[G.R. No. 123361. March 3, 1997.
] Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration,
TEOFILO CACHO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION and THE CITY OF
ILIGAN, Respondents-Appellees.
Godofredo D. Cabildo for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING.
— A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and,
therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and
conclusive against all persons including the Government
and its branches, irrespective of whether or not they
were personally notified of the filing of the application for
registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said
application, because all persons are considered as
notified by the publication required by law.
2. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVENESS OF A DECREE OF
REGISTRATION. — A decree of registration that has
become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the
questions actually contested and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the
land registration proceedings. With the certification duly
issued by the then Land Registration Commission, now
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting
Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished
member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the
the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly found
there is no doubt that decrees of registration had in fact
been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond
dispute that such decrees attained finality upon the lapse
of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees
to once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the
1914 case of Cacho v. US would be tantamount to
setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after
the lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore v.
Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 11960]). Such action would
definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens
System.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE JUDGMENT AND RESULTING
DECREE ARE RES JUDICATA. — To sustain the Court of
Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to fulfill
the conditions set forth in Cacho v. U .S. would constitute
a derogation of the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly,
the issuance of the subject decrees presupposes a prior
final judgment because the issuance of such decree is a
mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration
Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a
final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment
in Cacho v. U .S. could not have acquired finality without
the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No.
6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale
from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon
which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913);
and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new
survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10,
1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914
(upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8,
1915). Requiring the submission of a new plan as a
condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render
the finality attained by the Cacho v. U .S. case nugatory,
thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res
judicata. It must be stressed that the judgment and the
resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding
upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the
nature of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a
requirement is an impermissible assault upon the
integrity and stability of the Torrens System of
registration because it also effectively renders the decree
inconclusive.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACHES CANNOT BAR THE ISSUANCE
OF A DECREE. — As to the issue of laches, suffice it to
state that the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that
laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason
therefor may be gleaned from Sta. Ana v. Menla (1 SCRA
1294 [1961]): . . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6,
Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to
special proceedings, such as a land registration case.
This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured against
the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the
same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing
party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish
a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land is sought
to be established. After the ownership has been proved
and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom. . . . There is nothing in the law that
limits the period within which the court may order or
issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and does not need to be
asserted or enforced against the adverse party.
Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial
duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission . . . Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal
Marcos v. de Banuver (25 SCRA 316 [1968]) that a final
decision in land registration cases can neither be
rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by
laches. This was reiterated in Vda. De Barroga v. Albano
(157 SCRA 131 [1988])
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF AND
PRESUMPTIONS; THE EXECUTION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS IS ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY AND PROOF IS REQUIRED TO CONTROVERT
THE SAME; BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS UPON HIM WHO
ALLEGES THE CONTRARY. — By an Affidavit of
Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the property
in question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner under
Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series of 1985 of the Consulate
General of the Philippines in Chicago. The fact of
adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was
published in the Times Journal. Petitioner also appeared
personally before Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the
Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the
Philippines in Chicago and executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to represent
him in this case. The execution of public documents, as
in the case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a
presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail
and controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests
upon him who alleges the contrary and respondents
cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely casting
doubt as to his existence and his identity without
presenting preponderant evidence to controvert such
presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply
in the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn
before the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of
the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering
oath being of itself a performance of duty by a public
official.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The late Doña Demetria Cacho applied for the
registration of two parcels of land situated in what was
then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the
limits of Military Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp
Overton" .
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 &
6909 and were jointly tried and decided by Judge Jesse
Jorge on December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this
Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States (28
Phil. 616 [1914]) the trial court made the following
pronouncements: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Re: Case No. 6908
The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was
purchased by the applicant, Doña Demetria Cacho y
Soriano from Gabriel Salzos. The title of Gabriel Salzos is
founded on a deed of sale in his favor, executed and
signed by a Moro woman named Alanga, who acted for
her husband, a Moro named Dorondon. It appears that
the husband of Alanga, Datto Dorondon is alive yet and
before admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered
that a deed from Dorondon be presented, renouncing all
his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No.
6908. It is further ordered that the applicant present the
corresponding deed from Datto Dorondon on or before
March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No.
6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87
hectares or more than 90 acres. This was purchased by
the applicant from the Moro Datto Bunglay.
Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by
inheritance from his uncle Datto Anandog who died
without issue and the balance by his own possession and
cultivation.
A tract of land 37 hectares in area, is larger than is
cultivated by the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga
cadastral case of thousands of parcels now on trial before
this court, the average size of the parcels is not above 3
or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro
with all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of
land as the one in question.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doña
Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied
and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the
southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No.
6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the
land solicited in said case is denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp
Overton and had another ocular inspection for the
purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto
Anandog. The court set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., &
N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated
by Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in
accordance with the points mentioned. It is further
ordered that one half of the costs of the new survey be
paid by the applicant and the other half by the
Government of the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
Final decision in these cases is reserved until the
presentation of the said deed and the new plan.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as
the son and sole heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho,
filed a petition for reconstitution of two original
certificates of title under Republic Act 26, and docketed
under the original GLRO Record No. 6908 and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic
of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and
the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to
evidence filed by the Republic and the NSC, the lower
court dismissed the petition because it found the
evidence inadequate to show the prior existence of the
titles sought to be restored. The same order stated
further that the proper remedy was for the reconstitution
of decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908
and 6909, Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively,
were already issued. The same trial court specifically
found that since the decrees had, in fact, been issued,
the judgment of this Court in Cacho v. U.S., supra,
although by itself expressly dependent upon some
conditions, must have indisputably become final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of
court to file and to admit amended petition, but this was
denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court
(docketed as Teofilo Cacho v. Hon. Manindiara P.
Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand
the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to accept
the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-
issuance of decrees under the following guidelines: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA
1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 (1968), and the lower court
findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the
omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to
re-issue the decrees in order to have a basis for the
issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in
their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower
court to accept the amended petition subject to the
private respondents being given the opportunity to
answer and to present their defenses. The evidence
already on record shall be allowed to stand but
opportunity to controvert existing evidence shall be given
the parties.
(p. 59, Rollo.)
Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and
heard it as one for re-issuance of the decrees.
In their "Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition" to the
amended petition, respondents Republic of the
Philippines and NSC raised the defenses that the petition
suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner
was not the real party in interest; that petitioner was
guilty of laches; that Demetria Cacho was not the
registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no
decrees covering the properties were ever issued in the
name of Demetria Cacho; and that the issuance of the
decrees was dubious and irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan,
Branch 1) rendered its decision decreeing the
reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and
18969. The pertinent portion of the said decision reads: chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual
basis exist for the issuance of the subject decrees.
This Court has already ruled that Decrees Nos. 10364
and 18959 were issued in these LRC Cases Nos. 6908
and 6909, respectively, and that the issuance of the
decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had already
become final. Oppositors never disputed the cited
pronouncements and therefore these should now be
considered final and conclusive
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA), through its then Acting Commissioner
Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the
Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, all
certified that according to the Record Book of Decrees for
Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was
issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and Decree No. 10364
was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908. (Exhibits "C", "D",
"E" and "M").
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC
Commissioner Santiago Kapunan in compliance with an
order of this Court, confirmed that the proceedings
undertaken by the LRC in the original petition for
reconstitution have been regularly and properly done
based on existing records; that Decrees 10364 and
18969 have been issued and recorded in LRC’s Record
Book of Decrees; that the plan and technical description
of the lots involved were found to be correct, approved
by the LRC and transmitted to this Court, (Exh. "M").
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation
Nos. 43 and 63 in which this Court affirmed the issuance
of Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18969 in the name of
Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one
Ricardo A. Arandilla, Deputy Clerk of Court of the LRC
which identified and validated the report of the LRC to
this Court on the present petition, (Exh. "M"), shows that
the decrees registry of the LRC had recorded the fact and
date of issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969 in
GLRO Rec. No. 6908 and 6909 and the approval of the
plans and corresponding technical descriptions of the lots
involved in the aforesaid record numbers and decrees
(Exh. "T").
chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary
It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by
Oppositors’ counsel, Arandilla produced for scrutiny the
LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases, which
contained therein the entries showing that Decree No.
10364 was issued on May 9, 1913 in Case No. 6908 and
Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 7, 1915 in Case
No. 6909. (Exhs. "T", "P" and "19").
From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds
that the existence of the decrees have been established
sufficiently and indubitably by the evidence submitted by
the petitioner, and therefore, said amended petition has
to be granted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The amended petition is hereby granted and
approved. Declaring Decrees No. 10364 and No. 18969
as reconstituted.
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA), (formerly Land
Registration Commission) to reissue Decrees No. 19364
and No. 16869 existing at the LRC Registry Book of
Ordinary Registration Cases in the name of Demetria
Cacho upon payment by the petitioner of the required
legal fees.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel
Corporation in their joint brief assigned the following
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cacho’s
amended petition for reconstitution of decrees of
registration purportedly issued in LRC Record Nos. 6908
and 6909. Notwithstanding that —
I. The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmities;
II. The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government
of the United States, 28 Phil. 616, that final decision in
LRC Cases 6908 and 6909 had been reserved pending
compliance by the applicant therein of certain conditions
albeit, as of Date, No competent evidence exists showing
compliance with the imposed conditions and/or the
rendition of a "final judgment" and/or the issuance of
decrees pursuant thereto;
III. The petition is barred by laches; and
IV. The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person
and/or a party who does not have a lawful interest in the
case.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the
trial court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In giving due course to "Teofilo Cacho’s" petition for
reconstitution of titles when the same is already barred
by laches.
2. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution
when there is no proof that Teofilo Cacho actually exists
and is a real party in interest.
3. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution
even in the absence of sufficient proof to the effect that
land registration Decree Nos. 10364 & 18969 were
indeed issued to Demetria Cacho.
4. In reopening the case despite the finality of the order
dated 16 April 1979 dismissing the original petition for
reconstitution of title.
5. In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land
already owned by appellant City of Iligan pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation No. 469 (dated 4 October
1965) which ownership was affirmed by the Supreme
Court on 26 February 1988 [City of Iligan versus Director
of Lands, Et Al., 158 SCRA 158].
(pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the
proceedings below and brushed aside respondents’ claim
of jurisdictional infirmities. It also acknowledged the
issuance and existence of the registration decrees in
favor of Demetria Cacho, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold
that Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 were issued in GLRO
Record No. 6908 and GLRO Record No. 6909, on May 9,
1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively, according to the
Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration
Case. Then Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration
Commission Santiago M. Kapunan (now Justice of the
Supreme Court), submitted a Manifestation, dated
November 2, 1978, in compliance with an order at the
lower court, confirming that the plan and technical
description of the land involving both Lots 1 and 2 were
correct, that said lots are decreed properties, and that all
the proceedings undertaken by the LRC were regularly
done based on existing records.
(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the lower court and dismissed the petition for
re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, with
prejudice, for the following reasons: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v.
Government of the United States on December 10, 1914,
now appearing in 28 Phil. 617, regarding GLRO Record
Nos. 6908 and 6909, denied in part and granted in part
the application for adjudication and registration of the
two parcels of land of Demetria Cacho, appellee’s
predecessor-in-interest. Final decision on the cases was
reserved pending compliance with conditions set forth
therein.
1.) Re: Case 6908,." . . before admitting this parcel to
registration, it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon . . .
be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel
of land object of Case No. 6908" (28 Phil. 629).
2.) Re: Case No. 6909, "the parcel of land claimed by the
applicant in Case No. 6909 is the larger of two parcels
and contains 37.87 hectares . . . (28 Phil. 619). The
court therefore finds that the applicant Doña Demetria
Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and
planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern
part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909
only; and her application as to all the rest of the land
solicited in said case is denied." (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th
day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and
had another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing
the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog . . .
with previous notice to the applicant and her husband
and representative Señor Vidal. Having arrived late,
Señor Vidal did not assist in the ocular inspection . . . But
the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E.,
S.E., and N.W. corners of the land found to have been
cultivated by the deceased Anandog" (28 Phil. 630);
"And it is ordered that the new survey be made in
accordance with the points mentioned . . ." (28 Phil.
630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description
referred to in the Manifestation dated November 2, 1978
of the Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration
Commission and the plan submitted by Demetria Cacho
in Case No. 6909 are the same as to the area, which is
37.87 hectares, and as to the date of approval, which is
November 15, 1910. Since the Supreme Court decision in
Cacho v. US "ordered that the new survey be made in
accordance with the points mentioned" ; that applicant
Demetria Cacho is owner only of the portion of land
occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog;
and that her application as to all the rest of the land
solicited in case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the
new survey, if it was made, must have a smaller area
and a later date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969
was issued in GLRO No. 6909, re-issuance of the decree
cannot be made in the absence of the "new survey" on
which to base the area and technical description of the
parcel of land in Case No. 6909.
Second. While a person may not acquire title to
registered property through continuous adverse
possession, in derogation of the title of the original
registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may
lose his right to recover back the possession of such
property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled
appellee to act earlier;
b. that they were misled by appellee’s inaction into
believing that appellee would not assert the right on
which he bases his suit;
c. the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would
accrue to them in the event that relief is accorded to the
appellee or that the suit is not held barred; and
d. that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of
the property covered by the decree.
The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the
Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever classification
belong to the state.
The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered
lands which, unless the contrary is shown, are presumed
to be public lands, under the principle that all "lands
belong to the Crown which have not been granted by
(the King), or in his name, or by the kings who preceded
him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and
existence and that he is a real party interest. To qualify a
person to be a real party in interest in whose name an
action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been
denied, he filed the present petition because allegedly,
the Court of Appeals decided questions of substance in a
way not in accord with the law and applicable decisions
of this Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously
embarked upon a reopening of Decree Nos. 10364 and
18969 issued on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915,
respectively, when it required proof of compliance with
conditions for their issuance. These conditions are
conclusively presumed to have been complied with
before the original decrees were issued and can no
longer be inquired into.
Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened
settled and standing doctrines pronounced in Sta. Ana v.
Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315, when it applied laches as a bar
to the reissuance of decrees.
Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing
decisions of this Honorable Court when it applied laches
despite the total absence of proof to establish the
requisite elements for its application.
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied
the "Regalian doctrine" to dispense with proof of the
essential elements of laches.
Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial
responsibility to uphold the stability and integrity of the
Torrens system.
Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored
uncontroverted proof on the identity and existence of
petitioner and allowed itself to be swayed by wild and
gratuitous allusions to the contrary.
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
The petition having been given due course and the
parties having filed their respective memoranda, we shall
now resolve the case.
We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore,
the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive
against all persons including the Government and its
branches, irrespective of whether or not they were
personally notified of the filing of the application for
registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said
application, because all persons are considered as
notified by the publication required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become
final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the
questions actually contested and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the
land registration proceedings. With the certification duly
issued by the then Land Registration Commission, now
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting
Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished
member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the
Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration,
the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly found
there is no doubt that decrees of registration had in fact
been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond
dispute that such decrees attained finality upon the lapse
of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees
to once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the
1914 case of Cacho v. U.S. would be tantamount to
setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after
the lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore v.
Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action would
definitely run counter to the very purpose of the Torrens
System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as
regards requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set
forth in Cacho v. U.S. would constitute a derogation of
the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of
the subject decrees presupposes a prior final judgment
because the issuance of such decrees is a mere
ministerial act on part of the Land Registration
Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a
final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment
in Cacho v. U .S. could not have acquired finality without
the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No.
6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale
from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon
which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913);
and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new
survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10,
1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914
(upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8,
1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for
the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality
attained by the Cacho v. U.S. case nugatory, thus,
violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It
must be stressed that the judgment and the resulting
decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon the
whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of
proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an
impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of
the Torrens System of registration because it also
effectively renders the decree inconclusive.
As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the
settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that laches cannot
bar the issuance of a decree. The reason therefor may be
gleaned from Sta. Ana v. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]): chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to
civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings,
such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured against the adverse party, and
his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable
time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be established.
After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or
losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period
within which the court may order or issue a decree. The
reason is . . . that the judgment is merely declaratory in
character and does not need to be asserted or enforced
against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of
a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of
the Land Registration Commission ...
(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de
Banuver (25 SCRA 316 [1968]) that a final decision in
land registration cases can neither be rendered
inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of
This was reiterated in Vda. De Barroga v. Albano (157 the Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth Judicial Region
SCRA 131 [1988]). stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR
(GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993,
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
petitioner and his being a real party in interest, records
show that petitioner has sufficiently established his No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
existence and identity as well as his legal interest.
SO ORDERED.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria
Cacho, the property in question were adjudicated in favor Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ.,
of petitioner under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series of 1985 concur.
of the Consulate General of the Philippines in Chicago.
The fact of adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho
was published in the Times Journal. Petitioner also DIGEST:
appeared personally before Vice Consul Stephen V. David
of the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the
Philippines in Chicago and executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to represent
him in this case.

The execution of public documents, as in the case of the

Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of
regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert
the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who
alleges the contrary and respondents cannot shift the
burden to petitioner by merely casting doubt as to his
existence and his identity without presenting
preponderant evidence to controvert such presumption.
With more reason shall the same rule apply in the case of
the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the
Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the
Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering oath
being of itself a performance of duty by a public official.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

 [G.R. No. 113549. July 5, 1996.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by
the DIRECTOR OF LANDS), Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, namely,
ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE, LUIS RIBAYA,
ANTONIA RIBAYA-CONDE, and JOHN DOE RIBAYA,
all represented by ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE as
Administratrix of the Estate of Luis
Ribaya, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP,
PRESCRIPTION, NEVER LIES AGAINST THE STATE FOR
THE REVERSION OF PROPERTY WHICH IS PART OF THE
PUBLIC FOREST OR OF A FOREST RESERVATION WHICH
WAS REGISTERED IN FAVOR OF ANY PARTY. — The one-
year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496
merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned
from the entry of the decree. In the second place, there
are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after
the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by
Section 55 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that
"in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner
may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against
the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to
the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate
of title." Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in
cases where the property has been transferred to an
innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within
four years from discovery of the fraud. Recourse may
also be bad against the Assurance Fund. Finally,
prescription never lies against the State for the reversion
of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest
reservation which was registered in favor of any party.
Then too, public land registered under the Land
Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any
time. In Republic v. Animas, we ruled: Public land
fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title
may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance
with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does
not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of
Limitations does not run against the state. The right of
reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred by
prescription.
2. ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; LAND REGISTRATION; DUAL
PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF HEARING, A
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT. — As found by both the
trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of
Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the
spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered
by the original plan was published in the 17 March 1925
issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one
publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the
governing law then, required two publications. Hence,
the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land
registration court was void for want of the required
publications. The requirement of dual publication is one
of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the
registration court; it is a jurisdictional requisite. Land
registration is a proceeding in rem cannot be acquired
unless there be constructive seizure of the land through
publication and service of notice.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMENDMENT OR ALTERNATION IN THE
DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND AFTER ITS PUBLICATION
AND DECREE OR REGISTRATION IS NOT PERMISSIBLE
UNLESS COUPLED WITH REPUBLICATION. — The Court
of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January
1994 and the private respondents, however, maintain
that the publication of the amended plan was
unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin v.
Tuazon. This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine
Manufacturing Co. v. Imperial, (49 Phil. 122 [1926], Juan
and Chuongco v. Ortiz, (49 Phil. 252 [1926], Bank of the
Philippine Islands v. Acuña, (59 Phil. 183 [1933]),
Lichauco v. Herederos de Corpus, (60 Phil. 211 [1934]
and Director of Lands v. Benitez, (16 SCRA 557 [1966]),
that only where the original survey plan is amended
during the registration proceedings, by the addition of
land not previously included in the original plan, should
publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the
court to order the registration of the area added after the
publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the
amendment does not involve an addition, but on the
contrary, a reduction of the original area that was
published, no new publication is required. Reliance on
Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first
place, the amendment of the original survey plan for the
land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after
the land registration court rendered its decision. It
follows then that a re-opening of the case was
indispensable; however, no such re-opening appears to
have been done therein. Second, as earlier shown, the
land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the
land covered by the original plan because of insufficient
publication in the Official Gazette. Third, it has not been
sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered
by OCT No. 3947, which are based on the amended plan,
are but a small part of the same and covered by the
original survey plan. This conclusion is thoroughly
discussed below.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; THE MACHINE COPY
OF THE BLUEPRINT OF A SURVEY PLAN IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE IF IT WAS NOT PROVED THAT
THE ORIGINAL THEREOF WAS LOST OR DESTROYED OR
CANNOT BE PRODUCED IN COURT, WITHOUT BAD FAITH
ON THE PART OF THE OFFEROR. — The disagreement
between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot
be definitely resolved because no reliable copy of the
original Plan 11-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6" and
"6-A" are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said
Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most,
secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of
the offeror to prove any of the exceptions provided
therein and to establish the conditions for their
admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no
probative value.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution 1 of 24
January 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
17351, which set aside its earlier decision 2 of 9 January
1991. The latter affirmed the decision 3 of 11 November
1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Legazpi
City, in Civil Case No. 6198 which declared null and void
an original certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree
and a decision in a land registration case decided on 18
September 1925.

After the private respondents filed their Comment and
the petitioner their Reply, we gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
The Court of Appeals’ reversal was primarily due to its
disagreement with the trial court’s findings of fact.
Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind us in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 4
We are thus compelled to review the factual antecedents.
From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the following
were established:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On the basis of the private respondents’ exhibits, 5 on 9,
10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920, a parcel of land
located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of
Ligao, Province of Albay, was surveyed for the spouses
Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the
spouses Ribaya) by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands
surveyor. The parcel of land was found to comprise an
area of 25,542,603 square meters. The survey plan was
denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly approved by
the Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922.
However, as noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9
January 1991 decision, 6 these exhibits do not at all
show the surveyor’s signature. Moreover, as per Land
Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry, the
above parcel of land was considered part of the public
forest and released for disposition only on 31 December
1930. 7
In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and
confirmation of title of the lot covered by Plan II-13961
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay.
The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 26050. Notice of the application, and hearing
thereof were published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the
Official Gazette, 8 and in its decision of 18 September
1925, 9 the CFI granted the said application.
Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30
November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel of land covered
by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the
spouses Ribaya. This gave rise to Plan II — 13961-Amd.,
which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land
with an aggregate area of only 10,975,022 square
meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square
meters. Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared to have been
approved by the Director of Lands on 26 February 1926.
10 The application was not amended to reflect the
resurvey and the amended plan was not published.
On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of
registration was issued, 11 while on 19 August 1926,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the
four lots embraced by Plan II- 13961-Amd. was issued in
the names of the spouses Ribaya. 12
On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was
administratively reconstituted from the owner’s duplicate
copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated
as OCT No. PO-10848 (3947). 13
In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private
respondents) received compensation from the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for
damages sustained by the land during the war. 14
In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the
private respondents herein, the land covered by OCT No.
RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan
LRC Psd-96075, approved on 16 December 1968. 15
Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and
separate Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) were issued
to the private respondents. 16
In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers
occupying the land 17 and claiming ownership thereof,
requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to
annul OCT No. RO- 10848 (3947). 18 Finding merit in the
request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint,
dated 17 August 1978, with the CFI (now Regional Trial
Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of nullity of
OCT No. 3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all
subsequent titles emanating from the original title, viz.,
TCT Nos. T-31333 to T-31358, inclusive. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6198.
The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was
obtained through fraud and that the land registration
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of
republication of the amended plan, neither did the
spouses-applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No.
2874. 19 The petitioner further alleged that at the time
the petition for registration was filed, the land covered
therein was forest land, and therefore, inalienable.
On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers
filed a complaint-in-intervention and prayed that the land
revert to the petitioner and their titles over the portions
respectively occupied by them confirmed.
In its decision of 11 November 1987 20 the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) held for the petitioner as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows : chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and
administratively reconstituted Original Certificate of Title
No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and
without force and effect;
2. Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit:
T-31333, T-31334, T-31335, T-31336, T- 31337, T-
31338, T-31339, T-31340, T-31341, T-31342, T-31343,
T-31344, T-31345, T-31346, T-31347 T- 31348, T-
31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T-31354,
T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T-31358, emanating
from OCT No. 3947 and OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all
issued to the heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris,
as likewise null and void and without force and effect;
3. Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and
Agustina Revatoris to surrender their copy of OCT No.
RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Albay, who
(sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel the same;
4. Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner]
Republic of the Philippines, as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain;
5. And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim.
The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya
filed their petition for registration, the and was already
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land;
however, the then CFI, as a land registration court, did
not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of
publication or republication in the Official Gazette of Plan
II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the decree of
registration and OCT No. 3947. Consequently, said OCT
No. 3947 and its derivative titles were void. 21 In so
finding, it relied on Fewkes v. Vasquez, 22 where it was
held that any amendment or alteration in the description
of the land after its publication and decree of registration
was not permissible unless coupled with republication.
The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence
that the possession of the spouses Ribaya and their
predecessors- in-interests was open, continuous, and
adverse under a bona fide claim of ownership for the
required number of years; moreover, they failed to
present any tax declarations. It then concluded that the
said Spouses may have occupied portions of the land at a
later time, but not in the concept of bona fide owners, for
mere casual cultivation and raising of cattle on the land
did not constitute "possession" as contemplated by law.
23
The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. CV No. 17351), which, in its decision 24 of 9
January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of
the trial court. The appellate court further pointed out
another reason why the registration in favor of the
applicants was invalid, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina
Revatoris] applied for registration thereof in their names
said land was still part of the public forest. The land was
released for public disposition only on December 31,
1930 as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 871 of
the Bureau of Forestry (Exhs K, K-5). Consequently, OCT
No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO-10848 is void
ab initio.
It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified
as forest or timber lands, are incapable of registration in
the names of private persons and their inclusion in a title
nullifies the title (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA
177 and cases cited therein.)25 cralaw:red
In refuting the claim of the private respondents that
publication of the amended survey plan was unnecessary
in light of the decision of this Court in Benin v. Tuazon,
26 the Court of Appeals held that the facts in Benin were
different. In Benin, an approved survey plan was
submitted before the property was decreed for
registration, while in the present case: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[T]he land was decreed for registration on September
18. 1925. while its survey was performed sometime in
November and December 1925. The amended survey
plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) thereof was approved by the
Director of Lands on February 26, 1926. In other words,
the survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) of the land in the
instant case was approved when the land was already
decreed for registration. . . . 27
There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a
violation of Sections 23 and 26 of Act No. 496. 28
The private respondents seasonably moved for a
reconsideration of this decision.
In its resolution 29 of 24 January 1994, the Court of
Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration and set
aside its decision of 9 January 1991, reversed that of the
trial court of 11 November 1987, and dismissed the
complaint and the complaint-in- intervention in Civil Case
No. 6198 of Branch 7 of the RTC of Legazpi City. In
overturning its previous decision, the Court of Appeals
ruled that OCT No. 3947 "is conclusive upon and against
all persons, including the Government and all its
branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters
contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year
after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity
(Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became
incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496)." 30
It further applied the presumption of regularity in the
grant of the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya, and
even extended said presumption to their compliance with
all conditions required by law, in particular, their "open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894." It thus burdened the
Republic "to prove otherwise." 31
It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to
present tax receipts was not fatal, and that although they
actually lived in Oas, Albay, such did not negate the
character of their possession for" [p]ossession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have
his feet on every square meter of ground before he can
be said that he is in possession." 32
The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the
Fewkes case and applied, instead, the decision in Benin,
where this Court held that republication could be
dispensed with in an amendment in the application or in
the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the
exclusion of a portion covered by the original application
and the original survey plan as published. Accordingly,
the land registration court retained its jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding
that the land in question still formed part of the public
forest at the time of the application for registration. It
asserted, instead, that there was insufficient basis to
conclude that a parcel of land only became open to
disposition on the basis of the date of approval of the
land classification map, because such approval may have
been made later by authority of a prior executive
declaration. 33
Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and
asserts that(1) the indefeasibility of title does not lie
against the State in an action for reversion of land; (2)
the spouses-applicants failed to prove possession of the
land for the period required by law, and the evidence
shows that their possession was not open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of
ownership; (3) the amended survey plan was not
published, (4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was
then part of the forest land, hence, inalienable; and (5)
the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful. 34
In their Comment, the private respondents allege that
the petition merely raises factual matters and argue that
OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering
that the land was no longer part of the public forest when
it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further
contend, invoking Benin, that the issue of republication is
inapplicable since the publication of the original survey
plan was already had in compliance with law. Moreover,
possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-
applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions
thereof in favor of the government and the compensation
they received from the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission of the United States for damages sustained
by the land during the war sufficiently proved that they
were the legitimate owners of the land. Finally, the
original survey plan could no longer be questioned by the
petitioner. 35
As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be
resolved, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by
prescription to bring the action for annulment of OCT No.
3947 and all its derivative certificates of title; and
2. Whether the land registration court acquired
jurisdiction over the four parcels of land subject of the
amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered
by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by the General
Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the
said court of 18 September 1925.
As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that OCT No. 3947 was, to repeat: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the
Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496)
as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No.
496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the
date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said
certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act
No. 496). 36
First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of
Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is
reckoned from the entry of the decree. In the second
place, there are other remedies available to an aggrieved
party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance,
covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia,
provides that "in all cases of registration procured by
fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud, without
prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder
for value of a certificate of title." 37 Likewise, an action
for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property
has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value,
which may be filed within four years from discovery of
the fraud. 38 Recourse may also be had against the
Assurance Fund. 39
Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the
reversion of property which is part of the public forest or
of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of
any party. Then too, public; and registered under the
Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at
any time. In Republic v. Animas, 40 we ruled: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates
of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in
accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases
for the Statute of Limitation does not run against the
state. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state
is not barred by prescription.
We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the
spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released
only on 31 December 1930, 41 the land registration
court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was
not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State’s
action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder
and for the reversion of the land is not barred by
prescription.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the land
registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land
covered by either the original plan (Plan II-13961) or the
amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient
publication of the first and total want of publication of the
second.
As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198
and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of
application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of
the land covered by the original plan was published in
the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short,
there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act
No. 496, the governing law then, required two
publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925
of the land registration court was void for want of the
required publications. The requirement of dual
publication is one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the registration court; 42 it is a
jurisdictional requisite. 43 Land registration is a
proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be
acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the Land
through publication and service of notice. 44
Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely
based on an alleged original survey plan. The fact
remains, however, that in November of that year that
original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and the
amended plan was not published at all. There is no
evidence that the court amended its decision to conform
to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the
parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the
decree that was subsequently issued was based on the
amended plan insofar as the four lots were concerned.
A decree of registration is required to recite the
description of the land. 45 On the basis of the decree,
OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land
registration court may have amended its decision to
conform to the amended plan for the four lots which
ultimately found their way into the decree issued by the
General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT
No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land
Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to
conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally
flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended
plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no
jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended
plan.
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24
January 1994 and the private respondents, however,
maintain that the publication of the amended plan was
unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin v.
Tuazon. 46 This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine
Manufacturing Co. v. Imperial, 47 Juan and Chuongco v.
Ortiz, 48 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Acuña, 49
Lichauco v. Herederos de Corpus, 50 and Director of
Lands v. Benitez, 51 that only where the original survey
plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by
the addition of land not previously included in the original
plan, should publication be made in order to confer
jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the
area added after the publication of the original plan.
Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an
addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original
area that was published, no new publication is required.
Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In
the first place, the amendment of the original survey
plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was
made after the land registration court rendered its
decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case
was indispensable; however, no such re- opening
appears to have been done therein. Second, as earlier
shown, the land registration court acquired no
jurisdiction over the land covered by the original plan
because of insufficient publication in the Official Gazette.
Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four
parcels of land covered by OCT No. 3947, which are
based on the amended plan, are but a small part of the
same and covered by the original survey plan. This
conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.
In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of
Appeals, it found the original areas covered by Plan
13961 to be 25,542,603 square meters and the four
parcels of land embraced in the amended plan, Plan II-
13961-Amd., to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022
square meters. Thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought
for a judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
of the land described as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Parcel of land (plan II-13961) containing an area of
25,542,603 square meters, with the buildings and
improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio
Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
P.I. . . . (Emphasis Supplied).
Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July
9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 by Telesforo
Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands which survey
was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January
3, 1922.;Exh. 6).
The notice of application and hearing of the land as
aforedescribed, was published in the March 17, 1925
issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J-1).
The land registration court issued a decision in favor of
the spouses Ribaya on September 18 1925 but for a
smaller parcel of land than the 25,542,503 square
meters are applied for. On November 23 and 30, 1925,
said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land
Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the
Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 as Plan II-13961-
Amd. (Exh. H and series).
Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the
aggregate area of 10,975,022 square meters separately
described as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.),
containing an area of 3,318,454 square meters, more or
less;
2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 2 Plan II-13961-Amd.),
containing an area of 1,575,195 square meters more or
less;
3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3 Plan II-13961-Amd.),
containing an area of 4,844,205 square meters, more or
less;
4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4 Plan II-13961-Amd.),
containing an area of 1,237,368 square meters, more or
less. 52
This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9
January 1991. 53
In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private
respondents do not, for obvious reasons, dispute such
finding and so they not only quoted it therein, 54 they
also explicitly assert that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land
applied for which was published in the Official Gazette
contained an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The
land actually embraced in the decree of registration
contained only 10,975,022 square meters. 55 (Emphasis
supplied)
In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two
Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four Hectares, two
ares, and six hundred and three centares (2,554 has., 2
ares, and 603 centares); and the 10,975,022 square
meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares,
five ares, and twenty-two centares (1,097 has., 5 ares,
and 22 centares).
However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the
area of the land covered by Plan II-13961, as well as,
that covered by the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.).
Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San
Felipe wrote the Director of Lands that the report of the
ocular inspection and investigation conducted on May 14,
15 and 16, 1977 was true and correct, . . . that Plan II —
3961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with
an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong,
Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21,
December 8-9, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor
Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of
Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits G, G-l and G-2 for
plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-l and GG-2 for
Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2,
surveyed for-Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373
hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was
surveyed on November 23-30, 1925 by Private Land
Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the
Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits H, H-l
and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for
intervenors); . . . that Original Certificate of Title No RO-
10848 (3947) covers 4 parcels of land, to wit: Lot No. 1,
plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318.454
square meters more or less, Lot No. 2, plan II-13961-
Amd.), containing an area of 1,575.195 square meters
more or less, Lot No. 3, plan II-13961- Amd.), containing
an area of 4,844.005 square meters more or less, and
Lot No. 4, plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of
1,237.368 square meters more or less with a total of
10,975.022 square meters more or less; . . . that plan II-
13961 of property as surveyed for Luis Ribaya, situated
in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao,
province of Albay, containing an area of 25,542.603
square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23,
24, 26 and 27, 1920 in accordance with Section 45 of Act
2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of
Lands, and the said plan was approved by the Acting
Director of Lands on January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6 and 6-
A) . . . 56 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three
digits in the areas of the four lots covered by the
amended plan, as well as the areas embraced in the
original plan, the trial court placed a period (.). The
change from a comma to a period is of vital significance.
For, translated into hectares, the 25,542.603 square
meters would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares,
and five hundred and forty-two (542) centares; and the
aggregate of 10,975.022 square meters for the four lots
embraced in Plan II-13961-Amd. would be one (1)
hectare and nine hundred seventy-five (975) centares.
Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals
and the trial court as to the land area of the original
survey plan (Plan II-13961), i.e., whether it was
25,542,603 square meters (twenty-five million five
hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three
square meters) as found by the former, or 25,542.603
square meters (twenty-five thousand, five hundred forty-
two point six hundred and three square meters) as found
by the latter, only shows the unreliability of the original
plan sought to be established through Exhibits "6" and
"6-A." The Court of Appeals itself so found it to be in its
decision of 9 January 1991 because these exhibits did
not show that the survey plan was signed by the
surveyor. Thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis,
which is (original) plan II-13961 (Exhs. 6, 6-A), did not
indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said
original plan (plan II-13961) does not bear the signature
of the surveyor thereof, thereby casting doubt on its
genuineness and due execution. . . . 57 (Emphasis
supplied)
Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed
the area embraced therein was that found by the Court
of Appeals, i.e., 25,5452,603 square meters — with a
comma before the last three digits — it would have been
physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only
eleven days (9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July
1920). Plainly, the present-day sophisticated survey
instruments were not then available. Furthermore, the
trial court indicated in its findings of fact that in addition
to the four lots covered by OCT No. 3947, there were
other large tracts covered by the amended survey plan
(Plan II-13961-Amd.), viz.: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for
Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located
at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-1 and
G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 an; GG-2 for
Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2,
surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373
hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay,
(Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH,
HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors); 58 (Emphasis supplied)
The disagreement between the trial court and the Court
of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because no
reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented.
Exhibits "6" and "6-A" are a machine copy of the
blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence
under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They
are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible
for failure of the offeror to prove any of the exception
provided therein and to established the conditions for
their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have
no probative value.
Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude
that the four parcels of land included in OCT No. 3947
are but a part of the land covered by the original plan
(Plan II-13961).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
resolution of 24 January 1994 of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET ASIDE, while its
decision therein of 9 January 1991 affirming in toto that
of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of
11 November 1987 in Civil Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8936             October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO
PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners,
adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a
stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of
the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of
their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the
25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs
should be registered and issued to them the original certificate
provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and
certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the
lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the
court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original
certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description
of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said
wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the
plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the
certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and
correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however,
without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the
theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration
of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the
name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a
joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land
occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the
action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial
proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all
parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by
reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the
registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate
they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in
their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting
even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to
the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should
be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him,
he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting
the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than
six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted
to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The
plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the
wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch
all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else
was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that
question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole
scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration
must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered
the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid
the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied
that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens
system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep.,
482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is
final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
(Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz,
17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31;
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss,
219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its
consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are
parties, including the government. After the registration is
complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no
innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The
government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all
parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration
proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same
questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the
registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the
law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the
owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a
perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only
may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in
open document a precise and correct statement of the exact
status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence
of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered
titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even
by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by
law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496)
providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system
affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the
parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in
the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which
has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the
registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation
over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that
all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over
the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not
parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights
which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently,
and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at
present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an
adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under
the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section
46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world.
All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of
two different persons, has been presented to the courts in other
jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system
has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express
statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts.
Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens
System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case
of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter
certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier
certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7
N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48;
Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of
Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds
however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary
rules of construction relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the
two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the
"Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System,"
page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said:
"Where two certificates purport to include the same land the
earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more
than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose
claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the
holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While
the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the
issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a
registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the
same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to
hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of
registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation,
or included in the general description "To all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of
Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry
of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration"
shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for
fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then
the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason,
except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may
such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by
including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or
decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated
that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which
governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is
registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons.
Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that
when one piece of real property had been sold to two different
persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first
inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that
each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land.
The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of
registration. While we do not now decide that the general
provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land
Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we
think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should
have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the
effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule
which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes
and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion
and so decree that in case land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the
earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the
forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things;
"When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of
Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants
in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their
right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his
application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right
thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against
them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating
such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up
their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a
judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To
decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles
are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the
torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot
rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon
the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration
and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder
may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in
the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years
which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had
mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right
of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur
cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is
irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the
parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present
case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was
the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not
complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the
appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the
registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in
1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment
against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree
adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court
and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the
ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a
court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner
of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose
the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the
absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the
validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the
doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the
appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land
Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the
owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May
this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before
the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an
"innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land
has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he
acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the
vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the
vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to
cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the
interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No.
496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected
against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections
speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off
by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That
is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of
the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his
land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently
sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent
purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those
who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in
the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to
the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose
the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an
"innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the
phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said
sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent
purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be
applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to
be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under
the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the
difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to
the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second
original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser,"
as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original
certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original
certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until
it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are
charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons
dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be
charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This
rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
authorities in its support (Northwestern National
Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate,
sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio
State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27
N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509;
Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such
presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which
an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good
faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a
record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he
was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons
must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a
rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead
to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that
original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet
there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875
and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute
would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been
recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision,
when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land
released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the
recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the
plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona
fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no
knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule
that all persons must take notice of what the public record
contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all
men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the
law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that
they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and
obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public
record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the
purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate
be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had
theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the
vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112
should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that
the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a
purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser"
because of the facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a
parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original
certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another
earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record
contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior
registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in
a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the
vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we
think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase
"innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited
only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully
included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is
once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original
certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the
world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the
holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his
certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example,
that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens
system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had
included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in
question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent
purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the
appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip
of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice
resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question
must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that
these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496
than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the
purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his
successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for
damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to
molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no
negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his
successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title,
against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who
had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of
land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the
facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which
he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the
loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has
obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all
the difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens
system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we
now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the
ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system.
We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record
under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that
view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land
registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the
title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons
have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one
who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the

lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is
hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction
to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct
the error heretofore made in including the land in the second
original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the
appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-65129 December 29, 1986
TOMAS AVERIA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA, in her capacity
as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch LVII, Lucena City, and VERONICA
PADILLO, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We gave due course to this petition against a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Lucena City,   which is questioned on a
1
pure questions of law, more specifically whether or not the court
has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is
opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell.
The oppositor, petitioner herein, refused to participate in the
hearing of the registration proceedings below, claiming the
respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence
to act upon the said case under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise
known as the "Land Registration Act." The respondent court then
held the hearing ex parte and later rendered a decision ordering
the registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented
by the private respondent herein.  2
In his petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, it is argued that the lower court had no competence to
act on the registration sought because of the absence of
unanimity among the parties as required under Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act.   The petitioner cites Fojas as v.
3
Grey,   where this Court, through Justice Serafin Cuevas,
4 Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction
declared:
The aforequoted provision of the Land Registration Act
(Sec. 112) was relied upon by appellant Apolinar Fojas in
petitioning the court a quo for the annotation of the Deed
of Assignment. However, while he had the right to have
the said Deed annotated in the owner's duplicate of TCT
No. T-2376, the serious objection of Saturnina de Grey to
the same raises a substantial controversy between the
parties.
In a long line of decisions dealing with proceedings under
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act, it has been held
that summary relief under Section 112 of Land
Registration Act can only be granted if there is unanimity
among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise,
the case becomes contentious and controversial which
should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in any
case where the incident properly belongs.  5
While this was a correct interpretation of the said provision, the
same is, however, not applicable to the instant case. The reason
is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act
had been superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which
became effective on June 11, 1979.
In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that:
SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of
courts.-Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands
throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be
based on the generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens system.
over all applications for original registration of title to
lands, including improvements and interests therein, and
over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with
 power to hear and determine a questions arising upon
such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk
of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission
with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders,
and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions
for land registration, with the exception of stenographic
notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when
acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity
of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not
only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear
and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated
September 23, 1983, is set aside. Let a new trial of Cadastral
Case No. 1, GLRO Cad. Record No. 202, Lot No. 2810-B,
Lucena Cadastre, MC No. 374-82, be held, at which the
petitioner, as well as other interested parties, shall be given the
opportunity to be heard. Our temporary restraining order of
October 5, 1983, is hereby lifted except as to the registration of
the questioned deed of sale which shall depend on the outcome
of the said case.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, and Feliciano, JJ.,
concur.

Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of

the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529),
the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction
which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was
"unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any
"adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the
court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-
controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial
issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its
competence before.

It appears that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case

below notwithstanding the manifestation by the petitioner of his
intention to elevate to this Court the question of jurisdiction he
had raised.   The trial court should have given him the opportunity
6

to do so in the interest of due process, pending a categorical

ruling on the issue. As it happened, it arrived at its decision after
considering only the evidence of the private respondent and
without regard to the evidence of the petitioner.  7
G.R. No. 107751 June 1, 1995
LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES,
Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Iglesia ni Kristo and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Br. 82, granting the motion of respondent of Iglesia ni Kristo
to direct petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate of the
certificates of title in her possession.
On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint   for specific
1 certificates of title despite repeated requests.
performance with damages against the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines (IDP) docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-6937.
Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an
Absolute Deed of Sale dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2)
parcels of land located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, Quezon
City, both of which IDP is the registered owner. The parties
stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall undertake to evict
all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-five
(45) days from the execution of the contract.
IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial
court order IDP to comply with its obligation of clearing the
subject lots of illegal occupants and to pay damages to INK.
IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the
contract by delaying the payment of the purchase price and
prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.
On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on the ground that there was actually no genuine issue as to any
material fact.
On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment,
and on 7 October 1991 an amended partial judgment granting the
reliefs prayed for by INK except the prayer for damages which
was to be resolved later.
On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying
that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the
certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, be
directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in
its name. INK alleged that the document could not be registered
because of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the
On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the
motion on the ground that the IDP was not served copy of the
motion, and the ownership of the INK over the property was still in
issue since rescission was sought by the IDP as a counterclaim.
She prayed that the motion be denied, but should it be granted,
the Register of Deeds be directed after registration to deliver the
owner's duplicate copies of the new certificates of title to her.
On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental Opposition
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court because the motion
involved the registrability of the document of sale, and she was
not made a party to the main case.
On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and
ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the owner's copy of RT-
26521 (170567) and RT-26520 (176616) in open court for the
registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in the latter's name and
the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on
the new transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK. 2
On 6 April 1992, on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court
reconsidered its order by directing her to deliver the certificates of
title to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.  3
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
seeking the annulment of the two (2) orders. However, on 28
October 1992 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
affirmed the orders of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: (a)
in ruling that it had jurisdiction over petitioner; (b) in upholding the
orders of the trial court even as they violated the rule prohibiting
splitting of a single cause of action and forum-shopping; (c) in
holding that INK is the owner of the property and entitled to
registration of its ownership; and, (d) in holding that INK has a
superior right to the possession of the owner's copies of the
certificates of title.
Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to the
issuance by the trial court of the order of 2 March 1992, its legal
Board of Trustees filed a motion for intervention informing said
court that the sale of the properties was not executed by it but
was made possible by a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the sale
is void. The trial court denied the motion since jurisdiction over
the incident properly belonged to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Conformably therewith, IDP brought the
matter before the SEC which later declared that the sale of the
properties was void. Thus, IDP banks on this favorable decision
in similarly seeking the nullification of the questioned orders of the
trial court.
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate
certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in
some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case
the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or
fails to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a
voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate
issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states:
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate
certificates. — Where it is necessary to issue a
new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary
instrument which divests the title of the registered
owner against his consent or where a voluntary
instrument cannot be registered by reason of the
refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party in
interest may file a petition in court to compel
surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds.
The court, after hearing, may order the registered
owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same and direct the
entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
such surrender. If the person withholding the
duplicate certificate is not amenable to the
process of the court, or if for any reason the
outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot
be delivered, the court may order the annulment
of the same as well as the issuance of a new
certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new,
certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain
a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate.
Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, the former law, Act No. 496
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, and all
jurisprudence interpreting the former law had established that
summary reliefs such as an action to compel the surrender of
owner's duplicate certificate of title to the Register of Deeds could
only be filed with and granted by the Regional Trial Court sitting
as a land registration court if there was unanimity among the
parties or there was no adverse claim or serious objection on the
part of any party in interest, otherwise, if the case became
contentious and controversial it should be threshed out in an
ordinary action or in the case where the incident properly
belonged. 4
Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to
lands, including improvements and interest therein and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear
and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions." The above provision has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court
and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law
when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the
authority to act not only on applications for original registration but
also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions.5
The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937
before the trial court was for specific performance with damages
based on a document of sale. Such action was well within the
exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court.  When IDP, the
6 directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
defendant in the trial court, did not question the genuineness and
validity of said deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the
summary judgment issued by the court granting the reliefs sought
by INK was also an exercise of its general jurisdiction.
Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from
the same court to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates
of title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the
registration of the deed of sale subject of the principal action, the
motion was a necessary incident to the main case. When the sale
of the property was upheld by the court in its judgment and the
defendant was directed to comply with its terms and conditions,
the right of INK to have the same registered with the Register of
Deeds could not be disregarded. To assert and enjoy its right,
INK should be allowed to seek the aid of the court to direct the
surrender of the certificates of title. Since Regional Trial Courts
are courts of general jurisdiction, they may therefore take
cognizance of this case pursuant to such jurisdiction.   Even while
7
Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by
one who wants to compel another to surrender the certificates of
title to the Register of Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a
pending case to include as incident therein the relief stated under
Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of title to be
surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of
the principal action.  This principle is based on expediency and in
8
accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of
petitioner appears in the certificates of title Nos. 26520 and
26521. Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender
of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed
of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way
prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any
lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists
should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer
certificates of title. This is true even in the case of a real estate
mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted. It is inseparable
from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem — a lien on the
property whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a
change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is
disregarded. Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the
mortgage whether the transfer to them be with or without the
consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged
follows the property.  It is clear therefore that the surrender by
9

petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as

ordered by the trial court will not create any substantial injustice
to her. To grant the petition and compel INK to file a new action in
order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the
trial court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights
are prejudiced. This end should be avoided. Courts should not be
so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the
proper administration of justice. The rules are intended to insure
the orderly conduct of litigations because of the higher objective
they seek, which is, to protect the parties' substantive rights. 
10

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 28 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Quiason, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 175763               April 11, 2012
HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, namely:
ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA T.
VELOSO, Petitioners,
vs.
SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ GABRIEL-
ARNEDO married to ARTURO ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-
CALINGO married to FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M. MENDIOLA,
MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD married to EUSTAQUIO
NATIVIDAD, and ERLINDA VELASQUEZ married to
HERMINIO VELASQUEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse
the Decision dated August 18, 2006 and Resolution dated
1  2 
December 8, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 81224. The CA affirmed the Decision dated November 19,
3 
2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267 in Civil
Case No. 67846 dismissing petitioners’ complaint for declaration
of nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1035,
reconveyance and damages, as well as respondents’
counterclaims for damages and attorney’s fees.
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at
Ruhale, Barangay Calzada, Municipality of Taguig (now part of
Pasig City, Metro Manila). The first parcel ("Lot 1") with an area of
686 square meters was originally declared in the name of Jose
Gabriel under Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 1603 and 6425 issued
for the years 1949 and 1966, while the second parcel ("Lot 2")
consisting of 147 square meters was originally declared in the
name of Agueda Dinguinbayan under TD Nos. 6418 and 9676
issued for the years 1966 and 1967. For several years, these
4 
lands lined with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and
uninhabited.
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister
of Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a
1944 notarized instrument ("Affidavit of Sale") whereby she sold
the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga.
Said document states:
DAPAT MALAMAN NG LAHAT NG MAKABABASA
Na, akong Benita Gabriel, balo sa nasirang Calixto Lontoc,
Filipina may karapatang gulang naninirahan sa nayon ng
Palingon, Tagig, Rizal, x x x sa pamamaguitan nitoy
ISINASAYSAY KO AT PINAGTITIBAY
1.) Na, sarili ko at tunay na pagaari ang isang lagay na
lupang kawayanan na sapagkat itoy kabahagui ko sa
aking kapatid na [J]ose Gabriel, na itoy mana ko sa aking
nasirang ama Mateo Gabriel sa kami lamang dalawa ng
aking kapatid na binabanguit ko na Jose Gabriel siyang
mga anak at tagapagmana ng aming amang nasirang
Mateo Gabriel, maliban sa amin ay wala nang iba, kayat
kami ay naghati sa mga ari-arian na na iwan sa amin ng
nasirang ama namin na Mateo Gabriel, na ang lupang
kawayanang itoy may nakatanim na walong (8) punong
kawayan at na sa pook na kung pamagatan ay Ruhale
nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, at na sa loob ng mga
kahanganan at sukat na sumusunod[:]
Na, ang kahangan sa Hilagaan Sapang Ruhale at Vicente
Bunye, sa Amihanan Felipe Pagkalinawan, sa Timugan
Juan Flores, at sa Habagatan Apolonio Ocol may sukat
na 6 areas at 85 centiareas may halagan amillarada na
P80.00) Pesos alinsunod sa Tax Blg. 20037, sa pangalan
ng aking kapatid na Jose Gabriel. Na, ang lupang itoy
 hindi natatala sa bisa ng batas Blg. 496 ni sa susog
gayon din sa Hipotecaria Espaňola itoy may mga mojon
bato ang mga panulok at walang bakod.
2.) Na, alang-alang sa halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM
(P96.00) na Pisong salaping guinagamit dito sa Filipinas
na bago dumating ang mga sandaling itoy tinaggap ko at
ibinayad sa akin ng boong kasiyahang loob ko ng
magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA,
mga Filipinos may mga karapatang gulang mga
naninirahan sa nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, ngayon
ay inilipat ko at ipinagbili ng bilihang tuluyan (Venta real
soluta) ang isinasaysay kong lupang kawayanan sa itaas
nito ng nasabi halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM (P96.00)
na Piso at sa nabanguit na magasawang GABRIEL
SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA, gayon din sa lahat ng
mga tagapagmana nila, ngayong mga arao na ito ay ang
may hawak at namamahala ng lupang itoy ang mga
nakabili sa akin na magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT
CORNELIA SANGA.
3.) Na, ang kasulatang itoy ng bilihan ay nais na itala sa
bisa ng batas Blg. 3344.
NA SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITOY ako ay lumagda sa
kasulatang ito dito sa Tagig, Rizal, ngayong ika - 28 ng Junio
1944.
(Nilagdaan)
BENITA GABRIEL 5
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own
daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel
Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit
who was Florencia’s husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to
Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by a
notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964. Petitioners then
6 
took possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on
the land and declared the same for tax purposes, as shown by
TD No. 11445 issued in 1969 in the name of Bienvenido’s wife,
Araceli C. Tanyag; TD No. 11445 cancelled TD No. 6425 in the
name of Jose Gabriel. TD Nos. 3380 and 00486 also in the name
of Araceli Tanyag were issued in the years 1974 and 1979. 7
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda
Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed on
October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said
property and declared the same for tax purposes as shown by TD
Nos. 11361, 3395, 120-014-00482, 120-00-014-20-002-000, C-
014-00180 and D-014-00182 issued for the years 1969, 1974,
1979, 1985, 1991 and 1994. Petitioners claimed to have
8 
continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both
Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana Quinones ; they
9 
fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the land. 10
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured
TD No. 120-014-01013 in his name over Lot 1 indicating therein
an increased area of 1,763 square meters. Said tax declaration
supposedly cancelled TD No. 6425 over Lot 1 and contained the
following inscription :
11 
Note: Portions of this Property is Also Declared
in the name of Araceli C. Tanyag under
T.D.#120-014-00858 686 sq. m.
Also inscribed on TD No. 120-014-00858 (1979) in the name of
12 
Araceli Tanyag covering Lot 1 are the following:
This property is also covered by T.D. #120-014-01013
in the name of Jose P. Gabriel
1-8-80
which notation was carried into the 1985, 1990 and 1991 tax
declarations, all in the name of Araceli Tanyag.
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 67846
alleging that respondents never occupied the whole 686 square
meters of Lot 1 and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in
TD No. 120-014-01013 such that Lot 1 consisting of 686 square
meters originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel was
increased to 1,763 square meters. They contended that the
issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 over the subject
land in the name of respondents heirs of Jose Gabriel was null
and void from the beginning. 13
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no
cause of action against them for they have not established their
ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in
respondents’ name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had
become unassailable one year after its issuance and petitioners
failed to establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured.
14
Respondents’ evidence showed that the subject land was among
those properties included in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
of Jose P. Gabriel executed on October 5, 1988, covered by TD
15  Lot 2 was also separately declared for tax purposes after their
No. B-014-00643 (1985) in the name of Jose Gabriel.
Respondents declared the property in their name but the tax
declarations (1989, 1991 and 1994) carried the notation that
portions thereof (686 sq. ms.) are also declared in the name of
Araceli Tanyag. On October 28, 1998, OCT No. 1035 was issued
16  instrumental witnesses to the deed of sale and identified his
to respondents by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila
under Decree No. N-219177 pursuant to the Decision dated
September 20, 1996 of the Land Registration Court in LRC Case
No. N-11260, covering Lot 1836 MCadm-590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping, Plan Ap-04-002253, with an area of 1,560
square meters.
On the other hand, respondents’ TD Nos. D-014-00839 and D-
014-01923 issued in 1993 and 1999 respectively, showed that
respondents sold 468 square meters of Lot 1 to Jayson Sta.
Barbara. The segregation of said 468 square meters pertaining
17  she lent those documents to her brother Jose Gabriel. During the
to Jayson Sta. Barbara was reflected in the approved survey plan
of Lot 1836 prepared by respondents’ surveyor on March 18,
2000.18
At the trial, petitioners presented their witness Arturo Tanyag, son
of Bienvenido Tanyag and Araceli Tanyag who died on March 30,
1968 and October 30, 1993, respectively. He testified that
according to Florencia Sulit, Benita Gabriel-Lontoc and her family
were the ones in possession of Lot 1 since 1944; Benita Gabriel
had executed an Affidavit of Sale declaring said property as her
inheritance and conveying the same to spouses Gabriel and
Cornelia Sulit. He affirmed that they had been in possession of
Lot 1 from the time Bienvenido Tanyag bought the land from
Florencia Sulit in 1964. Based on the boundaries indicated in the
tax declaration, they fenced the property, installed Juana
Quinones as their caretaker who also attended to the piggery, put
up an artesian well and planted some trees. From 1964 up to
1978, nobody disturbed them in their possession or claimed
ownership of the land; four years after acquiring Lot 1, they also
purchased the adjacent property (Lot 2) to expand their piggery.
mother purchased it from Agueda Dinguinbayan. He had
personally witnessed the execution of the 1968 deed of sale
including its notarization, and was also present during the
physical turn over of Lot 2 by the seller. In fact, he was one of the
signature therein. He further described the place as inaccessible
at that time as there were no roads yet and they had to traverse
muddy tracks to reach their property. 19
Arturo further testified that the first time they met Jose Gabriel
was when the latter borrowed from their mother all the documents
pertaining to their property. Jose Gabriel came looking for a piece
of property which he claims as his but he had no documents to
prove it and so they showed him their documents pertaining to
the subject property; out of the goodness of her mother’s heart,
cadastral survey conducted in 1976, they had both lots surveyed
in preparation for their consolidation under one tax declaration.
However, they did not succeed in registering the consolidated lots
as they discovered that there was another tax declaration
covering the same properties and these were applied for titling
under the name of Jose Gabriel sometime in 1978 or 1980, which
was after the time said Jose Gabriel borrowed the documents
from their mother. No notice of the hearings for application of title
filed by Jose Gabriel was received by them. They never
abandoned the property and their caretaker never left the place
except to report to the police when she was being harassed by
the respondents. He also recalled that respondents had filed a
complaint against them before the barangay but since no
agreement was reached after several meetings, they filed the
present case. 20
The next witness for petitioners was Juana Quinones, their
caretaker who testified that she had been staying on petitioners’
property since 1964 or for 35 years already. She had built a nipa
hut and artesian well, raised piggery and poultry and planted
some root crops and vegetables on the land. At first there was
only one parcel but later the petitioners bought an additional lot;
Arturo Tanyag gave her money which she used for the fencing of
the property. During all the time she occupied the property there
was nobody else claiming it and she also had not received any
notice for petitioners concerning the property, nor the conduct of
survey on the land. On cross-examination, she admitted that she
was living alone and had no Voter’s ID or any document
evidencing that she had been a resident there since 1964.
Although she was living alone, she asks for help from other
persons in tending her piggery. 21
Angelita Sulit-delos Santos, cousin of petitioners and also of
respondents, testified that she came to know the subject property
because according to her paternal grandfather Gabriel Sta. Ana
Sulit, her maternal grandmother Benita Gabriel-Lontoc mortgaged
the property to him. It was Benita Gabriel Lontoc who took care of
her, her siblings and cousins; they lived with her until her death.
She identified the signature of Benita Gabriel in the 1944 Affidavit
of Sale in favor of Gabriel Sulit. Lot 1 consisting of 600 square
meters was vacant property at that time but her family was in
possession thereof when it was sold to Gabriel Sulit; it was her
father Eliseo Sulit and uncle Hilario Sulit, who were incharge of
their property. On cross-examination, she was asked details
regarding the supposed mortgage of Lot 1 to Gabriel Sulit but she
admitted she does not know anything as she was still very young
then.22
Respondents’ first witness was Roberto Gabriel Arnedo, son of
Luz Gabriel-Arnedo. He testified that when he was about 5 or 6
years old (1953 or 1954), his grandfather Jose Gabriel used to
bring him along to visit the subject property consisting of 1,763
square meters based on the tax declaration and OCT. They had
picnics and celebrate his grandfather’s birthday there. He recalled
accompanying his grandfather in overseeing the planting of
gumamela which served as the perimeter fence. Jose Gabriel had
not mentioned anything about the claim of petitioners over the
same land; Jose Gabriel handed the documents pertaining to the
land to his eldest aunt and hence it now belongs to them. On
23 
cross-examination, he claimed that during those years he had
visited the land together with his grandfather, he did not see
Florencia Sulit and her family.
24
Virginia Villanueva, daughter of Salome Gabriel, testified that they
acquired the subject property from their grandfather Jose Gabriel
who had a tax declaration in his name. Her mother furnished
them with documents such as tax declarations and the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Jose Gabriel; they also
have an approved survey plan prepared for Salome Gabriel. She
does not know the petitioners in this case. On cross-examination,
25 
she said that the subject property was inherited by Jose Gabriel
from his father Mateo Gabriel; Jose Gabriel was the sole owner of
the land while Benita Gabriel has separate properties in Palingon
and Langkokak. Though they are not actually occupying the
26 
property, they visit the place and she does not know anybody
occupying it, except for the portion (486 square meters) which
petitioners sold to Sta. Barbara. A nine-door apartment was built
on the said portion without their permission. She had talked to
both Sta. Barbara and with Arturo Tanyag they had meetings
before the barangay; however, petitioners filed the present case
in court. She insisted that there is nobody residing in the subject
property; there is still the remaining 901 square meters which is
owned by their mother. She admitted there were plants on the
land but she does not know who actually planted them; it was her
grandfather who built a wooden fence and gumamela in the
1960s. As to the hearings on the application for title, she had not
attended the same; she does not know whether the petitioners
were notified of the said hearings. She also caused the
preparation of the survey plan for Salome Gabriel. On the
increased area of the property indicated in the later tax
declarations, she admitted the discrepancy but said there were
barangay roads being built at the time.27
Esmeraldo Ramos, Municipal Assessor of Taguig, testified that
he was formerly a Land Appraiser in the Office of the Municipal
Assessor of Taguig and in the course of his duties had certified
one of the tax declarations in the name of respondents (TD No.
EL-014-10585). He identified and verified said document and the
other tax declarations submitted in court by the respondents. He
admitted that on January 10, 1980, they made the entry on TD
No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel that the same was
cancelled by TD No. 120-014-01013 also in the name of Jose
Gabriel who presented a supposed deed of sale in favor of
Araceli Tanyag which caused the earlier cancellation of TD No.
6425 in his name. However, upon investigation they found out
that the seller Florencia Sulit was not the owner because the
declared owner was Jose Gabriel; even the deed of sale
recognized that the property was declared in the name of Jose
Gabriel. They also discovered from the cadastral survey and tax
mapping of Taguig that the property is in the name of Jose
Gabriel both in the Bureau of Lands and Municipal Assessor’s
Office. As far as he knows, it was Jose Gabriel who owned the
subject property which he usually visited; he recalled that around
the late 70’s and 80’s, he ordered the fencing of barbed wire and
bamboo stalks on the land which is just 3 lots away from his own
property. As to the discrepancy in the area of the property as
originally declared by Jose Gabriel, he explained that the
boundaries in the original tax declaration do not change but after
the land is surveyed, the boundaries naturally would be different
because the previous owner may have sold his property or the
present owner inherits the property from his parents. He admitted
that the tax declaration is just for tax purposes and not
necessarily proof of ownership or possession of the property it
covers.28
Respondents’ last witness was Antonio Argel who testified that he
had resided for 52 years on a land near the subject property and
as far as he knows it was Jose Gabriel who owns it and planted
thereon. On cross-examination, he admitted that Jose Gabriel
was not in physical possession of the property. He just assumed
that the present occupants of the property were allowed by Jose
Gabriel to stay therein because he is the owner. There is an
apartment and three small houses existing on the property, and
about five families are living there. He confirmed that there is a
piggery being maintained by a certain Juana who had been
residing there maybe for fifteen years already.29
In rebuttal, petitioners presented two witnesses who are owners
of properties adjoining that of the subject land. Rodante Domingo
testified that it was only now did he learn that the property of
Arturo Tanyag is already titled in the name of respondents. He
was not aware of the titling proceeding because he never
received any notice as adjoining owner. His own property is
already titled in his name and he even asked Arturo Tanyag to act
as a witness in his application for titling. On the other hand, Dado
30 
Dollado testified that he acquired his property in 1979. He
likewise affirmed that he did not receive any notice of the
proceedings for application for titling filed by respondents and it
was only now that he learned from Arturo Tanyag that the subject
property was already titled in the names of respondents. 31
The last rebuttal witness for petitioners was Dominador
Dinguinbayan Ergueza, son of Agueda Dinguinbayan. He testified
that the subject property was formerly owned by his mother and
the present owner is Araceli Tanyag who bought the same from
his mother in 1968. He described the boundaries of the property
in relation to the adjoining owners at that time; presently, the left
portion is already a street (Rujale St.) going towards the sea. He
admitted that his wife, Livina Ergueza was an instrumental
witness in the 1968 deed of sale in favor of Araceli Tanyag. 32
In its decision, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as
the counterclaim, holding that petitioners failed to establish
ownership of the subject property and finding the respondents to
be the declared owners and legal possessors. It likewise ruled
that petitioners were unable to prove by preponderance of
evidence that respondents acquired title over the property
through fraud and deceit.
Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s
ruling. The CA found that apart from the Affidavit executed by
Benita Gabriel in 1944 claiming that she inherited Lot 1 from their
father, Mateo Gabriel, there is no evidence that she, not Jose
Gabriel, was the true owner thereof. It noted that just four years
after Benita Gabriel’s sale of the subject property to the Sulit
spouses, Jose Gabriel declared the same under his name for tax
purposes, paying the corresponding taxes. The appellate court
stressed that petitioners’ allegation of bad faith was not proven.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assail the CA in not finding that the respondents
obtained OCT No. 1035 in their names fraudulently and in bad
faith. They also claim to have acquired ownership of the subject
lots by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
The issues presented are: (1) whether respondents committed
fraud and bad faith in registering the subject lots in their name;
and (2) whether petitioners acquired the property through
acquisitive prescription.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does
not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property described
therein. Thus, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens
33 
title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the
registered property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is
that reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the
findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner,
or to the one with a better right.
34
An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property
subject of the acts. The totality of the evidence on record
35 
established that it was petitioners who are in actual possession of
the subject property; respondents merely insinuated at occasional
visits to the land. However, for an action for reconveyance based
on fraud to prosper, this Court has held that the party seeking
reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his
title to the property and the fact of fraud.
36
The CA correctly observed that the only evidence of Benita
Gabriel’s supposed title was the 1944 Affidavit of Sale whereby
Benita Gabriel claimed sole ownership of Lot 1 as her inheritance
from their father, Mateo Gabriel. The property until 1949 was still
declared in the name Jose Gabriel despite the 1944 sale
executed by Benita Gabriel in favor of spouses Gabriel and
Cornelia Sulit. As to the alleged fraud perpetrated by Jose Gabriel
and respondents in securing OCT No. 1035 in their name, this
was clearly not proven as Arturo Tanyag testified merely that
Jose Gabriel borrowed their documents pertaining to the property.
No document or testimony was presented to show that Jose
Gabriel employed deceit or committed fraudulent acts in the
proceedings for titling of the property.
However, the CA did not address the issue of acquisitive
prescription raised by the petitioners. In their Complaint before
the lower court, petitioners alleged –
15. Defendants never occupied the whole area of the lot covered
by Tax Declaration No. 1603 (686 sq. m.) neither were they able
to set foot on the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 6542
[sic] for the reason that those lots had been in actual, open
continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the plaintiffs
against the whole world for more than thirty years which is
equivalent to title.
xxxx 37
Such character and length of possession of a party over a parcel
of land subject of controversy is a factual issue. Settled is the rule
that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as only
questions of law shall be raised in such petitions. While this Court
is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court
from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of
justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual
conclusions based on the record. 38
In this case, the CA was mistaken in concluding that petitioners
have not acquired any right over the subject property simply
because they failed to establish Benita Gabriel’s title over said
property. The appellate court ignored petitioners’ evidence of
possession that complies with the legal requirements of acquiring
ownership by prescription.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a
possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen
into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is
39 
patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
40 
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that
it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in
the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse
possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of
acquisitive prescription.
41
On the matter of prescription, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real
rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession
of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioners’ adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the
issuance of TD No. 1145 in the name of Araceli Tanyag, which
tax declaration cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose
Gabriel. It is settled that tax receipts and declarations are prima
42 
facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for which
such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, they may become the basis of a claim
for ownership. Petitioners’ caretaker, Juana Quinones, has since
43 
lived in a nipa hut, planted vegetables and tended a piggery on
the land. Aside from paying taxes due on the property, petitioners
also exercised other acts of ownership such as selling the 468-
square meter portion to Sta. Barbara who had constructed
thereon a nine-door apartment building.
It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over
the property by securing a tax declaration in the name of Jose
Gabriel albeit over a bigger area than that originally declared. In
1998, they finally obtained an original certificate of title covering
the entire 1,763 square meters which included Lot 1. Did these
acts of respondents effectively interrupt the possession of
petitioners for purposes of prescription?
We answer in the negative.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v.
Rañon this Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil Code held that
44  45 
civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons
to the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse
Claim. Thus:
Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is
produced by judicial summons to the possessor. Moreover, even
with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets
limitations as to when such summons shall not be deemed to
have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1)
if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff
should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings
to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the
complaint.
Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore
the judicial character of civil interruption.  For civil interruption to
1âwphi1
take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons.
None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim
which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a
notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents’
possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil
interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice
of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a necessity
for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was
merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the
Civil Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed by
petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial
summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the
Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice
of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons
which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law. In
the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt
respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period of
acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in
respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in
March 2000, the latter have been in continuous, public and
adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having
possessed the property for the period and in the character
required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the
subject property. Such right cannot be defeated by respondents’
acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and
obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name in 1998.
This notwithstanding, we uphold petitioners’ right as owner only
with respect to Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters. Petitioners
failed to substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a deed of
sale from the original declared owner, Agueda Dinguinbayan.
Respondents asserted that the 147 square meters covered by the
tax declarations of Dinguinbayan being claimed by petitioners is
not the same lot included in OCT No. 1035.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an
action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who
claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the
identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In
regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the
person who claims that he has a better right to the property must
first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the
location, area and boundaries thereof. In this case, petitioners
46 

failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and

bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the
technical description contained in OCT No. 1035, which would
have shown whether Lot 2 consisting of 147 square meters was
erroneously included in respondents’ title. The testimony of
Agueda Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice because said
witness merely stated the boundary owners as indicated in the
1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his mother. On his part, Arturo
Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in
preparation for the consolidation of the two parcels. However, no
such plan was presented in court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision

dated August 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 81224 is MODIFIED in that petitioners heirs of Bienvenido
and Araceli Tanyag are hereby declared the owners of 686
square meters previously declared under Tax Declaration Nos.
11445, 120-014-00486, 120-014-0085, B-014-00501, E-014-
01446, C-014-00893 and D-014-00839 all in the name of Araceli
Tanyag, which lot is presently covered by OCT No. 1035 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila in the name of
respondents Salome Gabriel, Nestor R. Gabriel, Luz Gabriel-
Arnedo, Nora Gabriel-Calingo, Pilar Gabriel-Mendiola, Minerva
Gabriel-Natividad and Erlinda Gabriel-Velasquez. Respondents
are ORDERED to RECONVEY the said 686-square meter portion
to the petitioners.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice