Transportation Law Case Digest

Dasmariñas, Ma.
Loisa 2L - Transportation Law

Lara vs. Valencia G.R. No. L-9907
Facts: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao
with an annual salary of P1,800. The defendant is engaged in the business of
exporting logs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession
upon instructions of his chief to classify the logs of defendant which were about to
be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. The work Lara of lasted for six
days during which he contracted malaria fever. In the morning of January 9, 1954,
Lara who then in a hurry to return to Davao asked defendant if he could take him in
his pick-up as there was then no other means of transportation, to which defendant
agreed, and in that same morning the pick-up left Parang bound for Davao taking
along six passengers, including Lara.
The pick-up has a front seat where the driver and two passengers can be
accommodated and the back has a steel flooring enclosed with a steel walling of 16
to 17 inches tall on the sides and with a 19 inches tall walling at the back. Before
leaving Parang, the sitting arrangement was as follows: defendant was at the wheel
and seated with him in the front seat were Mrs. Valencia and Nicanor Quinain; on
the back of the pick-up were two improvised benches placed on each side, and
seated on the right bench were Ricardo Alojipan and Antonio Lagahit, and on the left
one Bernardo and Pastor Geronimo. A person by the name of Leoning was seated on
a box located on the left side while in the middle Lara sat on a bag. Before leaving
Parang, defendant invited Lara to sit with him on the front seat but Lara declined. It
was their understanding that upon reaching barrio Samoay, Cotabato, the
passengers were to alight and take a bus bound for Davao, but when they arrived at
that place, only Bernardo alighted and the other passengers requested defendant to
allow them to ride with him up to Davao because there was then no available bus
that they could take in going to that place. Defendant again accommodated the
passengers.
When they continued their trip, the sitting arrangement of the passengers remained
the same, Lara being seated on a bag in the middle with his arms on a suitcase and
his head cove red by a jacket. Upon reaching Km. 96, barrio Catidtuan, Lara
accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a result he suffered serious injuries. Valencia
stopped the pick-up to see what happened to Lara. He sought the help of the
residents of that place and applied water to Lara but to no avail. They brought Lara
to the nearest place where they could find a doctor and not having found any they
took him to St. Joseph's Clinic of Kidapawan. But when Lara arrived he was already
dead. From there they proceeded to Davao City and immediately notified the local
authorities. An investigation was made regarding the circumstances surrounding the
death of Lara but no criminal action was taken against defendant.
It therefore appears that the deceased, as well his companions who rode in the pick-
up of defendant, were merely accommodation passengers who paid nothing for the
service and so they can be considered as invited guests within the meaning of the
law. As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver
Dasmariñas, Ma. Loisa 2L - Transportation Law
of the pick-up owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they
may be transported safely to their destination.
Issue: Is there enough evidence to show that defendant failed to observe ordinary
care or diligence in transporting the deceased from Parang to Davao on the date in
question?
Ruling: The finding of the trial court that the pick-up was running at more than 40
kilometers per hour is not supported by the evidence. This is a mere surmise made
by the trial court considering the time the pick-up left barrio Samoay and the time
the accident occured in relation to the distance covered by the pick-up. And even if
this is correct, still we say that such speed is not unreasonable considering that they
were traveling on a national road and the traffic then was not heavy. We may rather
attribute the incident to lack of care on the part of the deceased considering that the
pick-up was open and he was then in a crouching position. Indeed, the law provides
that "A passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
injury to himself" (Article 1761, new Civil Code), which means that if the injury to the
passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be
held liable.
All things considered, we are persuaded to conclude that the accident occurred not
due to the negligence of defendant but to circumstances beyond his control and so
he should be exempt from liability.
Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-9671
Facts: A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as defendant, is a

corporation engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land for
compensation in the Bicol provinces and one of the lines it operates is the one
connecting Legaspi City, Albay with Naga City, Camarines Sur. One of the buses
which defendant was operating is Bus No. 31. On May 31, 1951, plaintiff boarded
said bus as a passenger paying the required fare from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili,
Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a motor
vehicle of the pick-up type coming from the opposite direction, as a result of which
plaintiff's left arm was completely severed and the severed portion fell inside the
bus. Plaintiff was rushed to a hospital in Iriga, Camarines Sur where he was given
blood transfusion to save his life. After four days, he was transferred to another
hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he under went treatment for three months. He was
moved later to the Orthopedic Hospital where he was operated on and stayed there
for another two months. For these services, he incurred expenses amounting to
P623.40, excluding medical fees which were paid by defendant.
Issue: Has defendant observed extraordinary diligence or the utmost diligence of

every cautious person, having due regard for all circumstances, in avoiding the
collision which resulted in the injury caused to the plaintiff?
Ruling: The evidence would appear to support the above finding. Thus, it appears
that Bus No. 31, immediately prior to the collision, was running at a moderate speed
because it had just stopped at the school zone of Matacong, Polangui, Albay. The
pick-up car was at full speed and was running outside of its proper lane. The driver of
the bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was then running, swerved
the bus to the very extreme right of the road until its front and rear wheels have
gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the road. Said
driver could not move the bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the pile,
the peak of which was about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of his
passengers. And notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side of the bus was
hit by the pick-up car.
A circumstances which miliates against the stand of appellant is the fact borne out
by the evidence that when he boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the
left side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside
the window, this being his position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for
this reason that the collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body
of appellant thus doing him a great damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is
guilty of contributory negligence. Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill
with a portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been
avoided as is the case with the other passenger. It is to be noted that appellant was
the only victim of the collision.
It is true that such contributory negligence cannot relieve appellee of its liability but
will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new
Civil Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates against the position
taken by appellant in this case.
Philippine First Insurance vs. Wallem First Shipping G.R. No. 165647
Facts: On or about 2 October 1995, Anhui Chemicals Import & Export Corporation
loaded on board M/S Offshore Master a shipment consisting of 10,000 bags of
sodium sulphate anhydrous 99 PCT Min. (shipment), complete and in good order for
transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila for consignee, L.G. Atkimson
Import-Export, Inc. (consignee), covered by a Clean Bill of Lading. The Bill of Lading
reflects the gross weight of the total cargo at 500,200 kilograms. The Owner and/or
Charterer of M/V Offshore Master is unknown while the shipper of the shipment is
Shanghai Fareast Ship Business Company. Both are foreign firms doing business in
the Philippines, thru its local ship agent, respondent Wallem Philippines Shipping,
Inc. (Wallem).
On or about 16 October 1995, the shipment arrived at the port of Manila on board
the vessel M/S Offshore Master from which it was subsequently discharged. It was
disclosed during the discharge of the shipment from the carrier that 2,426 poly bags
(bags) were in bad order and condition, having sustained various degrees of spillages
and losses. This is evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (turn-
over survey) of the arrastre operator, Asian Terminals, Inc. (arrastre operator). The
bad state of the bags is also evinced by the arrastre operator’s Request for Bad
Order Survey.
Asia Star Freight Services, Inc. undertook the delivery of the subject shipment from
the pier to the consignee’s warehouse in Quezon City, while the final inspection was
conducted jointly by the consignee’s representative and the cargo surveyor. During
the unloading, it was found and noted that the bags had been discharged in
damaged and bad order condition. Upon inspection, it was discovered that
63,065.00 kilograms of the shipment had sustained unrecovered spillages, while
58,235.00 kilograms had been exposed and contaminated, resulting in losses due to
depreciation and downgrading.
On 29 April 1996, the consignee filed a formal claim with Wallem for the value of the
damaged shipment, to no avail. Since the shipment was insured with petitioner
Philippines First Insurance Co., Inc. against all risks in the amount of
₱2,470,213.50, the consignee filed a formal claim with petitioner for the damage and
losses sustained by the shipment. After evaluating the invoices, the turn-over survey,
the bad order certificate and other documents, petitioner found the claim to be in
order and compensable under the marine insurance policy. Consequently, petitioner
paid the consignee the sum of ₱397,879.69 and the latter signed a subrogation
receipt.
Petitioner, in the exercise of its right of subrogation, sent a demand letter to Wallem
for the recovery of the amount paid by petitioner to the consignee. However,
despite receipt of the letter, Wallem did not settle nor even send a response to
petitioner’s claim.
Issue: Whether or not that as a common carrier, the carrier’s duties extend to the
obligation to safely discharge the cargo from the vessel
Ruling: It is undisputed that the shipment was damaged prior to its receipt by the
insured consignee. The damage to the shipment was documented by the turn-over
survey and Request for Bad Order Survey. The turn-over survey, in particular,
expressly stipulates that 2,426 bags of the shipment were received by the arrastre
operator in damaged condition. With these documents, petitioner insists that the
shipment incurred damage or losses while still in the care and responsibility of
Wallem and before it was turned over and delivered to the arrastre operator.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them. Subject to certain exceptions enumerated under Article
1734 of the Civil Code, common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier
lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them.
It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded

generally remain under the custody of the carrier. In the instant case, the damage or
losses were incurred during the discharge of the shipment while under the
supervision of the carrier. Consequently, the carrier is liable for the damage or losses
caused to the shipment.
PAL vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120262
Facts: On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao
City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was
supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City However, due to
typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash
assistance of P100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of two days
in Cebu. Respondent Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL's
expense because he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus,
respondent Pantejo was forced to seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger,
an engineer named Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at Sky
View Hotel with the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao.
On October 25, 1988 when the flight for Surigao was resumed, respondent Pantejo
came to know that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers, one Superintendent
Ernesto Gonzales and a certain Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the Philippine
National Bank, were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, respondent Pantejo informed
Oscar Jereza, PAL's Manager for Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was
in charge of cancelled flights, that he was going to sue the airline for discriminating
against him. It was only then that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo P300.00
which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the latter decline.
Issue: whether petitioner airlines acted in bad faith when it failed and refused to
provide hotel accommodations for respondent Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel
expenses incurred by reason of the cancellation of its connecting flight to Surigao
City due to force majeure.
Ruling: To begin with, it must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers

is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation, and this is
because of the relation which an air carrier sustain with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation
attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees
naturally could give ground for an action for damages.
Ruling: what makes petitioner liable for damages in this particular case and under
the facts obtaining herein is its blatant refusal to accord the so-called amenities
equally to all its stranded passengers who were bound for Surigao City. No
compelling or justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and prejudicial
conduct.
More importantly, it has been sufficiently established that it is petitioner's standard

company policy, whenever a flight has been cancelled, to extend to its hapless
passengers cash assistance or to provide them accommodations in hotels with which
it has existing tie-ups.
On the bases of all the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that petitioner acted
in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers and in
discriminating against herein respondent Pantejo. It was even oblivious to the fact
that this respondent was exposed to humiliation and embarrassment especially
because of his government position and social prominence, which altogether
necessarily subjected him to ridicule, shame and anguish.
The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes the former
liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil
Code. As held in Alitalia Airways vs. CA, et al., such inattention to and lack of care by
petitioner airline for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost
consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which
entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages.
Jesusa Vda. De Nueca vs. Manila Railroad Co. G.R. No. 31731
Facts: Fermin Nueca brought 7 sacks of palay to Manila Railroad Co. at its station in Barrio del Rosario, Camarines Sur, to
be shipped to the municipality of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The cargo was loaded on the freight wagon of Train 537.
Passengers boarded the train and shunting operations started to hook a wagon thereto. Before the train could reach the
turnoff switch, its passenger coach fell on its side some 40 meters from the station and pinned Nueca thus instantly killing
him. Nueca’s widow and children brought a claim for damages stating that Nueca was a passenger and his death was
caused by MRC’s negligence.
Issue: Whether or not Nueca was a passenger
Ruling: No Nueca was not a passenger. Even disregarding the matter of tickets, and assuming Nueca intended to be a
passenger, he was never accepted as such by MRC as he did not present himself at the proper place and in a proper
manner to be transported.
The relation of passenger and carrier commences when one puts himself in the care of the carrier with the bona fide intention
of becoming a passenger and is accepted by the carrier, as where he makes a contract for transportation and presents
himself at the proper place and proper manner to transported.
Calalas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122039
Facts: At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the
Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner
Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga
was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney.
As a result, Sunga was injured.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
Issue: whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage
Ruling: In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had
to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway,
and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the
R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which
provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. — No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging
or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of
other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the same law. It
provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. — No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow
more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater
than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for
the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent
in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking
an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing
that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning
by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito.
A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the
cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take
part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger
of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118664
Facts: On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL
001 in San Francisco, California bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private
respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los
Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for travelling
on the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan,
at the airlines' expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at
Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg
of their journey, went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents'
trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-
bound passengers on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for
the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. On June 16, 1991, much to
the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was
again cancelled due to NAIA's indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the
private respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation
expense during their stay in Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents
were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal
funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June
22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25, 1991,
commenced an action for damages against JAL before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104. To support their claim, private respondents asserted that
JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded
passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from
June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL was
obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they were still stranded in Narita. On
the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers have
no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to "force
majeure."
Issue: whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and
meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final
destination, even if the delay were caused by "force majeure."
Ruling: Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his
obligation because of "force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held
liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from
resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever
losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers
incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel
expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating

experience for the private respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and
anxiety during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but their predicament was not due
to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights.
Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities
of its stranded passengers by reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to
assume.
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to
the mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic
changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the
passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of
all risks.
Dangwa v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 95582
Facts: On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint 1 for damages against
petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident
which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among
others, it was alleged that on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was
driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and
imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety
to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However,
instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in
utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his
other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said
victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to
observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation
company and the supervision of the employees, even as they add that they are not
absolute insurers of the safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it
was the victim's own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject
incident.
Issue: Whether the petitioners are negligent and are liable for the
damages claimed.
Ruling: Common carriers, from the nature of their business and

reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence for the safety of their passengers according to all the
circumstances of each case. As such, in an action based on a contract
of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible
for any damages. Any injury that might be suffered by a passenger is
right away attributable to its fault or negligence. It is incumbent
upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary
diligence. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence
must be proved. In the case at bar, Pedrito, by stepping and standing
on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is
thus entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to their
contractual relation. The duty which the carrier owes to its patrons
extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting
therefrom. The testimonies of the witnesses show that the bus was at
full stop when Pedrito boarded the same. They further confirm the
conclusion that the he fell from the platform of the bus when it
suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires
of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
he was guilty of negligence. The contention of Dangwa Transportation
that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that he would ride
on the bus since the latter had not manifested his intention to board
the same does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion,
there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to
signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops,
is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it is
the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops,
to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a
passenger while he was attempting to board the same.
La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-20761
Facts: On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife,
together with their minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about
4½ years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing
plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the defendant, at San
Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were
carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging. The
conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano
Beltran, issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest
child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the
height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and
regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the
passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to
get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying
some of their baggages, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and
his children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians
side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he
returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind,
but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While
said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor
to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus,
whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward,
evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not
given the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending
to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again
placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where
the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from
the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the
side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and
children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of
a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child
was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she
rode earlier together with her parents.
Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus involved in
the incident, and therefore, the contract of carriage was already terminated?
Ruling: It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger
does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a
place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this
rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after
alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a
passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is
proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually
doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot,
and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to
relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus
continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and
company and its agents
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which
was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was,
must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running
board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus
started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving
vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over
and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had
exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755
of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its
obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although
stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run
the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter
was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and
family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they
are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the
protection under their contract of carriage.
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was
predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran,
plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent."
This allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that the
driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there
were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the
vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the
presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this
presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome.
Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the
child Raquel Beltran.
Aboitiz Shipping v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 84458
Facts: on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by
defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having
purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. 'B'). On May 12, 1975,
said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein
disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to
the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third
deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on
said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. '2')
between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator
Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers
of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from
said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already
disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were
still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to
the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the
crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was
thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days thereafter
Issue:Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the

latter had already disembarked the vessel.
Ruling: YES.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger
has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or
premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All
persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance
are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-
passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person
transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains
in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.
We believe there exists such a justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the
victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from
petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its
passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to
claim their baggage. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim
Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic
death.
Pestano v. Sumayang G.R. No. 139875
Facts: It appears from the records that at around 2:00 o'clock [o]n the afternoon of
August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along the national
highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with him was his friend Manuel Romagos.
As they came upon a junction where the highway connected with the road leading to
Tabagon, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by [Petitioner] Gregorio Pestaño
and owned by [Petitioner] Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation (Metro Cebu, for
brevity), which had tried to overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its
passengers hurtling upon the pavement. Both Ananias Sumayang and Manuel
Romagos were rushed to the hospital in Sogod, where Sumayang was pronounced
dead on arrival. Romagos was transferred to the Cebu Doctors' Hospital, but he
succumbed to his injuries the day after.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was negligent

Ruling: Petitioners are raising a question of fact based on Pestaño's testimony

contradicting that of Eyewitness Ignacio Neis and on the location of the dents on the
bumper and the grill. Neis testified that as the two vehicles approached the junction,
the victim raised his left arm to signal that he was turning left to Tabagon, but that
the latter and his companion were thrown off the motorcycle after it was bumped by
the overspeeding bus.
These contentions have already been passed upon by the trial and the appellate
courts. We find no cogent reason to reverse or modify their factual findings. The CA
agreed with the trial court that the vehicular collision was caused by Pestaño's
negligence when he attempted to overtake the motorcycle. As a professional driver
operating a public transport bus, he should have anticipated that overtaking at a
junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution.
Petitioners aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty
speedometer and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had this
instrument been properly functioning.
This contention has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master
or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision
of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing
that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and the supervision of its employee.
The CA said that allowing Pestaño to ply his route with a defective speedometer
showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the
supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over
its driver, not in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestaño was
able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in
the supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus
failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law.
Ludo v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125483
Facts: Petitioner Ludo & Luym Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in

copra processing with plant and business offices in Cebu City. Private Respondent
Gabisan Shipping Lines was the registered owner and operator of the motor
vessel MV Miguela, while the other private respondent, Anselmo Olasiman, was its
captain.
Petitioner owns and operates a private wharf used by vessels for loading and
unloading of copra and other processed products. Among its wharf's facilities are
fender pile clusters for docking and mooring.
On May 21, 1990, at around 1:30 P.M., while MV Miguela was docking at petitioner's
wharf, it rammed and destroyed a fender pile cluster. Petitioner demanded damages
from private respondents. The latter refused. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
Petitioner's evidence during trial showed that on May 21, 1990, at 1:30 P.M., MV
Miguela came to dock at petitioner's wharf. Ireneo Naval, petitioner's employee,
guided the vessel to its docking place. After the guide (small rope) was thrown from
the vessel and while the petitioner's security guard was pulling the big rope to be
tied to the bolar, MV Miguela did not slow down. The crew did not release the
vessel's anchor. Naval shouted "Reverse" to the vessel's crew, but it was too late
when the latter responded, for the vessel already rammed the pile cluster. The
impact disinclined the pile cluster and deformed the cable wires wound around it.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent’s captain and crew were negligent
Ruling: Petitioner did not have direct evidence on what transpired within as the
officers and crew maneuvered the vessel to its berthing place. We note the Court of
Appeals' finding that Naval and Espina were not knowledgeable on the vessel's
maneuverings, and could not testify on the negligence of the officers and crew.
Second, aside from the testimony that MV Miguela rammed the cluster pile, private
respondent did not show persuasively other possible causes of the damage.
Applying now the above, there exists a presumption of negligence against private
respondents which we opine the latter failed to overcome. Additionally, petitioner
presented tangible proof that demonstrated private respondents' negligence. As
testified by Capt. Olasiman, from command of "slow ahead" to "stop engine", the
vessel will still travel 100 meters before it finally stops. However, he ordered "stop
engine" when the vessel was only 50 meters from the pier. Further, he testified that
before the vessel is put to slow astern, the engine has to be restarted. However,
Olasiman can not estimate how long it takes before the engine goes to slow astern
after the engine is restarted. From these declarations, the conclusion is that it was
already too late when the captain ordered reverse. By then, the vessel was only 4
meters from the pier, and thus rammed it.
Respondent company's negligence consists in allowing incompetent crew to man its

vessel. As shown also by petitioner, both Captain Olasiman and Chief Mate Gabisan
did not have a formal training in marine navigation. The former was a mere
elementary graduate while the latter is a high school graduate. Their experience in
navigation22 was only as a watchman and a quartermaster, respectively.
Philippine Rabbit v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 66102-04
Facts: About 11:00 o'clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua,
Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro
Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro
Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at
their respective homes. Although they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a
jeepney that day because the buses were full. Their contract with Manalo was for
them to pay P24.00 for the trip. The private respondents' testimonial evidence on
this contractual relationship was not controverted by Mangune, Carreon and
Manalo, nor by Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the
jeepney, with contrary evidence. Purportedly riding on the front seat with Manalo
was Mercedes Lorenzo. On the left rear passenger seat were Caridad Pascua,
Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right rear passenger seat were
Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales. After a brief stopover at
Moncada, Tarlac for refreshment, the jeepney proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales,
Pangasinan.
Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the
jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped
on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the
eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on
the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the
south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was
going). The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the
western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among
which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven
by Tomas delos Reyes. Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn
and encroached on the western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos
Reyes, or after stopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by Mangune, Carreon
and Manalo, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda
Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney passengers sustained
physical injuries. What could have been a festive Christmas turned out to be tragic.
Issue: who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of
the jeepney.
Ruling: The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses
Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune
and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous The driver
cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the
contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the
contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of
contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger,
even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In other words,
the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with
him, for his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and
severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal
instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share
which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article
2181 of the New Civil Code.
After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find
that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses
Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed
precisely pro hac vice.
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-
ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil
Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous
event (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies
of Caridad Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's)
conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with
Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur supra.
Juntilla v. Fontanar G.R. No. L-45637
Facts: the plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney bearing plate No.
PUJ-71-7 on the course of the trip from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was
driven by defendant Berfol Camoro. It was registered under the franchise of
defendant Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando
Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded
causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the
front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff
momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found that he had
a lacerated wound on his right palm. Aside from this, he suffered injuries on his left
arm, right thigh and on his back. Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to
Danao City but on the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost.
Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered the Danao City Hospital to
attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to proceed immediately to
the place of the accident and look for the watch.
Issue: Whether or not defendants and/or their employee failed to exercise "utmost
and/or extraordinary diligence" required of common carriers contemplated under
Art. 1755 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling: In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the
respondents. The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and
jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence
shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the
accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep
running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire
blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded
at the time of the accident. The petitioner stated that there were three (3)
passengers in the front seat and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of
the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a
fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to
adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to
compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up,
therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire
coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the
accident.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the
negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common
carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe
and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows
up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.
It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the
contract of carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the circumstances. The
records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents.
Philippine American General Insurance Co, Inc. v. MGG Marine Services, Inc. G.R.
No. 135645
Facts: On March 1, 1987, San Miguel Corporation insured several beer bottle cases
with an aggregate value of P5,836,222.80 with petitioner Philippine American
General Insurance Company.2 The cargo were loaded on board the M/V Peatheray
Patrick-G to be transported from Mandaue City to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
After having been cleared by the Coast Guard Station in Cebu the previous day, the
vessel left the port of Mandaue City for Bislig, Surigao del Sur on March 2, 1987. The
weather was calm when the vessel started its voyage.
The following day, March 3, 1987, M/V Peatheray Patrick-G listed and subsequently
sunk off Cawit Point, Cortes, Surigao del Sur. As a consequence thereof, the cargo
belonging to San Miguel Corporation was lost.
Subsequently, San Miguel Corporation claimed the amount of its loss from
petitioner.
Upon petitioner's request, on March 18, 1987, Mr. Eduardo Sayo, a surveyor from
the Manila Adjusters and Surveyors Co., went to Taganauan Island, Cortes, Surigao
del Sur where the vessel was cast ashore, to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the loss of the cargo. In his report, Mr. Sayo stated that the vessel was
structurally sound and that he did not see any damage or crack thereon. He
concluded that the proximate cause of the listing and subsequent sinking of the
vessel was the shifting of ballast water from starboard to portside. The said shifting
of ballast water allegedly affected the stability of the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G.
Issue: whether private respondents were partly to blame for failing to exercise due
diligence to prevent the loss of the cargo.
Ruling: The findings of the Board of Marine Inquiry indicate that the attendance of
strong winds and huge waves while the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G was sailing through
Cortes, Surigao del Norte on March 3, 1987 was indeed fortuitous. A fortuitous event
has been defined as one which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, is
inevitable.
In the case at bar, it was adequately shown that before the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G
left the port of Mandaue City, the Captain confirmed with the Coast Guard that the
weather condition would permit the safe travel of the vessel to Bislig, Surigao del
Sur. Thus, he could not be expected to have foreseen the unfavorable weather
condition that awaited the vessel in Cortes, Surigao del Sur. It was the presence of
the strong winds and enormous waves which caused the vessel to list, keel over, and
consequently lose the cargo contained therein. The appellate court likewise found
that there was no negligence on the part of the crew of the M/V Peatheray Patrick-
G.
Although the Board of Marine Inquiry ruled only on the administrative liability of the
captain and crew of the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G, it had to conduct a thorough
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the vessel and the loss
of its cargo in order to determine their responsibility, if any. The results of its
investigation as embodied in its decision on the administrative case clearly indicate
that the loss of the cargo was due solely to the attendance of strong winds and huge
waves which caused the vessel accumulate water, tilt to the port side and to
eventually keel over. There was thus no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
relying on the factual findings of the Board of Marine Inquiry, for such factual
findings, being supported by substantial evidence are persuasive, considering that
said administrative body is an expert in matters concerning marine casualties.
Since the presence of strong winds and enormous waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur
on March 3, 1987 was shown to be the proximate and only cause of the sinking of
the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G and the loss of the cargo belonging to San Miguel
Corporation, private respondents cannot be held liable for the said loss.
Ganzon v. CA G.R. No. L‐48757
Facts: On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro
B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of
Manila on board the lighter LCT "Batman" (Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Facts, Amended
Record on Appeal, p. 38). Pursuant to that agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent his
lighter "Batman" to Mariveles where it docked in three feet of water (t.s.n.,

September 28, 1972, p. 31). On December 1, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing delivered the
scrap iron to defendant Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading which was
actually begun on the same date by the crew of the lighter under the captain's
supervision. When about half of the scrap iron was already loaded (t.s.n., December
14, 1972, p. 20), Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded
P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a
heated argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at
Gelacio Tumambing (t.s.n., March 19, 1971, p. 9; September 28, 1972, pp. 6-
7).<äre||anº•1àw> The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had to be taken to a
hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for treatment (t.s.n., March 19, 1971, p. 13; September
28, 1972, p. 15).
After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4,
1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain
Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron (t.s.n., June 16, 1972, pp. 8-9)
where the lighter was docked (t.s.n., September 28, 1972, p. 31). The rest was
brought to the compound of NASSCO (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-22). Later on Acting
Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken
custody of the scrap iron (Stipulation of Facts, Record on Appeal, p. 40; t.s.n.,
September 28, 1972, p. 10.)
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of breach of contract of transportation.
Ruling: The petitioner, through his employees, actually received the scraps is freely
admitted. Significantly, there is not the slightest allegation or showing of any
condition, qualification, or restriction accompanying the delivery by the private
respondent-shipper of the scraps, or the receipt of the same by the petitioner. On
the contrary, soon after the scraps were delivered to, and received by the petitioner-
common carrier, loading was commenced.
By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession
and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for
transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the
petitioner-carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary
responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the
carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The fact
that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair
the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control
of the carrier, albeit still unloaded.
The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the
following causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, namely:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted

negligently. By reason of this presumption, the court is not even required to make
an express finding of fault or negligence before it could hold the petitioner
answerable for the breach of the contract of carriage. Still, the petitioner could have
been exempted from any liability had he been able to prove that he observed
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods in his custody, according to all
the circumstances of the case, or that the loss was due to an unforeseen event or
to force majeure. As it was, there was hardly any attempt on the part of the
petitioner to prove that he exercised such extraordinary diligence.
Southern Lines v. CA G.R. No. L‐16629

Facts: Sometime in 1948, the City of Iloilo requisitioned for rice from the National Rice and Corn
Corporation (hereafter referred to as NARIC) in Manila. On August 24 of the same year, NARIC,
pursuant to the order, shipped 1,726 sacks of rice consigned to the City of Iloilo on board the SS
"General Wright" belonging to the Southern Lines, Inc. Each sack of rice weighed 75 kilos and the
entire shipment as indicated in the bill of lading had a total weight of 129,450 kilos.
On September 3, 1948, the City of Iloilo received the shipment and paid the amount
of P63,115.50. However, it was noted that the foot of the bill of lading that the City
of Iloilo 'Received the above mentioned merchandise apparently in same condition
as when shipped, save as noted below: actually received 1685 sacks with a gross
weight of 116,131 kilos upon actual weighing. Total shortage ascertained 13,319
kilos." The shortage was equivalent to 41 sacks of rice with a net weight of 13,319
kilos, the proportionate value of which was P6,486.35.
On February 14, 1951 the City of Iloilo filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo against NARIC and the Southern Lines, Inc. for the recovery of the amount of
P6,486.35 representing the value of the shortage of the shipment of rice. After trial,
the lower court absolved NARIC from the complaint, but sentenced the Southern
Lines, Inc. to pay the amount of P4,931.41 which is the difference between the sum
of P6,486.35 and P1,554.94 representing the latter's counterclaim for handling and
freight.
Issue: whether or not the defendant-carrier, the herein petitioner, is liable for the loss or shortage of
the rice shipped.
Ruling: Under the provisions of Article 361, the defendant-carrier in order to free itself from liability,
was only obliged to prove that the damages suffered by the goods were "by virtue of the nature or
defect of the articles." Under the provisions of Article 362, the plaintiff, in order to hold the defendant
liable, was obliged to prove that the damages to the goods by virtue of their nature, occurred on
account of its negligence or because the defendant did not take the precaution adopted by careful
persons.
Petitioner claims exemption from liability by contending that the shortage in the shipment of rice was
due to such factors as the shrinkage, leakage or spillage of the rice on account of the bad condition of
the sacks at the time it received the same and the negligence of the agents of respondent City of Iloilo
in receiving the shipment. The contention is untenable, for, if the fact of improper packing is known to
the carrier or his servants, or apparent upon ordinary observation, but it accepts the goods
notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting thereform. (9
Am Jur. 869.) Furthermore, according to the Court of Appeals, "appellant (petitioner) itself frankly
admitted that the strings that tied the bags of rice were broken; some bags were with holes and
plenty of rice were spilled inside the hull of the boat, and that the personnel of the boat collected no
less than 26 sacks of rice which they had distributed among themselves." This finding, which is binding
upon this Court, shows that the shortage resulted from the negligence of petitioner.
Tabacalera Insurance Co. v. North Front Shipping Services, Inc. G.R. No. 119197
Facts: On 2 August 1990, 20,234 sacks of corn grains valued at P3,500,640.00 were
shipped on board North Front 777, a vessel owned by North Front Shipping Services,
Inc. The cargo was consigned to Republic Flour Mills Corporation in Manila under Bill
of Lading No. 001 and insured with the herein mentioned insurance companies. The
vessel was inspected prior to actual loading by representatives of the shipper and
was found fit to carry the merchandise. The cargo was covered with tarpaulins and
wooden boards. The hatches were sealed and could only be opened by
representatives of Republic Flour Mills Corporation.
The vessel left Cagayan de Oro City on 2 August 1990 and arrived Manila on 16
August 1990. Republic Flour Mills Corporation was advised of its arrival but it did not
immediately commence the unloading operations. There were days when unloading
had to be stopped due to variable weather conditions and sometimes for no
apparent reason at all. When the cargo was eventually unloaded there was a
shortage of 26.333 metric tons. The remaining merchandise was already moldy,
rancid and deteriorating. The unloading operations were completed on 5 September
1990 or twenty (20) days after the arrival of the barge at the wharf of Republic Flour
Mills Corporation in Pasig City.
Precision Analytical Services, Inc., was hired to examine the corn grains and
determine the cause of deterioration. A Certificate of Analysis was issued indicating
that the corn grains had 18.56% moisture content and the wetting was due to
contact with salt water. The mold growth was only incipient and not sufficient to
make the corn grains toxic and unfit for consumption. In fact the mold growth could
still be arrested by drying.
Republic Flour Mills Corporation rejected the entire cargo and formally demanded
from North Front Shipping Services, Inc., payment for the damages suffered by it.
The demands however were unheeded. The insurance companies were perforce
obliged to pay Republic Flour Mills Corporation P2,189,433.40.
By virtue of the payment made by the insurance companies they were subrogated to
the rights of Republic Flour Mills Corporation. Thusly, they lodged a complaint for
damages against North Front Shipping Services, Inc., claiming that the loss was
exclusively attributable to the fault and negligence of the carrier. The Marine Cargo
Adjusters hired by the insurance companies conducted a survey and found cracks in
the bodega of the barge and heavy concentration of molds on the tarpaulins and
wooden boards. They did not notice any seals in the hatches. The tarpaulins were
not brand new as there were patches on them, contrary to the claim of North Front
Shipping Services, Inc., thus making it possible for water to seep in. They also
discovered that the bulkhead of the barge was rusty.
North Front Shipping Services, Inc., averred in refutation that it could not be made
culpable for the loss and deterioration of the cargo as it was never negligent. Captain
Solomon Villanueva, master of the vessel, reiterated that the barge was inspected
prior to the actual loading and was found adequate and seaworthy. In addition, they
were issued a permit to sail by the Coast Guard. The tarpaulins were doubled and
brand new and the hatches were properly sealed. They did not encounter big waves
hence it was not possible for water to seep in. He further averred that the corn
grains were farm wet and not properly dried when loaded.
Issue: Whether or not a charter-party agreement between P and R requires

extraordinary diligence.
Ruling: The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc.,
and Republic Flour Mills Corporation did not in any way convert the common carrier
into a private carrier.
North Front Shipping Services, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the business of

transporting cargo and offers its services indiscriminately to the public. It is without
doubt a common carrier. As such it is required to observe extraordinary diligence in
its vigilance over the goods it transports. When goods placed in its care are lost or
damaged, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently. North Front Shipping Services, Inc., therefore has the burden of proving
that it observed extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost
cargo.
North Front Shipping Services, Inc., proved that the vessel was inspected prior to
actual loading by representatives of the shipper and was found fit to take a load of
corn grains. They were also issued Permit to Sail by the Coast Guard. The master of
the vessel testified that the corn grains were farm wet when loaded. However, this
testimony was disproved by the clean bill of lading issued by North Front Shipping
Services, Inc., which did not contain a notation that the corn grains were wet and
improperly dried. Having been in the service since 1968, the master of the vessel
would have known at the outset that corn grains that were farm wet and not
properly dried would eventually deteriorate when stored in sealed and hot
compartments as in hatches of a ship. Equipped with this knowledge, the master of
the vessel and his crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid or
lessen the cargo's possible deterioration as they were presumed knowledgeable
about the nature of such cargo. But none of such measures was taken.
In fine, we find that the carrier failed to observe the required extraordinary

diligence in the vigilance over the goods placed in its care. The proofs presented by
North Front Shipping Services, Inc., were insufficient to rebut the prima
facie presumption of private respondent's negligence, more so if we consider the
evidence adduced by petitioners.
It is not denied by the insurance companies that the vessel was indeed inspected
before actual loading and that North Front 777 was issued a Permit to Sail. They
proved the fact of shipment and its consequent loss or damage while in the actual
possession of the carrier. Notably, the carrier failed to volunteer any explanation
why there was spoilage and how it occurred. On the other hand, it was shown during
the trial that the vessel had rusty bulkheads and the wooden boards and tarpaulins
bore heavy concentration of molds. The tarpaulins used were not new, contrary to
the claim of North Front Shipping Services, Inc., as there were already several
patches on them, hence, making it highly probable for water to enter.
However, we cannot attribute the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo

solely to the carrier. We find the consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation guilty of
contributory negligence. It was seasonably notified of the arrival of the barge but did
not immediately start the unloading operations. No explanation was proffered by the
consignee as to why there was a delay of six (6) days. Had the unloading been
commenced immediately the loss could have been completely avoided or at least
minimized. As testified to by the chemist who analyzed the corn samples, the mold
growth was only at its incipient stage and could still be arrested by drying. The corn
grains were not yet toxic or unfit for consumption.
Briñas v. People G.R. No. L‐30309
Facts: That on or about the 6th day of January, 1957, in the Municipality of Tiaong,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the
said accused Victor Milan, Clemente Briñas and Hermogenes Buencamino, being
then persons in charge of passenger Train No. 522-6 of the Manila Railroad
Company, then running from Tagkawayan to San Pablo City, as engine driver,
conductor and assistant conductor, respectively, wilfully and unlawfully drove and
operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due
regard to existing laws, regulations and ordinances, that although there were
passengers on board the passenger coach, they failed to provide lamps or lights
therein, and failed to take the necessary precautions for the safety of passengers
and to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence, that when said passenger Train No. 522-6
was passing the railroad tracks in the Municipality of Tiaong, Quezon, two of its
passengers, Martina Bool, an old woman, and Emelita Gesmundo, a child about
three years of age, fell from the passenger coach of the said train, as a result of
which, they were over run, causing their instantaneous death. "
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent

Ruling: It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers

like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and
the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common
experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand
and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a
full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train
resumes its run before they are able to disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus
may be stopped.
It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said
stop was still a full three minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of Appeals
correctly observed, "the appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous.
That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact that
immediately after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to full speed.
Petitioner-appellant failed to show any reason why the train suddenly resumed its
regular speed. The announcement was made while the train was still in Barrio
Lagalag.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous
announcement of petitioner' appelant Briñas. This announcement prompted the
victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the
victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked
as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous
announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct and
natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.
We have carefully examined the records and we agree with the respondent court
that the negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erroneously
announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of Martina
Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory
and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.
OngYiu v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-40597
Facts: On August 26, 1967, petitioner was a fare paying passenger of respondent
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL), on board Flight No. 463-R, from Mactan Cebu, bound
for Butuan City. He was scheduled to attend the trial of Civil Case No. 1005 and Spec.
Procs. No. 1125 in the Court of First Instance, Branch II, thereat, set for hearing on
August 28-31, 1967. As a passenger, he checked in one piece of luggage, a blue
"maleta" for which he was issued Claim Check No. 2106-R (Exh. "A"). The plane left
Mactan Airport, Cebu, at about 1:00 o'clock P.M., and arrived at Bancasi airport,
Butuan City, at past 2:00 o'clock P.M., of the same day. Upon arrival, petitioner
claimed his luggage but it could not be found. According to petitioner, it was only
after reacting indignantly to the loss that the matter was attended to by the porter
clerk, Maximo Gomez, which, however, the latter denies, At about 3:00 o'clock P.M.,
PAL Butuan, sent a message to PAL, Cebu, inquiring about the missing luggage, which
message was, in turn relayed in full to the Mactan Airport teletype operator at 3:45
P.M. (Exh. "2") that same afternoon. It must have been transmitted to Manila
immediately, for at 3:59 that same afternoon, PAL Manila wired PAL Cebu advising
that the luggage had been over carried to Manila aboard Flight No. 156 and that it
would be forwarded to Cebu on Flight No. 345 of the same day. Instructions were
also given that the luggage be immediately forwarded to Butuan City on the first
available flight (Exh. "3"). At 5:00 P.M. of the same afternoon, PAL Cebu sent a
message to PAL Butuan that the luggage would be forwarded on Fright No. 963 the
following day, August 27, 196'(. However, this message was not received by PAL
Butuan as all the personnel had already left since there were no more incoming
flights that afternoon.
In the meantime, petitioner was worried about the missing luggage because it
contained vital documents needed for trial the next day. At 10:00 o'clock that
evening, petitioner wired PAL Cebu demanding the delivery of his baggage before
noon the next day, otherwise, he would hold PAL liable for damages, and stating that
PAL's gross negligence had caused him undue inconvenience, worry, anxiety and
extreme embarrassment (Exh. "B"). This telegram was received by the Cebu PAL
supervisor but the latter felt no need to wire petitioner that his luggage had already
been forwarded on the assumption that by the time the message reached Butuan
City, the luggage would have arrived.
Early in the morning of the next day, August 27, 1967, petitioner went to the Bancasi
Airport to inquire about his luggage. He did not wait, however, for the morning flight
which arrived at 10:00 o'clock that morning. This flight carried the missing luggage.
The porter clerk, Maximo Gomez, paged petitioner, but the latter had already left. A
certain Emilio Dagorro a driver of a "colorum" car, who also used to drive for
petitioner, volunteered to take the luggage to petitioner. As Maximo Gomez knew
Dagorro to be the same driver used by petitioner whenever the latter was in Butuan
City, Gomez took the luggage and placed it on the counter. Dagorro examined the
lock, pressed it, and it opened. After calling the attention of Maximo Gomez, the
"maleta" was opened, Gomez took a look at its contents, but did not touch them.
Dagorro then delivered the "maleta" to petitioner, with the information that the lock
was open. Upon inspection, petitioner found that a folder containing certain
exhibits, transcripts and private documents in Civil Case No. 1005 and Sp. Procs. No.
1126 were missing, aside from two gift items for his parents-in-law. Petitioner
refused to accept the luggage. Dagorro returned it to the porter clerk, Maximo
Gomez, who sealed it and forwarded the same to PAL Cebu.
Issue:

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Dasmariñas, Ma.

Loisa 2L - Transportation Law

Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-9671

Facts: A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as defendant, is a

Issue: Has defendant observed extraordinary diligence or the utmost diligence of

It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded

PAL vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120262

Ruling: To begin with, it must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers

More importantly, it has been sufficiently established that it is petitioner's standard

Issue: Whether or not Nueca was a passenger

Calalas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122039

Issue: whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage

Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118664

Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating

Dangwa v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 95582

Ruling: Common carriers, from the nature of their business and

La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-20761

Aboitiz Shipping v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 84458

Issue:Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the

Pestano v. Sumayang G.R. No. 139875

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was negligent

Ruling: Petitioners are raising a question of fact based on Pestaño's testimony

Ludo v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125483

Facts: Petitioner Ludo & Luym Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in

Respondent company's negligence consists in allowing incompetent crew to man its

Philippine Rabbit v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 66102-04

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is

Juntilla v. Fontanar G.R. No. L-45637

Ganzon v. CA G.R. No. L‐48757

lighter "Batman" to Mariveles where it docked in three feet of water (t.s.n.,

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of breach of contract of transportation.

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted

Southern Lines v. CA G.R. No. L‐16629

Issue: Whether or not a charter-party agreement between P and R requires

North Front Shipping Services, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the business of

In fine, we find that the carrier failed to observe the required extraordinary

However, we cannot attribute the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo

Briñas v. People G.R. No. L‐30309

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent

Ruling: It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers

OngYiu v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-40597

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