International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society

BRIDGING DIVIDED BROTHERS The Dynamics of Civic Engagement after Sectarian

Violence in Sampang, Indonesia
--Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number:

Full Title: BRIDGING DIVIDED BROTHERS The Dynamics of Civic Engagement after Sectarian
Violence in Sampang, Indonesia

Article Type: Original Research

Keywords: Sectarian Violence; Shiite Community, Sunni Community, Civic Engagement.

Corresponding Author: siti rohmah

Universitas Brawijaya
Malang, Jawa Timur INDONESIA

Corresponding Author Secondary

Information:

Corresponding Author's Institution: Universitas Brawijaya

Corresponding Author's Secondary

Institution:

First Author: siti rohmah

First Author Secondary Information:

Order of Authors: siti rohmah

Fiqh Vredian Aulia Ali

Bakhrudin Fannani

Mohammad Anas Kholish

Order of Authors Secondary Information:

Funding Information:

Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
Title Page w/ ALL Author Contact Info.

BRIDGING DIVIDED BROTHERS:

The Dynamics of Civic Engagement after Sectarian Violence in Sampang, Indonesia

Siti Rohmah

Law Faculty, Brawijaya University, Malang, Indonesia

sitirohmah@ub.ac.id (corresponding author)

Fiqh Vredian Aulia Ali

Center For Religious And Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS), Gadjah Mada University,

Yogyakarta,Indonesia

vredianaulia@gmail.com

Bakhrudin Fannani

Maulana Malik Ibrahim State Islamic University Of Malang, Malang, Indonesia

b.fannani@gmail.com

Moh. Anas Kholish

Maulana Malik Ibrahim State Islamic University Of Malang, Malang, Indonesia

kholishmuhamad85@gmail.com

Abstract

In Sampang, Indonesia, after the sectarian attack on the Shiite community,

various reconciliation initiatives have not succeeded in returning Shiites to their

homes. It has been about six years since the displacement of vulnerable groups of

Shiites Muslims in Sampang but their right as internally displaced persons (IDPs)

to return to their homes remains unfulfilled. Even though the political

1
commitment of tolerance and peace is always echoed in national and regional

elections every year, their voices have never been heard by political elites. The

paper argues that reconciliation in Sampang should not only be charged or relied

upon the government, along with all its long-process bureaucracy, bias, and

favoritism but also by the associational inter-communal civic engagement which

is crucial to be strengthened while gradually pressing the government to provide

the infrastructure of just reconciliation. This paper will show the struggle of

grass-roots reconciliation as a big potency for restoring broader civic

engagement. In the context of Sampang post-conflict climate when both parties

are divided and have imbalance power with dormant reconciliation, I state that

associational civic engagement is more appropriate to manage agencies of grassroots

reconciliation as a countervailing force while restoring everyday civic

engagement is unlikely

Introduction

After the sectarian attack on the Shiite community in Sampang, Indonesia, various

reconciliation efforts have not succeeded in returning the Shiites to their homes until this

present. At the present, it has been about six years since the displacement of vulnerable

groups of Shiites Muslims in Sampang, but their right as internally displaced persons (IDPs)

to return to their homes remains unfulfilled. Around 81 families or 335 people1 still displace

from their homes in Sampang, and live in Puspa Agro flat, a refugee-like camp, in Sidoarjo,

1 Tajul Muluk, Lima Tahun Terusir dari Kampung Sendiri, Press Release, Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN)
Indonesia, Jakarta, April 2017.

2
East Java, since they had been forced for relocation. Their voices have never been heared by

political elites, even though every year the political commitment of peace and tolerance is

always echoed in national and regional ellections. This paper analyzes what happens with

civil society over there that is not strong enough to maintain the co-existence, even though

the engagement between Sunnis and Shiites was enough strong before violence. By these

following questions, this paper, therefore, examines the failure of civic engagement in

preventing sectarian violence to Shiites in Sampang and possibilities to restore civic

engagement for sustainable reconciliation: What caused the failure? What was missed? What

can be done to restore civic engagement or to fill the missing requirement for peace?

The paper argues that reconciliation in Sampang should not only be charged or relied

upon the government, along with all its long-process bureaucracy, bias, and favoritism but

also by the associational inter-communal civic engagement which is crucial to be

strengthened while gradually pressing the government to provide the infrastructure of just

reconciliation. This paper will show the struggle of grass-roots reconciliation as a big

potency for restoring broader civic engagement. Based on Varshney’s study, there is

interlink between the structure of civic life and ethnic conflict when the lacks of prior and

sustained contacts between members of different communities turn out. He argues that civil

society wing institutionalized in an “associational civic engagement” and derived from inter-

communal local grassroots is more robust as a sturdier bulwark and more reliable as a

countervailing force for a trouble-maker party, rather than every day or quotidian civic

engagement2.

2Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2002), p. 50-51.

3
 In a different direction, Tadjoeddin reads that the mechanism of “self (intra-

community) policing” is more relevant, rather than inter-communal civic engagement, for

Indonesian society where myriad deadly communal violence occurred mostly in rural areas

with segregated communities and the triggered clash of the individual level3. Understanding

the paternalistic structure of Indonesian society as well, he also underscores that mass level

integration which is suggested Varshney as an orientation is insufficient and, as such, “elite

integration” is highly needed. Tadjoedin suggests the combination of those three

mechanisms simultaneously: inter-communal engagement, self-policing, and elite

integration4. Tadjoeddin’s account is basic to understand the failure of civic engagement and

what missed in the mechanism of preventing violence and reconciling those divided parties.

However, there are various obstacles for implementing those three mechanisms

simultaneously, especially in the context of imbalance power of majority-minority relation

when elites are unwilling to embrace “the Others” associated as deviants or heretics. Some

questions might be submitted to Tadjoedin. What is the mechanism offered to repatriate

Shiite refugees who live for five years amid conditions of conversion to Sunnis by intolerant

religious leaders itself and a lack of government will for a just reconciliation that previously

has never been implemented on the basis of justice? What can be done when there is an

imbalance power between the intolerant religious and political elites and Shiite refugees? In

the context of post-conflict climate when both parties are divided and have imbalance power

with dormant reconciliation, one can state that associational civic engagement is more

appropriate to manage agencies of grass-roots reconciliation as a countervailing force while

3 Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement and Communal Violence: Reflection on Various
Hypotheses in the Context of Indonesia,” Politics Administration and Change, No. 42, July-December, 2004, p. 5.
4 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 10-12.

4
restoring everyday civic engagement is unlikely. Everyday civic engagement will be

imperative for sustainable peace if the Shiites refugees have been returned to their village in

Sampang.

The Failure of Civic Engagement in Preventing Violence

The narration of antagonism between Sunni and Shiite in Sampang, East Java, became

popular news nationally and internationally after sectarian violence against Shiite

community in 2011 and 2012, in two remote areas, Blu’uren and Karang Gayam. On 29

December 2011, about 1000 vigilante mob from four villages bringing machetes, crowbar,

stones, and wooden clubs burned and destroyed buildings related to Shiite figures and

activities, Tajul Muluk’s one house, Iklil Al-Milal’s two houses, Umi Hanik’s one house, and

one madrasah (Islamic school) building5. Because of this, around 300 Shiites had been

evacuated by police to Sports Center building in Sampang. On 12 January, those Shiites had

been returned to their village because that place would be used for the commemoration of

Sampang’s birthday without proper security guarantee and conflict resolution mechanism.

Next year, on 26 August 2012, sectarian violence happened again with the bigger

attack. Semendawai, et al.6 reported, with the call for persecuting Shiites from some small

mosques, hundreds of vigilante mob bringing bondet (homemade bomb for bombing fishes

yet many people died in Indonesia because of it), machetes, crowbar, stones, and wooden

5 Semendawai, et al., Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi (TTR) tentang Penyerangan terhadap Penganut Syiah di
Sampang, Madura, the Cooperation of Komnas HAM, Komnas Perempuan, KPA and LPSK, 2013, p. 3.
6 Semendawai, et al., Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi, p. 3-5.

5
clubs gathered and destroyed Shiites’ properties again. They also plundered Shiites’

livestock. 48 houses of Shiites were burned and, unfortunately, Chamamah, a Shiite member

was killed with tens of Shiite members having critical injuries. After being refugees again in

Sports Center during eight-months, on 20 June 2013, hundreds of Shiites were relocated

forcefully by the government of Sampang to Puspa Agro flat in Sidoarjo, about 113 km from

Sampang.

Varshney and Taddjoedin provided clear lenses to understand the deadly communal

and sectarian violence. According to Varshney, a multiethnic society with various religious,

sectarian or cultural identities was prone to ethnic disorders and violence, if there are few

interconnections across ethnic boundaries. Moreover, he argued that “‘intra-communal

networks’ did not contain or stop the violence” and “the presence of ‘the intercommunal

networks’ of engagement was decisive”.7 In the term of intercommunal networks or

engagement, Varshney argued that everyday civic engagement would be enough to

withstand potential riot in villages, if it was compared with condition in cities where face-to-

face contact is hardly among neighborhoods and it means that associational civic

engagement is necessary for urban areas to maintain civic peace and other common

interests. In another hand, giving a contextual picture of most deadly violence occurred in

rural areas of Indonesia which are highly segregated and homogenous, paternalistic, and

triggered from the individual-level clash, Taddjoedin suggested the integration of three

mechanisms simultaneously, i.e. inter-communal engagement, self (intra-communal)

policing, and elite integration8.

7 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, p. 15.

8 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 11-12.

6
 Based on Varshney and Tadjoedin’s elucidation, how to understand the failure of civic

engagement in rural areas of Sampang in preventing violence? What was missed? One could

argue that there are interlink causations, such as the lack of inter-sect engagement, the

absence of peace committee and self-policing, and unjust, imbalance elite integration. Each

the causation might influence each other. The lack of inter-sect engagement and the absent

of peace committee might be influenced by the local elites provoking segregation and

mobilizing intimidation without any civic peace mechanisms. Besides, the inadequate self-

policing and unjust elite integration might be because of there no any civic organizations and

civic networks as the countervailing forces balancing the intolerance power and facilitating

or constraining elite strategies and synergy of local government.

Actually, before antagonism narrative of Sunni versus Shiite became strong, people in

the rural area live in coexistence. There was well-known shared ethnic identity of Madura,

one of the strong tribal solidarities in East Java, which committed highly to a powerful

cultural catchword “Tretan Dibik” which means “all of us is a brother”. Beside of that sense

of brotherhood, like most rural area in Java, most of the people in Blu’uren and Karang

Gayam in Sampang have family ties, including between Shiites and Sunnis that persecuted

them. Some month after relocation to refugee flat, Shiites received remittance from their

family in Sampang that followed mob stream evicting them.9 In addition, both sectarian

groups also have common religious-cultural spaces, especially when they gathered together

for Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Islamic tradition of every Thursday in afternoon, like tahlilan,

yasinan, and sholawatan (weekly reciting some chapters of Qur’an, praising Prophet

Muhammad, and praying together). Madurese people were predominantly extreme, fanatical

9 Bayu, a member of Regional Disaster Management Agency of East Java, Interview, 1 December 2017.

7
members of NU, as the biggest Islamic organization of Indonesia. NU becoming like ‘religion’

in Madura was a shared umbrella for Shiites and Sunnis to blur the difference. Yet, the

emergence of anti-Shiite narrative in various preaching and publication sharpened the

binary opposition and caused the segregation. “We as Madurese Kyai had highly strong

‘Sunni-ness’. Our rituals were equally same since a long time ago as usual until 2006. A new

situation arose in 2007-2008 when Risalah Mujahidin and Sidogiri Bulletin (anti-Shiite,

Faith-based media) entered the village and caused the tension. In the past, we just know that

Islam was NU. Just that! NU was like religion”, Iklil Al-Milal, a Shiite refuges coordinator,

said.10

When the anti-Shiite narrative spread and violent attacks exploded, the shared

cultural spaces were not inclusive again. After first sectarian violence (2011), many Shiite

women, who usually join Muslimah (NU lady organization) weakly teaching, exited from the

program because the preaching of it stated that Shiite is kafir (infidel) and deviant. Yet, Sunni

women still fetched them menacingly to follow the teaching in order to ‘reconvert’ them to

Sunni.11 Maulid, a commemoration of the birth of Prophet Muhammad, which was a common

tradition before, became the controversial issue when rumors spread that Shiites would

invite foreign Shiite preachers. Vigilante mob usually gathered to cancel this event in Shiite

basis and this influenced other more violent attacks. Kari Telle12 stated that rumors may

have a ‘positive’ impact in the certain case with the risk. In Lombok, when the imagined

threat of Sasak Muslim about Hindu Balinese ritual spread and caused militias angry, there

10 Iklil Al-Milal, Interview, 1 November 2017.

11 Semendawai, et al., Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi,
p. 5.
12Kari Telle, Ritual Power: Risk, Rumours and Religious Pluralism on Lombok, The Asia Pacific Journal of
Anthropology, 17: 5, 2016.

8
are a dialog and a negation which still provided scrutinized successful ritual and religious

pluralism atmosphere. However, this happens when government and social elite have both

the accommodative inter-religious harmony view and the public order. In the case of social

hostility on Shiite in Sampang, the accommodative inter-religious harmony view was limited

to the issues of heresy and blasphemy and the government tended to use the public order

orientation. It was because, as argued in this paper, the structure of civic life in Sampang was

not strong enough.

The powerful antagonism narrative of Sunni-Shiite rose and distorted the civic

engagement. Many rumors spread among lay residents without valid source but those were

strongly believed, despite actually Shiite people in Sampang did not believe and practice it.

The rumors contained various sentimental, controversial issues for strong-hold Sunni

adherents in rural area of Sampang about Sunni-Shiite binary contradictions which placed

Shiite as the heresy, such as insulting three khalifah (early religious and political leader in

Islam) before Ali bin Abi Thalib as the prime patron of Shiite, having the different scripture,

implementing contractual temporal marriage, performing shalat (Islamic ritual prayers) just

three times daily with dancing, and so forth. Regarding anti-Shiite narrative, on 23 July 2012,

about one month after the first sectarian violence, the regional level of Indonesian Ulema

Council (MUI) in East Java released fatwa (the product of Islamic law made by the Islamic

authority outside the court) about the heresy of Shiite doctrine13. Before that, MUI in

Sampang with all of MUI in East Java, except MUI in Bondowoso, released fatwa about Shiite

and its danger as the heresy14. Surprisingly, Governor of East Java, on 23 July 2012, released

13 Article 5 (2), Decree of the Governor of East Java No. 55 Tahun 2012 about Building-up Religious Activity and
Monitoring of Heretics in East Java.
14 Afdillah, Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik.

9
government regulation delegating MUI to measure the criteria of heresy15, and, as such,

supported fatwa MUI about Shiite in Sampang. Moreover, that fatwa was a source of National

Court in Sampang to legitimate judgment on 11 Juli 201216 that Tajul Muluk, as the leader of

Shiite in Sampang, was proven for contravening Blasphemy law. Despite Tajul Muluk was in

jail, about one month after the judgment, on 26 August 2012, the second sectarian violence

against Shiites in Sampang exploded.

Before the antagonism brought the mass to sectarian violence phase, there was

gradual tension between Sunni and Shiite figures. These phases showed the development of

the segregation and the polarization in the level of civil society which before the tension they

lived contiguous with coexistence without sectarian violence. Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi

separate clearly the development of Sampang case into three sequential periods, i.e. 1980s-

2003, 2004-2010, and 2011-2012.17 In 1999, Tajul returned from Saudi Arabia to the hamlet

of Omben to continue his father’s Islamic boarding school with the help of his sister. As also

explained by Afdillah18, in the interval of 1999-2003, Tajul became a socio-religious reformer

by encouraging local people to care about neglected formal education because of over-

orientation of Islamic boarding school education in Madura, advocating for the rights of civil

administration such as marriage and birth certificates, and reforming traditions. One of the

revolutionary changes was when Tajul led the diversion of the Prophet Muhammad

memorial tradition (Maulid), becoming the pride of Madurese people, from the habit of

15 Fatwa Decision of the Indonesian Ulama Council East Java Province No. Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/2012 about the
Heresy of Shiite Doctrine.
16 The Verdict of District Court in Sampang No. 69/PID.B/2012/PN.Spg in 2012.
17 Rizal Panggabean dan Ihsan Ali Fauzi, Policing Religious Conflict in Indonesia (Jakarta: Pusat Studi Agama dan
Demokrasi, 2015), p. 104-113.
18 Afdillah, Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik.

10
conducting every house to the joint holding in a mosque. The effort was done because many

poor people were burdened with so expensive Maulid funds, including funds for bringing in

and paying the preaching of Kyai at their homes. Beside of the lost of the cultural space and

economic resources, many local Kyai did not like Tajul as a new religious figure because their

charisma was rivaled and distorted. In addition, there is a new nickname for them, namely

“Kyai Slabet” (Slabet means envelope to associate with greedy attitude). Besides, Blater, the

local civilian group which previously freely steal various property in the village at night also

disliked Tajul and his followers because the village did not vulnerable again after the routine

civil security hold. According to Iklil Al-Milal, the brother of Tajul, the nexus of those ‘three

small local imperial institutions’—bureaucrats, religious leaders, and civilians—made the

spreading rumors about Shiite as the heresy and escalate the conflict to the sectarian

violence. Frequently, civilians assisted certain religious leaders in collecting money to get

spiritual legitimation, politician very considered Kyai as the huge social capital for election,

and Kyai had so powerful bargain.19

The interval of 2006-2010 periods became critical when hard, opened confrontation

manifesting antagonism narrative of Sunni-Shiite began with various subjugation efforts

Despite since 2004 Tajul Muluk’s oppositions begun to confront him in the limited meeting

and accuse him as being heretical along with the fear of the opposition with the increased

numbers of his follower, opened confrontation did not happen because the charisma of Kyai

Ma’mun as a well-known honored figure. Kyai Ma’mun became a countervailing force to

balance the confrontation led by Kyai Karrar when many Tajul’s oppositions were his loyal

students ago. Tajul’s shelter was lost when Kyai Ma’mun who was very old passed away in

19 Iklil Al-Milal, Interview, 1 November 2017.

11
2006. The riot almost happened when Tajul would hold Maulid with memorial tradition,

after 40 days of the demise of the late Kyai Ma’mun, because there was a rumor that Tajul

would invite 12 Shiite Ulema from Kuwait. Police secured the polarization but the Maulid

was canceled. After Kyai Ma’mun passed away, Kyai Karrar more got vast support to reject

Tajul Muluk and his Shiite in Sampang. Bringing the Shiite issue to Association of Madurese

Ulema Bonding (BASSRA), Kyai Karrar initiated some meetings asking about his Shiite

assumed as the heresy, forcing him to return to Sunni, and suggesting MUI in Sampang to

released fatwa about the heretical issue20.

Unfortunately, Rois Al-Hukama, the brother of Tajul Muluk defending Shiite many

years ago, declares that he was not Shiite member again. Internal conflict with Tajul Muluk

in the dramatic, romantic love case was one of the causes 21, besides of the competition of

Kyai Ma’mun’s inheritance with many land properties22. Kyai Makmun’s family was divided

into two head-to-head groups: Tajul’s group (with Iklil, Hani, and Umma) and Rois’ group

(with Achmad, Budur, Kalsum, and Fatimah). Various intimidations and terrors emerged

after that, such as BASSRA’s ultimatum to end Shiite proselytization and theaching by various

non-state and state institutions in Sampang, like from MUI, BASSRA, NU, Ministry of Religion,

and Institute of Coordination for Monitoring the School of Belief (BAKORPAKEM)23 with 32

accusations of heretical aspects of Shiite24 (26 October 2009), the vigilante mob intimidation

20 Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi, Policing Religious Conflict.

21 See Center for Marginalized Comunities Studies, Quod Revelatum: Pledoi Ust. Tajul Muluk Demi Mengungkap
Kebohongan Fakta, Surabaya, 2013.
22 Afidillah’s explanation in YAKKUM Emergency Unit Yogyakarta, AMAN Indonesia, dan Kontras Surabaya.
Notulensi Lokakarya Perlindungan Minoritas di Indonesia: Menemukan Solusi Kasus Syiah Sampang, Gedung A
Fakultas Hukum Universitas Airlangga Surabaya 5-6 September 2016.
23 Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi, Policing Religious Conflict.
24 Center for Marginalized Comunities Studies. Syahadah: Newsletter n Religious Freedom, 13th edition, October
2011, p. 1.

12
making Tajul secured by Police (27 Juli 2010), and the order for Tajul to make statement that

he would not practice Shiite teaching again for the public safety (26 October 2010)25.

The phase in the interval of 2006-2010 periods showed the absent of self-policing

mechanism and the imbalance of elite integration and this lacks were more serious when the

elites not only allowed the harmful polarization and sectarian violence exploding in the

2010-2011 periods but also provoked and supported it under the issue of blasphemy.

Tadjoeddin stated that self-policing, which requires the role of leaders, elders, or certain

body to control troublemakers within their community, was workable, especially in a

segregated society and most conflicts began from the individual level26. However, the

question on this point is how if the religious leaders or the elders itself became

troublemakers and dominated social-political order to intimidate and evict the minority, like

in Sampang. As mentioned above, Kyai Karrar, despite he is Tajul’s uncle, was the most active,

influential Kyai propagating the conversion or the eviction of Shiites. With the alliance of

religious leaders within BASSRA, he led the forceful relocation of Shiites on 23 June 2013

when the relocation led by Vice Regent of Sampang was so hard to be executed.27 Moreover,

before the relocation, MUI in Sampang collected thousands of signatures of Madurese society

for the petition to reject Shiites and support the eviction.28

25 Semendawai, et al., Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi, p. 2.

26 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 5.

27
Video of the eviction of the Shiites is available on “Ali Karrar, Kiai Besar Madura Pimpin Aparat Pemkab
Mengusir Paksa Muslim Syiah Sampang dari Madura”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa0tQmX8iE8, accessed
on 24 Desember 2015.

28Center for Marginalized Comunities Studies. Syahadah: Newsletter n Religious Freedom, 13th edition, October
2011, p. 3.

13
 How to deal with that kind of situation when religious leader became the central part of

the problem? Tadjoeddin argued that even though there are myriad bad attitudes shown by

elites, including the religious leader, but there are still many good leaders that tended to be

scarce, unpopular, and sometimes regarded as ‘strangers’.29 Actually, in grassroots levels of

Sampang, there are many local religious figures disagreed with the discrimination and the

crisis of compassion of elites and society toward Shiites. Despite they believe that Shiite is

not the true Islam, they want to live together with coexistence. However, they did not have a

big influence. Those many Kyais are still silent because when declaring support or receiving,

they were afraid of being attacked and marginalized by powerful conservative Kyais that

could influence the viability of their pesantren unless they were supported by the

government30. Yet, this potential social capital is imperative to be bounded toward bridge-

building of peaceful Suni-Shiite relation.

The obstacle for the peace-building process could be seen on the unfair, imbalance elite

integration when mediation table was not used to reconcile but utilized for intimidation and

coercion to fulfill the intolerant majority desire. In contrast, elite integration mechanism, as

a horizontal bridge, requires common understanding and mutual trust among conflicting

parties with value consensus, power sharing, and compromise31. On 5 April 2011, regional

leaders of Sampang governmental institutions initiated mediation. Regent and Vice Regent

of Sampang also participated with the head of the regional police office of East Java. The main

figures, Tajul Muluk, and many Kiyais from NU and MUI participated as well. Rather than

29 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 7.

30 Afdillah, Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik.
31 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 7-8.

14
mediating, that meeting provided the arena of judgment for Shiites by religious figures

justified by the government and apparatus32.

After the second sectarian violence against Shiites, the Religious Minister Surya Dharma

Ali obtained the presidential mandate to led reconciliation, felt to the same hole. He tended

to localize the Sampang conflict and provided a big portion of the conflict resolution control

to the Madurese Kyais. There was the initiation to took the displaced Shiites to Hajj

Dormitory, Pondok Gede, East Jakarta in order to “equate perceptions” each other with the

Kyais. He seemed to only replace the word “repentance” or “conversion” required by Kyais

with more subtle words such as “enlightenment” and “perceptual equations”. Recognizing

Shiite in Islam, he did not regard the Sampang case as a Sunni and Shiite conflict but is a

matter of blasphemy (despite Ahlul Bait Indonesia, a biggest Shiite organization in Indonesia,

recognized Shiite in Sampang).

According to Surya Dharma Ali’s view, the Kyai elites had a better understanding of the

local culture. According to him, although every citizen had the right to stay anywhere and

security right, if it collided with the reality in Sampang, the right would be difficult to

implement. Because of strong education of pesantren and ‘Madura value’ from generation to

generation, there was a vast view of Madurese people that the domination of Kyai was ‘the

local wisdom’ as the consequence the strong commitment to honoring extremely Kyai as the

Islamic teacher and the Ulema, Warasatul Anbiya’, the continuing figure bringing Islamic

mission after Prophet Muhammad. This attitude impacted the domination of Kyai in the

social and political landscape of Madura. This symbolic capital impacted the intervention of

32Center for Marginalized Comunities Studies. Syahadah: Newsletter n Religious Freedom, 13th edition, October
2011, p. 3.

15
police to certain issues, like how to protect the religious freedom of Shiite, being blocked33.

However, the cultural or traditional mechanism claiming the essential cultural or religious

difference within certain society should be separated from “the collective right” which has

its own judicial system and customs and are in line with human right principles. The

mechanism which tends to maintain power and blinds us to essential internal difference

excluding the Other cannot be tolerated34, like the antagonism narration of Sunni-Shiite and

the cultural legitimacy of eviction of Shiites.

Restoring Civic Engagement: Grass Roots Reconciliation as the Countervailing Force

The previous elaboration showed that despite there was everyday civic engagement

between Sunnis and Shiites in the rural areas, but there were the confrontation and

antagonism narrations bringing people to sectarian violence. That showed that the structure

of civic life in the areas was insufficient. It was not because of the uncivil backwardness and

uneducated people in those areas. As Varshney stated, there was also social interconnection

in rural areas of developing countries which tended to be the everyday engagement rather

than associational engagement that was rare35. Among those people very engaged with

communal solidarity within shared cultural spaces and were not really segregated in the

hamlet, but when they faced sensitive issue like the heresy, that kind of engagement was not

enough because the absence of a countervailing force that could anticipate and withstand

33 Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi, Policing Religious Conflict, p. 118-127.

34 Bräuchler, “Introduction: Reconciling Indonesia”, in Birgit Bräuchler (Ed.), Reconciling Indonesia: Grass Root
Agency for Peace (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 11-12.
35 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Live, p. 43.

16
the antagonism narrative and confrontation after Kyai Ma’mun as the shelter passed away.

More serious than in Sampang case, in Lucknow, India, both oppositional groups, Sunni and

Shiite were extremely confronted with each tradition negating the existence of each other.

Yet there was a countervailing force from inter-communal cooperation that defended the

structure of civic life and communal violence did not take place because the force provided

the synergy of local government and civic organizations36. Learning from the past, an inter-

sect countervailing force is need to bridge those divided brothers, Sunnis and Shiite in

Sampang.

Managing agencies of grass-root reconciliation as a countervailing force is crucial

when each level of government from local, regional, to national seems passing the buck and

forms a ‘vicious circle’ of the unfinished reconciliation in Sampang. They often say having no

capacity to solve the case. Ministry of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Saifudin, who became

the foundation of hope, instead entirely hand over Sampang case to the regional government

with just coordinating37 without progressive political willing for bridging equal, inclusive

dialog and reconciliation. While in regional level, the provincial government of East Java and

the district government of Sampang expressed their inability to handle the current rejection

of Shiite refugees by conservative, intolerant groups. Besides, the regional government is

only able to fulfill ‘secular’ needs for Shiite refugees, such as shelter, administration, and

subsidy, despite in practice there are still many shortcomings. Some influential intolerant

Kiyai (religious informal leader) provide “the requirement for repentance” for Shiite

36 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Live,

p. 184-185.
37 Achmad Faizal, Tak Punya Solusi, Menag Pasrahkan Nasib Pengungsi Syiah ke Pemda,
http://regional.kompas.com/read/2017/03/18/21300761/tak.punya.solusi.menag.pasrahkan.nasib.pengungsi.syia
h.ke.pemda, accessed on 18 March 2017.

17
refugees with the support of vigilante groups. This barrier coercing faith conversion

becomes one of the biggest obstacles for reconciliation. The government seems powerless

and reluctant to handle the power of intolerant groups that negate the identity of Shiite

refugees. Without the politics of recognition, the reconciliation will remain at an impasse and

the IDPs of Shiite will continue to be eliminated and marginalized.

The meaningful civic engagement restoration could be seen on the progress of the

grassroots reconciliation declaring the “People’s Peace Charter” between the ex-

perpetrators of sectarian violence on 23 September 2013 at around 16.00 WIB, in Puspa

Agro flat, Sidoarjo. About 50 villagers of Blu'uren and Karang Gayam villages visited,

apologized, and asked to reconcile with Shiites. In the declaration, both sides stated that they

were tired of the conflict. They were committed to building peace and respecting their

respective beliefs while upholding the culture and traditions. The parties determined to bury

the grudge and wanted to return to live in harmony and peace as brothers, relatives, and

neighbors.

The grassroots reconciliation involves a peace initiative from Sampang Shiite

refugees, Sunni villagers in the hometown who are aware that the Sunni-Shiite conflict in

Sampang is due to the interests of the elite, and the activists of civil society organizations

(CSOs). Grassroots reconciliation takes root at the local level by engaging ordinary local

people in an inclusive and communal spirit38. Sulistiyanto and Setyadi39 described grassroots

reconciliation by civil society agencies involving victims and former perpetrators in the

38 D. Babo-Soares, “Nahe Biti: The Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation (and Justice) in East
Timor”, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 5(1), 2004, p. 18.
39 Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Rumekso Setyadi, “Civil Society and Grassroots Reconciliation in Central Java”,
in Birgit Bräuchler (Ed.), Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroot Agency for Peace (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.
194.

18
context of failure or lack of government concern to achieve reconciliation agenda. Especially

in the midst of local government regimes and political elites who tend to favor the majority

of intolerant votes in Sampang40.

Initially, at the first meeting, Sampang residents who will participate in the Reconciliation

still put suspicions on internally displaced Shiite refugees. They had hesitated when the

break in the middle of the journey from Sampang regency to Sidoarjo regency. They are

afraid and prejudiced that the displaced Shiites refugees will take revenge and attack them

when they arrive in refugee camps. This hesitation made them stop for about two hours,

leaving the internally displaced waiting and wondering. Then, the group of three cars first

came to the refugee camp. The rest, a group of two cars, waited around the evacuation just

in case anything happened.41 Participants are mindful of formulating the peacekeeping

charter themselves. Before the pledge, the attackers of 2011 and 2012 events were present

about three to four times in Sampang Shiite refuge. The more dilute the process of decay of

the problem is the loss of prejudice that the Shiite refugees will be revenge. From these

meetings, there was a greater interaction of mutual forgiveness.

In the post-reconciliation, the participants tried to convince the other residents in their

hometown. There are also those who refuse, although relatively more citizens agree to

reconciliation overall with the reintegration and repatriation of internally displaced Shiite

Sampang. Even Mat Safi, a civilian (tojing), who was one of the principals who led the attack

on Shiite Sampang in 2012, was so keen to encourage this reintegration process. These peace

40 See Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf dan Muhammad Afdillah, “Pilkada dan Kekerasan Anti-Syiah di Sampang”, in
Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, dkk, Politik Lokal dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada dan Struktur Kesempatan Politik dalam
Konflik Keagamaan di Sampang, Bekasi, dan Kupang (Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM, 2015).
41 Hertaning Ichlas, the Chairman of Universalia Legal Aid, Interview, 15 November 2016.

19
process agencies have found it difficult to expect follow-up from the government. According

to Nur Tamam, the Chairman of Lembaga Persatuan Umat Islam (The Institute of Ummah

Unity in Islam) Pamekasan and Kiyai of Al Hamidi Pamekasan Islamic Boarding School who

participated to facilitate reconciliation, if only the government chose to support this sincere

form, by helping to facilitate the movement, villagers are actually ready to flock to the towers

to attend reconciliation and even to take refugees home.

Unfortunately, the positively-constructed and participatory builds by civil society are

delegitimized by elite forces. During and post-reconciliation there is a disturbance to the

group departing. The Equal Institute reports that the accessibility of the Sunni population to

the refugees is limited by some who are trying to threaten to thwart this issue, even by

claiming to have ordered from the Police Sector (Polsek). In addition, the intolerant group

intercepted the signatories of the pact so as not to infiltrate the refugees and the mobilizers

of the reconciliation were brought to the intolerant Kyai to cancel the signatures in the peace

charter. Surya Dharma Ali, the Minister of Religious Affairs at the time, questioned the

reconciliation because it was considered not to involve the local government and scholars

by accusing the parties who use the conflict. The same attitude was also expressed by

Assistant 3 East Java Governor Edy Purwinanto and Vice Regent Fadhillah Budiono. Budiono

even rejects the results of the reconciliation and is determined that reconciliation and

repatriation can only happen on the condition of repentance or return to Sunni teachings. In

fact, the former assailants realized that the requirement of repentance proposed by the

religious-social elite was not negotiable and the government was reluctant to act in

affirmation of recognition. They finally initiate the reconciliation amidst the frustrating

deadlock.

20
 However, from that meeting, there was an inter-sect interaction of mutual forgiveness.

They were looking for ways to repatriate Shiites as internally displaced people. Participants

wanted to live in harmony and peace in a sustainable manner based on a strong bond

according to the principle of Tretan Dibik, ukhuwah or unity of fellow Muslims, and family

ties that in fact most of the conflicting parties come from the same relatives and origin. One

of the participants was Zainul who was a 30-year-old and a farmer. He was so sorry to attack

the Shiites in 2012 which actually took the victim of his own adoptive father named

Chamamah who was killed by the mass. He prostrated and embraced with his adoptive

mother who was often called by her husband's name; Mrs. Chamamah. Many people who

watched crying42. After the civic engagement restoration, the participants tried to convince

the other residents in their hometown. There were also those who refuse, although relatively

more citizens agreed to reconcile overall with the reintegration and repatriation of Shiites

as refugees. Even Mat Safi, a civilian, who was one of the principals who led the attack on

Shiites in 2012, was so keen to encourage this reintegration process.

Conclusion

This paper shows that there were several dynamics showing why civic engagement

in Sampang was not enough to prevent communal violence, such as the lack of inter-sect

engagement, the absence of peace committee and self-policing, and unjust, imbalance elite

integration. Each dimension had interrelated causation with other. The previous state-

sponsored reconciliation also strengthened intersect boundaries because of the unfair,

42 Camelia Pasandaran, “Manisnya Proses Islah Sunni dan Syiah Sampang”,

www.ahlulbaitindonesia.or.id/berita/manisnya-proses-islah-sunni-dan-syiah-sampang/, accessed on 30 December
2016.

21
imbalance elite integration where mediation table was utilized for intimidation and coercion

to fulfill the intolerant majority desire to convert Shiites. The absence of self-policing and the

abuse of elite integration were not balanced by any inter-sect associational civic

engagements in Sampang. This paper argues that the grass-roots reconciliation agency as a

countervailing force against intolerant, anti-Shiite antagonism is imperative where the

frustrating deadlock and stagnancy of unfinished reconciliation still cannot be solved.

Sustainable empowerment and multiplication of the countervailing force is crucial to restore

inter-sect civic engagement in Sampang continuously.

References

Afdillah, Muhammad. Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik: Melacak Akar-akar Kekerasan Agama

antara Komunitas Sunni dan Syiah di Sampang, Jawa Timur. (From Mosque to the Stage of

Politics: Tracing Roots of Religious Violence between Sunni and Shiite Community in

Sampang, East Java) Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM, 2016.

Ahnaf, Mohammad Iqbal and Muhammad Afdillah. “Pilkada dan Kekerasan Anti-Syiah di

Sampang (Regional Election and Anti-Shiite Violence in Sampang)”, in Mohammad

Iqbal Ahnaf, dkk. Politik Lokal dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada dan Struktur

Kesempatan Politik dalam Konflik Keagamaan di Sampang, Bekasi dan Kupang (Local

Politics and Religious Conflict: Regional Election and Political Opportunity Structure in

Religious Conflict in Sampang, Bekasi and Kupang). Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM, 2015.

Babo-Soares, D. “Nahe Biti: The Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation (and

Justice) in East Timor”, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 5(1), 2004.

22
Bräuchler, Birgit. “Introduction: Reconciling Indonesia”, in Birgit Bräuchler (Ed.), Reconciling

Indonesia: Grassroot Agency for Peace. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Center for Marginalized Communities Studies. Syahadah: Newsletter n Religious Freedom, 13th

edition, October 2011.

Faizal, Achmad. “Tak Punya Solusi, Menag Pasrahkan Nasib Pengungsi Syiah ke Pemda” (Not

Having Solution, Minister of Religious Affair Fates Shiite’s Destiny to Provincial

Government),

http://regional.kompas.com/read/2017/03/18/21300761/tak.punya.solusi.menag.pasrah

kan.nasib.pengungsi.syiah.ke.pemda, accessed on 18 March 2017.

Panggabean, Rizal dan Ihsan Ali Fauzi. Policing Religious Conflict in Indonesia (Jakarta: Pusat Studi

Agama dan Demokrasi, 2015.

Pasandaran, Camelia. “Manisnya Proses Reconciliation Sunni dan Syiah Sampang” (The

Sweetness of Reconciliation Process of Sunni and Shiite from Sampang),

www.ahlulbaitindonesia.or.id/berita/manisnya-proses-reconciliation-sunni-dan-syiah-

sampang/, accessed in 30 December 2016.

Peraturan Gubernur Jawa Timur Nomor 55 Tahun 2012 tentang Pembinaan Kegiatan Keagamaan

dan Pengawasan Aliran Sesat di Jawa Timur. (The Decree of the Governor of East Java No.

55 Tahun 2012 about Building-up Religious Activity and Monitoring of Heretics in East Java).

Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) Provinsi Jawa Timur No. Kep-01/SKF-

MUI/JTM/2012 tentang Kesesatan Ajaran Syiah. (The Fatwa Decision of the Indonesian

23
 Ulama Council East Java Province No. Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/2012 about the Heresy of

Shiite Doctrine).

Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Sampang Nomor 69/PID.B/2012/PN.Spg Tahun 2012. (The Verdict of

District Court in Sampang No. 69/PID.B/2012/PN.Spg in 2012).

Semendawai, et. al. Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi (TTR) tentang Penyerangan terhadap

Penganut Syiah di Sampang, Madura (The Report of Finding and Recommendation Team

about the Attack on Shiite Adherents in Sampang, Madura). The Cooperation of Komnas

HAM, Komnas Perempuan, KPA and LPSK, 2013.

Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi and Rumekso Setyadi. “Civil Society and Grassroots Reconciliation in

Central Java”, in Birgit Bräuchler (Ed.). Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroot Agency for Peace.

New York: Routledge, 2009.

Tadjoedin, Mohammad Zulfan. “Civil Society Engagement and Communal Violence: Reflection on

Various Hypotheses in the Context of Indonesia,” Politics Administration and Change, No.

42, July-December, 2004.

Telle, Kari. “Ritual Power: Risk, Rumours and Religious Pluralism on Lombok”. The Asia Pacific

Journal of Anthropology, 17: 5, 2016.

Varshney, Ashutosh. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2002.

24
YAKKUM Emergency Unit Yogyakarta, AMAN Indonesia, and Kontras Surabaya. Notulensi

Lokakarya Perlindungan Minoritas di Indonesia: Menemukan Solusi Kasus Syiah

Sampang (The Notes of Seminar on Minority Protection in Indonesia: Finding Solution

Shiite’s Case in Sampang), Gedung A Fakultas Hukum Universitas Airlangga Surabaya

5-6 September 2016.

25
Manuscript (Blinded) Click here to view linked References

1
2
3
4 BRIDGING DIVIDED BROTHERS:
5
6
7 The Dynamics of Civic Engagement after Sectarian Violence in Sampang, Indonesia
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 Abstract
15
16
17 In Sampang, Indonesia, after the sectarian attack on the Shiite community,
18
19 various reconciliation initiatives have not succeeded in returning Shiites to their
20
21
22 homes. It has been about six years since the displacement of vulnerable groups of
23
24 Shiites Muslims in Sampang but their right as internally displaced persons (IDPs)
25
26
27 to return to their homes remains unfulfilled. Even though the political
28
29 commitment of tolerance and peace is always echoed in national and regional
30
31
32 elections every year, their voices have never been heard by political elites. The
33
34 paper argues that reconciliation in Sampang should not only be charged or relied
35
36
37 upon the government, along with all its long-process bureaucracy, bias, and
38
39 favoritism but also by the associational inter-communal civic engagement which
40
41
42 is crucial to be strengthened while gradually pressing the government to provide
43
44 the infrastructure of just reconciliation. This paper will show the struggle of
45
46
47 grass-roots reconciliation as a big potency for restoring broader civic
48
49 engagement. In the context of Sampang post-conflict climate when both parties
50
51
52
are divided and have imbalance power with dormant reconciliation, I state that
53
54 associational civic engagement is more appropriate to manage agencies of grassroots
55
56
57
reconciliation as a countervailing force while restoring everyday civic
58
59 engagement is unlikely
60
61
62 1
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Introduction
8
9 After the sectarian attack on the Shiite community in Sampang, Indonesia, various
10
11
12 reconciliation efforts have not succeeded in returning the Shiites to their homes until this
13
14 present. At the present, it has been about six years since the displacement of vulnerable
15
16
17 groups of Shiites Muslims in Sampang, but their right as internally displaced persons (IDPs)
18
19 to return to their homes remains unfulfilled. Around 81 families or 335 people1 still displace
20
21
22 from their homes in Sampang, and live in Puspa Agro flat, a refugee-like camp, in Sidoarjo,
23
24 East Java, since they had been forced for relocation. Their voices have never been heared by
25
26
27 political elites, even though every year the political commitment of peace and tolerance is
28
29 always echoed in national and regional ellections. This paper analyzes what happens with
30
31
32 civil society over there that is not strong enough to maintain the co-existence, even though
33
34 the engagement between Sunnis and Shiites was enough strong before violence. By these
35
36
37 following questions, this paper, therefore, examines the failure of civic engagement in
38
39 preventing sectarian violence to Shiites in Sampang and possibilities to restore civic
40
41
42 engagement for sustainable reconciliation: What caused the failure? What was missed? What
43
44 can be done to restore civic engagement or to fill the missing requirement for peace?
45
46
47 The paper argues that reconciliation in Sampang should not only be charged or relied
48
49 upon the government, along with all its long-process bureaucracy, bias, and favoritism but
50
51
52 also by the associational inter-communal civic engagement which is crucial to be
53
54 strengthened while gradually pressing the government to provide the infrastructure of just
55
56
57
58
59 1 Tajul Muluk, Lima Tahun Terusir dari Kampung Sendiri, Press Release, Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN)
60 Indonesia, Jakarta, April 2017.
61
62 2
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 reconciliation. This paper will show the struggle of grass-roots reconciliation as a big
5
6
7 potency for restoring broader civic engagement. Based on Varshney’s study, there is
8
9 interlink between the structure of civic life and ethnic conflict when the lacks of prior and
10
11
12 sustained contacts between members of different communities turn out. He argues that civil
13
14 society wing institutionalized in an “associational civic engagement” and derived from inter-
15
16
17 communal local grassroots is more robust as a sturdier bulwark and more reliable as a
18
19 countervailing force for a trouble-maker party, rather than every day or quotidian civic
20
21
22 engagement2.
23
24 In a different direction, Tadjoeddin reads that the mechanism of “self (intra-
25
26
27 community) policing” is more relevant, rather than inter-communal civic engagement, for
28
29 Indonesian society where myriad deadly communal violence occurred mostly in rural areas
30
31
32 with segregated communities and the triggered clash of the individual level3. Understanding
33
34 the paternalistic structure of Indonesian society as well, he also underscores that mass level
35
36
37 integration which is suggested Varshney as an orientation is insufficient and, as such, “elite
38
39 integration” is highly needed. Tadjoedin suggests the combination of those three
40
41
42 mechanisms simultaneously: inter-communal engagement, self-policing, and elite
43
44 integration4. Tadjoeddin’s account is basic to understand the failure of civic engagement and
45
46
47 what missed in the mechanism of preventing violence and reconciling those divided parties.
48
49 However, there are various obstacles for implementing those three mechanisms
50
51
52 simultaneously, especially in the context of imbalance power of majority-minority relation
53
54
55
2 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale University
56
57 Press, 2002), p. 50-51.
58 3 Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement and Communal Violence: Reflection on Various
59 Hypotheses in the Context of Indonesia,” Politics Administration and Change, No. 42, July-December, 2004, p. 5.
60 4 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 10-12.
61
62 3
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 when elites are unwilling to embrace “the Others” associated as deviants or heretics. Some
5
6
7 questions might be submitted to Tadjoedin. What is the mechanism offered to repatriate
8
9 Shiite refugees who live for five years amid conditions of conversion to Sunnis by intolerant
10
11
12 religious leaders itself and a lack of government will for a just reconciliation that previously
13
14 has never been implemented on the basis of justice? What can be done when there is an
15
16
17 imbalance power between the intolerant religious and political elites and Shiite refugees? In
18
19 the context of post-conflict climate when both parties are divided and have imbalance power
20
21
22 with dormant reconciliation, one can state that associational civic engagement is more
23
24 appropriate to manage agencies of grass-roots reconciliation as a countervailing force while
25
26
27 restoring everyday civic engagement is unlikely. Everyday civic engagement will be
28
29 imperative for sustainable peace if the Shiites refugees have been returned to their village in
30
31
32 Sampang.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42 The Failure of Civic Engagement in Preventing Violence
43
44 The narration of antagonism between Sunni and Shiite in Sampang, East Java, became
45
46
47 popular news nationally and internationally after sectarian violence against Shiite
48
49 community in 2011 and 2012, in two remote areas, Blu’uren and Karang Gayam. On 29
50
51
52 December 2011, about 1000 vigilante mob from four villages bringing machetes, crowbar,
53
54 stones, and wooden clubs burned and destroyed buildings related to Shiite figures and
55
56
57 activities, Tajul Muluk’s one house, Iklil Al-Milal’s two houses, Umi Hanik’s one house, and
58
59
60
61
62 4
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 one madrasah (Islamic school) building5. Because of this, around 300 Shiites had been
5
6
7 evacuated by police to Sports Center building in Sampang. On 12 January, those Shiites had
8
9 been returned to their village because that place would be used for the commemoration of
10
11
12 Sampang’s birthday without proper security guarantee and conflict resolution mechanism.
13
14 Next year, on 26 August 2012, sectarian violence happened again with the bigger
15
16
17 attack. Semendawai, et al.6 reported, with the call for persecuting Shiites from some small
18
19 mosques, hundreds of vigilante mob bringing bondet (homemade bomb for bombing fishes
20
21
22 yet many people died in Indonesia because of it), machetes, crowbar, stones, and wooden
23
24 clubs gathered and destroyed Shiites’ properties again. They also plundered Shiites’
25
26
27 livestock. 48 houses of Shiites were burned and, unfortunately, Chamamah, a Shiite member
28
29 was killed with tens of Shiite members having critical injuries. After being refugees again in
30
31
32 Sports Center during eight-months, on 20 June 2013, hundreds of Shiites were relocated
33
34 forcefully by the government of Sampang to Puspa Agro flat in Sidoarjo, about 113 km from
35
36
37 Sampang.
38
39 Varshney and Taddjoedin provided clear lenses to understand the deadly communal
40
41
42 and sectarian violence. According to Varshney, a multiethnic society with various religious,
43
44 sectarian or cultural identities was prone to ethnic disorders and violence, if there are few
45
46
47 interconnections across ethnic boundaries. Moreover, he argued that “‘intra-communal
48
49 networks’ did not contain or stop the violence” and “the presence of ‘the intercommunal
50
51
52 networks’ of engagement was decisive”.7 In the term of intercommunal networks or
53
54
55
56
5 Semendawai, et al., Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi (TTR) tentang Penyerangan terhadap Penganut Syiah di
57
58 Sampang, Madura, the Cooperation of Komnas HAM, Komnas Perempuan, KPA and LPSK, 2013, p. 3.
59 6 Semendawai, et al., Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi, p. 3-5.
60 7 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, p. 15.
61
62 5
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 engagement, Varshney argued that everyday civic engagement would be enough to
5
6
7 withstand potential riot in villages, if it was compared with condition in cities where face-to-
8
9 face contact is hardly among neighborhoods and it means that associational civic
10
11
12 engagement is necessary for urban areas to maintain civic peace and other common
13
14 interests. In another hand, giving a contextual picture of most deadly violence occurred in
15
16
17 rural areas of Indonesia which are highly segregated and homogenous, paternalistic, and
18
19 triggered from the individual-level clash, Taddjoedin suggested the integration of three
20
21
22 mechanisms simultaneously, i.e. inter-communal engagement, self (intra-communal)
23
24 policing, and elite integration8.
25
26
27 Based on Varshney and Tadjoedin’s elucidation, how to understand the failure of civic
28
29 engagement in rural areas of Sampang in preventing violence? What was missed? One could
30
31
32 argue that there are interlink causations, such as the lack of inter-sect engagement, the
33
34 absence of peace committee and self-policing, and unjust, imbalance elite integration. Each
35
36
37 the causation might influence each other. The lack of inter-sect engagement and the absent
38
39 of peace committee might be influenced by the local elites provoking segregation and
40
41
42 mobilizing intimidation without any civic peace mechanisms. Besides, the inadequate self-
43
44 policing and unjust elite integration might be because of there no any civic organizations and
45
46
47 civic networks as the countervailing forces balancing the intolerance power and facilitating
48
49 or constraining elite strategies and synergy of local government.
50
51
52 Actually, before antagonism narrative of Sunni versus Shiite became strong, people in
53
54 the rural area live in coexistence. There was well-known shared ethnic identity of Madura,
55
56
57 one of the strong tribal solidarities in East Java, which committed highly to a powerful
58
59
60 8 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 11-12.
61
62 6
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 cultural catchword “Tretan Dibik” which means “all of us is a brother”. Beside of that sense
5
6
7 of brotherhood, like most rural area in Java, most of the people in Blu’uren and Karang
8
9 Gayam in Sampang have family ties, including between Shiites and Sunnis that persecuted
10
11
12 them. Some month after relocation to refugee flat, Shiites received remittance from their
13
14 family in Sampang that followed mob stream evicting them.9 In addition, both sectarian
15
16
17 groups also have common religious-cultural spaces, especially when they gathered together
18
19 for Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Islamic tradition of every Thursday in afternoon, like tahlilan,
20
21
22 yasinan, and sholawatan (weekly reciting some chapters of Qur’an, praising Prophet
23
24 Muhammad, and praying together). Madurese people were predominantly extreme, fanatical
25
26
27 members of NU, as the biggest Islamic organization of Indonesia. NU becoming like ‘religion’
28
29 in Madura was a shared umbrella for Shiites and Sunnis to blur the difference. Yet, the
30
31
32 emergence of anti-Shiite narrative in various preaching and publication sharpened the
33
34 binary opposition and caused the segregation. “We as Madurese Kyai had highly strong
35
36
37 ‘Sunni-ness’. Our rituals were equally same since a long time ago as usual until 2006. A new
38
39 situation arose in 2007-2008 when Risalah Mujahidin and Sidogiri Bulletin (anti-Shiite,
40
41
42 Faith-based media) entered the village and caused the tension. In the past, we just know that
43
44 Islam was NU. Just that! NU was like religion”, Iklil Al-Milal, a Shiite refuges coordinator,
45
46
47 said.10
48
49 When the anti-Shiite narrative spread and violent attacks exploded, the shared
50
51
52 cultural spaces were not inclusive again. After first sectarian violence (2011), many Shiite
53
54 women, who usually join Muslimah (NU lady organization) weakly teaching, exited from the
55
56
57
58
59 9 Bayu, a member of Regional Disaster Management Agency of East Java, Interview, 1 December 2017.
60 10 Iklil Al-Milal, Interview, 1 November 2017.
61
62 7
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 program because the preaching of it stated that Shiite is kafir (infidel) and deviant. Yet, Sunni
5
6
7 women still fetched them menacingly to follow the teaching in order to ‘reconvert’ them to
8
9 Sunni.11 Maulid, a commemoration of the birth of Prophet Muhammad, which was a common
10
11
12 tradition before, became the controversial issue when rumors spread that Shiites would
13
14 invite foreign Shiite preachers. Vigilante mob usually gathered to cancel this event in Shiite
15
16
17 basis and this influenced other more violent attacks. Kari Telle12 stated that rumors may
18
19 have a ‘positive’ impact in the certain case with the risk. In Lombok, when the imagined
20
21
22 threat of Sasak Muslim about Hindu Balinese ritual spread and caused militias angry, there
23
24 are a dialog and a negation which still provided scrutinized successful ritual and religious
25
26
27 pluralism atmosphere. However, this happens when government and social elite have both
28
29 the accommodative inter-religious harmony view and the public order. In the case of social
30
31
32 hostility on Shiite in Sampang, the accommodative inter-religious harmony view was limited
33
34 to the issues of heresy and blasphemy and the government tended to use the public order
35
36
37 orientation. It was because, as argued in this paper, the structure of civic life in Sampang was
38
39 not strong enough.
40
41
42 The powerful antagonism narrative of Sunni-Shiite rose and distorted the civic
43
44 engagement. Many rumors spread among lay residents without valid source but those were
45
46
47 strongly believed, despite actually Shiite people in Sampang did not believe and practice it.
48
49 The rumors contained various sentimental, controversial issues for strong-hold Sunni
50
51
52 adherents in rural area of Sampang about Sunni-Shiite binary contradictions which placed
53
54 Shiite as the heresy, such as insulting three khalifah (early religious and political leader in
55
56
57
58 11 Semendawai, et al., Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi,
p. 5.
59 12Kari Telle, Ritual Power: Risk, Rumours and Religious Pluralism on Lombok, The Asia Pacific Journal of
60 Anthropology, 17: 5, 2016.
61
62 8
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 Islam) before Ali bin Abi Thalib as the prime patron of Shiite, having the different scripture,
5
6
7 implementing contractual temporal marriage, performing shalat (Islamic ritual prayers) just
8
9 three times daily with dancing, and so forth. Regarding anti-Shiite narrative, on 23 July 2012,
10
11
12 about one month after the first sectarian violence, the regional level of Indonesian Ulema
13
14 Council (MUI) in East Java released fatwa (the product of Islamic law made by the Islamic
15
16
17 authority outside the court) about the heresy of Shiite doctrine13. Before that, MUI in
18
19 Sampang with all of MUI in East Java, except MUI in Bondowoso, released fatwa about Shiite
20
21
22 and its danger as the heresy14. Surprisingly, Governor of East Java, on 23 July 2012, released
23
24 government regulation delegating MUI to measure the criteria of heresy15, and, as such,
25
26
27 supported fatwa MUI about Shiite in Sampang. Moreover, that fatwa was a source of National
28
29 Court in Sampang to legitimate judgment on 11 Juli 201216 that Tajul Muluk, as the leader of
30
31
32 Shiite in Sampang, was proven for contravening Blasphemy law. Despite Tajul Muluk was in
33
34 jail, about one month after the judgment, on 26 August 2012, the second sectarian violence
35
36
37 against Shiites in Sampang exploded.
38
39 Before the antagonism brought the mass to sectarian violence phase, there was
40
41
42 gradual tension between Sunni and Shiite figures. These phases showed the development of
43
44 the segregation and the polarization in the level of civil society which before the tension they
45
46
47 lived contiguous with coexistence without sectarian violence. Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi
48
49 separate clearly the development of Sampang case into three sequential periods, i.e. 1980s-
50
51
52
53
54 13 Article 5 (2), Decree of the Governor of East Java No. 55 Tahun 2012 about Building-up Religious Activity and
55
56 Monitoring of Heretics in East Java.
14 Afdillah, Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik.
57
58 15 Fatwa Decision of the Indonesian Ulama Council East Java Province No. Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/2012 about the
59 Heresy of Shiite Doctrine.
60 16 The Verdict of District Court in Sampang No. 69/PID.B/2012/PN.Spg in 2012.
61
62 9
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 2003, 2004-2010, and 2011-2012.17 In 1999, Tajul returned from Saudi Arabia to the hamlet
5
6
7 of Omben to continue his father’s Islamic boarding school with the help of his sister. As also
8
9 explained by Afdillah18, in the interval of 1999-2003, Tajul became a socio-religious reformer
10
11
12 by encouraging local people to care about neglected formal education because of over-
13
14 orientation of Islamic boarding school education in Madura, advocating for the rights of civil
15
16
17 administration such as marriage and birth certificates, and reforming traditions. One of the
18
19 revolutionary changes was when Tajul led the diversion of the Prophet Muhammad
20
21
22 memorial tradition (Maulid), becoming the pride of Madurese people, from the habit of
23
24 conducting every house to the joint holding in a mosque. The effort was done because many
25
26
27 poor people were burdened with so expensive Maulid funds, including funds for bringing in
28
29 and paying the preaching of Kyai at their homes. Beside of the lost of the cultural space and
30
31
32 economic resources, many local Kyai did not like Tajul as a new religious figure because their
33
34 charisma was rivaled and distorted. In addition, there is a new nickname for them, namely
35
36
37 “Kyai Slabet” (Slabet means envelope to associate with greedy attitude). Besides, Blater, the
38
39 local civilian group which previously freely steal various property in the village at night also
40
41
42 disliked Tajul and his followers because the village did not vulnerable again after the routine
43
44 civil security hold. According to Iklil Al-Milal, the brother of Tajul, the nexus of those ‘three
45
46
47 small local imperial institutions’—bureaucrats, religious leaders, and civilians—made the
48
49 spreading rumors about Shiite as the heresy and escalate the conflict to the sectarian
50
51
52 violence. Frequently, civilians assisted certain religious leaders in collecting money to get
53
54
55
56
57
58 17 Rizal Panggabean dan Ihsan Ali Fauzi, Policing Religious Conflict in Indonesia (Jakarta: Pusat Studi Agama dan
59 Demokrasi, 2015), p. 104-113.
60 18 Afdillah, Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik.
61
62 10
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 spiritual legitimation, politician very considered Kyai as the huge social capital for election,
5
6
7 and Kyai had so powerful bargain.19
8
9 The interval of 2006-2010 periods became critical when hard, opened confrontation
10
11
12 manifesting antagonism narrative of Sunni-Shiite began with various subjugation efforts
13
14 Despite since 2004 Tajul Muluk’s oppositions begun to confront him in the limited meeting
15
16
17 and accuse him as being heretical along with the fear of the opposition with the increased
18
19 numbers of his follower, opened confrontation did not happen because the charisma of Kyai
20
21
22 Ma’mun as a well-known honored figure. Kyai Ma’mun became a countervailing force to
23
24 balance the confrontation led by Kyai Karrar when many Tajul’s oppositions were his loyal
25
26
27 students ago. Tajul’s shelter was lost when Kyai Ma’mun who was very old passed away in
28
29 2006. The riot almost happened when Tajul would hold Maulid with memorial tradition,
30
31
32 after 40 days of the demise of the late Kyai Ma’mun, because there was a rumor that Tajul
33
34 would invite 12 Shiite Ulema from Kuwait. Police secured the polarization but the Maulid
35
36
37 was canceled. After Kyai Ma’mun passed away, Kyai Karrar more got vast support to reject
38
39 Tajul Muluk and his Shiite in Sampang. Bringing the Shiite issue to Association of Madurese
40
41
42 Ulema Bonding (BASSRA), Kyai Karrar initiated some meetings asking about his Shiite
43
44 assumed as the heresy, forcing him to return to Sunni, and suggesting MUI in Sampang to
45
46
47 released fatwa about the heretical issue20.
48
49 Unfortunately, Rois Al-Hukama, the brother of Tajul Muluk defending Shiite many
50
51
52 years ago, declares that he was not Shiite member again. Internal conflict with Tajul Muluk
53
54
55
56
57
58
59 19 Iklil Al-Milal, Interview, 1 November 2017.
60 20 Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi, Policing Religious Conflict.
61
62 11
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 in the dramatic, romantic love case was one of the causes 21, besides of the competition of
5
6
7 Kyai Ma’mun’s inheritance with many land properties22. Kyai Makmun’s family was divided
8
9 into two head-to-head groups: Tajul’s group (with Iklil, Hani, and Umma) and Rois’ group
10
11
12 (with Achmad, Budur, Kalsum, and Fatimah). Various intimidations and terrors emerged
13
14 after that, such as BASSRA’s ultimatum to end Shiite proselytization and theaching by various
15
16
17 non-state and state institutions in Sampang, like from MUI, BASSRA, NU, Ministry of Religion,
18
19 and Institute of Coordination for Monitoring the School of Belief (BAKORPAKEM)23 with 32
20
21
22 accusations of heretical aspects of Shiite24 (26 October 2009), the vigilante mob intimidation
23
24 making Tajul secured by Police (27 Juli 2010), and the order for Tajul to make statement that
25
26
27 he would not practice Shiite teaching again for the public safety (26 October 2010)25.
28
29 The phase in the interval of 2006-2010 periods showed the absent of self-policing
30
31
32 mechanism and the imbalance of elite integration and this lacks were more serious when the
33
34 elites not only allowed the harmful polarization and sectarian violence exploding in the
35
36
37 2010-2011 periods but also provoked and supported it under the issue of blasphemy.
38
39 Tadjoeddin stated that self-policing, which requires the role of leaders, elders, or certain
40
41
42 body to control troublemakers within their community, was workable, especially in a
43
44 segregated society and most conflicts began from the individual level26. However, the
45
46
47
48
49
50 21 See Center for Marginalized Comunities Studies, Quod Revelatum: Pledoi Ust. Tajul Muluk Demi Mengungkap
51 Kebohongan Fakta, Surabaya, 2013.
52 22 Afidillah’s explanation in YAKKUM Emergency Unit Yogyakarta, AMAN Indonesia, dan Kontras Surabaya.
53 Notulensi Lokakarya Perlindungan Minoritas di Indonesia: Menemukan Solusi Kasus Syiah Sampang, Gedung A
54 Fakultas Hukum Universitas Airlangga Surabaya 5-6 September 2016.
55 23 Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi, Policing Religious Conflict.
56
24 Center for Marginalized Comunities Studies. Syahadah: Newsletter n Religious Freedom, 13th edition, October
57
58 2011, p. 1.
59 25 Semendawai, et al., Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi, p. 2.
60 26 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 5.
61
62 12
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 question on this point is how if the religious leaders or the elders itself became
5
6
7 troublemakers and dominated social-political order to intimidate and evict the minority, like
8
9 in Sampang. As mentioned above, Kyai Karrar, despite he is Tajul’s uncle, was the most active,
10
11
12 influential Kyai propagating the conversion or the eviction of Shiites. With the alliance of
13
14 religious leaders within BASSRA, he led the forceful relocation of Shiites on 23 June 2013
15
16
17 when the relocation led by Vice Regent of Sampang was so hard to be executed.27 Moreover,
18
19 before the relocation, MUI in Sampang collected thousands of signatures of Madurese society
20
21
22 for the petition to reject Shiites and support the eviction.28
23
24 How to deal with that kind of situation when religious leader became the central part of
25
26
27 the problem? Tadjoeddin argued that even though there are myriad bad attitudes shown by
28
29 elites, including the religious leader, but there are still many good leaders that tended to be
30
31
32 scarce, unpopular, and sometimes regarded as ‘strangers’.29 Actually, in grassroots levels of
33
34 Sampang, there are many local religious figures disagreed with the discrimination and the
35
36
37 crisis of compassion of elites and society toward Shiites. Despite they believe that Shiite is
38
39 not the true Islam, they want to live together with coexistence. However, they did not have a
40
41
42 big influence. Those many Kyais are still silent because when declaring support or receiving,
43
44 they were afraid of being attacked and marginalized by powerful conservative Kyais that
45
46
47 could influence the viability of their pesantren unless they were supported by the
48
49
50
51
52
53
27
Video of the eviction of the Shiites is available on “Ali Karrar, Kiai Besar Madura Pimpin Aparat Pemkab
54
55 Mengusir Paksa Muslim Syiah Sampang dari Madura”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa0tQmX8iE8, accessed
56 on 24 Desember 2015.
57
58 28 Center for Marginalized Comunities Studies. Syahadah: Newsletter n Religious Freedom, 13th edition, October
59 2011, p. 3.
60 29 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 7.
61
62 13
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 government30. Yet, this potential social capital is imperative to be bounded toward bridge-
5
6
7 building of peaceful Suni-Shiite relation.
8
9 The obstacle for the peace-building process could be seen on the unfair, imbalance elite
10
11
12 integration when mediation table was not used to reconcile but utilized for intimidation and
13
14 coercion to fulfill the intolerant majority desire. In contrast, elite integration mechanism, as
15
16
17 a horizontal bridge, requires common understanding and mutual trust among conflicting
18
19 parties with value consensus, power sharing, and compromise31. On 5 April 2011, regional
20
21
22 leaders of Sampang governmental institutions initiated mediation. Regent and Vice Regent
23
24 of Sampang also participated with the head of the regional police office of East Java. The main
25
26
27 figures, Tajul Muluk, and many Kiyais from NU and MUI participated as well. Rather than
28
29 mediating, that meeting provided the arena of judgment for Shiites by religious figures
30
31
32 justified by the government and apparatus32.
33
34 After the second sectarian violence against Shiites, the Religious Minister Surya Dharma
35
36
37 Ali obtained the presidential mandate to led reconciliation, felt to the same hole. He tended
38
39 to localize the Sampang conflict and provided a big portion of the conflict resolution control
40
41
42 to the Madurese Kyais. There was the initiation to took the displaced Shiites to Hajj
43
44 Dormitory, Pondok Gede, East Jakarta in order to “equate perceptions” each other with the
45
46
47 Kyais. He seemed to only replace the word “repentance” or “conversion” required by Kyais
48
49 with more subtle words such as “enlightenment” and “perceptual equations”. Recognizing
50
51
52 Shiite in Islam, he did not regard the Sampang case as a Sunni and Shiite conflict but is a
53
54
55
56
30 Afdillah, Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik.
57
58 31 Tadjoedin, “Civil Society Engagement”, p. 7-8.
59 32Center for Marginalized Comunities Studies. Syahadah: Newsletter n Religious Freedom, 13th edition, October
60 2011, p. 3.
61
62 14
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 matter of blasphemy (despite Ahlul Bait Indonesia, a biggest Shiite organization in Indonesia,
5
6
7 recognized Shiite in Sampang).
8
9 According to Surya Dharma Ali’s view, the Kyai elites had a better understanding of the
10
11
12 local culture. According to him, although every citizen had the right to stay anywhere and
13
14 security right, if it collided with the reality in Sampang, the right would be difficult to
15
16
17 implement. Because of strong education of pesantren and ‘Madura value’ from generation to
18
19 generation, there was a vast view of Madurese people that the domination of Kyai was ‘the
20
21
22 local wisdom’ as the consequence the strong commitment to honoring extremely Kyai as the
23
24 Islamic teacher and the Ulema, Warasatul Anbiya’, the continuing figure bringing Islamic
25
26
27 mission after Prophet Muhammad. This attitude impacted the domination of Kyai in the
28
29 social and political landscape of Madura. This symbolic capital impacted the intervention of
30
31
32 police to certain issues, like how to protect the religious freedom of Shiite, being blocked 33.
33
34 However, the cultural or traditional mechanism claiming the essential cultural or religious
35
36
37 difference within certain society should be separated from “the collective right” which has
38
39 its own judicial system and customs and are in line with human right principles. The
40
41
42 mechanism which tends to maintain power and blinds us to essential internal difference
43
44 excluding the Other cannot be tolerated34, like the antagonism narration of Sunni-Shiite and
45
46
47 the cultural legitimacy of eviction of Shiites.
48
49
50
51
52
53
54 Restoring Civic Engagement: Grass Roots Reconciliation as the Countervailing Force
55
56
57
58 33 Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi, Policing Religious Conflict, p. 118-127.
59 34Bräuchler, “Introduction: Reconciling Indonesia”, in Birgit Bräuchler (Ed.), Reconciling Indonesia: Grass Root
60 Agency for Peace (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 11-12.
61
62 15
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 The previous elaboration showed that despite there was everyday civic engagement
5
6
7 between Sunnis and Shiites in the rural areas, but there were the confrontation and
8
9 antagonism narrations bringing people to sectarian violence. That showed that the structure
10
11
12 of civic life in the areas was insufficient. It was not because of the uncivil backwardness and
13
14 uneducated people in those areas. As Varshney stated, there was also social interconnection
15
16
17 in rural areas of developing countries which tended to be the everyday engagement rather
18
19 than associational engagement that was rare35. Among those people very engaged with
20
21
22 communal solidarity within shared cultural spaces and were not really segregated in the
23
24 hamlet, but when they faced sensitive issue like the heresy, that kind of engagement was not
25
26
27 enough because the absence of a countervailing force that could anticipate and withstand
28
29 the antagonism narrative and confrontation after Kyai Ma’mun as the shelter passed away.
30
31
32 More serious than in Sampang case, in Lucknow, India, both oppositional groups, Sunni and
33
34 Shiite were extremely confronted with each tradition negating the existence of each other.
35
36
37 Yet there was a countervailing force from inter-communal cooperation that defended the
38
39 structure of civic life and communal violence did not take place because the force provided
40
41
42 the synergy of local government and civic organizations36. Learning from the past, an inter-
43
44 sect countervailing force is need to bridge those divided brothers, Sunnis and Shiite in
45
46
47 Sampang.
48
49 Managing agencies of grass-root reconciliation as a countervailing force is crucial
50
51
52 when each level of government from local, regional, to national seems passing the buck and
53
54 forms a ‘vicious circle’ of the unfinished reconciliation in Sampang. They often say having no
55
56
57
58
59 35 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Live, p. 43.
60 36 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Live, p. 184-185.
61
62 16
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 capacity to solve the case. Ministry of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Saifudin, who became
5
6
7 the foundation of hope, instead entirely hand over Sampang case to the regional government
8
9 with just coordinating37 without progressive political willing for bridging equal, inclusive
10
11
12 dialog and reconciliation. While in regional level, the provincial government of East Java and
13
14 the district government of Sampang expressed their inability to handle the current rejection
15
16
17 of Shiite refugees by conservative, intolerant groups. Besides, the regional government is
18
19 only able to fulfill ‘secular’ needs for Shiite refugees, such as shelter, administration, and
20
21
22 subsidy, despite in practice there are still many shortcomings. Some influential intolerant
23
24 Kiyai (religious informal leader) provide “the requirement for repentance” for Shiite
25
26
27 refugees with the support of vigilante groups. This barrier coercing faith conversion
28
29 becomes one of the biggest obstacles for reconciliation. The government seems powerless
30
31
32 and reluctant to handle the power of intolerant groups that negate the identity of Shiite
33
34 refugees. Without the politics of recognition, the reconciliation will remain at an impasse and
35
36
37 the IDPs of Shiite will continue to be eliminated and marginalized.
38
39 The meaningful civic engagement restoration could be seen on the progress of the
40
41
42 grassroots reconciliation declaring the “People’s Peace Charter” between the ex-
43
44 perpetrators of sectarian violence on 23 September 2013 at around 16.00 WIB, in Puspa
45
46
47 Agro flat, Sidoarjo. About 50 villagers of Blu'uren and Karang Gayam villages visited,
48
49 apologized, and asked to reconcile with Shiites. In the declaration, both sides stated that they
50
51
52 were tired of the conflict. They were committed to building peace and respecting their
53
54 respective beliefs while upholding the culture and traditions. The parties determined to bury
55
56
57
58 37 Achmad Faizal, Tak Punya Solusi, Menag Pasrahkan Nasib Pengungsi Syiah ke Pemda,
59 http://regional.kompas.com/read/2017/03/18/21300761/tak.punya.solusi.menag.pasrahkan.nasib.pengungsi.syia
60 h.ke.pemda, accessed on 18 March 2017.
61
62 17
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 the grudge and wanted to return to live in harmony and peace as brothers, relatives, and
5
6
7 neighbors.
8
9 The grassroots reconciliation involves a peace initiative from Sampang Shiite
10
11
12 refugees, Sunni villagers in the hometown who are aware that the Sunni-Shiite conflict in
13
14 Sampang is due to the interests of the elite, and the activists of civil society organizations
15
16
17 (CSOs). Grassroots reconciliation takes root at the local level by engaging ordinary local
18
19 people in an inclusive and communal spirit38. Sulistiyanto and Setyadi39 described grassroots
20
21
22 reconciliation by civil society agencies involving victims and former perpetrators in the
23
24 context of failure or lack of government concern to achieve reconciliation agenda. Especially
25
26
27 in the midst of local government regimes and political elites who tend to favor the majority
28
29 of intolerant votes in Sampang40.
30
31
32 Initially, at the first meeting, Sampang residents who will participate in the Reconciliation
33
34 still put suspicions on internally displaced Shiite refugees. They had hesitated when the
35
36
37 break in the middle of the journey from Sampang regency to Sidoarjo regency. They are
38
39 afraid and prejudiced that the displaced Shiites refugees will take revenge and attack them
40
41
42 when they arrive in refugee camps. This hesitation made them stop for about two hours,
43
44 leaving the internally displaced waiting and wondering. Then, the group of three cars first
45
46
47 came to the refugee camp. The rest, a group of two cars, waited around the evacuation just
48
49
50
51
52 38 D.
53 Babo-Soares, “Nahe Biti: The Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation (and Justice) in East
54 Timor”, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 5(1), 2004, p. 18.
55 39 Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Rumekso Setyadi, “Civil Society and Grassroots Reconciliation in Central Java”,
56 in Birgit Bräuchler (Ed.), Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroot Agency for Peace (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.
57 194.
58 40 See Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf dan Muhammad Afdillah, “Pilkada dan Kekerasan Anti-Syiah di Sampang”, in
59 Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, dkk, Politik Lokal dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada dan Struktur Kesempatan Politik dalam
60 Konflik Keagamaan di Sampang, Bekasi, dan Kupang (Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM, 2015).
61
62 18
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 in case anything happened.41 Participants are mindful of formulating the peacekeeping
5
6
7 charter themselves. Before the pledge, the attackers of 2011 and 2012 events were present
8
9 about three to four times in Sampang Shiite refuge. The more dilute the process of decay of
10
11
12 the problem is the loss of prejudice that the Shiite refugees will be revenge. From these
13
14 meetings, there was a greater interaction of mutual forgiveness.
15
16
17 In the post-reconciliation, the participants tried to convince the other residents in their
18
19 hometown. There are also those who refuse, although relatively more citizens agree to
20
21
22 reconciliation overall with the reintegration and repatriation of internally displaced Shiite
23
24 Sampang. Even Mat Safi, a civilian (tojing), who was one of the principals who led the attack
25
26
27 on Shiite Sampang in 2012, was so keen to encourage this reintegration process. These peace
28
29 process agencies have found it difficult to expect follow-up from the government. According
30
31
32 to Nur Tamam, the Chairman of Lembaga Persatuan Umat Islam (The Institute of Ummah
33
34 Unity in Islam) Pamekasan and Kiyai of Al Hamidi Pamekasan Islamic Boarding School who
35
36
37 participated to facilitate reconciliation, if only the government chose to support this sincere
38
39 form, by helping to facilitate the movement, villagers are actually ready to flock to the towers
40
41
42 to attend reconciliation and even to take refugees home.
43
44 Unfortunately, the positively-constructed and participatory builds by civil society are
45
46
47 delegitimized by elite forces. During and post-reconciliation there is a disturbance to the
48
49 group departing. The Equal Institute reports that the accessibility of the Sunni population to
50
51
52 the refugees is limited by some who are trying to threaten to thwart this issue, even by
53
54 claiming to have ordered from the Police Sector (Polsek). In addition, the intolerant group
55
56
57 intercepted the signatories of the pact so as not to infiltrate the refugees and the mobilizers
58
59
60 41 Hertaning Ichlas, the Chairman of Universalia Legal Aid, Interview, 15 November 2016.
61
62 19
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 of the reconciliation were brought to the intolerant Kyai to cancel the signatures in the peace
5
6
7 charter. Surya Dharma Ali, the Minister of Religious Affairs at the time, questioned the
8
9 reconciliation because it was considered not to involve the local government and scholars
10
11
12 by accusing the parties who use the conflict. The same attitude was also expressed by
13
14 Assistant 3 East Java Governor Edy Purwinanto and Vice Regent Fadhillah Budiono. Budiono
15
16
17 even rejects the results of the reconciliation and is determined that reconciliation and
18
19 repatriation can only happen on the condition of repentance or return to Sunni teachings. In
20
21
22 fact, the former assailants realized that the requirement of repentance proposed by the
23
24 religious-social elite was not negotiable and the government was reluctant to act in
25
26
27 affirmation of recognition. They finally initiate the reconciliation amidst the frustrating
28
29 deadlock.
30
31
32 However, from that meeting, there was an inter-sect interaction of mutual forgiveness.
33
34 They were looking for ways to repatriate Shiites as internally displaced people. Participants
35
36
37 wanted to live in harmony and peace in a sustainable manner based on a strong bond
38
39 according to the principle of Tretan Dibik, ukhuwah or unity of fellow Muslims, and family
40
41
42 ties that in fact most of the conflicting parties come from the same relatives and origin. One
43
44 of the participants was Zainul who was a 30-year-old and a farmer. He was so sorry to attack
45
46
47 the Shiites in 2012 which actually took the victim of his own adoptive father named
48
49 Chamamah who was killed by the mass. He prostrated and embraced with his adoptive
50
51
52 mother who was often called by her husband's name; Mrs. Chamamah. Many people who
53
54 watched crying42. After the civic engagement restoration, the participants tried to convince
55
56
57
58 42 Camelia Pasandaran, “Manisnya Proses Islah Sunni dan Syiah Sampang”,
59 www.ahlulbaitindonesia.or.id/berita/manisnya-proses-islah-sunni-dan-syiah-sampang/, accessed on 30 December
60 2016.
61
62 20
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 the other residents in their hometown. There were also those who refuse, although relatively
5
6
7 more citizens agreed to reconcile overall with the reintegration and repatriation of Shiites
8
9 as refugees. Even Mat Safi, a civilian, who was one of the principals who led the attack on
10
11
12 Shiites in 2012, was so keen to encourage this reintegration process.
13
14
15
16
17 Conclusion
18
19 This paper shows that there were several dynamics showing why civic engagement
20
21
22 in Sampang was not enough to prevent communal violence, such as the lack of inter-sect
23
24 engagement, the absence of peace committee and self-policing, and unjust, imbalance elite
25
26
27 integration. Each dimension had interrelated causation with other. The previous state-
28
29 sponsored reconciliation also strengthened intersect boundaries because of the unfair,
30
31
32 imbalance elite integration where mediation table was utilized for intimidation and coercion
33
34 to fulfill the intolerant majority desire to convert Shiites. The absence of self-policing and the
35
36
37 abuse of elite integration were not balanced by any inter-sect associational civic
38
39 engagements in Sampang. This paper argues that the grass-roots reconciliation agency as a
40
41
42 countervailing force against intolerant, anti-Shiite antagonism is imperative where the
43
44 frustrating deadlock and stagnancy of unfinished reconciliation still cannot be solved.
45
46
47 Sustainable empowerment and multiplication of the countervailing force is crucial to restore
48
49 inter-sect civic engagement in Sampang continuously.
50
51
52
53
54
55 References
56
57
58
Afdillah, Muhammad. Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik: Melacak Akar-akar Kekerasan Agama
59
60 antara Komunitas Sunni dan Syiah di Sampang, Jawa Timur. (From Mosque to the Stage of
61
62 21
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 Politics: Tracing Roots of Religious Violence between Sunni and Shiite Community in
5
6
7 Sampang, East Java) Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM, 2016.
8
9
10
11 Ahnaf, Mohammad Iqbal and Muhammad Afdillah. “Pilkada dan Kekerasan Anti-Syiah di
12
13 Sampang (Regional Election and Anti-Shiite Violence in Sampang)”, in Mohammad
14
15
16 Iqbal Ahnaf, dkk. Politik Lokal dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada dan Struktur
17
18 Kesempatan Politik dalam Konflik Keagamaan di Sampang, Bekasi dan Kupang (Local
19
20
21 Politics and Religious Conflict: Regional Election and Political Opportunity Structure in
22
23 Religious Conflict in Sampang, Bekasi and Kupang). Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM, 2015.
24
25
26
27 Babo-Soares, D. “Nahe Biti: The Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation (and
28
29 Justice) in East Timor”, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 5(1), 2004.
30
31
32
33
Bräuchler, Birgit. “Introduction: Reconciling Indonesia”, in Birgit Bräuchler (Ed.), Reconciling
34
35 Indonesia: Grassroot Agency for Peace. New York: Routledge, 2009.
36
37
38
39 Center for Marginalized Communities Studies. Syahadah: Newsletter n Religious Freedom, 13th
40
41 edition, October 2011.
42
43
44
45 Faizal, Achmad. “Tak Punya Solusi, Menag Pasrahkan Nasib Pengungsi Syiah ke Pemda” (Not
46
47 Having Solution, Minister of Religious Affair Fates Shiite’s Destiny to Provincial
48
49
50 Government),
51
52
53 http://regional.kompas.com/read/2017/03/18/21300761/tak.punya.solusi.menag.pasrah
54
55 kan.nasib.pengungsi.syiah.ke.pemda, accessed on 18 March 2017.
56
57
58
59
60
61
62 22
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 Panggabean, Rizal dan Ihsan Ali Fauzi. Policing Religious Conflict in Indonesia (Jakarta: Pusat Studi
5
6
7 Agama dan Demokrasi, 2015.
8
9
10
11 Pasandaran, Camelia. “Manisnya Proses Reconciliation Sunni dan Syiah Sampang” (The
12
13 Sweetness of Reconciliation Process of Sunni and Shiite from Sampang),
14
15
16 www.ahlulbaitindonesia.or.id/berita/manisnya-proses-reconciliation-sunni-dan-syiah-
17
18 sampang/, accessed in 30 December 2016.
19
20
21
22 Peraturan Gubernur Jawa Timur Nomor 55 Tahun 2012 tentang Pembinaan Kegiatan Keagamaan
23
24
25 dan Pengawasan Aliran Sesat di Jawa Timur. (The Decree of the Governor of East Java No.
26
27 55 Tahun 2012 about Building-up Religious Activity and Monitoring of Heretics in East Java).
28
29
30
31 Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) Provinsi Jawa Timur No. Kep-01/SKF-
32
33
34
MUI/JTM/2012 tentang Kesesatan Ajaran Syiah. (The Fatwa Decision of the Indonesian
35
36 Ulama Council East Java Province No. Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/2012 about the Heresy of
37
38
39 Shiite Doctrine).
40
41
42 Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Sampang Nomor 69/PID.B/2012/PN.Spg Tahun 2012. (The Verdict of
43
44
45 District Court in Sampang No. 69/PID.B/2012/PN.Spg in 2012).
46
47
48
49
Semendawai, et. al. Laporan Tim Temuan Rekomendasi (TTR) tentang Penyerangan terhadap
50
51 Penganut Syiah di Sampang, Madura (The Report of Finding and Recommendation Team
52
53
54 about the Attack on Shiite Adherents in Sampang, Madura). The Cooperation of Komnas
55
56 HAM, Komnas Perempuan, KPA and LPSK, 2013.
57
58
59
60
61
62 23
63
64
65
 1
2
3
4 Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi and Rumekso Setyadi. “Civil Society and Grassroots Reconciliation in
5
6
7 Central Java”, in Birgit Bräuchler (Ed.). Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroot Agency for Peace.
8
9
10 New York: Routledge, 2009.
11
12
13 Tadjoedin, Mohammad Zulfan. “Civil Society Engagement and Communal Violence: Reflection on
14
15
16 Various Hypotheses in the Context of Indonesia,” Politics Administration and Change, No.
17
18 42, July-December, 2004.
19
20
21
22 Telle, Kari. “Ritual Power: Risk, Rumours and Religious Pluralism on Lombok”. The Asia Pacific
23
24
25 Journal of Anthropology, 17: 5, 2016.
26
27
28 Varshney, Ashutosh. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven: Yale
29
30
31 University Press, 2002.
32
33
34
35
YAKKUM Emergency Unit Yogyakarta, AMAN Indonesia, and Kontras Surabaya. Notulensi
36
37 Lokakarya Perlindungan Minoritas di Indonesia: Menemukan Solusi Kasus Syiah
38
39
40
Sampang (The Notes of Seminar on Minority Protection in Indonesia: Finding Solution
41
42 Shiite’s Case in Sampang), Gedung A Fakultas Hukum Universitas Airlangga Surabaya
43
44
45
5-6 September 2016.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62 24
63
64
65