Clientelism 

is the exchange of goods and services for political support, often involving an implicit
or explicit quid-pro-quo.[1][2] Clientelism involves an asymmetric relationship between groups of
political actors described as patrons, brokers, and clients.
Although many definitions for clientelism have been proposed, according to the political scientist
Allen Hicken, it is generally thought that there are four key elements of clientelistic relationships:

 Dyadic relationships: Simply, these are two-way relationships.

 Contingency: Delivery of a service to a citizen by a politician or broker
is contingent on the citizen's actions on behalf of the politician or party through which
they are receiving services.
 Hierarchy: The politician or party is in a higher position of power than the citizen.
 Iteration: The relationship is not a one-off exchange, but rather, ongoing.[3]
Contingency and iteration are the two components shared across most definitions of clientelism.[4]

Origins[edit]
The origin of the practice has been traced to ancient Rome. Here relationships between
the patron (patronus) and client (cliens) were seen as crucial to understanding the political
process. While the obligations between these were mutual, the key point is they were
hierarchical. These relationships might be best viewed not as an entity but rather as a
network (clientela), with the patronus himself perhaps being obligated to someone of greater
power, and the cliens perhaps having more than one patron. These extensions increase the
possibilities of conflicting interests arising. While the familia was the basic unit underlying Roman
society, the interlocking networks (clientela) acted as restrictions on their autonomy but allowed a
more complex society to develop. Historians of the late medieval period evolved the concept
into bastard feudalism. There is, as is usual, ambiguity in the use of political terminology and the
terms "clientelism", the "patron–client relationship", "patronage" and the political machine are
sometimes used to describe similar or related concepts.[5][6][7][8]
The reigns of Julius Caesar (49–44 BCE) and Tiberius (14–16 AD) have been characterized as
examples of widespread clientelism. In the 1500s, French political theorist Étienne de La
Boétie did not use the term clientelism, but described the practice of emperors who used gifts to
the public to gain loyalty from those who were eager to accept what amounted to bribery:
Tyrants would distribute largesse, a bushel of wheat, a gallon of wine, and
a sesterce [coin]: and then everybody would shamelessly cry, "Long live the King!" The
fools did not realize that they were merely recovering a portion of their own property, and
that their ruler could not have given them what they were receiving without having first
taken it from them. A man might one day be presented with a sesterce and gorge himself
at the public feast, lauding Tiberius and Nero for handsome liberality, who on the morrow,
would be forced to abandon his property to their avarice, his children to their lust, his very
blood to the cruelty of these magnificent emperors, without offering any more resistance
than a stone or a tree stump. The mob has always behaved in this way—eagerly open to
bribes.[9]

Mechanics[edit]
Susan Stokes et al. distinguish clientelism as a form of non-programmatic policy within
distributive politics. It meets the criteria through failing to meet the two requirements of
programmatic distribution, that are (1) 'formalized and public' and (2) 'shape actual
distribution of benefits or resources'.[1] Within non-programmatic policy, clientelism is then
distinguished from 'pork-barrel politics' in that voters are given a benefit or are able to avoid a
cost conditional on their returning the favor with a vote.[1] The patron/client system can be
defined as a mutual arrangement between a person that has authority, social status, wealth,
or some other personal resource (patron) and another who benefits from their support or
influence (client).[10] The patron provides selective access to goods and opportunities, and
place themselves or their support in positions from which they can divert resources and
services in their favor. Their partners-clients- are expected to buy support, and in some
cases, votes. Patrons target low-income families to exchange their needed resources for their
abundant resources: time, a vote, and insertion into networks of other potential supporters
whom they can influence.[11] However, patrons are unable to access the information needed to
effectively form the exchange; thus they hire intermediaries, brokers, that more equipped to
find out what the targeted voter needs, which voters will require less prodding, and if the voter
followed through on their end of the bargain.[1] As Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco
emphasize, brokers in turn serve political leaders, and they may also not target resources
exactly as leaders would wish; the resulting principal-agent problems can have important
implications for understanding how clientelism works.[1]
Standard modeling of clientelism assumes that politicians are able to monitor votes, and in
turn, reward or punish voters based on their choices. Quid pro quo would dissolve in the
absence of such monitoring, rendering clientielism highly inefficient at best and completely
ineffective at worst. However, evidence suggests that systematic monitoring of voter choice
at the polls is surprisingly uncommon.[4]
Patronage, turnout buying, abstention buying, and vote buying are subcategories of
clientelism.[1][12] Patronage refers to an intra-party flow of benefits to members.[1] Turnout
buying, coined by Nichter, treats or bribes voters to the polls whereas abstention buying
treats or bribes voters to keep them from going to the polls.[13] Vote buying is a direct transfer
of goods or services, in exchange for one's support and vote. The result for the good or
service is a question of did you or will you vote for me?[14] A key to understanding clientelism
might come in stressing not only the mutually beneficial relationships of exchange but also
asymmetries in power or standing. Implied is a certain selectivity in access to key resources
and markets. Those with access, the patrons (and/or sometimes sub-patrons or brokers) rely
on the subordination and dependence of the clients. In return for receiving some benefits the
clients should provide political support.

Forms of clientelism[edit]
Politicians can engage in clientelism on either (or both) a group or individual level. One way
individual level clientelism can manifest itself is in a vote buying relationship: a politician gives
a citizen goods or services, and, in exchange, that individual citizen promises to vote for that
politician in the next election.[15] Individual level clientelism can also be carried out through
coercion where citizens are threatened with lack of goods or services unless they vote for a
certain politician or party.[16] The relationship can also work in the opposite direction, where
voters pressure politicians into clientelistic relationships in exchange for electoral support.[17]
Stokes' research on clientelism in Argentina assumed that the Peronist party was providing
financial support to prospective voters to buy their votes. It was hypothesized that Peronists
targeted moderately opposed voters because they were thought to be easily persuaded to
change sides at the party's minimal expense.[18] Stokes elaborated on the need of the
Argentinian Peronist party to be able to track who their clientele in fact voted for amidst
the secret ballot system. Stokes' argument is that the potential for vote buying depends on
the accuracy with which the patron party, the Peronists in the case of Argentina, are able to
monitor votes.[18] She uses evidence to show that overall smaller communities offer less
anonymity, making it easier for the patrons to find out who committed to supporting them.
Thus, Stokes concludes that this is one of the reasons why vote buying is more frequent in
relatively small communities. Another reason is that smaller communities are generally
poorer. Furthermore, smaller communities, which are generally poorer and have a greater
need for resources, are a more attractive target.[18]
Research by Nichter promoted a simpler hypothesis for the Argentinian election cycle: to
prove Peronists were solely buying supporting voters' turnout, not all the people's votes.[19] He
dismissed Stokes' arguments on patrons spying on smaller and poorer communities, instead
saying the Peronists initially targeted votes assumed to be their strong supporters. In this
case the patrons would be reasonably sure they receive a vote from a person if this person
receives a good from them.[19]
In many young low-income democracies, clientelism may assume the form of group-level
targeting, where parties channel benefits to specific groups of voters, conditional on past or
future electoral support.[3] For group-based targeting to work, parties must find efficient ways
to distribute benefits while also holding voters accountable—i.e., ensuring that they don't
renege on their commitments.[20] This leads parties to hire intermediaries, often referred to as
'brokers', who supply them with fine-grained information about who needs what and what
sorts of voters will and will not vote for them, regardless of the benefit(s) provided.[1] Party
brokers are not the only type of intermediaries that mediate clientelist exchanges; there
are organizational brokers who represent specific interest groups but mobilize voters for
multiple parties, hybrid brokers who also represent specific interest groups but demonstrate
strong party loyalties, and independent brokers who neither represent specific group interests
nor exhibit stable partisan attachments.[21]
Scholarly consensus has thus far eluded the question of why parties channel clientelist
benefits to certain groups more than others. Some of the earlier work on group-level targeting
argues that politicians are more likely to direct party largesse to their co-ethnics because
ethnicity helps parties solve the commitment problems that are so critical to making
clientelism work.[22] Some of the more contemporary work underscores the salience of
partisan loyalties: politicians direct the bulk of their vote-buying efforts at persuadable swing
voters—i.e., voters who are either indifferent to the party's professed programmatic goals, or
moderately opposed to them.[6] Some studies have challenged these claims, suggesting
instead that most instances of vote-buying in clientelist democracies might actually be
instances of turnout-buying, whereby parties shower benefits on their most loyal supporters
with the hope they will show up at the polling booth on election day.[23] However, the lack of
well-developed political machines does not preclude clientelist targeting. Recent studies have
shown that in many emerging democracies where parties often lack the organizational
capacity to monitor individual-level voting behavior, parties fine-tune their targeting strategies
by updating their beliefs about what sorts of groups have been most responsive to their
clientelist appeals in the past.[24]

Clientelism in context[edit]
Clientelism may not look the same from context to context.[16] Several individual and country-
level factors may shape if and how clientelism takes hold in a country including the types of
individual leaders, socioeconomic status of individuals, economic development,
democratization, and institutional factors.[25] In some contexts, clientelistic behavior is almost
expected, as these types of interactions can become embedded in the formal political
structures.[17] Some types of leaders (such as hereditary traditional leaders who remain in
power for extended periods of time) are more effective in carrying out clientelistic
relationships than others (such as elected officials).[26] Research has also shown that although
politicians can benefit electorally from clientelistic relationships by gaining support from those
who receive goods from them, there are also potential costs as clientelistic politicians may
lose support from wealthier voters who do not engage in clientelistic relationships themselves
view the practice negatively.[27] Not all voters view clientelistic behavior as a positive trait in
politicians, especially voters of higher socioeconomic statuses.[27] In short, there is no one
factor that causes clientelism to take hold.

Consequences[edit]
Clientelism has generally negative consequences on democracy and government while also
having more uncertain consequences on the economy.
The accountability relationship in a democracy, where voters hold elected officials
accountable for their actions, is undermined by clientelism. This is because under clientelism,
votes are contingent on gifts to clients rather than the performance of elected officials in
office. Clientelism also degrades democratic institutions such as the secret ballot and
administrative oversight. These factors both weaken democratic institutions and negatively
impact the efficiency of government.[3]
Corruption and the perception of corruption have also been established as strongly correlated
with clientelist systems. There are many reasons for this. For one, patrons often appear
above the law in many clientelist systems. What is more, some acts in clientelist systems
such as vote buying, could be inherently illegal. Finally, resources needed for patrons to
maintain the clientelist system could necessitate illicit means of obtaining goods.[28]
Some scholars believe that because patrons focus on the control and procurement of private
goods, they also neglect public goods such as roads and public schools which aid economic
development.[29] Scholars also note that rent seeking and corruption, prevalent in clientelist
systems, could negatively impact the economy as well. Nevertheless, there is still great
uncertainty in the economic effects of clientelism.[3]

Controversy[edit]
It is common to link clientelism with corruption; both involve political actors using public and
private resources for personal gain, but they are not synonymous. Corruption is commonly
defined as "dishonest and fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery",
[30]
 while political clientelism is seen as "the distribution of benefits targeted to individuals or
groups in exchange for electoral support".[31] It is common to associate the two together
because they moderately overlap.[32] There are different forms of corruptions that have nothing
to do with clientelism, such as voter intimidation or ballot stuffing. "Clientelism is considered
negative because its intention is to generate 'private' revenue for patrons and clients and, as
a result obstruct 'public' revenue for members of the general community who are not a part of
the patron-client arrangement."[33]
Clientelism as a strategy of political organisation is substantially different from other
strategies which rely on appeals to wider programmatic objectives or simply emphasize
higher degrees of competence. It is often assumed that clientelism is a vestige of political
underdevelopment, a form of corruption, and that political modernization will reduce or end it.
But alternative views stressing the persistence of clientelism – and the patronage associated
with it – have been recognized.[5][34][6]