Possession either actual or constructive - G.R. No.

185128
G.R. No. 185128

"x x x.
In People v. Tira,[27] this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However,
the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the
drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is
under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary.
The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the
place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.[28]
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the
property is under appellant’s control or possession.[29] The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the
right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.[30] The records are
void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it
established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely
presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials,
the petitioner being an electrician by profession. x x x.
x x x."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 185128              

January 30, 2012

(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo assailing the
1 

Decision dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
2  3 

27819, which affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal
4 

Case No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic
Act (R.A.) 6425.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search
warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to
Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.

Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding
and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey house
and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her
that they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because
he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.

They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3
Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay
tanods.

In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo,
searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched
the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut
several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that
were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed
transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information reads:
5 

That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his possession and
control four (4) packs of white crystalline powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu," all
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any competent
authority.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, trial on the merits
7 

ensued.

To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2
Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo and
Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical wirings and
airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to
finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged by the owner of the establishment in a conversation. He
was able to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his wife that police operatives
searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20 meters away from his house where they
found the confiscated items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a storage place by his father.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del Castillo "alyas Boy Castillo," GUILTY of
violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum of Prision
Correccional.

The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.31 gram, positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and shall be destroyed in accordance with the law.

SO ORDERED. 8

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against accused-
appellant.

SO ORDERED. 9

After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the following arguments raised:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE
RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-
1197-24;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER
ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS USED BY
THE PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED
AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY
THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE
SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF "POSSESSION" AS AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE
SAID COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE
SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN. 10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10, 2009, enumerated the following counter-
arguments:

SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24, Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City is valid.

II

The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence against him.
III

The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs. 11

Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo
Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-
buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the
petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was
conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.

Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is no longer
within the "permissible area" that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search warrant
did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against government authorities and
not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing packs of shabu inside the
nipa hut.

As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because they
were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when
prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular person,
the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the same
is sufficient to convict.

This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. According to
12 

petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs
13 

only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him
14 

and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The existence
15  16 

depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in
no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long
as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge
17 

brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched. A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.
18 

With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the
peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-
19 

9-1197-24 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally,
20 

the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The
confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as
fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized were found
in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the
one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of
merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance of
the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:

Fiscal Centino:

Q For how long did the chase take place?

A Just a very few moments.

Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?

A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.

Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?

A Yes.

Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?

A Nelson Gonzalado.

Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get?

A Two.

Q What happened after that?

A We searched the house, but we found negative.

Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?

A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.

Q What about you, where were you?

A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.

Q What about the barangay tanod?

A Together with Milo and Pogoso.

Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative what did you do?

A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop because he ran from his shop, so we searched his
shop.

Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?

A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.

Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder
sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?

A Yes.

Q What happened at the shop?

A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded paper.

Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?

A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.

Q Was that the only item?

A There are others like the foil, scissor.

Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others inside the electric shop?

A Yes. 21

The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the items that were actually seized were found in
another structure by a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:

FISCAL:

Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still recall what took place?

A We cordoned the area.

Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?

A We waited for the barangay tanod.

Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?

A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's wife.

Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?

A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.

Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the search?

A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw that Ruben ran away from
his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in front of his house.

Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was clean.

Q What did you do afterwards, if any?

A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.

Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?

A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run from that store and furthermore the door
was open.

Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.

xxxx

Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?

A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there were other persons or other person that
followed after Masnayon?

A Then we followed suit.

Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?

A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.

Q What about you?

A I also followed suit.

Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?

A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw him open the folded paper which contained four
shabu deck.

Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the folded paper?

A We were side by side because the shop was very small. 22

SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:

FISCAL CENTINO:

Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?

A At his residence, the two-storey house.

Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search at the residence of the accused?

A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A Negative, no shabu.

Q And what happened afterwards, if any?

A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.

Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you proceeded to?

A It is a nipa hut.

Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?

A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.

Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?

A I was just outside the nipa hut.

Q And who among the team went inside?

A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod. 23

Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the
searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as:

x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental
corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman
shall also be deemed a person in authority.

A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
deemed an agent of a person in authority.

The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of
persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:

SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay
members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their
jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged
with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a
desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority,
shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.

By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in
authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is
considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence, petitioner's third argument that the
prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated drugs seized, would still be meritorious.

Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique opportunity to
weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are
24 

accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal as in the present case.

25 

It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution
for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in
possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the
accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. 26

In People v. Tira, this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
27 

This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not
only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate
physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it
is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise
control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another. 28

While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellant’s control or possession. 29 

The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns
30 

the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA,
merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an
electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:

x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such, conclusion could be arrived
at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being the case, he has
control of the things found in said structure.
31

In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to the ownership of the
structure where the seized articles were found. During their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating their basis,
that the same structure was the shop of petitioner. During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly
32 

concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:

FISCAL CENTINO:

Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you proceeded to?

A It is a nipa hut.

Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A 5 to 10 meters.

Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?

A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.

Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?

A I was just outside the nipa hut. 33

However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical shop but denied what he said
in his earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner, thus:

ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:

Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that correct?

A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the shop.

Q Now, this shop is within a structure?

A Yes.

Q How big is the structure?

A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and at the other side is a structure rented by a
couple. 34
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place
under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut
35 

was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case,
it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is
presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
36 

doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of
those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. 37 
1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which affirmed the
Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES *

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No. 1178 dated
*

January 26, 2012.

1 
Dated August 23, 2008, rollo, pp. 32-44.
 Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Priscilla
2 

Baltazar-Padilla, concurring; id. at 54-70.

Dated August 23, 2008, id. at 71-72.

3 

Penned by Presiding Judge Aproniano B. Taypin; id. at 45-53.

4 

Records, pp. 1-2.

5 

Id. at 1.
6 

Id. at 57.
7 

Id. at 254.
8 

Rollo, p. 70.
9 

10 
Id. at 37.

11 
Id. at 98-103.

Abuan v. People, G.R. No. 168773, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 799, 822, citing People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 129035,
12 

August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 569, 575.

Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., G.R. No. 165122, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 474, 484, citing Columbia Pictures, Inc.
13 

v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875, 903 (1996).

14 
Id., citing Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 550.

Abuan v. People, supra note 12, citing People v. Tampis, 467 Phil. 582, 590 (2003); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 US
15 

727, 104 S.Ct. 2085 (1984).

16 
Id., citing US v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954 (1995).

17 
People v. Estela Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2011.

18 
Id. citing People v. Tee, 443 Phil. 521, 540 (2003).

19 
People v. Tee, supra.

20 
Records, p. 114.

21 
TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 8-9. (Emphasis supplied.)

22 
TSN, February 4, 1999, pp. 4-6. (Emphasis supplied.)

23 
TSN, May 12, 1999, pp. 3-4. (Emphasis supplied.)

24 
People v. Baygar, 376 Phil. 466, 473 (1999).

25 
People v. Matito, 468 Phil. 14, 24 (2004).

Quelnan v. People, G.R. No. 166061, July 6, 2007, 526 SCRA 653, 662, citing Abuan v. People,  supra note 12, and
26 

People v. Torres, G.R. No. 170837, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 591, 610.

27 
G.R. No. 139615, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 134.
 Id. at 151-152.
28 

People v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 153254, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 601, 613-614, citing People v. Dichoso, G.R.
29 

Nos. 101216-18, June 4, 1993, 223 SCRA 174, 191, citing Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984).

People v. Tira, supra  note 27.

30 

Rollo, p. 65.
31 

TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 7-9; TSN, February 4, 1999, pp. 5-6.
32 

TSN, May 12, 1999, pp. 3-4.

33 

TSN, July 16, 1998, p. 15.

34 

See People v. Tira, supra note 27.

35 

People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 207, citing Article III (Bill of Rights), Section
36 

14(2) of the 1987 Constitution which reads: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 131773, February 13, 2002, 376 SCRA 615, 637, citing People v. Gomez, G.R. No.
37 

101817, March 26, 1997, 270 SCRA 432, 444.

 THIRD DIVISION

January 17, 2018

G.R. No. 223142

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ROLANDO SANTOS ZARAGOZA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Rolando Santos y Zaragoza (Santos) seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the 6 August 2014 Decision  and 2 March 2015 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals, Fourth Division (CA) in C.A.-
1 2

G.R. CR-HC No. 05851, affirming the Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal
3

Case Nos. C-82010 and C-82011 finding him guilty of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, respectively.

THE FACTS

Accused-appellant Santos was charged before the RTC of Caloocan City with three (3) counts of violation of certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9165, viz:

Crim. Case No. C-82009 (Violation of Sec. 6, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165)

That on or about the 21st day of August, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously maintain in his house at 21 Tagaytay St., Caloocan City, a drug den, dive or
resort where dangerous drugs are habitually dispensed for use by the customers and addicts. 4

Crim. Case No. C-82010 (Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165)

That on or about the 21st day of August, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody, and control dried crushed leaves and
seeds wrapped in a newsprint and contained in transparent plastic "tea bag" marked "ELS-21-8-09-06"
weighing 1.0022 grams, when subjected for laboratory examination gave positive result to the tests for
Marijuana, a dangerous drug. 5

Crim. Case No. C-82011 (Violation of Sec. 12, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165)

That on or about the 21st day of August, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, custody, and control several strips of used
aluminum foil in a transparent plastic bag, several pieces of used plastic sachet in a transparent "tea
bag," and a plastic tube intended for sniffing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 6
In relation to Criminal Case No. C-82009 where Santos was charged for maintaining a drug den, Imee Baltazar
Loquinario-Flores (LoquinarioFlores) who was found inside the house of Santos during the service of the search warrant,
was charged with violation of Sec. 7, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.7

When arraigned, both Santos and Loquinario-Flores pleaded not guilty.  Joint trial of the cases thereafter ensued.
8

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution tried to prove its cases against Santos through the testimony of Special Investigator Elson
Saul (Saul), Agents Jerome Bomediano (Bomediano), Henry Kanapi (Kanapi) and Atty. Fatima Liwalug (Atty. Liwalug), all
from the Reaction, Arrest and Interdiction Division (RAID) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and Nicanor Cruz,
Jr. (Cruz), of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division (FCD).

Prior to the application on 20 August 2009 by Atty. Liwalug for a search warrant before the RTC, Manila, the RAID-NBI
received information from their confidential informant that there was a group of individuals at Tagaytay St., Caloocan City,
selling drugs and using minors as runners. After Atty. Liwalug interviewed the informant, she, along with an NBI team and
the technical staff of Imbestigador, a GMA Channel 7 investigative program, went to the reported area to conduct
surveillance. The actual surveillance, where videos were taken of the buying, selling, and use of drugs in the different
houses on Tagaytay St., lasted for two weeks. During the first test-buy, Bomediano was able to buy  shabu from Santos
alias "Rolando Tabo." Two informants were used by the NBI for the surveillance but the spy camera was attached to only
one of them. The informants were able to buy drugs from Santos and to use them inside his house. 9

The first video,  taken by the staff of Imbestigador, showed the informants going inside a makeshift house on Tagaytay St.
10

which, according to one of the informants, was owned by Santos. He was shown standing in front of a table while
preparing the paraphernalia to sniff shabu. Also shown in the video was Jenny Coyocot, the adopted daughter of Santos,
who, according to the informant, sold foil for the price of ₱2.00 per strip. The second video  depicted Erwin Ganata Ayon
11

telling Jack, one of the occupants in Santos' house, "pasok kami sa bahay ni Tabo."  The videos were turned over by
12

Mean de Chavez of Imbestigador to Atty. Liwalug. 13

On 21 August 2009, Kanapi, Saul, Bomediano, and SI Junnel Malaluan, armed with a search warrant,  proceeded to the 14

house of Santos on Tagaytay St. Kanapi and Malaluan guarded the perimeter of Santos' house to ensure that no one
could exit from or enter the house during the service of the search warrant. Previous to the service of the warrant, the NBI
RAID coordinated  with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the officials of the barangay, and the media.
15 16

Saul knocked on the door of Santos' house. When nobody answered despite several minutes of waiting, the NBI team
broke open the door. Saul, Bomediano, Malaluan, and the Imbestigator team proceeded to the second floor where they
found a person who identified himself as Rolando Santos. Saul told Santos that the team was from the NBI and that they
were to serve a search warrant on him, which copy was actually shown to Santos. The team waited for the
representatives from the DOJ and the barangay before conducting the search. 17

During the conduct of the search at the living room on the second floor of the house, Saul found inside the bedroom and
beside the bed of Santos several used and unused foil strips either crumpled or rolled, the size of a cigarette stick. The foil
strips,  numbering fourteen, were found inside a baby powder container.  He also found unused small plastic
18 19

sachets.  Saul placed the foil and plastic sachets on the center table in the living room. When Saul frisked Santos, he
20

found marijuana leaves wrapped in paper on the right pocket of his pants. Saul informed Santos of his constitutional rights
and placed the marijuana leaves on top of the center table. Saul searched the rooms on the second floor but found
nothing. From a trash can in the kitchen, Saul found used small transparent sachets which he also placed on the center
table. Loquinario-Flores, who was caught on video selling to the informant aluminum foil to be used with drugs, and two
minor children were found on the first floor of the house. The children admitted that they were part of a gang in the area. 21

Santos, Assistant City Prosecutor Darwin Cañete, Kagawad Magno Flores, and media representative Eugene Lalaan
of lmbestigador witnessed the inventory  of the seized items by Saul and when he marked them. Santos, Loquinario-
22

Flores, and the two minors were brought to the NBI office. When Saul returned to the NBI office after the operation, he
submitted the seized items to the NBI forensic chemist. A joint affidavit of arrest  was thereafter executed by Saul,
23

Malaluan, Bomediano, and Kanapi. 24

The testimony of Cruz, the forensic chemist, was dispensed with after the parties agreed to stipulate on the matters he
would testify and after a short cross-examination by the defense.

Version of the Defense

The version of the defense was established through the testimony of Loquinario-Flores, Santos, and Renamel
Destriza (Destriza).

On 21 August 2009 at about 3:00 p.m., while Santos was alone at home playing his guitar, the NBI team armed with long
firearms suddenly arrived looking for a certain Roland Tabo. Santos was made to lie face down and thereafter was
frisked. The team took Santos' money amounting to ₱140.00 and his house was searched in the presence of a kagawad
from Quezon City but the search team found nothing. As a result, the team brought out foil, lighters, and marijuana and
took pictures. Loquinario-Flores was inside the house that time as she was called by Destriza to help bring down from the
second floor an elderly who was hit by the door when the NBI team forcibly opened it. Loquinario-Flores was no longer
allowed to leave while Destriza, who was carrying a child that time, was allowed to go out of the house. Santos,
Loquinario-Flores, and the other persons arrested were brought to the NBI office. It was only during the inquest held the
following day that Santos was informed that he was being charged of violating the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 and
allowed to see the items allegedly seized from him. 25

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC  ruled that the entry in the house of Santos by the NBI team and the subsequent confiscation of the
26

paraphernalia and marijuana were valid and legal since the team had a search warrant. Moreover, it held that the search
was conducted following proper procedure. Thus, the R TC resolved the cases as follows:

Premises considered, this court finds and so holds the accused Rolando Santos y Zaragoza GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 6, 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes upon him the
following:

(1) In Crim. Case No. C-82009, the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱500,000.00);

(2) In Crim. Case No. C-82010, the penalty of Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00); and

(3) In Crim. Case No. C-82011, the penalty of Imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00).

Further, in Crim. Case No. C-82012, accused Imee Baltazar Loquinario-Flores was likewise

found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 7 of the above-cited law and imposes
upon her the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and a
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).

The drugs and drug paraphernalia subject matter of these cases are hereby confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

The Ruling of the CA

Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the RTC, Santos appealed before the Court of Appeals.

In Criminal Case No. C-82009, the CA, Fourth Division  ruled that the RTC should not have given much weight to the
27

video footages because these were not identified and authenticated by the confidential informant who took them. It held
that the prosecution failed to present any witness who had personal knowledge and who could have testified that Santos'
house was a drug den. The team, on the other hand, failed to show that Santos or any other person was committing illegal
activities inside the house. It found that the testimony of the confidential informant was essential and indispensable for the
conviction of Santos because the NBI agents did not have any personal knowledge as to the alleged illegal activities in the
house that would characterize it as a drug den. 28

In Criminal Case No. C-82012, because of its ruling that the prosecution failed to establish that Santos was maintaining a
drug den, the CA held that it necessarily followed that Loquinario-Flores, pursuant to Sec. 11 (a), Rule 122  of the Rules
29

of Court, must be exonerated of the charge against her for violating Sec. 7, Art. II of R.A. 9165. Despite the fact that
Loquinario-Flores did not appeal, the CA relied on the dictum that everything in an appealed case is open for review by
the appellate court.
30

In Criminal Case Nos. C-82010 and C-82011, the CA held that the prosecution was able to show the guilt of Santos
beyond reasonable doubt. It held that the testimony of Saul was straightforward and that there was no proof that he had ill
motive to testify against Santos. On the other hand, it found the defense of frame-up put up by Santos was self-serving
which failed to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution; and that the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Kanapi and Bomediano were on trivial and immaterial details that do not affect their credibility.  Hence, the
31

appeal of Santos was decided as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 26 September 2012 of the
lower court is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-82010 finding the appellant Rolando Santos y Zaragoza guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article
II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED;

2. The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-82011 finding the appellant Rolando Santos y Zaragoza guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under Section 12,
Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED;

3. The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-82009 finding the appellant Rolando Santos y Zaragoza guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of maintaining a Drug Den under Section 6, Article II of RA 9165 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Rolando Santos y Zaragoza is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal
Case No. C-82009 for insufficiency of evidence.

4. The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-82012 finding the accused Imee Baltazar Lquinario-Flores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Visiting a Drug Den under Section 7, Article II of RA 9165 is
likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. She is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. C-82012 for
insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.

Santos sought for a partial reconsideration  of the decision of the CA insofar as it affirmed his conviction in Crim. Case
32

Nos. C-82010 and C-82011. Finding no persuasive grounds or substantial bases to reconsider, however, the CA denied
the motion. 33

ISSUES

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND RESONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FAILURE TO PROVE THE INTEGRITY AND
IDENTITY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUGS.

OUR RULING

The appeal is without merit.

It bears to stress that while an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until proven guilty, the evidence of the
prosecution must stand on its own strength and not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense. The Court firmly
34

holds that the prosecution was able to successfully discharge its burden of overcoming the constitutional presumption of
innocence of Santos and in proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case Nos. C-82010 and C-82011.
The findings of the trial court and the appellate
court as to the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses are binding and conclusive upon the Court.

Santos claimed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were indecisive, conflicting, and contradictory; as
opposed to the version of the defense which was consistent, straightforward, and complementary with each other. 35

To justify his claim, Santos averred that when Saul first testified he stated that the second floor of the house had a living
room, kitchen, and two rooms. It was when Saul allegedly frisked Santos that he found several used and unused
aluminum foil and a sachet of marijuana, but nothing was found inside the two rooms. When Saul was again put on the
witness stand, he allegedly admitted that the five disposable lighters and the strips of aluminum foil were found inside
Santos' bedroom. 36

Contrary to the claim of Santos, the testimonies of Saul were not inconsistent with each other. When first put on the stand,
Saul admitted that he found the strips of aluminum foil in the living room; and that when he frisked Santos he found in the
right pocket of his pants the marijuana leaves wrapped in paper.  Clearly, Saul was forthright in stating where he found
37

the used and unused aluminum foil and the marijuana. Saul never claimed that the strips of aluminum foil were found on
the body of Santos.

When Saul testified again, he described in detail that the strips of aluminum foil were found inside a plastic baby powder
container.  Although Saul claimed that he found these in the bedroom of Santos, the Court took note of the fact that in
38

most houses in urban areas, the living room is also used as the bedroom. What is important is that Saul was consistent
that he found the strips of aluminum foil on the second floor of the house where the living room and bedroom were
located.

It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a
particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to
convict.  The truth that the strips of aluminum foil were found in the house of Santos and the marijuana in his body, had
39

not been successfully controverted by him. In fact, there was but the lame defense of frame-up offered by Santos to
overcome the presumption. Enlightening at this point is the jurisprudence in People v. Lagman,   viz: 40

It held that illegal possession of regulated drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an
essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to
possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession,
but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate possession
or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the
place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid
conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is
shared with another. 41

The contention of Santos that the members of the raiding team gave an altogether different account as to who actually
witnessed the implementation of the search warrant,  is a trivial and inconsequential matter that does not affect the
42

credibility of the prosecution witnesses. These matters do not deal with the central fact of the crime. Besides, it has been
held, time and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not destroy the
witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 43

In stark contrast, the defense of denial proffered by Santos cannot prevail over the positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses. A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence
becomes negative and self-serving deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over
convincing, straightforward, and probable testimony on affirmative matters.  Courts generally view the defense of denial
44

with disfavor due to the facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. 45

Equally important is that it is the general rule that "the factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of
the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions on the credibility of the
witnesses on which said findings were anchored are accorded great respect. This great respect rests in the trial court's
first-hand access to the evidence presented during the trial, and in its direct observation of the witnesses and their
demeanor while they testify on the occurrences and events attested to."  Settled also is the rule that factual findings of the
46

appellate court affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such
findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.  Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal
47
cases throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.  The Court had assiduously reviewed the records but
48

found nothing to qualify these cases as falling within the exception to the general rule.

Santos asserted that the search warrant was only for an undetermined amount of shabu; thus, the discovery of the
incriminating items other than that described in the warrant must result from bodily search or seized in plain view to be
admissible in evidence. 49

The assertion of Santos has no merit considering that he did not question the admissibility of the seized items as evidence
against him during the trial of these cases. It was only when he appealed the decision of the RTC before the CA that he
raised the issue as to the admissibility of the seized items. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is that no question will be
entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the lower court. 50

There was an unbroken chain in the custody of the seized drugs and paraphernalia.

It was the position of Santos that there was doubt as to the whether the marijuana and paraphernalia seized from him
were the very same objects offered in court as corpus delicti. He claimed that there was no explanation given regarding
the items confiscated from Santos from the time these were seized until their turnover for laboratory examination. 51

"Corpus delicti is the 'actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.' In illegal drug cases, it refers to the
illegal drug item itself. "
52

The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) - the policy making and strategy formulating body in the planning and formulation of
policies and programs on drug prevention and control tasked to develop and adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified,
and balanced national drug abuse prevention and control strategy  - has expressly defined chain of custody involving
53

dangerous drugs and other substances in the following terms in Sec. l(b) of DDB Regulation No. I, Series of 2002,  to wit:
54

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature
of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. 55

The exacting requirement as to the chain of custody of seized drugs and paraphernalia is highlighted in R.A. No. 9165 as
follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

On the one hand, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) settles the proper procedure to be followed in Sec. 21(a)
of R.A. No. 9165, viz:

(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
 practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirement" under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.

The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links that should be established in the chain of custody of the
confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.
56

On the first link, jurisprudence dictates that '"(M)arking' is the placing by the apprehending officer of some distinguishing
signs with his/her initials and signature on the items seized. It helps ensure that the dangerous drugs seized upon
apprehension are the same dangerous drugs subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station or at some other practicable venue rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the
'chain of custody' rule requires that the 'marking' of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (I) in the presence of the apprehended
violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation. 57

Saul testified that after he gathered the drug paraphernalia and the marijuana which he confiscated from Santos, he
prepared the inventory of seized items/property  in the presence of Santos, and the respective representatives of the
58

DOJ, media, and the barangay. In addition to the inventory, he marked the confiscated items as follows:

1. five (5) pieces of disposable lighters "ELS-21-8-09"

2. several pieces or strips of unused aluminum foil "ELS-21-8-09-01"

3. several pieces/strips of used aluminum foil "ELS-21-8-09-02"

4. several pieces unused small plastic sachet "ELS-21-8-09-03"

5. several pieces used small plastic sachet "ELS-21-8-09-04"

6. one (1) improvised plastic pipe "ELS-21-8-09-05"

7. undetermined amount of marijuana leaves and seed wrapped m newspaper "ELS-21-8-09-06"

Anent the second and third links, on the same day that Saul arrived at the NBI RAID office after the service of the search
warrant, he forthwith prepared the disposition form  for the turnover of the seized items to the FCD. The seized items
59

were received by the FCD on 21 August 2009 at 11:05 p.m. A certification  dated 21 August 2009 was likewise issued by
60

the FCD confirming that the confiscated items marked as "ELS-21-8-09- 02", "ELS-21-8-09-04", and "ELS-21-8-09-05"
yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and positive results for marijuana for "ELS-
21-8-09-06". On 25 August 2009, the FCD released its Dangerous Drugs Report Nos. DDM-09-08  and DD-09-47.
61 62

On the fourth link, the testimony of Cruz was dispensed with after the parties had agreed to stipulate on the following
facts:

That he is an expert witness, and as such is of the receipt of a letter request dated 21 August 2009;

That attached to the letter request were several pieces/strips of used aluminum foil marked as ELS-21-8-
09-02; several pieces of used small plastic sachet marked as ELS-21-8-09-04; one (1) improvised plastic
pipe marked as ELS-21-8-09-05, and undetermined amount of marijuana leaves and seed wrapped in a
newspaper marked as ELS-21-8-09-06;

That he conducted laboratory examination on the specimen submitted to their office, the result of which
he reduced into writing as evidenced by Dangerous Drugs Report No. DDM-09-08, stating that upon
examination conducted on the dried crushed leaves and seeds wrapped in a newsprint gave positive
results for "marijuana" and by Dangerous Drugs Report No. DDM-09-47, stating that upon examinations
 conducted on the several strips of used aluminum foil in a transparent plastic bag; several pieces of used
plastic sachets in a transparent "tea bag" and a plastic sachet tube gave positive results for the presence
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, respectively;

That he issued a Certification dated 21 August 2009 to the effect that he conducted examination upon the
above-mentioned specimen submitted to their office. 63

As opposed therefore, to the claim of Santos, there was no significant gap in the chain of custody of the seized items.
Moreover, the assertion of Santos that the forensic chemist did not testify to explain the measures undertaken to preserve
the integrity and identity of the substance examined until their presentation in court,  has no merit. As earlier mentioned,
64

both the prosecution and the defense had agreed to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist upon stipulation
on certain facts. Moreover, the defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the forensic chemist but, as
revealed by the records, his cross-examination never dealt on matters pertaining to the measures carried out by the NBI
team to maintain the integrity of the confiscated items.

In the same vein, it needs to be stressed that Cruz is a public officer; thus, his reports carried the presumption of
regularity.  Besides, Sec. 44, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that entries in official records made in the
1awp++i1

performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specifically
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.  It necessarily follows that the findings of Cruz as
65

contained in Dangerous Drugs Report Nos. DDM-09-08 and DDM-09-47 were conclusive in view of the failure of the
defense to present evidence showing the contrary.

Noteworthy, the legal teaching in our jurisprudence is that "the integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been
preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-
appellant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers properly
discharged their duties."  Santos had miserably failed in presenting any evidence that would justify a finding that the NBI
66

team had ill motive in tampering with the evidence in order to hold him liable for these grave offenses.

The prosecution was able to fully discharge its burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt its charges against Santos.

In Crim. Case No. C-82010, Santos was charged with and convicted of violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165,  the67

elements of which are as follows: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be prohibited
or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the drug.68

Saul testified that when he frisked Santos, he found marijuana in the right pocket of his pants. Santos did not offer any
explanation on why he was in possession of the marijuana or if he was authorized by law to possess the dangerous drug.
Based on the Dangerous Drugs Report No. DDM-09-08, the dried crushed leaves and seeds wrapped in newspaper and
contained in the transparent plastic tea bag marked as "ELS-21-8-09-06" and which gave a positive result for marijuana,
had a net weight of 1.0022 grams.

Pursuant to Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years, and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱400,000.00), shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana is less than three hundred (300) grams. Thus, the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱300,000.00) as imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, is hereby sustained.

In Crim. Case No. C-82011, Santos was convicted of violation of Sec. 12, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165,  its elements being as
69

follows: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for
smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such
possession is not authorized by law. 70

Saul testified that when he served the search warrant on Santos at his house on 21 August 2009, he found thereat
several strips of used aluminum foil in a transparent plastic bag, several pieces of used plastic sachet in a transparent tea
bag, and a plastic tube intended for sniffing shabu, which he respectively marked "ELS-21-8-09-01 ," "ELS-21-8-09-04,"
and "ELS-21-8- 09-05." Similar to the marijuana, Santos failed to justify his possession of these items. Significantly,
Dangerous Drugs Report No. DD-09-47 showed that the examination made on the washings of these confiscated items
yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Pursuant to Sec. 12, Art. 11 of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years, and a fine ranging from Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) shall be
imposed for violation of this provision of the Act. Finding no error in the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years, and a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00) imposed by the RTC, which was affirmed by the
CA, the Court hereby maintains the same.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 6 August 2014 Decision and 2 March 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Fourth Division in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 05851 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Rollo, pp. 2-21.
1

 CA rollo, pp. 189-190.
2

 Records, pp. 408-422.

3

 Id. at 277.
4
 Id. at 25.
5

 Id. at 48.
6

 Id. at 269, docketed as Crim. Case No. C-82012.

7

 Id. at 174.
8

 TSN, 29 March 2011, pp.10-12; TSN, 4 October201 l, pp. 15-17.

9

10
 Records, p. 336, Exh. "O."

11
 Id.; Exh. "0-1."

12
 TSN, 4 October 2011, p. 18; TSN, 8 November 2011, pp. 4-6.

13
 TSN, 8 November 2011, p. 8.

14
 Records, p. 343-344; Exh. "G."

15
 Records, pp. 347-348; Exhs. "N" and "N-1."

16
 TSN, 4 October 2011, pp. 4-6; TSN, 29 September 2010, p. 10; TSN, 9 March 2011, p. 5.

17
 TSN, 29 September 20 10, pp. 7-10.

18
 Exh. "K."

19
 Exh. "L."

20
 Exh. "M."

 TSN, 29 September 2010, pp. 10-14, 24; TSN, 10 November 2010, pp. 4-6; TSN, 29 March 2011, pp. 15-16; TSN, 4
21

October 2011, p.10.

22
 Record s, p. ", 45 , E x h . "H ."

23
 Id. at 330-332, Exhs. "I", "1-1", and "1-2."

24
 TSN, 29 September 2010, pp.14-17, 20 and 25-26.

25
 TSN, 22 May 2012, pp. 3-4; TSN, 26 June 2012, pp. 3-7; TSN, 31 July 2012, pp. 4-5.

26
 Records, pp. 408-422; penned by Judge Aurelio R. Ralar, Jr.

 CA rollo, pp. 189-190; penned by Associate justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by Associate Justices
27

Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Edwin D. Sorongon.

28
 Rollo, pp. 18-19.

29
 Section l l. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;

xxx
  Rollo, p. 19.
30

 Id. at 18-19.
31

 CA rollo,pp.173-179.
32

 Id. at 189-190.
33

 People v. Calantiao, 736 Phil. 661, 674-675 (2014).

34

 CA rollo, p. 58.
35

 Id.
36

 TSN, 29 September 2010, pp. 10-12.

37

 TSN, 10 November 2010, pp. 4-5.

38

 People v. Dela Trinidad, 742 Phil. 347, 358 (2014).

39

 593 Phil. 617, 625 (2008), citing People v. Tira, 474 Phil. 152, 173-174 (2004).
40

 People v. Dela Trinidad, supra note 39 at p. 348.

41

 CA rollo, pp. 58-59.
42

 People v. Rebotazo, 711 Phil. 150, 172-173 (2013).

43

 People v. Salvador, 726 Phil. 389, 402(2014).

44

 Zalamedav. People, 614 Phil. 710, 733 (2009).

45

 Luy v. People of the Philippines, G .R. No. 200087, 12 October 2016, 805 SCRA 710, 718-719; citing Gulmatico v.
46

People, 562 Phil. 78,87 (2007); People v. De Guzman, 564 Phil. 282, 290 (2007); People v. Cabugatan, 544 Phil. 468,
479 (2007); People v. Taan, 536 Phil. 943, 954 (2006); Perez v. People, 515 Phil. 195, 203-204 (2006); People v. Tonog,
Jr., 477 Phil. 161, 177 (2004); People v. Genita, Jr., 469 Phil. 334, 341-342 (2004); People v. Pacheco, 468 Phil. 289, 299
(2004); People v. Abolidor, 467 Phil. 709, 716 (2004); People v. Santiago, 465 Phil. 151, 162 (2004).

 People v. Bontuyan, 742 Phil. 788, 798 (2014).

47

 People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 225 (2015).

48

 CA rollo, p. 60
49

 Tionco v. People, 755 Phil. 646, 654 (2015).

50

 CA rollo, p. 62.
51

 Rontos v. People, 710 Phil. 328, 336-337 (2013).

52

 sec. 77, R.A. No. 9165.

53

 Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
54

and Laboratory Equipment pursuant to Section 21, Article II of the IRR of RA No. 9165 in relation to Section 81 (b ), Article
IX of R.A. No. 9165.

 Peoplev. Gonzales, 708 Phil. 121, 129-130 (2013).

55
  People v. Holgado, 741 Phil. 78, 94-95 (2014); citing People v. Nandi, 639 Phil. 134, 144-145 (2010).
56

 People v. Somoza, 714 Phil. 368, 387-388 (2013).

57

 Records, p. 345, Exh. "H."

58

 Id. at p.201, Exh."A."

59

 Id. at 204, Exh. "D."

60

 ld. at 202, Exh. "E."

61

 ld. at 203, Exh. "F."

62

 TSN, 11 November 2009, pp. 9-10.

63

 CA rollo, p. 62.
64

 Zalameda v. People, supra note 45 at p. 740.

65

 People v. Dela Trinidad, supra note 39 at p. 360.

66

 Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
67

hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:

(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;

(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;

(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;

(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";

(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and

(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB),
and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and
promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated
as follows:

(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is
ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;

(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four
hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities
 of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin,
cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride
or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred
(300) grams or more but less than five (hundred) 500) grams of marijuana; and

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (I) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if the quantities
of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or
other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or
if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams
of marijuana.

 People v. Dela Trinidad, supra note 39 at p. 357.

68

 Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia/or Dangerous Drugs. - The
69

penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging room Ten
thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body: Provided, That in the case of medical practitioners and various professionals who are required to carry
such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their profession, the Board shall
prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof. The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia fit or intended for any of the purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph shall be  prima
facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered to himself/herself, injected, ingested or used a
dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Section 15 of this Act.

 Zalameda v. People, supra note 45 at p. 727.

70