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I Kadek Angga Ardiantna - 2017051124 - Wacana Ekonomi - Rombel 18
I Kadek Angga Ardiantna - 2017051124 - Wacana Ekonomi - Rombel 18
NIM : 2017051124
Sumber : https://scholar.google.com/citations?
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Abstract-This study examines the effect of institutional ownership and managerial ownership on accounting
conservatism. The institution as the majority shareholder of the company strives to present quality earnings
because it realizes that earnings information is an important concern for investors in making investment
decisions. In addition, management participation as the owner of the company will be able to align goals
between shareholders and management. Profit ability to maintain its quality is often associated with
accounting conservatism. The population of this study is a company going public on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange in the non-financial sector in the period 2014 to 2017. The study sample was determined using a
purposive sampling method which resulted in a sample of 364 observations. The data analysis technique used
in the study is multiple linear regression analysis. The test results prove that institutional ownership and
managerial ownership have a positive effect on accounting conservatism.
Keywords: Accounting conservatism; Institutional ownership; Managerial ownership.
Abstract– This study examines the influence of institutional ownership and managerial ownership on
accounting conservatism. The institution as the majority shareholder of the company strives to present a
quality profit because it realizes that profit information isan important concern for investors in making
investment decisions. In addition, the inclusion of management as the owner of the company will be able
to align the objectives between shareholders and management. Profitability in maintaining qualityis
often associated with accounting conservatism. The population of this study is companies going public
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on the Indonesia Stock Exchange which were in the non-financial sector in the period 2014 to 2017.
The research sample was determined using purposive sampling method which resulted in a research
sample of 364 observations. The data analysis technique used in the study is multiple linear regression
analysis. The test results prove that institutional ownership and managerial ownership have a positive
effect on accounting conservatism.
Keywords: Accounting conservatism; Institutional ownership; Managerial ownership.
I. Introduction
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in question changed the time of the complainantn revenue against the sale of photocopiers. Based
on the principle of conservatism should sales in long-term agreements be recognized in part
during the term of the agreement. While the company recognizes the revenue at the beginning
of the periode agreement, whereas there is a portion of the revenue that has not been realized.
This resulted in the company's profit being reported too large in the initial period and too small
in the next period. The Security Exchange Commission imposeda fine on the breach of the
principle of conservatism to Xerox Corporation, based on possible decision-making errors by
investors guided by the company's erroneously presented financial statements.
The application of the level ofaccountability conservatism between companies has a
different level . Chi et al. (2007); Wardhani (2008); Indrayati (2010); and Widayati (2011) found
that one of the factors determining the high-low application of accounting conservatism was the
company's institutional ownership structure. Rachmawati and Triatmoko (2007) found that in
relation to the supervisory function, institutional investors are believed to have the ability to
monitor management actions better than individual investors. Institutional investors are more
focused on future earnings that are relatively larger than current earnings. Institutional investors
are classified as experienced investors (sophisticated) so they will conduct monitoring
effectively and tend to be skeptical of the actions of the management. A large proportion of
institutional ownership is expected to improve the supervisory function of management
performance and encourage management to apply the conservative account principle.
Previous research intothe influence of core ownership on accounting conservatism has
shown mixed results - and the impact of the 2015-16 campaign has been a major one. Wardhani
(2008) and Indrayati (2010) in his research found results that institutional ownership al
positively influenced accounting conservatism. Different results were obtained by Chi et al.
(2007) where institutional ownership negatively influenced accounting conservatism. On the
other hand Pramana (2010) found that institutional ownership had no effect on accounting
conservatism. This inconsistency indicates that the results of previous research have not been
conclusive, thus encouraging further research.
The researchers also added another variable as a beba variable i.e. managerial ownership.
The reason for the selection of managerial ownership variables is due to an agency conflict
between the principal and the agent. The owner has the purpose of maximizing the value of the
company through the application of conservative accounting principles f, while on the other hand
the management wants to prosper his personal so as to choose to apply aggressive accounting
principles. One way to suppress agency conflicts between owners and agents is to combine
the functions of ownership and management of the company by including agents as shareholders
of the company (managerialownership). The process of inclusion of management parties in
the company's share ownership can reduce the opportunist actions of management because
any benefit or loss of decisions taken will be felt directly. In addition, by including the
management as shareholders, can lead to the suitability of the purpose between management
and the owner of the company. Wu (2006) found that managers with high corporate
shareholdings would be more in line with shareholders so as to require more conservative
accounting.
Managerial ownership is defined as share ownership by the manajemen company
(Pramana,2010). Managerial shareholdings can align shareholder interests with
managers, because managers feel directly the benefits of decisions taken and bear the risk if
there are losses incurred as a consequence of wrong decision making. Managerial ownership
will lead to the suitability of objectives between management and shareholders
(Wardhani,2008). The purpose of shareholders is to maximize the value of the company, and
one way is to present quality financial statements through the application of conservative
accounting principles. Wu's research (2006) found that companies with a high percentage of
managerial ownership showed a more conservative pattern in their revenue reporting. The
reason is because managers with high corporate shareholdings will be more in line with
shareholders so it requires more conservative accounting. Based on the fenomena, the
formulation of this research problem is as follows:
1) Does institutional ownership have an effect on accounting contingency?
2) Does managerial ownership have an effect on accounting conservatism?
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Agency Theory
The agency's theory explains that there is a separation of ownership and control over the
company. The party that mandates and as the owner is the principal while the party
responsible for managing the company's assets is referred to as the agent. The agency's theory
also states that if there is a separation between the owner as the principal and the manager as the
agent running the company, there will be agency problems because each of these parties will
always try to maximize the function of its utilities (Jensen and Meckling,1976). In situations
where the management as the management and the owner as the fund provider, maka the conflict
that occurs is a conflict between management and shareholders otherwise known as a type 1
agency problem.
Conflicts of interest that occur between shareholders and management can be resolved
by concentrated ownership because it can bringabout supervision of management decisions. On
the other hand, this causes another problem that causes conflict between majority and
minority shareholders. When owners increase their ownership by increasing their capital
investment tothe extent that they can obtain control rights of the company then there is a change
of conflict from principal to management to minority and majority shareholders (Bhasin,
2010). Conflicts between majority shareholders who have control atU.S. companies and
minority shareholders raise problems of type 2 agencies or agency problems 2 (Villalonga and
Amit, 2004).
This type 2 agency problem is very relevant to be used for research especially in Asian
countries including in Indonesia, where the general ownership structure of the company is a
concentrated ownership structure. The statement is reinforced by research conducted by
Claessens et al. (2002) in Cahyani and Sanjaya (2014) on the ownership structure of companies
in nine Asian countries showing that public companies in Asia have concentrated ownership
structures with protection of investor rights that tend to be weak.
The issue of type 2 agencies illustrates that the majority shareholders have the right of
control over the company to influence management in determining the direction of the
company's decision. The controlling rights of the majority shareholders are used to control
thecompany's policies through management to exploit the business relationships of companies
under its control. This condition indicates that minority shareholders are in a difficult
position to maximize their interests as long as they have a conflicting goal with the majority
shareholders.
Conservatic Accounting
Accounting conservatism is defined by Watts (2003a) as a condition that does not
anticipate profit, but anticipates all potential losses. Accounting conservatism is a tendency of
accountants to verify good news (good news) higher as profit than bad news (bad news) as
losses (Basu,1997). The higher the level of verification required to recognize profit, the
higher the level of conservativeme accounting required by the company. Although there are
pros and cons regarding accounting conservatism, but the developments that occur precisely
show that the existence of accounting conservatism practices are increasing (Pramana,2010).
Some san ala that encourage the rise of accounting conservatism is because the company's
stakeholders (shareholders, government, creditors, and otherparties) need
information about bad news earlier than the good news ( Basu,1997). This definition is based on
the thought of accounting conservatism. Another reason is because the owner aims to
maximize the value of the company, where one way is to present financial statements that
are inline with applying conservative accounting principles.
Measurement of Accounting Conservatism
Measurement of accounting conservatism based on accrual management as part of the
company's book value developed by Givoly and Hayn (2002). Totalual accruals are calculated
from operating accruals summed up with non-operating accruals. Accruals are earned through
the company's net profit before depreciation reduced by cash flow from operating activities.
The underlying reason for the use of negative accruals to curthe level of accounting
conservatism is because the accrual mechanism accelerates the recognition of economic losses and
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delays the recognition of economic benefits. Such a mechanism will cause the accrual value
will become negative gradually. The accrual arrangements will result in a reverse accrual
explaining that if the company's financial statements are in an understatement then the report
hides the amount of hidden reserves or has potential that has not occurred.
Concentration of Unconstitutional Ownership
Ownership of public companies used to be seen as widespread among many shareholders ,
but the reality today is not entirely true, especially for countries other than the United States.
According to Zhang in Tarjo (2008), companies outside the United States are generally
controlled by large shareholders. Research conducted by La Porta et al. (1999), as well as Faccio
and Lang (2002) found that ownership of public companies in almost all countries is
concentrated, except in the United States, United Kingdom and Japan. Indonesia belongs to the
group of countries whose share ownership of public companies is concentrated. The main
agency problem in companies with this concentration of ownership is the conflict between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. When associated with this research, it
can be described how institutional investors as majority shareholders use their control to
influence the policy of accounting conservatism.
Briefly institutional ownership means ownership of shares by other institutions.
Institutional ownership is one of the tools that can be used to reduce agency conflict. The
higher the level of institutional ownership, the stronger the level of supervision and control
carried out by external parties of the company to suppress the opportunistic behavior of
management. Eriandani (2013) states that institutional investors usually control a large number of
stocks so that dapat influence decision making. Through a large proportion of institutional
ownership the owner can direct management actions to apply conservative accounting
principles with the aim of avoiding opportunist management actions to manipulate the
company's performance.
Research conducted by Wardhani (2008) stated that the greater the institutional
ownership in the corporate ownership structure, the more encourage the use of conservative
accounting principles that are enthusedby the size of accruals. Similar results were also
obtained in a study conducted by Indrayati (2010), in which he stated that institutional
ownership has a positive and significant relationship to the level of accounting conservatism.
Based onthe above exposure can be concluded hypotheses as follows:
H1: Institutional ownership positively affects accounting conservatism
Managerial Ownership
Based on classical agency theory, the greater ownership by inside directors (managerial
ownership) will lead to the suitability of objectives between management and shareholders
(Wardhani,2008). Associated with the context of conservatism, managerial fish kepemil can serve
as a monitoring function in the financial reporting process. If the inside directors and management
perform their supervisory functions properly, then it will require information from financial
reporting that has a high quality so that they will demand the use of the principle of high
conservatism.
Wu (2006) examined the impact of managerial ownership on profit quality which one
measure is conservatism in financial reporting. More conservative accounting will be used
because rational creditors will expect managers with high holdings to be more in line with
shareholders so those creditors need certain mechanisms to protect the value of their
investments. Wu's research (2006) found that companies with a high percentage of
managerial ownership showed a more conservative pattern in their revenue reporting. This
shows evidence that there is a positive relationship between managerial property andthe level of
conservatism within the company.
H2: Managerial ownership positively affects accounting conservatism
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The total accrual result is divided by total assets and multipliedby negative 1, so
companies that have a positive total accrual are said to apply conservative accounting while
companies that have negative accruals are said to apply optimistic accounting.
Independent Variable (X)
InstitutionalProperty Kepe
The calculation of institutional ownership according to Ardiansyah (2014) is as follows.
Managerial Ownership
The indicator used to measure managerial ownership is the number of shareholdings by
management divided by the total number of shares managed by the company (Pramana,2010).
Data Analysis Techniques
This hypothesis test was conducted using multiple linear regression analysis method
which aims to test the influence relationship between one variable and another variable.
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Based on the results that have been obtained from the regression coefficient above, it can
be made a regression equation as follows: Y= -0.270 + 0.219X1 + 0.291X2
Significance test results (t test)
This test aims to show how far the influence of one individual variable is independent
individually in describing dependent variables (Ghozali,2009:88). Table 4.3 presents the results
of the t test in this study as follows.
Table 3 Test Result t
Model Q Sig.
(Constant) -3,986 ,000
Institutional Ownership 2,858 ,005
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Based on the hypothesis testing that has been done, it can be described discussion about
variable relationships as follows.
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