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Debris flow disaster at Larcha, upper Bhotekoshi Valley, central Nepal

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Blackwell Science, LtdOxford, UKIARThe Island Arc1038-48712005 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty LtdDecember 2005144410423Thematic Article Larcha debris flow disaster in the Nepal HimalayaD. P. Adhikari and S. Koshimizu

The Island Arc (2005) 14, 410–423

Thematic Article
Debris flow disaster at Larcha, upper Bhotekoshi Valley, central Nepal
DANDA PANI ADHIKARI,1,2,* AND SATOSHI KOSHIMIZU2
1
Department of Geology, Tri-Chandra Campus, Tribhuvan University, PO Box 13644, Kathmandu, Nepal
(email: adhikaridpnpl@yahoo.com) and 2Yamanashi Institute of Environmental Sciences, 5597-1, Kenmarubi,
Kamiyoshida, Fujiyoshida, Yamanashi 403-0005, Japan

Abstract Damage, destruction and casualties related to landslide and debris flow are
common phenomena in the Himalaya, especially during the summer monsoon. This fact
was tragically illustrated on 22 July 1996, when Larcha, situated at the 109-km mark of
the Arniko Highway, upper Bhotekoshi Valley, central Nepal, experienced a catastrophic
debris flow powered by the Bhairab Kunda Stream. Of the 22 houses in Larcha, 16 were
swept away, two were partially damaged and 54 people were killed in a matter of a few
minutes. The event attracted attention when media linked it to a glacial lake outburst flood
as a result of the fact that the source of the stream is a glacial lake. To understand the
cause, initiation mechanism and deposition process, the basin area was studied from
geological, geomorphologic and engineering geological points of view and the role of
precipitation was evaluated. A combination of rainfall, runoff from cliff faces and stream
undercutting triggered failure of the bedrock and colluvium, both on the dip and counter-
dip slopes, 500 m upstream from the highway. The landslide debris dammed the channel,
which was eventually breached, and deposited approximately 104 000 m3 of coarse debris,
dominated by the metasediments of the Lesser Himalayan origin, and overwhelmed the
village of Larcha. The debris deposit was studied for clast size, composition, texture and
dimensions. Lack of sorting and the presence of abundant silt and clay in the source area
helped in the initiation of debris flow. The abundance of the Lesser Himalayan metasedi-
ment clasts together with the absence of debris traces upstream from the landslide site
ruled out the possibility of a glacial lake outburst flood. The disaster was a result of landslide
damming triggered by precipitation and stream undercutting and sudden bursting.

Key words: Arniko Highway, colluvium, debris flow, glacial lake outburst flood, Higher
Himalaya, Larcha, Lesser Himalaya, monsoon, upper Bhotekoshi Valley.

INTRODUCTION moisture-laden, tropical air from the Indian Ocean

from June to September, and accounts for 70–93%
Nepal occupies the central one-third part of the of its annual precipitation (Upreti 2001).
Himalayan Arc. Physiographically, 83% of its ter- In geotectonic terms, the Indian Plate is moving
ritory is mountainous terrain and the remaining northward against the more stable Tibetan block
17% lies in the alluvial plain of the Gangetic Basin at an average rate of approximately 5 cm/year even
in the south. The altitude within the 130–255-km- after the collision between the Indian and the Eur-
wide country (Fig. 1) varies between 69 and asian plates sometime during 55–40 Ma (Molnar &
8848 m, and gives rise to steep and rugged topo- Tapponnier 1975). The continued push related to
graphy as well as extreme relief. Nepal lies in the such movement has made the Himalaya a belt of
south Asian summer monsoon regime, which is both seismicity and uplift; the present uplift rate
characterized by a strong northwesterly flow of is a few mm to nearly 1 cm/year (Jackson & Bilham
1994). High seismicity, steep and unstable slopes,
*Correspondence. rugged terrain, active geodynamic processes and
Received 11 January 2005; accepted for publication 29 August 2005. intense monsoon rains make the Himalaya an
© 2005 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd active and fragile mountain range. Landslides,
 Larcha debris flow disaster in the Nepal Himalaya 411
Fig. 1 Location of the study area. Star
in the index map shows location of
Kodari, a border town near the Nepal–
China border. Larcha is at the 109-km
mark of the Arniko Highway, which links
Nepal and China.
debris flows, monsoon floods, landslide dam fail-
ures, glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF) and
earthquakes are the main types of natural hazards
in the Himalaya. During the monsoon season,
water-induced disasters wipe out villages, wash out
roads, bridges, canals and hydropower plants, and
cause damage to hectares of valuable agricultural
land. Such disasters cause substantial economic
losses and human casualties (> 300 deaths each
year) in the Nepal Himalaya alone (International
Center for Integrated Mountain Development,
Kathmandu, unpubl. data, 2000).
Landslide and debris flow disasters are common
phenomena in the upper Bhotekoshi Valley, espe-
cially during the monsoon period. On 22 July 1996,
Larcha experienced an unprecedented channelized
debris flow down the valley of the Bhairab Kunda
Stream (BKS). No year in the Bhotekoshi Valley
passes without several landslide and debris flow
events, and there is anecdotal evidence from the
experience of locally based people, including the
first author of the present paper, that there has
been an increase in the number of such disasters
over the past few decades. However, there has been
very little systematic documentation of these events
and the previous natural history is not known.
Debris flows occur when masses of poorly sorted
sediment, agitated and saturated with water, move
down a slope. Debris flows can originate by various
means (Rodine & Johnson 1976; Ikeya 1981; Wilson
& Wieczorek 1995), but mobilization from land-
slides is the predominate cause (Johnson 1984;
Iverson 2000). Iverson et al. (1997) explained three
processes that make mobilization of landslides to
debris flow easier: (i) widespread Coulomb failure
within a sloping soil, rock or sediment mass; (ii)
partial or complete liquefaction of the mass by high
pore fluid pressures; and (iii) conversion of landslide
translation energy to internal vibration energy.
The significance of the 1996 event was its large
death toll and its occurrence at a major highway,
and more importantly, the publicizing of the event
as a possible GLOF. The main source of the BKS
is a glacial lake, which, as well as most of the catch-
ment area, is generally invisible and inaccessible
during the monsoon period. The speculation was
understandable, because, throughout the Nepal
Himalaya and neighboring mountain ranges,
GLOF events have occurred in geological, histori-
cal and recent times (Vuichard & Zimmerman
1987; Yamada 1998; Mool et al. 2001). Since 1935,
more than 16 GLOF events have been reported in
Nepal, and seven of them occurred between 1977
and 1998, including the 1985 destructive event in
Bhotekoshi Valley, which destroyed a highway
bridge near Larcha.
For a debris flow produced from a basin with
contrasting rock types, clast composition count
could be a reliable proxy for the rapid assessment
of the source of the debris flow. Based on this
assumption, the present study provides a basis for
testing the then widely held concept of GLOF as
the cause of the Larcha debris flow. The process
of debris flow initiation and transport at Larcha,
and present field observations on the role of litho-
logy, geological structures, basin morphometrics,
412 D. P. Adhikari and S. Koshimizu
source area and precipitation were examined. Par-
ticular emphasis is given to the roles played by
source area and precipitation.
LOCATION AND GEODYNAMIC SETTING
Bhotekoshi Valley is named after the Bhotekoshi
River, one of the major rivers flowing across the
central Nepal Himalaya with an origin in Tibet.
Larcha is located in the upper Bhotekoshi Valley
at the 109 km mark on the Arniko Highway
(Fig. 1), which is 5 km south of the Friendship
Bridge at the Nepal–China border at Kodari. The
small settlement of Larcha, which was hit by the
debris flow, is situated along the highway and banks
of the BKS, one of the western tributaries of the
Bhotekoshi River. Geologically, Larcha is almost at
the northernmost edge of the Lesser Himalaya
close to the main central thrust (MCT) zone.
Morphometric characteristics of the Bhairab
Kunda Basin and the BKS are shown in Figures 2
and 3. The BKS originates with the discharge of
the Bhairab Kunda Glacial Lake. It has a mature
drainage network characterized by a nearly
straight fifth-order feeder channel with gradients
in the range 10–24° (Fig. 3), several vertical water-
falls up to 100 m high, and cascades at places in the
lower part of the basin. The climate in the basin
varies from cool-temperate in the lower part to
alpine in the upper part. The Larcha area receives
some winter snow and has an annual rainfall of
more than 3500 mm. In the upper part, glacier and
periglacial processes transport diverse material to
the fluvial network.
The BKS is superimposed on both the Higher
Himalayan (HH) and the Lesser Himalayan (LH)
units (Fig. 4), which are Precambrian–Paleozoic in
age (Stöcklin 1980). The LH and HH rocks occupy
approximately 30 and 70% of the catchment area,
respectively (Fig. 2). The LH rocks consist of
three formations: Benighat Slate (black slate) with
Jhiku carbonate beds, Malekhu Limestone and the
Robang Formation (phyllite with brown quartzite).
The carbonate beds form two waterfalls, WF1 at
500 m and WF2 at 900 m upstream from the con-
fluence with Bhotekoshi River (Fig. 2). In the Lar-
cha area, the bedrock exposures dip 50° northeast,
and the BKS locally follows strike. The MCT zone
is 3 km upstream from the confluence, which is
marked by a change in lithology (Fig. 4) and a
sharp increase in topographic slope, from approx-
imately 15° in the Lesser Himalaya to 24° in the
Higher Himalaya (Fig. 3). One kilometer north
along the Arniko Highway, the MCT zone is
marked by a hot spring. The rocks in the Higher
Himalaya are garnet and kyanite schists, and
augen and banded gneisses.
Fig. 2 Topographic, drainage and
land-use map of the Bhairab Kunda
Stream Basin and location of Larcha in
the basin. Contours are at 100-m inter-
vals. Only representative drainage is
shown. The main central thrust (MCT)
zone is also marked.
 Larcha debris flow disaster in the Nepal Himalaya 413
Generally, the Upper Bhotekoshi Valley is nar-
row, steep and bounded by high rugged mountains.
The area is geologically active with glacially over-
steepened slopes and deep gorges in places, which
probably indicate high uplifting rates. Mountain
slopes are composed either of bare bedrock or,
more commonly, of bedrock mantled by thick to
very thick unconsolidated soil cover. Despite some
controversies, these soils are said to be of moraine-
type materials of the Quaternary period (ITECO
Switzerland 1996). These soil slopes are chroni-
cally unstable and, in places, the whole mountain
appears to be moving down under the influence of
toe cutting by the Bhotekoshi River at the bottom
and back cutting for the maintenance of the Arniko
Highway in the upper slope. Evidence of prehis-
Fig. 3 Longitudinal profile of the Bhairab Kunda Stream. MCT, main
central thrust.
Fig. 4 Geological map of the Sakhuwa–Kodari section (modified and extended from Stöcklin 1980).
toric debris flows dominates the entire valley.
Debris flow source sediments consist of weathered
and jointed bedrock, colluvial wedges, and sedi-
ment stored adjacent to the channel, hillslope and
along the tributary valleys.
Physical weathering of rocks in the BKS basin
is relatively high because of the daily high temper-
ature difference, along with freeze–thaw and frost
action, which promote expansion and contraction
of rocks. The lower mountain slopes in the basin
therefore have abundant landslide source materi-
als, such as extensive talus cones and colluvial fans.
Rockfall chutes are common along the wall of
the cliff, and a mass of loose boulders blankets
the stream embankment below the bedrock cliff.
Because the valley is steep and narrow, a relatively
small volume of material is sufficient to dam the
valley. The lower mountain slopes are sparsely veg-
etated but the upper catchment area has lost its
forest cover because of clearance cutting, and over-
grazing is presumably responsible for further
devegetation after the forests have been cleared.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Field studies were conducted to characterize the
BKS catchment area and debris flow deposit for
the purpose of understanding the cause and
details of the event. For the event description,
the proxy information and accounts of residents
were used; these were recorded at the site
414 D. P. Adhikari and S. Koshimizu
1 week after the event. Beyond that, knowledge
of the disaster site before the event enabled the
determination of the changes in the area as a
result of the event. As it was the monsoon time,
the catchment area was difficult to assess imme-
diately after the disaster. Therefore, the drainage
basin, as far as the upper reaches, was thor-
oughly studied 2 months after the event, follow-
ing the end of the monsoon.
The catchment area was studied from geologi-
cal, geomorphologic and engineering geological
points of view. Catchment features were studied
from the topographic map (HMG Nepal 2000). A
geological map of the catchment and surrounding
area was prepared by modifying and extending an
existing map prepared by Stöcklin (1980). The role
of geological structures and geomorphic features
on slope stability was evaluated for the BKS catch-
ment area. The debris flow was traced to its source
to evaluate the initiation mechanism and source
materials. Slope steepness, soil thickness, compo-
sition, particle size and the dimension of landslides
were studied. At the sites of the slope failure, the
pre-erosion surface was reconstructed by project-
ing the surface profile of the adjacent undisturbed
slope over the eroded surface and the volume of
the debris displaced was estimated.
The debris flow deposit was studied for clast
size, type of materials, texture, deposit length,
width, thickness and slope from the apex to the
distal end of the fan. The thickness of debris was
estimated in reference to the height of the surviv-
ing bridge piers. The total deposition on the sub-
aerial fan was calculated using the field-measured
dimensions. In order to compare the size distribu-
tion of clasts in different parts of the fan, the long
dimension of the largest clasts was measured by
tape at intervals of 1 m along the fan axis. A total
of 390 clasts were measured. To confirm the prov-
enance, the petrographic composition of the
deposit was determined by five clast counts every
3 m along the fan axis, which resulted in a total of
650 counts from 130 points. For lithologic classifi-
cation, six main lithologies were distinguished:
slate, limestone, phyllite, schists, quartzite and
crystalline rocks (augen gneiss and banded
gneiss). The results of the clast size and composi-
tion distributions obtained along the fan axis were
qualitatively compared to the results along the fan
margins to see if there were any large differences.
Attention was also paid to whether delicate edges
were preserved in blocks and boulders. For the
purpose of specification of clast size both in the
source area and the debris deposit, the following
scale was used: block (coarse > 8 m, medium = 8–
4 m, fine = 4–2 m); boulder (coarse = 2–1 m,
fine = 1–0.256 m); cobble (256–64 mm); pebble (64–
4 mm); gravel (4–2 mm); sand (2–0.0625 mm); and
mud (< 0.0625 mm).
Climatic data and recent climate events in the
upper Bhotekoshi Valley and other parts of the
country were obtained from the Department of
Hydrology and Meteorology, and the Ministry of
Home, Nepal. Few Bhotekoshi tributaries have
climatic stations, so estimation of precipitation for
the Larcha area was made in reference to Gumthang
(2000 m a.s.l.), the nearest meteorological station,
approximately 10 km southwest of Larcha.
RESULTS
According to the survivors’ accounts, there was
sustained rain over the preceding few days and
more intense rainfall and higher stream discharge
was observed as night fell on 22 July 1996. It was
dark; there was thunder and lightning; and the
area experienced threatening noises and ground
shaking, twice, at 23.30 hours and approximately
24.00 hours, as if it was stricken by strong earth-
quakes (the first one being more intense than the
second). The debris flow occurred shortly after the
cessation of the sounds and shaking. The sudden
surge of debris overwhelmed the small settlement
and carried much of it into the Bhotekoshi River.
Of the 22 business and residential houses located
at the disaster site, 13 from the sides of the high-
way and three from the terrace were swept away;
two were partially damaged (Fig. 5); and 54 people
were killed in a matter of a few minutes. Those who
were asleep had no time to wake, and those who
were awake never knew what was happening in the
darkness. The debris surge also washed out five
water mills, one temple, a 150-m stretch of road
and a highway bridge over the BKS, and destroyed
crops and agricultural lands. Apart from the loss
of lives and damage to infrastructure and property,
the human suffering was tremendous.
The precipitation record between 1972 and 2002
at Gumthang shows that annual and monsoon (June
to September) rainfall amounts vary between
5526.7 and 2548.7 mm and 4560.2 and 1812.4 mm,
respectively (Fig. 6). Monsoon precipitation in this
record accounts for 71–92% of the annual amount;
high monsoon precipitation invariably corresponds
with high annual precipitation. A significantly
increasing trend has been seen since 1993. The
record from 11 June (the beginning of the monsoon
 Larcha debris flow disaster in the Nepal Himalaya 415
Fig. 5 Schematic map of the settle-
ment along the highway sides at Larcha:
(a) before (based on field experience
before the event and survivors’ accounts);
and (b) after the disaster. Five water mills
and one temple located behind the settle-
ment, in the terrace upstream, were
destroyed.
Fig. 6 Precipitation record at Gumthang (2000 m a.m.s.l.), the nearest
meteorological station, approximately 10 km southwest of Larcha, between
1972 and 2002 (Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, Nepal, unpubl.
data, 2003). a.m.s.l., above mean sea level.
in that year) to 21 July 1996 shows some fluctuation,
with a total of 16 events with precipitation equal to
or greater than 40 mm/day (Fig. 7). On 22 July 1996
(event day), Gumthang received 80 mm of rain
(Fig. 7) (people from Gumthang said it was within
a few hours), and the estimate for Larcha (approx-
imately 1500 m a.s.l.) would be less than 80 mm, as
precipitation in mountainous area generally
decreases with decreasing altitude.
On the event day, several small landslides
occurred up to the middle reaches of the BKS
basin, but no traces of debris were seen along the
channel margins and hillslopes in the middle and
upper reaches of the BKS when it was studied
2 months after the event. What was left in a dip
and counter dip mountain setting between two
waterfalls (WF1 and WF2), 500 m upstream from
Fig. 7 Daily precipitation record at Gumthang from the beginning of
the monsoon to the end of July 1996 (Department of Hydrology and
Meteorology, Nepal, unpubl. data, 2003).
the confluence of BKS and the Bhotekoshi River
(Figs 2,8), suggested that it was the only major
landslide site that generated a huge amount of
debris. The bedrock at the major landslide site was
mantled by thick colluvium, which was mud-rich
with an unsorted array of particles from mud to
block size. In contrast, the weathering product in
the upper catchment area was shallower and more
sandy, and therefore more permeable. These dif-
ferences were the main factors causing more land-
slides in the lower part of the catchment compared
with the upper part. Because the debris flow at
Larcha was caused mainly by slope failures in the
small area mentioned above, the description below
is specific to this source area.
Slope failures occurred both on dip and counter
dip slopes (Fig. 8). The dip slope, underlain by the
416 D. P. Adhikari and S. Koshimizu

Fig. 8 Schematic block diagrams of the debris source area in a V-notch between two waterfalls, WF1 and WF2, and the debris generation mechanisms:
(a) source area before the event; (b) debris for the first surge of the flow – plane rock failure and soil slides on the dip slope and bulk colluvium collapse
on the counter dip slope, and plane rock failure, which dammed the narrow river channel at WF1 and mobilized into debris flow after bursting the dam;
(c) second phase soil failure on both sides of the stream and generation of second surge of flow; and (d) source area after the event with profiles before
and after the slope failures. The two phases of slope failures were expected to define the two surges of flow as suggested by clast size distribution
(Figs 10,12), which was supported by the accounts of residents living above the landslide scar, who said that ground vibrations took place twice with a
brief time gap in between.

Benighat slates and the Jhiku carbonate beds dip-
ping 52° toward the stream, was mantled by 2–3 m
of thick, poorly sorted colluvial (mud- to block-
sized) slope dipping approximately 40° toward the
stream (Fig. 8a). A planar rockslide along carbon-
ate beds on the lower slope and a soil slide (200 m
long, 300 m wide and 1.5–3.0 m deep) occurred on
the upper slope (Fig. 8b,d). Assuming a mean soil
depth of 2 m, the volume of the failed material was
estimated to be approximately 120 000 m3. The
counter dip slope, in contrast, consisted of a steep
rocky upper slope and colluvial wedges of various
inclinations (30–60°) and thicknesses at the base
adjacent to the stream (Fig. 8a). The colluvium con-
sisted primarily of 1–5 m of boulders underlying
poorly sorted finer materials, including mud. The
colluvium was coarser downslope, probably because
larger blocks travel greater distances. The collu-
vium was also somewhat coarser at the surface of
a wedge, probably because finer material had been
washed away. The boulders and blocks were mostly
phyllite and limestone and the finer fractions were
dominated by slate fragments. The slope geometry
looked predisposed to failure under stream under-
cutting. A 230-m-long, 85-m-wide and 3.1-m-deep
(average) landslide occurred on this slope (Fig. 8d),
and the resulting landslide debris is estimated to
be approximately 60 000 m3. The total landslide
debris generated from both sides of the slope is
estimated to be approximately 180 000 m3.
Mud lines and friction marks on the WF1 and
valley sides, both in the source area and down-
 Larcha debris flow disaster in the Nepal Himalaya 417

Fig. 9 Waterfall 1 (WF1) with mud lines and friction marks on the valley
walls. Mud line on the valley sides is 9 m high.

stream, were observed. The mud line was 9 m high

on the valley sides between WF1 and WF2 and at
the notch of WF1 (Fig. 9). The maximum wave
height observed on the wall of the partially dam-
aged house was 15 m. A debris fan, 400 m long
(along the axis) and 30–150 m wide with a surface
area of 26 000 m2 (funnel shaped, widening and
thickening downfan), was deposited between the
foot of WF1 and the collapsed bridge site
(Fig. 10a). The deposit was 2–7 m thick with an
average slope of 10°. Clasts of gneiss and schist
were smaller and rounded, whereas the clasts of
slate, phyllite and limestone were slab-like and
coarser. The flat clasts displayed imbrication fab-
ric, with the long axis striking perpendicular or
oblique to the slope and dipping downstream
(Fig. 10a). Channel incision in the week following
the deposition was 2 m. The deposit was free from
particles finer than gravel (i.e. < 2 mm) as observed
both in the undisturbed and incised sections.
Results of the maximum clast size and composi-
tion count along the fan axis are shown in
Figure 11. Based on the results, the fan can be
divided into two major surges and two segments,
distal and proximal, in each surge. Downstream
from the collapsed bridge site, the presence of a
toe zone with almost all clasts smaller than boulder
size was observed (Fig. 10a). It is not considered
to be part of the fan in the following discussion. Fig. 10 (a) Debris fan (between waterfall 1 [WF1] and the collapsed
bridge site) at Larcha; surges and segments are based on the clast size
The other four segments are described below. and composition (further elaborated in Fig. 11). (b) Cross-section along
The first surge was characterized by a blocky AB.
front (material dominated by block-sized particles,
i.e. from 2 to > 8 m) and a systematic upfan decrease ders (Fig. 12) with imbrication fabric dipping in the
in size from the front at 400 m (collapsed bridge downstream direction. The largest blocks of lime-
site) to 195 m with predominance of the LH clasts stone and phyllite transported in the debris front
(Figs 10a,11). The first, 100 m was a distal segment, (e.g. 10.6 m × 6.8 m × 6.6 m, 10.5 m × 5.5 m × 3 m,
distinguished by a plug of blocks and coarse boul- 8.6 m × 6.7 m × 3.7 m, 8.5 m × 4.3 m × 2.5 m, 7.5 m
418 D. P. Adhikari and S. Koshimizu
Fig. 11 Radial position of (a) maximum clast size, (b) clast composition
vs distance from apex for the Larcha debris fan. Clast size as measured at
every 1-m interval (for size specification, the long diameter of the blocks
was used to define the following size types: coarse block >8 m; medium
block 8–4 m; fine block 4–2 m; coarse boulder 2–1 m; fine boulder 1.000–
0.256 m), and for the identification of lithologic composition, five clasts
were counted at 3-m intervals. Surges and segments are indicated.
× 6.5 m × 5.7 m) plugged the opening between the
bridge piers (Figs 5,12). In terms of composition,
65–95% of the material came from the LH rocks
(Fig. 11b). The blocks had some very delicate
edges, intact and well preserved. The thickness of
the material deposited at the 6-m-high bridge site
was up to 14 m, projecting 8 m above the bridge
axis (Fig. 5). Boulders were seen on top of big
blocks (Fig. 12). The deposit was approximately
7 m thick in average and extended over 100 m. The
second, 105-m-long segment upstream, in contrast,
was bouldery (predominated by boulder-sized frac-
tions, i.e. from 0.256 to 2.000 m) but still predomi-
nated by the LH composition (62–65%). It forms
the proximal segment (Figs 10a,11). It was 105 m
Fig. 12 Debris front: (a) between highway bridge piers; (b) on the right
bank of the Bhairab Kunda Stream. The glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF)
of 1985 destroyed the highway bridge located just below the newly built
Phulping Bridge.
long and 3 m thick in average. The depositional
fabric showed imbrication of planar clasts dipping
downslope, and materials along the margins of the
flow showed, in places, a weakly developed levee
of boulders. Old terrace materials on the left bank
of the stream had some erosional hanging cliffs of
up to 5 m, with 3 m of fresh debris at the bottom.
Clasts finer than boulder-sized (i.e. finer than
0.256 m) were rare in both segments, and the size
and composition observed along the fan axis did
not show any visual difference with the flanks.
A portion of the fan between 195 m and the apex
was distinguished as the second surge on the basis
that there was an upfan increase in clast size and
that was followed by a portion with upfan decrease
in size (Fig. 11a). The fan between 195 and 85 m
showed an upfan increase in clast size (from fine
boulder to fine block, i.e. from 0.256 to 4.000 m)
with dominance of the LH composition (55–62%),
 Larcha debris flow disaster in the Nepal Himalaya 419
which is the distal segment. The length and aver-
age thickness of this segment were 110.0 and
2.5 m, respectively. The fan from 85 m to the apex
had an upfan decrease in clast size (from fine block
to fine boulder) with 51–55% of the LH clasts. The
proximal segment was 85 m long and approxi-
mately 2 m thick. Like the first surge, the clast size
and composition observed along the fan axis did
not show any variation from the sides throughout
the second surge deposit.
The maximum flow depth estimated from the
elevation of mud lines on the valley wall below
WF1 was 7 m from the BKS channel measured on
28 July 1996, whereas the thickness of the deposit
for the 300 m stretch (excluding the distal segment
of the first surge, which was 7 m thick) was approx-
imately 2.5 m thick on average. The total volume
of material up to the high flood level in both the
first and second surges together was estimated to
be approximately 182 000 m3 (the surface area of
the fan multiplied by the maximum flow depth:
26 000 m2 × 7 m), and the material left on the fan
before post depositional erosion was approxi-
mately 104 000 m3 (surface area of the fan multi-
plied by the average deposit thickness:
26 000 m2 × 4 m), indicating that the fan occupied
approximately 57% of the total volume of the
debris transported into the channel with the
remaining 43% delivered to the Bhotekoshi River.
DISCUSSION
DEBRIS SOURCE AND INITIATION MECHANISM
The composition count on the fan did not match
the catchment bedrock area (i.e. approximately
70% of the composition being the LH rocks, despite
the smaller area [30%] of catchment underlain by
such rock types). This disparity indicates the
Lesser Himalaya as the major source of debris.
Furthermore, the absence of debris traces (i.e.
spill-over chute and levees) along the margins of
the BKS channel and in the hillslope in the middle
and upper reaches of the stream also supports
the notion that the debris source was within the
Lesser Himalaya, within 3 km from Larcha. The
absence of upstream debris traces also suggests
that little or none of the HH materials (approxi-
mately 30%) deposited on the fan was transported
from the bedrock source area on the event day. In
contrast, it is suggested here that these materials
were previously stored in the debris source area,
probably by multiple episodes of flood/debris flow
over a period of time. Based on the evidence above,
the possibility of GLOF was ruled out, and the
study has provided the first scientific basis for
questioning the then widely held concept of GLOF.
Slope movement occurs when stress exceeds
internal strength. Many factors can act as triggers
for hillslope failure, and one of the most common
triggers in the Himalaya is prolonged or heavy
rainfall (Gabet et al. 2004). Although debris flows
can originate by various means, mobilization from
landslides predominates in all mountainous land-
scape (Johnson 1984; Iverson 2000), because land-
slide translation energy converts into vibrational
energy (Iverson et al. 1997). Landslide motion is
more rigid, with deformation localized along per-
sistent slip surfaces and shear zones. Debris flows
exhibit pervasive, fluid-like deformation that facil-
itates motion of even boulder-rich debris through
tortuous channels, across gentle slopes, and around
obstructions (Iverson et al. 1997). If soil pore space
throughout the landslide mass is saturated or
nearly saturated at the time of slope failure, the
potential for debris flow mobilization is increased.
Rainfall intensity–duration thresholds for trig-
gering landslides have been widely identified in
many different climates and geological settings
(Caine 1980; Wilson & Wieczorek 1995; Terlien 1998).
Caine and Mool (1982) estimated a threshold rain
of 100 mm/day to trigger a landslide and mobiliza-
tion into debris flow in the Kolphu Khola drainage
basin area in central Nepal. However, the intensity
and duration of rainfall necessary to initiate a
landslide in the upper Bhotekoshi Valley is poorly
known because there are only two climatic stations
(Barabise and Gumthang) in this valley. However,
it is known that most historic/reported landslide
and debris flows in the Nepal Himalaya are asso-
ciated with either intense or sustained monsoon
precipitation (Dhital 2003; Adhikari 2004). Notable
landslides and debris flows associated with ext-
reme weather events of the recent past include
Lele (1981), Kulekhani (1993), Syangja and Butwal
(1998), and Khotang, Ramechap, Bhojpur and
Taplejung (2003). The intense precipitation (540 mm
in 24 h) on 19–20 July 1993 in the Kulekhani catch-
ment area in central Nepal triggered 300 land-
slides of various sizes, and many of them mobilized
into disastrous debris flows (Dhital 2003).
Beyond the observed annual variation in
Figure 6, the pattern of monsoon precipitation
since the mid-1970s reveals that the numbers of
rainy days are decreasing and the intensity of rain-
fall (equal to or greater than 40 mm/day) appears
to be increasing (Adhikari 2004). During the mon-
420 D. P. Adhikari and S. Koshimizu
soon of 1989, a total of 50 km of road of the 114-
km-long Arniko Highway was severely affected by
landslides, which in some places converted into
debris flows (Department of Roads, Nepal, unpubl.
data, 1998). The monsoon in 1989 was marked by
precipitation, with 40 mm/day for 40 days, and
landslides and debris flow occurred when precipi-
tation was 70 mm/day following sustained rain for
a few days. There has been a substantial increase
in the frequency of landslide and debris flow
events in the upper Bhotekoshi Valley over the
past decade or longer (pers. comm. with village
representatives). When the timing of these events
is compared with the monsoon precipitation record
(Fig. 6), the obvious underlying cause is precipita-
tion. As for the disaster mentioned in the present
paper, it occurred on a day with 80 mm rainfall (the
highest precipitation since the beginning of the
monsoon in that year), following sustained rains of
several days (Fig. 7). The cases from 1989 and 1996
may indicate a threshold of approximately 80 mm/
day or concentrated rains within a few hours if the
ground is already saturated with antecedent rains.
The monsoon rains in Larcha contributed to
incipient instabilities on the mountain slopes, while
the stream undercutting triggered failure and the
resulting landslide mobilized into debris flow. The
saturation of soil materials increased their weight
and reduced the cohesive bonds between individ-
ual soil particles, leading to the reduction of the
internal strength of the hillslope. Moreover, the
presence of bedding planes in the dip slope caused
the soil resting above to slide along the bedding
plane surface enhanced by the lubrication effect of
percolating water and buoyancy effects.
Based on the observations above, the following
mechanisms of debris flow initiation were identified.
Bedrock plane failure (large slab failure) and slope-clearing
on the dip slope
The poorly sorted mud-rich soils overlying the
bedrock on the dip slope had already achieved sat-
uration as a result of antecedent rains (Fig. 6) and
low permeability. With the added pore pressure
and water weight following the intense precipita-
tion in the evening of the event day, the decreasing
shear strength of the colluvia and the strength
at the soil–rock interface promoted further up-
slope instabilities under the force of gravity. In the
meantime, stream undercutting along the bedding
plane of carbonate beds on the dip slope bottom
led to the occurrence of a planar rockslide (Fig. 8b).
The plane rock failure removed support for the
overlying and adjacent soils, and sliding and
slumping might have propagated rapidly up the
slope so that a huge volume of debris began to move
almost simultaneously like a slope-clearing event.
Sheetflow runoff focusing at the intersection of the colluvial
edge and cliff face on the counter dip slope
On the counter dip slope, sheetflow runoff from
cliff faces could have focused at the intersection of
the colluvial edge and cliff face. This sheetflow run-
off would have had the effect of augmenting direct
precipitation and increasing the rate and amount
of saturation. At the same time, runoff falling from
the cliff face could have impacted unconsolidated
colluvium at the base of the cliff, thus promoting
bulk failure. Some scour marks on the colluvium,
on the base of the rock slopes, together with some
runoff flow marks on the rock cliff lead to this
conclusion. Johnson (1984) previously reported
this type of failure mechanism and named it the
‘firehose effect’. The stream undercutting, in
combination with the above two processes in the
counter dip slope resulted in slope failure, probably
simultaneous with the dip slope failure (Fig. 8b,c).
The large carbonate slabs that slid down the dip
slope and were deposited in the debris front should
have spanned the entire channel width (20 m) at
the notch of WF1 and the supported materials
behind it. Progressive and retrogressive failure of
the sediments from both sides and the insufficient
stream power to transport material away from the
toe of the slope would have added to a growing
source of debris. Then a high landslide dam must
have formed, even if for a brief interval, because
the valley was narrow and steep-walled and
because there was little area for the landslide mass
to spread out. The mud line up to 9 m high on the
valley walls supports this interpretation.
Whatever the mechanism, eventually the dam
breached catastrophically. The mud line and the
friction marks on WF1 and the valley wall (Fig. 9)
suggest that material fell from the 50-m-high WF1
and propagated downslope through the pre-
existing channel system with sufficient potential
energy to transform into debris flow through the
processes described by Iverson et al. (1997). The
presence of slate was the key factor in debris flow
initiation because weathered slate provides abun-
dant fine particles and clay minerals that are
essential to the mobility and transport competence
of debris flows, giving them the internal strength
necessary to transport large boulders. Electro-
chemical attraction among clay particles increases
 Larcha debris flow disaster in the Nepal Himalaya 421

debris flow matrix strength, and strong water

absorption helps maintain high pore pressures, a
condition deemed necessary for the support of
large clasts (Major & Pierson 1992). The fine par-
ticles occupy the interstitial spaces in debris flow
slurries, increasing the density of the matrix and
the buoyant forces that contribute to the suspen-
sion of large particles (Rodine & Johnson 1976).
The transformation of material into a debris
flow was also promoted by the lack of sorting and
the presence of silt and clay, derived from the
weathering of slate, both of which significantly
lowered the soil permeability. Reduced permeabil-
ity causes pore water to be trapped, increasing
hydrostatic pressure, adding strength to the inter-
stitial fluid phase and decreasing the shear
strength of soil, all aiding the initiation of a debris
flow (Costa 1984; Campbell 1990).

FAN DEPOSITION

The deposition of the debris flow occurred after

moving 400 m downstream from the WF1 when the
concrete bridge over the BKS stood as an obstacle
in the flow path. The design capacity of the bridge
is unknown, but the depositional features, internal
structures and texture of the debris deposit,
together with the appearance of the debris front
as seen in Figures 5 and 12, suggest that the blocky
debris front pushed out the concrete flap of the
bridge. Both piers remained intact and provided
enough resistance to prevent further movement of
the debris front. As a result, the blocky front blocked
the bridge opening forming a dam and causing the
debris materials to be impounded behind it. Dam-
ming of the channel at the bridge site would have
forced a change in the orientation of clasts, partic-
ularly in the front and, to a lesser extent, in the
upfan region, causing the clasts from the bridge
site up to the distal segment of the second surge
to show imbrication fabrics sloping downfan. With-
out the damming effect, the imbrication fabrics
should have sloped upstream. The depositional fea-
tures therefore indicate that the counterpush from
the debris front was stronger than the recessional
debris flow strength, causing the development of
the imbrication shown in Figure 10a. The stages
for the development of the observed imbrication
fabric are depicted in Figure 13.
Several outsized boulders of gneiss strewn
about on the old channel and banks before the
event were not seen in the new deposit (per. obs.
of the first author and survivors). The disappear-
ance of the old boulders together with the ero-
Fig. 13 Schematic illustrations of (a) the longitudinal profile of the
moving debris at Larcha, showing the variable concentration of materials
and vertical velocity gradient (v); (b, c) possible stages for the develop-
ment of the depositional fabric in the fan. When the debris reached the
bridge site, the resisting force provided by the bridge piers was greater
than the driving force from the flowing debris, which resulted into the
depositional fabric as shown in (c) and Fig. 10a.
sional features on the stream banks suggest that
in the course of movement the pre-existing mate-
rial was eroded away by the bulldozing action of
the debris front, while the channel was filled with
new material. Such a sequence of events was made
possible by the blocky front and high initial energy
of the debris flow. The old channel material must
have cleared before the destruction of the bridge.
The energy of the flowing debris might have been
partially exhausted in the process of bulldozing old
material so that the barrier provided by the bridge
piers could not be broken.
The first flow surge at Larcha carried large
blocks that appear to have floated in slurry. This
conclusion is supported by two observations. First,
the delicate edges of the phyllite and limestone
blocks were intact. Second, the orientation of the
blocks with the long axis oblique or perpendicular
422 D. P. Adhikari and S. Koshimizu
to the bridge axis (Figs 5,12a) suggests that they
were transported with the long axis vertical. Alter-
native explanations are not likely to explain these
features. The phenomenon of large blocks floating
in debris flow was studied and modeled extensively
by Rodine and Johnson (1976), Hampton (1979)
and Johnson (1984). In the case of the Larcha
debris flow, poor sorting of the debris, combined
with the presence of clay in the slurry, gave the
slurry a high density as well as cohesive strength.
Boulders would have literally floated because of
the small density difference between the blocks
and the slurry, augmented by the strength of the
clay–water slurry. Conversely, the absence of
matrix in the deposit is inconsistent with the above
interpretation. However, the two lines of evidence
mentioned above suggest that the deposits in the
fan represented a concentrated lag produced by
extensive winnowing of finer materials after depo-
sition. Winnowing could have been easily achieved
by the high volume of water that was funneled from
the stream following the deposition of the debris.
The observed variation in clast size distribution
along the fan is interpreted as the result of depo-
sition from two different phases of slope failure
over some interval of time in the source area. The
blocky front and gradual upward fining to 195 m
represented a single, first surge produced by the
landslide debris generated from the lower slope
failures from both dip and counter dip slopes
(Fig. 8b). As the transit distance from WF1 to the
bridge site is 400 m, there was time for clast seg-
regation to develop a distal blocky front with clast
size reduction to the proximal segment. The begin-
ning of an upfan coarsening trend, again at 195 m,
followed by fining to the apex is interpreted as the
second surge deposit, which was supplied by the
landslide debris from the upper slope failures on
both dip and counter dip slopes in the second phase
(Fig. 8c). In this case, the transit distance was
approximately 200 m or less, which was most prob-
ably not enough time for clast segregation to
develop distinct distal and proximal segments with
continuous fining upfan as in the case of the first
surge. The deposit in the first surge was coarser
than that in the second surge because soil in the
source area was coarser on the lower slope, which
failed and mobilized into debris flow before the
upper slope. The detached blocks of carbonate
rocks that slid as a result of plane failure at the
notch of WF1 added to the first surge. The inter-
pretation of slope failures in two phases and dep-
osition with two surges was also supported by the
survivors’ account that the area had experienced
threatening noises and ground shaking twice in
an interval of approximately 30 min, with the sec-
ond instance being weaker than the first. The close
agreement between the estimation of total volume
of materials displaced from the source area,
180 000 m3 (120 000 m3 from dip slope and 60 000 m3
from counter dip slope), and the estimation of
182 000 m3 of materials up to the high flood level
in the stream channel suggests that very little or no
debris was contributed beyond the landslide site.
CONCLUSIONS
For a debris flow deposit, if produced from a basin
with contrasting rock types, clast composition
count was found to be a reliable proxy for the rapid
assessment of its source area. The possibility of the
then widely held concept of GLOF for the occur-
rence of the Larcha disaster was finally ruled out
based on the lack of debris traces in the middle and
upper reaches of the BKS as well as the clast com-
position count in the debris deposit. The Larcha
area was predisposed to mass movement because
of its ideal geological, geomorphologic and engineer-
ing geological conditions. The disaster happened
when monsoon rains triggered landslides, dammed
the stream course and mobilized into debris flow
following the bursting of the dam. The prevalence
of debris flow deposits in the Bhotekoshi Valley
implies that there have been debris flow risks in
the past. It is likely that they will grow in the future
as population increase presses human settlement
developments ever closer to vulnerable areas. The
Larcha event illustrates how disastrous damming
can be in narrow mountain valleys when landslides
are mobilized into debris flows. It also highlights
the need for caution and evaluation of debris-gen-
erating potential before planning settlement and
locating infrastructures in mountainous regions.
Although high-intensity precipitation cannot be
described as the sole factor, the observed scenario
in the upper Bhotekoshi Valley implies that high-
intensity precipitation following sustained rain and
the occurrence of landslides with subsequent mobi-
lization into debris flow is highly correlated. In
order to develop rainfall intensity–duration
thresholds for triggering landslides and debris
flows in the valley, it will be necessary to establish
several recording stations and document the
amount and duration of rainfall necessary to trig-
ger landslides over several monsoon seasons. The
physical causes of many landslides and the result-
ing debris flow cannot be removed; however, geo-
 Larcha debris flow disaster in the Nepal Himalaya 423
logical, geomorphologic, engineering geological
and hydrologic investigations, and good engineer-
ing practices can reduce the disastrous effects
from such events. In the upper Bhotekoshi Valley,
where debris flow activity and risk are high, hazard
mapping and zonation help reduce risk and raise
awareness. The only way to reduce loss of lives and
property is to develop a better understanding of
debris flow processes and more reliable techniques
of predicting their potential effects, and designing
remedial or protective measures.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank Steven H. Emerman, Simpson
College, Indianola, Iowa, USA, for reading earlier
drafts and providing the basis for improvements.
Review by Vishnu Dangol, Tribhuvan University,
Kathmandu, Nepal, was valuable in improving the
manuscript. Thanks are also due to Hiroshi Ikeya,
Sabo Technical Center, Tokyo, for providing rele-
vant literature, and Subas Sunuwar and Sarmila
Khanal for their help in various ways. A postdoc-
toral fellowship to D. P. Adhikari for research at
the Yamanashi Institute of Environmental Sci-
ences, Japan, by the Japan Society for the Promo-
tion of Science (JSPS) is gratefully acknowledged.
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