 207542
MICAH P. ESPIA, JOSE
MARIE F. NASALGA AND
CHE CHE B.
SALCEPUEDES,
PETITIONERS,
vs.
DR. CARLOS C. BA
YLON, DR. MINDA J.
FORMACI ON AND DR.
EMERLINDA ROMAN (TO
BE SUBSTITUTED BY
ALFREDO E. PASCUAL,
BEING THE NEW UP
PRESIDENT),
UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES BOARD OF
REGENTS,
RESPONDENTS.
port workers.
in the Master of Science
in Fisheries Biology at
UP Visayas under a
scholarship from the
Department of Science
and Technology-
Philippine Council for
Aquatic and Marine
Research and
Development. They
finished their first year of
study with good grades,
and thus were eligible to
start their thesis in the
first semester of their
second year. The
petitioners then enrolled
in the thesis program,
drafted their tentative
thesis titles, and
obtained the consent of
Dr. Rex Baleña to be
their thesis adviser, as
well as the other faculty
members’ consent to
constitute their
respective thesis
committees. These
details were enclosed in
the letters the petitioners
sent to Dean Baylon,
asking him to approve
the composition of their
thesis committees.
Upon receipt of the
petitioners’ letters, Dean
Baylon wrote a series of
memos addressed to
Whether or not "To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x x x the petitioners must establish the following requisites:
the Writ of (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
Preliminary complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the
Injunction is writ to prevent serious damage. Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of
proper in this an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive
case. injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction [presents a fourth
requirement: it] is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s
right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of
injunctive relief is improper."6
The CA did not err in ruling that the petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right that needs the
protection of a preliminary mandatory injunction. We support the CA’s conclusion that the dean has the
discretion to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee, and, hence, the petitioners had
no right for an automatic approval and composition of their thesis committees.
The functions and duties of a college dean are outlined in the university’s Faculty Manual, which details the
rules and regulations governing the university’s administration. Section 11.8.2, paragraph b of the Faculty
Manual enumerates the powers and responsibilities of a college dean, which include the power to approve
the composition of a thesis committee, to wit:
11.8.2 Administration
b. Dean/Director of UP System or UP Diliman-based Programs * The Dean/Director shall be responsible for
the planning and implementation of the graduate programs. In particular, the Dean/Director shall exercise
the following powers and responsibilities based on the recommendations forwarded to him/her, through
channels:
Approve the composition of the Thesis, Dissertation or Special Project** Committees and Master’s or
doctoral examination/oral defense panel for each student[.] (emphases and italics ours)
7
By necessary implication, the dean’s power to approve includes the power to disapprove the composition of
8
a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP System’s faculty manual, the dean has complete discretion in
approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. Verily, the academic freedom accorded
to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves their aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who
10
can and cannot study in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being
their graduates. This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such as
11
the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their students.
 Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, we held that the
13
right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen
has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the procedures leading to it, are
part of the reasonable academic requirements a person desiring to complete a course of study would have
to comply with.
Professor Sanares,
questioning the propriety
of the thesis topics with
the college’s graduate
degree program. He
subsequently
disapproved the
composition of the
petitioners’ thesis
committees and their
tentative thesis topics.
According to Dean
Baylon, the
petitioners’ thesis
titles connote a
historical and social
dimension study
which is not
appropriate for the
petitioners’ chosen
master’s degrees..
RTC’s Ruling
The petitioners thus filed
a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before
the RTC, asking it to
order Dean Baylon to
approve and constitute
the petitioners’ thesis
committees and approve
their thesis titles. RTC
issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory
injunction against Dean
Baylon, and order him to
perform such acts while
the suit was pending.
RTC granted the same.
CA’s Ruling
The CA reversed RTC’s
order, holding that the
petitioners had no clear
right to compel Dean
Baylon to approve the
composition of their
thesis committees as a
matter of course. The
CA held that the case
presents issues that are
purely academic in
character, which are
outside the court’s
jurisdiction. It also noted
that Dean Baylon has
been accommodating of
the petitioners, and that
the requirements he
imposed were meant to
assist them to formulate
a proper thesis title and
graduate on time.
Arguments of the
Petitioners:

v  Calawag’s
right to
education, the
right to due
process, and
the right to
equal protection
under the law
were violated.
v  Dean Baylon
violated his right
to due process
when he added
to and changed
the
requirements for
the constitution
of his thesis
committee,
without prior
publication of
the change in
rules.
v   Calawag’s
right to equal
protection of the
 law was
allegedly
violated
because only
students like
him, who chose
Dr. Baleña for
their thesis
adviser, were
subjected to the
additional
requirements
imposed by the
dean, while the
other students’
thesis
committees
were formed
without these
impositions.
v  The college
dean’s functions
are merely
administrative,
and, hence, the
CA erred in its
construction of
Article 51 of the
Graduate
Program
Manual of UP
Visayas, as well
as its
proclamation
that the college
dean has
supervisory
authority over
academic
matters in the
college.

20 Atoc vs. Camello IPI No. Clemente Atoc, herein Whether or not NO. The Court explained that administrative complaints against magistrates cannot be pursued
16-241-CA-J, November complainant, filed a an administrative simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or
 29, 2016 complaint against the action against judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they
justices of the 22nd the CA justices cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been
Division of the Court of is the resolved with finality. 
Appeals (Cagayan de appropriate
Oro City). The complaint remedy against Here, it is evident that the parties aggrieved by the resolution can avail or may have already availed of other
stemmed from the cases the issuance of judicial remedies. Quite significant is the fact that the instant administrative complaint was filed by someone
of Mayor Oscar Moreno WPI who is not a party or privy to the case. As correctly noted by the respondent justices in their Joint-Comment,
and Glenn C Banez Atoc did not even disclose the capacity in which he brings the present administrative complaint.  
(OIC Treasurer with the
Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found

Moreno and Banez
guilty of grave
misconduct and violation
of RA No. 6713. The
Ombudsman furnished a
copy of the said order to
the DILG. However,
Moreno and Banez
sought relief from the
CA and was able to
obtain a TRO then a
Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

Atoc, claiming that he

was aggrieved by the
CA’s decision to issue
the WPI filed an
administrative complaint
against the Justices
issuing such order. He
further alleged that the
justices be dismissed for
gross ignorance of the
law

21 G.R. No. 189026, Petitioner Philippine 1. Whether The fact that the interconnection agreement between Smart and PT&T involved access charges warrants a
November 09, 2016 Telegraph & Telephone or not NTC has more nuanced analysis, thus, requires NTC’s intervention.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH Corporation (PT&T) and jurisdiction - YES
TELEPHONE CORP., v. respondent Smart 2. Whether The first paragraph of Section 18 of RA 7925 mandates that any agreement pertaining to access charges
SMART Communications, Inc. or not RTC can must be submitted to the NTC for approval; in case the parties fail to agree, the matter shall be resolved by
COMMUNICATIONS, (Smart) entered into an validly issue a the NTC. 
INC.,  Agreement for the TRO against
interconnection of their NTC - NO The NTC is certainly the approving authority on matters pertaining to either the access charge formula or
telecommunication revenue-sharing arrangement. 
facilities. The
Agreement provided for Conspicuously, neither Smart nor PT&T claims that the access charges in the Agreement have been
the interconnection of submitted to, much less approved, by the NTC. 
Smart's Cellular Mobile
Telephone System
(CMTS), Local The second paragraph of Section 18 enumerates the guidelines to be considered by the NTC before it
Exchange Carrier (LEC) approves the access charges. Thus, the NTC must be satisfied that the access charge formula is fair and
and Paging services reasonable 
with PT&T's LEC
service. Starting 1999, The proceeding under Section 18 is quasi-judicial in nature. The NTC correctly treated the dispute as
however, PT&T had adversarial and gave both Smart and PT&T the opportunity to be heard.
difficulty meeting its
financial obligations to
Smart. Thus, the parties As for the Preliminary Injunction
amended the
Agreement, which Under Rule 58, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court where the action is pending may
extended the payment grant the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. Generally, trial courts have the ancillary jurisdiction to
period and allowed issue writs of preliminary injunction in cases falling within its jurisdiction, including civil actions that are
PT&T to settle its incapable of pecuniary estimation and claims for sum of money exceeding P400,000.00, among others. 
obligations on
installment basis. The
Exceptions:
amended Agreement
1. when Congress, in the exercise of its power to apportion jurisdiction, restricts the authority of regular
also specified that
courts to issue injunctive reliefs. For example, the Labor Code prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in
Smart's access charge
cases involving or arising from labor disputes.
to PT&T would increase
2. Republic Act No. 897545 (RA 8975) provides that no court, other than the Supreme Court, may
from P1.00 to P2.00
issue provisional injunctive reliefs which would adversely affect the expeditious implementation and
once PT&T's unpaid
completion of government infrastructure projects. 
balance reaches P4
3. courts could not interfere with the judgments, orders, or decrees of a court of concurrent or
Million and that PT&T's
coordinate jurisdiction. This rule of non-interference applies not only to courts of law having equal
access charge to Smart
rank but also to quasi-judicial agencies statutorily at par with such courts.
would be reduced from
P8.69 to P6.50. Upon
full payment, PT&T's The NTC was created pursuant to (EO 546). It assumed the functions formerly assigned to the Board of
access charge would be Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau and was placed under the administrative
further reduced to supervision of the Ministry of Public Works. Meanwhile, the Board of Communications previously exercised
P4.50. the authority which originally pertained to the Public Service Commission (PSC). 

On April 4, 2005, Smart
sent a letter informing
PT&T that it increased
the access charge from
Section 16 of EO 546 provides that, with respect to the NTC's quasi¬-judicial functions, its decisions shall be
appealable in the same manner as the decisions of the Board of Communications had been appealed. The
rulings and decisions of the Board were, in turn, appealable in the same manner as the rulings and decisions
of the PSC. Under Section 35 of the Public Service Act, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review any
order, ruling, or decision of the PSC. In Iloilo Commercial and Ice Company v. Public Service Commission,
P1.00 to P2.00 starting we categorically held that courts of first instance have no power to issue a restraining order directed to the
April 1, 2005 in PSC. 
accordance with the
amended Agreement. x x x In the absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to Courts of First Instance to grant injunctive relief
However, on September against orders of the Public Service Commission, it would appear that no court, other than the Supreme
2, 2005, PT&T sent a Court, possesses such jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would amount to a presumption of power in favor of
letter to Smart claiming one branch of the judiciary, as against another branch of equal rank. 
that the latter
overcharged PT&T on The above ruling was modified by BP Blg. 129, granting the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all final
outbound calls to judgments, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
Smart's CMTS.5 PT&T instrumentalities, boards or commission" except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
cited the NTC resolution Court in accordance with the Constitution and the Labor Code. In this regard, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
in a separate dispute provides that an appeal from any award, judgment or resolution of or authorized by a quasi-judicial agency in
between Smart and the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, including the NTC, shall be through a petition for review with the
Digitel, where the NTC Court of Appeals.
ultimately disallowed the
access charges
imposed by Smart for In view of the legislative history of the NTC, it is clear that Congress intended NTC, in respect of its quasi-
being discriminatory and judicial or adjudicatory functions, to be co-equal with regional trial courts. Hence, the RTC cannot interfere
less favorable than with the NTC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers without breaching the rule of non-interference with
terms offered to other tribunals of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. In this case, the NTC was already in the process of
public resolving the issue of whether the access charges stipulated in the Agreement were fair and equitable
telecommunication pursuant to its mandate under RA 7925 when the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.
entities (PTEs). Mediation conferences had been conducted and, failing to arrive at a settlement, the NTC had ordered the
Accordingly, PT&T parties to submit their respective pleadings. Simply put, the NTC had already assumed jurisdiction over the
demanded a refund of issue involving access charges. Undeniably, the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it restrained the NTC
P12,681,795.13 from from exercising its statutory authority over the dispute.
Smart.

PT&T filed a complaint

with the NTC raising that
the access charges
imposed by Smart were
"discriminatory and not
in conformity with those
of other carriers." 

NTC ordered Smart and

PT&T to attend
mediation conferences,
but the mediation failed,
the NTC directed them
to file their pleadings.
But before they could
submit, Smart filed a
complaint with the
Makati (RTC) against
PT&T alleging that
PT&T was in breach of
its contractual obligation
when it failed to pay its
outstanding debt and
denied its liability to
Smart. 

Smart also asked the

RTC to issue a TRO
against the NTC and
PT&T, which the RTC
granted.
PT&T sought for the
dismissal of the civil
case for lack of
jurisdiction, non-
observance of the
doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, exhaustion
of administrative
remedies, litis pendentia
and res judicata. It also
prayed for the
restraining order be set
aside. 

RTC issued a writ of

preliminary injunction in
favor of Smart. The RTC
reasoned that allowing
the NTC to proceed and
adjudicate access
charges would violate
Smart's contractual
rights. 

PT&T petitioned with the

CA. The CA found that
the RTC had jurisdiction
over the case because it
involved an action for
specific performance,
i.e., PT&T's compliance
with the Agreement, and
is therefore incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
And insofar as the
dispute involved an
alleged breach of
contract, there was no
need to refer the matter
to the NTC because it
had no jurisdiction over
breach of contract
cases.

CA denied the MR,

PT&T then filed this
petition for review 

For PT&T, NTC has

primary jurisdiction over
the determination of
access charges. PT&T
characterizes the NTC
case as one involving
the validity of
interconnection rates, as
opposed to one
involving purely a
breach of contract and
claim for damages
cognizable by the RTC.
PT&T adds that the writ
of preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC
against NTC constitutes
interference with a co-
equal body. 

For Smart, RTC has

jurisdiction as the
dispute was purely
contractual. It alleges
that NTC has no
jurisdiction over bilateral
interconnection
 agreements voluntarily
negotiated and entered
into by PTEs.

Smart believes that its

complaint before the
RTC is one which is
incapable of pecuniary
estimation and,
accordingly, falls within
its jurisdiction. For
Smart, because it is
seeking to enforce the
Agreement, the regular
courts, not the NTC,
have jurisdiction 

22 BICOL MEDICAL Sometime in 1982, the Whether or not A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a result of an impartial
CENTER VS. NOE B. Camarines Sur the Court of determination of the context of both parties. It entails a procedure for the judge to assess whether the reliefs
BOTOR - G.R. NO. Provincial Government Appeals erred in prayed for by the complainant will be rendered moot simply as a result of the parties' having to go through
214073 donated about five (5) directing the the full requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits. Although a trial court judge is given a latitude
hectares of land to the Regional Trial of discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of injunction if there is no clear legal right materially and
Ministry of Health, now Court to issue a substantially breached from a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant. Even if this is
the Department of writ of present, the trial court must satisfy itself that the injury to be suffered is irreparable.
Health,[8] as evidenced preliminary Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ of preliminary injunction may be
by Transfer Certificate of injunction on the issued: when it is established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
Title (TCT) No. closure of Road of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
13693.The Training and Lot No. 3. requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the
Teaching Hospital and commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
Road Lot No. 3 were probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening,
included in this or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
donation.The Training rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
and Teaching Hospital ineffectual.
became the Bicol Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first before a writ of
Medical Center (BMC) in preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued:
1995. BMC constructed The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (2) There is a
a steel gate along J. material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable
Miranda Avenue to injury to the applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
control the flow of infliction of irreparable injury.
vehicle and pedestrian In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her claim with complete
traffic entering the and conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required "to give the court an idea
hospital premises. of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits."
To prove its clear legal right over the remedy being sought, Naga City presented before the trial court the
Dr. Nerva, BMC Chief I,
issued Hospital
Memorandum No.
0310,which ordered the
rerouting of traffic inside
the BMC Compound.
This rerouting scheme
closed the steel gate for
vehicles and
pedestrians along J.
Miranda Avenue,
relocating it from the
eastern side of the
hospital to the western
side
Atty. Noe Botor (Atty.
Botor) wrote to Naga
City Mayor John Bongat
(Mayor Bongat), asking
for the reopening or
dismantling of the gate
for being a public
nuisance.
The Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Naga
City passed a resolution
authorizing Mayor
Bongat to dismantle the
gate. However, instead
of dismantling it, Mayor
Bongat filed a Verified
Petition with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against BMC.
Atty. Botor, Celjun F.
Yap, Ismael A. Albao,
Augusto S. Quilon,
Edgar F. Esplana II, and
Josefina F. Esplana
(Intervenors) were
allowed to intervene and
submit their complaint-
1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map which both identified Road
Lot No. 3 as being in the name of the Province of Camarines Sur. Witnesses' testimonies were also
presented to corroborate Naga City's claims of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3.
Respondents claimed that as members of the general public, they had every right to use Road Lot No. 3, a
public road. On the other hand, BMC presented TCT No. 13693,which covered a total land area of
53,890m2 within Barrio Concepcion, Naga City with the Ministry of Health, now Department of Health, as the
registered owner. It is not disputed that Road Lot No. 3 is part of the property covered by TCT No. 13693.
A careful reading of the records convinces this Court that respondents failed to establish prima facie proof of
their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever right they sought to establish by proving the public
nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the Department of Health's certificate of title and the City
Engineer's categorical statement that "the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of
[BMC] was not included in the list'' of city roads under Naga City's control.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely to the evidence
presented by Naga City and respondents and in disregarding altogether petitioners' evidence, which had the
effect of squarely rebutting Naga City and respondents' assertions. The Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
the nature of the ancillary remedy of a writ of preliminary injunction as against the ex parte nature of a
temporary restraining order.
Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only upon prior notice to the party sought to be enjoined and upon
their due hearing. Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
Rule 58 requires "a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the propriety of the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction," giving the applicant an opportunity to prove that great or irreparable injury
will result if no writ is issued and allowing the opposing party to comment on the application
By focusing solely on Naga City and respondents' evidence to determine if there was prima facie evidence
to issue the writ of preliminary injunction while the case was being heard in the lower court, the Court of
Appeals misappreciated the nature of a writ of preliminary injunction.
To reiterate, a preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where both parties are
given the opportunity to present their respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be considered.
Respondents were unable to present prima facie evidence of their clear and unmistakable right to use Road
Lot No. 3.
in-intervention.The
Regional Trial Court
denied Naga City's
application for injunctive
relief, ruling that Naga
City failed to prove a
clear and unmistakable
right to the writ prayed
for.
Only the Intervenors
filed a petition for
certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals

granted the petition and
emphasized that only a
prima facie showing of
an applicant's right to
the writ is required in an
application for writ of
injunctive relief.

The Court of Appeals

denied the motions for
reconsideration filed by
BMC and the
Department of Health.
However, the Court of
Appeals emphasized
that the injunction was
not directed against the
construction of the
Cancer Center Building
but against the
relocation of the service
road and gate closure.

Petitioners BMC and the

Department of Health
filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners applied for a
temporary restraining
order and/or writ of
 preliminary injunction to
prevent the reopening of
the gate since doing so
would affect the
construction of the
Cancer Center Building.

The first Resolution

granted petitioners'
motion for extension to
file their petition. The
second Resolution
issued a temporary
restraining order
enjoining the
implementation of the
Court of Appeals which
directed the Regional
Trial Court to issue a
writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction on
the closure of Road Lot
No. 3.

Rule Whether or not the

58 NERWIN INDUSTRIES In 1999, the National
CORPORATION, Petitioner, Electrification
RA vs. Administration ("NEA")
PNOC-ENERGY published an invitation to
897
DEVELOPMENT pre-qualify and to bid for a
5 granted.
CORPORATION, and ESTER contract (IPB No. 80) for
R. GUERZON, Chairman, the supply and delivery of
Bids and Awards Committee, about sixty thousand
Respondents. (60,000) pieces of
G.R. No. 167057 / April 11, woodpoles and twenty
2012 thousand (20,000) pieces
BERSAMIN, J.: of crossarms needed in the
  country’s Rural
Electrification Project. In
response to the said
invitation, bidders, such as
petitioner (Nerwin) were
required to submit their
application for eligibility
together with their technical
proposals. Nerwin qualified
petitioner’s The RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in
application for issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining the bidding for the O-ILAW Project. This is
TRO and Writ of expressly provided under sections (3) and (4) of RA 8975.
Preliminary
Injunction must be
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Mandatory
 
Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
NO. subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private acting under the government
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national
government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/ project of the national government as defined under Section 2
hereof;
(c) Commencement prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders
involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency
involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by

as the lowest bidder. NEA
then conducted a pre-
award inspection of
Nerwin’s manufacturing
plants and facilities.
However, on December 19,
2000, NEA’s Board of
Directors passed a
resolution reducing by 50%
the material requirements.
Nerwin protested the said
50% reduction, alleging
that the same was a ploy to
accommodate a losing
bidder. On the other hand,
the losing bidders
appeared to have filed a
complaint, citing alleged
false or falsified documents
submitted during the pre-
qualification stage which
led to the award of the IBP-
80 project to Nerwin.
the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
In after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a
rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing
laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. – Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and
effect.
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition
to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources
Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government.
The RTC failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government
infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project certainly was. It thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this
Court’s various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure projects
in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. 
 

In the interim, PNOC-

Energy Development
Corporation purporting to
be under the Department
of Energy, issued
Requisition No. FGJ
30904R1 (O-ILAW Project)
or an invitation to pre-
qualify and to bid for
wooden poles needed for
its Samar Rural
Electrification Project.
Upon learning of the
issuance of Requisition No.
FGJ 30904R1, Nerwin filed
a civil action in the RTC in
Manila alleging that O-
ILAW Project was an
attempt to subject a portion
of the items covered by
IPB No. 80 to another
bidding; and praying that a
TRO issue to enjoin
respondents’ proposed
 bidding for the wooden
poles. Respondents sought
the dismissal arguing that
government infrastructure
projects by virtue of RA
8975 cannot be subjected
to TROs.

The RTC granted the

preliminary injunction. It
also denied the
Respondents’ motion for
reconsideration. Thence,
respondents commenced
in the Court of Appeals
(CA) a special civil action
for certiorari. Respondents
alleged that the RTC
committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to
lack or excess of
jurisdiction in holding that
Nerwin had been entitled to
the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction
despite the express
prohibition from the law
(RA 8975). The CA granted
the respondents’ petition. 

Rule 58. Preliminary Injunction

*CASE 1-PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF THE PERIOD WHEN NIASSI OPERATED AS CARGO HANDLER AT NASIPIT PORT:
 

Period Duration Basis

January 3, 2001 to December 9, 3 years, 11 months and 6 Notice of Award

2004 days
 March 28, 2005 to April 11, 2005 14 days Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction

August 8, 2006 to December 3, 2014 8 years, 3 months and 26 Reinstatement of Preliminary Injunction
days

Total 12 years, 3 months and 15 days