Digest:

PIMENTEL v. LEB

FACTS: 

Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal Education Reform
Act of 1993 which creates the Legal Education Board. Petitioners particularly seek to declare as
unconstitutional the creation of LEB itself, LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law
practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting
a system of continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and
establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine
Law School Admission Test or the PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s power to “prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662. Petitioners principally grounded the
petitions on LEB’s alleged encroachment upon the rulemaking power of the Court concerning
the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom, and violation of law school
aspirant’s right to education under the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court.
2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e)
of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

RULING: 

1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently
exercised by the political departments. The historical development of statutes on education
unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to
supervise and regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal education. Legal
education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique
because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is no reason in itself to
demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the
political branches. 
Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and
supervision of legal education:

First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal
education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate admission to the practice of law.
This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to the history of legal education in the
Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon
itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that
regulates legal education and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners
suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism. 

As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution covers the practice
of law and not the study of law. The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not
support the argument that the Court directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely
provides academic competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar.
Furthermore, it is the State in the exercise of its police power that has the authority to regulate
and supervise the education of its citizens and this includes legal education.

2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to
promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to
determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the
Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of
legal education but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct
encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions
to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.

3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly give the LEB the
power to supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch
as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses
and for such duration as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s
power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of
Lawyer-professors as the teaching of law is considered the practice of law.

4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission. The PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to
guide law schools in measuring the applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such
other admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard. However,
the PhilSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law school.
The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to
be admitted to any law program. When the PhilSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict
admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhilSAT goes beyond mere
supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and
therefore, unconstitutional.

Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operations v. City of Manila

G.R. No. L-24693Police Power – Due Process Clause

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same wasapproved by
then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels andmotels. It classified them
into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to
get the demographics of anyone whochecks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to
have wide open spaces soas not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate
impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due
process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate

.ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the

lawsenacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a
strongfoundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a
stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further,
theordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that
thechallenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful topublic
morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages
hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increasesthe revenue of the lgu
concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power aswell. The due process contention
is likewise untenable, due process has no exactdefinition but has reason as a standard. In this
case, the precise reason why theordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the
city which is reasonenough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of
the saidordinance alleged to be vague.

POLICE POWER

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national of local, primarilyrest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, isthe power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, goodorder, safety and
general welfare of the people. Police power is based upon theconcept of necessity of the State
and its corresponding right to protect itself and itspeople.43 Police power has been used
as justification for numerous and variedactions by the State. These range from the
regulation of dance halls,44 movietheaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome
scope of police power isbest demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of
presence in ournation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
May Courts Inquire Upon the Exercise of Police Power?

In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicableconstitutional
guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power insofar as itmay affect the life, liberty or
property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry.Where such exercise of police power
may be considered as either capricious,whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
process or a violation of anyother applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by
the courts.

Two types of Due Process

Procedural Due Process: Procedural due process refers to the procedures thatthe government
must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, orproperty.49 Procedural due
process concerns itself with government action adhering
to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere.Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.

Substantive Due Process: Substantive due process completes the protectionenvisioned

by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government hassufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property