Chapter 7

Is Mind Material?
Story

u Some things in the environment are wholly physical things, like

rocks or chunks of ice.
u But what about living things, such as bacteria?
u Bacteria are today held to be wholly material, too.
u And if this is so, then it seems that we are wholly material, too.
u After all, simply increasing the number of cells in an organism
should make no difference as to whether it is material or not.
u But what about our mental states?
u Are thinking, feeling, and perceiving nothing but physical states
of an organism?
u How does the mind fit into the material world?
u This is the mind-body problem. Happiness?
Positions

u Behaviorism: to have a certain mental state is just to

behave in certain ways
u The Identity Theory: to have a certain mental state is
to have a brain in a certain neural firing pattern.
u Functionalism: mental states are functional states.
u Dualism: the mind is not material at all.
 Behaviorism - 1
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Behaviorism - 2

u To have a mind, to be in such-and-such mental

states, is to behave in certain ways, or to be
disposed or inclined to behave in certain ways.
u But what if a being was controlled remotely by others,
so he behaves as if he had a mind?
u Would they then have beliefs, desires, and intentions?

u What if a person exhibited no behavior, perhaps as a

result of locked-in syndrome?
u Would they still have a mental life, or not?
problem with behaviourism then
 The Identity Theory

u The property of having a brain state in a neural firing

pattern W is identical to a particular mental state,
such as the desire for water.
u But perhaps this is too narrow in scope, as it
excludes beings from possessing mental lives that
lack the biological brains of humans.
the difference between basic survival needs and the complexity of the human brain

What entities other than humans have ‘minds’?

 Functionalism

u Mental states are identical to functional states.

u A functional state can be implemented in a variety
of hardware, and so biological brains are not
needed for beings to have mental states.
mind is what the body does

from a functionalist account, it can (a matter of complexities)

Does this mean that a computer could have a

‘mind’?
Dualism

u Maybe the mind is not material after all.

u Maybe the mind is mental.
u Ryle critically refers to this position as "the dogma of
the ghost in the machine."
Readings: Summary

u Descartes: Descartes argues that the mind is better

known than the body.
u "I am essentially a thinking thing, but I also have a body
that I am conjoined with."
u Ryle: Ryle argues against the "official doctrine" that
people are both bodies and minds.
u Searle: Searle argues against the view that the mind
is analogous to a computer program, with the brain
being the hardware.
Readings: Descartes - 1

u I cannot doubt that I am a thinking being, as doubting

involves thinking.
u Hence, I am, I exist.
u But what is this "I"?
u A thing that thinks.
u How well do I understand bodies?
u Consider wax—what I understand in wax is nothing that
comes to be from the senses, for wax can change and yet
still be wax.
u The nature of the wax is perceived by the mind alone, by
my faculty of judgment.
u The mind is thus known better than the body.
 Readings: Descartes - 2

u That I can clearly and distinctly understand mind

and body as being separable makes me certain
that they are distinct.
u My essence is that of a thinking thing.
u But I also have a body that I am conjoined with.

Is your mind distinct from your body? Use an

example to illustrate your response.
 Readings: Descartes - 3

If the mind is distinct from the body, what is it that

keeps my mind in my body?

If my mind is material, like my body, why is it so

mysterious?
Readings: Ryle - 1
Readings: Ryle - 2

u The "official doctrine" is that people are both bodies

and minds.
u But this view of minds being "a ghost in the machine"
of the body is a category-mistake.
u It represents the facts of mental life as though they
belong to one category when they belong to another.
u Descartes makes this mistake, although he did not
originate it.
 Readings: Ryle - 3

If an integrated AI becomes ‘another layer’ of

intelligence, will it be a different type of thing than
my mind? Would Ryle put it in the same category as
minds and bodies? Or would it be different?
Readings: Searle - 1

Argues that computers are different than humans

Readings: Searle - 2

u Argues against "Strong AI," the view that "the mind is

to the brain, as the program is to the computer
hardware."
u Searle supports his view through the thought
experiment of the Chinese Room.
u The person in the room will never understand Chinese.
u Similarly, no digital computer will ever understand
Chinese.
Discussion Questions

u Do you think that a robot could ever think, or feel

pain? Why do you believe as you do? Is it possible
that you could be a robot?
u If the mind is distinct from the body, how could they
interact?
u Do you believe that the Chinese Room understands
anything? Explain your answer, and outline its
implications for the functionalist view of the mind.