weeks, is not too short especially since the questions are issues of the day and the
I. WHAT IS LAW?
Sanidad v. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J
FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition
with preliminary injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991
and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the president has no power to
propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the referendum-plebiscite has no
legal basis.
ISSUE:
1.    Is the case at bar justiciable?
2.    Does the president have the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?
3.    Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame
allowed sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a
justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the
president to perform such act is in question. The president has the authority to propose
amendments as the governmental powers are generally concentrated to the president in
times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3
people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law.
Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland v. Albania)
This dispute gave rise to three Judgments by the Court. It arose out of the
explosions of mines by which some British warships suffered damage while
passing through the Corfu Channel in 1946, in a part of the Albanian waters
which had been previously swept. The ships were severely damaged and
members of the crew were killed. The United Kingdom seised the Court of the
dispute by an Application filed on 22 May 1947 and accused Albania of having
laid or allowed a third State to lay the mines after mine-clearing operations had
been carried out by the Allied naval authorities. The case had previously been
brought before the United Nations and, in consequence of a recommendation
by the Security Council, had been referred to the Court.
In a first Judgment, rendered on 25 March 1948, the Court dealt with the
question of its jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Application, which
Albania had raised. The Court found, inter alia, that a communication dated 2
July 1947, addressed to it by the Government of Albania, constituted a
voluntary acceptance of its jurisdiction. It recalled on that occasion that the
consent of the parties to the exercise of its jurisdiction was not subject to any
particular conditions of form and stated that, at that juncture, it could not hold
to be irregular a proceeding not precluded by any provision in those texts.
A second Judgment, rendered on 9 April 1949, related to the merits of the
dispute. The Court found that Albania was responsible under international law
for the explosions that had taken place in Albanian waters and for the damage
and loss of life which had ensued. It did not accept the view that Albania had
itself laid the mines or the purported connivance of Albania with a mine-laying
operation carried out by the Yugoslav Navy at the request of Albania. On the
other hand, it held that the mines could not have been laid without the
knowledge of the Albanian Government. On that occasion, it indicated in
particular that the exclusive control exercised by a State within its frontiers
might make it impossible to furnish direct proof of facts incurring its
international responsibility. The State which is the victim must, in that case, be
allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial
evidence ; such indirect evidence must be regarded as of especial weight when
based on a series of facts, linked together and leading logically to a single
conclusion. Albania, for its part, had submitted a counter-claim against the
United Kingdom. It accused the latter of having violated Albanian sovereignty
by sending warships into Albanian territorial waters and of carrying out
minesweeping operations in Albanian waters after the explosions. The Court
did not accept the first of these complaints but found that the United Kingdom
had exercised the right of innocent passage through international straits. On the
other hand, it found that the minesweeping had violated Albanian sovereignty,
because it had been carried out against the will of the Albanian Government. In
particular, it did not accept the notion of “self-help” asserted by the United
Kingdom to justify its intervention.
In a third Judgment, rendered on 15 December 1949, the Court assessed the
amount of reparation owed to the United Kingdom and ordered Albania to pay
£844,000.
Marbury v. Madison - 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803)
FACTS:
William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William
Harper, by their counsel, Charles Lee, severally moved the court for a rule to
James Madison, secretary of state of the United States, to show cause why a
mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them
respectively their several commissions as justices of the peace in the district of
Columbia. This motion was supported by affidavits of the following facts; that
notice of this motion had been given to Mr. Madison; that Mr. Adams, the late
president of the United States, nominated the applicants to the senate for
their advice and consent to be appointed justices of the peace of the district
of Columbia; that the senate advised and consented to the appointments; that
commissions in the due form were signed by the said president appointing
them justices, and that the seal of the United States was in due form affixed to
the said commissions by the secretary of state; that the applicants have
requested Mr. Madison to deliver them their said commissions, who has not
complied with that request; and that their said commissions are withheld from
them. 
Applicant asked the Supreme Court to compel President Jefferson’s Secretary
of State, by Writ of Mandamus, to deliver the commission.
ISSUE:
Does the applicant have a vested right in the commission he demands?
ANSWER:
No.
CONCLUSION:
The Court granted a rule to show cause, requiring the Secretary to show cause
why a mandamus should not issue to direct him to deliver to the commissions.
No cause was shown and the applicant filed a motion for a mandamus. The
Court determined that the applicant had a vested legal right in his
appointment because his commission had been signed by the President, sealed
by the Secretary of State, and the appointment was not revocable.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one
supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time,
ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising
under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be
exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of
the United States. In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the
supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state
shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction."
The Court held that § 13 of the Act of 1789, giving the Court authority to
issue writs of mandamus to an officer, was contrary to the Constitution as an
act of original jurisdiction, and therefore void.
RULE:
The Constitution of the United States establishes certain limits not to be
transcended by the different departments of the government. The powers of
the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?
The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are
imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a
proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the
Constitution by an ordinary act.

PEOPLE v. POMAR
November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.
FACTS:
Julio Pomar is the manager and person  in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco
factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation
duly authorized to transact business in the City of Manila. under his employ is
Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy.
However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days
before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands made by her,
Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo.
The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of
Act No. 3071. POmar appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the
exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding
the health of pregnant women laborers in “factory, shop or place of labor of any
description,” and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one
month before and one month after their delivery.
ISSUE: 
Whether  or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of
the police power of the state.
RULING:
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization
develops and public conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be
extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with reference
to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow faster
than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition
of the people’s law – the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power
extended and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they
must first amend that law.
It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account
of contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is
equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or
corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs
women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty
days during which no services were rendered.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law,
that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are
unconstitutional and void.
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby
dismissed.
Del Monte Corporation v. CA (G.R.
No. L-78325)
Facts:
Petitioner Del Monte, an American corporation, granted Philpack the
right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines its Del Monte
catsup. Petitioner’s trademark and logo ‘Del Monte’ and its catsup bottle
were subsequently registered in the Philippines. Meanwhile respondent
Sunshine Sauce, a company also engaged in the manufacturing and
sale of various kinds of sauces, registered its logo ‘Sunshine Fruit
Catsup.’ Philpack received reports that respondent was buying and
recycling used Del Monte’s bottle in junk shops to serve as container for
its own catsup. Thus, petitioner and Philpack filed a complaint for
trademark infringement and unfair competition which the trial court
dismissed. CA affirmed holding there were substantial differences
between the 2 marks.
Issue:
Whether or not there is confusing similarity between the two
trademarks.
Ruling: YES.
At that, even if the labels were analyzed together it is not difficult to see
that the Sunshine label is a colorable imitation of the Del Monte
trademark. The predominant colors used in the Del Monte label are
green and red-orange, the same with Sunshine. The word “catsup” in
both bottles is printed in white and the style of the print/letter is the
same. Although the logo of Sunshine is not a tomato, the figure
nevertheless approximates that of a tomato.
As previously stated, the person who infringes a trade mark does not
normally copy out but only makes colorable changes, employing
enough points of similarity to confuse the public with enough points of
differences to confuse the courts. What is undeniable is the fact that
when a manufacturer prepares to package his product, he has before
him a boundless choice of words, phrases, colors and symbols
sufficient to distinguish his product from the others. When as in this
case, Sunshine chose, without a reasonable explanation, to use the
same colors and letters as those used by Del Monte though the field of
its selection was so broad, the inevitable conclusion is that it was done
deliberately to deceive.          

Asia Brewery v. CA (G.R. No. 103543)
Facts:
Respondent San Miguel Corporation filed a complaint against petitioner
Asia Brewery for trademark infringement and unfair competition on
account of the latter’s BEER PALE PILSEN or BEER NA BEER product
which has been competing with petitioner’s SAN MIGUEL PALE
PILSEN for a share of the local beer market. The trial court dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, CA found petitioner guilty of trademark
infringement.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the words ‘pale pilsen’ may be exclusively
appropriated and used by SMC;
(2) Whether or not there is confusing similarity between the two
trademarks.
Ruling:
(1) NO. The fact that the words ‘pale pilsen’ are part of ABI’s trademark
does not constitute an infringement of SMC’s trademark: SAN MIGUEL
PALE PILSEN, for “pale pilsen” are generic words descriptive of the
color (“pale”), of a type of beer (“pilsen”), which is a light bohemian beer
with a strong hops flavor that originated in the City of Pilsen in
Czechoslovakia and became famous in the Middle Ages. “Pilsen” is a
“primarily geographically descriptive word,” hence, non-registrable and
not appropriable by any beer manufacturer. The words “pale pilsen”
may not be appropriated by SMC for its exclusive use even if they are
part of its registered trademark: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. No one
may appropriate generic or descriptive words. They belong to the public
domain.
(2) NO. There is hardly any dispute that the dominant feature of SMC’s
trademark is the name of the product: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN,
written in white Gothic letters with elaborate serifs at the beginning and
end of the letters “S” and “M” on an amber background across the
upper portion of the rectangular design. On the other hand, the
dominant feature of ABI’s trademark is the name: BEER PALE PILSEN,
with the word “Beer” written in large amber letters, larger than any of
the letters found in the SMC label.
The trial court perceptively observed that the word “BEER” does not
appear in SMC’s trademark, just as the words “SAN MIGUEL” do not
appear in ABI’s trademark. Hence, there is absolutely no similarity in
the dominant features of both trademarks. Neither in sound, spelling or
appearance can BEER PALE PILSEN be said to be confusingly similar
to SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. No one who purchases BEER PALE
PILSEN can possibly be deceived that it is SAN MIGUEL PALE
PILSEN. No evidence whatsoever was presented by SMC proving
otherwise. There is no confusing similarity between the competing
beers for the name of one is “SAN MIGUEL” while the competitor is
plain “BEER” and the points of dissimilarity between the two outnumber
their points of similarity.
Republic v. MERALCO (G.R.
No. 141314)
Facts:
MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its
rate schedules to reflect an average increase in its distribution charge.
ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that should
the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser
increase, all excess amounts collected from the latter’s customers shall
either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor.
The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase,
thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting of the excess amounts. On
appeal, the CA set aside the ERB decision. MRs were denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of
MERALCO is valid.
Ruling: YES.
 The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon
the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the
control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof.
When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with
public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to
regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission
to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but
as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to
public regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the
public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the
efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to
regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which
are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on
investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that
yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property
performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the
services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a
balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.
 Philippines as a natural child of the deceased, Cheong Boo. On the other hand,
the 2 daughters of Cheong and Petitioner Mora Adong are entitled also to the
shares of the estate.

Issue:
W/N the marriage between Cheong boo and tan bit in China is valid here in the
Philippines.

Held/Ratio Decidendi:
NO! There is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the
province of an Bit. Section IV of the Marriage Law (Gen. Order #65) provides
that “All marriage contracted without these islands, which would be valid by
laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these
islands”. To established a valid marriage, it must be proven before the court of
the islands the existence of the law as a question of fact; and must be supported
by convincing evidence in which Respondent Cheong Seng Gee failed to
ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG provide.

GEE 43 PHIL. 43
November 24, 2016

Facts:
A Chinese national, Cheong Boo, died intestate in the Philippines. His
(deceased) property in the Philippines is being claimed by; a) Respondent,
Seng Gee, who alleged to be his son from his first marriage with Tan Bit in
China, and b) Petitioner, Mora Adong, deceased lawfully married wife in
Basilan with 2 daugthers. CFI states that deceased Seng Gee failed to prove the
validity of the marriage of his parents through his uncle’s letter, however, he is
entitled to the estate of his father because he has been admitted to the
G.R. No. L-99            November 16, 1945

PIO DURAN, petitioner,
vs.
SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS, Judge of People's Court, respondent.