Caselist Criminal Case List For Criminal Law

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Caselist-Criminal - Case list for criminal law.
Criminal law (University of London)
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Case list for Criminal law.
1
Actus reus.
Acts(General principle)
1. 1. Bratty v. A-G for The actus reus must be voluntary or willed. In this case Lord
Northern Ireland. Denning stated; 'no act is punishable if it is done involuntary:
and an involuntary act in this context means...an act doe by,
the muscles without control by the mind such as a spasm, a
reflex, or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not
conscious of what he is doing such as an act done while
suffering from a concussion or while sleep walking'.
2. 2. Deller. The actus reus must be proved.
Exception
3, 3, 4 Larsonneur; Status, situational and possession offences can be committed

4 and Robinson Pierre; involuntarily. They do not require a proof of mens rea.
and 5. Winzar; Elvin;
Deyemi.
5.
Burden of proof(General principle)
6. 6. Woolmington V. Burden of proof is on the prosecution. If the jury is left with

Dpp. reasonable doubt as to the guilt, they must acquit; although they may
not be satisfied that he is innocent, but if they are not sure of the
guilt, the case against the defendant has not been proven. Exception;
the defenses of 'insanity' and ' diminished responsibility'.
Omissions.
(1).Mere omission (conduct crime).
7. 7. Dytham; These cases illustrate the presence of omissions at common law .
Brown.
8, 8, 9. Miller Most result crimes can be committed by omission.

9. (criminal
damage);
Shama
(Theft).
10. 10. Dunn Definitions of some crimes specify and imply that only acts are
(assault). sufficient.
(2).Commission by omission (5 duty situations) (result
crime).
11, (a). Close Downes; Duty exists between parents and children.
12, Relation. Gibbons
13 , Parents & and
children. Proctor;
14 ,
Lowe;
15.
Emery and
Russell.
16 (a). Hood; Smith. Duty exists between husband and wife.
and Close
17. Relation.
Husband & wife.
Muhammad Shahzaib Shoaib.

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18, (b). Marriot; Instan; Where responsibility of another person has been
19,2 Voluntary Stone and voluntarily assumed, the criminal law imposes a duty
20 assumption of Dobinson; to act on the basis of expectation or reliance.
responsibility. Ruffel.
and
21.
22, (c). R V. Miller In a case where the defendant does an act which
23, Creating a 1954; creates a dangerous situation but then deliberately
24 dangerous R V. Miller or knowingly fails to undo that danger due to which
situation. 1983; Dpp V. the harm is caused.
and
Santa
25.
Bermudez;
Gemma Evans.
26 (d). R V. Pittwood; Applies when through a contract of employment,
and Contractual, R V. Dytham. an employee assumes responsibility for third
27. statutory or parties, such as public.
official duty.
28 (e). R V. Fagan; This doctrine applies where the actus reus and mens
and 'Continuing act Kaitamaki. rea do not coincide in time and the defendant brings
29. doctrine'. about the actus reus without relevant mens rea but
while the harmful result continues, intentionally omits
to remedy them.
30. exception Airedale NHS An omission by the doctors to provide life
Trust V. Bland. support in the best interest of the patient is not
a breach of duty.
31. Causation! Morby. The prosecution must be able to prove that the
defendant’s breach of duty caused the harm.
Causation; Causation is a set of rules by which the courts determine whether the
defendant has caused or contributed significantly to the result as a matter of law. It is a
two stage test: factual and legal causation.
32 (1). R V. White; R 'But for test'; "but for" the defendant's conduct, the result
and Factual V. Dalloway. would not have happened. Defendants 'culpable conduct
33. Causation should be the factual cause of the result.
.
34 Dr. Adams; Dr. Minimal contributions are disregarded. Thus a doctor
and Cox. who accelerates death by minutes or hours of a
35. terminally ill patient by administering him with a high
dose of pain killers for the purposes of palliative
care does not cause death; defendants conduct need
not be the minimal cause of the end result; it has to
be the significant cause of the result.
(2). Legal Causation; Legal causation is more of a test of moral judgment. The defendants
‘culpable conduct’ should be the legal cause of the end result.
36 36 and 37. Hennigan; 'De minimis principle'; the defendants conduct should
and Cato. be more than trivial cause of the end result.
37.
38. 38. Pagett. The defendants conduct should be the significant cause of
the end result.
39. 39. Smith. The defendants conduct should be the substantial cause of
the end result.
40. 40. Benge. The defendant conduct need not be the sole or main cause of the
end result but it has to be an operating cause.
41. 41. Mitchell. 'Casual connection does not have to be direct'.
Third Party interventions (4 situations)

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42. (a). Pagett. (1). The defendants acts need not be the sole or main cause
3 Homicide of victim's death.
and violent (2). Defendants act need only contribute 'significantly' to
the result.
offences.
(3). Third party intervention has to be 'free, deliberate and
informed'.
(4). Reasonable act in self-preservation or in pursuance of a
legal duty is not voluntary.
43. (a). Rafferty. (1). Third party intervention has to be 'free, deliberate and
Homicide informed'.
and violent (2). If there is an independent act that supersedes the
initial act then the chain of causation will be broken.
offences.
44. (b). Dalby and (1). A voluntary act of self injection will break the chain of
Drug supply causation as self injection of a class A drug, by an informed
Armstong;
cases. adult of sound mind is an autonomous act.
Kennedy
(2). Third party intervention must be 'free, deliberate and
(No.2). informed'.
• Not voluntary where the third party is acting: in

the course of duty or self preservation, in
concert with the defendant, or is an innocent
agent.
(c). 2 main (1). The defendants act need not be the only or main cause
Medical of death.
rules
cases. (2). The defendants act need not be the sole cause of death
apply
but 'must' be a 'substantial, operating and significant cause'
45 (1) Dyson; Mckechnie. Defendants act does not have to be the
and only or main cause of death.
46.
47, (2). Smith; Malcherek and Steel; The defendants act does not have to be
48, Cheshire (COC not broken). the sole cause of death but it must be
49. substantial, operating and significant
cause.
50. (2). Jordan (COC broken). At the time of death, injuries caused
by the defendant were not substantial,
operating and significant cause. The
cause was the 'palpably wrong'
treatment.
(d). 2 main rules (1). You must take your victims as you find them;
Intervention (2). Victim escape cases.
apply
by victim. (potentially
conflicting).
51, (1). Owens v Liverpool Corp Egg shell rule; you must take your
52, (originated); Martin; Blaue; victims as you find them.
54. Holland; Hayward;
55, (1). Blaue; Holland. The victim is under no duty to seek
56. help.
57, (1). Dear, Dhaliwal. Unforeseeable acts by the victim followed
58, by the defendant’s unlawful act, even
59. Wallace (Coc broken). suicide will not break the coc. Applies to
Blue and Holland too.
60, (2). Roberts; Marjoram. Victim’s response must be proportionate to
61. the threat. The test of 'reasonable
forseeability' applies and the victim is
judged through the standards of a
hypothetical on-looker.
62, (2). Williams; Davis. Victim’s abnormal, unreasonable or daft

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63. reaction will break the coc.

4
Mens Rea.
Direct Intention.
64. 64. Moloney. Direct intention is the aim or purpose of

the defendant.
Oblique Intention.
65. 65. Nedrick/Woollin. Nedrick/Woollin test;

(1). A court or jury may also find that a
result is intended, though it is not the
actor's purpose to cause it, when; (a)
the result is virtually certain
consequence of the act, and (b) the
actor know that it is virtually certain
consequence of the act.
Recklessness.
66. 66. Cunnigham; R v G & R . Recklessness is now defined

subjectively as 'conscious taking of
an unjustified risk’. The House of
Lords held a subjective standard now
applies to criminal damage.
Negligence.
67. 67. McCrone v. Riding. Negligence adheres to an objective

standard.
68, Gross- Bateman; Gross negligence is defined according to these cases as
69. negligence. Adomako. 'an extremely high degree of negligence' so as to
deserve criminal punishment. Only applies to gross
negligence manslaughter.
Transferred Malice.
70. 70. Gnango. Transferred malice is a legal doctrine

that states that when the intention to
harm one individual inadvertently causes
a second person to be hurt instead, the
perpetrator is still held responsible for
the end result.
71. 71. A-G's Ref (No.3 of 1994). Indented victim and the actual victim
are treated as if they were one.
72. 72. Latimer. The doctrine applies to all crimes of
violence and not merely murder.
73. 73. Grant; Pembliton. The doctrine only applies if the family
of offences is the same.

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Criminal Homicide
Murder.
Murder is defined at common law as ‘an unlawful killing of a human being in the Queen’s
peace with malice aforethought’.
Actus reus Unlawful killing of a  Unlawful killing;
human being in the  Human being.
Queens’s peace.  Queen’s peace.
Mens rea  Intention to kill;
Malice aforethought  Intention to cause
GBH.
74. (1).Unlawful killing Clegg. Soldiers and police may kill in
(Actus reus) the course of their duties
but they will be liable for
murder if they go beyond
their duty or use excessive
force.
75,76 (1).Unlawful killing Nicklinson; Consent is not a defense to
. (Actus reus) Nicklinson V. UK; liability for criminal homicide
Inglis. by affirmative action; there
is no defense of euthanasia
or of dueling.
77. (1).Unlawful killing Dr. Adams; Dr. Cox. Minimal contributions are
(Actus reus) disregarded. Thus a doctor who
accelerates death by minutes or
hours of a terminally ill patient
but the purpose of palliative
care does not cause death;
defendants conduct need not be
the minimal cause of the end
result; it has to be the
significant cause of the result.
78. (1).Unlawful killing Airedale Hospital Withdrawal of treatment will
(Actus reus) Trustees V. Bland. also not expose the doctors
to liability.
79. (1).Unlawful killing St George’s Health If the victim refuses to have
(Actus reus) care NHS Trust V. S. medical treatment to save
their life, doctors who
accede to that refusal are
not responsible for the
resulting death.
80. (2). Human being A-G’s Ref (No.3 of A fetus is not classified as a
(Actus reus) 1994). human being and hence a
defendant who kills a fetus
cannot be charged with
murder.
81, (2). Human being Poulton; Enouch. If the child has ‘an existence
82. (Actus reus) independent of its mother’
then it is capable of being
murdered. To have such an
existence the child must have
been wholly expelled from its

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mother’s body and be alive.

83.6 (2). Human being Vo V. France. ECTHR has declined to decide
(Actus reus) directly whether the fetus is
protected by the right to life
in Article 2.
84. (2). Human being Inglis. Disability, no matter how
(Actus reus) extreme, does not prevent a
person becoming a human
being.
85, (2). Human being Malcherek and A person ceases to be a
86. (Actus reus) human being when their brain
Steel.
stem ceases to be active,
irrespective of whether they
are being kept alive by
artificial means.
87. (1).Malice aforethought Vickers; Cunningham. Malice aforethought means
(Mens rea). ‘intention to kill’ (aka express
malice) and ‘intention to cause
GBH’ (aka implied malice).
88. (1).Malice aforethought Moloney. Direct intention for murder.
(Mens rea).
89. (1).Malice aforethought Nedrick/Woollin. [Oblique-intention]

(Mens rea). Nedrick/Woollin test;
(1). A court or jury may also
find that a result is intended,
though it is not the actor's
purpose to cause it, when; (a)
consequence of the act, and
(b) the actor know that it is
virtually certain consequence.
Murder defenses. (1). Diminished o Only available in murder.

responsibility. o Partial defenses.
o Reduces the conviction
(2). Loss of self control.
from murder to
voluntary
manslaughter.
90. (1). Diminished HM Advocate V. The defense of diminished

responsibility. responsibility originated in
Dingwall.
this case in Scotland and
introduced in UK by the S.2
of the Homicide Act 1957.
91. (1). Diminished Campbell. It is not a defense to

responsibility. attempted murder.

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92,93,94 (1). Diminished Dunbar; Ahmed Din; In the case of diminished

. responsibility. Bradshaw. responsibility, the burden
of proof is on the
defendant and the
standard of proof is on a
balance of probabilities.
1. Abnormality of
Elements of
mental
Diminished functioning;
responsibility: 2. Recognized
medical
condition;
3. Which provides
an explanation
for the killing
52 (1B) ;
4. Substantially
impaired the
defendant’s
ability 52 (1A).
95. (1).Abnormality of Lord Parker CJ stated:

Byrne.
mental functioning. ‘Abnormality of mind’
means a state of mind so
different from that of
ordinary human beings that
the reasonable man would
term it abnormal.
He further stated that it
was wide enough to cover
the minds activities in all
its aspects. Including the
ability to form a rational
judgment of what is right
and wrong but also the
ability to exercise will
power to control physical
activities in accordance
with rational judgment.
96. (2).Recognized medical Gittens. Depression is a recognized
condition. medical condition for the
purposes of diminished
responsibility.
97. (2).Recognized medical Inglis. Bipolar disorder is a
condition. recognized medical
condition for the purposes
of diminished
responsibility.

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98.8 (2).Recognized medical Sutcliffe (The times). Paranoid schizophrenia is

condition. a recognized medical
of diminished
reasonability.
99. (2).Recognized medical Byrne. Psychopathy is a
of diminished
responsibility.
100. Martin (Anthony). Paranoid personality

(2).Recognized medical disorder is a recognized
medical condition for the
condition.
purposes of diminished
responsibility.
101. (2).Recognized medical Reynolds. Postnatal depression is a
of diminished
responsibility.
102. (2).Recognized medical Ahluwalia. Battered Women’s
condition. syndrome is also a
recognized medical
of diminished
responsibility.
103. (2).Recognized medical Smith (sandie). Premenstrual syndrome is
condition. also a recognized medical
of diminished
responsibility.
104. (2).Recognized medical Brennan. If the medical evidence
condition. supporting a defense of
diminished responsibility is
put before the court by a
medical expert and the
prosecution does not
contradict the evidence
with evidence of their own
medical expert, a charge
of murder should be
withdrawn from the jury.
105. (4).Substantially Golds. The Court of Appeal in this
impaired the case ruled that the
defendant’s ability. defendant’s mental
abnormality must have had
a very significant effect
on his ability to
understand/ control
himself.
106. (4).Substantially Lloyd. The impairment need not
impaired the be total bit it must be
defendant’s ability. more than trivial or

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minimal.
9
Diminished responsibility and intoxication.
107. Diminished Fenton. Intoxication is not a

responsibility and ‘medical condition’ and
therefore it will be no
intoxication.
ground for the defense.
108. Diminished Dowds. The Court of Appeal in

responsibility and this case concluded that
voluntary acute
intoxication.
intoxication, whether
from alcohol or another
substance is not capable
of a defense of
diminished responsibility.
109. Diminished Gittens. In this case the Court of
responsibility and Appeal suggested that a
person who kills due to
intoxication.
the combined effect of
intoxication and a
recognized medical
condition may still have a
defense and in such
cases the jury should be
directed to consider,
first whether the
defendant would have
killed as he did without
being intoxicated, and if
the answer to that was
affirmative, the second
question would be
whether he would have
been suffering from
diminished responsibility
when he did so.
110. Diminished Atkinson. The approach suggested
responsibility and in the case of Gittens
was approved by the
intoxication.
Court of Appeal.

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10
111. Diminished Dietschmann. Lord Hutton, in this case
responsibility and disapproved Egan and
concluded that a brain
intoxication.
damaged person who is
intoxicated and who kills
is not in the same
position as a person who
is intoxicated, but not,
brain damaged and who
kills. It was also held
that a distinction must
be drawn between a
craving for a drink which
is caused by abnormality
of the mind, and an
abnormality of the mind
caused by a craving for
drink.
112. Diminished Tandy. Chronic alcoholism could be
ground for defense. The
responsibility and
Court of appeal accepted
intoxication. that where a defendant
could how that she was
suffering from an
abnormality of the mind at
the time when the
defendant killed, that it
was induced by a disease,
namely ‘alcoholism’, and
that it was such as to
substantially impair their
responsibility for their
actions. Then the defense
of diminished responsibility
would be made out; Wood;
Stewart.
113. Diminished Inseal. The defense of diminished
responsibility would fail if
responsibility and
there is evidence which
intoxication. shows that the defendant’s
first drink was taken
voluntarily without the
craving.
Diminished Sanderson.
114. In this case the principles
responsibility and developed in Tandy in
intoxication. respect of alcoholism and

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diminished responsibilities
11 have been extended to
other areas of substance
abuse such as of heroin and
cocaine.
(2).The defense of ‘Loss of self

control’.
Elements of 1. Loss of Burden of proof:
self- The burden of proof
the defense is on the prosecution;
control.
of ‘Loss of S.54 (5).
2. Qualifyin
self control’.
g trigger
+
Limitation
s on the
use
qualifying
triggers.
3. Degree
of
tolerance
and self-
restraint.
115. (1). Loss of Acott. The loss of self-control

must be the result of
self
someone’s deeds or
control. actions.
116. (1). Loss of Duffy. (1).There is no
requirement that the
self
loss of self-control be
control. sudden [S.54 (2)].
(2). This case
represents a change
from the law of
provocation, which
required the loss of
control to be sudden
and temporary which
was seen as a
significant barrier to
victims of domestic
violence; Ahluwalia;

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Thornton.
12
117. (1). Loss of Dawes and The longer the time
self Hatter. gap between the
trigger and the killing
control.
the less likely it is
that killing is
attributable to
defendant’s loss of
control.
118. (1). Loss of Ibrams and If the defendant acted
in a considered desire
self Gregory.
for revenge, they
control. cannot rely on the
defense.
(2). 2 (a). constituted
circumstances of an
Qualifying requirements.
extremely grave
trigger. character, and
(b). caused D to have a
justifiable sense of
being seriously wronged.
119. (2). Davies. The provocative action
did not have to be
Qualifying
deliberate or aimed at
trigger. the victim.
120. (2). Doughty. Even a baby crying
Qualifying was accepted as a
provocative act.
trigger.
122. (2). Bowyer. The issue of justifiable
sense of being wronged
Qualifying
was considered in this
trigger. case and the Court of
Appeal confirmed that
the defense was not
available since
defendant’s status as a
burglar blew apart his
claim that he was
justified in losing his
self- control.
Limitations

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on the use 2 more

13 1S.55 (6) (a),
of limitations.
2S.55 (6) (b).
qualifying
triggers.
123. Limitations Johnson. If the defendant is at
fault in causing the
on the use
victim to use violence,
of then the defendant is
qualifying not disabled from using
triggers. victim’s conduct as a
qualifying trigger.
124. Limitations Bowyer. If the defendant does
so in order to give
on the use
himself an excuse to kill
of the victim when the
qualifying victim retaliates, then
triggers. the defendant is
disabled.
125. Sexual Clinton. Emotions such as sexual
jealousy and unjustified
infidelity.
anger are no longer
qualifying triggers.
126. Sexual Dawes and The Court of Appeal
approved the case of
infidelity. Hatter.
Clinton.
127. The requirement of
(3). AG for ‘degree of tolerance
Degree of Jersey V. and self-restraint’
tolerance replaces the reasonable
and self- Holley. man test which existed
restraint. under the law of
provocation which
attracted widespread
criticism and was
subject to much
conflicting
interpretation in the
courts culminating in
the landmark case
stated above.
Involuntary manslaughter.
 Constructive manslaughter;

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 Gross negligence manslaughter;

14
 Reckless manslaughter.
(1).Constructive manslaughter.
Actus reus: (1). An Act;

(2). An unlawful Act;
(3). The unlawful act need not be
directed at the victim’.
(4). The unlawful act must be
dangerous.
(5). The unlawful dangerous act
must cause death (causation).
Mens rea: Mens rea of the unlawful act
committed, e.g.: assault, criminal
damage, burglary, robbery and
theft.
128, (1). An Act (AR). Lowe; Khan (Rungzabe). To be guilty of
129. constructive
manslaughter, the cause
of death must be an act
and cannot be committed
by omission.
130. (2). An unlawful Andrews V. Dpp. Constructive
Act (AR). manslaughter cannot be
committed by a crime
of ‘negligence’.
131. (2). An unlawful Franklin. Unlawful act
Act (AR). manslaughter must be
based on a criminal act
as opposed to a civil
wrong.
132. (2). An unlawful Arobikie.  If the

Act (AR). prosecution
cannot establish
a criminal act on
part of the
defendant, the

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defendant will
15 not be liable for
unlawful act
manslaughter.
 Self imposed
fear does not
constitute
psychic assault.
133. In this case the victim
(2). An unlawful Evans apprehended
Act (AR).
. immediate unlawful
personal violence but
the appellant’s actions
did not constitute an
assault and thus no
unlawful act.
134. Consent of the victim
(2). An unlawful Cato. will not prevent an act
Act (AR).
from being unlawful.
135. (2). An unlawful Kenned The House of Lords
Act (AR). held that a voluntary
y act breaks the chain
(No.2). of causation and
prevents the
defendant from
bearing responsibility
for the death.
135, 136 and 137. (2). An unlawful Jenning In deciding whether
Act (AR). someone has
s; committed
Larkin; constructive
manslaughter, the
Lamb. first question to ask is
whether the death
resulted from
commission of the
crime. The crime must
then be identified by
the prosecution and
the authorities for the
proposition that the
prosecution must be
able to prove all
elements of a criminal
offence to support a
conviction for
constructive
manslaughter.
138 and 139. (2). An unlawful Scarlet If the defendant has a
Act (AR). defense to a core
t; offence (e.g. self

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16 Slingsb defense, intoxication)

then no conviction for
y. unlawful act
manslaughter will
arise.
140. An unlawful and
(3). The Dalby. dangerous act must be
unlawful act
an act directed at the
need not be
victim which was likely
directed at the to cause immediate
victim’ (AR). injury, albeit slight.
141, 142, 143, 144 (3). The Mitchell;

and 145. unlawful act A-G Ref
No.3 of Unlawful and
need not be
dangerous act need
directed at the 1994;
not be directed at the
victim’ (AR). Goodfello victim.
w; Dume; .
Dpp V. K
(A)
minor.
146. Humphreys J explained

(4). The unlawful act must Larkin that an unlawful act is one
be dangerous (AR).
. which is likely to injure
another person.
146. In this case Edmund
(4). The unlawful act must Churc 
Davies LJ defined
be dangerous (AR).
h. ‘dangerous act’: “the
unlawful act must be
such as all sober and
reasonable people
would inevitably

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recognize must
17 subject the other
person to, at least, the
risk of ‘some harm’
resulting there from,
albeit not serious
harm”.
 The test is thus
objective, concerned
with what a sober and
reasonable person
would regard as giving
rise to some harm.
This is assessed as if
the reasonable person
was present at the
time of the unlawful
act and observing.
147 The reasonable person will
and
(4). The unlawful act must Daws thus have only the
be dangerous (AR).
148. on; knowledge of an observer
and any special factors
Watso which would not be
apparent to an observer
n. will not be taken into
account.
149. In this case the Court of
(4). The unlawful act must Daws Appeal held that the jury
be dangerous (AR).
on. must be directed to
consider the possibility of
physical harm as opposed
to merely emotional harm.
Any knowledge of the
Ball. defendant, including a
(4). The unlawful act must
150. mistaken belief cannot be
be dangerous (AR).
imputed to the sober and
reasonable person.
151.
A-G The test of dangerousness
(4). The unlawful act must
be dangerous (AR). Ref will also be satisfied, even
though the eventual victim
No.3 was not a life in being at
the time of the
of defendant’s unlawful act.
1994.
152. The unlawful and dangerous
(5). The unlawful dangerous Raffer act must be a substantial
act must cause death
(causation) (AR). ty. cause of death but any
‘intervening event’ which
supersedes the defendants
act shall break the coc.

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153.
18
(5). The unlawful dangerous Cato. The defendant shall be
liable for manslaughter,
(causation) (AR).
even though the victim
consented to the injection.
154. (5). The unlawful dangerous Dias. The defendant shall not be
held liable for
(causation) (AR).
manslaughter if the victim
injects himself.
154. If the victim self injects
(5). The unlawful dangerous Kenne and this causes the victims
(causation) (AR). dy death, the defendant who
supplies the drugs will not
(No.2) be held liable for
manslaughter as the
. victim’s free, deliberate
and informed act breaks
the coc.
‘Mens rea’ of the unlawful Dpp V. It was required to be
155. act committed, e.g.: assault, established by the
Newbur prosecution that the
criminal damage, burglary, y and defendant had the
robbery and theft. Jones. mens rea of the
unlawful act
committed.
(2).Gross negligence manslaughter.

Gross negligence was
156.
Introduction. Bateman. originally set out in this
case.
After being set out in
157
Introduction. Andrews V. Dpp;
the case of Bateman;
and Stone and Dobinson. gross negligence
158. manslaughter was
followed in these cases.
159, Gross negligence
160,
Introduction. Lawrence; Seymour;
manslaughter was largely
and Kong Cheuk Kwan V. replaced with reckless
161. manslaughter. These
The Queen.
decisions created a new

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
head of common law

19 manslaughter based on
Caldwell/Lawrence
recklessness.
162, The reinstatement of
163,
Introduction. Prentice; Sulman;
killing by gross
164, Adomako; Holloway. negligence arose out of a
and number of appeals
165. against conviction for
manslaughter that were
heard together on the
basis that they raised
identical or sufficiently
similar points of law.
166. (1).The modern law of gross
Introduction. Adomako. negligence manslaughter
derives from this leading case.
It was held that certain
elements had to be satisfied
in order to prove gross
negligence manslaughter.
Firstly, the defendant owed ‘a
duty of care’ towards the
victim. Secondly, the
defendant was in gross
violation of this duty. Thirdly,
death of the victim occurred
as a result of this breach of
duty and lastly, the
defendant’s conduct was
extremely bad in all the
circumstances as to amount in
the jury’s opinion to a crime.
(2).It was also held that

doctors owe a duty of care
towards patients.
167. Introduction. Honey Rose V. Regina.

Latest case where the
principle laid down in
Adomako was applied.
Firstly, the defendant owed a
Requirements to 
‘duty of care’ towards the victim,
Cumulative
prove ‘Gross- requirements.
 Secondly, the defendant was in
negligence gross violation of this duty,
manslaughter’.
 Thirdly, death of the victim
occurred as a result of this
breach of duty (causation) and,

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
 Lastly, the defendant’s conduct

20 was extremely bad in all the
circumstances as to amount in
the jury’s opinion to a crime.
168, (1).Firstly, the Duties owed in the civil

169 defendant owed a Wacker; Willoughby; Evans. law of negligence as well
and as the duties recognized
‘duty of care’
170. by the criminal law.
towards the victim.
171 (1).Firstly, the Applies when the

and defendant owed a defendant is responsible
172. for contributing to
‘duty of care’ Miller; Gemma Evans.
circumstances of
towards the victim. extreme danger for the
victim. It is enough that
the defendant simply
contributed to the
danger.
173 It is important to
and
Scope of determine the moment
R (Lewin) V. CPS; Singh.
174. duty of the duty of care arises
and when it comes to an
care. end.
175 (2).Breach of duty of The level of

Adomako; Rose.
and breach of duty of
care.
176. care on part of the
defendant must be
very high.
The liability for

177. Rose. gross negligence
(2).Breach of duty of care
manslaughter
requires there to
be a risk of death
and there is no
liability if the risk
is simply of
harm/serious
harm.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
A-G’s Ref No.2 There is no mens

21 Mens Rea of
rea for gross
178. ‘Gross negligence of 1999. negligence
manslaughter, and
manslaughter’.
the offence of
killing by gross
negligence could be
established
without proof of
mens rea.
(3).Reckless manslaughter.
 Every case of reckless manslaughter is automatically a case of constructive

manslaughter.
 A person can be charged with reckless manslaughter if he realized the risk of GBH
or death and still continued to act and death of the victim occurs as a result of
defendants actions.
 Subjective recklessness was defined in the case of Cunningham; ‘Conscious taking
of an unjustified risk’.
 (R V.G and R)-The House of Lords held a subjective recklessness now applies to
criminal damage. It was held that a defendant must be shown to have subjectively
appreciated a risk to the health or property of another but carried on in any event
before they may be said to be criminally culpable. It abolished the ‘objective
recklessness’ test previously established under Caldwell.
Non-fatal offences Against the Person.

(1).Psychic assault; S.39 Criminal
(2).Battery. Justice Act 1988.
Psychic assault
180. Introduction. (1). Psychic assault requires no
Venna.
physical contact with the victim and
was defined in the above mentioned
case as; ‘a person is guilty of psychic
assault if he intentionally or
recklessly leads someone to

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
apprehend the application to his body

22 of immediate unlawful force/personal
violence’.
Actus reus.  Causing apprehension;
 Immediacy; Cumulative requirements.
 Unlawful force/personal
violence.
Mens rea.
 Intention or Cumulative requirements.
recklessness.
181. (1).Causing
apprehension Mansfield, Justices. No physical contact is required for
to the victim causing victim to apprehend physical/
(AR). personal violence.
182. (1).Causing Psychic assault in the narrow sense
Logdon V. Dpp. can be committed even if the
apprehension
to the victim defendant meant his treat as a joke
(AR). because what matters is the reaction
of victim and if the victim apprehends
immediate physical violence that will
be enough to constitute psychic
assault.
183. (1).Causing There can be no psychic assault if the
Arobikie.
apprehension apprehension of force/physical
to the victim violence is self-induced.
(AR).
184. (1).Causing Meade and Belt. Horloyd J stated a dictum in which he
apprehension directed the jury that no words or
to the victim singing could ever constitute psychic
(AR). assault.
185. (1).Causing Lord Godard CJ stated an obiter that the
Wilson. phrase stated by the defendant ‘get out
apprehension
knives’ could constitute psychic assault.
to the victim
(AR).
186 and (1).Causing The issue regarding words being

187.
Ireland; Burstow. enough to make the victim
apprehension to the
apprehend unlawful personal
victim (AR).
violence was finally settled by the
House of Lords in these above
stated cases. Lord Steyn in this
above stated case dismissed
Meade and Belt and stated; ‘...A
thing said is also a thing done.
There is no reason why something
said should be incapable of
causing an apprehension of
immediate personal violence’. He
further stated that silent
telephone calls might also amount
to psychic assault provided that
the victim anticipated immediate
physical violence as a result of it.

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188. (1).Causing Conditional verbal threat only

23 Tuberville V. Savage. applies when the defendant
apprehension to the
threatens the victim.
victim (AR).
189 and (1).Causing If the defendant says to the
Blake V. Barnard; victim that he will shoot him if he
190. apprehension to the
victim (AR).
Read V. Coker. does not remain silent, the
defendant has not committed
psychic assault, as the threat was
conditional on the victim’s own
behavior.
191. (2). Immediacy (AR). There is no psychic assault if the
Halliday. defendant threatened the victim
for future harm.
192. (2). Immediacy (AR). No psychic assault is committed
Thomas V. NUM. by the defendant where he
threatened the victim from afar,
or he was unable to execute his
threat immediately.
193. (2). Immediacy (AR). Smith V. Superintendent (1).After the decision in the
above stated case, the
of Working Police. requirement of immediacy has
been gradually attenuated.
(2).The Court also held that it is

not necessary for the prosecution
to establish precisely what the
victim feared would happen and a
general apprehension of violence
is sufficient to hold the
defendant liable.
(3).The defendant’s action was

likely to instill fear of potential
violence, even though objectively
his position outside the
apartment made this physically
impossible.
194. (2). Immediacy Threat to inflict harm at

Constanza. sometime in the future
(AR).
can be assault, provided
the victim genuinely
believed that the threat
is constant/ continuous
and the defendant is
willing to carry it out at
any moment.
195. (3). Unlawful force/ Cousins (1).The threat of force
must be unlawful, so no
personal violence. (Exception 1).
offence is committed if
(AR).
the defendant is acting
in self-defense.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
(3). Unlawful force/ 2 more (2). If the show of force

24 personal violence. exceptions: was done to effect a
lawful arrest-S.3 (1) of
(AR).
the Criminal Law Act
1967.
(3). If the victim

consented to such force
or threat of force.
196. Mens rea of psychic Venna. The mens rea of psychic
assault is intention or
assault.
recklessness.
Direct Intention.
Moloney. Direct intention is the aim or purpose of
the victim.
Oblique Intention.
Nedrick/Woollin. Nedrick/Woollin test;
(1). A result is intended when it is the
actor's purpose to cause it.
consequence.
Recklessness.
R V. Venna . Recklessness is now defined
subjectively as 'conscious taking of
an unjustified risk’. Later confirmed
in the cases of Spratt; Savage;
Parmenter.
(2). Battery.
202 and Introduction. Battery has been defined as;

Cole V. Turner;
203. ‘least touching of another
Ireland. person without, his or her
consent, in anger’.
204. Examples Thomas.
Touching someone’s clothes can
of conduct
amount to battery.
that can
amount to

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
battery.
25
205. Examples
Coatsworth, Cumulative requirements.
of conduct
Commonealth V. Cohen.
that can
amount to
battery.
206. Examples
Dpp V. Smith. Cutting the victim’s hair can
of conduct
amount to battery.
that can
amount to
battery.
207. Examples
It is not necessary that there
of conduct Faulkner V. Talbot.
must be some strong physical
that can force for battery; any touching
amount to will suffice.
battery.
207. Examples
Restraining a person can amount
of conduct Collins V. Wilcock.
to battery.
that can
amount to
battery.
The defendant
unlawfully touched or
Actus Reus of Battery. applied force to the
victim.
The Same as the mens

Mens Rea of Battery. defendant intended or rea of psychic
was reckless as to the assault.
unlawful touch or
application of force.
208. The defendant unlawfully The threat of force

Kenlin V.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
touched or applied force to must be unlawful; so,

26 Gardiner. as with battery, no
the victim.
offence is
(AR) committed if the
defendant was
acting in self-
defense.
209. The defendant unlawfully The threat of force
Slingsby. must be unlawful; so,
touched or applied force to
the victim. as with battery, no
offence is
victim consents.
The defendant unlawfully The threat of force
touched or applied force to must be unlawful; so,
S.3 (1) of Criminal
the victim. as with battery, no
Law Act 1976. offence is
show of force was
done for the
purposes of a lawful
arrest.
210. Battery requires an
Battery. Dunn. act; it cannot be
committed by
omission.
211. Exception to the

Battery. Fagan V. MPC. rule stated in the
case of Dunn; know
as the ‘continuing act
doctrine’. In this
case, the
defendant’s failure
to act will be

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
construed by the
27 courts as continuing
an earlier act, which
will fulfill the
requirement of some
positive act on part
of the defendant.
211. Certain degree of
Battery. Donelley V. physical contact is
Jackman. believed to be
consented to a part
of everyday life.
E.g.; passengers in a
crowded train.
212, 213,
214 and Battery. Scott V. Shepherd;
For battery, it is not
Martin; Mitchell;
215. necessary that there
Dpp V. K(A) must be a direct
minor. contact between the
defendant and the
victim.
Section 47 OAPA, 1861

(ABH).
3 cumulative 1. An Assault;
Actus Reus of 2. Occasioning-
‘Actual bodily
requirements: Causation;
harm’.
3.
.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
It comprises of two (1).Psychic assault;

28
(1). Assault (AR). alternative forms of wrong (2).Battery.
doing:
216
and (2).Occasioning- It must be shown that
Notman; Hennigan.
217. Causation (AR). the defendant’s actions
were more than a ‘di
minimis’ cause of the injury
in question.
Both factual and legal

causation must be proved.
218. (2).Occasioning- Roberts. Stephenson LJ provided
Causation (AR). the test of ‘reasonable
forcibility’ applies in such
cases and the victim’s
response must be
proportionate to the threat.
Additionally, the victim’s
response must not be ‘daft
or unexpected’.
219. (2).Occasioning- Savage. The principle laid down in
Causation (AR). Roberts was approved in
the above mentioned case.
220. (3).Actual bodily Miller. Actual bodily harm was

harm (AR). defined by Lynskey J in the
above mentioned case as
‘any hurt or injury likely to
interfere with the health or
comfort of the victim’.
221. (3).Actual bodily Donovan. Swift LJ in this case also

harm (AR). stated a similar definition
as Lynskey J in Miller; ‘any
hurt or injury calculated to
interfere with the health or
comfort of the victim. Such
hurt or injury need not be
permanent, but must… be
more than merely transient
and trifling’.
221. (3).Actual bodily Reigate Justices, ex
harm (AR). Actual bodily harm (ABH)
parte Counsell.
could cover injuries such as
bruising.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
222, (3).Actual bodily Chan fook; Ireland; Psychiatric injury can also
223 29 harm (AR). constitute ABH but it has
Burstow.
and to be shown by medical
224. evidence that the harm was
more than mere emotional
disturbance.
225. (3).Actual bodily Dpp V. Smith. Cutting a women’s pony tail
harm (AR). could also constitute ABH.
225. Mens rea of ‘Actual Venna. It was held that the

bodily harm’. prosecution would have to
establish intention or
recklessness on part of the
accused.
226.
227 Mens rea of ‘Actual Subjective recklessness
Savage; Spratt;
and bodily harm’. applies.
228. Parmenter.
Section 20 OAPA, 1861 (Malicious

wounding and maliciously
inflicting GBH).
(1).Malicious wounding; S.20 creates two
(2).Maliciously inflicting GBH.
offences.
229. (1).Malicious The dermis and epidermis must be

Moriarty V.
broken.
wounding. Brooks.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
230. (1).Malicious Internal ruptures do not count as a

30 Mcloughlin.
wound, nor does bruising, despite the
wounding.
blood loss.
231. (1).Malicious The principle laid down in Mcloughlin
Eisenhower.
was applied in this above stated case.
wounding.
The internal rupture in the victim’s
eye, caused by pallets fired from an
air gun by the defendant, did not
amount to wounding.
232 and (1).Malicious Dume; Martin. Indirect cause of wound could also
233. amount to charge under S.20.
wounding.
234. (2).Maliciously GBH was defined by the House of
Dpp V. Smith.
Lords in this case as ‘really serious
inflicting GBH.
harm’.
235 and (2).Maliciously The Court of Appeal in this case held

Saunders;
236. that it is sufficient for a trial judge to
inflicting GBH. Janjua. direct a jury that, GBH simply means
‘serious harm’.
237. (2).Maliciously In this case the Court of Appeal
Bollom.
stated that in deciding whether harm
inflicting GBH.
was serious or not, the jury should
take into account the age and state of
physical fitness of the victim, as well
as the extent and nature of the injury.
238. (2).Maliciously Dica. In this case the House of Lords held
that sexually transmitted disease with
inflicting GBH.
serious effects, for example HIV,
counts as GBH.
239. (2).Maliciously In this case the House of Lords

Burstow.
ruled that GBH includes serious
inflicting GBH.
psychiatric injury such as acute
clinical depression.
240. (2).Maliciously Expert medical evidence will be

Mandair; Chan
necessary, therefore, to determine
inflicting GBH. Fook. this; mere emotions such as panic,
shock or distress do not count as
bodily harm for the purposes of
S.47, 20 or 18.
241. Inflicting (AR) (1). It was held that a husband, who
Clarence.
infected her wife with venereal
disease during consensual sexual

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
intercourse, was not guilty under

31 S.20.
(2). It was also held that he had

caused GBH but not inflicted it.
(3). The defendant had not inflicted

GBH as he had not assaulted her as
she consented to the intercourse.
(4). It was also stated that there

should be at the very least some
form of direct contact between the
defendant and the victim, which
delivers the harm to the victim.
242. Inflicting (AR) Wilson.
(1). The requirement of assault to
establish an infliction was dispensed
with.
(2). It also dispensed the

requirement that there should e
some form of direct contact
between the parties.
243. Inflicting (AR) Burstow.

(1). In this case, the principle
laid down in Clarence was
disapproved.
(2). The House of Lords held

that serious clinical
depression could amount to
GBH.
(3). No force was required
for the infliction.
(4). It was also said that

there is no meaningful
difference between inflicting
harm and causing harm.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
244, Inflicting (AR). The term ‘inflict’ should

32 Martin; Dume; Wilson.
245 and generally be treated as simply
246. requiring proof a causation
and GBH may be inflicted
directly or indirectly.
247. Mens rea for Mowatt.

It is not necessary for the
Malicious wounding
prosecution to prove that the
and maliciously defendant foresaw, GBH or
inflicting GBH. wounding. It is enough that
the defendant indented or
foresaw the risk of some
physical harm. (Savage;
Parmenter).
248. Mens rea for The defendant must foresee

Sullivan.
the possibility of some
Malicious wounding
physical harm occurring and
and maliciously an intention merely to
inflicting GBH. frighten will not be sufficient
for the offense under S.20.
Section 18 OAPA, 1861 (Wounding

with intent).
 Same Actus Reus S.20;
 Mens rea Belfon; The Court of Appeal stated that the
defendant must be ‘malicious’ and moreover, he must be proved to
have had a further specific intent. In other words, the
defendant’s intention should be to cause GBH to the victim.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
Direct Intention.
33
Moloney. Direct intention is the aim or purpose of
the victim.
Oblique Intention.
Nedrick/Woollin. Nedrick/Woollin test;
(1). A result is intended when it is the
actor's purpose to cause it.
consequence.
Property Offences.
 Theft;
 Burglary;
 Fraud.
(1). Theft.
Defined in S.1 of the ‘A person is guilty of theft if he

Theft Act 1968. dishonestly appropriates property
belonging to another with the intention
of permanently depriving the other of
it’.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
(1). There must be property;

34
Actus reus of
theft. (2). The property must be
appropriated by the defendant;
(3). The property appropriated

must belong to another at the time
of the appropriation of it.
Mens rea of theft. (1). Dishonesty;
(2). Intention to permanently

deprive the owner of the property.
250, (1). There is a comprehensive definition of
property in S.4 of Theft Act 1968.
251, 252
and 253.
(1). Property (AR).
(2). Subsection 4 (1) gives us a general
statement to the effect that property:
‘Includes money and all other property,
real or personal, inkling things in action
and other intangible property’
(3). Real property means land and

interests in land, such as a tenancy.
(4). Personal property means material

objects which can ( as a rule ) be bought
and sold; for example furniture, clocks,
pictures, food, books, clothes and so on.
(5). Things in action are not material

objects but are things of value which
can be liquidated into money and
enforced in the courts. E.g. Debt,
Shares in a company (Marshell) and
Bank account (Joachinson V. Swiss
Bank corp.).
(6). Things in action are those things

of which the victim does not have the
possession. (Torkington V. Magee)
(7). Money includes coins and notes.

(Davis)
(8). Prohibited drugs are also

property. (Smith)

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
254, 255 Things which are (1). Confidential information

and 256. 35 (Oxford V. Moss);
not Property:
(2). Electricity;
(3). Dead human body parts

(general principle) Sharpe.
[Exception Kelly]
Subsection 4(2)(a) 4(2): States the general rule that 4(2)(a): The exception
(General rule and land and interests in land cannot be covers cases where an
stolen. executor of a will who,
exceptions)
instead of transferring
the land to the intended
beneficiary, sells it for
their own purposes.
Subsection 4(2)(b) 4(2)(b): Deals with cases where 4(2)(c): Deals with cases
and (c). people steal things from the land where people steal things
which formed part of the land at from the land which
the time of the appropriation. This formed part of the land at
section deals with trespassers. the time of the
appropriation. This section
deals with tenants.
Subsection 4(3): Things that are concerned 4(4): Wild creatures are
4(3) and (4) in this section are not land itself property that cannot be
but things forming part of the stolen. However, tamed
(Exceptions).
land. This section deals with animals are considered as
plants and states that wild plants property that can be
cannot be stolen but if the stolen.
defendant steals the wild plants
for commercial purposes the
requirement of property being
stolen is satisfied.
257,
258 Sharpe (general principle): Dead Kelly; (exception):
Identifying
and human body parts cannot be stolen A corpse or part of a
259. the property as bodies are not personal property. corpse is capable of being
(AR). property within S.4 of
the Theft Act 1968, if it

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
has acquired different

36 attributes by virtue of
the application of skill,
such as dissection or
preservation techniques,
for exhibiting or teaching
purposes.
Welsh (exception):
Using the same reasoning
as Kelly, a driver was
guilty of theft for
removing his own urine
specimen from a police
station.
260, (1). Appropriation is defined by S.3 (1)
261, of the Theft Act 1968 as ‘Any
262, assumption by a person of the rights of
an owner amounts to an appropriation,
263 (2). Appropriation
and this includes, where he has come by
and (AR).
the property (innocently or not) without
264.
stealing it, any later assumption of a
right to it by keeping or dealing with it
as owner’.
(2). Assuming the rights of the owner

amounts to appropriation.
(3). A thief can appropriate property

without taking possession of it, but a
degree of control is required. (Corcoran
V. Anderton; Easom; Eddy V. Niman).
(4). S. 3 (2) of the Theft Act 1968

provides a limited defense in relation to
a bona fide purchaser. A purchaser of
goods who decides to keep them when
they discover the goods are stolen is
not guilty of theft. (Wheeler)
(5). The assumption of any right of

ownership, however trivial, amounts to
an appropriation; assumption of right to
sell(Pitham and Hehl)
265, (1). No consent is required for

266, Consent and appropriation (Lawrence)
267, appropriation
268, (AR). (2). The House of Lords came to a
269,

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
270, different conclusion in Morris, where

271, 37 it was held that it was of the essence
272, of an appropriation that the act be by
273, way of ‘adverse interference or
274 usurpation of the owner’s rights’.
and
Similar decisions were held in Meech;
275.
Fritschy; Eddy V. Niman.
(3). The conflict of approach between

Lawrence and Morris was finally
resolved in Gomez; the House of Lords
held that the fact that the act was
authorized in no way prevented if from
being an appropriation. I was not of the
essence of an appropriation that it
constituted some form of challenge to,
or interference with, the owner’s
rights.
(4). If goods are stolen once, the goods

cannot be stolen again by the thief.
(Atakpu)
(5). Appropriation is defined by S.3 (1)

of the Theft Act 1968 as ‘Any
assumption by a person of the rights of
an owner amounts to an appropriation,
and this includes, where he has come by
the property (innocently or not) without
stealing it, any later assumption of a
right to it by keeping or dealing with it
as owner’.
(6). In Gomez, the transfer was

defective because the shop manager’s
consent was obtained by fraud and so
the transfer of ownership could be
undone.
(7). Hinks: The case established that in

the English law of theft, the acquisition
of an indefeasible title to property is
capable of amounting to
an appropriation of property belonging
to another for the purposes of the

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
Theft Act 1968. Therefore, a person

38 can appropriate property belonging to
another where the other person makes
him an indefeasible gift of property,
retaining no proprietary interest or any
right to resume or recover any
proprietary interest in the property.
The same principle applies to other
transactions involving the transfer of
ownership such as contracts for sale
(Gomez).
276, (3). Belonging (1). Turner (No.2): A person can steal

277 his own property provided someone has
to another possession or control or interest in the
and
278. (AR). property.
(2). Abandoned property is property

that belongs to no one.
(3). Toleikis: Refuse which a

householder puts out to be taken away
is not abandoned property until it was
taken away.
(4). Meredith: If there is no purpose

and right attached  no theft.
279, Abandoned property (1). Elwes v. Briggs Company;

280, Waverly Borough Council v.
(AR).
281, Fletcher: Abandoned
282, property may belong to
283, someone else, it may belong
284, to the owner of the land or
285 vessel in which in which the
and property is found.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
286.
39
(2). Hibbert V. McKiernan:
Property without an owner is
abandoned property.
(3).Bridges v Hawkesworth;
Hannah v Peel: Lost property
belongs to the loser.
(4). William V. Phillips;

Woodman; Hancock:
 It was held by the
Divisional Court that
such refuse remained
property belonging to
the householder until
collected, whereupon
property passed to the
local authority. So
refuse workers helping
themselves to such
property could be
convicted of theft, on
the basic that the
property had always
belonged to someone.
 A person has possession
of any articles or
property on his land even
if he is not aware that
the property exists or
had forgotten it exists.
By having control of the
site he has control of
the property within [S.5
(1)].
The property must (1). Corcoran V.

The Whent:
287,
belong to another at defendant ate food in a restaurant with
288. Maybe held
a friend. After they left, the friend

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
the time of told the defendant that the meal had liable under
40 not been paid, but he didn`t return to
appropriation. (AR). S.3 of the
pay it. His conviction was quashed since
the elements of theft, although present, Theft Act
didn’t coincide. At the time of the 1978 for
appropriation of the property belonging the offence of
to another, he had not mens rea for
theft. At the time the mens rea was
‘Making off
formed he did not appropriate property without
belonging to another since: 1) one cannot payment’.
assume rights of ownership over the
contents of one’s stomach, 2) the food
was no longer food, 3) it belonged to no
one, not even him.
Edwards’s v Ddin:
(2).
The defendant’s actions did not
amount to theft as in contract law
the property in the petrol passed to
the defendant when it was put into
his petrol tank. At the time of
forming the intention not to pay for
the petrol, it already belonged to
him.

289, (1).Applies in cases ‘where a person

290, receives property from or on account of
The property must
291 another, and is under an obligation to
and belong to another at the other to retain and deal with that
292. the time of property or its proceeds in a particular
appropriation. (AR) way, the property or proceeds shall be
regarded (as against him) as belonging
to the other’.
Subsection 5 (3) of (2). If section applies when A gives

property to B to do something specific
the Theft Act
with it and B does something else with
1968. it. B will be held liable for theft even if
he has become the sole legal owner of
the property.
(3). Wain; Hall: Charity collectors owe

an obligation to the donors to hand over
their donations to the relevant charity.
(4). Davidge V. Bunnett: The Divisional

Court held that S. 5 (3) applies, that
the defendant was under a legal
obligation to use the proceeds to pay
the bill and therefore they were
property belonging to another by virtue
of S. 5 (3).

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
41 (5). Dpp V. Huskinson: No purpose; No

theft.
293, (1).Subsection 5 (4); property

294, mistakenly transferred or otherwise
The property must
295, received belongs also to the transferor
296, belong to another at for the purposes of the law of theft, so
297 the time of if the transferee treats the property as
and appropriation. (AR) their own they will be guilty of theft.
298.
(2).Moynes V .Cooper:
The Appellant workman received £7
Subsection 5 (4) of in his pay packet more than was due
the Theft Act to him. He did not open his pay
1968. packet until sometime later. He then
kept the £7. He was held not to be
theft and due to this subsection 5
(4) was designed to combat such
problems.
(3).Shadrokh-Cigari:
The defendant took and spent the
extra money transferred into his
account; he was guilty of theft on
the basis that it remained property
belonging to another, namely the
issuing bank. See also; A-G Ref (No
1 of 1983); Stalham.
(4).Gilks:
There must be a legal obligation to
return the money as opposed to a
moral obligation.
Mens rea of theft. (1). Dishonesty;
(2). Intention to permanently

299 (1). The Theft Act 1968 itself does
(1).Dishonesty
and not define dishonesty. However, the
(MR).

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
300. act does define honesty in S 2 (1)

42 a, b and c.
Requirements of
honesty:
 S 2 (1) a: The right to
deprive in law.
 S 2 (1) b: Consent of the

owner.
 S 2 (1) c: Person to whom the

property belongs cannot be
discovered by taking
reasonable steps.
(2). If the requirements of honesty

do not apply; go to test of
dishonesty. The test of dishonesty
was laid down in the case of Ghosh
which had two requirements.
Objective and subjective test but
ever since the land mark case of
Ivery V. Genting Casinos; the test
for dishonesty is now purely
objective. That is to say whether the
conduct complained of was dishonest by
the lay objective standards of ordinary
reasonable and honest people.
301, 302, (2). Intention to (1). Theft does not require the victim to
303 and permanently deprive be permanently deprived of their
304. the owner of the property. It simply requires the
property (MR). defendant to have this intention at the
precise moment they appropriate the
property.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
43 (2). Intention includes conditional

intention; that is, the intention of
someone who appropriates property
conditionally on the contents proving
sufficiently valuable to take
permanently. However, to gain a
conviction, it is necessary for the
prosecution to draft the charge so as
not to refer to any specific property.
[Easom; A-G’s Ref (No.1 and 2 of
1979)].
(3). Wanes: Long term borrowing cannot

amount to theft.
(4). Velumyl: In the case of fungibles

such as money, food, drink and so on, this
intention exists even if the defendant
intends to return as identical sum,
amount of food, drink and so on.
Subsection 6 (1) and 6 These subsection’s of the Theft Act

(2). 1968 provide two special circumstances
beyond its normal meaning where the
intention to take something temporarily
counts as an intention to permanently
305, 306, Subsection 6 (1) (1). Coffey; This provision refers to

307 and cases where the appropriation amounts
308. an outright disposal but the defendant Even if a person
nevertheless shows no particular does not intend
the owner to be
commitment to depriving the victim of
deprived of the
the property permanently.
property
permanently.
(2). Marshall, Coombes and Eren: Intention to
The Court of appeal ruled that selling on permanently

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
a used but unexpired tube ticket counts, deprive may still

44 by virtue of S .6 (1), as involving an be found under
intention to permanently deprive the S.6 (1) if the
London Underground of the ticket. defendant took
the property and
tried to bribe
(3).Dpp V. Lavender: The courts have
the victim. On
insisted that the defendant’s intention reduction in the
must be to exhaust the property’s value of the
usefulness, or sell or otherwise get rid property; the
of it. purpose of the
property is
(4). Lloyd: defected.
The Court of appeal quashed the
convictions of the defendant’s on the
ground that they lacked the intention
permanently to deprive the owner of the
property, not having sought to dispose of
the property, and that S.6 (1) does not
cover the case of borrowing for a
dishonest purpose, however damaging to
the owner’s rights this may be.
Subsection 6 (2)  This provision refers to cases A is

deemed to have the intention to
permanently deprive
B of B’s property if A parts with
property in A’s possession or
control under a condition, which A
may not be able to perform.
 This applies where someone who

has property belonging to someone
else in their possession or control
pawns that property to another.
Burglary.
S.9 of the Theft Act (1). An inchoate crime of ulterior

1968 created two intent where there is no need to
separate offences of prove the commission of the
burglary: offence S.9 (1) (a) only

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
intention is required to commit

45 Theft; GBH and Criminal damage.
(2). A complete crime where proof

of the commission of an offence is
of the essence S.9 (1) (b) Theft
and GBH only.
(1). Entry;
Common features
between the (2). Trespassing;
offences:
(3). Entry to building or part of a
building.
(1).Entry (1). Collins: Initially, it was held

that to amount to an entry; the
defendant entry shall be
substantial and effective.
(2). Brown; Ryan: However, the

view taken in Collins was rejected
in the above stated cases which
state that part of body entering a
building is also effective entry.
(2).Trespassing (1). Who is a trespasser:

 Without permission;
.
 Enter with consent but not
allowed in a particular area;
 Entry for one purpose but

does anything else;

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
 Permission withdrawn by the

46 owner.
(2). Jones and Smith:

Those who enter premises in excess
of authority are trespassers on
those premises.
(1). Building is not defined in the

(3). Entry to Theft Act 1968, although S.9 (4)
states that it includes ‘vehicle or
building or part
vessel constructed or adapted for
of a building. human habitation’.
(2). B and S V. Leathley: A

consensus holds that a building must
be some form of structure with a
degree of permanence capable of
being entered. This would cover
barns, churches, shops, warehouses
and even portable cabins such as
freezer containers, and outbuildings
but probably not tents.
(3). Walkington: A person who enters

a building lawfully may become a
trespasser in relation to a part of
that building where they have no
license to go.
Mens rea of (1).The defendant must know they

are a trespasser (Knowledge) or
Burglary
be reckless as to whether they
[S.9 (1) (a)].
are trespassing at the time of
entry.
(2). Intention to commit 1 of 3

offences (GBH, Theft or Criminal
damage).

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
47
Mens rea of (1).The defendant must know they

are a trespasser (Knowledge) or
Burglary
be reckless as to whether they
[S.9 (1) (b)].
are trespassing at the time of
entry.
(2). Having entered as a

trespasser attempts to steal or
steals; or attempts to cause GBH
or causes GBH  prove ‘Theft or
GBH’.
(1).A person is guilty of (2). O’ Leary: For the purpose

aggravated burglary if he of 9 (1) (a); Possession at the
(3). Aggravated
commits one of the two burglaries time of Entry (Aggravated
burglary under burglary) and for 9 (1) (b);
stated in S.9 of the Theft Act
S.10 of Theft 1968 and at the time has with
Possession when GBH or Thef
Act 1968. committed and not on entry
him any firearm or imitation
(Aggravated burglary).
firearm, any weapon of offence,
or any explosives. (3).Stones: The defendant is n
required to use the weapon;
 9 (1) (a)  Possession at simply having it in possession i
the time of Entry enough to incur liability.
(Aggravated burglary).
 9 (1) (b)  Possession when

GBH or Theft is
S.2, S.3, S.4, S.11 of Fraud committed and not on entry
Act 2006. (Aggravated burglary).
Fraud.
 The Fraud Act 2006 abolishes all the deception offences in the
Theft Act 1968 and 1978.
 The Act replaces the deception offences with one basic fraud
offence which can be committed in 3 ways: false representation,
failure to disclose information and abuse of position.
(1).Fraud by false representation (S.2).

Actus reus; False representation.

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
Mens rea;  The defendant must

48 know that the
representation was
false or that it
might be false.
 Dishonesty.
 Acted with intent to

gain or cause loss.
False (1). Representation is not (4). As a general rule of thumb,
defined in the Fraud Act no can make a representation (7). Rai: Change of
representatio
2006 but S. (3) states that without doing or saying anything. circumstances can render
n (AR).
‘representation’ means any a true statement to be
representation as to fact or (5). Firth: A doctor is under a wrong and it is upon the
law, including a duty to tell the hospital if the ‘representor’ to make sure
representation as to the patient is a private one or is one that the ‘representee’
state of mind of-(a) the who can avail the NHS services knows of this change or
person making the that are free as the hospital is else the representation
representation or (b) any entitled to assume that all will be considered false.
other person. patients operated on are NHS
patients unless, the doctor tells
(2). The simplest meaning of the hospital otherwise. If the
representation is ‘stating doctor does not inform the
something’, ‘pretending hospital, he is creating a false
something’, ‘professing impression.
something’ or ‘creating an
impression’. A representation (6). Where the circumstances
can be made without words, giving rise to a representation
by conduct or can be implied. change; this renders the original
representation no longer
(3). A useful question to ask accurately describes the true
is ‘What false impression or state of affairs.
statement is the defendant
making for the purposes of
defrauding the victim?’
Representation and (1). The Fraud Act 2006 S.2 (5)

no makes it possible to commit (3). A person who puts a
machines (AR).
fraud via a machine, since a foreign coin in a slot
representation is regarded as machine, such as a car
having been made: ‘if it (or
park ticket machine or
anything implying it) is submitted
chocolate machine, also
in any form to any system or
commits fraud, whether
device to receive, convey or
respond to communication (with or not the ruse if
or without intervention)’. successful, not because
of subs.2 (5) but
(2). This includes putting false because by putting the
information on an online tax or coin in, they are making
insurance form, or computer ‘ a representation that is
phishing’ as in the case of those

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
who place viral sob stories on the false. Fraud in now

49 internet which are intended to complete upon the
cause naive recipients to transfer making of a false
money to the phisher. In this
representation and it
latter case the representation is
does not have to be
made as soon as the
effective or even
representation is typed on to the
phisher’s machine, thus relieving communicated.
the prosecution from having to
prove that anyone read it.
The representation (1). By virtue of subs.2(2) of the

Fraud Act 2006, a
must be false (AR).
representation is false if (a) it is
untrue or misleading, and (b) the
person making it knows that it is,
or might be, untrue or misleading.
This definition includes situation
of someone who believes what
they say to be true but knows it
might not be true or knows it
might be misleading. This act
criminalizes ‘mere puffs’; vague
claims made by a salesmen.
Mens rea;  The defendant (1).The mens rea of fraud is the

defendant’s intention by making
must know that
the representation, to make a
the
gain for themselves or another, (3). ‘Gain and loss’ are
representation or to cause loss to another or to defined by S.5 (2) and (3).
was false or expose another to a risk of loss.
that it might be Intention in this context, in line
(4). S.5 (2) (a); Extends
with its meaning in theft (purpose
false. only to gain or loss in
or knowledge of virtual
money or other property.
certainty).
 Acted
(5). S.5 (2) (b); Such gain
Dishonesty. (2).If the defendant knows that
or loss can be temporary
their representation will cause
or permanent.
loss to the victim or expose the
 Acted with
victim to the risk of loss, the
intent to gain or (6). Property means any
defendant intends that
property whether real or
cause loss. consequence.
personal (including things
inaction and other

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
intangible property).
50
(7). Gain includes a gain by
keeping what one has, as
well as a gain by getting
what one does not have.
4 possible (1). The intention to make a
gain for oneself by false
cases of representation.
this Mens
(2). The intention to make a Allsop; ‘’Interests which
rea gain for someone else. are imperiled are less valuable in
requirement terms of money than those same
(3). The intention to cause a interests when they are secure
; and protected’’.
loss to another; includes
cases where the
representors purpose is
purely destructive.
(4). The intention not to

cause a loss to the
representee but to expose
them to the risk of loss
(Allsop).
Dishonesty The test of dishonesty was laid down in the case of

Ghosh which had two requirements. Objective and
subjective test but ever since the land mark case of
Ivery V. Genting Casinos; the test for dishonesty is
now purely objective. That is to say whether the
conduct complained of was dishonest by the lay
objective standards of ordinary reasonable and
honest people.
(2).Fraud by failing to disclose information (S.3).
This provision is probably unnecessary since a

failure to disclose information which one has a duty
to disclose counts as a representation for the
purposes of S.2 of the Fraud Act 2006 (in problem
question acknowledge S.2 first and if it does not
apply; then go on to S.3).
 Section 3 allows a conviction simply upon

proof of the duty to disclose and the failure
to do so with the relevant intent.
 The important aspect of S.3 is the
requirement that the defendant be under a
legal duty of disclosure: a moral duty is not

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
enough.
51 The concept of legal duty was explained in the
Law Commission’s Report on Fraud, which
said: ‘Such a duty may derive from statute
(such as a contract of insurance), from the
express or implied terms of a contract, from
the custom of a particular trade or market,
or from the existence of a fiduciary relation
between the parties (such as that of agent
and principal)’.
 Thus an art dealer would not commit the
offence if they bought a painting at a care
boot sale knowing that the painting was worth
a thousand times the asking price, as they
have only a moral duty of disclosure.
Mens rea of
S.3 has the same mens rea as S.2; Fraud by abuse of power (S.4):
fraud by ‘failing there is no requirement that the
to disclose defendant be aware that they are The Law Commission described the type of
under a legal duty of disclosure, relationships intended to be covered by
information’ and although evidence of lack of fraud by abuse of position as follows:
‘fraud by abuse awareness will, no doubt, influence ‘The necessary relationship will be present
the jury’s assessment of between trustee and beneficiary, director
of power’. and company, professional person and
dishonesty.
client, agent and principal, employee and
employer, or between partners. It may
S.4 has the same mens rea as S.2;
arise otherwise, for example within a
there is no requirement that the family, or in the context of voluntary work,
defendant be aware that they are or in any context where the parties are not
under a duty to safeguard the at arm’s length. In nearly all cases where it
other’s financial interests, although arises, it will be recognized by the civil law
evidence of lack of awareness will, as importing fiduciary duties, and any
no doubt, influence the jury’s relationship that is so recognized will
assessment of dishonesty. suffice’.
Obtaining services dishonestly (S.11).

Actus reus; Obtaining services Unlike S.2, 3, and
dishonestly. 4 which are inchoate
offences. S.11
requires that services
be actually obtained.
Mens rea;  Knowledge.
 Dishonesty.
 Intention.
What conduct Subsection 11 (2) clarifies what is meant by ‘obtaining services’
and provides a narrow range of conducts:
does
‘Obtaining
(a). They are made available on the basis that payment has been,

lOMoARcPSD|1317039
services is being or will be made for or in respect of them.

52
dishonestly’
(b). he obtains them without any payment having been made for or
cover?
in respect of them or without payment having been made in full,
and
(c). when he obtains then, he know – (1) that they are being made
available on the basis descried in paragraph (a), or (2) that they
might be, but intends that payment will not be made, or will not
be made in full.

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Caselist-Criminal - Case list for criminal law.

Criminal law (University of London)

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Case list for Criminal law.

3, 3, 4 Larsonneur; Status, situational and possession offences can be committed

6. 6. Woolmington V. Burden of proof is on the prosecution. If the jury is left with

8, 8, 9. Miller Most result crimes can be committed by omission.

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• Not voluntary where the third party is acting: in

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63. reaction will break the coc.

64. 64. Moloney. Direct intention is the aim or purpose of

65. 65. Nedrick/Woollin. Nedrick/Woollin test;

66. 66. Cunnigham; R v G & R . Recklessness is now defined

67. 67. McCrone v. Riding. Negligence adheres to an objective

70. 70. Gnango. Transferred malice is a legal doctrine

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mother’s body and be alive.

89. (1).Malice aforethought Nedrick/Woollin. [Oblique-intention]

Murder defenses. (1). Diminished o Only available in murder.

90. (1). Diminished HM Advocate V. The defense of diminished

91. (1). Diminished Campbell. It is not a defense to

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92,93,94 (1). Diminished Dunbar; Ahmed Din; In the case of diminished

95. (1).Abnormality of Lord Parker CJ stated:

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98.8 (2).Recognized medical Sutcliffe (The times). Paranoid schizophrenia is

100. Martin (Anthony). Paranoid personality

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107. Diminished Fenton. Intoxication is not a

108. Diminished Dowds. The Court of Appeal in

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(2).The defense of ‘Loss of self

115. (1). Loss of Acott. The loss of self-control

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