THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 179080, November 26, 2014 ]

EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL
ALIAS “TAPOL”, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated
June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the
November 15, 2001 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17,
Kidapawan City, Cotabato.

Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias “Tapol” were
charged with the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).[4] The Information dated May 3, 1990 reads:
The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND
GENEROSO MARFIL Alias “TAPOL” of the crime of Violation of Domicile,
committed as follows:
That at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan,
Barangay Greenhills, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines,
the above-named accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the
rest being CAFGUs, hence, persons in authority, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, armed with garand rifles, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, without proper judicial order, entered the house of ROBERTO MALLO
by forcibly breaking the door of said house against the will of the occupants thereof,
search the effects of the house without the previous consent of the owner and then
mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG inflicting injuries to the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
During the arraignment on November 5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded not guilty.
[6]
 Thereafter, trial ensued.

Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock in
the evening of May 14, 1989 inside the house which he already bought from Roberto
Mallo. He roused from sleep when petitioners, who were not armed with search warrant,
suddenly entered the house by destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled him,
striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but
instead found and took away his airgun.

Roberto Limbag, Baleriano’s nephew who was living with him, witnessed the whole
incident and corroborated his testimony.

Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of
President Roxas Police Station who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera
also took the witness stand for the prosecution. Essentially, he affirmed the medical
certificate that he issued. His findings indicated that Baleriano suffered hematoma on the
left side of the nose, back portion of the body at the level of the hip region, and back
portion at the right side of the scapular region as well as abrasion on the right side of the
breast and left side of the body at the axilliary region.[7] Dr. Cabrera opined that the
injuries inflicted would heal from seven to ten days.[8]

For the defense, petitioners denied the crime charged, declaring in unison that they were
in their respective houses the entire evening of May 14, 1989. They alleged, however,
that the night before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving foot patrol, together with
other barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the area. At the time, they
recovered a stolen carabao owned by a certain Francisco Pongasi [9] from three
unidentified persons who managed to escape.

On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They
were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is,
four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. According to the RTC, the prosecution
failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an essential element of Article
128 of the RPC. It held:
The prosecution who has that onus probandi failed to prove one of the essential elements
of the crime; on the issue of whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it
is true that accused were named CVO’s and the other as a barangay captain and that even
if the same were admitted by them during their testimony in open court, such an
admission is not enough to prove that they were public officers; it is for the prosecution
to prove by clear and convincing evidence other than that of the testimony of witnesses
that they were in fact public officers; there exist a doubt of whether or not all the accused
were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts should be ruled in favor of the accused;
that on this lone and essential element the crime charged as violation of domicile is ruled
out; that degree of moral certainty of the crime charged was not established and proved
by convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; x x x.[10]
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which, on November 18, 2005, set aside the trial
court’s judgment. While it agreed with both parties that petitioners should not be
convicted for Less Serious Physical Injuries, the CA still ruled that they are guilty
of Violation of Domicile considering their judicial admissions that they were barangay
captain (in the case of Geroche) and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(in the case of Garde and Marfil). The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and the
evidence on hand, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
finding the accused-petitioners GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
them to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months, One (1) Day of arresto
mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision [correccional] minimum
with the accessory penalty of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. They argue that
there is double jeopardy since the trial court already acquitted them
of Violation of Domicile and such judgment, being now final and executory, is res
judicata.   Petitioners insist that their appeal before the CA is limited to their conviction
for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, focusing their arguments and defense for
acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their constitutional right to due
process when it convicted them for Violation of Domicile.

We deny.

An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including
one not raised by the parties.[12] When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws
the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to
render such judgment as law and justice dictate.[13] An appeal confers upon the appellate
court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase (or
reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.[14] The appellate court
may, and generally does, look into the entire records to ensure that no fact of weight or
substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. [15]

Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious
Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition
on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as
may be found in the assailed judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed twice in
jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty
of Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical
Injuries.

The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their
testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche
denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were
CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered as public
officers/employees.[16]

As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128
of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years)
if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not
constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the
offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were
sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law[17] requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence.
The maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. Yet the
penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is composed of only two, not three, periods.
In which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division into three equal portions
the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions.
Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 128 are:

Minimum – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days

Medium – 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days

Maximum – 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years

Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or
from 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the
provisions of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period.

On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by
Article 128 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court
hereby sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years
and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and
Resolution dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR No. 26418
finding petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias “Tapol”
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Domicile, penalized under Article 128 of
the Revised Penal Code, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be
imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal and Ricardo R. Rosario concurring; rollo, pp. 25-36.
[2]
 Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[3]
 Penned by Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano (Records, pp. 326-332; id. at 17-23).
[4]
 Art. 128. Violation of domicile. – The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized
by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search
papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or
having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises,
shall refuse to do so.

If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not constituting
evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender,
the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
[5]
 Records, p. 31.
[6]
 Id. at 36.
[7]
 Records, p. 4.
[8]
 TSN, December 7, 1993, p. 4. (Id. at 140).
[9]
 Spelled as “Pungasi” is some parts of the Records (See records, pp. 318-319).
[10]
 Records, p. 331; Rollo, p. 22.
[11]
 Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[12]
 People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22,
2014.
[13]
 People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22,
2014.
[14]
 Garces v. People, 554 Phil. 683, 696-697 (2007).
[15]
 People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 201723, June 13, 2013, 698 SCRA 548, 554.
[16]
 The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of
complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality. It was
composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in their
localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security.  As such, they were
provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order detention of
individuals. (See People v. Flores, 410 Phil. 578, 587 [2001]).
[17]
 Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 and Republic Act No. 4203.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 64349, May 27, 1988 ]
CARLOS CARPIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

NARVASA, J.:

Petitioner Carlos Carpio seeks reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony, of Violation of Domicile under Article 128
of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
The indictment upon which he was arraigned and tried stated that “on or about March 13,
1982, in the City of Manila, ** (Carpio,) being then the Barangay Chairman of Barrio
Slip. Zero, Kagitingan Extension, Tondo, ** and therefore a public officer, while in the
performance of, and in relation to his official duties as such, without any justifiable order,
did ** enter and conduct illegal search inside the dwelling of Corazon Abalos y Masaca
located at 971 Kagitingan Ext., Tondo, ** by forcing his way in purportedly looking for a
certain 'Mundong' against the will and without the previous consent of Corazon Abalos y
Masaca."

The record discloses the testimony of the complaining witness, the aforesaid Corazon
Abalos, to the effect that in the morning of March 13, 1982, Barangay Chairman Carpio
had indeed gone to the house where she and her husband, Reynaldo Abalos (alias "Long
Hair") were residing. According to her, Carpio entered her residence unannounced and
without any warrant, and looked around for a certain "Mundong," staying in the house for
five minutes or so. She gave no reason why Carpio was searching for Mundong. [1]

The record reveals, too, that Corazon Abalos' complaint against Carpio was not filed until
after certain occurrences had taken place. These occurrences are summarized in the
Solicitor General's brief as follows:
"(O)n March 14, 1982, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, ** (Carpio) was summoned
in his house at 923 Kagitingan Extension ** by the residents who were playing basketball
in a nearby basketball court (TSN, Dec. 21, 1982, p. 31). The latter informed him that one
Reynaldo Abalos a.k.a. 'Long Hair,' husband of complainant Corazon Abalos, was
brandishing his bolo in public (TSN, id., p. 32). As petitioner went out of his house, he
saw Abalos in a small alley, by the makeshift basketball court, about 6 to 7 meters away
from him, making a show out of his bolo **. In the performance of his duty to preserve
peace in the area as barangay chairman, petitioner admonished Reynaldo Abalos of the
consequences of his actions and the ** danger that the same may cause the bystanders
and the public. Abalos merely responded by looking at petitioner without a word and
walked towards his own house (TSN, id., p. 33).

"As petitioner pursued Abalos, he saw complainant Abalos, complainant's cousin, Victor
Aglinao, and 20 other persons armed with bladed weapons, pipes and bolos, blocking his
way (TSN, id., pp. 34 and 36). Compelled to save his life and limb, petitioner cried for
help, and immediately some residents went to his succor and accompanied him home
safely (TSN, id., p. 36).

"Unable to retaliate physically on the person of petitioner for the previous incident
wherein petitioner publicly reprimanded him, Abalos and company (one Mundo, Victor
Aglinao **, Boy Kulot and others), abetted by one Patrolman Enrico Cruz, proceeded to
petitioner's house, destroyed his store with the use of a crowbar, and hacked his house,
with petitioner trembling with fear inside". The group threatened to kill petitioner as
Patrolman Cruz watched. After ten (10) minutes, and petitioner's house destroyed, the
group left.

"Thereafter, residents of the Barangay Slip Zero sought the assistance of one Patrolman
Rodolfo Perez, assigned as Officer-in-Charge of Desk II, Western Police District at about
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon (Exhibit "1", TSN, id., p. 4).

"Accompanied by Sgt. Rodolfo Perez and his men, petitioner went to the house of
complainant to arrest her husband, Reynaldo Abalos and the others responsible for
destroying the house of the former (TSN, id., p. 42).

"Complainant Corazon Abalos, who was found therein refused petitioner and the other
peace officers entry to the house, and instead uttered defamatory words **.

“Unable to arrest Reynaldo Abalos and company, petitioner together with Sgt. Perez and
company, proceeded to the police station to enter the same at the police blotter and at the
same time sought police protection against the former (TSN, id., p. 44).”
The aforementioned Pat. Enrico Cruz is the brother-in-law of Corazon Abalos. For his
part in the "raid" and the destruction of the store and house of Carpio, an administrative
complaint was filed by the latter against him with the NAPOLCOM for grave
misconduct.

It was after these events on the fourteenth of March had transpired, and an administrative
complaint for grave misconduct had been filed with the NAPOLCOM against her
brother-in-law, Pat. Cruz, that, to repeat, Corazon Abalos presented her own complaint
against petitioner Carpio for violation of domicile. Parenthetically, a similar complaint
was also filed against Carpio by Oscar Aglinao, brother of one of the "raiders” (Victor
Aglinao), but Carpio's prosecution therefor resulted in his acquittal by
the Sandiganbayan.[2]

The Sandiganbayan however found Carpio guilty of the charge preferred by Corazon
Abalos. In convicting Carpio, the Sandiganbayan relied on Corazon's sole testimony; and
that testimony referred to Carpio's alleged criminal intrusion into Corazon's residence on
the 13th of March, a day before the occurrence of the events giving rise to the cause to
look for and arrest her husband and/or his companions.

No persuasive reason is given by the Trial Court for disregarding the facts on record,
established by the evidence of the defense. This is surprising specially in the light of the
Lower Court's observations in its decision respecting corroboration of Carpio's evidence
by Sgt. Rodolfo Perez, who has not been shown to be other than a neutral witness, having
no motive to falsify his testimony.[3] According to the Sandiganbayan [4]
"Sgt. Rodolfo Perez corroborated the testimony of accused that he responded to a call for
police assistance at Barrio Slip Zero ** and there, upon arrival, he found that a riot was in
progress. He also saw the damage caused on the house of the accused, which the latter
claimed were the handiwork of a certain Mundong and other persons. When he asked the
accused where they can find said Mundong, he was led to the place of Corazon Abalos.
There he saw Pat. Cruz in front of Corazon's house, who told him, in answer to his
inquiry to that effect, that Mundong had already left the place. They did not enter the
house of Corazon Abalos. Instead he advised the accused to lodge a complaint in Station
2."
A conviction may, to be sure, be made to rest on the testimony of a single witness,
provided he appears otherwise trustworthy and, reliable.[5] Corazon Abalos cannot
however be so characterized as a witness. Not only is her evidence belied by the proofs of
the defense, inclusive of the testimony of impartial, objective persons, it also makes no
sense, since it describes a search for a friend of her husband and an illegal entry into her
house for that precise purpose by the barangay chairman, who had no conceivable reason
for doing so on that day.

Rejection of Corazon's testimony is thus called for. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to

consider her accusation a concocted one, designed "to counteract the petitioner's
complaint against Pat. Enrico Cruz"[6] in the NAPOLCOM considering that, as the
Solicitor General points out, "she and her husband rely for subsistence and support" on
said Pat. Cruz.[7]

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and

another entered ACQUITTING petitioner Carlos Carpio of the offense charged.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (C.J.,) Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

[1]
 TSN, Dec. 21, 1982, pp. 7-10
[2]
 Judgment in Criminal Case No. 6899, promulgated on Nov. 16, 1983
[3]
 SEE Peo. v. Aleman, 102 SCRA 785; Peo. v. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321; Peo. v.
Blas, 106 SCRA 305; Peo. v. Aposaga, 108 SCRA 574; Peo. v. Clarin, 108 SCRA 684
[4]
 Decision, Crim. Case No. 6487, p. 6
[5]
 Peo. v. Naba-unag, 79 SCRA 33; Peo. v. Candado, 84 SCRA 508
[6]
 Petition, p. 6
[7]
 Comments, p. 8

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 130442, April 06, 2000 ]
THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE
BOARD, PNP, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, PETITIONERS, VS. C/INSP.
LAZARO TORCITA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

 Before us is a Petition for Review by way of Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals [1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 43872, which set aside the Decision of the Regional
Director (RD) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Iloilo City, through its
Summary Dismissal Board (SDB), suspending herein respondent C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita
from the service for twenty (20) days for "Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty
under Section 41 of R. A. 6975."

The antecedents are as follows:

On July 6, 1994, the following verified complaints were filed against C/Insp. Lazaro
Torcita, herein respondent, by Manuel Puey, Jesus Puey, Alex Edwin del Rosario:
1) Administrative Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-01- for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police
Officer filed by Jesus H. Puey in a complaint dated June 25, 1994;
2) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-02- for Grave Threats filed by Jesus H. Puey;
3) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-03 for Abuse of Authority and Illegal Search filed by
Jesus H. Puey;
4) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-04 for Abuse of Authority
and Violation of Domicile filed by Jesus H. Puey;
5) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-05 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Jesus H. Puey;
6) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-06 for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed
by Manuel H. Puey;
7) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-07 for Illegal Search filed by Manuel H. Puey;
8) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-08 for Grave Abuse of Authority
and Violation of Domicile filed by Manuel Puey;
9) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-09 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Manuel Puey;
10) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-10 for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed
by Alex Edwin del Rosario;
11) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-11 for Abuse of Authority and Grave Threats filed by
Alex Edwin del Rosario;
12) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" 94-12 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario.

The twelve administrative complaints were the subject of administrative hearings before
the Summary Dismissal Board of the PNP. At the pre-trial, the parties and their
respective counsels agreed that the twelve cases shall be consolidated into one "major
complaint" for "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" under Par. e, Sec. 3, Rule II,
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 pursuant to RA 6975 [2]. The statement of the case by
the Summary Dismissal Board is as follows:
"That sometime last April 26, 1994, after attending the birthday party of Miss Jessie
Vasquez Alex Edwin del Rosario, together with Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and
Cristita Dawa boarded Mazda pick up with plate nr. HHP-808 and driven by Reynaldo
Consejo, proceeded towards the direction of Cadiz City.

While nearing Crossing Cadiz in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, the aforementioned
Mazda pick-up driven by Consejo overtook a red Cortina Ford driven by Major Lazaro
Torcita; That on board the motor vehicle driven by Torcita were three females sitted at
the back;

That Major Lazaro Torcita signaled the passengers of the Mazda pick-up to stop,
however, the driver of the Mazda pick-up refused to abide by the signal and instead
accelerated and proceeded to Hda. Aimee without stopping.

That upon reaching Hda. Aimee Major Lazaro Torcita, entered the compound and was
approached by two persons in civilian clothes which prevented him from further
proceeding; Moments after, the patrol car of Cadiz PNP arrived and together with Major
Torcita, approached Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario, inquiring as to the
identity of the persons who accosted him;

The complainants alleged that Major Torcita approached and entered the compound of
Hda. Aimee, very drunk, with back-up vehicle full of armed policemen, confronted Jesus
H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario as who stopped him at the gate, shouting in a very,
very loud voice, invectives and remarks;

That such act of Major Lazaro Torcita constitute Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer not
worth of respect;

In his answer, the respondent, Lazaro R. Torcita, while admitting that he entered the
premises of the complainants, the same was done on a regular, lawful and proper way for
he was in the performance of his official duties in pursuing the suspect who committed a
crime in his presence;

From the affidavits of the witnesses and testimonies presented by the complainants and
the counter affidavits and the counter testimonies of the respondent, the ISSUE before the
Board is whether the respondent is guilty of Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer
under Republic Act 6975 as implemented by Memorandum Circular 92-006 of the
National Police Commission under Rule II Section 3, Paragraph C, committed thru a
series of illegal acts consisting of Grave Threats, Illegal Search, Abuse of
Authority, violation of Domicile and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban."
The complainant presented documentary evidence and witnesses Congressman Manuel
Puey, Rosita Bistal, Alex Edwin del Rosario and Reynaldo Consejo. Respondent Torcita
testified in his behalf and presented Nehru Java, a member of the PNP Cadiz, who was
with him during the incident in question.

The Summary Dismissal Board made the following findings of facts:

"That sometime last April 26, 1994, at about 10:30 in the evening, a red Cortina Ford,
driven by C/Insp. Lazaro H. Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, in the front seat and
his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a mazda pick-up, in the
vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, about 10 kilometers from crossing Cadiz, owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the
persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, the executive assistant and financial analyst of
Congressman Puey, three (3) helpers employed under the Congressman, namely, Rosita
Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa;

That both parties came from the Municipality of Victorias where they attended some
social functions on the occasion of the town fiesta;

After the mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, it accelerated speed and
proceeded to Hda. Aimee, a sugarcane plantation in Cadiz City, also owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey; The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it
reached Hda. Aimee where C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java alighted and the confrontation
with Alex Edwin del Rosario and Jesus Puey, occurred;

The Complainant tried to establish the fact that nothing unusual occurred or transpired
between the parties in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig and that Torcita has no business
pursuing them; However the Board is more inclined to give credence to the affidavits
(exhibit 5 & 6) and the testimony of C/Insp. Torcita that a vehicular collision almost took
place due to reckless driving of the driver of the mazda pick-up;

That it was the duty inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as
deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulation to prevent
chaos and accidents in roads and highways of the country (exhibit 13); This observation
is further bolstered by the testimony of Reynaldo Consejo, the driver of the mazda pick-
up, that he was able to overtake the red Cortina Ford only after the latter car hit the
shoulder of the road and after overtaking he increased his speed (tsn page 131, August
30, 1994 );

This sudden increase in speed of a driver involved in a vehicular accident is a classic

move for one who wants a fast get away from the scene, to escape responsibility;

Further, Alex Edwin del Rosario testified that upon reaching Hda. Aimee, he instructed
the guard to be on look-out for a car might be following them and might enter the
compound (TSN page 70 August 30, 1994 ). This conduct would show that witness is
anticipating that red Cortina Ford would follow them because of the incident in Sitio
Puting Tubig which could have ended in a vehicular collision and finally no proof was
presented to show that no other reason exist as to why C/Insp. Torcita would pursue the
Mazda pick up other than near occurrence of a vehicular collision;

The Complainant presented the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo
and the Affidavit of Alex Edwin del Rosario, jointly taken, may be considered as proof
that C/Insp. Torcita has committed act or series of acts that would constitute Grave
Threat, Illegal Search, Abuse of Authority, Violation of Domicile and Violation of
COMELEC Resolutions regarding the gun ban, thus CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A
POLICE OFFICER;

That in the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo (exhibit c; exhibit 2),
Bistal attempted to establish the fact that C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java illegally entered
the gate of the compound but were stopped by the guards armed with cane stick or batuta,
however in her testimony given during the hearing (tsn page 32, August 30, 1994) she
stated that she did not know what transpired between the two men approaching and the
guards near the gate because she, together with her companions, were busy unloading
kitchen utensil from the pick-up to the kitchen and Consejo categorically stated that this
portion of their affidavit, specifically paragraph 7, is NOT TRUE; Alex Edwin del
Rosario, in his testimony given in the hearing, corroborated this fact that he also did not
see or hear what happened for he was in some distance away and he cannot see them
clearly (TSN page 73, August 30, 1994 );

The only piece of evidence presented in connection with the incident which happened
near the gate of the compound is the affidavit of C/Insp. Torcita and his testimony given
in the hearing of the case that when he was walking towards the compound together with
his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, two armed civilian guards stopped and threatened him; He
identified himself however, the same had no effect, and PO2 Java whispered that there
are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this
point, they radioed for back-up; Since no proof to the contrary was presented by the
Complainant nor was there any witness or witnesses presented to rebut this allegations,
the Board had no other choice except to consider these allegations as proof; (Exhibit 5 &
6); The Board also resolve to take note that a metropolitan newspaper with nationwide
circulation and with unquestionable credential, had published a news item about the
presence of armed security personnel of Congressman Manuel Puey exhibit 14); This
evidence give more credence to the fact that there were really armed men in the premises
where the aforementioned incident happened; That this is corroborated further by the
affidavit of PO2 Nehru Java (exhibit 17);

This observation of the Board that there were really armed men in the premises of Hda.
Aimee, is further enhance by the fact that Major Torcita felt their presence when he
desisted from further entering the compound, a feeling which was developed and
nurtured by years of living under combat conditions and finally the Board also feels that
the presence of armed persons in the offices and properties of high government officials
is accepted as a necessary consequence for their protection due to the greater risks they
are expose to;

That because of the incident in Sitio Puting Tubig which was further aggravated by the
confrontation near the gate of the compound of Hda. Aimee, C/Insp. Torcita upon the
arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus
Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were; This fact is not disputed by the parties;

xxx......xxx......xxx

Chief Insp. Lazaro Torcita does not deny having taken alcoholic drink; However, not to
the point of drunkness; The Board is more inclined to believe this allegation for no sane
person will risks the life of a member of his family by deliberately driving when he is
mentally and physically incapable; Further, C/Insp. Torcita was able to drive from
Victorias to Cadiz City, a distance of forty kilometers, on a dark night and raining and
was able to avoid collision of the vehicles involved by sheer reflex action despite the
admitted fact that his tire hit the shoulder of the road;

Further, at the time Chief Inspector Torcita entered the compound he was fully aware of
the presence of armed men and reacted to this by exercising prudence while approaching
the compound of Hda. Aimee; The foregoing facts would show that C/Insp. Torcita was
in full command of his senses and was not affected by the numbing effect of alcohol for a
drunk person does not show any caution and behaves irrationaly."
The Board did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody
with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties. The Board
also found that there was no sufficient evidence that the urinating incident took place, and
held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. The
Board found that Lazaro Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties when the
incident happened; however, he committed a breach of internal discipline by taking
alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same. The dispositive portion of the decision
of the Board reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint for CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER under Memo Cir. Nr. 92-006 pursuant to Sec.
42, RA 6975, be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence, however finds C/Insp.
Lazaro R. Torcita to have committed SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY under Sec. 41, RA 6975, in relation to NAPOLCOM
Memo Cir. Nr. 91-002 and is hereby ORDERED SUSPENDED for twenty days (20) and
forfeiture of salary for the same period of time effective upon receipt of this Decision
under Rule 7, Section 2, Sub-par. b of the same Memo Circular."
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP, Region VI,
Iloilo City, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; Thus,
"Under the applicable provisions of Section 45 of R. A. 6975, however, the disciplinary
action imposed by the Regional Director upon a PNP member shall be final and
executory except those involving demotion in rank or dismissal from the service. The
appealed decision being that of suspension from the service with corresponding forfeiture
of pay only the same is not subject to review by this Board." [3]
Whereupon, C/Insp. Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the regional trial court of
Iloilo City, Branch 31, questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which
he was not charged, "which conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due
process of law."

Public respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The regional trial court
granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned
decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of
duty.

Public respondent appealed from the above-mentioned decision of the regional trial court,
by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that
the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that "the twelve (12)
cases treated as Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer were eventually dismissed."

The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the
aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:   
"1. THE OFFENSE OF "SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
DUTY" IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE CHARGE OF "CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER."
2. THE DECISION OF THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD (SDB) AND THE
NAPOLCOM REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY." [4]

The petitioners submit that the offense of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer" is
broad enough to include any act of an officer which tends to bring dishonor and disgrace
to the PNP organization, and Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty is one act
which brings such disgrace and dishonor as contemplated by law. Moreover, the
dismissal has become final and executory and the trial court erred when it proceeded with
the petition in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

In his comment, respondent Torcita insists that his right to due process of law was
"corrosively abridged and impaired", and pleads for an affirmance of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

The appeal has no merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the
trial court granting the petition for certiorari.

The administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing with complaints or charges against
any member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) is laid down in Republic Act No.
6975, otherwise known as the "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of
1990." This law defines the summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and Regional
Directors, among others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a police officer." [5] Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the "Rules and
Regulations in the conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP
members" and defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3 (c), Rule
II, as follows:
"Conduct unbecoming of a police officer" refers to any behavior or action of a PNP
member, irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or
otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously compromise his character and
standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of
moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial
or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a
gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits himself as
morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization."
On the other hand, the acts constituting "simple irregularity in the performance of duty"
are defined in Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. It is a light offense, incurred, among
others, by a member of the PNP who shall, among others, be found to "have the odor or
smell of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess alcoholic beverages on his
person, police vehicle, post or office." (Sec. 2.A, Rule VI)

As above-stated, the Summary Dismissal Board absolved the C/Insp. Torcita of the
consolidated charge of "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" but found him guilty of
simple irregularity in the performance of duty under Sec. 41, R.A. No. 6975, in relation
to Napolcom Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and imposed a penalty of suspension for
twenty (20) days and forfeiture of salary for the same period.

We are unable to sustain the theory of the petitioners that the definition of "conduct
unbecoming of a police officer" as earlier granted, is broad enough to include any act of
an officer which tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization, and that
there is "no legal prohibition" which would prevent the Summary Dismissal Board from
finding petitioner guilty of the lesser offense. While the definition of the more serious
offense is broad, and almost all- encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter
how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced
without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.

The series of twelve complaints filed against C/Insp. Torcita were solely based on the
incident that occurred on April 26, 1994 at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, wherein
Torcita, who was off-duty and was in civilian clothes, riding in his private vehicle with
members of his family, chased another vehicle which overtook his car in a reckless
manner and in violation of the Traffic Code; the hot pursuit ended at the Hacienda
Aimee, where he allegedly entered the place without lawful warrant and while inside,
belligerently shouted invectives, challenging everyone to a fight, pointed his gun at
somebody and urinated in full view of the persons therein. The Dismissal Board found
the above charges unsubstantiated and held that Torcita was in the performance of
official duty when the incidents happened. "However, he committed breach of internal
discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same."

It is glaringly apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve administrative cases filed
against C/Insp. Torcita, earlier quoted, that none of the charges or offenses mentioned or
made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official
duty. The records do not bear out the specific acts or conduct constituting the
charge/offense in the twelve cases which were consolidated at the pre-hearing conference
into a single case of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer." Thus, the Board defined
the issue before the Board as "whether the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of
a police officer under Republic Act 6975, as implemented by Memorandum Circular No.
92-006 of the National Police Commission under Rule II, Section 3, Paragraph c,
committed though a series of illegal acts consisting of grave threats, illegal search, abuse
of authority, violation of domicile or violation of Comelec Gunban." Notably, there is no
indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita
was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic
drinks while in the performance of his duties. Acctä mis

The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for
which he was not notified nor charged. Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by
specific requirements of notification of the charges together with copies of affidavits and
other attachments supporting the complaints, and the filing of an answer, together with
supporting documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the duration of
the hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting the hearing is summary, in that
sworn statements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination
is confined only to material and relevant matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory
proceedings shall not be entertained. (Section 4, Memorandum Circular No. 92-006).
However, notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be informed of the
specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being charged with
being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse the accusation
squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be
heard on the multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the absence of
specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper
observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process (Alonte vs.
Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245).

It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was
decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the Court (ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454 ). Memorandum
Circular No. 92-006 specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief
statement of the material facts and the findings of the summary dismissal authority as
well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board
that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this
particular offense. As it turned out, the dismissal Board believed his allegation that he
was not drunk and found that he was in full command of his senses where he tried to
apprehend the driver of the maroon Mazda pick-up. Although Torcita did not deny that
he had taken a shot of alcoholic drink at the party which he attended before the incident,
the records show that he was then off-duty and the party was at the Municipality of
Victorias, which was outside of his area of police jurisdiction. On the other hand, the hot
pursuit incident occurred while he was on in his way home to Cadiz City with the
members of his family. As observed by the Dismissal Board itself, the hot pursuit was
motivated by the duty "inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as
Deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulations, to
prevent chaos and accidents in roads and highways" (Decision, p. 76). The Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of
duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the
performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor;
he was on a private trip fetching his wife.

Premises considered, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the decision
of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent
Torcita was found guilty of an offense for which he was not properly charged. A decision
is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of
being heard (Palu-ay vs. CA, 293 SCRA 358). A void judgment never acquires finality
(Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA 255 SCRA 672; Fortich vs. Corona, 298
SCRA 678). Hence, aforementioned decision cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September l, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

 [1] Seventeenth Division, composed of Associate Justices Angelina-Sandoval-Gutierrez

as Chairman, Bernardo LL. Salas, (ponente), and Omar U. Amin; Rollo, 31-47.
 [2] "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department
of the Interior and Local Government, and for other purposes" otherwise known as the
"Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990".
 [3] Order dated January 16, 1995.
 [4] Rollo, p. 15.
 [5] "Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors. The
Chief of the PNP and regional directors, after due notice and summary hearings, may
immediately remove or dismiss any respondent PNP member in any of the following
cases:    
a. When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;
b. When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there are
reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of the charges; and
c. When the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer."

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxx

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004 ]
ELI LUI AND LEO ROJAS, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES EULOGIO AND
PAULINA MATILLANO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 44768 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch 21.[2]
 The Antecedents

Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt,
his father’s older sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan,
Davao del Sur. On May 2, 1988, Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao United
Products Enterprise store, with a monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by
Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao and was located at the corner of Monteverde and
Gempesaw Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked to close the store during lunchtime
and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben himself opened the store in the mornings and
after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another store owned by Kiao’s son, Eli
Lui, who also happened to be Ben’s nephew. Aside from Lariosa, Ben and Kiao
employed Maximo Pagsa and Rene Malang.

Lariosa chose to live in the house of Kiao. Lariosa fed the dogs of his employer every
morning before going to work and in the afternoon, in exchange for free meals and
lodging. There were occasions when Lariosa stayed in the house of Pagsa and Malang
and left some of his things with them. Lariosa deposited his savings with the Mindanao
Savings Bank in Bansalan.

On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He
went to the house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in
Bansalan City, where he rested until the next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for
work the day after, or on October 19, 1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was
terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary for the month of October. Kiao warned
Lariosa not to report the matter to the Department of Labor. Lariosa decided to return to
Bansalan without retrieving his things from Kiao’s house.

On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his
backwages from Ben in the amount of P500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings from the
Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan City and on November 1, 1988, applied for a job at
his cousin’s place, at Quimpo Boulevard, Davao City. He bought a radio cassette for
P2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban sunglasses for P900.00.

On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, at New Matina,
Davao City, but returned to Bansalan on the same day. On November 4, 1988, he
returned to Nancy’s house and stayed there until the next day, November 5, 1988.

That day, Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the
store. Ben reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith
executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that after Lariosa’s employment was terminated
on October 19, 1988, he discovered that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that
Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to
the side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.
At 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1988, a Sunday, Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and
Malang to retrieve his things. The two invited Lariosa to go with them to the beach, and
when Lariosa agreed, they borrowed Lui’s Ford Fierra for their transportation. The
vehicle stopped at the Almendras Hall where Pagsa alighted on the pretext that he was
going to buy fish. Lariosa, Rene, and his wife remained in the Fierra. Pagsa contacted Lui
and informed the latter that Lariosa was with him.

After about an hour, Lui arrived on board a vehicle. With him were Pagsa and two others,
Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. Lui told Lariosa that he wanted to talk, and asked the
latter to go with him. Pagsa urged Lariosa to go along with Lui. Lariosa agreed and
boarded Lui’s vehicle. The car stopped in front of Lui’s house, where the latter alighted
and went inside, while his companions and Lariosa remained in the car. When Lui
returned, he was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked Lariosa with the weapon. He
warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he would be killed. The group went to Ben’s house
to get the keys to the store. Ben joined them as they drove towards the store.

Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Ben’s money.
Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and
pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the
crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the
Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City.

Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-88
dated November 6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas “to follow up a theft case committed in
Davao City from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.” Rojas was directed to coordinate with the
nearest PNP headquarters and/or stations. He was authorized to carry his firearm for the
mission. He then left the police station on board a police car and proceeded to the corner
of Magsaysay and Gempesaw Streets.

In the meantime, a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. One of
them handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store with the use of
the keys. As Lariosa opened the lock as ordered, one of Lui’s companions took his
picture. Another picture was taken as Lariosa held the door knob to open the door.
Lariosa was then boarded in the police car and brought to the corner of Magsaysay and
Gemphesaw Streets where he was transferred to the police car driven by Rojas. He was
brought to the Metrodiscom headquarters. Lui once more mauled Lariosa, still trying to
force the latter to confess that he stole P45,000.00 from his uncle and to reveal what he
did with the money. When a policeman asked him where he slept the night before,
Lariosa replied that he spent the night in the house of his girlfriend’s parents at New
Matina, Davao City. The policemen brought Lariosa there, where they asked Nancy if
Lariosa had left anything while he slept thereat. Nancy replied that Lariosa had left a
radio cassette and a pair of sunglasses. The policemen took these and brought Lariosa
back to the Metrodiscom headquarters where Lui and his two companions were waiting.

Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa replied that he
used to stay in the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses Matillano, in Lily Street,
Poblacion Bansalan. Rojas and Lui then brought Lariosa, with his hands still handcuffed,
to a car. Lui’s companions, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan boarded another car and
proceeded to the Matillano residence.

Without prior coordination with the Bansalan PNP, Rojas, who was in civilian clothes,
Lui, Tan and Mendoza arrived at the house of the Spouses Matillano at about 3:00 p.m,
with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow. With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the
kitchen and gained entry into the house. They then proceeded to the sala where they
found Lariosa’s aunt, Paulina Matillano. In the adjacent room were Julieta, Lariosa’s
sister, Paulina’s daughter-in-law, Virginia, the latter’s sister, Erlinda, and a seven-month-
old baby. Paulina was shocked. Rojas told Paulina, “Mrs., we are authorities. We are here
to get something.” Paulina remonstrated, “Why are you meddling (manghilabot)?”

Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because something
might happen. He then said, “All right, where is your aparador because we are getting
something.” Paulina told Lui to wait for her husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and
told her that they were in a hurry. Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two
companions, Mendoza and Tan, to the second floor where her aparador was located.
Rojas and the handcuffed Lariosa remained in the sala. Lui and his two companions then
took two mats and two pairs of ladies’ shoes belonging to Paulina and Eulogio, two pairs
of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts which belonged to the latter’s
children. They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and when she did, Lui and his
companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins. Lui and his
two companions then went down to the ground floor. When Julieta went out of the room,
one of Lui’s companions recognized her as Lariosa’s sister. Lui and his companions
brought her along with them as they left the house.

Paulina was so unnerved by the incident. Her vision blurred, her stomach ached and she
was on the verge of losing consciousness. Concerned, Erlinda massaged Paulina’s
stomach. However, Erlinda had to leave because she was worried about her mother.
Paulina then went to the kitchen, prepared hot water and put a soothing ointment on her
stomach to relieve the pain.

In the meantime, Lui and his companions proceeded to the Bansalan Police Station and
caused an entry in the police blotter at 3:20 p.m. that he had recovered the following
items from the Matillano residence -- one pair of colored blue pants valued at P89.00; one
floor mat costing P290.00; a pair of black ladies’ shoes worth P126.00; and another pair
of ladies’ shoes worth P69.00.
At 4:30 p.m., Paulina reported to the barangay captain that persons identifying
themselves as policemen had gained entry into their house and took the following: two
polo shirts; two t-shirts; two pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; one
Bulova wristwatch; one necklace; one ring; and old coins.[3]

At 7:35 p.m., Eulogio Matillano made an entry in the Bansalan police blotter that earlier
that day, at 4:00 p.m., Rojas took the following from his house: two polo shirts; two t-
shirts; 2 pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies’ shoes; 1 Bulova wristwatch; 1
necklace; one ring; and, old coins, without his and his wife’s consent and without a
search warrant.[4] In the meantime, Doroteo Barawan, officer-in-charge of the Office of
the Barangay Captain, filed a complaint against Kim Kiao, et al., based on the complaint
of Paulina, docketed as Barangay Case No. 168.[5]

On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he stated that

he stole P40,000.00 on October 15, 1988 from the Davao United Products, and that he
used part of the money to buy appliances, a Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of
ladies’ shoes, a Seiko wristwatch, two pairs of maong pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor
mats.[6]

On November 16, 1988, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, charging Lariosa with robbery with force upon things. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.[7] The trial court rendered judgment on June 14, 1989,
acquitting Lariosa of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui
procured Lariosa’s confession through force and intimidation, in connivance with police
authorities.[8] The trial court, likewise, found that Lui had an ulterior motive for charging
Lariosa of robbery:
What would have been the possible motive of complainant in putting the burden of this
charged against the accused despite want of any appreciable evidence, can be gathered in
the record, as indicating the fear of complainant, that the accused will file a complaint
against him in the Department of Labor for illegally dismissing him in his employment,
without any sufficient legal grounds and basis. This unfounded complaint was intended to
support complainant’s ground against any possible complaint, the accused might file
against him with the Department of Labor by way of anticipation.[9]
On motion of Lariosa, the trial court ordered the return of the following exhibits:
Accordingly and conformably with the judgment of this court dated June 14, 1989, one
Eulogio Matillano, accused’s uncle, is hereby allowed to get or to retrieve exhibits “H,”
“I,” “J,” “K,” “L,” and “M,” consisting of Sony Cassette with serial no. W3658; Rayban
sunglasses; two (2) bundles of floor mat; two (2) pairs of pants; two (2) pairs of ladies’
shoes; and Seiko Actus wristwatch.[10]
Meanwhile, Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery against Lui, Peter
Doe, John Doe and Alan Mendoza. An Information was, thereafter, filed against them in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and the case was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 880-B. On December 13, 1988, the court issued a warrant for the
arrest of the accused therein. Upon reinvestigation, however, the Provincial Prosecutor
issued a Resolution dated March 31, 1989, recommending that the case be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence, but that the charges be forwarded to the Judge Advocate
General’s Office for possible administrative sanctions against Rojas.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the
complaint against the respondents Eli Lui be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Considering that Pat. Leo Rojas is a member of the Integrated National Police, this office
is without jurisdiction to entertain the complaint against him pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1850. Therefore, let the complaint against Pat. Leo Rojas, together with its
annexes, including a copy of the resolution of the undersigned, be forwarded to the Judge
Advocate General’s Office at Camp Catitipan, Davao City, for whatever action it may
take.[11]
The complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 92-0020. The National Police
Commission, thereafter, rendered a decision exonerating Rojas of administrative liability
for the complainant’s failure to substantiate the charges.[12] The Commission held that
Rojas was merely complying with the mission order issued to him when he accompanied
Lui and the latter’s two companions to the Matillano residence.

In a Resolution dated August 25, 1989, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III
dismissed the petition for review of the Provincial Prosecutor’s resolution filed by
Paulina Matillano. The Secretary of Justice, likewise, denied a motion for reconsideration
thereon.

In a parallel development, Lariosa’s parents, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a

complaint for robbery, violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention
against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et al., with the Commission of Human Rights docketed as
CHR Case No. RFO No. 88-0207-DS. In a Resolution dated December 4, 1989, the
Regional Office of the Commission recommended, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are recommending that there is sufficient prima
facie evidence:

1. to indict Eli Lui for unlawful arrest as defined under Art. 369 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended; and

2. to indict both Eli Lui and Pat. Leo Rojas liable for Violation of Domicile, as
defined under Art. 128 of the same code.[13]

The Proceedings in the Trial Court

On January 11, 1990, the spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano filed a civil complaint
for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur against Eli Lui, Leo Rojas,
Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. G-XXI-47(90).
The plaintiffs therein alleged the following:
 3. That plaintiffs are merchants by occupation and have been residing in Bansalan,
Davao del Sur, for several years now. They are law-abiding and peaceful citizens
in the community;

4. That at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, while plaintiff
husband was away from his residential house at Lily St., Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
and plaintiff wife was there tending the house, defendants, without any lawful
search warrant, arrived and thru intimidation succeeded in searching the house
owned by the plaintiff after which they brought with them two floor mats, two
pairs of ladies shoes, two pairs of pants, two polo shirts, two T-shirts, one Relova
wrist watch, one necklace (sinubong), one ring (sinubong) and several old coins,
without the consent of the plaintiffs and without even giving any receipt for the
items taken;

5. That the defendants allegedly wanted to recover the items taken by one Elinito
Lariosa but defendants thru the use of naked power and brute force, illegally
searched the house of the herein plaintiffs in gross violation of plaintiffs’
constitutional rights;

6. That what defendants did in conspiring and confederating to illegally search the
house of plaintiffs and then taking with them the items mentioned above without
even the benefit of any receipt is not only violative of Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the Civil Code but also of Article 32 of the Civil Code;

7. That because of what defendants did, plaintiffs suffered mental anguishes,

wounded feelings, deprivation of the properties taken, besmirched reputation, and
fright for which reason defendants should be made to jointly and severally pay
moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00;

8. That in order to deter others similarly bent and minded and by way of example or
correction for the public good, defendants should be made to pay jointly and
severally exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00;

9. That in the protection of their rights, plaintiffs engaged the services of counsel for
an agreed attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total award plus per diem of
P1,000.00 per court appearance;

10. That plaintiffs are bound to incur litigation expenses in an amount not less than
P10,000.00;[14]

They prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing judgment issue ordering
the defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs:
 1. P500,000.00 as moral damages;

2. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3. Litigation expenses of P10,000.00;

4. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total award;

5. Per diems to be proved during the trial of this case.

Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs consistent with equity.[15]

In their Answer to the complaint, the defendants therein alleged, inter alia, that they did
not conduct a search in the house of the plaintiffs and that plaintiff Paulina Matillano
allowed them to enter the house and even brought out pairs of pants. They added that the
other items were brought out by Lariosa’s sister and that they took only one (1) floor mat,
two (2) pairs of ladies’ shoes, and one (1) pair of blue pants.[16]

The defendants adduced evidence that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter
their house, and with Lariosa’s sister, voluntarily turned over the items declared in the
complaint. They testified that no violence, threats or intimidation were even committed
by them against Paulina Matillano. Defendant Rojas further testified that he was merely
complying with the Mission Order issued to him when he entered the house of the
plaintiffs in the company of the other defendants, and that he remained in the ground
floor while the other defendants retrieved the goods from plaintiff Matillano in the
second floor of the house.

On August 18, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment, ordering the dismissal of the complaint
for plaintiffs’ failure to prove their claims. The trial court also dismissed the defendants’
counterclaims. The trial court gave credence to the collective testimonies of the
defendants, that plaintiff Paulina Matillano voluntarily allowed them to enter her house,
and that the latter voluntarily turned over the subject items to them. The trial court took
into account the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Secretary of Justice, the
National Police Commission, as well as the order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Bansalan, dismissing Criminal Case No. 880-B.

The Case on Appeal

The decision of the trial court was elevated to the Court of Appeals where the appellants
contended, thus:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT PAULINA

MATILLANO VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED APPELLEES TO ENTER THE
HOUSE BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF HER NEPHEW ELINITO
LARIOSA WHO WAS HANDCUFFED;
 2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MRS. PAULINA
MATILLANO WAS THE ONE WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO THE
BANSALAN POLICE STATION.

3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE

CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS
– APPELLEES.[17]

On April 22, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the
RTC. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering defendants-appellees
jointly and severally:

1. To pay plaintiffs-appellants the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as

moral damages and Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as exemplary damages;
and

2. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), as attorney’s fees; and

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[18]
The appellate court denied the appellees’ motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The appellees Mendoza and Tan no longer appealed the decision.

Petitioners Eli Lui and Leo Rojas now assail the decision of the Court of Appeals
contending that:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE TIME-

HONORED DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT
THAT FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING AND CONCLUSIVE
AND DESERVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPECT, WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT THAT TRIED THE CASE;

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED

THAT AN ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED IN MRS. MATILLANO’S
RESIDENCE, IN DISREGARD OF THE EXCULPATORY FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT MRS. MATILLANO HAD VOLUNTARILY
ALLOWED PETITIONERS ENTRY INTO HER HOUSE.[19]

The Issues
The issues in this case may be synthesized, thus: (a) whether or not respondent Paulina
Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her house, as well as to the taking of the
clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family; (b) whether or not the
petitioners are liable for damages to the respondents; and, (c) if so, the extent of the
petitioners’ liability to the respondents.

Considering that the assignments of errors are interrelated, this Court shall delve into and
resolve them simultaneously.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Admittedly, the issues in the case at bar are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari.
However, the rule admits of some exceptions, such as a case where the findings of facts
of the trial court are substantially different from those of the appellate court, and the
resolution of such issues are determinative of the outcome of the petition. [20]

The petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in discarding
the factual findings of the trial court. Contrary to the disquisitions of the appellate court,
the petitioners assert that the inconsistencies between the testimonies of Rojas and Lui
are peripheral. Lui did not conduct any search in the second floor of the respondent’s
house and even if he did so, respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against
unreasonable search when she allowed the petitioners to enter. According to the
petitioners, the respondents failed to prove that they forced their way into the house of the
respondents, and that the facts and circumstances which the appellate court found the trial
court to have overlooked are not, in fact, substantial enough to warrant a reversal of the
factual findings of the court a quo. According to the petitioners, the appellate court failed
to discern that the action filed by the respondents with the trial court was merely a
leverage to the charge of robbery against Lariosa, the respondents’ nephew.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals gave credence and full probative weight to the
evidence of the respondents. It stated in its decision that the trial court erred in giving
credence and probative weight to the testimonies of the petitioners (the appellants
therein). Moreover, the appellate court found that the trial court had overlooked facts and
circumstances of substance, which, if considered, would have altered the court’s decision.
The appellate court gave weight to the findings of the trial court in Criminal Case No.
17,136,88.[21]

We agree with the Court of Appeals.

The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn
and with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the
house of the respondents. They proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano
was. Over her vehement protests, and because of petitioner Lui’s warning that she might
be harmed, respondent Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his
cohorts to the second floor of their house. The foregoing was testified to by respondent
Paulina Matillano, thus:

ATTY. SUARIO:
Q Mrs. Matillano, do you know the person of Eli Lui?
A I know him.
Q Why do you know Eli Lui?
A Because he is from Bansalan.
Q On November 6, 1988, where were you, Mrs. Matillano?
A I was in our house.
Q At about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, did you notice any
unusual incident that took place in your house?
A There was.
Q What incident was that, Mrs. Matillano?
A There were five (5) persons who suddenly went inside our house.
Q Where did they enter?
A They entered through the kitchen.
Q Now, where were you when they entered suddenly in your house?
A I was in our sala.
Q Now, what did you do when you saw these five (5) persons entered (sic) your house?
A I was afraid.
Q Aside from fear, what did you do?
A One of them suddenly said, “Mrs., we are authorities.”
ATTY. TAN:
Not responsive to the question, Your Honor.
ATTY. SUARIO:
She is responding the question because my question is, “Aside from fear, what did you
do?” and according to this witness, she was not able to do anything because one of
those who entered…(not continued)
COURT:
I think the answer is not responsive. Just reform the question.
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q What did these persons do when they entered your house?
A One of them said, “Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something from your
house."
Q Do you know who this person was, this person who was talking that they were persons
in authority?
A That person when he first went to our house, I do not know him yet, but I know (sic)
him later to be Leo Rojas.
Q Why do you know him later to be Leo Rojas?
A When the case was already being tried, he introduced himself as Leo Rojas.
Q What was Leo Rojas wearing at that time?
A He was in civilian clothes.
Q Aside from Leo Rojas, who were the other persons who entered your house?
A Aside from the two (2) persons whom I do not know, my nephew was also with them
in the name of Elinito Lariosa.
Q Who else, Mrs. Matillano?
A Eli Lui.
…
ATTY. SUARIO:
At least, may we ask, Your Honor, that the word “manghilabot” be incorporated.
COURT:
So, the word is “interfering” or “meddling.” You record the word “manghilabot.”
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q When you said “manghilabot,” what do you mean, Mrs. Matillano?
A Yes, because they said that they are taking some of our things and I said why are they
doing that (manghilabot)?
Q When you said those remarks, what else happened?
A It was Eli Lui who answered, “Mrs., do not answer anymore because something might
happen.” (Basig madisgrasya).
ATTY. SUARIO:
“Madisgrasya,” Your Honor, is more than something.
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q When you heard those words from Eli Lui, what else transpired?
A He said, “All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something.” And I
even told him that we should wait for my husband but they did not agree because they
said they are in a hurry.
Q And after that, what else happened?
A I accompanied him upstairs.
You accompanied him upstairs, who are you referring to that you accompanied
Q
upstairs.
A Eli Lui and his other two (2) companions.
Q These two (2) companions whom you said you do not know their names?
A Yes, sir.[22]
…
ATTY. TAN:
Q Now, you said on November 6, 1988, five (5) men suddenly entered your house. When
you said suddenly, will you please describe how did they enter the house?
A They passed through the kitchen and suddenly appeared inside the house.
Q You mean to say that they did not knock at the door?
A They did not.
Q Who first entered the house among the five (5)?
A What I first saw was that they immediately converged in the sala and whom I
recognized was Eli Lui and my nephew who was in handcuffs.
Q Was your door opened at that time?
A It was closed but it was not locked. It can be kicked open.
Q But you can open it without kicking the door?
 A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you said that you were afraid, why were you afraid?
A Why would you not be afraid when they were armed?
Q Who were armed among the five (5)?
A All of them except the one who was in handcuffs.
Q You are very sure of that?
A I am very sure.[23]

Respondent Paulina Matillano, likewise, testified that petitioner Lui and his cohorts took
her personal things, and those of her family’s, from the second floor of the house:

Q Now, while you and Eli Lui with two (2) other companions were upstairs, what
happened upstairs?
A Upon reaching upstairs, they immediately rolled the two (2) floor mats, the pair of
leather shoes, 2 pairs of pants, two (2) polo-shirts. They also let me open the chest and
when it was already open they rummaged through it and they got my old Bulova watch,
my necklace, my ring and a coinsita, old gold coins.
Q When you said “coinsita,” what is “coinsita”?
A Old coins.
Q After taking all of these things, what else happened?
A They went downstairs.[24]
…
Q Now, you mentioned in this affidavit that several properties were taken from your
house, do you confirm that there were two (2) polo-shirts that were taken?
A Yes.
Q And there were also two (2) floor mats?
A Yes, that is true.
Q One (1) Bulova wristwatch?
A Yes.
Q One (1) necklace?
A Yes.
Q Two (2) pairs of lady (sic) shoes?
A Yes.
Q Two (2) pairs of pants?
A Yes.
Q One (1) ring?
A Yes.
Q Who owns these two (2) pairs of lady’s (sic) shoes?
A That was mine.
Q What were the color of the shoes?
A Black and dirty white (referring to the color of the rostrum).
Q Where did you buy that shoes?
A In Davao City.
Q What store in Davao City?
A NCCC.
Q What particular date when you bought that shoes?
A I think it was in the month of November.
Q 1988?
A 1988.
Q And who owns these two (2) polo-shirts?
A My children.
Q What are the names of your children?
A Allan and Danilo.
Q Where is Allan residing?
A During the incident, Allan was still schooling in Tacloban.
Q So, you mean to say, on November 6, 1988, he was no longer residing in Bansalan?
A No more.
Q How about Danilo, where was he residing in November 6, 1988?
A He was living in Sta. Cruz.
Q He has a family of his own at Sta. Cruz?
A He was still single then.
Q But he was residing in Sta. Cruz?
A Yes.
Q How about these two (2) pairs of pants, who owns these pants?
A My children also.
Q You are referring to Allan and Danilo?
A No, because I still have so many children.
Q So, who owns these two (2) pants?
A Also my children, Eulogio, Jr. and Allan.
Q Now, Eulogio, Jr. where is (sic) he residing on November 6, 1988?
A In our house.
Q How about these two (2) t-shirts?
A Also owned by my children.
Q Are you referring to Allan and Danilo?
A They used to wear that.
Q How come that Allan has a polo-shirt in your house when you said he was then
residing in Tacloban?
ATTY. SUARIO:
May we manifest, Your Honor, that he was schooling in Tacloban.
COURT:
All right.
A They used to have a vacation during December and March and usually they left some
of their clothes inside our aparador.
Q These polo shirts were still new?
A Already used.
Q How about the pants?
A The other one is already used and the other one is new.
Q How about the floor mats?
A That is mine.
Q Now, you claimed that these clothes were taken from the cabinet or aparador, is that
correct?
A Yes, that is true.
 Q Inside your aparador, how many pieces of clothes were stored therein?
A Many.
Q Could you say one (1) dozen?
A It cannot be counted.
Q Could you say three (3) dozens?
A It is really full of dress.
Q Would you say it is more than three (3) dozens?
A More.
Q And these more than three (3) dozens consists of polo shirts, t-shirts and pants?
A Yes.
Q And inspite (sic) the fact that there were more than three (3) dozens of clothes, pants,
polo shirts and t-shirts only these two (2) pants, two (2) polo shirts and two (2) t-shirts
w ere taken?
A Only those things because they only selected the ones which were still usable the good
ones.
Q Now, you mentioned also in your affidavit that the group also searched your trunk?
A I was ordered to open the trunk.
Q Who particularly ordered you to open the trunk?
A Eli Lui.[25]

The respondents immediately reported the matter to the Office of the Barangay
Captain[26] and filed a complaint against petitioner Lui and his cohorts.[27]

The petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano allowed them and their cohorts
inside the house and voluntarily gave their personal belongings is belied by the unshaken
testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano, corroborated by Erlinda Clarin.

The petitioners’ attempt to project themselves to have acted with civility and courtesy to
respondent Paulina Matillano is implausible, taking into account petitioner Lui’s state of
mind before he and petitioner Rojas and their cohorts left the Metrodiscom Headquarters
in Davao City, and proceeded to the house of the respondents in Bansalan. Before they
left Davao City, Lui sadistically mauled Lariosa with the acquiescence of the police
authorities, and forced him to give an uncounselled extrajudicial confession. This was the
finding of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88:
Despite being mauled by Eli Lui and drowned in a toilet bowl, accused denied having
anything to do with the lost money of the complainant. Later, he was turned over to the
police for investigation and there without affording accused with his right to counsel, he
was interrogated orally and was forced to admit that out of the money he stole, he bought
items which the police later recovered at Bansalan. They also returned the accused to the
complainant’s establishment and forced to do re-enactment of the act of robbery, without
accused again afforded the right to counsel. Pictures were taken during the re-enactment
while accused was handcuffed, as shown in the pictures taken by the police.

Finally, the accused was forced to admit and sign his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit A),
no longer able to bear the pain of the mauling to him by Eli Lui, who has the temerity of
maltreating the accused even in the presence of the guards in the jail and seriously
threatening accused to admit ownership of the recovered items at Bansalan and at New
Matina, SIR, Davao City, otherwise he will be salvaged, along with the serious
threatening words of accused’s companion in the jail, that if he will refuse to sign his
alleged confession, he will be salvaged as directed by Eli Lui with the police.

Indeed, in the records, it can be deduced with sufficient basis, that Eli Lui seems to have
an open hand in the prosecution of the accused. He was the one who called the police to
arrest him, even without a warrant of arrest. Before his statement was obtained,
policeman relied on him in the investigation and the filing of proper charges against
accused. They rode in a car of Eli Lui, in taking accused from the Metrodiscom to the
establishment of complainant during the re-enactment in going to Bansalan, to recover
the items allegedly bought by accused out of the money allegedly stolen; all of these
incidents shows the police despite justification, that they do not have enough facilities,
gone astray in conducting an impartial investigation, by submitting to any possible
indiscretion of Eli Lui of making the scale of justice bend in his favor, by manifesting
control over the police power of investigation highly and seriously pre-judicial to the
rights, and interests of the accused.[28]
If petitioner Lui was so brazen as to have mauled Lariosa in the presence of police
authorities, he would not have cared a whit in barging into the respondents’ house with
petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City, and his cohorts, and divesting the
respondents of their belongings. The petitioners and their cohorts wanted to insure that
their caper would succeed. Hence, they did not coordinate with the Bansalan Police
Station when they went to the respondents’ house with their intention to divest them of
their belongings.

Petitioner Rojas’ reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by

Sergeant Alberto Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely
tasked in the said order to “follow up a theft case within the area of responsibility of the
Metrodiscom, Davao City.” The petitioner was not authorized, under the said order, to
commit or tolerate the commission of a crime, such as violation of domicile as defined in
Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
ART. 128. Violation of domicile— The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized
by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search
papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or,
having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises,
shall refuse to do so.

If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not constituting
evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender,
the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts to the second
floor of the respondents’ house and himself conduct a search therein, he allowed them to
search the premises without a warrant. The petitioners and their cohorts were not
authorized to conduct a search in the house of the respondents, much less divest the latter
of their personal belongings. As a police officer, it was petitioner Rojas’ duty to prevent
the commission of crimes in his presence, and to arrest the persons committing such
crimes.

The trial court rejected the testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano on the following
grounds: (a) she had known petitioner Lui for ten years as a businessman doing business
in Bansalan; (b) the occupants of the respondents’ house when the petitioners and their
cohorts arrived were all women; (c) the respondents failed to report the incident to the
Bansalan police authorities; and, (d) the provincial prosecutor’s resolution recommending
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 880-B for robbery against the petitioners, which was
sustained by the Secretary of Justice, and the ruling of the National Police Commission
exonerating petitioner Rojas from any liability.

We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in overruling the trial court.

First. Respondent Paulina Matillano testified that petitioner Lui did not stay permanently
in Bansalan. He went there only to collect money from a certain Matura and other
businessmen.[29] She also testified that there were many cases against the petitioner, one
of which was for arson. The case was dismissed, but one of her neighbors was rendered
missing.[30] If the petitioner, a businessman for ten years or so, had no qualms in torturing
Lariosa under the very noses of police officers, he would, likewise, have no qualms about
intimidating respondent Paulina Matillano and divesting her of her personal belongings.
It must be stressed that petitioner Lui was in the company of petitioner Rojas, a police
officer from Davao City.

Second. The petitioners and their cohorts had no foreknowledge that the occupants of the
respondents’ house were all women. They must have believed that there were male
occupants; hence, barged into the house with drawn guns.

Third. As shown clearly in respondent Paulina Matillano’s sworn statement before the
Bansalan Police Station, she declared that the petitioners were armed with guns. They
threatened her life and, without any search warrant therefor, divested her and her family
of their personal belongings against their will.[31]

Fourth. In her complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain, respondent Paulina
Matillano declared that the petitioners entered their house, that petitioner Lui pointed a
gun at her, and that the petitioners and their cohorts searched the house and carted away
their personal belongings.[32] That the report made before the Barangay Captain and
petitioner Paulina Matillano’s sworn statement are not as complete as her testimony
before the trial court is understandable. Affidavits are usually taken ex parte and are
almost always incomplete and inaccurate, but they do not detract from the credibility of
the witness.[33] An entry in the police blotter is usually incomplete and inaccurate for want
of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the victim may be unable to recall
the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion
of his memory, and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. [34] The
same principle applies to entries in the barangay blotter.

Fifth. As correctly held by the trial court, the findings of administrative and quasi-
administrative agencies are not binding on the courts. In the present case, the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, as affirmed by the Secretary of Justice,[35] found no probable
cause for robbery against the petitioners because they had no intent to rob, but merely to
recover the properties from the house of the respondents which petitioner Lui perceived
to have been acquired by Lariosa with money stolen from his uncle, Ben. [36] The decision
of the National Police Commission absolving petitioner Rojas of grave misconduct was
anchored on its finding that the petitioner was merely performing his duty as ordered by
his superior officer.[37] It was inevitable for the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint
for violation of domicile filed against petitioner Rojas in I.S. No. 91-1488 because the
crime of violation of domicile was committed in Bansalan and not in Davao City.[38] In
contrast, the Commission on Human Rights recommended the indictment of petitioner
Lui for unlawful arrest and of petitioner Rojas for violation of domicile.[39]

Sixth. Under Articles 19 and 32, in relation to Article 21 of the New Civil Code, the
dismissal of the complaint against the petitioners by the Provincial and City Prosecutors,
the Municipal Trial Court and the National Police Commission are of no relevance to the
civil complaint for damages filed by the respondents against the petitioners. The action of
the respondents against the petitioners may still proceed despite the dismissal of the
criminal and administrative actions against them.

The petitioners’ contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against
unreasonable search and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable.” This provision protects not only those who appear to be
innocent but also those who appear to be guilty, who must nevertheless be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.[40] The general rule is that a search and seizure must
be carried through or with judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure becomes
unconstitutional within the context of the constitutional provision[41] because a
warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right. Peace officers who effect a
warrantless search cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions. [42]

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. [43] There
must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to
constitute a waiver of a constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that
the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right.[44] The waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
The Court indulges every reasonable presumption against any waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights.[45] The fact that the aggrieved person did not object to the entry into
her house by the police officers does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein.[46] A peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. [47]

In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure
by consenting thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina
Matillano did not object to the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their
personal properties. However, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied
waiver of her right against unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed
with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio
Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts
conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional
right.

Furthermore, the petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano voluntarily handed
over the articles to petitioner Lui is incredible. There is no evidence that there was
foreknowledge on the part of the petitioners of the articles they wanted to retrieve from
the respondents’ house. Even if respondent Paulina Matillano did hand over the articles to
the petitioner, it was only because the petitioner and his cohorts had earlier threatened
and intimidated her into doing so.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are liable to the
respondents for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts respectively awarded by it.
Petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City, conspired with petitioner Lui and, with
drawn guns, gained entry into the respondents’ house, and threatened and intimidated
respondent Paulina Matillano. Although petitioner Rojas did not himself conduct the
search, he assented thereto by allowing petitioner Lui and his cohorts to go up to the
second floor and divest the respondents of their belongings. The petitioners even left
together after the incident.

In MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[48] we had the occasion to state:
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation
of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:
“ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.

“xxx
“(9) the rights to be secure in one’s persons, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

“xxx
“The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudged.”

“ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

“xxx
“(6) Illegal search;

“(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

“Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or
employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.”

xxx

“The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite
would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of
individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object
of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United
States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.” (emphasis supplied)

In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, the Court En Banc explained the liability of
persons indirectly responsible, viz:

“[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person ‘directly or indirectly’ responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.

xxx
“While it would certainly be too naïve to expect that violators of human rights would
easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made
clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

xxx

[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated ‘directly’ should be
held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions
those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violations.” (emphasis supplied)

Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly
granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in
transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum
Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting
supplies. As correctly observed by respondent court:

“Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees’

(respondents’) merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition
against appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant
(petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from
those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation’s instance that the PC
soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should
answer the trial court’s query— posed in its decision now under consideration – as to
why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant
(petitioner) corporation.”

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman
did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing by
and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers
themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the
goods unreasonable seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to
surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair
competition.[49]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Cancio
C. Garcia and Teodoro P. Regino, concurring.
[2]
 Penned by Judge Rodolfo A. Escovilla.
[3]
 Exhibit “A.”
[4]
 Exhibit “3.”
[5]
 Exhibit “B.”
[6]
 Exhibit “1.”
[7]
 Exhibit “E.”
[8]
 Exhibit “K.”
[9]
 Exhibit “K-25.”
[10]
 Exhibit “L.”
[11]
 Exhibit “10.”
[12]
 Exhibit “18.”
[13]
 Exhibit “N.”
[14]
 Records, pp. 1-3.
[15]
Id. at 3.
[16]
Id. at 12-13.
[17]
 CA Rollo, p. 20.
[18]
 Rollo, p. 30.
[19]
Id. at 5.
[20]
 Heirs of Tan Eng Kee vs. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 740 (2000).
[21]
 Rollo, pp. 24-27.
[22]
 TSN, 23 September 1991, pp. 5-10.
[23]
Id. at 20-21.
[24]
Id. at 10-11.
[25]
 TSN, 3 December 1991, pp. 9-12.
[26]
 Exibit “A.”
[27]
 Exhibit “B.”
[28]
 Exhibit “K.”
[29]
 TSN, 23 September 1991, p. 16.
[30]
Id. at 20.
[31]
 Exhibit “4.”
[32]
 Exhibit “B.”
[33]
 People vs. Padilla, 213 SCRA 631 (1992).
[34]
 People vs. Tabao, 240 SCRA 758 (1995).
[35]
 Exhibit “13.”
[36]
 Exhibit “10.”
[37]
 Exhibit “18.”
[38]
 Exhibit “20.”
[39]
 Exhibit “H.”
[40]
 MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 227 (1994)
[41]
 People vs. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994).
[42]
 People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., 360 SCRA 690 (2001).
[43]
 Ibid.
[44]
 Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 89 (1938).
[45]
 People vs. Compacion, 361 SCRA 540 (2001).
[46]
 Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770 (1948).
[47]
 Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, supra; People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., supra.
[48]
 Supra.
[49]
Id. at 234-236.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 104604, October 06, 1995 ]
NARCISO O. JAO AND BERNARDO M. EMPEYNADO, PETITIONERS, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS; COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS; COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS, PORT OF MANILA; COL. SINDULFO R. SEBASTIAN,
DIRECTOR, ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY SERVICES, BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS; AND MAJ. JAIME MAGLIPON, CHIEF, OPERATIONS AND
INTELLIGENCE STAFF, ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY SERVICES,
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 111223]

NARCISO O. JAO AND BERNARDO M. EMPEYNADO, PETITIONERS, VS.

THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, AND
SINDULFO SEBASTIAN, JAIME MAGLIPON; JOSE YUCHONGCO;
RICARDO CORONADO; VICTOR BARROS; DENNIS BANTIGUE; ROY
LARA; BENJAMIN SANTOS; RODOLFO GONDA; ADONIS REJOSO;
DANIEL PENAS; NICANOR BONES; ABUNDIO JUMAMOY; ARTEMIO
CASTILLO; ANDRESITO ABAYON; RUBEN TAGUBA; JAIME JAVIER;
HERBERT DOLLANO, ALL WITH THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS; JOVY
GUTIERREZ OF THE MAKATI POLICE, AND ‘JOHN DOES,’
 RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

G.R. No. 104604 is a petition for certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, the
dispositive portion of which states:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The orders issued by the respondent
judge dated November 20, 1990, December 10, 1990, January 3, 1991 and all subsequent
orders in the Civil Case No. 90-2382 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati are SET
ASIDE. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the respondent judge is hereby enjoined
from proceeding with Civil Case No. 90-2382 and further, Case No. 90-2382 is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 111223 is a petition for certiorari of the resolution of the

Ombudsman[2] dismissing the case filed before it by herein petitioner.

The above-docketed cases were consolidated per resolution of the Court on August 26,
1993, as the facts in both cases were the same.

These facts are the following:

On August 10, 1990, the Office of the Director, Enforcement and Security Services
(ESS), Bureau of Customs, received information regarding the presence of allegedly
untaxed vehicles and parts in the premises owned by a certain Pat Hao located along
Quirino Avenue, Paranaque and Honduras St., Makati.  After conducting a surveillance
of the two places, respondent Major Jaime Maglipon, Chief of Operations and
Intelligence of the ESS, recommended the issuance of warrants of seizure and detention
against the articles stored in the premises.

On August 13, 1990, District Collector of Customs Titus Villanueva issued the warrants
of seizure and detention.

On the same date, respondent Maglipon coordinated with the local police substations to
assist them in the execution of the respective warrants of seizure and detention. 
Thereafter, the team searched the two premises.

In Makati, they were barred from entering the place, but some members of the team were
able to force themselves inside.  They were able to inspect the premises and noted that
some articles were present which were not included in the list contained in the warrant. 
Hence, on August 15, 1990, amended warrants of seizure and detention were issued by
Villanueva.

On August 25, 1990, customs personnel started hauling the articles pursuant to the
amended warrants. This prompted petitioners Narciso Jao and Bernardo Empeynado to
file a case for Injunction and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-2382 with prayer
for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati Branch 56 on August 27, 1990 against respondents.  On the same date, the trial
court issued a Temporary Restraining Order.

On September 7, 1990, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint,
claiming that it was the Bureau of Customs that had exclusive jurisdiction over it.

On November 20, 1990, the trial court denied respondents' motion to dismiss.

On November 29, 1990, petitioners' application for preliminary prohibitory and

mandatory injunction was granted conditioned upon the filing of a one million peso bond.

The Court also prohibited respondents from seizing, detaining, transporting and selling at
public auction petitioners' vehicles, spare parts, accessories and other properties located
at No. 2663 Honduras St., San Isidro, Makati and at No. 240 Quirino Avenue, Tambo,
Paranaque, Metro Manila.  Respondents were further prohibited from disturbing
petitioners' constitutional and proprietary rights over their properties located at the
aforesaid premises.  Lastly, respondents were ordered to return the seized items and to
render an accounting and inventory thereof.

On December 13, 1990, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration based on the
following grounds:

a)   the lower court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, it has
no recourse but to dismiss the same; and

(b)  the lower court had no legal authority to issue an injunction therein.

On January 3, 1991 the motion for reconsideration was denied.  Respondents then went to
the Court of Appeals on the ground that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying their motion to dismiss and in granting petitioners' application for preliminary
injunction. They argued that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings, such jurisdiction being exclusively vested in the Bureau of
Customs.
The Court of Appeals set aside the questioned orders of the trial court and enjoined it
from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 90-2382.  The appellate court also dismissed
the said civil case.

On May 2, 1992, petitioners filed a petition with this Court to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 104604.

As regards G.R. No. 111223, petitioners filed criminal charges against respondents, other
officers and employees of the Bureau of Customs and members of the Makati Police
before the Office of the Ombudsman for Robbery, Violation of Domicile and Violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-90-2027.

Respondent Ombudsman summarized the case before it as follows:

"This is an affidavit-complaint filed by the complainants against the respondents, Officers

and Employees of the Bureau of Customs and members of the Makati Police allegedly
for violation of Domicile and Robbery defined and penalized under Articles 128, 293 and
294 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of R.A. 3019 committed as follows, to
wit:

That on August 11, 1990, after receiving intelligence information of the presence of
smuggled goods, some of the respondents headed by Jaime Maglipon posed themselves
as Meralco inspectors and entered complainants' stockyards and residence located at 2663
Honduras Street, Makati, Metro Manila and at 240 Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Paranaque
for the purpose of searching smuggled goods found therein without the consent of the
owner thereof;

That after the search, respondents on August 13, 1990 up to August 25, 1990, this time
clothed with a Warrant of Seizure and Detention, with the aid of the Makati Police and
several heavily armed men entered complainants stockyard located at 2663 Honduras St.,
Makati, Metro Manila, and pulled out therefrom several machineries and truck spare parts
without issuing the corresponding receipts to the complainants to cover all the items
taken.

Respondents claimed in their consolidated and verified comment that they are not liable
for violation of domicile because the places entered and searched by them appear not to
be the residences of the complainants but only their warehouses.  As proof of this
allegation, the respondents presented the pictures of said warehouses, which are attached
to their comment as Annexes "6", "6-A" to "6-C" and the Sheriff's return likewise
attached to their verified comments as Annex "7". According to the respondents, a charge
for violation of domicile may apply only if the place entered into against the will of the
owner is used exclusively for dwelling.  In the case at bar, the place entered into was used
more of a warehouse than a dwelling place.

Further respondents also claimed not liable for robbery (sic) because the complainants
appear not to be the owners of the properties taken. Moreover, the respondents claimed
that the taking is lawful because the same proceeded from a warrant of Seizures and
Detention; there was no violence or intimidation of person committed and that there was
no intent to gain on the part of the respondents, the purpose of the seizure of the subject
goods being to collect customs duties and taxes due the government.

Lastly, the respondents disclaimed liability for a violation of R.A. 3019 because they
deny having demanded from the complainants the sum of P100,000.00.  Instead
according to the respondents, it was the complainants who offered them P70,000.00 to
delay the hauling of the seized goods as attested to in the joint affidavit of CPSGT,
Ricardo Coronado and Dennis Bantequi."

A preliminary investigation was conducted and on May 31, 1991, another hearing was
held to give the parties a chance to submit further evidence to support their respective
claims.

On March 15, 1993 respondent Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending that the
case be dismissed for lack of merit.

On May 17, 1993, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of said resolution, but the
same was denied on July 8, 1993.

Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 111223, which was filed on August 16, 1993.

In G.R. No. 111223, petitioners claim that respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the case and in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

They allege that respondent Ombudsman ignored evidence incriminatory to the raiders;
that the receipts did not tally with petitioners' receipts nor with the Commission on
Audit's inventory; that the respondents are guilty of robbery and of violating petitioners'
constitutional right against violation of domicile.  For these reasons, petitioners pray that
the Ombudsman's resolution be reversed and that the Court direct the Ombudsman to
cause the filing of criminal charges as may be warranted against respondents.

We find the petition in G.R. No. 111223 devoid of merit.

The Court, recognizing the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and for reasons of practicality, declared, in
an En Banc resolution dated August 30, 1993, issued in G.R. Nos. 103446-47[3] that the
Court will not interfere nor pass upon findings of public respondent Ombudsman to avoid
its being hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, and that it will not review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.  The dismissal by the Ombudsman of petitioners'
complaint, therefore, stands.

We will now discuss G.R. No. 104604.

Petitioners contend:  (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the Collector
of Customs could no longer order the seizure for the second time of items previously
seized and released after amnesty payments of duties and taxes; (2) that the Bureau of
Customs has lost jurisdiction to order the seizure of the items because the importation had
ceased; (3) that the seizure of the items deprived the petitioners of their properties
without due process of law; and (4) that there is no need to exhaust administrative
remedies.

We find no merit in petitioners' contentions.

There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass
upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the
Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings [4] The
Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of
dutiable goods.  The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over
such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.[5]

It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court of
Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal
objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings.  Thus, actions of the Collector
of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is
subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there
to the Court of Appeals.

The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is
anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive,
not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to
render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State,
which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.
[6]

Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven,
we have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction
thereon.

"Respondents assert that respondent Judge could entertain the replevin suit as the seizure
is illegal, allegedly because the warrant issued is invalid and the seizing officer likewise
was devoid of authority. This is to lose sight of the distinction between the existence of
the power and the regularity of the proceeding taken under it.  The governmental agency
concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority.  Even if it be
assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be
correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave
abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction.  It does not mean however
that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in
the light of the decisions the law has not seen fit to do so."[7]

The allegations of petitioners regarding the propriety of the seizure should properly be
ventilated before the Collector of Customs.  We have had occasion to declare:

"The Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal

expressly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of such
proceedings without any interference from the Court of First Instance.  (Auyong Hian v.
Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 19 SCRA 10).  The Collector of Customs of Sual-Dagupan
in Seizure Identification No. 14-F-72 constituted itself as a tribunal to hear and determine
among other things, the question of whether or not the M/V Lucky Star I was seized
within the territorial waters of the Philippines.  If the private respondents believe that the
seizure was made outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, it should raise the
same as a defense before the Collector of Customs and if not satisfied, follow the correct
appellate procedures.  A separate action before the Court of First Instance is not the
remedy."[8]

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104604 and in G.R. No. 111223 are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, JJ., on official leave.

[1]
 G.R. No. 104604, Rollo p. 21, Torres, ponente, Francisco and Santiago, JJ. concurring.
[2]
 G.R. No. 111223, Rollo, p. 91.
[3]
 Ocampo v. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 725 (1993).
[4]
 Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar, 177 SCRA (1989).
[5]
 General Travel Service v. David, G.R. No. L-19259, September 23, 1966, 18 SCRA
59; Pacis v. Averia, G.R. No. L-22526, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 907; De
Joya v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-24037, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 893; Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya,
G.R. No. L-29043, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381; Collector of Customs v. Torres,
G.R. No. L-22977, May 31, 1972, 45 SCRA 272; Pacis v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-24068,
April 23, 1974, 56 SCRA 583; Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-33146,
May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 264; Republic v. Bocar, G.R. No. L-35260, September 4, 1979,
93 SCRA 78; De la Fuente v. De Veyra, G.R. No. L-35385, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA
451.
[6]
 Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar, supra.
[7]
 Ponce Enrile v. Venuya, supra.
[8]
 De la Fuente v. de Veyra, supra.