DESCOPING JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE (JWST)

(As of the year 2005, concerns have been raised that the JWST program is at risk for significant cost overruns and
delays. There is need to descope JWST and reduce both risk, cost and delay)

The science goals in a science mission are always ambitious and are intended to make
significant scientific innovations. The same is also the case for JWST. Its birth was intended to provide
some fundamental questions regarding the origin of our Universe.

BACKGROUND

JWST is envisioned to be a large deployable, infrared-optimized space telescope and the

scientific successor to the aging Hubble Space Telescope. JWST is being designed for a 5-year mission
to find the first stars and trace the evolution of galaxies from their beginning to their current formation,
and is intended to operate in an orbit approximately 1.5 million kilometers—or 1 million miles—from
the Earth. On overall with its on board support it can operate for a life span of 10 years approximately.

From the outset, the challenge for the JWST would be how to design innovative technologies in a
package 6 times larger but 4 times lighter than the HST. Among the pioneering technologies being
developed for JWST were:

• Folding primary mirror and ultralightweight beryllium optics for the honeycombed mirror segments.

• Detectors able to record extremely weak signals.

• Micro shutters (made up of filaments thinner than human hair) to enable programmable object
selection for the spectrograph.

• Cryogenic cooling mechanism for the midinfrared detectors as they need to be operated at −223°C.

The telescope will rely on a host of untried technologies, ranging from its sensitive light-detecting
instrumentation to the cooling system that will keep the huge spacecraft below 50 kelvin. And it will
have to operate perfectly on the first try, some 1.5 million kilometres from Earth and beyond the reach
of any repair mission.

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 Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (data and images)

JWST was originally conceived in 1996 as a $1 billion telescope, with an expected launch
sometime around 2007. Over the course of the formulation phase, the JWST cost estimate for
completion had increased to nearly $3.5 billion by the year 2004. Approximately, the majority of the
increase (around $655 million) was attributed to external factors: a projected 22-month launch delay
as JWST waited for approval of the Ariane 5 launch vehicle offered by ESA (estimated $300 million).
Another estimated $125 million was due to added contingency budget reserves required by NASA. An
additional price (estimated $386 million) was the result of changes in requirements and growth in
implementation, including cost increases in getting major suppliers under contract and architecture
changes to the cryocooler and electronics components. Integration and test re-evaluation also
contributed additional costs, including test facility changes and more launcher-related testing, and
instrument costs were growing as well.

CONCERNS DURING EARLIER STAGES

Two fundamental mistakes were made at the time of Confirmation. First, the Project Budget presented
for Confirmation was not based upon a current, estimate of projected costs. Second, the Agency
Program Management Council (APMC) did not fully recognize the inadequacy of the Project Budget,
although they did add contingency (reserves) to cover unanticipated problems that were likely to occur
on such a complex project. However, there were two issues with the Confirmation budget decision:
The reserves added to the Project Budget were inadequate, and the reserves were skewed to the out
years so that inadequate reserves were provided in the years needed.

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OVERCOMMING DELAY AND COST OVERRUN IN SEVERAL SITUATIONS

(a) Indecision over the launch vehicle (LV) also hung over the project like a dark cloud. In 2005,
NASA administrator Mike Griffin had signed off on Ariane in June, but the agency was still
awaiting US State Department approval of a formal agreement with ESA. The assumption was
that approval would be forthcoming, but the issue was complicated domestically. Support for
Boeing’s launcher came not only from political quarters but also from corporate and
institutional interests, as the US rocket industry continued to experience a decline in its number
of launches.
Recommendation:
As the ESA Ariane 5 has a history of successful 18 launches before JWST, its so obvious to
invest on which is technically ready and available. And if NASA ended up going with a US
launch vehicle, there would be an additional cost on top of the delay cost already incurred.
Making a quick decision in agreeing the ESA Ariane 5 would have avoided a large portion of
cost increase.
A delay in deciding the LV for a period of six months really impacted the development in the
design of major equipment like primary mirror and the cryocoolers. If LV was decided early
then the cost overrun for that period of time will be reduced significantly due to fast progress
in observatory and its components design.
If there is further delay in There wouldn’t be any risk to the mission in agreeing with ESA
Ariane 5 without delaying, other than the political debates against the use of US Boeing LV.

(b) Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is critical for project funding in any organisation. Given
the range of new technologies and the testing required, meeting the performance standards in
time would be challenging. Work on the readiness demonstrations, ranging from the sunshield
material to cryocooling systems, was in full swing. The innovative technologies that had to
demonstrate readiness were:
1. sunshield membrane: material qualification 6. sidecar ASIC (application-specific
test report integrated circuit for image digitization)
2. near-infrared detector: focal plane 7. passive cryogenic thermal control: heat
assembly switch development
3. midinfrared detector: focal plane assembly 8. WFS&C (wavefront sensing and control
subsystem for correcting optics errors)
4. primary mirror: segment assembly 9. large, precision cryostructure

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 5. NIRSpec: microshutter array 10. MIRI cryocooler system.
Recommedation:
The project was possibly as big and ambitious as anything undertaken at NASA by that time,
and it is a first-of-its-kind observatory. So many things were novel about the JWST, from its
size to the cryogenics to the technology required to fold it all up like a paper inside a rocket. It
is strongly believed that some, if not all, of the cost overrun was simply unavoidable if the
technologies required for developing JWST were understood before based on what is readily
available. As these many new innovations might take around 5-10 years of hardship. Generally,
the risk of cost growth was less than 5% when more than 25% of development cost was spent
during the study phase. It was estimated the JWST would spend 49% of its total cost by the
end of phase B (technology development) in March 2008.

(c) Project and Finance Management is a crucial section in any organisation to bring a
successful project outcome. JWST even though being a successor of Hubble Space Telescope
(HST), still its vision to perform extraordinary things has overlooked many other things like
cost estimate and management in between the science and political groups. Without a proper
cost estimates and deadlines planned, there’s a danger the project might get shelved.
Recommendation:
Risk in going along with the fault management may lead to huge economic losses. At this point
its not wise to hold the project without flushing in money at appropriate times, because having
spent $3.5B already of taxpayer funds that has led to 75% of the hardware being delivered or
in fabrication, this seems like a wise and prudent additional investment, even in periods of
fiscal challenges. Furthermore, the money that might be “saved” by holding for a period or
terminating would not be available to other science programs, and much of the $3.5B would
also be wasted since the hardware is so special to JWST that it cannot be reused.
As the technical innovations are getting ready on full swing, a 10% additional marginal cost
can be allotted if required and not more than that by keeping the deadlines being same as
prescheduled.

(d) Detectors that are to be carried on board with JWST are highly sensitive towards the space
environment. The mid-range Infrared Detector say NIRSpec:Multiarray is to be designed with
utmost precision and precautions. Any issue found in such instruments which has a total life

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 cost of $300 million, will not only add up cost but also delay in the commissioning of the
equipment on board.
These kinds of risks can be mitigated by ensuring precision design during development process,
because issue in a small microshutter array can lead to redesign the entire module.
(e) Individual partner companies and institutions proving equipment to JWST should be given
proper regulations regarding the design and maintenance of instruments. Assuming that the
spacecraft’s thrusters has been improperly cleaned, this may lead to sprung leaks in the
thrusters and it takes at least part of a year to replace them. Along with that, the cost involved
will get doubled bearing the additional time and components.

CONCLUSION

This report raises significant concerns about the way in which the JWST Project has been
planned and how there is a huge cost overrun and launch time delay. It is well known that the funds
used by JWST over the past years weren’t wasted. On the contrary, a substantial amount of cutting-
edge hardware has been in the direction of innovation as part of the first steps toward the overall
integration and test of the Observatory. The JWST Project does face serious difficulties, however,
largely stemming from the lack of a well-defined plan for completion and because a series of decisions
have led to substantial underfunding along with the complexity in telescope design.

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