Chapter 9

Are Things as
They Appear?
Appearance and Reality
Story

u Why do lemons look yellow?

u Presumably because they reflect light in a certain way.
u But this is an account of why lemons look yellow
without appealing to the fact that they are yellow.
u And if we don't need to appeal to the fact that lemons
are yellow, why suppose that there is any such fact at
all?
u A simpler hypothesis would be that lemons have no
color at all.
Appearance and Reality
 Positions

u Color eliminativism: colors should be eliminated

from an accurate description of physical objects.
accurate is an important word of this idea, as we describe it how we perceive but not accurately as they really are
u This can be extended to other sorts of eliminativism:
taste eliminativism, shape eliminativism, etc.
u Idealism: not only do physical objects not have
colors; there are no physical objects.
u Eliminativism about minds: minds are only
collections of ideas—there are no minds over and
above ideas.
Argument from Science - 1

u If yellowness does not figure in any explanation of

why a lemon is yellow, then the lemon is not yellow.
u Science can explain why the lemon looks yellow
without supposing that it is yellow.
u So lemons are not yellow.
u Since this argument works for everything, no
physical object is colored. (or has an odor or a
taste)
Argument from Science - 2

u We can provide three explanations for why a lemon

looks yellow:
u Its reflectance curve
u The pigments in its skin
u That it is disposed to look yellow under certain
conditions to normal observers.
u We do not need a fourth explanation that the
lemon is yellow.
Argument from Science - 3

Properties in objects and in the mind

u Objects have primary properties
u Extension, shape, solidity, gravity, motion, rest
u Secondary properties exist in the mind
u Sensory qualities such as colour, taste, smell
u However, modern physics might give us a reason to
doubt that ‘shape’ is any different than colour
u The shape of a lemon as we perceive it has nothing to
do with it’s physical components – particles, electrons,
etc.
Appearance and Reality
Argument from Variation

u Objects look different colors when viewed from

different perspectives.
u There is no reason to think that one color is more
fundamental to the object than another.
u If there is no reason to think that one color is more
fundamental than another to the object, then it
seems there is no particular color that an object is.
u Therefore, objects are not actually a particular
color.
u This can be extended to other features such as
taste and shape as well.
What is it?

u If the ‘real’ lemon has no

colour, odour, taste, smell
or shape – what is the real
lemon?
u Do real lemons exist?
u If yes, where do they exist?
Are you in the Matrix?

u If reality is perception, then how we perceive life to

be (or the world, or things in the world), could be an
illusion
u But we’d only find out if it wasn’t a perfect illusion.
u The perfect illusion is reality
u Is your social media identity the ‘real’ you?
Readings: Summary

u Russell: Russell argues that we cannot be sure of the

reality that lies behind our experiences.
u Berkeley: Berkeley argues for idealism (the view that
there are no physical objects, only minds and their
perceptions). pronounced barkley
u Vasubandhu: Vasubandhu also argues for idealism
even when it comes to our minds (they are merely
collections of ideas).
Readings: Russell - 1

u “In daily life, we assume a certain many things

which, on a closer scrutiny, are found to be so full of
apparent contradictions that only a great amount
of thought enables us to know what it is that we
really may believe.”
u If I am in a room with another person, I presume that
they see the same objects I do
u A lamp, table, chairs, books, papers
Readings: Russell - 2

u "we speak of the colour of the table, we only mean

the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a
normal spectator from an ordinary point of view
under usual conditions of light. But the other colours
which appear . . . have just as good a right to be
considered real . . . we are compelled to deny that,
in itself, the table has any one particular colour."
u Similar points apply to the texture and shape of the
table.
u It looks one shape when viewed one way, and a
different shape when viewed another way.
u The texture looks different up close versus far away
Readings: Russell - 3

u "The one thing we know about it [the table] is that it

is not what it seems.”
u ”The real table, if there is one, is not the same was what
we immediately experience by sight or touch"
u This suggests that we cannot know which of various
competing theories of the nature of the table is
correct.
u Perhaps there is no table at all, but we don’t know
that either.
u All we can say is: Reality is not what it seems to be.
Appearance and Reality
Readings: Vasubandhu

Vasabandhu seems to be a metaphysical idealist

u "it has been established that everything in the three

realms is nothing but appearance."
u The objects of awareness "are nothing but
appearances."
u We are not really aware of other minds, nor are we
aware of our own minds.
u "one's own mind is unknown to one in the manner in
which it is known to the Buddhas."
Discussion Questions

u If there were no perceivers in the world, would

anything be colored? Why do you believe as you
do?
u Should we accept color eliminativism or not? Why
do you believe as you do?
u Do physical objects exist? How can we know?
u Are you living in a computer simulation?

movie: everything is mind