FE FLORO VALINO v. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, GR No.

182894, 2014-04-22

Facts:

Atty. Adriano Adriano... married respondent Rosario Adriano... on November 15, 1955. The couple had
two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa;
and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to
live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide... financial
support to Rosario and their children

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States
spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When

Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that
she delay the interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano
were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila

Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.

Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was
buried... respondents commenced suit against Valino

In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than
twenty (20) years before he courted her.

Although they... were living together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support
the respondents.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of
Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.

The trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of
Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents.

In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to
the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in
relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the... appellate court that
the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the
funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the... latter's death, notwithstanding their 30-
year separation in fact.
Issues:

The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of
Atty. Adriano.

Ruling:

Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199[6] of the Family Code, specifies
the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased.

It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
members of the family to the exclusion of one's common law partner.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership... requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements
to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately
from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no... controlling significance. To say
that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.

The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other... right, will not be considered as
having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
free and voluntary intent to that end.

It cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband when she died,
she had already renounced her right to do so.

Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO

G.R. No. 73748 73972             May 22, 1986

Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano, petitioner

vs.
President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant

Facts:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to
the 1973 Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

2. Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Discussions:

 In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favourable action.
 The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people
that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its
legitimacy.

Rulings:

1. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The
holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a
cause of action.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure
government.  Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government.
Estrada vs. Escritor A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003 Benevolent Neutrality

JANUARY 26, 2018

FACTS:

 Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent
Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband.  They allegedly
have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. He filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she
is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

ISSUE:

What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is respondent entitled thereto? Is the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality consistent with the free exercise clause?

RULING:

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits.  Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded
the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the
case is remanded to the RTC.

 Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise
given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.  Should the Court
prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action
would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore
simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the
“compelling state interest” test.  The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an
opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override
respondent’s religious belief and practice.

Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967

SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three resolutions which aim to:
• Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members (First Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional Convention without forfeiting
their seats (Third Resolution).

Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on June 17, 1967. RA 4913 is
an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the Constitution proposed by
the Congress in the First and Third Resolutions.

Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation thru class suit of all
citizens of this country, filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC
from implementing Republic Act 4913 assailing said law as unconstitutional.

Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the constitutionality
not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of First and Third Resolutions.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.

2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines violate the spirit of the
Constitution – NO.

RATIO:

1. RA 4913 is constitutional.

The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the amendments are sufficient
under the Constitution. The Constitution does not forbid the submission of proposals for amendment to
the people except under certain conditions.

2. The submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines do not violate the spirit of the
Constitution.

People may not be really interested on how the representatives are apportioned among the provinces of
the Philippines as per First Resolution. Those who are interested to know the full details may enlighten
themselves by reading copies of the amendments readily available in the polling places. On the matter
of Third Resolution, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate
knows that it permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and
assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

NOTE: The majority voted that the Resolutions and RA 4913 were unconstitutional but they did not
reach specific number of votes to invalidate these congressional acts under the 1935 Constitution, which
is two-thirds of the Supreme Court.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971

SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of
the Philippines by Resolutions No. 2 and 4 on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969, respectively.

On November 10, 1970, the delegates were elected. The Convention has its inaugural session on June 1,
1971. Three months later, the Constitutional Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1.
Constitutional Convention OR No. 1 lowered the voting age to 18 years old and made women qualified
to vote.

President Diosdado Macapagal sent letter to Comelec calling upon it to implement the resolution. A day
later, Comelec resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite.
Constitutional Convention then passed a series of resolutions to continue with the plebiscite. Plebiscite
was scheduled on November 8, 1971, which is the same day for the elections of other government
officials.

Petitioner assailed COMELEC’s resolution and the holding of the plebscite, arguing that:

 the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress.

 the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all of the other amendments. (Sec. 1, Art. XV – partly stated above)

The COMELEC argued that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the
plebiscite is within the authority of the Constitutional Convention  and that this power includes that of
submitting such amendments either individually or jointly.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Constitutional Convention is governed by the Constitution.

2. Whether the plebiscite initiated by the Constitutional Convention, and to be held by the
COMELEC is constitutional

RATIO:

1. The Constitutional Convention is governed by the Constitution.

As a creature of the Constitution, the Constitutional Convention is governed by the same Constitution
that created it. This Convention has not been called by the people, that is, revolutionary convention).
Consequently, it is not completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise. Therefore, it is subject to
the constraints imposed upon it by the Constitution.

2. The plebiscite initiated by the Constitutional Convention, and to be held by the Comelec, is not
constitutional.

The plebiscite is against Sec. 1, Article of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that:

“SECTION 1. … Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.”
(emphasis supplied)
The phrase “an election” refers to a singular election. The rationale of which is that, to allow the people
to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of the provision, they need to examine the amendments
proposed by the Constitutional Convention in harmony with the others, as well as the rest of the
Constitution.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION:

Fernando, J.

Such an approach (plebiscite) all the more commends itself to me considering that what was sought to
be done is to refer the matter to the people. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and
to the people alone, in whom sovereignty resides. There is no repugnancy to the fundamental law when
the Constitutional Convention ascertains the popular will.

Once the Constitutional Convention is convened, it cannot in any wise be interfered with, much less
controlled by Congress. Though not sovereign, it is a body independent of legislation.

The justification that the use of word “election” in the singular is not decisive.  The words used in the
Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious purpose at which they are aimed.
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
50 scra 33 | March 31, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J

 The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the
crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court
(Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the
petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the
relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.

 Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the “Plebiscite” then “Ratification” Cases.

FACTS:
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments
to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24,
1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on
November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1,
1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Then, the
President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

Then Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines
and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential
Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said
Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting
of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to
be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the
Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission to the people of said
Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly,
and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”

The President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the
purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. He then announced the postponement
of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this
effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said General
Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution.”

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court
deemed it fit to refrain from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions
under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. The Congress then
scheduled to meet  in regular session and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was
that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds
therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of
the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress
and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these
cases.

The petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as
soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
Then the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said
“urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or
on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a
“supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,”
praying:

“… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as
well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of
Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating
Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all
other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing
and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum
results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between
January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental
Urgent Motion.”

On the same date, the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948
to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting
the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date
last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that,
upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy
of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned
to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing
in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according
to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that
morning.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the
Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their
subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found
in the present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a
“Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter” and as “a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all
citizens and voters similarly situated,” was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in
substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President
had announced “the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including,” and that the latter “are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said
proposed Constitution” upon the ground: “that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies”; that the same “are
without power to approve the proposed Constitution …”; “that the President is without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution”; and “that the election
held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.”

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable, or political and therefore
non-justiciable, question?
2. Whether the Constitution has proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly
(with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions?

3. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution has acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people? (acquiesced – “permission” given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or
agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)

4. Whether petitioners are entitled to relief?

5. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force?

HELD:
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro
did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the
people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an
approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people’s will,
but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution been complied with.” Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3)
members of the Court hold that the issue is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.

2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the
1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been
validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding
the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies, specially in the
manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In
view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there
was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution
without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to
hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have
cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV,
hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has
been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally
ratified.”

Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view
there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid
ratification.
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.

Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people
have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice
Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the
effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced
in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that
such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of
ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a
concomitant feature of martial law.” 88

Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under
a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted,
(they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted
the Constitution.”

4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so
voted on the strength of their view that “(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is
the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than
judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable.” 91

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to
deny respondents’ motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:  Four (4) members of the
Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the
people’s acceptance thereof;

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no
vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to
declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar,
Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect.
Sanidad v. COMELEC

73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976

Ponente: Martin, J

FACTS:

On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the
president has no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the referendum-
plebiscite has no legal basis.

ISSUE:

1.    Is the case at bar justiciable?

2.    Does the president have the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?
3.    Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:

The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable
question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform such act
is in question. The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are
generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the referendum-
plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the questions are issues of the day and
the people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law.

Estrada v. Arroyo

Estrada V. Arroyo

G.R. No. 146738

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for 
judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution.”
HELD:

FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid
down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves
the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and
the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but
EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

1. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

2. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as
well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.

"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

"The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of
the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”

The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear
when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of resignation.

3. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and
after transition period.
 4. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and
he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed
his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the president which
he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press
release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to
determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states:
“RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION
INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION
CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that
he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he
is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision
that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he
must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada
was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency.
On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment
Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due
to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to
his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case
does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

Estrada v. Desierto

JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)

G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001

FACTS:
 Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President.

 Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

 House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or
more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator
Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.

 Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as
judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.

 When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope
which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank
account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in
protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight,
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered
against the petitioner and the 11 senators.

 January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A
10-km line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. 

 January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to
the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed
services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.

 January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President
of the Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. 

 January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers the duties of the Presidency.

 February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after
the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." 

 February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for
judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
 respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." 

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.

 Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
President. 

HELD:

 Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

 In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-
taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.

 Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

 An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to
the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President xxx.

 What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of inability.

 In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.