Bureaucracy in Japan

Author(s): T. J. Pempel
Source: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 19-24
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/419570
Accessed: 14-02-2018 15:12 UTC

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 Bureaucracy in Japan

Bureaucracy in Japan

T. J. Pempel, University of Colorado, Boulder

I. Introduction: Central Points Bureaucratic organizations emerged The military and commercial
in various time periods and threat to national sovereignty posed
Japan, the first Asian country to geographical areas throughout the by the Western powers in the later
enter the ranks of the industrialized country's subsequent history. The nineteenth century was the principal
democracies, provides an excellent establishment of centralized catalyst toward the creation of a
case study of a non-Western, but feudalism under the Tokugawa truly modern civil service, as we
highly modern, national bureaucracy. family in the early 1600s, however, know it today.
As such, it provides a useful, marks the earliest seeds of a modern
informative, but culturally different, Bureaucracy Under the Meiji System:
country for comparative purposes, A series of steps taken during the
whether with the United States
Because of the central role early years of the Meiji government
specifically or with other provided the groundwork for
industrialized democracies more that the Japanese developing a truly modern national
generally. bureaucracy. The model for Japan in
-Because of the central role that bureaucracy has played in
much of its government organization,
the Japanese bureaucracy has played planning and and especially in its national
in planning and implementing so bureaucracy, was Bismarck's Prussia.
many of the major changes in Japan,implementing so many of By implication this made it, as well,
it is a good example of bureaucracy a relatively close approximation of
as planner and agent of change.
the major changes in
Max Weber's ideal bureaucracy.
-Because the Japanese bureauc- Japan, it is a good Under a small core of oligarchs, the
racy has been so closely linked to national bureaucracy was designed to
political leadership, it provides an example of bureaucracy as be an instrument that would take the
important contrast to countries whereplanner and agent of lead in the nation's modernization
bureaucrats and politicians are and industrial development. A strong
presumed to have rather separate andchange. legalistic basis underpinned bureau-
antagonistic roles. cratic activity. Tokyo Imperial
-Because Japan has self- University was created for the
consciously limited the size of its national bureaucracy. Even then, the explicit purpose of training skilled
governmental bureaucracy, the Tokugawa government exercised servants of the state. Civilian and
Japanese case provides an excellent direct control over only about one- military bureaucracies were separated
counter-case to presumptions that quarter of Japan, with the remainder and put on a par. Both were given
bureaucratic expansion is inevitable.largely under local control. In these explicit mandates to serve the
Japan instead offers a most impor- local regions too, however, bureau- emperor and the nation, rather than
tant case of systematic downscaling cratic forms of governance flourished region or class. Careers in the
of bureaucracy. as, over time, samurai warriors bureaucracy were accorded security
-Because the Japanese became de facto civilian administra- and hence the civil service became a
bureaucracy has gone through several tors. Nonetheless, in both shogunal permanent career. Written rules
conscious historical reformulations, and local administrations, vassalage, assigned separate responsibilities to
including explicit imitation of the birth, and chance were far more different offices. Demonstrated
Prussian model, and systematic often the keys to administrative rank, competence in such areas as military
reformulation by American bureau- official duties, and promotion than science, finance, foreign language,
crats, it is an excellent case for were proven technical competence or engineering, and technology soon
examining the interaction of written regulations. Yet throughout became keys to an individual's
competing bureaucratic traditions. the more than 250 years of the success. In all of these ways, the
Tokugawa regime (1600-1868), Japanese bureaucracy quite quickly
civilian administration unquestion- took on modern trappings.
II. Background ably expanded in areas such as tax
Historical Background collection, justice, finance, construc- Training: A rigorous examination
tion, and religious supervision. Over system governed entry into most
Premodern Bureaucratic History: time, in both national and local levels of the civil service, as well.
Japan, heavily influenced by Chinesegovernments, proven competence Exams were targeted to identify the
models in so many other areas, also came to take the place of heredity in generalist, rather than the specialist,
adopted a Chinese style bureaucracy determining both assignments and much as was true in Britain. Legal
as early as the Nara period (710-794).promotions. training was the key channel to

March 1992 19

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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

entrance and mobility in the national particularly subject to control by the electoral or parliamentary
service. Senior civil servants through elected officials. spheres. Far more frequent than
the prewar (and well into the The military was able during the political penetration of the bureau-
postwar) period came disproportion- late 1920s and early 1930s to cratic world was bureaucratic
ately from Tokyo University, manipulate its direct ties to the penetration of politics. As an
especially from its Faculty of Law. emperor so as to gain control over example, only eight of the forty-four
In 1937, for example, 74%/0 of the large areas of government policy cabinets formed between 1890 and
senior civil servants had graduated formation. In this they were often the end of World War II were
from Tokyo Imperial University, joined by a number of so-called formed by the heads of political
with a full 47% from its Faculty of "new bureaucrats" in the civilian parties.
Law. An additional 9% came from agencies, individuals committed to Despite the anti-democratic dimen-
Kyoto Imperial, leaving only 18% of
high levels of national planning and sions of this system, there is wide-
the total senior civil service coming resource mobilization under their spread agreement that much of the
from anywhere but one of these two own directly supervised lines of industrial and social transformation
institutions. (85%/o of the prefecturalauthority. that Japan achieved in the late nine-
governors also came from one or the Both civilian and military bureauc- teenth and early twentieth centuries
other of these two universities). was due to the strong bureaucratic
Open testing for admission to the leadership provided in so many
universities and for entry into the Because the Japanese spheres of Japanese life. Clarity of
civil service meant that the bureauc- vision and technical efficiency were
racy was far more meritocratic, and bureaucracy has been so positive counterbalances to the
less class-based, than most European closely linked to political bureaucracy's lack of political
bureaucracies at the time. This responsibility.
undoubtedly contributed heavily to leadership, it provides an
the widespread public support and Bureaucracy Under the U.S.
prestige enjoyed by the civil service. important contrast to Occupation: Following Japan's
At the same time, arrogance and countries where defeat in World War II, the
disdain for public input was not American forces that occupied the
uncommon in the wake of such bureaucrats and country attempted a series of
meritocratic recruitment. panoramic changes in politics,
politicians are presumed economics and society. Many
Political Ties: Under the Meiji to have rather separate impinged on the bureaucracy. The
system, the bureaucracy was free military bureaucracy was eliminated;
from patronage controls by political and antagonistic roles. the Home Ministry was broken up;
parties but was intimately tied into many functions of the national
the political system as a whole. government were transferred to local
Senior civil servants were appointed racies were integral components in authorities. A National Personnel
by, and directly responsible to, the the governing of prewar Japan, Law altered various features of the
emperor, just as were cabinet exerting extensive controls over most civil service, and a retrenchment
members. As "servants of the facets of national policy. Bureau- program sought to cut back the size
emperor," they were sharply cratic agencies drafted most laws that of the civil service. Most important-
proscribed from any involvement in went before the national parliament, ly, the powers of elected officials,
electoral and party politics. For the and they frequently relied on extra- political parties, and the national
military, the "National Rescript to legislative ordinances to exert direct parliament were greatly enhanced,
Soldiers and Sailors" served as an bureaucratic control. Local govern- thereby reducing bureaucratic influ-
imperially sanctioned ban on all ments were typically subject to close ence by default. Yet, the bureaucracy
partisan activities. legal, financial and personnel was not restructured as an integral
Only the most senior ministers controls by the powerful Home component of politics; far more
were expected to have any "politicalMinistry. Many former bureaucrats attention was given, particularly after
ties" and these were rarely to the were eventually appointed to the the first wave of Occupation
parties. Nor were civil servants or House of Peers, from which they reforms, to increasing bureaucratic
ministers legally responsible to the gained no small measure of prestige.efficiency and to internal rationaliza-
cabinet, the prime minister or the Others entered politics, most tion of tasks. Thus, when the total
parliament. Meanwhile, the so-calledtypically by being appointed to picture is examined, the central
"right of supreme command" cabinet positions or prefectural conclusion must be that much of the
provided additionally that the armedgovernorships, rather than by structure and character of the
forces reported directly to the running for office. Thirty-six percentJapanese national bureaucracy itself
emperor, leaving them even more of the prewar cabinet ministers, for was minimally affected. Most
explicitly outside of electoral or example, were former bureaucrats. bureaucrats were drawn from the
political responsibility. As a conse- Unlike their counterparts in the U.S., same social background and training
quence, Japan during this period had Britain or even France, Japan's civil as previously; administrative discre-
two very separate bureaucracies, oneand military bureaucracies were rela- tion remained wide; direct control by
civilian and one military, with neither
tively free from major checks from elected officials over administrators

20 PS: Political Science & Politics

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 Bureaucracy in Japan

remained low; and the powers of the United States, France, West ministerial organization and charged
various bureaucratic agencies vis-a- Germany and Britain; in Japan the with overseeing special areas of
vis the rest of the political organs of figure is only 4.5%. In terms of administration substantially different
government remained high. proportion of the total employed from, or overlapping, those of the
population, Japan's government main ministries, these "external
employees represent about 9% of theorgans" hold slightly less prestige for
The Contemporary total compared to between 14 and a variety of technical administrative
Bureaucracy 20% for the other four countries. reasons. For most practical purposes,
Approximately 1.2 million individ- however, they can be considered
Overview: Japan's contemporary
uals work as full-time personnel for similar to the ministries.
bureaucracy is structurally similar to
the national government. Some Each of the 12 main ministries and
many of its counterparts in Western
300,000 work in the Defense Agency; most important agencies are headed
Europe, although it is typically
over 350,000 more work in one of by a minister, with the assistance of
smaller than any other. It is highly
the five government enterprises one or occasionally two, vice
meritocratic and typically staffed
with some of the nation's most (posts, national forestry, government ministers. These top two to three
talented individuals. It is deeply individuals are almost invariably
imbued both with a sense of mission, elected parliamentarians and the only
as well as the willingness to
Because Japan has self- politically appointed and responsible
officials in a ministry or agency;
aggrandize to itself the powers consciously limited the below them are members of the
needed to achieve that mission. It is
closely linked to the governing politi- size of its governmental appointed civil service.
The most senior civil servant in
cal party (and to many of the
opposition parties as well) but its
bureaucracy, the Japanese each agency is the administrative
vice-minister, in charge of oversight
individual members are rarely case provides an excellent of all administrative matters within
involved directly in partisan or
counter-case to his ministry. Below him stretch a
electoral politics while they hold
office. Quite unlike the national limited number of relatively clean
presumptions that lines of hierarchy. Each ministry is
bureaucracy in the United States
where large numbers of top positions bureaucratic expansion is
typically divided into six to twelve
change hands with the changes in the functionally arranged bureaus
presidency, in Japan it is far more inevitable. Japan instead
(kyoku), and these in turn are either
often the politicians who change and sub-divided into departments (bu) or
offers a most important divided directly into sections (ka). It
the bureaucrats who remain. It has
also been an exceptionally small and case of systematic is these sections, employing anywhere
continually reexamined organ of from twenty to thirty people, which
government.
downscaling of form the working units of each
ministry.
bureaucracy. Most agencies also include a
Organization and Structure: The
National Civil Service Law (October number of attached organs such as
21, 1947) and the National Govern- printing, the mint, and the alcohol research institutes, museums,
libraries and the like as well as from
ment Organization Law (July 10, monopoly). Slightly more than
1948) provide the main legal out- 125,000 work in the national school one to several dozen advisory
lines of Japan's national bureaucraticsystem. This leaves approximately committees (shingikai) designed to
service. In addition, Japan has an 420,000 who make up the general provide the agency with various
extensive local governmental service administrative staff of the national policy input from outside interest
and about 100 public corporations. government. associations, professionals,
Together these three employ over 5 In the early 1990s, there were 12 journalists and policy experts.
million full-time public employees main ministries (sho) in the Japanese
(komuin). Although this represents national government. Along with the Civil Service System: Responsibility
nearly a tenfold increase in the size Prime Minister's Office (Sorifu) these for overseeing the national civil
of Japan's bureaucracy since the form the principal administrative services in regard to recruitment,
1940s and although Japan is often organs of the national government. promotion, compensation and
thought of as a bureaucratized In addition, there are a number of adjudication of disputes lies with the
country, this figure is actually signifi-agencies and commissions, such as National Personnel Authority, a
cantly lower than that for most otherthe National Archives, the Science semi-autonomous body somewhat
major industrialized countries. WhileCouncil of Japan, the Department of analogous to the U.S. Civil Service
differences in administrative struc- the Imperial Household, the Tax Commission. The Management and
ture, institutional variation, and Administration Agency, the Immi- Coordination Agency (formerly the
methods of calculation make precise gration Service Agency and the like Administrative Management
comparisons difficult, government which are collectively referred to as Agency), under the Office of the
employees represent approximately "external organs" (gaikyoku). Tech- Prime Minister, is charged with over-
6-9% of the total populations of the nically outside the direct lines of seeing the organizational needs and

March 1992 21

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 Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

efficiency of individual agencies. their entire careers. Often this will above are subject to additional
On paper, civil service positions include one or more temporary cabinet and LDP scrutiny. As a
are well-differentiated. There are detachments to another agency. result, the actual promotion of indi-
eight main classes: administrative, Advancement tends to be principally viduals to top positions in the
taxation, security, marine, education, a function of seniority, and groups bureaucracy is by no means devoid
research, medical and a final catch- of individuals hired together tend to of political sensitivity.
all. Most of these classes are further be promoted together, with some Most successful individuals can
subdivided. allowances for different demonstra- expect to head a section after
tions of ability or lack thereof. approximately fifteen years of
Individuals rarely remain in a single service, to be assistant bureau chiefs
Recruitment: As with the prewar
position for more than two or three after 22-25 years and bureau chiefs
service there is little horizontal entry
years, and transfers are designed, after 25-28 years with an agency. The
into the top or middle ranks of the
civil service. Rather most recruitment among other things, to assure that all top post of administrative vice-
occurs after the completion of minister, available only to a limited
few, can be achieved after 28-30
university education in one's early
twenties, and promotion involves a Because the Japanese years. It is usually held for two to
long and fairly predictable series of three years, after which the vice
bureaucracy has gone minister and most of those who
steps up the career ladder leading
eventually to "retirement" from an through several conscious entered the agency with him are
agency in one's mid-fifties. Entrance expected to resign their posts. Their
and promotion are based on examin- historical reformulations, age at this point is usually in the
low-to mid-fifties.
ations. Most recruits are male, including explicit imitation
although by the beginning of the
1990s an increasing number of of the Prussian model, Competition and Coordination: If
females were being recruited and
promoted along with their male
and systematic there is a blend of security and
competition in the recruitment of
counterparts. reformulation by individual civil servants, a good deal
The most important exam is the
of autonomy is given to individual
Principal Senior A-Class Entrance American bureaucrats, it
agencies within the national bureauc-
Examination (Kokka Komuin Shiken
Jokyu Ko). This is a rigid entrance
is an excellent case for racy. This agency autonomy often
results in intense agency-to-agency
exam for the top tier of the civil examining the interaction competition (as well as intra-
service. Competition on this examin-
ministerial competition among
ation is intense and has become more of competing bureaucratic
different sections or bureaus).
so with time. Today over 50 individ- traditions. Certain ministerial rivalries have
uals typically compete for each slot
reached epic proportions such as that
available. Those who pass this exam between Finance and International
can expect appointment at grade six Trade and Industry; between Posts
followed by rapid advancement to senior officials will be broadly and Telecommunications and Educa-
top positions, usually to one of the familiar with most of an agency's or tion; or between the "economic"
top three levels, before retirement. ministry's complete functions. ministries and the "service"
Those who fail the exam must seek During their careers, an individual ministries. Coordination among such
employment elsewhere. has many opportunities to acquire isolated power bases is never easy,
Although there has been some additional skills. Various courses in and tunnel vision and compartmen-
reduction in the dominance of the foreign languages, computers, talization are surely a part of
civil service by Tokyo University economics, and the like are often bureaucratic life in Japan as else-
graduates, roughly 35% of the given by an agency. There is lots of where. At the same time, a variety of
successful applicants continue to be room for the development and
structures exist to mitigate this
Tokyo graduates; an additional 15% flourishing of individual talents
compartmentalization, ranging from
or so will come from Kyoto Univer- within each agency. In addition, the
alumni clubs and informal study
sity. Usually only 15 or so of Japan's National Personnel Agency maintains
groups on particular issues to more
460-odd universities see ten or more a program for potential high flyers to formally structured bodies such as
of their graduates succeed in the be sent abroad for two years of the weekly conference of administra-
exams. Thus, there has been some advanced education, including tive vice ministers, or issue specific
democratic broadening of the recruit- language skills.
interministry teams. That most of the
ment process since the prewar period Technically all promotions in the senior officials have been trained as
although past biases remain civil service are governed by civil
influential. generalists, rather than technical
service regulations and are not specialists, also undoubtedly helps in
subject to interference by political brokering complicated issues of juris-
Career Patterns: Most members of parties or other partisan considera- diction and agency power.
the national bureaucracy remain with tions. In point of fact, all promo-
a single government agency during tions at the level of bureau chief and Post-bureaucratic Careers: Retire-

22 PS: Political Science & Politics

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 Bureaucracy in Japan

ment comes at such a relatively officials were former bureaucrats. divorced from politics. One of the
young age for most officials that it Many of these included a core of most important means for bureau-
provides a spur to bureaucratic supporters of Prime Minister cratic influence over politics in Japan
rejuvenation. At the same time, there Yoshida Shigeru who plucked a has been its influence over policy
is both an economic and psychologi- number of talented younger bureau- formation. One survey of national
cal need on the part of most retiring crats from the civil service to stand level bureaucrats showed a full 80%
officials to remain active in the for elective office under the Liberal holding that it was they, and not the
workforce, as well as a broad social Party label. This 25% figure elected politicians, who were solving
desire to take advantage of their remained relatively constant over the Japan's general policy problems.
expertise. Thus a major phenomenon postwar period, although it has This figure compared to only 21 % of
associated with the Japanese declined somewhat of late. In addi- the British and 16% of the West
bureaucracy concerns the reemploy- tion, about one-half of the prefec- German officials surveyed. Japan's
ment of former bureaucrats, a tural governors during the mid-1970s senior bureaucrats surely see them-
process known as the "descent from had been in the national or local selves as pro-active, rather than re-
heaven" (amakudari) in which most governmental service. Perhaps most active on policy measures.
ex-officials gain employment either notably, in the twenty-five years These attitudinal supports for
with a public corporation, a think following the formation of the LDP bureaucratic influence are matched
tank, an affiliated agency, or a in 1955, the office of prime minister by actual performances. Bureaucratic
private corporation previously over- was held for only five years by men expertise provides a key component
seen by the agent and his agency. who could be described as profes- in the exercise of such influence.
The implicit presumption behind sional politicians; during the remain- Agencies have a great deal of influ-
most such hiring is that the rehired ing twenty years, former bureaucrats ence in shaping the conceptualization
official will serve as a useful bridge occupied the office. of issues. They are most often
between his new and his former Evidence in the last decade plus charged by parliament with investi-
employer. suggests that the influence of former gating politically sensitive problems.
bureaucrats within the LDP is on the Reports submitted to the agencies by
Bureaucrats as Elected Officials: wane. Essentially, politics has their various attached advisory com-
Japan's civil servants do not enter become a full-time career path, with missions often form the core of new
the political world very overtly while entry at the top or middle levels legal proposals. Their various
in office. Unlike in France, Japanese becoming increasingly difficult. Most attached advisory commissions often
civil servants do not serve as formal politicians today have not served for play an instrumental role in issuing
advisors to the cabinets. Nor is there many years in the bureaucracy; agenda setting reports. Ultimately,
a Grands Corps concept allowing rather they have come up through about ninety percent of all legislation
Japanese civil servants to move freely local electoral offices; most ex- passed in the parliament is first
between administrative and political bureaucrats who enter politics now drafted by bureaucratic agencies.
posts, or to run for office while do so by resigning in their early to Top-level bureaucrats are typically
retaining bureaucratic status. Unlike mid-thirties, after perhaps only ten the equivalent of floor managers for
those of West Germany, Japan's years or so with an agency, rather such bills once they are introduced in
bureaucrats can not sit simultaneous- than waiting for retirement following parliament. Moreover, most bills are
ly in parliament. In contrast to the twenty-five or thirty year careers as broad in nature and include specific
United States they do not serve on administrators. Moreover, unlike the provisos relegating specifics on
"presidential teams" made up of earlier corps of bureaucrats-turned- implementation to subsequent
politicians, administrators, and politician who had served principally bureaucratic ordinances. In fact,
admixtures of both. The lines sepa- in economic or diplomatic agencies much of the actual lawmaking in
rating politics and administration in such as Finance or Foreign Affairs, Japan consists not simply of laws,
Japan remain relatively stark. Where most of the officials now leaving the but of precisely such extra-parlia-
bureaucrats do enter the world of bureaucracy for the political world mentary ordinances issued on the
electoral politics it is usually after come from ministries such as basis of agency authority alone.
their retirement. Construction, Home Affairs, or Agencies also utilize the so-called
Compared to the total number of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, power of administrative guidance vis-
officials who retire annually, the agencies with direct pork barrel and a-vis the organizations dealt with by
number who enter electoral politics is partisan connections that make the their agencies. This term involves
extremely small. At the same time, transition to electoral politics quite little more than the sometimes subtle,
particularly in the first twenty years logical. oftentimes blunt, jawboning of such
or so following the end of the war, a organizations to adjust their behavior
substantial proportion of the parlia- The Bureaucracy and Policy to accord with agency priorities.
mentarians from the Liberal Demo- Formation: Entering the world of Post-retirement careers also serve as
cratic Party, and an even greater electoral politics is only one of the a tool of bureaucratic influence in
proportion of their leaders, were many ways in which an administrator many spheres. Discretionary
drawn from the ranks of former or an entire agency can influence subsidies, public works spending,
officials. As early as the 1953 political decisions. Certainly, there is licensing and permits and so forth
elections, some 25% of the elected no modern bureaucracy today that is are also important elements in

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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

bureaucratic power. The consequence Public Unionization: Close coopera- two more widely recognized conse-
is that most national bureaucratic tion between senior bureaucrats and quences of this reform were first, the
agencies have a wide range of tools leaders of the LDP are not always not incidental breaking of the politi-
with which to shape and influence matched at the lower levels of the cal strength of much of Japan's
public and private activities within civil service, both national and local. public sector union power; and
the country. Employees of agencies at both levels second, a strong reaffirmation of the
Much of a bureaucratic agency's have been highly unionized since the longstanding commitment to
influence is the result of the rapid early years following the war. minimalist government, and to a lean
turnover of cabinet ministers and Explicit strikes are banned by if highly efficient, national
vice-ministers. With some important officials in most areas; collective bureaucracy.
exceptions, few ministers hold their bargaining is allowed in some spheres
positions for more than a year, such as the postal service, the rail-
making it difficult for most of them ways, and the telegraph and tele- Suggested Discussion Topics
to exert close day-to-day supervision phone services. In many instances
over staffs with 15-30 years of strikes for the "right to strike" have Compare the role of the bureauc-
accumulated expertise. actually occurred, even in the face of racy in Japan to that of the United
At the same time, such power is a continued legal prohibition against States or any other country with
not at all unchecked. Political them. Privatizations of many public which you are familiar.
Examine the relative merits and
parties, interest groups, the media, corporations in the mid- to
single issue movements, parliament late-1980s, however, have reduced demerits of the prewar Japanese
and a host of other political actors the powers of public sector unions in bureaucracy in terms of the tradeoff
provide important counterweights. Japanese politics. between economic development and
Moreover, since senior level bureau- political democratization.
cratic promotions are closely What factors would suggest
scrutinized by the Liberal DemocraticAdministrative Reform: As noted Japan's bureaucracy is "political"
Party, most senior officials are above, Japan's bureaucracy remains and what would suggest it is not.
consequently close in their thinking comparatively small. This has been If you were a member of the LDP
to the broad goals of the elected due in large part to a series of charged with scrutinizing promotions
officials of the country. But clearly administrative reform measures in the civil service, what traits would
most national bureaucratic agencies undertaken since the last years of the you most look for? What would be
are also active and interested players Occupation, all of which were the probable consequences if your
in the politics of Japanese policy designed systematically to reduce the standards were adhered to?
formation. size and complexity of government
agencies and governmental paper-
Bureaucrats vs. Politicians: One of work. An important series of
the ongoing disputes among special-measures undertaken in the late Additional Sources
ists in Japanese politics concerns the 1960s and early 1970s involved
relative degree of influence over systematic reductions in the Inoki, Masamichi. 1964. "The Civil Bureauc-
policymaking exerted by bureaucrats authorized size of most agencies racy: Japan," in Robert Ward and
versus elected officials. There is no Dankwart Rustow, Political Modernization
often by figures such as 5 % over
in Japan and Turkey. Princeton: Princeton
room to recap this debate. It is fair periods such as four years. The University Press, pp. 283-300. A fine
to say, however, that there is general cumulative effect was a de facto overview of the prewar Japanese
agreement that the recent trends in freeze in the size of the national bureaucracy in a developmental context.
relative influence show that members administration, and an actual cut in Johnson, Chalmers. 1975. "Japan: Who
Governs?: An Essay on Official Bureauc-
of the Liberal Democratic Party are the number of government agencies
racy," Journal of Japanese Studies. 2, 1,
taking an increased interest in, and and public corporations. pp. 1-28. An examination of the relative
are exerting greater overall influence In the early 1980s an expanded policymaking and other influences of
over, an ever larger range of policy version of administrative reform, bureaucrats and other political actors.
. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle.
issues. At the same time, it is impor- often known by its Japanese
Stanford: Stanford University Press. An
tant to realize that because there are acronym, Rincho, was begun. This exceptionally detailed study of a single
such close and intimate linkages-- was followed by two additional agency and its role in national economic
personal, organizational and reform commissions. Among the development.
ideological-between these politicians major results of these reform groups Kumon, Shimpei. 1984. "Japan Faces Its
Future," Journal of Japanese Studies 10,
and most national bureaucrats, that was a substantial simplification of 1, pp. 143-166. An examination of the
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24 PS. Political Science & Politics

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