Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Theo Chocolate
Theo Chocolate
APRIL 2012
Theo Chocolate
Four years after moving from Boston to Seattle to join her ex-husband in running an
organic, FairTrade chocolate factory, Debra Music felt both a sense of accomplishment and one
of foreboding. Theo Chocolate began producing its first Fair-Trade certified, single-origin,
blended dark chocolate bars in March of 2006, and by the fall of 2009, had built a unique brand
that was particularly strong in the Pacific Northwest region. Seattle, with its young, well-
educated, and socially conscious population, had proved to be a perfect base for a company
rooted in socially responsible, sustainable business practices. The company had increased sales
each year since its inception (see Exhibit 11), and in the wake of large customer orders that
were coming in, production had been recently ramped up. As the Vice President of Sales and
Marketing of Theo Chocolate, Debra had reason to be proud of what the company had achieved.
She also had reason to be concerned. Despite a unique value proposition, a skilled and
fervent management team, growing brand strength, numerous awards, and an endorsement
from a well-known celebrity, Theo Chocolate had yet to turn a profit by the fall of 2009. Joe
Whinney, Debra‟s ex-husband and Theo‟s CEO, had strong feelings about how the chocolate
industry operated. Theo was designed from the outset to completely change the way people
thought of and purchased chocolate products; Joe‟s explicitly stated goal was to do for cacao (the
fruit from which chocolate is made) and chocolate what Starbucks had done for coffee. He had
built a company that implemented sustainable, Fair-Trade practices at every stage of its value
chain – a model totally unique in the highly competitive chocolate industry. In fact, Theo
Chocolate‟s website boasted that it was “the only organic, Fair-Trade, Bean-To-Bar chocolate
factory in the United States.”2 Theo‟s entire marketing and branding strategy – indeed, its
reason for existence – was based on these principles.
With some indication that the company might soon turn the corner and get “in the black”
for the first time in its existence, Debra faced a key decision: should the company stay true to
its socially-responsible roots, or would it have to compromise some of its core principles in order
to become and stay financially profitable? As the person Joe had entrusted with building the
This case was prepared by Michael Cummings, Lecturer of Management, and Gary Ottley, Lecturer of Marketing at Babson College,
based on published sources. It was developed as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling
of an administrative situation. It is not intended to serve as an endorsement, source of primary data or illustration of effective or
ineffective management.
Copyright © 2012 Babson College and licensed for publication to Harvard Business Publishing (HBP). All rights reserved. No
part of this publication can be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission of
Babson College.
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Theo Chocolate
Theo brand, much of the responsibility of this decision had fallen to Debra. The decision would
determine the strategic direction the company would take and ultimately how the company
would market itself and its products. Perhaps most importantly, it would determine whether
Joe and the rest of the management team could make a profit while maintaining their values.
For Joe Whinney, the journey to CEO of a chocolate company had truly been a unique
one. An avid sailor, Joe decided to work for a conservation foundation while sailing around
Central America in his early twenties. His very first job was volunteering to help indigenous
cocoa farmers in Belize. Always environmentally conscious and a self-described “tree-hugger”,
Joe quickly found his passion in cacao working with farmers and saw firsthand the impact of a
pure-profit motive on the members of an industry value chain. He also saw the business
opportunity in an alternative business model early on:
[Back in 1991] I saw the problem – the need for profit, combined with short-term
thinking, is making everybody – from the subsistence farmer in Central America
who has to buy books for his kids for school and has a small cash requirement, all
the way up to CEOs of Fortune 100 companies – they all have exactly the same
mindset. I thought it made sense – good business sense – for business to be done
differently. I thought, if people are paid a fair price, they can invest [in their
business] for the long term and not have these short-term, paycheck-to-paycheck
behaviors, and there‟s this group of consumers who respect this – I thought, why
not just make it happen? To me, it was just pure common sense. It wasn‟t this
„I‟m going to change the world‟ thing; I just thought that it was so silly that this
hadn‟t happened yet.
Theo Chocolate was not Joe‟s first attempt at running a company devoted to this ideal.
He had tried being a “value added broker,” sourcing organic cacao for 10 of the largest
processors of cocoa beans in the United States. His company, Organic Commodity Products,
purchased beans from farmers, and provided partially or totally processed cocoa and chocolate
products to those processors, to be sold under their labels. The company ultimately succumbed
to the economic forces in play in 2001 and 2002. The dot.com bust froze OCP‟s equity
financing, customers started looking for less expensive sources, and the company closed in
2002.
The experience did little to dampen Joe‟s passion for his vision: to convince consumers
that where chocolate came from, and how it was made, made a difference – in taste, in quality,
and in the impact it had on each stage of the supply chain. In fact, after dealing with large-scale
cocoa processors, it had increased. Joe wanted nothing less than to cause a major shift in how
consumers thought of and consumed chocolate, and often cited Starbucks as an exemplar
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because of what it had done to shift perceptions of another so-called commodity product: coffee.
He wanted to increase the perceived value of, as he put it, “this really special, incredibly
delicious agricultural product called cocoa beans.” He was convinced that “converted”
consumers would be willing to pay more for a higher quality product, which would have a direct
impact all the way down the chain to the farmers. Despite the failure of OCP, Joe still felt that
there was a way to do this profitably, and he felt that at the heart of it all, the consumer held the
key to that profitability.
At the heart of this is a consumer issue. We can point fingers at industry, but at
the heart of it, business is designed to give people what they want in the most
efficient way possible at the highest level of profit. The big guns – they‟re just
trying to give people what they think the people want. Now – companies have
some influence, and can and should take an active role to change consumers‟
perceptions - but at the end of the day what it‟s going to take is consumers
putting a value – a higher value – on where all of their things come from, and the
decisions they make and how they impact the future. To me, that‟s a cultural
movement – and a very, very tall order.
Joe realized that he needed to build a brand that personified and exemplified these ideals
to do all this - not only to control the message going out, but also the supply chain feeding it and
the facility making it. If quality was to be the differentiator, the only way he could be sure of the
quality was to control as much of the supply chain as he could. For the three years after OCP
folded, he consulted to companies in the organic food industry while he refined his ideas and
made connections.
Then in 2005, a group of investors with interests in some of those companies decided to
partner with Joe in an organic chocolate company run on principles of quality, sustainability
and Fair Trade. Joe had little trouble finding smart people to come work in a real chocolate
factory with strong ideals and socially responsible principles in Seattle. What was missing was
additional executive skill – “adult supervision,” as Debra had playfully described it. Joe was
great at articulating a vision, infusing enthusiasm into his endeavors and motivating others to go
along with them – and of course, at the technical elements of making chocolate. When it came
to running a company on a day-to-day basis, and especially to the marketing of the company‟s
products, even he would admit those weren‟t his strong suits. Debra, however, had a graduate
degree in psychology, a strong background in social marketing and consumer brand building,
and had held numerous marketing positions in Boston in the 18 years she lived there. When Joe
decided to move to Seattle, he had no hesitation in offering a Sales and Marketing VP position to
Debra – who gladly accepted.
They spent the next 18 months building the factory in a historic building, the former
home of the Red Hook Brewery, in the quaint, eclectic and artsy Fremont3 district of Seattle.
Joe envisioned controlling his chocolate “from bean to bar,” and a factory was an integral and
necessary part of Joe‟s plan to differentiate Theo from other, much larger, chocolate makers. In
March 2006, the company began producing its first Fair Trade-certified, single-origin and
blended dark chocolate bars at that factory.
3 According to the website gonorthwest.com, Fremont is “home to several prominent Northwest businesses such as
Adobe Systems and Getty Images, numerous local and international nonprofit organizations”, and is “known best for
its offbeat and irreverent parades, parties and sidewalk art…such as the Annual Solstice Parade, which is famous for
its nude cyclists and quirky celebrations; and the Fremont Troll Monument.”
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Theo Chocolate
2006-2009
Debra‟s job was a challenging one from the get-go: find customers for the products made
at this quirky factory - a new and unknown brand that was very different from what others in the
industry represented. She was meticulous about the customers she targeted, matching Theo‟s
value proposition with values of customers in the Pacific Northwest with whom she felt they
would resonate. Beginning with organic supermarkets and cooperatives in the Seattle area, and
the distributors that served them, Debra painstakingly built Theo sales each quarter. Given the
seasonal nature of the chocolate market, Theo monitored its growth by quarter, year after? over
year, comparing a given quarter to the same quarter in the previous year4. By that measure, Q3
FY09 (January-March 2009) was the only quarter in Theo‟s 3-year history in which sales had
not increased substantially compared with the corresponding quarter the previous year (see
Table 1).
Table 1
Net Sales By Quarter
Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun
Qtr 06 06 07 07 07 07 08 08 08 08 09 09
Ending Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
CY06 CY06 CY07 CY07 CY07 CY07 CY08 CY08 FY09 FY09 FY09 FY09
Net
Sales
($000, 150 310 330 340 450 700 850 670 620 970 690 801
rounded
)
over
same
quarter n/a n/a 1142% 1142% 206% 123% 159% 99% 38% 40% -19% 21%
in
prev.
year
Sales came primarily from distributors (who introduced? or channeled? them into retail
establishments such as supermarkets) and through Theo‟s retail store in Fremont. The store
was in the same building as the factory, and served as both a retail front and the gateway to
factory tours run by employees known as “Theonistas”.
By June 2009, between 75% and 80% of annual sales came from these two channels (see
Table 2). Direct sales, which accounted for about 25% of annual sales (on average), came from
small, mostly local stores, and a few large chain stores. Co-packing (i.e., the production of
chocolate to be sold under another company‟s brand), although accounting for a negligible
amount of total sales, nevertheless was proving to be very beneficial to the company as it learned
how to manage its capacity and drive down production costs. Co-packing arrangements allowed
for longer runs, and thus for better management of contribution and of capacity.
Table 2
Sales By Channel , Q4 FY09
4 As of July 2008, Theo‟s financial year ran from July to June the following year.
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Theo Chocolate
from
Channel % of Total (Q4) previous
year
Theo Retail Store 39% 35%
Direct (to retailers) 18% -29%
Distribution 39% 60%
Co packing 4% -17%
Total 100% 20%
Joe, Debra and Theo‟s management team were eagerly anticipating the results for the
second half of 2009. Despite the economic recession that had gripped the country that year, all
indications were that Q4 FY‟09 – traditionally Theo‟s busiest quarter because of Halloween,
Thanksgiving and the end-of-year holidays – would be Theo‟s first “in the black,” and that
FY2010 might be Theo‟s first profitable year.
Farming
Cocoa was generally grown on small farms in hot rainy environments. Many growers
were subsistence farmers, surviving at the margins, and extremely vulnerable to price
fluctuations, crop failure and down-stream distribution power. Historically, farm labor
conditions were primitive with numerous documented cases of extreme abuse of labor,
especially child labor. Prior to the 1990s however, cocoa prices were protected by government
price controls providing some measure of insulation from market-based forces. In the late 1990s
5 fieldmuseum.org
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Theo Chocolate
Intermediate Processing
rs source cocoa directly from growers using the cocoa to produce products such as cocoa
butter, cocoa powder and cocoa liquor. Depending upon a firm‟s market position, these
intermediate products are sold to down-stream manufacturers for use in products as diverse as
sun tanning products, food products and alcoholic beverages or a portion are retained for in-
house use. Intermediate processing was highly concentrated with three large firms controlling
40% of the origin grindings. Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) operated cocoa processing plants
globally and sold its products under the De Zaan brand. Swiss-based Barry Callebaut was a
processing and chocolate confectionery firm. Approximately two thirds of the firm‟s production
was for in-house usage while the balance was sold to down-stream food producers. The firm had
long-term contractual arrangements as a strategic supplier with both Nestle and Hershey. U.S.-
based Cargill ground 14% of world cocoa bean production. The firm purchased Nestlé‟s primary
cocoa processing plant in 2007. Cargill also recently developed processing capabilities in
Ghana.7
Outside of the four largest industry players (see below), the market for chocolate was
widely distributed with no one firm holding greater than a 1% market share. However, large
chocolate-consuming nations experienced a change in consumption behavior from the late
1990s through 2009. In the United States, demand for high-end organic chocolate was
increasing. Specifically, health research suggested that dark chocolate with higher cocoa content
had substantial health benefits when associated with moderate consumption, including
reduction in LDL (bad cholesterol) oxidation. In addition, antioxidants present in chocolate
were shown to reduce the risk of cancer similar to health claims associated with red wine
consumption. Growth estimates of high-cocoa-content chocolate products were 24% from 2001
6
“Ivorian Cocoa Committee Wants Industry Run by State”; Bloomberg.com, December 10,2009
7
Report to the Executive Committee, International Cocoa Organization April 2008
8
IBIS World Industry Report July 2, 2009 - Confectionery Production from Purchased Chocolate in U.S.
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Theo Chocolate
to 2005, as opposed to the more modest growth rates of 3% for the more traditional milk
chocolate products sold by the major competitors.9
Distribution
The majority of products were distributed through confectionery wholesalers (76.8%)
with the largest U.S. distributor, McLane Company, responsible for 26% of Hershey‟s total sales
distribution. Distributors supplied a wide variety of retail outlets including supermarkets,
convenience stores, discount stores, pharmacies and other specialty stores. Distributors forged
links to all the various retail outlets, developing long-term relationships with their customers.
Increasingly, small producers sought to bypass complex distribution channels with the increased
usage of online direct-to-end-user sales.
Retail
Grocery, supermarket and convenience stores accounted for 14.6% of confectionery sales
in 2009. Larger chain operators, aided by increased online purchasing efficiency, increased their
share of industry revenue. Aided by increased volume, large retailers bought increasing amounts
of product directly from manufacturers.10
Competition
Large Competitors
The United States was the largest chocolate market in 2008. Competition was fierce
among the major industry competitors with Hershey, Mars, Nestle and Russell Stover holding a
combined market share of 51.7%. The major firms sought to increase market power through
increased brand loyalty and through widening their product offerings. Operating worldwide, the
major competitors combined high intensity marketing, strong product portfolios and key
contractual arrangements with large retailers to wield considerable market power.
While industry growth was thought likely to continue, large players were increasingly
concerned with the negative publicity associated with the health aspects of candy. Media
coverage of childhood obesity issues led to concerns voiced by health advocates over the
consumption of snack foods such as candy and chocolate by school age children. Responsible
marketing to children was an increasingly important industry issue.11 Recognizing the threats
associated with stakeholder concerns with candy, combined with the emergent data on the
health benefits of certain kinds of chocolates, large competitors began to focus on growing niche
markets in the chocolate industry. Nestle‟s strategy emphasized wellness products and shifted
from low-end commodity-based consumer products to high-margin health-based products.
Chocolate was designated as a key product category in this effort.12
For all major competitors, organic growth was challenging with most growth coming
from existing or acquired brands. As competitors tried to differentiate themselves, large
established firms sought a foothold in the organic chocolate segment. In addition to Cadbury‟s
9 AC nNielsen estimates
10 IBIS World Industry Report July 2, 2009 - Confectionery Production from Purchased Chocolate in U.S.
11 candyusa.com (website for the National Confectioners Association Washington DC)
12 “The Unrepentant Chocolatier”, The Economist, November 2009
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Theo Chocolate
acquisition of Green and Black‟s,13 Hershey entered the market with the acquisitions of Dagoba
Organic Chocolate and Scharffen Berger Chocolate Maker. As large candy producers continued
to purchase smaller brands, other firms such as Campbell‟s exited the market, selling their
Godiva brand to a private equity firm in 2007. Clearly there was opportunity in the
organic/niche brand space.
Niche Competitors
Recognizing a market opportunity, smaller players emerged during the late 1990s to fill
the market need for high content cocoa products. Competitors‟ approaches to satisfy market
demand varied widely among the new entrants (see Exhibit 4). Early entrants into the organic
chocolate market such as UK‟s Green and Black‟s had sales of £22 million by 2004 before selling
to Cadbury‟s for £20 million in 2005.14 (Appendix 1 provides a background of the terms as
applied to the chocolate industryand its standard requirements and definitions.)
In the United States, new market entrants into the gourmet segment reached 25 by
2008. Seeking to capitalize on demand for high quality chocolate, producers entered the market
as retailers, mid-stream producers and fullyintegrated producers of high cocoa content
chocolate products. Firms such as Fran‟s Chocolates, from Seattle, Washington, chose to
compete primarily via retail outlets in the Pacific Northwest while other firms such as Jacques
Torres concentrated on one local retail market: New York. Most other finished product
producers bought chocolate from intermediate producers adding inputs before final shipment to
retail outlets. A few new entrants chose to fully integrate production from contracting directly
with growers to in-house, grinding and finished product manufacturing.
Using only pure ingredients that are grown sustainably. We source our
ingredients locally whenever possible, fair trade whenever applicable.
Partnering with our growers by ensuring they earn a living wage and have
access to education for their families.
Honoring and respecting our employees and suppliers. This is possible
due to the unique fact that we control every step of our own
manufacturing process.
Using green energy sources to power our factory.
Using sustainable packaging and printing methods.
Educating about social and environmental accountability 7 days a week
through public tours of our artisan factory.
13 Since the writing of the case, Kraft Foods has acquired Cadbury‟s
14 independent.co.uk
15 theochocolate.com
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Theo Chocolate
By 2009, Joe had surrounded himself with people who were both as passionate about the
business as he and Debra were and skilled in necessary business areas. Apart from himself and
Debra, the company‟s executive management team included Andy McShea, its Chief Operating
Officer and Head Scientist, and Charles (Chuck) Horne, its CFO. Andy was a Harvard-trained
molecular biologist with expertise in genetic and chemical analysis who left a routine research
career to assume the COO role at Theo. His credo “Better Science Through Chocolate”, was
sewn onto his lab coat. Chuck came to Theo first as an investor, and then as CFO, after an
illustrious 25 year career in senior financial leadership in companies such as Safeco, Dell and
Silicon Graphics. (See Exhibit 5 for a company organization chart.) A total of 40 people
worked at Theo in the fall of 2009. Most worked in the factory or in the store; fewer than 10
worked in a managerial or administrative capacity.
The factory in Fremont was a 20,000 square foot facility, which also housed Theo‟s
offices and its retail store. The company could expand to 28,000 square feet if needed. Its
capacity was between 700,000 and 800,000 pounds of chocolate per year, and in 2008, it was
running at about 33%, producing 250,000 pounds (120 tons) of chocolate. It was turning over
inventory about 10 times per year.
On the factory floor, cacao beans went through a number of production stages before
being transformed into chocolate. Exhibit 7 diagrams Theo‟s chocolate production process.
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Theo Chocolate
Table 3
Distribution of Product Orders and Shipments, Q1 FY10 (Jul-Sep ‟09)
(totals may not equal 100% due to rounding)
Product Shipments
Category ($)
Classic 32%
3400 Phinney 25%
Origin 10%
Confections 13%
Specialty 6%
Misc./Other 11%
Co-Pack 1%
Total 100%
As might be expected, Theo‟s target customer fit a defined profile, despite the company‟s
lofty goal of repositioning chocolate in everyone‟s eyes. They tended to be younger than 40,
were educated (i.e., college or post-grad), and/or were “eco-minded”. The recent focus on the
green movement in the United States meant that more people were seeking out products that
were made using sustainable practices, which fit Theo‟s value proposition perfectly. Of course,
one of the key questions facing Debra and Theo Chocolate was that of whom they should target
going forward. Although the company‟s value proposition and branding messages connected
with this group of customers, catering exclusively to this population had not been profitable up
to this point. There was obviously some uncertainty as to whether the firm could afford to
continue to target just these customers, and if so, how to reach more of them to become
profitable.
As Table 2 illustrated, Theo marketed its products through four main channels: food
distributors to retailers (39%); direct to retailers (18%); co-packing arrangements (4%); and
through its retail sStore (39%). Across much of the United States, Debra had also built a
network of brokers and representatives, whose job was to facilitate sales at the retail level.
Retailers
Between product distributed to them and product sold directly to them, third-party retail
(i.e., retail sales outside of Theo‟s retail store) accounted for almost 60% of all of Theo‟s sales.
Customers could buy Theo‟s products in higher-end food retail stores such as Whole Foods, and
some specialty retail stores, such as REI or Pier One. Theo also had discovered a potentially
lucrative retail channel in bookstores (more on this below).
At the retail level, price of a typical Theo bar was about $4; Single Origin bars were about
25% more expensive, while the smaller 3400 Phinney bars sold for between $3 and $3.50 each.
There was no significant difference in COGS among the bars – they all were between $1.20 and
$1.25 per bar. However, where and how a bar was sold had a large impact on Theo‟s bottom
line. Distribution and direct-to-retail costs, including discounts and chargebacks, could run as
10
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Theo Chocolate
much as 50% of the price of a bar (although they typically accounted for 40%-45%), and thus
had significant impact on Theo‟s returns.
Brokers
Food brokers were independent sales agents who negotiated sales for producers and
manufacturers of food and food products, usually in a specified geographic area. They provided
a service to both food producers and buyers by facilitating sales to chain wholesalers,
independent wholesalers and retail stores. Suppliers often found it less expensive to sell through
food brokers rather than directly because it saved the cost of paying a sales staff to market their
products. Brokers tended to represent between 15 and 30 brands, so wholesalers and retailers
saved time, energy and resources by dealing with one broker rather than with many
manufacturers‟ representatives.
Theo employed a network of food brokers that served the natural food channel on the
East Coast, in the Rocky Mountain region and on the West Coast (as of the fall of 2009, Theo
did not have a presence in the Midwest, the Southwest or the South). Brokers tended to pay a
disproportionate amount of attention to the larger, more established brands. Brokers were
classified as “A,” “B” and “C” brokers, according to size and focus. Theo was too small and not
well known enough to attract “A” class brokers, and tended to be sought out by “B” brokers.
Direct-to-retail
About 18% of Theo‟s revenues came from direct sales to retailers. Most direct sales were
made to small, independent food retailers, many of whom liked to have personal? relationships
with their suppliers. Theo had established especially strong ties with co-operative
supermarkets. These were owned and operated by groups of individuals with similar interests
and tended to have a strong regional/neighborhood focus. Theo also had a few large “house”
accounts which it served directly.
Distributors
Distributors such as United Natural Foods16 would take delivery of product on pallets for
distribution to large food retailers, such as Whole Foods (which used UNFI exclusively). In the
Pacific Northwest, where Theo was widely available, the company used a number of smaller,
regional distributors; as the company looked to the national stage, and was attempting to break
out of the Northwest, distribution and transportation became the key issue.
Getting access to large grocery stores and supermarket chains had proven to be a unique
challenge because of how Theo‟s distribution was managed. Distributors “owned” a chain‟s
16 UNFI is Theo‟s largest distributor, and has an investment stake in the company
11
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Theo Chocolate
entire product set; one distributor would provide a chain‟s entire candy inventory, for example,
as it was the only way the chains could manage the logistics involved. Grocery store chains (with
the exception of Whole Foods) never dealt with Theo directly. These chains purchased from
distributors, not producers. A company like Theo would have to enter into a contract with a
distributor, usually at prices well below what it charged retailers. As such, margins on sales to
distributors were significantly less than to retailers. For example, for a bar with a suggested
retail price of $4, a typical direct-to-retailer price might be between $2 and $2.50, depending on
volume. The same bar would cost a distributor between $1.50 and $2.00.
Still, Theo was very optimistic about potential arrangements with the top 100 stores in
the Safeway chain (the third largest supermarket chain in the country, behind Wal-Mart and
Kroger17) and Costco. Theo was negotiating to create a new private-label product for the Costco
brand. In addition, the company had begun selling through Amazon.com in the fall of 2009 and
was discussing options for co-branding with other major brands.
Trade Shows
Because over 60% of its sales were made “business-to-business,” Debra had put in a lot
of face time at food trade shows to build Theo‟s network of players in the industry. By late 2009,
however, she was attending fewer trade shows because she thought their results were mixed, at
best. Still, as the company looked toward the future and envisioned a national brand, Debra
would have to think about the best way to use trade shows to her advantage.
Store sales accounted for about 40% of Theo‟s total revenues. Everything that was
available in other retail establishments was on sale at the factory store. Since starting
operations in 2006, Debra had put a lot of effort into local outreach in order to drive foot traffic
to and through the store and the factory. Although supported mainly by local patrons, the store
and factory tour attracted a booming tourist trade, especially in the summer. In fact, Theo‟s
chocolate factory had become so well known and respected by 2009 that it was listed in the top
10% of Seattle tourist attractions at tripadvisor.com, a popular travel rating website. 18 Seattle
convention organizers and cruiseship lines19 actively promoted Theo as an attraction.
The typical, “core” customer in the factory store tended to be someone who wanted to
support a local business and who cared about green, organic, and Fair Trade products. Seattle-
based customers typically had discovered Theo through word-of-mouth (either from a friend
who had visited or from social media outlets such as Twitter or Yelp.com), and sought out the
store for gifts and keepsakes for holidays known for involving chocolate and sweets (the end of
year holidays, Valentine‟s Day). Non-Seattle customers were directed to the store by their tour
organizers, convention organizers, and/or had found out about it via the internet. In fact,
12
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Theo‟s advertising had been entirely word of mouth and relied on Twitter and Facebook posts
and blog entries by satisfied customers.
Factory Tours
Theo offered factory tours, which were key to the store‟s revenues. The tours were
conducted by Theo employees and covered not only the production facility, but also a
description of where the chocolate was coming from, the farming practices involved in
producing the raw cacao, and tastings of chocolate made with cacao from different regions of the
world. They were immensely popular. In the summer and on weekends (Friday to Sunday),
they ran every day, four times a day; during the week and in the offseason, they operated twice
daily. Reservations were required, and although walk-ins were accommodated as space allowed,
the tours were usually filled up a week or two in advance. On weekends, as many as 25% of the
people who came to the store took the tour.
Theo charged $6 a head for its daily tours and $12 for private tours. Tours were limited
to 20 people (25 for private tours). In the summer of 2009, Chuck Horne instructed the store
employees to start asking customers buying chocolate if they had taken the tour. When he ran
the numbers, he realized that for every dollar the tour itself brought in, tour guests spent
another $1.50 to $2.00 on chocolate products. Table 4 shows a typical breakdown of sales by
product line from the retail store.
The factory tours made staffing the store a challenge. Audrey Lawrence, the Retail
Manager, had a supporting staff of 10 in the store, and there were plans to hire more given the
tours‟ popularity. The factory store employees tended to be female and were usually in their
early to mid-twenties. These weren‟t high-paying jobs, but Audrey and Debra found that there
was no shortage of applicants for customer service positions in an organic, Fair Trade chocolate
factory. People who worked at Theo, and especially those who worked in the factory store, felt a
deep and strong connection to the Theo brand. That connection manifested itself and was
visible in the enthusiasm with which Theonistas conducted the factory tours and fielded tough
questions from customers on the tours.
Table 4
Sample Percentage Quarterly Breakdown of Factory Store Sales
(totals may not equal 100% due to rounding)
Product Category % of Sales
Classic 15
Phinney 22
Theo Origins 5
Confections 21
Specialty 13
Misc. Other 23
TOTAL 100
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Events
The 1500 square foot retail store space was available for private functions after 6 pm.
The space could hold 100 people standing or 70 seated and was often rented out for gatherings
and parties. Events were often catered. The room rental rate was $125 per hour.
By definition and by design, Theo‟s products were more expensive than those of their
mass-producing competitors. Part of the company‟s mission was to increase the positive
perception of chocolate and to convince consumers that there was intrinsic value in a product‟s
origin and production processes. Joe was actively attempting to do with chocolate what
Starbucks had successfully done with coffee: change the perception of the base product (cacao)
from a “commodity,” and of the finished product (chocolate) from “candy.” By sticking to its
sourcing and production principles, Theo‟s products had a significantly higher cost of
production, necessitating higher prices – but as Joe put it, “we sell our chocolate at a price that
reflects the true cost of making chocolate.” As they saw it, Theo chocolates were priced in order
to reward the company for the higher quality it provided. Table 5 lists the retail prices of a 3 oz
Theo bar, and a sampling of those of its competitors.
20 theochocolate.com
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Table 5
Sample of Competitors‟ Retail Prices
Firm Brand Weight Retail Prices
Theo Dark Chocolate (Orange) 3 oz $4.00
Cadbury Green and Black 3 oz $3.69
Hershey Bar 2.6 oz $1.19
Hershey Symphony 4.25 oz $1.69
Extra Dark 3.25 oz $2.50
Nestle Crunch 4.40 oz $1.25
Twix 3.02 oz $1.19
Mars
Snickers 3.25 oz $1.19
Jane Goodall had created her own “Good For All” seal to reflect her personal
commitment to supporting high quality, ethically-produced products from the developing world.
Two of Theo‟s chocolate bars carried the “Good For All” seal – a major accomplishment? for a
small company like Theo. The partnership between Theo and Jane Goodall was inspired by
“Cocoa Practices,” a Theo Chocolate initiative that brought together small-scale cocoa farmers,
larger producers and non-governmental organizations from the world‟s cocoa producing
regions. Cocoa Practices was designed to give farmers the tools they needed to grow high-quality
cocoa beans while conserving indigenous wildlife and other natural resources in the tropical
rainforest eco-systems that provided both their livelihoods and their homes. As such, the “Good
For All‟ seal was a natural fit with Theo.
Proceeds from the sale of these chocolate bars (see Exhibit 11) would benefit cocoa
farmers, promote conservation in the tropical rainforest and directly contribute to the Jane
Goodall Institute‟s efforts to save chimpanzees, develop community-centered conservation
efforts and direct youth education programs around the world.
Private Labels
Despite Debra‟s desire to grow the brand to such a degree that the factory reached
capacity making Theo-branded products, the company was not yet at that stage. It had recently
entered into a private label agreement with a large chocolate maker that would serve to increase
throughput significantly and reduce the company‟s overhead burden. Debra and Joe were
hopeful that Theo could use its excess capacity in the next few years for similar arrangements.
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The dream was, however, rooted in a harsh reality: Joe had a company that had been
unprofitable for its first three years, and he now was responsible for 40 people working for him.
The bedrock upon which Theo had built its foundation – socially responsible business practices
throughout the value chain – had yet to prove that it was strong enough to support a profitable
business. The next few years, and especially the next year, would be crucial. Chuck was still
crunching the numbers for Q1 FY10 (July-September 2009), but they looked very promising,
and given the orders coming in, the last three months of 2009 was expected to be Theo‟s best
quarter ever.
Joe had always been focused on the internal operations of the company, trusting Debra
with the marketing and sales of his products. It was Debra who needed to find and capitalize on
Theo‟s growth opportunities. But first, she had to determine whether Theo could continue to
operate with its current business model or whether that growth necessitated compromise on
some level. All signs pointed to eventual profitability, with steady and significant increases in
sales, but Theo was still hemorrhaging. Did Theo have “something” worth persevering with its
unique positioning? Its vision and strategy were certainly laudable – but were they viable?
Could Theo withstand more unprofitable quarters in order to achieve its vision – or would it
have to take measures to stop the bleeding and thus compromise its principles?
With Theo‟s busiest period fast approaching, Joe and the rest of the management team
were expecting to hear her opinion, and a plan for moving ahead, soon.
EXHIBIT 1
Select Company Financials 2006-2009
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EXHIBIT 2
Value Chain of the Chocolate Industry
EXHIBIT 3
Product Definitions and Market Shares
Source: Report to the Executive Committee, International Cocoa Organization June 6, 2007
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EXHIBIT 4
Gourmet Chocolate Competitors
Competitor Location Year Founded Ownership
Askinosie Chocolate Springfield, MO 2005 Private
Amano Artisan Chocolates Orem, UT 2006 Private
Cabaret Brewed Chocolate Oakland, CA 2003 Private
Charles Chocolate Emeryville, CA 2007 Private
Chocolove Denver, CO 1998 Private
Chuao Chocolate Carlsbad, CA 2002 Private
Cocoa Pete's n/a 2002 Private
Dagoba Organic Chocolate Ashland, OR 2001 Sold
Hershey
DeVries Chocolate Denver, CO 2005 Private
Endangered Species Chocolate Indianapolis, IN 1993 Private
Fran's Chocolate Seattle , WA 1993 Private
Ithaca Fine Chocolates Ithaca, NY 2002 Private
Jacques Torres Chocolate Brooklyn, NY 2000 Private
Joseph Schmidt Confections San Francisco, CA 1983 Sold
Hershey
Malie Kai Honolulu, HI n/a Private
Michael Mischer Chocolates Oakland, CA 2004 Private
Noka Chocolate Dallas, TX 2004 Private
Patric Chocolate Columbia, MO 2006 Private
Recchiuti Confections San Francisco, CA 1997 Private
Scharfeen Berger Berkeley, CA 1996 Sold
Hershey
Taza Chocolate Somerville, MA 2005 Private
Tcho San Francisco, CA 2007 Private
Theo Chocolate Seattle , WA 2004 Private
Vermont Nut Free Chocolates Grand Isle, VT 1998 Private
Source: Adapted from Note on U.S. Chocolate Market, Powell, Greg: Stanford School of Business 2004
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EXHIBIT 5
Theo Chocolate Organization Chart, Fall 2009
Joe Whinney
President and CEO
Retail Store
Head of
Manager and
Confections
Staff
Roasting
Team
Shift Mgmt
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EXHIBIT 6
Theo Foundation Principles21
21 www.theochocolate.com
20
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EXHIBIT 7
Theo Chocolate Production Process
(Shown at each Factory Tour)
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Exhibit 8
Theo Chocolate Product Lines
22
www.theochocolate.com
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EXHIBIT 9
Theo Factory Store
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EXHIBIT 10
Theo “Chocolate University” Class Listing (Fall 2009)
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EXHIBIT 11
Jane Goodall Co-Branded Bars
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EXHIBIT 12
List of Awards for Theo Chocolate
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APPENDIX 1
Background and Explanations of „Organic‟ and „Fair Trade‟
In The Chocolate Industry
Organic Chocolate
Market demand for certified organic cocoa developed rapidly from 2003 to 2009.
General definitions of organic agriculture were not restricted to chemical-free
agricultural products but encompassed a more complex set of requirements:
Tying into chocolate products‟ health attributes, firms sought organic cocoa from
an increasing limited supply base. While over 400 organizations provided certification
services, legislative changes during the decade resulted in a smaller number of suppliers
able to meet the increased requirements. Tougher import permits requirements
squeezed out small growers. In 2006, the import costs of organic cocoa was $200 per
ton more than for non-organic cocoa. The $200 per ton premium was a fixed price over
market prices of non-organic which generally fluctuated between $100 and $300 per
ton.23
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Ignoring economic arguments against Fair Trade costs, consumer products firms
including high-end chocolate producers recognized a potential market opportunity
during the last ten years to align their brands with the Fair Trade movement. Consumers
who purchased Fair Trade products tended to have more education and wealth which
allowed firms to increase prices to compensate for the additional costs associated with
Fair Trade practices.26
Fair Trade practices were distinct from organic trade practices although there
was alignment between the two movements. Fair Trade was principally concerned with
economic viability. The goal was to use collective bargaining through a cooperative
organization of farmers to generate a sustainable price per pound guarantee irrespective
on market forces although the movement did incorporate some elements of
environmental stewardship into their programs. Activists used high intensity marketing
including public relation tactics to appeal to “conscious consumers” to buy Fair Trade
products while working to convince high profile firms such as Wal-Mart and McDonald‟s
to purchase and sell Fair Trade products. While 50% of U.K. consumers were aware of
the Fair Trade movement only 20% of U.S. consumers were conscious of Fair Trade in
2007.27
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