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International Journal of General

Systems
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SYSTEMS AND DISTINCTIONS; DUALITY AND
COMPLEMENT ARITY†
Joseph A. Goguen a; Francisco J. Varela b
a
Department of Computer Science, University of California, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A
b
School of Medicine, University of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, U.S.A

Online Publication Date: 01 January 1979

To cite this Article: Goguen, Joseph A. and Varela, Francisco J. (1979) 'SYSTEMS
AND DISTINCTIONS; DUALITY AND COMPLEMENT ARITY†', International
Journal of General Systems, 5:1, 31 - 43
To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/03081077908960886
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03081077908960886

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Int. I . General Systcmr Q Gordon and Bruch Science Publi~hcnLtd.

t 979,Vol. 5, pp. 31-43 Printed in Great Britain

SYSTEMS AND DISTINCTIONS; DUALITY AND

COMPLEMENTARITY f-
JOSEPH A. GOGUEN
'Department 4 Computer Science, University of Cal&!omiu, Los Angeles, Calfirnia, U.S.A.
and

FRANC1SCO J. VARELAt
School of Medicine, University of Cobrado, Denver, Colorado, U.S.A.
(Rccclvad December 6,1977; infinalform May 26. IPf8)

This paper p m t s a lrarncwotk within which a number or prcrcrnd syncm drxriptiont mn bc unitid. Or pnrticutar
interest are [he difkrcrms stemming ttom thc study ol natunl systems (b~ologlnland social) and man-mdde systems
~(enginaringand computer). It is claimed that the insighrs Itom [he nudy o l n3!urrl sptcms have becn dewlopcd leu
~xrens~vcly and prmscly. One important case discussed here is the relationship bctwcen dcxrib~nga system as
~vtoaomowor as cnntrof!d, k prcciw chancterizal~onof complcmunrar~tyIn d a a l p t ~ o n ris propused through the
notion or adjoint runnor. to cxplicatc the interplay of these dual views. Othcr descriptive dualitla of similar kind a r t
dzxurzcd; the cornplemeniarity h t w c c n nets and I ~ 15Sprcxnled in rull detail.
INDEX TERMS Complemmr~rity.distinaions nutonomy, control, adjoint functor, rrces. networks.

1. INTRODUCTION
. .
The world does not present itself to us neatly
divided into systems, subsystems, environments,
and so on. These are divisions which we make
ourselvts, for various purposes, often subsumed
under the general purpase evoked by saying "for
convcnitnce". I t is cvtdent that different people
find it convcnicnt to divide the world in different
ways, and even ant person will be interested in
different systems at different time, for example,
now a cell, with. the rest or the world its environ-
ment. and later she postal system. or the econ-
omic system, or the atmospheric system.
The established scientific disciplines have, of
course, developed different preferred ways of
tnk papr wu Prtidbs u ~ ~ r t cby d the Narov
Institulc b u ! d a , Colorado (J.G.). and rht A l i m l P, Slonn
Foundation (F+v,). is a stria or thrtc. -rhe wnd
paptr w ~ l lprtscnb some rnathcrnatical roundations lor sell-
releren!~al g r m fin systems. including a Spacer-
Brominn ~ l c u l r uof indiiuoad rszntry. third paw
will deal with applrcntions to variom spmfic uajcs.
:Prucnlt addfeu: Bmn Research h b o r a t o n q New Yore
Uaivtr~ityMedical School. SSO Fint Avenue, New York. City
1W0016.
diridinn the world into cnrironmeat and system,
in line- with their diverent purpcB, and have
also dtveloped different methodologics and termi-
nologies consisten! with their motivations.
In this paper, we prwent a framework within
which a number of these various preferred views
on systems can be unified. Ot particular interest
ro as are the differences stemming from the study
OF natural systems (particularly biological and
social systems) and man-made systems (such as
engineering and computer systems).
Contemporaty system theory has developed ex-
tensively through experience in the Iattr fields,
but thc insights derived from natural sysrcms
have remained by and large much less formally
developed. We hold that the notions of cooper-
ative interaction, self-organization, and
sutonomy-in brier, holistic notions-a~ re-
levant and basic to the study or systems.
In the Framework of this Paper and its sumes5ors,
these nolions ate not only made more explicit
applicable, but arc also presented eomple-
ments to the more traditional notions of system
theory, such as control and input-output h-
havioral description.
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007
32 J. A. GOGUEN AND F. J. VARELA
Our interest and background for this work is
derived from a variety of sources, Humbeno
Maturana and Heint von Focrster have been
instrumental in clarifying the importance of cir-
cular and cognitive processes in natural systems.
Heinz von Foerster, Warren McCullough,
Gordon Pask and Lotfi Zadeh hare been
influential in suggesting a broader vision of sys-
tem theory and cybernetics. Sauaders Mactane,
Samuel EiFenberg and William Lawvere have
provided crucial mat htmat ical inputs, Moreover,
t hc teachings or Chogyam Trungpa, Rinpoche
have been a constant source of guidance and
inspiration in understanding and putting to-
gether all [hest ideas. Finally, we acknowledge the
positive influences of Gregory Bateson, Charlotte
Linde, G. Spencer-Brown and the ADJ group.
The next section discusses in general terms the
rotc which distinction plays in the creation and
recognition of systems, The following t h r n sec-
t ions discuss certain dual perspectives on systems
in sornc detail, including the autonomyJcontro1,
state-variable/input-output, ho Iisrn/rcductionism,
and netltret dualities. fhe firth section develops
h e suggestion that such alternatives are com-
plementary rather than antagonistic, into a sug-
-gestion that their inter-rclntianship can oiten be
exptesscd precisely as an adjoint functor re-
lationship, in thc sense o t categorical algebra.
The final section discusses the holism/reduction
tclotionship in some detail, in relationship to the
philosophy ofscience. .
Future papers will build on this foundation, to
discuss the notion of autonomy in terms of a
mathemarical theory or self-rerertnce or indefinite
recursion and its applications to various systems.
2. DISTlNCTf O N AND INDICATION
k distinction splits the world into two parts,
"that" and "this", or "environment'" and "sys-
tem", or "us" and "them", etc. One or the mosk
fundamental of all human activities is the making
or distinctions. Certainly, it is the most lunda-
mental act of system theory, the very act of
defining the system presently of interest, of
distinguishing it from its environment.
Distinctions coexist with purposes. A parti-
cularly basic case is a system dehning its own
boundasics and attempting to maintain them;
this seems to correspond to what we think of as
I r c;~n he seen in individuals
selr.c~~~~scious~icss.
(ego or indentity maintenance) and in social units
(clubs, subcultures, nations). In such cases, not
only is there a distinction, but an indication, that
is, a marking or one of. the two distinguished
states as being primary ("thisw, "I". "us", etc.);
indeed, it is the very purpose of the distinction to
create this indication.'.
A less basic kind of distinction is one made by
a distinctor for some purpose oh his own. This is
what we generally ste explicitly in science, for
example, when a discipllnc 'dcfincs its field OF
interests", or a scientist defines a system which he
will study.
In either case, the establishment a l system
boundaries is inescapably associated with what
we will call a cognitive point 01view, that is. a
particular set of presuppositions and atzi t udes, a
perspective, or a frame in the sense of Bateson'
ar G o h a n d ; in particular, it is associated with
some notion of value, or interest. It is also linked
up with the cognitive capacities (sensory capabi-
litits, knowledge background) of the distinctor.
Conversely, the distinctions made reveal the c o p
nitive capabil~ttesof the distinctor. Et is in thls
way that biological and social structutts exhibit
their coherence, and make us aware that they in
tact have cognitive capacirities or that they are
"conscious" in some degree.
The importance lor system theory or cognitive
coherence (or cognitive point of view, or eog-
nit~vccapability) is a thcmc which tuns through-
out this paper and its successors. Because or the
focus on system theory, we shall reel free to
invoke the idea of an "observer", one or more
vrsons who embodies the cognirive point of view
which created the system in' question. and from
whose pesspect ive it is subsequent Ey described.
A simple but fundamental property of the
situation involving a system and an observer, is
that he may choose to focus his attention either
on the internal constitution of the system, or else
on its environment, taking the system's properties
ns given. That is, an observer can make n distinc-
tion into an indication through the imposition
of his value. lf the observer chooses to pay
attention to the environmcnt, he treats the system
as n simple entity wirb given properties and seeks
the regularities or its interaction with the tnvlron-
ment, that is, the constraints on the behavior of
the sysrem imposed by its ea~ironrnent.~ This
leads naturally to the problem or controlling the
behavior of the system. as considcrd in engineer-
ing control theory. O n the other hand, the obser-
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007

DLIALlTY AND COMPLEMENTARITY 33

ver may choose to focus on the Internal structure
of the system viewing the environment as ba-
ckground, for example, as a sourcc or Ipertur-
bations upon the sy stem's autonomous behavior.
From this viewpoint, the properties of the system
emerge from the interactions d its compontn ts.
Biology has iterated this proms of indication,
creating a hierarchy of levels or biological study.
The cell biologist emphasitts the cetl's autonomy,
and views the organism of which it is part as
little more than a source o l perturbations for
which the cell compensates. But the physiologist
views the cell as an element in a network o l
intcrdtpendencia constituting the individual or-
ganism: this corresponds to a wider view or
environment, namely the ecology in which the
individual participates. A population biologist
makes his distinctions at a still higher Icvel, and
largely ignores the cell. A similar hierarchy of
levels can be found in thc social sciences. It seems
to' be a general reflection a[ the richness oh
natural systems that indimtion can be iterated to
product a hierarchy of levels.
At a given level of the hierarchy, a particular
system can be seen as an outside to systems
below it, and as an inside to systems above it;
thus, the status (i.e., thc mark of distinction) of a
given system changes as one passes through its
level, in either the upward or the downward
direction. The choice of considering the levcl
above or belaw corresponds 20 a choice of treat-
ing the given system as autonomous or eon-
trolled (constrained). Figures I to T illustrate a
variety of configurations aC systems. subsystems,
and marks. and Figure 8 illustrates the hierarchy
or levcls.

FIGURES 1-7 Various configurations o l systerna subsytsms

end marks; tach configtiration reprmnta a cognitive viewpo~nt.
nnd the mark indicates its center. The arrow lndlmle the flaw of
s~gnalsand interactions.
l--Control o l a System S,by its Environmm~Ej. 2-Autonomy
of System S, in ~ t Environment
s E, H o n t r o l oFa Subsystem St in
,.
a System 5,. &Autonomy oTa Subsystem S, of a System 5,. ,.
+Feedback Control ol System S, by Systtm S;,6-Comrnuni-
-tion bctwctn (Coordination 00 Two Subystcms S,, S; o l
System S,. ,. 7--€wrd~nation (Ecology) or Subryrtems
, - ,.sr-,.
s, - , s;
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007

tanmu consideration or three different levels,

whereas the behavioral strictly spiking involves
only two. This is because the behavioral model,
in taking the tnvironmtntns view or the system,
does not involve making any new distinctians.
But expressing interest in how the system
achieves its behavior through the interdependent
action or its parts adds a new distinction, be-
twmn the system and its parts.
The bollowing may help to make this seem Ias
abstract. The mast tradiltional way to express the
interdcpndense of variables in a systern is by
differential equations. A (time varying) auto-
nomous system can be representd by equations
or the form

FIGURES Diagrnrnatic tvocalion of a hierarchy oI ...,

where x = { x E , x,) is the state vector or the
lmk: Systems 5:- ,.S:?,. S!?;. ... of level ( I - 1 )
sysltrn systcm. The autonomous behavior of the system
censtitule system SF at IcvtE i: similarry. systems is descrikd by a solution vector x(t), which
S;,S,', S;, ... o i level i consti~u~esystem S,, , a1 lcvt! [if 1): satisfies ( I ) . This involves treating everything as
and S,,, lugether wEth other syqtcms or level (i+l ) will
conslirulc a syrlcm at lcvtt ( i C 2 ) ; and SO On. vpwzrd and happening on the same level, and all variables as
downward. being observable; in tITtcr, environment is treated
as pnrr of the systcm (or ignored).

3. RECURSION AND BEHAVIOR -

However, the effect of thc cnvironmcnt on the
system can be repttscnted 'by a rector e (e,, ...,
4)of parameters, giving
In system theory, the autonomy/con t rol distinc-
tion appcars more specifically as a recursion/ ,f,=F,Ix. e,r), for 1 S i S n , (2)
'behavior distinction. The behavioral view reduces
a system to its input-output performance or which explicitly rakes account of two levels.
hhavior, and reduces the environment to inputs
Solutions ro khe system (2) are now also para-
meterized by e, that is. they are o l the form
to the systcm. The effect of outputs on environ- x(e, r I.
ment is not raken into account in this model of The situation or ( 2 ) can be elaborated in two
the system. The recursive view of a system em-
directions. In control theory, it is usual to assume
phasizes the mutual interconnectedness of its
that the internal variables x o l the system ate
~ornponents.~-~*' That is. the behavioral view
either unobservable. or are of no direct interest,
arises when emphasis is placed on the environ-
and that we have instead direct access to (or
ment, and the recursive view arises when em- interest in) an output vector y or variables which
phasis is plaeed on the system's intcrnal
structure.
are functionally devndent on x. The variables e
are usually taken no bc under the control of the
If we stress the autonomy or a system S, (see
Figures 1 to 7) then the environmental influences
observtr, and the question is posed, how Lo use
those variables to obrain certain desired valves or
become perturbations (rather than inputs) which
y. The equations are thus of the rorm
are compensated for through the underlying re-
cursive interdepcndcnce of the system's com-
ponents (the S , , , , in the figures). Each such
component, however, is treated behaviorally, in
terms of some input-putput deserip~ion.
The recursive viewpoint is more sophisticated Strictly speaking the equations span t b m levels,
than the behavioral, since i t involves the simut- and can be used, Tor example, to inrer infor-
 DUALITY AND C
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007
mation about the system's internal state, but the
emphasis ('mark") is on the environment, which
is identified with the observer. Behavior appears
M an input+utput function y(e.t), the observ-
able results or applying the inputs (also called
Ccon~rols")e to the system.
An alternative elaboration or the situation of
(21 views the vector e as not ncmsarily or
particularly under the control of an observer, but
rather as a source or perturbations upon (2). For
example, the components el of e may be some
coeficients which art regarded as constants in
the original equation (1). A natural question to
pose is the stability of the system under such
perturbaaons, that is the relation of (1) to a
penur'bed system
in which 6 {in a rairly intuitive nonation) repre-
sents a "small change". It is known, lor example,
that changes in structural constants can cause the
system to undergo a "catastrophic" change (in the
sense d ThornM)into a new configuration.
The system ( 2 ) has in it nothing which intrinsi-
cally prefers the approach of either (3) or (4).
This choice depends on rhe interest of the
analyst.
Note that "recursion" {in [he broad sense or
reedback which affects the hrrturc) plays a role in
all t h e e f~rmulations,but is more obscure in the
control theory interpret ation, On the other hand,
the behavioral information, though still available,
is more obscure In the stability interpretation (4).
We are not, OF course, claiming that either or
these approaches is inhcrcntly better.
Historically speaking, some of the many pos-
sible approaches to systems hare k e n much
more developed than others. The most highly
developd parts, in fact, center on the notions of
control, input+utput behavior, and state-
transition, This is presumable because of the
interest in applying these approaches in
tnginmring.
I t seems, however, that the notion of autonomy
is panicularly important for natural systems, e.g.,
biological and social systems, and the lack o l a
well-developed theory of autonomous systems is
felt as a serious difliculty. An engineer designing
an artifact wilt choose the inpults of interest to
him tor this application with some assurance that
the choice will be adequate. But a biologist
studying a cell is Forced to acknowledge the
autonomy of the cell; if the bialogisr's prelertnm
for input and output variables do not match the
celI's internaI organization, the biologist's theory
will not work. Furthemore, the hierarchy of
levels seem to particularCy assm its importance
for natural systems, so that it is generally nec-
essary to take account of. at least three levels.
Even when the lowmt lcvel is very. well under-
stood, the role which it plays, at the next higher
level when interconnected with other systems, can
be qoite obscure. For example, an enzyme bio-
chemist may be able to describe a particular
metabolic loop very ellecdvcly by a transfer Iwnc-
tion, but Ibe quite unable to spbciFy haw it fits
into the overall metabolic process of the cell as a
coherent whole.
This situation or being unable to understand
haw elements, even quite well underslood elc-
mznts. coordinate or somehow runetion efhec-
tirely together at the next higher lcvel, is quite
common in the study of narural syslems,'and is a
major source or our desire for a better developed
theory of autonomous systems.
Some Fragments of theory emphasizing the
aumnomy or systems d o exist, but they are far
less developd than is the behavioristic approach.
First and foremost, thc idea OF stability derived
[ o m classical mechanics, has been extensively
studied and used. As wc said before, a set of
interdependent differentiaI equations can be used
to represent the autonomous properties oi a
whole syslem. Rosen? Iberall'O and lange"^
have applid this perspective lo natural systems
with various degrees or ernphnsis on autonomous
behavior. More speclific examples can be found in
population biology," cellular b i o l ~ p y , ' ~ -and
~'
more recently, in nturobiology." Some thought
has been given to cooperative interactions in this
area or hierarchical multilevel systems. The idea
of hierarchy is of~enpresented from the p i n t or
view of the interdependency or different levels of
systems dcs~ripzions.'~."~'~Particular instances
of hierarchical structure including rnuItiIeveF
cooperation can be Found in "- 2 0 + 2 ' .G o g ~ t n ~ ~ . ~ ~
p m n ts a genera! theory of hierarchical systems
of interdependent processes. Its basic ideas are
interconnection, behavior, and lcvel, and its
theoretical framework is categorical algebra. A
East area in which the idea of a whole system is
somewhat explicit is that or self-organizing sys-
tems. Work in this area based on an information-
theoretic. approach includes ron Foerster,'" and
A11an.I~
 36 J. A. GOGUEN AND f. J. YARELA
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007
We do not intend to unite all these various
rhretlds of research together in a single kame-
work. Rather. we emphasize the ways in which
pairs of seemingly different points or view, such
as autonomy/control, are cumplementary, in the
sense or conthibutiag ta a better understanding of
natural systems. But 'the idea of complementarity,
hundarnental though it seems, is still vague. The
next two sections develop an txpiicit definition,
4. NETS AND TREES
II we retain inttrtst only in the connectivity of a
system, it is possible to represent the duality
recursion/behavior by 'a networkJtret duality.
Intuitively, the nodes in these nets or trees repre-
sent the elcrnents or components of a system,
while their links reprcscni interactions or in-
terconnections. Tht reciprocal connectivity of a
net suggests the coordination of a system's ele-
ments; a tree structure suggests the sequential
subordination or a system's parts, each part hnv-
ing its own wel1delined input-output behavior
description. To be sure, in retaining only the
basic connectivity of a system's organization.
much is disctlrded in the netttree representation.
We intcnd to use this convenient gencrol repre-
sentation to study camplemenrurity.
Now ro the definition of nets and 'trees. Let
therc be a set of ( v , . .... w,} OF nodes (components
or parls), which arc to be interconnected by a set
or E = {c,. ....c . ~ edges ) (relations or processes).
1. DEFINITION A r~eswork is n directed graph
C, that is, a quadruple G=(IC[,E,do.2,), where
- J,:E+IGI
1Gb= { D , , , . . , u ~ } . and are the source (i
) and target (i = 1 3 functions, from the edges
to the nodes ot G. lf e ~ E , d , e = v and d , c = u',
then we write e : v + v ,
2. DEFINITIONA path from v to v' in a graph
G is a finite sequence p = e, . ..e, 06 edges which
arc adjacent, that is, sa~isfya, e, =Joe,, for I 2 i
s n , with doeo= w and ?,en==". lr d,p=v and d,p
= v', then write p: v - . ~ ' ,
3. EXAMPLE Consider the graph G:
1 graph and a ~GIl is a vertex.
k jlZ
The nodes 1,2,3 might represent three physical
locations, each with a CB (Citizens Band) radio,
Because of direrencts in transmitter and rmivzr
strength, available frequencies, and terrain, corn.
munication is possible only along the channels
indicated by arrows in (5). For example, there is
a mountain bttwcen I and 4. k t us assume that
node 1 is of particular interest-say it is our
base. Thcn we are interested in the patterns of
transmission which are possible starti& from our
base. For example, to reach node 3, if channel g
is out, we can send a message via f ij; to verify its
correctness, it couId k sent back to node 1, via
the pathjijk; node 3 might also generate a reply,
which would require a message to be sent to
node 2, giving a path ijkj; and so on. Thus, we
arc interested in the set of all paths in G with
source 1. This c~llection itself has a branching
structure, because starting with a given path, i t
can sometimes be developed rurther by choosing
alternative edgcs to get alternative paths. The
collection of all choices can be represtnted by [he
following tree
Notice that it is an infinite tree,
I n some sense the tree (6) "unravels'" or "un-
+
folds" the graph ( 5 ) rrom node 1. To make this
more precise w t define tsm, pointcd graphs, and
structure-preserving mappings ot graphs called
graph homomorphism.
4. DEFINITION A poinrsd graph t is a 5-tupfc
(IG[,E,~,.C,,~) such that <] G l . ~ , 2 , , d , > is a
A pointed graph is reachable iT for each vertex
v s ] G I there is a path a+v in G.
1
A graph G is loopfree if for all u, Y'E GI there
is at mosl one path v-v'.
A tree is a reachable 1oopiree pointed graph,
5. DEFINITION Let G be a pointed graph
(1GI,E, Eo, S,, 0 ) . Then the unfoldmtnr U,(G) of G
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007
DUALITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY
rrom a, is the graph in which: lCI,(G)I is all the
paths p:a-.o, for YEIG~;
the edges of U J G ) are
the pairs (p,pe), such that p, p e ~ Iu,(E)(,
and
e E E ;do{p, pe) = p, and a , { p , pe} = pe. The null
path o+a is written l,:o-~u, and is taken to be.
the point For U , ( G ) ,
6. P~omsrnon Let C be o pointed graph
{I G 1, E, 3,. a,. a>, and U J C ) the unfildmnr of G
from a. Then U,(G) is a trre.
Proof We must show that U J G ) is a pointed,
reachable, and loopfree graph. By the definition :
of CI'JG), it has point 1,: a+a.
We now show that U , ( C ) is reachable.
...
Consider a node p :a+o of Wa(G), say p=e, e,
# id, with e, E E. Then we can show that:
is a path horn 1, to p in U , ( G ) . Clearly its source
is 1, since
and its targct is p since
Moreover q is n path since its edges are adjacent,
that is.
=dO{e0...e,+,,eo...e,+2)
=t'e.,.e,+,, for 0 s k s n - 1 .
So there is a path from 1, to every node in
W,(C).
Last we show that U,(G) is loopfree, that is,
for every palr of nodes p.p' in U,(G) there is at
most one path p'+p in U , ( G ) . Consider again p
= e o n ..en, and lets show first that there is exactly
one edge with target p, e.g.' exactly one path of
length one. Any edge with target p is d the form
} with se,=p. Thus r must equal
e,... em-,, and the unique edge is ( e Q . . . e , , ,,p).
This says that if p W # p , a path p'-p must end with
edge (e o . . . e ,-,,p ) . Let now p,=e, ...e,. Then a
path p ' h p must be a composite of a path p'
, ,,
-+pa - with edge (p,, p). But we may reason
37
in a similar way for the node pa-, , and the path
p r 4 pm - , , p ,-,, and p ' k p ,-,, and so on.
Eventually we must find that p'=p, for some k,
and the unique path p'+p is of the form
If p=p', the unique path p+p' is the null path at
p. Thus U,(G) is loopfree, and the proof, is
complete,
7. DEF~NITION
Let G={lGl.E,a,,J,> and G'
=(IG'~, E;db,a',) be graphs. Then a raph mor-
phism is a pair ( J FI, F) a l luncrions I Ff : G -1 Cl
and F : E - c E ' , such that the source and targel
relationships are preserved, that is, such that
and
i.e. such that the diagram
commutes for i = O and i = I. We will generally
I'
abbreviate { F , F ) to just F. A morphism o/
painled grap rs, from G to G', is a graph mor-
phism F such that IFla=a', where a, a' are the
selected vertica of G, G' respectively.
The relation between a g a p h G and its untold-
rnent is, from our perspective, very interesting. Given
a node a in G, then U,(G) is a loopfree version of
C. We could say U , ( G ) expresses G as a (possibly
inlinite) chain of subordinated choices, starting
from the selected node, The unfoldment of G
optimally "covers" G in a sense which is made
precise through the '*universal property" of
U,(G). that any graph marphism F : T + G cnn
be factored through a "covering morphism"
CG:LI,(G)-.G, defined as follows: Tor p a node or
U,(G), let Ic,[ p = d , p ; and for ( p , p e > an edge of
U,IG 1, let C,<a pe) =Q.
We now show that CG is a graph morphism.
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007

38 J. A. GQGWEN AND F. J. VARELA

For ( p , p e } an edge of U,(G), then Thus F satisfies the rquirtd conditions.

For a detailed proof, and the uniqueness argu-
30 c, (P. P )=doe. "
ment see Theorem 7,
This theorem brings into focus the basic in-
ICttdo(~,per=IC,lp=a,p, tuition that there is a mutual interdeptndence
and between a system's elements (as a graph), and the
sequential subordination ai their interconnections
(as a tree). To express this more clearly, let Cr, be
the cIassz7 or pointed graphs, and let T be the
becaus~pe is a path. Abo, class of trees. Also, if G and G' arc pointed
graphs, let Gt, (C,17) denote the set of 'all
~ , C G <pe>=a,e.
P* pointed graph rnorphisrns from G to G'.
and Since every trce is by definition a pointcd
graph, w t have a mapping

We now show that any other morphism horn a

tree can bc factored through CG.
which simply views t r m as pointed graphs, We
8. THEOREM Let G be a pointed graph, let T be also have a mapping
a tree. and ler F: T d G be o pointed graph
morphism. 7hen there b o unique ~ o i n t e dgruph U
Gr, .----a T
morplrism f :T- UJG) such that:
which assigns to every pointed graph the tree
WIG) which covers it. These two mappings F,U
are tightly interlocked. For any h~ M o r (G,
FT)
we have
CG

Sketch oJ Proaf Lct vel TI. Then there is a

FK forauniquc 1
Ulc)
.
unique path p:r-u in T, where r is its root, and FT T
F : Fr=a+Fv is a path in G. Now we define
by Theorem 8. This says rhat there is a bijection
, and for e : v + v ' , an c d ~ ein T, we
(Fp)Fej, and edge in U,(GJ. v :Gr,(F7; G)-Gt,(?; U G )
Then :
defined by o ( h ) = h . We will call (F,U,rp) a
~ ~ , ~ ~ F ~ ~ = I C ~ I F F = F ~ ~ P = ~ Fcomplementarity
(~. k t w t t n Gr, and T,
and This notion of netltrtt complementarity e k e -
tively relatw two levels of dwription of systems.
CGFe= c ~ { F P(Fp)Fe}
, =Fe.
in such a way that each n m i t a t e s the other. 12
is convenient at this point to see that similar
notions of complemen~arity apply to other
situations, and so we now turn to rhe general
We now verify that F is a pointed graph notion.
morphism:
a,Fe =d o ( ~ p , ~ ( ~ p=) F
~ cA> P ~ & ~ =Fp,
= IFIV 5. COMPLEMENTARITY A N D
ADJOINTNESS
T h e netjtree complementary is a particularly clear
instance of the interdependence of apparent du-
alities. This Section develops this idea in the
 DUALITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007
general setting of category theory, which is be-
coming increasingly useful in systems theory."*''
Readers unfamiliar with this terminology may
find a leisurely introduction in ' 0 - 3 ' or we
attempt to stay at a fairly intuitive level in this
Section, although some technicalities are
inevitable.
The intuitive idea of a category is that it
embodies some structure by txhi biting the class
of all objects having that structure, together with
all the structure prwerving mappings or mor-
phisms among them. (Somewhat wore technically,
categories assume there is an associative oper-
ation of composition on t hosc morphisrns whosc
source and target match.) This idea is due to
Eilenberg and M a c L a n ~ . ~ ~
For example, pointed graphs and pointed
graph morphisms constitute a category. If C 1s a
category, and A , B are objects in C, we shall ler
C ( A , B ) denote the set of all morphisms in C
rrom A to 8.
Usually, we are intcrestcd no[ only in objects
rrom various categories, but we are even more
interested in certaln constructions performed on
the objccts ol one category to yield objects of
another category. For example, unfoldment is a
construction performed upon graphs which yields
t recs. This construct ion has a kind of consistency,
in that i t can nlso be extended to the morphisrns;
that is, a rnorphism or pointed graphs induces in
a natural way, a morphism betwecn their unfold-
ments. This kind or consistency is expressed by
saying that the construction is funcrorial, or is a
Jmcrar. {More technically, this has to do with the
preservation of the composition or rnorphisms).
However, the unColdment construction is na-
tural in n much stronger sense: the ''optimal"
covering of a graph is its unioldrnent; this is
expressed by the universal property of
Theorem 8, and the bijection q ol the previous
section. The conccpk of.adjunction generalizes just
this state of affairs, to the lollowing situation:
Let A and B be categories, let F be a lunctor
from A to 0 , and C a functor from 0 to A. Then
an adjuncrion is, in addit ion, a natural bijection.
This says that every rnorphism f : FA+B de-
termines a unique rnorphism ~ ( f A-.GB.
) : (The
precise sense of the '"naturalness" or cp is that of
n a t u a l transformation, due to Eilcnbtrg and
M a ~ L a n c , ~which
' however, we shall not define
here. The idea o i adjunction is due to Kan.")
39
The discussion at the end of the previous
section shows that the netltrix complementarity
is an instance of the concept of, adjunction. What
we now propose, is to explore she view [hat rhe
precise concept of udjuncrion is on explication of
the general (and vogue) concept of
complementarity.
Another example a1 this is Goguen's adjun.
ction lxtween minimal realization and be-
h a v i ~ r . * ~ ~Let
' ' A be the category o l automata
(in some fixed smse which we shall not explain in
detail), and let B k the category of input-output
behaviors of such automata (with appropriate
rnorphisms). Then there is a functor from B to A
which constructs the minimal au tomalion M ( B )
having the behavior 3;and there is a functor Be
from A to '& which constructs"the behavior Be(A )
of an automaton A. Moreover, thtre is a natural
bijection
which expresses the complementarity of the no-
tions of internal stale transition (as embodied in
automata) and input-ouaput behavior. GoguenJ5
has shown that many other classes or systems
exhibit such a complementarity with their input-
ourput behaviors.
Hert is still another example. IT G is a graph,
the collection of at1 paths (From all sourws) in G
forms a category whosc objects art the nodes of
G, and whosc rnorphisrns are the paths of G;this
category is denoltd Pa(G), and called the path
caregory OF G. Pa is a functor from the category
Cr of graphs to the category Cat of (small)
categories. There is also a functor F from Cot to
Gr, which merely forgets the additional structure
which categories have over graphs (namely. the
possibility of composing morphisms), regarding
the objects as nodes, and the morphisms as
edges. Again, there is a natural bijection
C)-.Gr (G, FC)
q : Cat (Pa(C),
expressing the complementarity of graphs and
categories. Alternatively, Pa(G) is the free ca-
tegory generated by the graph G, and the adjun-
ction (or [he corresponding "universal property")
expresses this relationship. (See3& for further
details.)
In general, it is more satisfacltory to consider
diflcrtnt modes of dexription that may appear as
opposites. to be complementary instead. This is
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007
4
l J. A. GOGUEN 41
the case, quite rigorously, with the apparent
dualities ntt/trec and recursion/behavior. as we
have seen above. On a more intuitive level, there
is a similar relatianship for the pair auto-
nomy/control discussed in earlier sections.
LawvereJ4 is a particularly fundamental, stimu-
lating paper, which suggesrs that there is.a cont-
plernen tary relationship between the traditional
conceptual/fomal viewpoints in the foundations
or mathematics. This duality also appears as a
semantics/syntax pair, in that LawvereJS has
shown an adjunction between a functor which
associates to each algebraic theory its category of
semantic models (i.c., Its algebras), and a Functor
which extracts from each category, the optimal
syntactic t32tory or its algebraic component of
structure.
VarelaJn has described many situations where
apparent opposites arc in Iact complementary.
Out usual way of thinking about pairs of de-
scriptive notions is biased in the direction of
regarding them us mutual negations, or the g-
n e r d lorm: not-A/A. I t is the case, however,
that many of the most important such pairs
operatc by mutual specification. that is. are com-
plemcntnry. We mention in particular, content/
' Torm, scmantics,'syntax. ~utonomy/controt, net/
tree. minimal-model/behaviw, sirnultaneous/
sequential, and tnvironment/system. OC course,
the gcrminal example is the fernale/rnale com-
pkmcntnrity, which seems to bc particularly mis-
understood as nn opposition in our contem-
porary culture.
This general point seems particularly clear in
the context or systems theory: there is no whole
system without an interconnection or its pans:
and there is no whole system without an environ-
ment. Such pairs are mutually interdependent:
tach defines the other. What is remarkable about
the notion or adjoint functor, is that it captures
the notion OF complementarity in a very precise
way, without imposing any particular model lor
the nature of the objects so related. It is also
worth noting that there is a well-developed
theory of adjunctionsr for example. the corn-
position OF ~ w o adjoint pairs of functors is an-
other adjoint pair. Such results should be very
useful in system theory. Of course, not all pairs
of descriptive modes are eornpttmzntary, and
similarly, not all pairs of runctors are adjoint.
The so-called "adjoint runctor t hcorem" provides
some generill conditions For when a given functor
in iact does have an adjoint, and again, this may
well find some application in general discussions
about system theory. Much more work, including
many Further exampPes, wiIl be needed to dis-
cover the proper domain of application, and the
limits, of the adjointless idea.
The general system theory of G o g ~ e n ~in- ~*~'
volves a hierarchy of Iewels, much as pictured in
Figure 8, with functors going outwardJ9 which
regard a component at a lower 1cvcl as a whole
system at the next higher level, and runetors
going inward which compute the behavior of the
whole system, viewing the result as a single
object at the lower level. Thcre is a base level o l
glven 'objects" our of which systems can be
constructed, and objects at level ( i + l ) arc in-
terconncctions (that is systems) of objects at ltvel
i. Goguen shows that each pair of outward/in-
ward functors is an adjunction. The inward iunc-
tor is in Iact the tundarntntal categorical con-
struction known as "limit". Goguen also shows
that the consrruction of interconnecting a system
of systems (over some common subparts as "ter-
minals") 10 get a single systcm, is given by the
dual concept or "colimit", which also appears as
an adjunction. This is not the place to give
details, bat the connecrion with the themes of
this paper should bc evident.
6. HOLISM AND REDTTCT10NISM
If we think OF the philosophy of.science, the
dual~ty holism/~ductionism comes to mind as
analogous to the material previously discussed in
this paper.
Most discussions place hoIism/reductionism in
polar opposition.a"."~41 This stems no stem from
the historical split ktwetn empirical sciences,
viewed as mainly rductionist or analy~ic.and the
(European) schools of philosophy and social
science that grope toward a dynamies of
totaEiti~~.*~"*
In the light of the previous discussion, both
attitudes are possible lor a given descriptive level,
and in fact they arc complementary. On the onc
hand, one can move down a level and study the
properties of the components. disresarding their
mutual interconnection as a system.On theother
hand, one can disregard the detailed structure of
the components, treating their behavior only as
contributing to that or a larger unit. I t seems.thnt
both these directions of analysis always coexist.
either implicitly or explicitly, because these de-
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007
DUALITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY
sc'riptivt levels are mutually interdependent Ior
the observer. We cannot conceive of components
if t h t r t is no system from which they are abstrac-
ted; and there cannot be a wholt unless there are
constitutive clemtnts.
. It is interesting to consider whether one can
have a measure &r the degree of wholeness of a
system. One can, of course, always draw a distinc-
tion, make a mark, and get a "system" but the
rtsuh does not always seem to be equally a
"whole system*',a "natural entity", or a "coherent
object" .or "concept". What is it that makes some
systems more cohtrtnt, more natural, more
whole, than others? (See45,7~a6, for different ways
to answer thesc questions.)
One thing ta notice is, that in the hierarchy or
levels, "emergent" or "immanent" properties a g
pear at some levels. For cxamplc, Ict us consider
music as a system or organization of notes (for
the purpose or this example, we do not attempt
to reduce notes to any lower lcvel distinctions).
Then harmony only arises when we consider the
simultaneous or parallel sounding of notes, and
melody only arises when we consider the sequtn-
tial sounding of notes. That is, harmony and
melody are emergent properties of a level of
organization above that OF the notes themset ves.
, can only emerge at a still higher
~ i m i l a r l ~farm
level of organization. relating dimerent melodic
units to one another, These properties, form,
melody and harmony. arc systems properties,
arising from hierarchical organizations oC notes.
into pieces or rnusa; they are not properties of
notes, (See47 For further discussion of the hle-
rarchical organization of music.) I t also appears
that "life" is an emergent property or the biologi-
cal hierarchy of levels: it is nowhere to be found
at the lcvcl of aroms and rnoleculcs; but it
becomes cleat at the level of cells through the
autcpoietic organization or molecule^.'^-'^
Language can be been as an emergent property at
a stilt higher level: of this hierarchy."
Thus, one point of view toward wholeness is
that it co-o&uss with interesting emergent pco-
ptrtits at some level. A sequencc of notes is
whole if it is an interesting melody. Similarly, the
significant differences in behavior or cells and
organism rrom the behaviors or atoms and mo-
lecules, marks the cells and organisms as whole
systems.
Another point. OF view toward wholeness, is
that i t can be measured by the diflculty of
rerlrrcrion: Because it is very hard to reduce the
41
behavior of organisms to the behaviors of mo-
Iecules, we may say that organisms are whole
systems. Similarly, it is very diflicult (if not
impossible) to reduce the effects or melodies to
the effects of notes. Onc must consider properties
ol patterns of notes or molecules.
A third point of.vitw is that a system is whole
to the extent that its parts art lightly intereon-
necred, that is, to the degree that ir is dificult to
find relatively independent subsystems. This is
clearly related to the previous views. An interest-
ing corollary or this view is that a system with a
strongly hierarchical organization will be lws
whole than a system with a strongly heterarchical
organization; that is, ntrs arc mort whole than
trees. More precisely, given that the graph OF
connections or the parts or a system has no
isolated subsystems, the more tree-like it IS, the
less whole it is, while still k i n g (presumably) a
system. The extreme is probably a pure linear
structure, without any branching at all.
A lounh point of view, is that a system seems
more wholt if it i s more complex, that is, mort
dificdt no reduce to descriptions as intercon-
nections of lower level components. I t is nec-
w a r y in this discussion to take account of the
very modern point or view that the relatively
more complex a system is to describe. the more
random it is; in fact, K ~ l r n o g o r c vwho
~ ~ gave
the original foundation for probability theory in
terms of measure theory," has proposed to redc-
fine probabiliky theory and informntion theory in
terms of complexity theory. Thus, for example,
the wholeness or a living sptem is. in everyday
encounters, construed as unprdictability. The
more difticult it is to reduce a system to a simple
inputJoutput control the more likely it is we will
deem it alive, In this sense complete autonomy is
logically cquivalenl 10 complete randomness.
Another example: a piece oi music which is too
comptex (rtfative to our cultural expectations and
inherent capacities) will sound random, chaotic,
perhaps mcaninglcss, but it will also sound
whole. Here the extreme is white noise. (See4' lor
a discussion ob hierarchical complexity with a g
plications to musical atsthet icr.) fhis viewpoint
toward wholeness involves measurement relative
to some standard interpreting syslem, such as a
human being. But given such a standard, this
viewpoint can be deduced lrom the preceding
viewpoints. For surely, if it is dificult to describe
a system. it will also be diflicutt to reduce i t to
lower ltvtls. and its parts w ~ l lseem to k tightly
Downloaded By: [UNAM] At: 23:17 12 October 2007
42 J. A. GOGUEN AND F.J. VARELA
interconnected- Quite possibly, its very corn-
ploxity will appear as an emergent property.
On the other hand, a diflerent cognitive view-
point might well 'be b e ~ t t rable to p r o w what
now seems likc a very complex system, and thus
see it as less whole. Once again, the relativity to
cognitive rapacity appears, This can bc sem over
and over in the history of. science, as new tech-
niquw, tools, or ideas, suddenly make long stand-
ing problems soluble, or perhaps, uninteresting or
even ill-posed.
Thest descriptive levels haven't been gmeralIy
realized as complementary largely because there
is a diflerence between publicly announced
methodology nnd actual practice, in most fields
or research in modern science. A reductianist
attitude is strongly promoted, yet the analysis 06
n system cannot begin without acknowledging a
dcgrec of coherence in the system lo be in-
vestigated; the analyst has to have an intuition
that he is actually dealing with a coherent pheno-
menon. Although science has publicly taken a
rductionisz attitude, in practice both approaches
have always been active. I t is not that one has to
have a holistic view as opposed to a rcductionist
view, or uice uuersa, but rather that the two views
ofsystems arc cornpbmen~ary.
There is a strong current in contcmprary
culture advocating "holistic" views as some sort
o l cute-all. This is easily seen in discussions of
environmental phenomena, health delivery, and
value systems. The way in which holism is used
in this paper is quite diretmt. We simply see
reductionism and holism as complementary, or
"cognitively adjoin t", Tor the dmript ions of those
systems in which we ate interested. Reductionism
implies attention to a lower level, while holism
implies attention to a higher level. Thtse are
intertwined in any satisfactory description; and
each entails some loss relative to our cognitive
pretcrcnces, ns well as some gain,
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