Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 200334               July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, 

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail
themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous
drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect
to perform what could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who
traffic this scourge of society.

Squarely raised in· this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a
warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were
not based on their personal knowledge. The information as to the accused’s whereabouts was
sent through a text message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a
driver. The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required to be opened under
intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully apprised of his rights. This
was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable
suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by
the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure or coercion.

The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article
III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused
should be acquitted.

According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union,
"received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer"2 that one Marvin Buya (also
known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1
Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a
checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6 A
passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint.7 The
jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male
passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa
Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and
Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a
favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag,
revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.13Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy
nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what
[is] contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought
them to the police station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective
bags"16 inside the station.17

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3
Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4)
rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick
of suspected marijuana.20

PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan personally
delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer
Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects
obtained were indeed marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total
weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The
marijuana collected from Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams
werecollected from Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags.27

According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a
jeepney to take him"28to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.29 He boarded a
jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of
San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for
[Cogaed’s] help in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack."32 Cogaed
agreed because they were both going to the market.33 This was when SPO1 Taracatac
approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags,
Cogaed replied that he did not know.34SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed
was not privy to their conversation.35 Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed
and brought them to the police station.36 These facts were corroborated by an
eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was
apprehended.37

At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head."38 The bags were
also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.39

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged
with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.40 The information
against them states:

That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province
of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with
discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did
then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have
in their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight
of seventeen thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.

CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No.
9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").41

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La
Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed against Dayao
because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed
ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment,
and to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46

The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time
was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas about to do
so or that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless
search should also be considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding
the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to such irregularity"49 when "he did
not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."50

Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal
and affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his
right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he]
voluntarily opened his bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS
AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF
AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9165.

III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.54

For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure
of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search
should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the
accused.

In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the
requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55

We find for the accused.

II

The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has
many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and
seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all
the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of
probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.56The existence of probable cause must
be established by the judge after asking searching questions and answers.57Probable cause at
this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames
the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and
the things to be searched.58

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.59 In the
Rules of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate
warrant.60 This court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured."61 The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable
warrantless searches and seizures are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
 thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consentedwarrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)

III

One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk"
searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of
Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante
delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is
done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64

On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime.
For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals65 was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’
situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain
the status quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information."66 This
court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly
unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time
to secure . . . a search warrant."67

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with
all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches68) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission
of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police
officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal
behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion
would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place
frequented by people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man
with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner."71 The suspicion increased
when the man avoided the police officers.72 These observations led the police officers to
conclude that the man was high on drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police
officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate."74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.76 This man was also
"wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His
flight added to the suspicion.79After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed
"homemade firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the
government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first."82 This was also a
valid search.

In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion.
Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is
indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is
probably hiding something as well.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or
carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:

COURT:

Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the
passenger jeep?

WITNESS:

A Not yet, Your Honor.83

SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:

COURT:

Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe
that the accused were carrying marijuana?

WITNESS:

A No, Your Honor.84

The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police
officers otherwise.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably
searched.85 Anything less than this would be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of
one’s person and effects.

IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a
judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases
adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe
suspicious circumstances as probable cause:

The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the
buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it
was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged."88

Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable
cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to serve the purposes
of the "stop and frisk" exception:92

Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)

In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not
rely on a single suspicious circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more than
oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity."96 The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly,
reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
search.98

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation
for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven
the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the
person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that
he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This
should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid
search warrant.

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there
is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of
protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)

The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for
cases involving dangerous drugs.

The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta.102 In that case, an informant
told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by
bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves.104 The informant pointed at
a woman crossing the street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police apprehended
"Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag.107The bag
contained marijuana leaves.108

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal.109 There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and
seizure.110 It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The evidence
obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search.112Consequently, Aruta was
acquitted.113

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police’s
informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.114 Here, the National
Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing
drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was
disembarking from a boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and
found bundles of what turnedout to be marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the
searchand seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119

People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had
been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in
Angeles City."121 One night, the police received information that thisdrug dealer would be
dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout.122 A car "arrived and
parked"123 at the hotel.124The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was
dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127 The police
immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in
the juice box he was holding.128

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s situation when
the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no valid‘stop-and-frisk’."129

VI

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For
there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless
arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may,
withouta warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was
made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was
about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto
be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting officer."130 Both
elements were missing when Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain
view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the
last allowable warrantless arrest.

VII

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:

Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaed’s
silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought
about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the
police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is
knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
presumed.

The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again
from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:

ATTY. BINWAG:

Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags,
is it not?
WITNESS:

A Yes, ma’am.

Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?

A None, ma’am.

Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents ofthe
bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?

A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.

Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is
it not?

A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised.133 (Emphasis
supplied)

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses to Judge
Florendo’s questions:

COURT:

....

Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?

A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat
frightened.1âwphi1 He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and
he put down the bag I asked him, "what’s that," and he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin
only asked me to carry."134

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the
police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.1âwphi1 The police
officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part will
amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a
reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known
to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be anassurance
given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental
nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.

VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures]
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures."137 It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects
are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his
bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to
convict Cogaed.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better.
However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in
our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the
society that we seek to protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La
Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand
SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless he is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 136066-67. February 4, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BINAD SY CHUA, accused-

appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two
separate Informations which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-507[1]

That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control two (2) plastic bags
containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (SHABU) weighing more or less two (2) kilos and
one (1) small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine Hydrocloride weighing more or less
fifteen (15) grams, which is a regulated drug, without any authority whatsoever.

Criminal Case No. 96-513[2]

That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control twenty (20) pieces of
live .22 cal. ammunitions, without first having obtained a license or permit to possess or carry
the same.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. The two cases were then jointly
tried.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police force of Angeles
City. Their testimonies can be synthesized as follows:
On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2
Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant
was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The
informer further reported that accused-appellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke
bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City, Col. Neopito
Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of operatives composed of Major Bernardino, Insp.
Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, P02 Emmeraldo Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian
assets, with SPO2 Mario Nulud, as team investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag
and the civilian informer positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai
Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant
which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-
appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag
hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant
pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from
his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded
twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2
Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline
substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice
box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant.
Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the
confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito,
Angeles City.[3]
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags
containing crystalline substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the
PNP Headquarters revealed that the siezed items contained shabu.[4] Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud
together with accused-appellant brought these items for further laboratory examination to the
Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due testing, forensic
chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive results
for shabu. The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while the two big plastic bags weighed
1.942 kilograms of shabu.[5]
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different
version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his wife to
follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along
McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago,
Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approach and
examine the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man
immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man
later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took
out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys
and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the
scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a
nearby bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom
for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In
the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to
hold the box while pictures were being taken.[6]
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points. He
testified that he witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security check around
the premises of the Guess Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel.[7]
On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a
decision,[8] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, the accused is hereby
acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.

2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu, accused
Binad Sy Chua is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING FINDINGS:

A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BINAD SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;

B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF SHABU

ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN A LAWFUL AND VALID MANNER;

C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CRIME CHARGED IS SUFICIENT

TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REAONABLE DOUBT.[10]

Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police
operatives was unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest
he has been under surveillance for two years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the
haste within which the arresting officers sought to arrest and search him without a warrant; that
the police officers had sufficient information about him and could have easily arrested
him. Accused-appellant further argues that since his arrest was null an void, the drugs that were
seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.
Accused-appellants argument is impressed with merit.
Although the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and
fast one.

It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of
witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the
course of their testimonies. The only exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the case.[11]

In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and substance that have
been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the
guilt of accused-appellant. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and
this includes the review of the penalty and indemnity imposed by the trial court. [12] We are
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance
in favor of the accused shall be considered. [13] This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate
that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon
accused-appellant, the court a quo made the following findings:

Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs (shabu). A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects x x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. x x x x

While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal affects (sic) of the accused, however, under the circumstances of
the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime.

x x x x x x x x x

In the present case, the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs
that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and
there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and
frisk.[14]

A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial
court. It confused the two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante
delicto) and of a stop-and-frisk.
In Malacat v. Court of Appeals,[15] we distinguished the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, to wit:

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of
the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g.,whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be madethe
process cannot be reversed.At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may
search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon
or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or
which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

x x x x x x x x x

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a stop-and-frisk as a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons, as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth amendment.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop-
and-frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-
frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriatecircumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2)
the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.[16] (Emphasis ours)

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is
applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the
police operatives on accused-appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the
search of a person and his belongings. [17] Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[18]
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals
that when accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his
car along the McArthur Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance
of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious
manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation of
the law, the group of SPO2 Nulud hurriedly accosted [19] accused-appellant and later on
introduced themselves as police officers.[20] Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged
drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in this case was more imagined than real. Thus,
there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in light of the lack of
an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had committed a crime, was
committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it
has been held that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.[21] Hence, in People v.
Aminudin,[22] we ruled that the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed
to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension (Emphasis supplied).
The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben[23] to justify the polices actions is
misplaced. In the said case, based on the information supplied by informers, police officers
conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga
against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaged in the
traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red
travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open
his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside
the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of
the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge from the very
same informant of accused-appellants activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team
leader of the arresting operatives, admitted that their informant has been telling them about the
activities of accused-appellant for two years prior to his actual arrest on September 21, 1996.
An excerpt of the testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the illegality of the arrest of accused-
appellant as follows:
Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you the name of this chinese drug
pusher?
A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.
Q. And he had been mentioning these names to you even before September 21, 1996?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling you about the activities of this
chinese drug pusher reckoning in relation to September 21, 1996?
A. That was about two years already.
Q. Nothwithstanding his two years personal knowledge which you gained from the
civilian informant that this chinese drug pusher have been engaged pushing drugs
here in Angeles City, you did not think of applying for a search warrant for this
chinese drug pusher?
A. No, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually walking along the road near
the Thunder Inn Hotel, is that right?
A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is the chinese drug pusher that
will deliver to him also.
Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad Chua the accused in this case
he alighted with a Corolla car with plate number 999, I think, he just alighted when
you saw him?
A. Yes, sir.
 Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked towards near the entrance of the
Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel but he was pinpointed already
by the civilian informer.
Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag pounced on him as you used
pounced on him in your affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that alleged small plastic bag, is
that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice box?
A. Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline substance is shabu?
A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we have been tailing the accused
that he is really a drug pusher.
Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long time that you are very sure
that what was brought by him was shabu?
A. Yes, sir.[24]
The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of accused-
appellant. Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was
already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the
police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and
searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to them hours before
accused-appellants arrest was not a product of an on-the-spot tip which may excuse them from
obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting teams contention that their arrest of
accused-appellant was a product of an on-the-spot tip is untenable.
In the same vein, there could be no valid stop-and-frisk in this case. A stop-and-frisk was
defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him
for weapon(s)[25] or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make
initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct,
in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.[26] The apprehending
police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and
the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him.[27] It should therefore be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.[28]
 This principle of stop-and-frisk search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of
Appeals.[29] In said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes,
walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the
validity of the search as akin to a stop-and-frisk. In People v. Solayao,[30] we also found
justifiable reason to stop-and-frisk the accused after considering the following circumstances:
the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled
when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an
intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid stop-and-
frisk in the case of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before
the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending
police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants business in the vicinity
or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only
introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. Besides, at the
time of his arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct
reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There
was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellants arrest.
Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given to
them by their confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-
appellants warrantless arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid stop-and
frisk. For a valid stop-and-frisk the search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so
in this case. Besides, as we have earlier emphasized, the information about the illegal activities
of accused-appellant was not unknown to the apprehending officers. Hence, the search and
seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a valid stop-and-frisk.
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in
accused-appellants possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e.,
the plastic bags found in the Zest-O juice box which contained crystalline substances later on
identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber
ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The police officers first arrested accused-
appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice box
before they were able to see and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu.
There was no clear showing that the sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried
contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the small plastic bags which allegedly contained
crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited
substances were not in plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the
fruits of the poisonous tree.
In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and
emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate,
much more cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-
appellant. Neither can the presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an
officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by
the Constitution.[31] In People v. Nubla,[32] we clearly stated that:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for
affirming accused-appellants conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a
mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as
binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-
appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that
the initial field test where the items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the
PNP headquarters of Angeles City.[33] The items were therefore not marked at the place where
they were taken. In People v. Casimiro,[34] we struck down with disbelief the reliability of the
identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where they were
seized, thus:

The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not
conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable
doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of
marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime
laboratory.

The governments drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it
should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution.
The constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes
wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their
minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered.
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.  Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence.[35]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch 59, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting accused-appellant Binad
Sy Chua of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable
doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody, unless he is being lawfully
held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna. JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January 21, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Constitution bars the admission of evidence gathered in violation of the right against
unreasonable search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug was searched for and
found in a hut that has not been proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for
residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of the
illegal drug found therein.

The Case

Antonio C. Estella appeals the August 25, 1998 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69) in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I. The trial court found him
guilty of violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I, accused Antonio C.
Estella is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A.
6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana is ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The
Sheriff is directed to deliver the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper
disposition.

In Criminal Case No. RTC 2144-I, accused Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED and the
Information dated 07 January 1997 filed against him for violation of P.D. 1866 is dismissed with
costs de oficio.

The .38 caliber revolver without serial number and four (4) live ammunitions, subject of the
offense, are ordered delivered to any authorized representative of the Philippine National Police,
Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.[2]

The Information dated January 7, 1997, charged appellant thus:

That on or about the 20th day of November, 1996 at about 11:15 oclock in the morning, at Purok
Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, in the Municipality of Masinloc, Province of Zambales, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control, [o]ne (1) tin can labeled
CLASSIC containing twenty (20) small bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total
weight of 589.270 grams each wrapped with a piece of reading material; [o]ne (1) tin can
labeled CLASSIC containing dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 41.126 grams; [t]wo (2)
white sando plastic bag each containing one (1) [brick] of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a
total weight of 1.710 kilograms each wrapped with a piece of newspaper; [o]ne (1) white sando
plastic bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of
1.820 kilograms each wrapped with a piece of newspaper, all in the total of 8.320 kilograms of
dried marijuana, without any authority to possess the same.[3]

After the Information had been read to him in Filipino, a language he fully understood,
 appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte,[5] pleaded not guilty when arraigned on March 11,
[4]
1997. After due trial, the RTC convicted appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
(marijuana), but acquitted him of illegal possession of firearms. On November 4, 1998, his
counsel filed a Notice of Appeal.[6]

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,[7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of
the facts as follows:

Prior to November 20, 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of
Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of appellant
at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.

In the morning of November 20, 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Bulor[o]n, then
Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose Arca and several other members
of the Provincial Special Operation Group based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales
proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated with the members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of
Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement of the search warrant. Barangay Captain Barnaceha
accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place
mentioned in the search warrant.

On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a rocking chair located
about two (2) meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, brother of appellant, and being
rented by appellants live-in partner, named Eva. They approached appellant and introduced
themselves as police officers. They showed appellant the search warrant and explained the
contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked appellant if indeed he had in his possession prohibited
drug and if so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty.

While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team two cans containing dried marijuana
fruiting tops. One can contained twenty (20) bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in
the presence of appellant and his live-in partner. They found a plastic container under the
kitchen table, which contained four (4) big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber
revolver with four live ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and
ammunitions. The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items. Barangay Captain
Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the receipt as
witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested appellant and brought him to San
Marcelino, Zambales.

At their office in San Marcelino, Zambales, SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca placed their markings
on the seized items for purposes of identification. SPO1 Arca kept the seized items under his
custody. The next day, SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca brought the seized items to San Antonio,
Zambales, where Police Senior Inspector Florencio Sahagun examined the suspected
marijuana dried leaves. Inspector Sahagun prepared a certification of field test.

On November 29, 1996, the suspected marijuana dried leaves were delivered to the PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Olivas for further examination. Senior Inspector Daisy Babor, a forensic
chemist, examined the suspected marijuana dried leaves and issued Chemistry Report No. D-
768-96 stating that the specimens are positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug. Specimen A
weighed 1.710 kilograms, while Specimen D weighed 1.820 kilograms.[8] (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

For his version of the facts, appellant merely reproduced the narration in the assailed RTC
Decision as follows:

Accused Antonio C. Estella [I]s married to Gloria Atrero Estella. They have three (3) children,
namely: Carmen Estella (8 years old), Antonio Estella, Jr. (5 years old) and Roen Estella (3
years old). Since 1982, Antonio Estella has been [a] resident of Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc,
Zambales.

On 20 November 1996 between 10:30 oclock and 11:00 oclock in the morning, while accused
was talking with his friends Rael Tapado and Victor de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the
house of Camillo Torres and about 70 meters away from his house, a group of men approached
them. The group introduced themselves as policemen and told them that they were looking for
Antonio Estella because they have a search warrant issued against him. Accused identified
himself to them. The policemen inquired from the accused as to where his house is located and
accused told them that his house is located across the road. The police did not believe him and
insisted that accuseds house (according to their asset) is that house located about 5-8 meters
away from them.Accused told the policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea
as to where his house is and heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near
the Abokabar junk shop. After about half an hour, the policemen went inside the house nearby
and when they came out, they had with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to the
accused. They photographed the accused and brought him to their office at San Marcelino,
Zambales. Accused Antonio Estella was investigated a[t] San Marcelino, Zambales where he
informed the police officers of the fact that the house they searched was occupied by Spouses
Vicente and Fely Bakdangan.

Accused denied having surrendered to policeman Buloron tin cans containing marijuana and
likewise having any firearm.
Miguel Buccat, who personally knew the accused for about ten (10) years, identified the house
depicted on a photograph as that house belonging to the accused.[9] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

In finding appellant guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, the court a quo relied
heavily on the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness, Intelligence and Investigation
Officer SPO1 Antonio Buloron. He was among the members of the police team that searched
appellants alleged house. Since the defense failed to present proof of any intent on the part of
SPO1 Buloron to falsely impute to appellant such a serious crime, the trial court accorded full
faith and credence to the police officers testimony.
Moreover, the RTC held that no less than the barangay captain of the place named in the
search warrant led the police to the house. Thus, appellant could not deny that he owned it.
As to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, the lower court ruled that the search
warrant did not cover the seized firearm, making it inadmissible against appellant. He was thus
acquitted of the charge.
Hence, this recourse.[10]

The Issues

In his appeal, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:

A. The trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the conjectural and conflicting
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses;

B. The trial court gravely failed to consider the serious contradictions in the facts and evidences
adduced by the prosecution;

C. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime
charged has been prove[n] beyond reasonable doubt, instead of judgment of acquittal
demanded by the constitutional presumption of innocence[.][11]

Though not clearly articulated by appellant, the pivotal issue here is the legality of the police
search undertaken in the hut where the subject marijuana was seized.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Main Issue:
 Legality of the Search Undertaken

Once again, this Court is confronted with a situation that involves a well-enshrined dogma
in our Constitution: the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties
against unreasonable searches and seizures.[12] The exclusionary rule prescribed by Section
3(2), Article III of the Constitution, bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of this
right.[13]
The conviction or the acquittal of appellant hinges primarily on the validity of the police
officers search and seizure, as well as the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue
thereof. Without that evidence, the prosecution would not be able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ownership of the Subject House

Appellant claims that the hut,[14] which was searched by the police and where the subject
marijuana was recovered, does not belong to him. He points to another house[15] as his real
residence. To support his claim, he presents a document[16] that shows that the subject hut was
sold to his brother Leonardo C. Estella by one Odilon Eclarinal. The OSG, on the other hand,
argues that just because appellant has another house in a place away from the hut that was
searched does not necessarily mean that the hut is not occupied by him or under his full control.
[17] The prosecution cites the testimony of Rey Barnachea, the barangay captain of that place, to
show that the hut in question belongs to appellant.
The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject hut is that it was bought
by his brother Leonardo a.k.a. Narding Estella.[18] We cannot sustain the OSGs supposition that
since it was being rented by the alleged live-in partner of appellant, it follows that he was also
occupying it or was in full control of it. In the first place, other than SPO1 Bulorons
uncorroborated testimony, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that
the person renting the hut was indeed the live-in partner of appellant -- if he indeed had
any. Moreover, the testimony of Barnachea serves to undermine, not advance, the position of
the prosecution. We quote from his testimony:
Q Do you know who is the owner of that house?
A What I know is that Narding Estella bought that house, sir.
Q Who is that Narding Estella?
A The brother of Tony Estella, sir.
Q And you know that that has been rent[ed] to people?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, so far how many people [rented] that place or that house?
A I do not have any information about that[,] sir.
Q Why did you know that that place was rented?
A Because when I asked Eva she replied that they [were] only renting that house, sir.
Q How long has Eva been renting that house?
 A I do not have any information about that[,] sir.
Q Do you know who was living with Eva?
A No, sir.
Q So, what you know is that Eva lives alone in that house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you do not know anybody who is renting that house?
A I have no information, sir.
Q And you do not know if the accused was renting [it] or not?
A I dont have any information, sir.[19]
At most, the testimony shows that the subject hut was bought by Narding Estella and rented
by someone named Eva. The attempt to make it appear that appellant occupied it, or that it was
under his full control, is merely conjectural and speculative. We have often ruled that courts do
not rely on evidence that arouses mere suspicion or conjecture. [20]To lead to conviction,
evidence must do more than raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt. [21] It must
engender moral certainty.
Neither do we find merit in the OSGs argument that appellant cannot deny ownership or
control of the hut, since he was found in front of it, sitting on a rocking chair and drinking coffee.
[22] Indeed, to uphold this proposition would be to stretch our imagination to the extreme.

The OSG maintains that when appellant was shown the search warrant and asked about
the existence of prohibited drug in his possession, appellant went inside the hut, took his stock
of marijuana and turned it [over] to the police officers. [23] This, according to the prosecution,
clearly showed that he was not only occupying the hut, but was in fact using it to store the
prohibited drug.[24]
It is well-settled that this Court is not precluded from assessing the probative value of
witnesses testimonies on the basis of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs).[25]
In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court erred in adopting the prosecutions dubious story. It
failed to see patent inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies about the search
undertaken.
A review of the TSNs shows that SPO1 Buloron, the prosecution's principal witness,
testified that appellant had allegedly gone inside the hut; and that the latter had done so to get
his stock of illegal drugs, which he turned over to the police. Ironically, Captain Barnachea, who
was purposely presented by the prosecution to corroborate SPO1 Buloron's story, belied it
when he testified thus:
PROS. QUINTILLAN:
Q When the police officer showed that search warrant what did Antonio Estella said, if
any, if you hear[d]?
A What I saw is that Tony Estella is sitting in the rocking chair outside the house
drinking coffee, sir.
Q And you saw him and then the search warrant was presented, isnt it?
A Yes, sir.
 Q And when it was presented what did Tony Estella do?
A What they did they show to Tony the search warrant and I also read the contents of
the search warrant, sir.
Q And when Tony was shown that search warrant what did he do immediately after
being shown that search warrant?
A He just [sat] and then he stood up, sir.
Q And when he stood up what else did he do?
A Nothing, sir. The NARCOM g[o]t inside the house, sir.
Q And where did Antonio Estella go when the police entered the house?
A He was just outside the house, sir.
Q And how far is that house from Antonio Estella?
INTERPRETER:
Witness estimating the distance of about five (5) meters.
COURT:
Do the prosecution and defense agree to 5 meters?
BOTH COUNSEL:
Yes, Your Honor.
PROS. QUINTILLAN:
Q And when the police entered the house did not Tony go with them?
A I did not notice, sir.[26]
It is undisputed that even before arriving at the hut, the police officers were already being
assisted by Barangay Captain Barnachea. Thus, it was highly improbable for him not to see
personally appellants alleged voluntary surrender of the prohibited drug to the authorities. And
yet, his testimony completely contradicted the policemens version of the events. He testified that
appellant, after being served the search warrant, remained outside the hut and did nothing. In
fact, the former categorically stated that when the police officers had gone inside the hut to
conduct the search, appellant remained seated on a rocking chair outside.[27] Barnacheas
statements sow doubts as to the veracity of SPO1 Bulorons claim that, after being apprised of
the contents of the search warrant, appellant voluntarily surrendered the prohibited drug to the
police.[28]
Apart from the testimony of Barnachea -- which contradicted rather than validated the story of
SPO1 Buloron -- no other evidence was presented to corroborate the latters narration of the
events. Without any independent or corroborative proof, it has little or no probative value at all.
In a criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable,
and in harmony with the usual course of human experience -- not by mere conjecture or
speculation.[29] While the guilty should not escape, the innocent should not suffer.[30]

Search Incident to Lawful Arrest

 The OSG argues that [e]ven assuming that appellant was not the occupant of the hut, the
fact remains that he voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers.After appellant
had surrendered the prohibited stuff, the police had a right to arrest him even without a warrant
and to conduct a search of the immediate vicinity of the arrestee for weapons and other unlawful
objects as an incident to the lawful arrest.[31]
The above argument assumes that the prosecution was able to prove that appellant had
voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. As earlier adverted to, there is no
convincing proof that he indeed surrendered the prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or
otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies
the prosecutions story.
Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a
lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked
through Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 Rule 112.

Never was it proven that appellant, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession
of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that there was no way of
knowing if he had committed or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could have been no search incident to a lawful
arrest.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the
search conducted was within the confines of the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful
arrests are governed by Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which reads:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person to
be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy. [32]The prevailing
rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property
found upon the latters person -- that which was used in the commission of the crime or was the
fruit of the crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence or
escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.[33]
In the leading case Chimel v. California,[34] the Supreme Court of the United States of
America laid down this rule:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself
frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize
any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And
the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items
must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who
is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestees person and
the area within his immediate control construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.

There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that
in which an arrest occurs or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other
closed or concealed areas in that room itself.[35]

The purpose of the exception is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the
person being arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter
from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond
what is needed to serve its purpose.[36]
In the case before us, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been
within appellants immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that which may
be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest.

The Presence of the Accused or the

Witnesses During the Search

Having ruled that the prosecution failed to prove appellants ownership, control of or
residence in the subject hut, we hold that the presence of appellant or of witnesses during the
search now becomes moot and academic.
Obviously, appellant need not have been present during the search if he was neither the
owner nor the lawful occupant of the premises in question. Besides, as we have noted, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding these crucial circumstances were
contradictory. They erode SPO1 Bulorons credibility as a prosecution witness and raise serious
doubts concerning the prosecutions evidence. This Court is thus constrained to view his
testimony with caution and care.
 With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken --
during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered -- we hold that the search was
illegal. Without the badge of legality, any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso
facto inadmissible.

Objections to the

Legality of the Search

Finally, the OSG argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to object to the
legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence seized through that search because,
during the trial, he did not raise these issues.
On the contrary, during the trial, appellant constantly questioned the legality of the
search. In fact, when SPO1 Buloron was presented as a prosecution witness, the formers
counsel objected to the offer of the latters testimony on items allegedly confiscated during the
search. Appellants counsel argued that these items, which consisted of the marijuana and the
firearm, had been seized illegally and were therefore inadmissible. [37]
Further, in his Comments and Objections to Formal Offer of Exhibits, [38] appellant once
again questioned the legality of the search conducted by the police, a search that had yielded
the evidence being used against him.
Finally, on October 21, 1997, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence[39] reiterating his objection to
the search and to the eventual use against him of the evidence procured therefrom.
All told, without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the prosecution failed to
establish his guilt with moral certainty. [40] Not only did its evidence fall short of the quantum of
proof required for a conviction, it has also failed to present any evidence at all. Under our Bill of
Rights, among the fundamental rights of the accused is to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.[41] To overcome such presumption, the prosecution must establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Our criminal justice system dictates that if the prosecution fails to do
so, it becomes not only the right of the accused to be set free, but also the constitutional duty of
the court to set them free.[42] This principle leaves this Court no option but to acquit Appellant
Antonio C. Estella for insufficiency of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Antonio C. Estella
is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith
and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was
actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170233             February 22, 2007

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 

vs.
JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y
ABADEOS,Appellants.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was charged1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Olongapo City, Branch 75, with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II
of Republic Act No. 64252 as amended.

Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga (Din) and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos (Inocencio) were likewise
charged3 with the same crime, before the same court.

Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 As the
evidence in the cases was common and the prosecution would utilize the same witnesses, the
cases were consolidated. After a joint trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision5 dated 4
April 2002, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding all accused in the above-entitled cases guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
this Court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and each to pay
[a] fine of ₱500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.

The bricks of marijuana are hereby confiscated and disposed in accordance with existing
regulations.

SO ORDERED.6

To put in appropriate context the operative facts on which adjudication of this case hinges, there
is need to recall the factual assertions of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the
defense.

PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3
Cesar B. Cabling (Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had received
information that a certain male person, more or less 5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a
tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would
make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who
fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from
a motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. Fami
asked Nuevas where he was going. Nuevas answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down.
Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other
stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Later on,
Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges,
Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana
weighing more or less five (5) kilos.7

Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo
City, which according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could
be located. From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway,
introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked,
Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection
found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."8 After confiscating the
items, Fami and Cabling brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for
proper documentation.9Fami further testified that a receipt for the property seized was issued by
Cabling and that a field test was duly conducted on the confiscated items. All three accused
were likewise physically examined on the basis of which corresponding medical certificates
were issued. The corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were also accomplished.
Fami stated that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in connection with the arrest of all the
accused and the confiscation of the items.10

On cross-examination, Fami revealed that when the receipt of evidence seized was prepared,
all three (3) accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the
one who escorted all the accused during their physical examination. He also escorted all three
to the Fiscal’s office where the latter were informed of the charges against them.11

Cabling corroborated Fami’s testimony. He, however, testified that after he and Fami had
introduced themselves as police officers, Din and Inocencio voluntarily handed to Fami the
marijuana dried leaves.12

On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip from
Fami’s informant, conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in the list of
persons under surveillance. Fami then relayed the tip to Cabling.13 Cabling restated that Nuevas
had voluntarily submitted the plastic bag he was holding and that after Nuevas had been
informed of the violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his willingness to cooperate and
point to his other cohorts.14 When Fami and Cabling proceeded to the identified location of
Nuevas’s cohorts, they chanced upon Din and Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag
while Inocencio was looking into its contents.15 Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the
plastic bag he was holding to the police officers.16

For his defense, Nuevas testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he was walking
along Perimeter Street, on his way home from the Barangay Hall, when Fami called him.
Nuevas approached Fami, who was then in front of his house, and asked why Fami had called
him. Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside the room where Fami
handcuffed Nuevas’s hands, got Nuevas’s wallet, took out ₱1,500.00 and put it in his (Fami’s)
wallet. Fami then confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the latter denied the charge. Before
leaving the house with Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag and told Nuevas to carry it.
Subsequently, they boarded a red owner—type jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas
was put in jail. Nuevas further stated that he did not know Din or Inocencio.17

Din, on the other hand, stated that at about 10 o’clock in the morning of 27 September 1997,
while his ‘compare’ Inocencio was visiting, two (2) men entered his house looking for a woman.
The two (2) introduced themselves as police officers. Then, Din and Inocencio were immediately
handcuffed. They were not informed of the reason for their arrest and were told that the reason
will be explained to them in court. Next, they were brought to the Cabalan precinct where the
investigator asked for their names, and subsequently to Station B where they were ordered to
stand up and be photographed with Nuevas, who Din first met in jail. Inside the room where they
had their fingerprints taken, he saw marijuana placed on top of the table.18

Inocencio testified that he went to his ‘compadre’ Din’s house in the morning of 27 September
1997 to sell his fighting cocks as he needed money to redeem his driver’s license. While there,
he and Din were arrested by two persons, one of whom pointed a gun at them while the other
searched the house for a lady named Vangie. Afterwards, he and Din were brought to the
Cabalan Police Precinct and then to Station B where he first came to know Nuevas. He denied
that a plastic bag containing marijuana was recovered from them and claimed that he only saw
such evidence on the day he gave his testimony. He also stated that when a photograph was
taken of the three of them, he and Din were ordered to point to a "wrapped thing." When the
photograph was taken, they were not assisted by counsel. He also does not recall having
signed a receipt of property seized. Afterwards, they were brought to a detention cell. And when
they asked the police what they did wrong, the police replied that they will just explain it in
court. 19

All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court
for automatic review. However, on 14 July 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to
withdraw appeal.20 The Court granted Nuevas’s withdrawal of appeal and considered the case
closed and terminated as to him, in a Resolution21dated 25 August 2003.

In a Resolution22 dated 22 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 153641-42,23 the cases

were transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Court’s ruling in People v. Efren
Mateo.24

Before the Court of Appeals, Din and Inocencio (appellants) argued that the trial court erred: (1)
in finding them guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the testimonies of the arresting
officers; and (2) n not finding that their constitutional rights have been violated.25

The Court of Appeals in a Decision26 dated 27 May 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00341, affirmed
the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 459-97, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.27

The Court of Appeals restated the rule that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness,
the trial court’s assessment is entitled to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was
tainted with arbitrariness or there was an oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or
influence. The appellate court found Fami and Cabling’s version of how appellants were
apprehended to be categorical and clear. Din, at the time of his apprehension, was seen holding
a plastic bag containing marijuana leaves. On the other hand, Inocencio’s possession of the
marijuana leaves was established by the fact that he was seen in the act of looking into the
plastic bag carried by Din.28

With respect to appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights have been violated, the appellate
court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial
warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din voluntarily
surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the
instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply.29

Din and Inocencio are now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued
before the Court of Appeals. Through their Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplementary
Brief)30 dated 22 March 2006, appellants stated that all the arguments necessary to support
their acquittal have already been discussed in the brief they had submitted before the appellate
court; thus, the filing of a supplemental brief would be a mere reiteration of the arguments
discussed in said brief.31 The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing
a supplemental brief.32

The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and
seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virture
thereof.

In holding that the warrantless searches and seizure are valid, the trial court ruled as follows:

While the confiscation of the bricks of marijuana from the accused Jesus Nuevas was without a
search warrant, it was not bereft of a probable cause. The police team received informations
[sic] from an asset that on that day, a male person whom he sufficiently described will deliver
marijuana at the vicinity of Perimeter and Bonifacio S[t]., Pag-asa, Olongapo City, a known drop
point of illegal drugs. They went to the said area upon that information. Their waiting was fruitful
because not long afterwards they saw the accused Jesus Nuevas alighting from a tricycle
carrying a bag and after confronting him, he voluntarily gave the bag containing bricks of dried
marijuana leaves. With respect to the confiscation of 2 ½ kilos of marijuana and the
apprehension of accused Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, it was a result of a continued
operation by the team which this time was led by accused Nuevas to get some concession from
the team for his own earlier apprehension. As the apprehension of Nuevas was upon a probable
cause, in the same vein was the apprehension of Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio and
the recovery from them [of] 2½ kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The propriety of this conclusion
is necessity [sic] because of the impossibility of getting first a warrant in so short a time with
such cumbersome requirements before one can be issued. Before getting a warrant, the culprits
shall have already gone into hiding. These situations are not distant to the case of People v[.]
Jean Balingan (G.R. No. 105834, 13 Feb. 1995) where we learned that expediency and
practicality are some of the justification[s] in the warrantless arrest.33 [Emphasis supplied]

Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and the subsequent inspection
of the plastic bags of Nuevas and Din, as they were not doing anything illegal at the time.34
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence
obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.35 The constitutional
proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence);

2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.36

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when
the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness
of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched and the character of the articles procured.37

The courts below anchor appellants’ conviction on the ground that the searches and seizure
conducted in the instant case based on a tip from an informant fall under one of the exceptions
as Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags containing
marijuana to the police officers.38

We differ.

First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first
exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court.39 Recent jurisprudence

holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case
where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search. 40
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches
conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." 41

Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine.

An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain
view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.42

Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din
were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas’s
case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue
cloth.43 In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in
newspaper and wrapped therein."44 It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view
which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.45

On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas’s case was made with
his consent. In Din’s case, there was none.

Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The
consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is
given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3)
whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given.46

In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the
incriminating bag to the police officers. Fami testified in this wise:

FISCAL BELTRAN:
Q Now, when you saw this accused carrying this Exhibit "D,"47 for your part, what did you do?

A I just talked to him and asked him where he was going and according to him, he acted
arrogantly, sir.

Q This arrogant action of the accused Jesus Nuevas, when you confronted him did he resist?

A How did he show his elements, [sic] he said, "So what if you are policeman[?]"

Q And being confronted with that arrogance, what did you do next?

A Later on he kept calm by saying [sic] in Waray dialect, sir.

xxxx

Q What, exactly, did he tell you in Waray dialect?

A "Sir Famir[sic], don’t charge me, sir[.] I am planning to go home to Leyte. I was just earning
enough money for my fare, sir."

xxxx

Q So when the accused speak [sic] to you in Waray, what else did you do if you did anything?

A I pretended that I agree in his [sic] offer but I also asked him where are the other staffs[sic]
sir. 48

xxxx

Q With respect to the bag that you confiscated from him, what did you do?

A He voluntarily pointed it to me and I checked it, the bag, for verification, sir.49

Cabling likewise testified as follows:

Q When Fami got this from the accused, he opened this thing that he got?

A The subject voluntarily submitted the same, sir.

Q Upon the order of Fami to open it?

A Nobody ordered it, sir.50

There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the
incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to
exculpate himself from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the
plastic bag and even revealed his ‘associates,’ offering himself as an informant. His actuations
were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others and save
oneself even at the cost of others’ lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas’s
conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal.

However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such
consent had actually been given. Fami testified as follows:

FISCAL BELTRAN

Q Now, what did you do when you saw Din with that Exhibit "C," the plastic bag?

A Din said that "Oo, Sir, that is owned by Nuevas" [sic] and I took the said plastic bag.

Q When you took this plastic bag from Din….

Was the accused Jesus Nueva [sic] present when Din told you that?

A Yes, sir. Nuevas alighted also [from] the vehicle with Cabling.

Q And what was the reaction of Nuevas when Din told you that the bag belongs to him?

A I did not react, sir.

Q After getting that plastic bag from Reynaldo Din, what did you do with it?

A I inspected the bag and I found out that there is still marijuana packed in newspaper and
wrapped therein, sir.51[Emphasis supplied.]

Cabling, however, gave a different testimony, viz.:

FISCAL BELTRAN

Q And upon siting [sic] the two subject persons you have just indicated in your earlier testimony,
what did you do?

A We approached them and introduced ourselves as police officers, and pinpointed by Nuevas
as the ones who kept suspected prohibited drugs, sir.

Q After you approached these two people, what happened?

A These two people, upon introducing ourselves, [sic] voluntarily surrendered to Fami those
marijuana dry leaves, sir.52

The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they
got hold of the bag. This already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of Din’s submission
of the plastic bag. Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver,
it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual
or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right.53
The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. While it may not be contrary to human nature for one to be jolted into
surrendering something incriminating to authorities, Fami’s and Cabling’s testimonies do not
show that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami and Cabling did not testify on Din’s
composure—whether he felt surprised or frightened at the time—which fact we find necessary
to provide basis for the surrender of the bag. There was no mention of any permission made by
the police officers to get or search the bag or of any consent given by Din for the officers to
search it. It is worthy to note that in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented
search, the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive
proof.

Neither can Din’s silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the
warrantless search. In People v. Burgos,54 the Court aptly ruled:

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law.55

Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Din’s conviction cannot be sustained based on
the remaining evidence. The Court has repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution.1awphi1.net56 As such, Din deserves an acquittal.

In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite the prosecution’s insistence that the appellants
have effectively waived any defect in their arrest by entering their plea and by their active
participation in the trial of the case. Be it stressed that the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Inspite of any alleged waiver, the dried
marijuana leaves cannot be admitted in evidence against the appellants, Din more specifically,
as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
an illegal warrantless arrest.57

Turning to Inocencio’s case, the Court likewise finds that he was wrongly convicted of the crime
charged. Inocencio’s supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be
shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying.58 Taking a look at an
object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the same as taking
possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to Inocencio is
insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess
the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the
contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was
firm and unshakeable in his testimony that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried
leaves.

Finally, the law enforcers should be reminded of the Court’s dated but nevertheless current
exhortation:
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some
lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as
long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law
enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and
the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of
law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.59

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 458-97 and No. 459-97 is reversed and modified. Appellants
Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED. The
Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from
confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court
compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127801. March 3, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAMUEL YU VALDEZ @

Bebot, accused-appellant.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision[1] rendered on November 4, 1996, by the Regional Trial
Court of Lagawe, Ifugao, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. 930, which found Samuel Valdez
guilty of the crime of illegal transport of marijuana buds/leaves and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
In an information dated December 28, 1994, Provincial Prosecutor Jose Godofredo Naui
charged herein accused-appellant with violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 1994, in the Municipality of Hingyon, Ifugao and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while on board a
Dangwa Tranco bus bound for Manila, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully transport
marijuana weighing more or less two kilos packed in two separate containers.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]2

Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not

guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court rendered the assailed
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

From the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is fined the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos. The drug in question is ordered
forfeited in favor of the government.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The prosecutions evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was
based is summarized by the trial court as follows:

In the morning of September 1, 1994, SPO1 Bernardo Mariano was in the Municipality of
Banaue, Ifugao waiting for a ride to report for work in Lagawe, Ifugao. A civilian asset
approached him and intimated that an Ilocano person was ready to transport marijuana. This
asset described to him the physical appearance of the suspect as thin and possessing a green
bag. Mr. Mariano invited the asset and together they proceeded to Barangay O-ong, Hingyon,
Ifugao. There they alighted and stopped and ordinary Dangwa passenger bus bound for Baguio
City. Aboard on this bus, they did not find the person concerned and reaching Barangay
Pitawan, Hingyon, Ifugao, they stepped out of the vehicle and waited for the air conditioned
Dangwa bus bound for Manila. When this bus arrived, Police Officer Mariano boarded the aircon
bus and looked for that person from among the passengers and noticed him holding the green
bag. He immediately ordered the person to get out of the bus. This fellow followed holding the
bag. Once outside, he further ordered the suspect to open the bag and saw a water jug colored
red and white and a lunch box. He told this man to open the jug and the lunch box and when
opened, he saw marijuana leaves as contents. At this time, suspect revealed his name to be
Samuel Yu Valdez. With this discovery, the asset was left behind and Peace Officer Mariano
escorted the accused to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial Headquarters at
Lagawe, Ifugao. He turned over the accused including the contents of the green bag to his
superiors for further investigation.[4]

In open court, SPO1 Bernardo Mariano identified the water jug, the lunch box, both stuffed
with dried marijuana leaves and the green bag. He further identified the accused as the same
person from whom he seized the prohibited drug. Police Senior Inspector Alma Margarita
Villasenor, Forensic Chemist, PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet
averred that from her laboratory examination, the items or samples taken from the water jug and
lunchbox gave positive results to the test for the presence of marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as
follows:

Accused is a resident of Barangay Gumol, Guimba, Nueva Ecija and knows construction work
and more often than not, his co-worker is a certain Edwin Andres from Cabanatuan City who
married one from Banaue, Ifugao. Upon the invitation of Edwin Andres to attend the latters
birthday celebration slated on August 31, 1994, accused and Edwin Andres arrived in Banaue,
Ifugao on August 30, 1994. The next day, August 31, 1994, accused partook of the birthday
party and the following morning September 1, 1994, he was bound for Nueva Ecija taking the
7:00 oclock in the morning Dangwa bus. Because of too much intake of liquor (hang-over),
when he boarded the bus, he still felt groggy and sat alone on a seat near the window. While
the bus was proceeding, he felt sleepy on that seat still alone. His bag was placed on the right
side and the green bag was place under the seat to the right. Feeling sleepy, he noticed
somebody or a passenger seated beside him and later he also felt and noticed that his
seatmate was gone and at this time he was awakened by a tap on his shoulder. He saw two
persons standing and one of them mentioned as Mariano who he thought at first was the bus
inspector as he was in fatigue uniform. Then this Mariano asked him whether or not he owns the
green bag but he replied saying I do not know. I have a fellow seated with me here but he is no
more. He was made to step out of the bus and there he was forced to declare that he is the
owner of the bag. The other policeman was nearby who pointed to the green bag. That the two
policemen were the ones who opened that bag and its contents were marijuana. Thereafter, he
was brought to the PNP Provincial Headquarters (termed by the accused as barracks) in
Lagawe, Ifugao. When brought to said office, he saw many people possibly police or
soldiers. He was later on investigated and showed them the bag. He was told to stay for a while
in the jailhouse. He could remember that he was made to sign some papers or documents
which he did not read. After an overnight stay at the barracks, he was brought to the hospital for
medical examination about the pain on his breast but kept mum on the blow delivered by
Bernardo Mariano at the waiting shed where he was first aprehended. That from the hospital, he
was brought to the Municipal Jail and later to the Provincial Jail for further detention.[5]
 Appellant, through his counsel, Public Attorneys Office, raised the following assignment of
errors in his appeal:
I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DRUGS IN EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE

OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[6]

Appellant contends that the marijuana allegedly seized from him was a product of an
unlawful search, hence, inadmissible in evidence.
The resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question of the constitutionality and legality
of the arrest and search of herein appellant effected by the police officer.
Settled is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[7] It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said rights shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[8]
The abovementioned constitutional provisions serve as safeguards against wanton and
unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and
effects. The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation
which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must be
strictly construed. We cannot liberally consider arrests or seizures without warrant or
extend their application beyond the cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do so
would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and yet, so
deserving of full protection and vindication.[9]
Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.[10]
On the other hand, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the following circumstances:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.[11]

In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time
of his arrest. A crime was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made
upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true that SPO1 Mariano
was not armed with a search warrant when the search was conducted over the personal effects
of appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.[12] The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.[13]
Our jurisprudence is replete with instances where tipped information has become a
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.[14]
In People v. Tangliben,[15] two police officers and a barangay tanod were conducting
surveillance mission at the Victory Liner terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga
against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in
the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. At 9:30 in the
evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting
suspiciously. An informer pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. They
confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when
the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his
arrest. Hence, faced with such on-the-spot tip, the police officers acted quickly as there was not
enough time to secure a search warrant.
In People v. Maspil,[16] a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional
Unit of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize
vehicles on the highway going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential
report by informers that Maspil and Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana
to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As
expected, at about 2 oclock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached
the checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle
and saw that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When
opened, the sacks and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The
policemen thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves
which, upon scientific examination, were verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the
validity of the search thus conducted, as being incidental to lawful warrantless arrest and
declared that Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited
drugs.
In People v. Malmstedt,[17] Narcom agents set up checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province in view of reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They
likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the
identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. Accuseds actuations also aroused the
suspicion of the officers conducting the inspection aboard the bus. The Court held that in light of
such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a
search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In People v. Bagista,[18] the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information
they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of
accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable
cause to search accused-appellants belongings since she fitted the description given by the
NARCOM informant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,[19] the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the
Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon
reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high
on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying
manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and
asked what he was holding in his hands , he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it
contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost
accused-appellant to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious
actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug
addicts.
As in the instant case, police officer Mariano was tipped off by a civilian asset that a thin
Ilocano person with a green bag was about to transport marijuana from Banaue, Ifugao. Said
information was received by SPO1 Mariano the very same morning he was waiting for a ride in
Banaue to report for work in Lagawe, the capital town of Ifugao province. Thus, face with such
on-the-spot information, the law enforcer had to respond quickly to the call of duty. Obviously,
there was not enough time to secure a search warrant considering the time involved in the
process. In fact, in view of the urgency of the case, SPO1 Mariano together with the civilian
asset proceeded immediately to Hingyon, Ifugao to pursue the drug trafficker. In Hingyon, he
flagged down buses bound for Baguio City and Manila, and looked for the person described by
the informant. It must be noted that the target of the pursuit was just the thin Ilocano person with
a green bag and no other. And so, when SPO1 Mariano inspected the bus bound for Manila, he
just singled out the passenger with the green bag. Evidently, there was definite information of
the identity of the person engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and
place. SPO1 Mariano had already an inkling of the identity of the person he was looking for. As
a matter of fact, no search at all was conducted on the baggages of other passengers. Hence,
appellants claim that the arresting officer was only fishing for evidence of a crime has no factual
basis.
Clearly, SPO1 Mariano had probable cause to stop and search the buses coming from
Banaue in view of the information he got from the civilian asset that somebody having the same
appearance as that of appellant and with a green bag would be transporting marijuana from
Banaue. He likewise had probable cause to search appellants belongings since he fits the
description given by the civilian asset. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the police
officer, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible against appellant.
 Appellant likewise asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He claims that when SPO1 Mariano apprehended him, he was not in possession of the
green bag as the same was under the seat before him.
The assertion is incredulous.
As SPO1 Mariano declared in his testimony, the appellant was alone in his seat and the
green bag was placed under the seat just in front of appellant. SPO1 Mariano testified as
follows:
Q: How about this travelling bag, the green bag, is it not that this bag was placed
considerably far from the accused?
A: The green bag was placed just in front of him.
Q: But he was not holding the bag, is it not?
A: No.
Q: So he was not in possession of this bag when you apprehended him?
A: No.
Q: And of course there were other passengers aside from the accused?
A: There were other passengers but he was alone on that seat.
Q: How about the seat fronting this accused, is it not that there was a person seated in front?
A: Yes, there were.
Q: And upon seeing the accused you ordered him to get that bag?
A: Yes.
Q: And you told him to get the bag and alight from the bus?
A: I told him, you get off the bus, and I told him to carry his bag.[20]
From the foregoing testimony, it can be gleamed that when appellant was asked to get off
the bus and bring his bag, appellant brought with him said bag. If, indeed, the bag was not his,
he should not have taken it with him in alighting from the bus. Besides, denial, like alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence bearing
no weight in law.[21]
Appellant further avers that the civilian asset should have been presented in court to shed
light on how he managed to get his information. This argument is not tenable. The settled rule is
that the presentation of an informant in illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely
corroborative and cumulative.[22]
Based on the foregoing, this Court is convinced that the guilt of appellant has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
With the enactment and effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, [23] the penalty imposable upon violators
of Section 4 of Dangerous Drugs Act is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) if the marijuana
involved weighs 750 grams or more. In this case, the quantity of marijuana involved weighs
more or less two kilograms, hence, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
the imposable penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the rules for the application of
indivisible penalties under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. This is
pursuant to our pronouncement in People vs. Simon[24] where we recognized the suppletory
application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code as well as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to the Dangerous Drugs Act after the amendment of the latter by R.A. No. 7659.
[25]
 Thus, as there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
crime, the trial court correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Finally,
considering that the penalty imposed is the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be applied.[26]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The judgment of the lower court finding
appellant guilty of the crime illegal transport of marijuana and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetuaand to pay fine of P500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless
arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving
him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of
P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon
9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him
to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated
from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as
marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against
him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been
arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on
the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-
appellant, who was eventually convicted .6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the
informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was
found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
examiner, 10who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests
on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against
Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search
warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not
properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed
to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling
from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other
expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt
but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers
nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the
watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to
his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also
rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the
injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge
who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh
their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush
of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the
impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact
amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-
appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit
to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never
been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for
his release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that
he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his
possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not
even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b)
of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a
lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution,
that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying.
Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer
who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their
testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may
prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as
follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to

the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.

Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the

possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we
have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before

June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence
report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling
operation.

COURT:

Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days

before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding
the activities of Idel Aminnudin

A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities

of Idel Aminnudin.

Q What were those activities?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q From whom did you get that information?

A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the
person.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. LLARIZA:

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?

A Marijuana, sir.

Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo

with marijuana was received by you many days before you
received the intelligence report in writing?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his

activities.

Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he

was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I
received the information that he was coming. Regarding the
reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already
consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.

COURT:

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

A Yes, sir.

Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was

mentioned?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

 A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?

A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or
search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?

A No, more.

Q Why not?

A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result

you do not need a search warrant anymore?

A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of
the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of
laws and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of
the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of
the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and
aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the
warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who
was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant
was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result
of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was
clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the
prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive
finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin
and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed
to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of
Rights guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The
constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense
is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the
fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an
incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did
not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search
was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must
therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying
marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking
from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a
prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his
arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the
search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful
(Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him
guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying
marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking
from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a
prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his
arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the
search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful
(Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him
guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110995 September 5, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALVARO SAYCON y

BUQUIRAN, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.chanrobles virtual law library

Francisco S. Garcia and Marcelo G. Flores for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Alvaro Saycon was charged with violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 as amended,
the Dangerous Drugs Act, in an information which read as follows:

That on or about the 8th day of July 1992, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not being then authorized by law, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, deliver and transport[-] from Manila to
Dumaguete City approximately 4 grams of methamphetam[ine] hydrochloride commonly known
as "shabu," a regulated drug.

Contrary to Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended. 1(Brackets
supplied)chanrobles virtual law library

At arraignment, Alvaro Saycon entered a plea of not guilty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles

virtual law library

After trial, the trial court rendered, on 15 June 1993, a judgment of conviction. The court found
Saycon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having transported four (4) grams of
metamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu") and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00. 2chanrobles virtual law library

The relevant facts as found by the trial court were gleaned from the testimonies of the arresting
officers Senior Police Officers Winifredo S. Noble and Ruben Laddaran of the Narcotics
Command, PNP; Police Officer Emmanuelito C. Lajot of the Philippine Coastguard Office in
Dumaguete City; and Forensic Analyst N.G. Salinas of the PNP Crime Laboratory. The trial
court summarized the facts in the following manner:

. . . that on or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel
received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by
the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was arriving at that
moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO
Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and
Philippine Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior Police
Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of
Pier 1.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The MV Doña Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City.
Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint
manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer Winifredo Noble
of NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. He
willingly went with them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag,
and the latter willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside
that maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". When police
officer Winifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected
"shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected
"shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested,
the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest. 3chanrobles virtual law library

After the arrest of Saycon, the suspected drug material taken from him was brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Cebu City for chemical examination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an examination of the
specimens which had been taken from appellant Saycon and submitted to the Crime Laboratory
on 9 July 1992. Her findings were, basically, that the specimens she examined weighing 4.2
grams in total, consisted of the regulated drug methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely
known as 
"shabu." 4chanrobles virtual law library

For his part, appellant Saycon denied ownership of the "shabu" taken from his black bag. He
claimed that upon disembarking from the ship at the pier in Dumaguete City, he was met by two
(2) unfamiliar persons who snatched his bag from him. Thereafter, he was taken to the office of
the port collector, at gunpoint, and there his bag was searched by four (4) men despite his
protests. The four (4) persons were later identified by appellant Saycon as Noble, Sixto, Edjec
and Ruben Laddaran. When appellant Saycon asked why his belongings were being searched,
the four (4) answered that there was "shabu" inside his bag. After the search of his bag,
appellant continued, he was shown a small wallet purportedly taken from his black bag which
contained "shabu." Appellant Saycon was then detained at the Dumaguete City
Jail. 5chanrobles virtual law library

In his appeal before this Court seeking reversal of the decision of the court a quo finding him
guilty of the crime charged, Saycon contends that the search of his bag was illegal because it
had been made without a search warrant and that, therefore, the "shabu" discovered during the
illegal search was inadmissible in evidence against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

It is not disputed that the arresting officers were not armed with a search warrant or a warrant of
arrest when they searched Saycon's bag and thereafter effected his
arrest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The relevant constitutional provisions are set out in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issued except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness as he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Sec. 3. xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

The general rule, therefore, is that the search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of the above constitutional provisions. 6The evidence secured in the process of search
and seizure - i.e., the "fruits" thereof - will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any
proceeding. 7chanrobles virtual law library

The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search
and seizure is, however, not absolute. "There are certain exceptions recognized in our law," the
Court noted in People v. Barros. 8The exception which appears most pertinent in respect of the
case at bar is that relating to the search of moving vehicles. 9In People v. Barros, the Court said:

Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles -automobiles, trucks, etc. -
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a
vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant may be sought. (People v. Bagista, supra; People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra) In carrying out
warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks,
that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or
body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. In Valmonte v.
De Villa (178 SCRA 211 [1989]), the Court stated:

[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according
to the facts of each case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search. (Citations omitted)

When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject
matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. (People v. Bagista, supra; Valmonte v. de
Villa, 185 SCRA 665 [1990]).

While the analogy is perhaps not perfect, we consider that appellant Saycon stands in the same
situation as the driver or passenger of a motor vehicle that is stopped by police authorities and
subjected to an extensive search. In this situation, the warrantless search and arrest of
appellant Saycon would be constitutionally permissible only if the officer conducting the search
had reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that Saycon who had just
disembarked from the MV Doña Virginia upon arrival of that vessel at 6:00 a.m. of 8 July 1992
at Pier I of Dumaguete city, was violating some law or that the contents of his luggage included
some instrument or the subjects matter or the proceeds of some criminal
offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is important to note that unlike in the case of crimes like, e.g., homicide, murder, physical
injuries, robbery or rape which by their nature involve physical, optically perceptible, overt acts,
the offense of possessing or delivering or transporting some prohibited or regulated drug is
customarily carried out without any external signs or indicia visible to police officers and the rest
of the outside world. Drug "pushers" or couriers do not customarily go about their enterprise or
trade with some external visible sign advertising the fact that they are carrying or distributing or
transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the application of the rules in Section 5 (a) and (b), Rule
133 of the Rules of Court needs to take that circumstance into account. The Court has had to
resolve the question of valid or invalid warrantless arrest or warrantless search or seizure in
such cases by determining the presence or absence of a reasonable or probable cause, before
the search and arrest, that led the police authorities to believe that such a felony (possessing or
transporting or delivering prohibited drugs) was then in progress. In Barros, the Court listed the
kinds of causes which have been characterized as probable or reasonable cause supporting the
legality and validity of a warrantless search and a warrantless arrest in cases of this type:

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package
the distinctive smell of marijuana (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988]); (2) agents of the
Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a
confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported
along the route where the search was conducted (People v. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751 [1990]); (3)
Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that
prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date
(People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra); (4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of as conspicuous bulge in this
waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do
so (People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991]); and (5) Narcom agents had received
confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the
accused would be transporting marijuana (People v. Bagista, supra.).

Close examination of the record of the case at bar shows that there did exist reasonable or
probable cause to believe that appellant Alvaro Saycon would be carrying or transporting
prohibited drugs upon arriving in Dumaguete City on the MV Doña Virginia on 8 July 1992. This
probable cause in fact consisted of two (2) parts. Firstly, Senior Police Officer Winifredo Noble
had testified in court that the NARCOM Agents had, approximately three (3) weeks before 8
July 1992, conducted a test-buy which confirmed that appellant Saycon was indeed engaged in
transporting and selling "shabu." The police authorities did not, on that occasion, arrest Alvaro
Saycon, but what should be noted is that the identity of Saycon as a drug courier or drug
distributor was established in the minds of the police authorities. 10Secondly, the arresting
officers testified that they had received confidential information that very early morning of 8 July
1992, Alvaro Saycon would probably be on board the MV Doña Virginia which was scheduled to
arrive in Dumaguete City at 6:00 a.m. on 8 July 1992, probably carrying "shabu" with
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In respect of the first element of the probable cause here involved, the testimony of Police
Officer Winifredo Noble had not been denied or rebutted by the defense; as it happened, Officer
Noble was not even cross-examined on this point by defense
counsel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In respect of the second element of the probable cause here involved, appellant Saycon
contended that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed that the NARCOM Agents
knew three (3) weeks before 8 July 1992 that the MV Doña Virginia would be arriving and that
the would probably be on board that vessel. It was argued by Saycon that the police authorities
should have procured, and had the time to procure, the necessary judicial warrants for search
and arrest. Saycon also sought to underscore a supposed confusion in the testimonies of
NARCOM Officer Winifredo Noble and Coastguard Officer Lajot relating to who, as between the
NARCOM agent and the Coastguard elements, had informed the other that appellant would
probably be arriving on board the MV Doña Virginia. The relevant portion of NARCOM Agent
Winifredo Noble's testimony includes the following:

Q: Despite the lapse of three (3) weeks, more or less, from acquiring knowledge through this
informant, did you not secure the necessary search warrant and warrant of arrest on the
effect(s) and person of the subject Alvaro Saycon?chanrobles virtual law library

A: All the time we were only informed by the Coastguard that this certain fellow in the name of
Alvaro Saycon is travelling through and through from Manila to Dumaguete will be carrying
shabu from Manila to Dumaguete and we could not ascertain (with) the time when he will be at
the pier area.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q: You have not answered my question. My question is: Despite the lapse of more than three
(3) weeks upon being informed by your informer that this Alvaro Saycon, the accused in this
case, has been a courier from time to time of prohibited drugs, did you not bother to secure the
necessary warrant: search as well as the arrest?

A: As I said earlier, we could not obtain the necessary search warrant to that effect because we
do not know or ascertain when Alvaro Saycon will arrive [from] Manila. On that particular
morning, we were informed by the Coastguard that Doña Virginia would be arriving and they
told us that probably this suspect will be among the passengers, so you better come over and
(to) identify the subject. 11(Emphasis supplied)

Upon the other hand, Coastguard Police Officer Emmanuelito Lajot, Jr. testified in the following
way:

Q: What time were you in your office?chanrobles virtual law library

A: Before 6:00 o'clock, I was there.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: While you were there, did you receive any communication?chanrobles virtual law library

A: Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q: What communication was that?chanrobles virtual law library

A: That a certain Alvaro Saycon was on board MV Doña Virginia arriving at 6:00 o'clock in the
morning?chanrobles virtual law library

Q: Who gave you that information?chanrobles virtual law library

A: Ruben Laddaran(a).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q: Who is this Ruben Laddaran?chanrobles virtual law library

A: NARCOM Agent. 12(Emphasis supplied)

If there was any confusion or uncertainty in the testimonies of NARCOM Officer Noble and
Coastguard Officer Lajot, that confusion was a minor detail. It was in any case clarified by
NARCOM Officer Noble's explanation that after the NARCOM Command had received
information appellant Saycon would be transporting drugs from Manila to Dumaguete City, they
advised the Coastguard that they (the Narcotics Command) wanted to set up a checkpoint at
Pier I at Dumaguete City because appellant Saycon could be on board one of the vessels
arriving in Dumaguete City. The Coastguard in turn informed the NARCOM Officers of the
arrival of the MV Doña Virginia and assisted the NARCOM Officers in their operation that
morning of 8 July 1992.

The record shows that the NARCOM Officers were uncertain as to the precise date and time
appellant Saycon would arrive from Manila; all they knew was that Saycon would be taking a
boat from Manila to Dumaguete City Pier. 13The MV Doña Virginia docked at the Port of Pier I of
Dumaguete City between 6:00 and 6:30 in the morning of 8 July 1992. Earlier on that same
morning, the NARCOM Officers received more specific information that appellant Saycon could
be on board the MV Doña Virginia which was arriving that morning. 14Clearly, the NARCOM
Agents had to act quickly but there was not enough time to obtain a search warrant or a warrant
of arrest. It was realistically not possible for either the NARCOM Agents or the Coastguard
Officers to obtain a judicial search warrant or warrant of arrest in the situation presented by the
case at 
bar. 15chanrobles virtual law library

The Court considers, therefore, that a valid warrantless search had been conducted by the
NARCOM and Coastguard Officers of the "black bag" of appellant Saycon that morning of 8 July
1992 at the checkpoint nearby the docking place of the MV Doña Virginia and at the office of
the Coastguard at Dumaguete City. It follows that the warrantless arrest of appellant Saycon
which ensued forthwith, was also valid and lawful, since the police had determined, he was in
fact carrying or transporting "shabu." The further consequence is that the four (4) grams of
"shabu" obtained from his maong wallet found inside his black bag was lawfully before the
court a quo. We agree with the court a quo that the evidence before the latter proved beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant Saycon had been carrying with him "shabu" at the time of his
search and arrest and his guilt of the offense charged was established beyond reasonable
doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court dated 15 June 1993, in Criminal Case No.
10325, should be affirmed, but the penalty properly impassable upon appellant Alvaro Saycon
must be reduced to imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months
of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as maximum, and the fine
of P20,000.00 must be deleted. This reduction of penalty is required by the provisions of Section
20, Article IV of R.A. NO. 6425, as last amended by Section 17, of R.A. No. 7659 (effective 13
December 1993) as construed and given retroactive effect in People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No.
93028, 29 July 1994) considering that the amount of "shabu" here involved (four [4] grams) is
obviously less than the 200 grams of "shabu" cut-off quantity established in the amended
Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 10325, is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS, however, that appellant shall suffer
imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as maximum, and that the fine of P20,000.00
shall be DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002]

RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision[1] of respondent Court of Appeals dated

September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa
Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of theft, and the resolution [2] dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft
committed as follows:

"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at
P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power
Corp., in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:

"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on
a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.

Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down
the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did
not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.

With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of
3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,
244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that they
came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter,
appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police
Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which
were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was
incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.

In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident
of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his identification
card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a
passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in
his jeepneyconductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had
finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he
dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something
unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires
and that the former would act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base
in Pagsanjan.

After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own

vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered
with kakawatileaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was
promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his
case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables,
he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the
owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police
headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead
locked him up in jail for a week."[4]

On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment[5] the dispositive portion of which

reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
property worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from TWO
(2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to
TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power
Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award
for damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty
imposed, to wit:

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant
RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and
penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years, Nine
(9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years,
Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity and no
costs."[6]

Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:

"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers
searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when
samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his
conviction;

(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was engaged
in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in rejecting said
defense;and

(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to
presumption of innocence."

The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of

the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:

"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and
validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot
again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21,
1991, it has been held that considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things
and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity,
a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of practicability. The doctrine is
not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24,
1990 (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that
automobiles because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not
justifying warrantless search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any
case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant,
would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and
the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances (Ibid.). In Umil v.
Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a
search may be made even without a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under
the circumstances, the police officers are not only authorized but are also under obligation to
arrest the accused even without a warrant."[7]

Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on
routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the
findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express
or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right
against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section
2, Article III thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."

The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute
but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
[8]
 (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; [9] (3) search of moving vehicles; [10] (4)
consented warrantless search;[11] (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search);[12] and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[13]
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant
is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed
except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the
character of the articles procured.[14]
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the
case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence
taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence,
the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

I. Search of moving vehicle

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of

privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.[15] Thus,
the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever
a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible
in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving
vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.[16] Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or
'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.[17]
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the
territory and in the absence of probable cause.[18] Still and all, the important thing is that there
was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a
case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.[19] The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.[20]
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at
military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, [21] for as long as it
is warranted by the exigencies of public order [22] and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.[23] A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive
search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the
following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds;[24] (2) simply looks into a vehicle; [25] (3) flashes a light
therein without opening the car's doors;[26] (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search;[27] (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search
or visual inspection;[28] and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[29]
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did
not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had
to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were
able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,[30] the Court held that the physical intrusion of a
part of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth
Amendment, to wit:

"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a
physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not
conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to
see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . . In doing so, his
inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the vehicle
by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the area protected by the
Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the open window of a
home."

On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist
is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the
vehicle to be searched.[31]
 This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package
the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to
present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do
so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same
physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana;[32] (5) the accused
who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received
confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6)
where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information
and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged - that said accused were
bringing prohibited drugs into the country.[33]
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police
officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the
vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?
A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol
in the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped
the jeepney and searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these
conductor wires.
Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did
you do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."[34]
The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:
"ATTY SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be
covered by those and I flagged him, sir."[35]
 We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for
such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify
the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,[36] we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the
accused was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over
the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to
flee from the police authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause.Thus:

"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly
cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines
x x x, CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities,
and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with
immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.

This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale
clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or
the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior,
and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner
would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA
was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that
ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not
automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis
supplied)

In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or
tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could
otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantlesssearch and seizure.
[37]
 Unfortunately, none exists in this case.

II. Plain view doctrine

It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain
view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if
the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure.[38]
 It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight
because they were placed in sacks[39] and covered with leaves. The articles were neither
transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was
hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what
was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view
which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.[40]

III. Consented search

Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle

"with the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the
search. He claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how
it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At
most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no
"consent" at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. [41] Hence, consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. [42] The question whether a
consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances.[43] Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on;[44] (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence
will be found;[45] (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.[46] It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.[47]
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was
conducted in this wise:
"WITNESS
Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?
A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on
said date and time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is that incident?
A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw
Rudy Caballes driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
 x x x x x x x x x
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered
by those and I flagged him, sir.
Q Did the vehicle stop?
A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle
and by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?
A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.
Q What was the answer of Caballes?
A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I
told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive.
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you
do?
A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from
the Cavinti area, sir."[48]
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of
consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to
search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no
room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the
accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature
and consequences of such request.[49]
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,[50] the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his
consent to said search. In People vs. Lacerna,[51] the appellants who were riding in a taxi were
stopped by two policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants
readily agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant
himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting
to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People
vs. Cuizon,[52] the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they
freely consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were
carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,[53] it was held that the accused spontaneously
performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or
intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his
right. In People vs. Omaweng,[54] the police officers asked the accused if they could see the
contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are
only clothings." Then the policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered
"you can see it." The Court said there was a valid consented search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[55]
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his
right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly
obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be
desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner
and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For
all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they
will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.In addition, in cases where this Court
upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly
asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of
the accused was established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the
statements of the police officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him
that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually
requested and granted because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination
what he did when the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of
the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a clarificatory question
that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an
afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what they
did when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the
vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search.[56]
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to
the warrantless search. In People vs. Barros,[57] appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton
box, boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and
found marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box
and failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal
and held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted
simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,[58] to wit:

"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law."

Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain petitioners conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating
the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88017             January 21, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA
y SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine, a regulated drug under Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended. One of its derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride, notoriously
known in street parlance as "shabu" or "poor man's cocaine."

Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo
Tia, were charged with a violation of Section 15, Article III of the aforementioned statute
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, before Branch 114 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City. Only appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. They
were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P25,000.00 each, and to pay the
costs. Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. The pertinent portion
of the information reads as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of October, 1987, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver, dispatch or transport 56
teabags of Metamphetamine, a regulated drug.

Contrary to law.1

The antecedent facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of
the Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized
group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and
gunrunning. After an evaluation of the information thus received, a project codenamed "OPLAN
SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected syndicate.

As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was
carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused,
Reynaldo Tia (hereinafter referred to as Tia).

Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred to as Lim) by
another confidential agent named George on August 3, 1987. Lim expressed a desire to hire a
male travelling companion for his business nips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired.

Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to make arrangements for a trip to China. In the
course of those meetings, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (hereinafter referred to as appellant),
whom Tia found out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.

As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the
suspected criminal syndicate. Meanwhile, the officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887,
Captain Luisito Palmera, filed with his superiors the reports submitted to him, and officially
informed the Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.

On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight.
Before they departed, Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their
expected date of return to the Philippines as declared in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6,
1987 at two o'clock in the afternoon.

The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for
Guangzhou, in the People's Republic of China. Upon arriving there, they checked in at a hotel,
and rested for a few hours. The pair thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased
six (6) tin cans of tea. Tia saw the paper tea bags when the cans were opened for examination
during the purchase. Afterwards, they returned to the hotel. Appellant kept the cans of tea in his
hotel room. That evening, Tia went to appellant's room to talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two
other men with appellant. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning substance
on a piece of aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter. Appellant joined the second man and
sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. Tia asked the latter what they would be
bringing back to the Philippines. He was informed that their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs.
Tia stayed in the room for about twenty minutes before going back to his room to sleep.

The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight. Appellant
had with him his red traveling bag with wheels. Before departing from Guangzhou however,
customs examiners inspected their luggage. The tin cans of tea were brought out from the
traveling bag of appellant. The contents of the cans were not closely examined, and appellant
was cleared along with Tia.

The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), then named Manila
International Airport, on schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. Lim talked
to appellant, while Tia, upon being instructed, looked after their luggage. After Lim and appellant
finished their conversation, the latter hailed a taxicab. Appellant and Tia boarded the taxicab
after putting their luggage inside the back compartment of the vehicle. Lim followed in another
taxi cab.

Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to act
on the tip given by Tia. On the expected date of arrival, the team proceeded to the NAIA.
Captain Palmera notified the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for
coordination. After a briefing, the operatives were ordered to take strategic positions around the
arrival area. Two operatives stationed just outside the arrival area were the first ones to spot the
suspects emerging therefrom. Word was passed on to the other members of the team that the
suspects were in sight. Appellant was pulling along his red traveling bag while Tia was carrying
a shoulder bag. The operatives also spotted Lim meeting their quarry.

Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed
them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant
and Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other
taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked from their
car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. Three
pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives
requested from the suspects permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out
of the red traveling bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab, one of the operatives,
pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its
contents. Some crystalline white powder resembling crushed alum came out of the bag. The
sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its contents more closely. Suspecting the
crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three traveling bags opened for
inspection. From the red traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans were found, including the one
previously opened. Nothing else of consequence was recovered from the other bags. Tia and
appellant were taken to the CIS Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.

Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro
Street, Quezon City. Lim was likewise apprehended and brought to the CIS Headquarters for
interrogation.

During the investigation of the case, the six tin cans recovered from the traveling bag of
appellant were opened and examined. They contained a total of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags
with white crystalline powder inside instead of tea leaves.

The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was sent to the PC-INP
Crime Laboratory for preliminary examination. Tests conducted on a sample of the crystalline
powder inside the tea bag yielded a positive result that the specimen submitted was
metamphetamine. Samples from each of the fifty-six (56) tea bags were similarly tested. The
tests were also positive for metamphetamine. Hence, the three suspects were indicted.

In rendering a judgment of conviction, the trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the
government anti-narcotics operatives, to whom the said court applied the well-settled
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court, namely:

I.
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON
THE ACCUSED AS ILLEGAL.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF DELIVERING,

DISPATCHING OR TRANSPORTING METAMPHETAMINE, A REGULATED DRUG.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING REYNALDO TIA TO TESTIFY FOR

THE PROSECUTION.2

We affirm.

Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure
made against the accused is illegal for being violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
He reasons that the PC-CIS officers concerned could very well have procured a search warrant
since they had been informed of the date and time of a arrival of the accused at the NAIA well
ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact that the search and seizure in
question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant argues, does not automatically make the
warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the
necessity of a valid warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-narcotics
agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant.

The contentions are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure
must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-
recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,3 these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle,
and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case
clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a
valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.

In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in
the appellee's brief, that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.4

We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."5

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the
authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband
and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from
surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a
member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of
the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there
was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a
case.

The second assignment of error is likewise lacking in merit. Appellant was charged and
convicted under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, which reads:

The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to
thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, dispose, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug (emphasis
supplied).

The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea
bags containing metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction "or' was used, thereby
implying that the accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the alternative.
Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of "delivery" because the term connotes a source
and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It is also argued that
"dispatching' cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or disposed of drugs. As for
"transporting," appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor because the act of
transporting necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is non- existent under the
given facts.

The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which appellant
and his co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law
enforcers caught appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited
drug. The term "transport" is defined as "to carry or convey from one place to another."6 The
operative words in the definition are "to carry or convey." The fact that there is actual
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. It is
immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached. Furthermore, the argument of
appellant gives rise to the illogical conclusion that he and his co- accused did not intend to bring
the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e. they had no place of destination.

The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted
by the search and arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already
been commenced. Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.

Therefore, considering the foregoing, since the information included the acts of delivery,
dispatch or transport, proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of any of the acts so
included is sufficient for conviction under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.

Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished

as an offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law
punishing the act, it cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is
what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual
caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.7

As to the third assigned error, appellant contests the discharge of accused Reynaldo Tia to
testify for the prosecution on the ground that there was no necessity for the same. Appellant
argues that deep penetration agents such as Tia "have to take risks and accept the
consequences of their actions."8 The argument is devoid of merit. The discharge of accused Tia
was based on Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part:

Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, the court may directone or more of the accused to be discharged
with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state . . . (emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the discharge of an accused is left to the
sound discretion of the lower court.1âwphi1 The trial court has the exclusive responsibility to
see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist.9 In the instant case, appellant does not
allege that any of the conditions for the discharge had not been met by the prosecution.
Therefore, the discharge, as ordered by the trial court, stands.

Finally, appellant alleges that the testimony of Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab regarding the facts
surrounding the commission of the offense proves that the discharge of accused Tia is
unnecessary. The allegation is baseless. Appellant himself admits that the sergeant's testimony
corroborates the testimony of the discharged accused. The fact of corroboration of the
testimonies bolsters the validity of the questioned discharge precisely because paragraph (a) of
the aforequoted rule on discharge requires that the testimony be substantially corroborated in its
material points. The corroborative testimony of the PC-CIS operative does not debunk the claim
of the prosecution that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of accused Tia.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is
thereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31,
1990,1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of
selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:

That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers
containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty.3

At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of
the 9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the
buy-bust operation made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th
Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust
operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of
PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the prosecution
was summarized by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt.
Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at
Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance
and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information
received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded
to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari
Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian
informer had also described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani
was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00.
Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped
marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to
him and found it to be marijuana.

The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned.
Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was
given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali
Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt
(Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up
security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his
right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM
teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was
composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt.
Lego and Sgt. Biong.

Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while
the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about
90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went
on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached
Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said
he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money.
After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back
and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani
opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the
contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised
his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped
towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.

At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside
his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and
Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the
NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known
as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari
Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then
asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the
money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag
containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was
then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt.
 Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had
earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").

In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on,
Mari Musa gave his true name — Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over
the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one
newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag
containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the
kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for
laboratory examination. The turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory was by way of a letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"),
which was stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on
the same day.

Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime

Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three
tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the
presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her examination in
her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-
2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper
wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each
specimen written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also
identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on
December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also
identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)

T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana

through his initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words "December 14, 1989, 2:45
P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga also identified the receipt of the
P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989,
and his signature thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed
to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and
the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1").4

For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa;
and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:

[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his
house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa,
known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin
named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at
one hand, his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to
sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents,
dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open.
The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply
announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched
Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The
NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag
 whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the
plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father,
who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa, then,
was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him
for clarification.

Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office
at Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was
investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced into
writing. The writing or document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The
document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was
asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not
belong to him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the
assistance of counsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted
to be assisted by counsel.

Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right
hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents
boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated,
he said his wife was outside the NARCOM building. The very day he was
arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari
Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal
asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single
question, Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell
the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was
afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.

Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of
marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had
given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that was
against the law and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the
authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa said
he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before.5

After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he
is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter
imposed without subsidiary imprisonment.6

In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because:
(1) prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were
personally known by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged
giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he
conducted a test-buy operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana
for P15.00 from the latter.7 He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same
day.8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for
the following day.9

On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by
T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the
appellant's house located in Laquian Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with
the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was
given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.

Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places.11 Sgt.
Ani approached the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted.
Sgt. Ani asked him for some more marijuana.12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and
the appellant went inside the house and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana
which he handed to Sgt. Ani.13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there were other
people in the house.14

After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-
arranged signal of raising his right hand.15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani,
went inside the house and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to
find the marked money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his
wife.16

The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the
buy-bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction
of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any
of the material points, it deserves credence.

The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not
know each other is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of
marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the
appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during
the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an existing
familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be
strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.17

The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for
the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place
of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial18 and
the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the
consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco,19 these factors may
sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the other
people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have given him some
assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities.

The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt.
Belarga. The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters
away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The
appellant invokes People v.
Ale20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot
distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the
cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant contends
that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.

People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his
companion were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-
buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating
that:

This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.

Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana
cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are
different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).

It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done
on those cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale
of more or less 10 to 15 meters.21

In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant
hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain
articles between the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads:22

Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the
house of Mari Musa?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please tell us?

A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego,
Sgt. Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the
house near the road and he was met by one person and later
known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short pants and
later on I saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter
received by Mari Musa and went inside the house and came back
later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.

Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have
seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the
latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani
received from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless,
corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by
Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a
surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on
December 13, 1989; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a
successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt.
Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on
December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville,
Zamboanga City;26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be
used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville,
Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in
the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places;28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani
and an exchange of articles took place.29

The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani.
Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the
poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of
their distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution's case30 provided there exists other
evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to
prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug

The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing
marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt.
Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested
the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find
it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his
wife.31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt.
Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen."32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they
opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant questioned the
admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order
ruling that these are admissible in evidence.33

Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against
unreasonable searches and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v.
Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures.35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be
effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,36 the Court stated that.
"[t]he most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest."37

Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:

Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the
arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the
Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any
money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or
was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . .
"38 Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement
agents may seize the marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants.39

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him
in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found
and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.

The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control.40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.41

In Ker v. California42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information
that the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the
building manager a passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they found the
defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of
the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a small
scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green leafy
substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as evidence
in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was
challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not
unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the
defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute
a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view.43 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the
"plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's
evidence. 44

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence
of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on
the application of the doctrine:

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification —
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.46

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view"
doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is
not apparent from the "plain view" of the object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband,
or otherwise subject to seizure.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room.
Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched
the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not
within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM
agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic
bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the
adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this
case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen,
they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained.
When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v.
California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in
this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they
not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came
across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object
in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of
the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said
object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
observer.48

We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not
apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging
effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant
sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold
that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of
marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the
appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.

 
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132165. March 26, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES

and ROGER AMAR y MATEO, accused.
MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES, accused-appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 7,
finding accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Information charged accused-appellant of sale of prohibited drugs, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 4th day of March, 1996, in the afternoon, in Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each
other, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver,
distribute and transport prohibited drugs consisting of nine hundred (900) grams of Marijuana
leaves, otherwise known as Indian Hemp to the intended buyers Joysie R. Duran, Jonalyn R.
Duran and Pepe Casabuena, who were apprehended two (2) days ago by the police authorities,
said prohibited drugs were confiscated from the possession and control of the accused.[2]

Upon arraignment on March 25, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. [3] Trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses. Their testimonies can be synthesized into the
following narration of events:
Armed with a search warrant,[4] SPO4 Gelacio R. Guarino, Chief of Police of Banga, Aklan
together with PO2 Jhanny Navida, raided the house of Conrado Ricaforte at Rizal Street,
Poblacion, Banga, Aklan on March 2, 1996, relative to the reported sale of marijuana by its
occupants, Jonalyn Duran, Joysie Duran and Pepe Casabuena. The three were apprehended
for illegal possession of marijuana and were detained at the Banga Police Station. [5] In the
course of their investigation, the police learned that a certain Mellyfrom Capiz and
one Roger were the suppliers of marijuana and that they will be back on March 4, 1996.
On March 4, 1996, Janet Iguiz,[6] caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte informed
Guarino that there were two strangers looking for the Duran sisters.
Accordingly, Guarino and Navida recorded the report in the police blotter [7] and proceeded
to the house of Conrado Ricaforte, which is more or less three hundred meters away from the
police station. When they arrived there, Guarino saw a woman, who turned out to be accused-
appellant Melly Sarap, walking in the alley near the house. Accused-appellant saw Guarino and
Navida in police uniform and immediately threw away her black canvass bag, which her
companion Roger Amar picked up. Guarino blocked Saraps path and grabbed from her the
green plastic bag she was holding. Upon inspection, the plastic bag was found to contain two
blocks of marijuana fruiting tops.[8]
In the meantime, Navida pursued Amar and arrested him.[9]
The marijuana confiscated from Sarap was brought to the Iloilo Headquarters for laboratory
examination.[10] The chemical analysis conducted by forensic chemist Angela Baldevieso
revealed that the substance was indeed marijuana or Indian hemp and weighed approximately
900 grams as per Physical Science Report No. D-01296.[11]Consequently, the above-quoted
information was filed against Sarap and Amar.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, denied the accusation against her. She narrated that
she delivered dried fish to her sister, Susanne Ricablanca, after which she went to the comfort
room of the dress shop fronting Banga Public Market to relieve herself. On her way to the dress
shop, she met Amar and entrusted to him her black bag. Thereafter, a woman approached and
told her that there were policemen waiting for her outside. The policemen forced her to board a
jeep and brought her to the office of Chief of Police Guarino at the municipal hall. Guarino
poked a gun at her and pulled her hair. He also asked her to remove her pants and shirt. A
certain PO3 Pedro Jerry Icay asked her to remove her bra and when she refused, he pulled her
bra because he was looking for marijuana on accused-appellants person. Sarap asserted that
the policemen did not get any marijuana from her.
Accused-appellants testimony was corroborated by her co-accused Roger Amar, her sister
Susanne Ricablanca and Leandro Braca, a pedicab driver.
On October 2, 1997, the trial court rendered the appealed decision. The dispositive portion
of which states:

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, accused Roger Amar is hereby ACQUITTED.

The Court finds accused Melly Sarap GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Article II,
Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, as amended and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Considering that accused Melly Sarap is a detention prisoner, she shall be credited
of her sentence with the full time during which she has undergone preventive imprisonment
having agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners.

The two (2) blocks of dried marijuana fruiting tops are hereby confiscated in favor of the
government. The Court orders the immediate release of Roger Amar from detention unless
there are other lawful reasons for his continued confinement.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Hence, this appeal with the accused-appellant raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND ARREST ILLEGAL;
 II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING FAVORABLY THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI AS A GROUND FOR THE ACQUITTAL OF THE HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT INSPITE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE WHICH IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR;
III. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING AS A GROUND FOR
THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HER DEFENSE THAT THE
TRANSPARENT PLASTIC BAGS WAS NOT POSSESSED NOR OWNED BY HER,
DESPITE POSITIVE AND CONVINCING PROOF ADJ[U]CED IN SUPPORT
THEREOF;
IV. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]
A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly
issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.[14] Articles which are the
product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to
Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. [15] Warrantless searches and seizures may be made
without a warrant in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle, (3) search in violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the evidence in plain
view, (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures,[16] (6) stop and frisk[17] and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[18] These
instances, however do not dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable cause
must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed.[19]
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court held that: (1) the police officers are
presumed to have regularly performed their duties, in the absence of proof of ill or improper
motive on their part to falsely impute a serious crime against Sarap; and (2) the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses have more weight compared to Saraps negative
testimony. It also relied heavily on the testimonies of Chief of Police Guarino that in view of the
urgency of the case, they proceeded immediately to the house of Conrado Ricaforte to pursue
Sarap and Amar. It concluded that the warrantless arrest was lawful considering that Sarap had
committed or was actually committing a crime when arrested. It ruled that the search incident to
the said arrest is sanctioned under the Rules[20] and evidence obtained therefrom is admissible.
We are not convinced. The Banga Police Officers were admittedly not armed with a warrant
of arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it. xxx

In the instant case, Sarap cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about
to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. She was merely walking in the alley near the
house of Conrado Ricaforte. It was only when Janet Iguiz led Sarap downstairs and identified
her as Melly that she was singled out as the suspect. Guarino would not have apprehended
Sarap were it not for Janet Iguizs identification. Moreover, the evidence on record clearly
illustrated that it was only after Janet Iguiz pointed to Sarap as Melly that Guarino suspected
that the bag she was holding contained marijuana.
The Banga Police could have secured a search warrant when Jonalyn Duran disclosed
during the investigation that a certain Melly of Capiz and one Roger would be back on March 4,
1996. The persons intended to be searched had been particularized and the thing to be seized
specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be March 4, 1996, although it was
uncertain whether Melly would arrive. Melly turned out to be accused-appellant [21] and the thing
to be seized was marijuana. The above particulars would have provided sufficient grounds to
secure a search warrant, instead, the police only acted when the caretaker of the house of
Conrado Ricaforte informed them that there were strangers looking for Jonalyn and Joysie
Duran. Hence, they cannot now dispense with the requirement of a search warrant on the basis
of urgency in effecting it, considering that they had twenty-four hours to do so. The
apprehending officers had prior knowledge of Saraps alleged activities. Verily, there was no
excuse for the Banga Police not to secure a search warrant.
Hence, the Banga Police could not effect a warrantless search and seizure since there was
no probable cause and Sarap was not lawfully arrested. The law requires that the search must
be incidental to a lawful arrest in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
It is true that we adhere to the time honored-doctrine that the trial courts assessment of
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is accorded great weight and may even be deemed
conclusive and binding on the appellate court.[22] In innumerable instances, however, we
interfered with the judgment of the trial court when there appeared facts or circumstances of
weight and influence which the trial court may have overlooked and, if taken into consideration,
could have a significant effect on the outcome of the case.[23]
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the instant case did not come within the purview of
the plain view doctrine. In order for the doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be
present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.[24]
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest, the search of Saraps
bag was also not justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the fourth exception. The
marijuana fruiting tops contained in the green plastic bag carried by Sarap were not clearly
visible. Chief of Police Guarino, testified, thus:
Q So that when you saw Melly Sarap, she was just doing nothing in the alley?
A She was walking, about to approach me.
Q So that, when you saw her approaching you, you grabbed her bag?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did you do that?
A Because I suspected that transparent plastic bag has a marijuana.
Q You were not certain that the woman you were able to apprehend was Melly Sarap?
A I did not know that it was she.
Q And you are not certain that the content of the bag was marijuana?
 A I suspected that there was marijuana and shabu inside the bag, I found out that there
was tawas and other personal belongings.
Q So your answer to my question is no. You are not certain?
A I am not certain.[25]
The above testimony negates the conclusion of the trial court that the marijuana fruiting
tops were inadvertently discovered. More importantly, the marijuana fruiting tops were also not
apparent and in plain view as shown by the fact that Chief of Police Guarino still had to grab
Saraps bag to ascertain its contents.
Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot stand. There is
simply no sufficient evidence to convict her. That the search disclosed marijuana fruiting tops in
appellants possession, and thus confirmed the police officers initial information and suspicion,
did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest
effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search for being a fruit of a poisonous
tree.
All told, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
measured by the required moral certainty of conviction. The evidence presented by the
prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally
ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the
crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. [26] Moreover, as
Justice Holmes declared: I think it is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part.[27]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 7, finding accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
the ground of reasonable doubt. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is
directed to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant unless lawfully held for another
cause, and to inform this Court of the date of her release, or the ground for her continued
confinement, within ten days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.