Constitutional Political Economy

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09361-1

ORIGINAL PAPER

Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided

democracy’

Soumyanetra Munshi1 

Accepted: 4 January 2022

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
2022

Abstract
An ‘elite’ party caters to ‘elite’ voters, while a ‘non-elite’ party caters to ‘non-elite’
voters. Now, the ‘elite’ party wants to expand its support base to include ‘non-elite’
voters. It can do so using one of two possible strategies—it can provide them public
goods or it can dole out clientelistic benefits to them. We present a probabilistic vot-
ing model to study the conditions under which the ‘elite’ party is likely to choose
one or the other strategy. Our findings are supported by several historical and con-
temporary political experiences like that of the BJP in India, and the Muslim Broth-
erhood-affiliated parties in Egypt, Yemen, and Indonesia.

1 Introduction

Standard models of political competition have the following essential features: vot-
ers have policy preferences over a range of issues to redistribute resources through
state action; office-seeking politicians bundle issue positions into electoral platforms
that are often aligned in a single left-to-right dimension; voters evaluate their own
preferences vis-à-vis those offered by politicians and opt for the most preferred one
(often given other strategic considerations); and finally, victorious parties implement
their promises (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). What this kind of models ignore
is that often a different kind of patronage-based, party-voter linkage exists in many
countries, both developed and developing, where direct material inducements to a
targeted group of citizens, buy their vote. In such a clientelistic transaction1 there is
1
  The Wikipedia definition of clientelism states: “exchange systems where voters trade political support
for various outputs of the public decision-making process”. Descriptive accounts of clientelism often
include both, “vote-purchases via upfront pre-election payments (which are unconditional), as well as
post-election delivery promises conditional on election” (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2012). In this paper,
we use ‘clientelism’ in the sense of vote-buying, i.e., pre-electoral unconditional payments with the hope
of influencing the votes in the favor of the clientelistic party.

* Soumyanetra Munshi
soumyanetra@isical.ac.in
1
Economic Research Unit (ERU), Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Kolkata, India

13
Vol.:(0123456789)
 S. Munshi

a direct exchange of the citizen’s vote for direct favours (direct payments or access
to employment, goods and services). As a result, democratic outcomes in such a sys-
tem, does not necessarily reflect distributive outcomes preferred by broad categories
of citizens (e.g., income and asset redistribution through taxes and social benefits
schemes).
In this paper, we study such clientelistic transactions, albeit, under specific cir-
cumstances. Briefly, we study when clientelism is likely to be adopted in a democ-
racy where an established political party is trying to attract a voter population, that
has hitherto not been part of its core support base. We call such a party ‘elite’ (after
Thachil 2014). An ‘elite’ party typically caters to ‘elite’ voters, while a ‘non-elite’
party caters to ‘non-elite’ voters2. Now, the ‘elite’ party wants to expand its support
base to include ‘non-elite’ voters. It can do so using one of two possible strategies—
it can provide them public goods or it can dole out clientelistic benefits to them.
Under what conditions, is the elite party likely to turn clientelistic and when is it
likely to provide public goods? This is the question that we attempt to answer in this
paper.
We find that clientelism is likely to be adopted in areas where the provision of
public goods is relatively very costly, and where the total expenditure incurred in
delivery of clientelistic goods among the target ‘non-elite’ population is ‘small’
(small relative to the expenditure on public goods). Our findings are supported by
several historical and contemporary political experiences like that of the BJP in
India, and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties (ikhwan parties) in Egypt,
Yemen, and Indonesia.
Before we lay down our model, we elucidate on some aspects of our paper.

1.1 Clientelism

A substantial body of literature establishes clientelism3, more specifically vote-buy-

ing, as an integral part of politics in today’s world, both in the developed as well
as the less developed countries. Clientelism is broadly the practice of political par-
ties mobilizing electoral support by trading particularistic benefits in exchange of

2
  We elucidate on ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ below in Sect. 1.2—but note that several political parties have
these features—like the BJP (elite) and the Left (non-elite) in India, the PKS (elite) and the PKB (non-
elite) in Indonesia, and the FJP (elite) and Salafist Al-Nour party (non-elite) in Egypt (see Thachil (2014)
for much more details).
3
  The term ‘clientelism’ is very broad in its scope and has been used in many different senses by vari-
ous branches of scholarship and authors. For example, in anthropological studies, it refers to a “dyadic
transaction between traditional notables and their dependents bound by ties of reciprocity.” (Chandra,
2007) Similarly, van de Walle (2007) speaks of “clientelism that emerged in post-colonial Africa was
decentralized and rarely focused on the party. Clientelistic networks were fragmented, crisscrossing all
sorts of organizations in which elites exerted power and competed for supremacy. Every state’s insti-
tution appeared to benefit from them, but so did union organizations, the military, and even organized
religions.” However, unlike these instances, the sense in which we use the term is voters (possibly) recip-
rocating with votes for materialistic benefits (inducements before the election) bestowed on them by the
patrons who are politicians.

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

their votes4 (Stokes, 2005, Gans-Morse et al., 2014). Nichter (2008) speaks of ben-
efits like cigarettes, beer and medicine (in East St. Louis), coupons for free chicken
dinners (in Oakland), and “street money” (in Chicago), as instances of clientelistic
practices in the US. Mattresses, construction materials and marijuana are distributed
in Argentina (Szwarcberg (2013)). Other authors like Schaffer (2007) have noted the
wide range of goods used as inducements like soap, cement, whisky, coffins, ciga-
rettes, bicycles and other material items. In Taiwan, Cambodia, Brazil, Argentina,
and Mexico, varying number of voters (up to 40%) reported accepting cash before
an electoral campaign (Szwarcberg, 2013).
Clientelism pervades the political psyche of Indians too. Many media reports
seemed to lend credence to the fact that clientelism has played a big role in the
recently concluded Lok Sabha polls in India5. Some Rs 3,500 crore (approximately
US $490 million) worth cash, liquor, drugs were seized prior to the polls, a three-
fold increase over the 2014 seizure of Rs 1206 crore (approximately US $169 mil-
lion, The Statesman, Editorial titled ‘Law and the Lawless’, June 20, 2019). It is
likely that what was seized was just a “minuscule amount of what greased the elec-
toral wheels.” Bardhan and Mookherjee (2012) and Bardhan et  al. (2009) discuss
clientelism in West Bengal6.
Auerbach (2019a), for example, closely studies clientelism (and distributive poli-
tics in general, also see Auerbach (2016)) in Indian slums—“crowded, low-income
neighborhoods defined by their haphazard construction, weak or absent formal
property rights, and disadvantaged position in the distribution of public services...
In India alone, a staggering 65 million people reside in urban slums, exceeding the
entire population of countries like Colombia, Italy, and South Africa.... slums—
spaces commonly described as bastions of clientelistic politics, where parties are
assumed to have local workers in place to generate support among poor voters.” He
goes on to elucidate, “Parties distribute cash, food, and liquor in settlements before
elections to encourage support and turnout. Networks of political intermediaries

4
  However, there is an issue of commitment since with secret ballot, voters can easily renege—that is,
accept benefits from the machine but vote as they choose during elections. This problem is also related to
problems of what exactly a political party wants when it gives benefits to voters—is it turnout buying (of
loyalists), is it abstention buying (of opposing voters), is it double persuasion (of indifferent or opposing
voters) or is it rewarding loyalists? (Nichter, 2008, Gans-Morse et al., 2014) Some authors have looked at
clientelism as portfolio diversification (Magaloni et al., xxxx, Estévez et al., 2002). In our formal model,
we refrain from making subtle distinctions within clientelism and take it in the sense of vote-buying
where a political party makes transfers (monetary or in kind) to the people to increase the probability of
people voting for them.
5
  In fact, election to the Vellore Lok Sabha constituency in Tamil Nadu got scratched courtesy when
the Income Tax Department seized Rs 11.48 crore (approximately US $1.5 million) from the house of a
candidate for Vellore. It was alleged that the money would have been used to influence voters in his favor.
6
  However they use it in the sense of rewarding loyalists. Hence in their set-up, prior to election, each
party holds a rally, and citizens decide which rally, if at all, they want to attend. Attendance is observ-
able by both parties, who then condition the delivery of benefits to citizens on that basis. Specifically,
a political party, if elected will deliver benefits only to those citizens that attended its pre-election rally
and did not attend the rally of the rival party. Hence they study only post-election delivery of clientelistic
benefits. For example, jobs as civic volunteers, as para-teachers, in primary schools, etc. are all bestowed
on people who are enlisted workers for the party of the government. (Editorial in Ananda Bazaar Patrika,
a leading Bengali daily of West Bengal.)

13
 S. Munshi

assist slum residents in gaining access to state services, in the process collecting fees
and generating popular followings that can be translated into crowds during elec-
tions.” Auerbach and Kruks-Wisner (2020), compare between clientelism in urban
slums and that in rural peripheries. Auerbach and Thachil (2019) help us understand
clientelistic linkages better by studying how political brokers in slums respond dif-
ferently to different clients. In a related paper (Auerbach and Thachil (2018)), the
authors explore the reverse direction—how do clients/voters choose brokers/political
intermediaries to help them redress their woes. In another strand of related research,
Auerbach (2017) looks at horizontal associations formed by slum-dwellers and how
they interact with political brokers to demand development.
Many authors argue that the biggest component of clientelism is just norms of
reciprocity. As Lawson and Greene (2014) argue, “Clients regularly report feeling
indebted to the politicians who provide them with benefits and act accordingly.” One
example comes from the “new leaders” (naya netas7) in northern India (Krishna,
2007). Although these village notables cannot monitor voters’ behavior, they can
count on beneficiaries to support them nonetheless. As one naya neta of Rajasthan
put it:
It is a matter of keeping faith. People can obviously vote as they wish. But
most people remember well who has helped them in times of need. And it is
only a rare person who is faithless.
Several factors may influence the existence and persistence of clientelism. Kitschelt
and Wilkinson (2007) elaborate on the ease of supervision and monitoring, role of
economic development, and effect of political competition, among others, that could
affect clientelism through various channels. Auerbach (2019b) elucidates how slum-
dwellers are perennially kept in the clutches of clientelism. “Look, slums are only
vote banks in India. Politicians make promises that are not fulfilled,” (says one of
his respondents). While a politician unabashedly agrees, “After winning an election,
parties are afraid to give slum dwellers all the facilities, like education, healthcare,
roads, and other things, because they will become independent and not go around
seeking help. That is a loss for the parties.”
In this paper, we don’t study why clientelism is adopted and how it is effective in
the most general setting. Rather we study the conditions under which clientelism is
likely to be adopted in a democracy where an established political party is trying to
attract a voter population, that has not been part of its core support base.

1.2 ‘Divided democracy’

This paper studies vote-buying/clientelism by a political party in a ‘divided democ-

racy’. We use the phrase ‘divided democracy’ in two senses—the entire population
can be perceived to be divided into two groups while each of the political parties is

7
  Krishna (2007) distinguishes between different kinds of leaders available to the villages like “political
party officials, traditional village patrons (jajmaan), elected local council (panchayat) leaders, caste lead-
ers, and naya netas.”

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

also perceived to be catering to each of the two groups. Moreover, following Thachil
(2014), I don’t use the restrictive terminology of “left” or “right” parties but the
more flexible concept of ‘elite parties’, as described below. Put differently, consider
an economy where both the political actors and the electorate can be thought to be
divided into two kinds: parties can be of two types, an elite party and a non-elite
party, and similarly, voters can be of two types, elite voters and non-elite voters. An
elite party can attract voters using one of two possible strategies—it can provide
them public goods or it can act clientelistic and pay direct benefits to them. This
paper analyses this choice. Before moving on to the paper, let us briefly look at what
we mean by an elite party.

1.2.1 Elite party

Digressing from a left-right divide to describing parties, we now distinguish par-

ties based on the social composition of their core constituencies—the “groups most
influential in providing their electoral, ideological, and financial support, and in
shaping their policy profile”. I borrow the term elite from Thachil (2014) to describe
a party whose core constituencies are mainly located in the upper strata of society.
That is, a party is called elite when its core supporters are elite. Now who the elite
are in a society varies from context to context. For example, they might be connot-
ing the rich as in nineteenth century Britain or Argentina; or the whites as in South
Africa; or they may be associated with a particular ethnic group as in many African
countries (Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)). In Argentina, during some periods for
example, the elite is the military, and in most of the cases there is also close associa-
tion of the elites with the rich.
In poorer countries, like in India, the elite and privileged strata often include
the so-called middle classes, demarcated according to Western standards of con-
sumption, who are thus, closer to the top than the middle of the countries’ income
distribution.
To ascertain who constitutes a party’s core support base, we follow Thachil
(2014) and consider three dimensions in the existence of a political party—its inter-
nal composition, pattern of electoral support, and policy profile. So firstly, elite par-
ties emerging out of privileged social communities, have organizational positions
dominated by members of this group. Secondly, these parties receive disproportion-
ate electoral support from these privileged groups (though not exclusive support
since to be successful in elections they must win some non-elite votes as well). And
finally, elite parties should advance economic and cultural interests of the constitu-
encies they emerged to represent.
Later, in Sect. 3, we describe how the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India quali-
fies to be an elite party according to our criteria and so does the Muslim Brother-
hood-affiliated parties (or ikhwan parties) in Egypt, Yemen and Indonesia.
As political vehicles of the advantaged, these parties face the electoral challenge
of winning over non-elite voters, while still retaining their core supporters since in
all likelihood, the latter constitutes a numerical minority. Yet, these small privileged
cores are also economically and politically more powerful and well organized. The
question is how can the elite party pursue expansionary policies without hurting its

13
 S. Munshi

small privileged core support base. Here we consider two major strategic alterna-
tives—clientelism and provision of public goods.

1.3 Our model

Suppose initially, parties are completely specialised in the sense that the elite party
only provides the good consumed by elite voters whereas the non-elite party only
provides the good consumed by the non-elite voters8. Let x denote the good con-
sumed by the elite voters, g (a public good) denote that consumed by non-elite
voters. Let A denote the elite party (in the sense that it historically provides only
the elite good at first), and B denote the non-elite party (in the similar sense that
it provides the non-elite good only). In our set-up, we will hold party B’s behav-
iour constant throughout in that it only provides the non-elite public good g to the
non-elite population9. Now consider party A contemplating a penetration into the
non-elite population. Suppose it has two possible instruments to deal with the prob-
lem—it can either engage in clientelism (roughly meaning it can distribute amounts
of money to appease voters and win their votes) or it can start providing the public
good like party B to the non-elites. The question that we then explore is when or
under what condition is one or the other avenue better than the other10.
We find that clientelism is likely to arise in areas where the provision of public
goods is relatively very costly, and where the total expenditure incurred in deliv-
ery of clientelistic goods is ‘small’ (small relative to the expenditure on public

8
  This kind of division is often seen in real-life. For example, pertaining to two major political parties,
PKS and PKB in Indonesia, Thachil (2014) notes, “Of members supporting the PKS, 56% were in the
top third of the overall sample in terms of percentage of their educational attainment (most were college
graduates). By contrast, only 17% were in the bottom third of this category (almost all of whom had not
completed secondary school). In sharp contrast, 49% of the members supporting the PKB came from the
least educated subsample, and only 22% from their more educated counterparts.” This points to the elite
nature of PKS’s cadre and the disadvantaged core base of its rival PKB.
9
  This also seems to be historically true since the elite parties have tried to expand their voter base under
changed political circumstances but it is not commonplace to find a non-elite party trying to attract an
elite voter base.
10
  Note that the model does not distinguish between different levels of government (as in reality). In
reality, in India for example, most public goods provisioning takes place at the local level (Panchayats or
Urban Local Bodies). Hence for the purposes of the theoretical model, the party-operation level we are
focusing on, is the level at which decisions are being made (at the Panchayat/Urban Local Bodies level
in the Indian context). Hence the public good under consideration can be thought to be roads, bridges,
schools etc. in the village (and not national defence, space programs etc. which are mainly provided by
the government at the national/state level.) The analysis of the model should be visualised keeping this
caveat in mind. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for highlighting this aspect of federalism.
  This also rests a related doubt—is it the case that the elitist party doles out clientelistic benefits because
it cannot provide public goods, simply because it does not operate at the lowest levels of government
who is in charge of such public goods provisioning? It turns out that it is not so. In other words, it is not
the case that the elitist party (BJP in our case, say) has to dole out clientelistic benefits because it is oper-
ating at the national and state levels (and not at the local level), and hence cannot, even if it wanted to,
provide local public goods (because that decision wrests with some other level of government which is
controlled by some other party). In fact, in rather interesting empirical findings, it turns out that the elitist
party (BJP in India), was at the Union, state, and local government levels, and still chose to offer clien-
telistic transfers instead of public goods. See Sect. 3.1 for a closer look at such examples.

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

goods). Our findings are supported by narrative and historical evidences of sev-
eral countries like India, Egypt, Yemen, and Indonesia. Next, we turn to the for-
mal model.

2 The model

Let nE and nN be the number of elite voters and non-elite voters respectively. Con-
sider an elite voter i. Elite voter i would support party A if

vEiA + ui (xA ) ≥ vEiB + ui (xB );

where vEiA is the partisan preference of elite voter i for party A and vEiB is that for party
B, and ui (x) is his utility from the pliable policy x, where xA is the policy adopted by
party A, and xB is that adopted by party B. Everything else equal, partisanship cap-
tures the bias that a person has towards one party or another. This bias (or rather the
difference in biases), is modeled to be probabilistic (as in probabilistic voting mod-
els, see Grossman and Helpman (2001), for example) and drawn from a distribution,
as described below.
ui is assumed to have a unique maximizer (preference is assumed
to be single-peaked over policy x) and for simplicity I assume that the
maximizers are increasing with i. Hence for any two voters j and k,
j > k ⟺ arg max uj (x) > arg max uk (x). For simplicity, let the ith citizen’s pref-
erence over x be:

ui (x) = −(x − xi )2 .

Hence i votes for A if

vEi ≥ (xA − xi )2 − (xB − xi )2 ;

where vEi = vEiA − vEiB . Recall that here good x is the elite good, consumed mainly by
the elite voters (temples, for example, consumed by Hindus in India, and different
Hindus have different preferences over the number of temples). Assume that party B
does not provide any elite good, hence xB = 0 , so that i votes for A if

vEi ≥ (xA − xi )2 − xi2 .

As standard in probabilistic voting models, vEi is assumed

[ to be randomly
] chosen
from a prior distribution that is known. Let vi ∼ U f − 2f , f + 2f  . This gives a
E bE 1 bE 1
E E E E
uniform distribution with height fE which measures the diversity of preferences for
the fixed positions of the two parties, and a shift parameter bE which measures popu-
larity of a party’s fixed positions (image) on the whole. Hence the probability that
voter i votes for party A is given by, PiE
A
as follows (assume conditions on the param-
eters that make the expressions meaningful):

13
 S. Munshi

PiE
A
=Pr(vi ≥ xA2 − 2xi xA )
1
= + bE − fE [xA2 − 2xi xA ].
2
Therefore, the expected number of elite votes for A can be calculated to be
nE
1
( ) ∑
VAE = nE + bE − fE xA2 + 2xA fE xi . (1)
2 i=1

Party A maximizes the number of elite votes by choosing xA . Taking FOC of (1), and
letting average x, x̄ = n1 i=1 xi , we find that in equilibrium,
∑nE
E
nE
1 ∑
xA∗ = x = x̄ .
nE i=1 i

This is reminiscent of the well-known tendency of policies to converge to the

average where the equilibrium amount of the elite good is just the average of the
demands of all the elite voters. Substituting in (1), we get
1
( )
VAE = nE + bE + fE x̄ 2 .
2
Hence the number of elite votes in favor of party B would be VBE = nE − VAE which is
1
( )
VBE = nE − bE − fE x̄ 2 .
2
Hence whether A garners more votes than B among the elite voters would depend on
what the partisan bias ( bE ) is, the distribution of partisans ( fE ), as well as the aver-
age demand for the elite good ( x̄  ). As expected, among the elite voters, a favorable
partisan bias (positive bE ), concentration of partisans (large fE ), and large average
demand for the elite good (large x̄  ) will all prove to be conducive for A as far as elite
votes are concerned.
Now let us turn to the non-elite population. Non-elite voter i votes for A if

vNi ≥ (gA − gi )2 − (gB − gi )2 ;

where vNi = vNiA − vNiB . We have also assumed that only party B provides the non-elite
good g which party A doesn’t provide (like, schools and health clinics, for example,
in remote villages of India). Hence gA = 0 , so that i votes for A if

vNi ≥ g2i − (gB − gi )2 .

Let vNi[ be randomly] chosen from a prior distribution given by

vNi ∼ U f N − 2f1 , f N + 2f1  . This gives a uniform distribution with height fN which
b b
N N N N
measures the diversity of preferences for the fixed positions of the two parties, and a
shift parameter bN which measures popularity of a party’s fixed positions (image) on

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

the whole. Hence the probability that voter i votes for party A is given by, PiN
A
as fol-
lows (assume conditions on the parameters that make the expressions meaningful):

PiN
A
=Pr(vi ≥ 2gi gB − g2B )
1
= + bN − fN [2gi gB − g2B ].
2
Hence the probability that a non-elite voter votes for B will be
1
PiN
B = − bN + fN [2gi gB − g2B ].
2
Therefore, the expected number of non-elite votes for B can be calculated to be
nN
1
( ) ∑
VBN = nN − bN − fN g2B + 2gB fN gi . (2)
2 i=1

Party B maximizes the number of non-elite votes by choosing gB . Taking FOC of
(2), and letting average g, ḡ = n1 i=1
∑nN
gi , we find that in equilibrium,
N
nN
1 ∑
g∗B = g = ḡ .
nN i=1 i

This is again reminiscent of policies converging to the centre where the equilibrium
level of g is just the average of all the g’s demanded by the non-elite population.
Substituting in (2) and subtracting from nN  , we get the number of non-elite votes in
favor of party A as
1
( )
VAN = nN + bN − fN ḡ 2 .
2
Hence whether A garners more votes than B among the non-elite voters would
depend on what the partisan bias ( bN  ) is, the distribution of partisans ( fN  ), as well
as the average demand for the non-elite good ( ḡ  ). As expected, among the non-elite
voters, a favorable partisan bias (positive bN  ), will increase the vote share of A.
However, concentration of partisans (large fN  ), and large average demand for the
non-elite good (large ḡ  ) will tend to reduce the vote share of A.
Hence the total vote share of A in the economy would be
1 1 1
[ ( ) ( )]
VA = nE + bE + fE x̄ 2 + nN + bN − fN ḡ 2 . (3)
n +n E N 2 2

Given this benchmark case, we next consider what happens when the elite party
contemplates a penetration in the non-elite voter base via the strategies of public
good provision or clientelism. First, we consider the case when the elite party diver-
sifies into providing the public good g.

13
 S. Munshi

2.1 Elite party provides g

Non-elite voter i votes for A if

vNi ≥ (gA − gi )2 − (gB − gi )2 ;

where vNi = vNiA − vNiB . Now both the parties provide g. Hence i votes for A if

vNi ≥ g2A − g2B − 2gi (gA − gB ).

[ ]
Like before, let vNi ∼ U − 2f1 , f N + 2f1  . Hence the probability that voter i votes
bN b
fN N N N
for party A, given by, PiN
A
as
follows (we will assume conditions on the parameters
that make the expressions meaningful):

PiN
A
=Pr(vi ≥ g2A − g2B − 2gi (gA − gB ))
1
= + bN − fN [g2A − g2B − 2gi (gA − gB )].
2
Therefore, the expected number of non-elite votes for A can be calculated to be
nN
1
( ) ∑
VAN = nN + bN − fN (g2A − g2B ) + 2fN (gA − gB ) gi . (4)
2 i=1

Maximizing (4) w.r.t. gA we find that

g∗A = ḡ .

Hence substituting g∗A and g∗B in (4), we find that the vote share of A on diversifica-
tion into producing public good is as follows:
1
( )
VAN = nN + bN . (5)
2
Hence the total vote share of A in the economy when it diversifies into producing a
public good will be as follows:
1 1 1
[ ( ) ( )]
VAP = nE + bE + fE x̄ 2 + nN + bN . (6)
n +nE N2 2

Hence comparing this with (3), we see that A does not have the negative part of fN ḡ 2
when it starts producing the the public good for the non-elite.

2.2 Elite party turns clientelistic

Now suppose party A does not provide gA but pays some amount ci to each voter
encouraging it to vote for it. Hence a non-elite voter i votes for A if (ignoring prob-
lems of commitment where a non-elite voter may not vote for A even after accepting
the monetary transfer)

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

vNi ≥ g2i − (gB − gi )2 − ci ;

[ ]
where vNi = vNiA − vNiB . Like before, let vNi ∼ U f N − 2f1 , f N +  . Hence the proba-
b b 1
N N N 2fN
bility that voter i votes for party A is given by, PiN
A
as follows (we will assume condi-
tions on the parameters that make the expressions meaningful):

PiN
A
=Pr(vi ≥ 2gi gB − g2B − ci )
1
= + bN − fN [2gi gB − g2B − ci ].
2
We also know that in equilibrium,
nN
1 ∑
g∗B = g = ḡ .
nN i=1 i

Substituting we get the expected number of non-elite votes in favor of party A as

nN
1
( ) ∑
VAN = nN + bN − fN ḡ 2 ) + fN ci .
2 i=1

Hence the total expected vote share of A in the economy would be

nN
[ ]
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ∑
(7)
C 2 2
VA = n + bE + fE x̄ + nN + bN − fN ḡ + fN ci .
n E + nN E 2 2 i=1

Hence we see that how VAP in (5) and VAC in (7) compares, that is how the vote shares
of the elite party under the public goods provision regime and clientelist regime,
compares, will depend on how i=1 ci compares to nN ḡ 2.
∑nN
In general, clientelism will be more lucrative than public goods provision whenever
nN
∑
ci > nN ḡ 2 . (8)
i=1

Notice that this condition is more likely to be true, ceteris paribus, the smaller is nN
and lower is ḡ  . The following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 1 VAC > VAP iff i=1
∑nN
ci > nN ḡ 2 .

2.3 Incorporating costs

Let 𝜆 be the leakage rate of delivering private benefits to the non-elite population.
Hence the total cost of clientelism will be:
nN
∑
𝜆 ci .
i=1

13
 S. Munshi

Let p be the per unit cost of providing the good g. Hence under the public goods
regime, its total disbursement is p̄g . Suppose both the schemes are equally costly for
the elite party. That is, 𝜆 i=1 ci = p̄g . Substituting in (8), we find that clientelism is
∑ nN
better than public goods provision when both of them are equally costly, when
p
> 𝜆nN .
ḡ

The following proposition summarizes.

Proposition 2 When both clientelism and public goods provision is equally
costly, then VAC > VAP iff pḡ > 𝜆nN .
This can roughly be interpreted to mean that the cost of ḡ is greater than the cost
of clientelism. In other words, clientelism is likely to be better (worse) than public
goods provision when the cost of production of g is greater than average g. Note that
the condition is likely to be fulfilled

(i) the larger is p, the per unit cost of providing g, relative to ḡ  , the average
demand for public good in the non-elite population;
(ii) the smaller is 𝜆nN  , the leakage rate in delivery of clientelistic goods times the
target population .

Below we discuss the above mathematical conditions and highlight the circum-
stances under which clientelism is likely to be better suited:

2.4 p∕ḡ is large

This is likely to be true when existing levels of public goods is small and it is costly
to channelise resources to production of public goods. This again, is likely to be
true at lower levels of economic development. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007),
describe
Economic development is the most commonly confirmed predictor of differ-
ential modes of democratic accountability. Affluent democracies and parties
appealing to affluent citizens in a democracy tend to operate more through
programmatic accountability, while parties in poor democracies and parties
appealing to the poorest electoral segments tend to practice clientelism.... Poor
people cannot wait for material rewards and therefore prefer targeted handouts
to the distant benefits of policy change...
Hence economies with ample provision of public goods are less likely to see cli-
entelism than economies with dearth of them. Below, in the context of the rise of
the BJP in India, we see how this finding is corroborated. Briefly, BJP caters to
the Dalit and the Adivasis, the poorest of the Indians, through clientelism to gar-
ner their votes—this delivers them votes in the Indian state of Chhatisgarh where
public goods are scant but not in the state of Kerala, where public goods are rela-
tively abundantly available. Similarly the elitist ikhwan parties succeed in Egypt and
Yemen to woo poor voters where public goods provision is quite abysmal but not

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

in Indonesia where the level of economic development is much better. Hence, how
receptive poor voters are to clientelistic benefits, will depend, in part, on the existing
standard of living that correlates positively with the level of economic development.

2.5 
nN is small

Either the target population is small so that distribution (and associated monitoring)
might be more feasible, even when leakage rate per unit of delivery of goods is high
or the target population is large but the rate of leakage in delivery of clientelistic
goods is small, both of which contain the total expenditure on clientelistic benefits
and prevent it from blowing up. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), explain
... monitoring how a group votes is less costly than monitoring how individu-
als vote, so individual monitoring will be used more often where the number
of voters is small (hundreds or thousands rather than tens of thousands) and
geographically compact rather than dispersed.
Hence clientelism is viable as long as the total expenditure arising from its imple-
mentation is contained, i.e. 𝜆nN is small.
Auerbach (2019a), for example, very pertinently and interestingly points out, in
his intensive study of Indian slums, that public goods provisioning is better in slums
with large populations (and worse in less populated ones), owing to, among other
reasons, greater competition among political leaders of the squatter settlements for
votes. He writes, “a settlement’s population, or the size of its “vote bank”... shapes
the electoral incentives of political elites to expend limited party resources and party
positions. Moreover, residents of more populous settlements have greater incentives
to enter the fray of slum leadership, given the larger pools of local voters from which
they can draw rents and launch their political careers.” Hence public good provision-
ing is poorer relative to clientelistic dole-outs for less populous slums.
Below we provide some narrative evidence to broadly support the empirical pre-
dictions of the model.

3 Narrative evidence and discussion

We discuss the case of BJP in India and the Muslim Brotherhood in three countries,
Egypt, Yemen and Indonesia, to support our model’s predictions.

3.1 The BJP in India

The Bharatiya Janata Party is traditionally identified as a Hindu nationalist party and
a party of India’s privileged upper castes. Auerbach (2015) writes, “The BJP’s base
of support is traditionally understood to be within the Hindu and urban middle class.
In 2014, middle-class voters in urban India were described by the media as ardent
supporters of Modi, seeing him as a decisive ‘super-CEO’ for India—a strong leader

13
 S. Munshi

bent on advancing India’s economy and the aspirations of its growing urban middle
class.”
The BJP has consistently demonstrated all the three markers of elite parties. For
example, the party’s leadership positions and legislative candidacies have continued
to be dominated by upper castes. Among the loyal supporters of the party, upper
castes were two to six times as numerous as Dalit (former untouchable castes) and
Adivasi (indigenous tribal community) voters, despite constituting a much smaller
share of the overall electorate. Not surprisingly therefore, despite its ambitions to
be “a party of all Hindus”, the BJP has actually come to be recognized as a polit-
ical instrument in the hands of the “Brahmin-Bania” (two prominent upper caste
communities). The BJP too has not disappointed its core supporters. For example,
an analysis of manifestos and speeches of BJP leadership seldom shows dearth of
emphasis on Hindutva doctrines to expand its appeal to those alienated by it. Similar
was its ambivalence on the highly controversial issue of mandatory quota (reserva-
tions) for non-elite caste communities in India’s public sector.
Again, such an elitist bias in the programmatic stance of BJP is also apparent in
an analysis of its public spending. Typically, as succinctly put by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) while summarizing a huge political economy literature on the sub-
ject, “the rich prefer too few public goods while the poor prefer too many”. Thachil
(2014) analyzed patterns of public spending from 1967 to 2007 in fifteen major
Indian states accounting for more than ninety five percent of India’s population. He
finds that a 10 percentage improvement in the party’s seat share in a state resulted in
$13 million being diverted away from social services to more non-inclusive budget-
ary categories.
Given the elite party BJP we will discuss how in some states, to expand its reach
to subaltern population11, it has employed clientelism and provided local pub-
lic goods (through its service affiliates) while such tactics have failed in others. In
particular, in the Indian state of Chhatisgarh, for example, as discussed in Thachil
(2014), BJP through ground level service provisioning to Dalit and Adivasi com-
munities12, has been able to gain much support. Now Chhatisgarh is quite a less
developed state ( ḡ is low) and hence success of clientelistic methods corroborates
the finding of our model.

11
  Auerbach (2015) elucidates on various organizational methods that even help to increase the support
of BJP among Muslim voters, “The main structure of the BJP is supplemented by the prakosht and mor-
cha, or cells and wings, each tasked to organize various groups in support of the party. These groups
include the SCs and STs, OBCs, farmers, laborers, women, lawyers, university students, youth, and slum
dwellers. Party organizations are further strengthened by their social organization affiliates, such as Seva
Bharati, the Bajrang Dal, and the RSS. ... Among the most surprising findings of my fieldwork was the
growing strength of the BJP within Muslim slum settlements in Jaipur and Bhopal. The BJP and its
Sangh Parivar affiliates have long held deeply antagonistic, often violent relations with India’s Muslims.
Indeed, Modi’s political career has been colored by the Hindu-Muslim riots that unfolded during his ten-
ure as chief minister in Gujarat during the early 2000s. My qualitative fieldwork, though, demonstrated
that the BJP has made efforts in Jaipur and Bhopal to build support in Muslim communities.”
12
  Services were mainly provided by two major wings of the Sangh network, Seva Bharati (Service to
India, SB) and the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (Association for the Welfare of the Tribals, VKA).

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

... service provided substantive inducements to disadvantaged citizens and thus

provided a material basis for winning their support. However, to keep costs
to a minimum, the services provided by Hindu nationalists were necessarily
basic. Such frugal offerings were only going to be attractive to the poorest of
the India’s citizens, and of the communities the BJP regarded as Hindu, Dalits
and Adivasis were by far the most uniformly impoverished.
This also points to better targeting, less leakage (and hence smaller 𝜆nN  ) and hence
lower expenditure relative to public goods provisioning, again in support of the find-
ing in our model.
On the other hand, in the Indian state of Kerala, due to years of left legacy of
good public goods provisioning ( ḡ high), BJP’s tactics has not performed well.
[In Kerala,] [r]elatively reliable public services, especially in the very fields of
health and education in which Sangh benefits were concentrated, weakened the
attractiveness of Hindu nationalist offerings for most poor voters. Unlike their
counterparts in Chhatisgarh, Sangh activists complained of not even being
able to attract enrolees into their service wings. Given a choice, poor voters
appeared to prefer services provided by a government they voted for, rather
than from an elite party’s affiliates.
(Pg 184, Thachil (2014))
To look at a particular state more closely, consider the Indian state of Madhya
Pradesh where BJP has been in power there since 2003 (except 2018-20 period).
By all accounts, it is considered to be an underdeveloped state. An article on the
situation in MP articulates as follows13: ‘... a result of vision-less rulers who have
for decades handed out endless charities, patronage and sops, without real growth,
jobs and opportunities. ... The Madhya Pradesh Economic Survey says at least 14.1
lakh youth across MP are registered as unemployed. Voters are craving economic
opportunities, but only getting the well-meaning handouts of a mai baap sarkar14.
The article further describes how the chief minister of the state has been doling out
cash transfers, “Chouhan has created one yojana15 after another. There’s a Sambal
yojana (subsidised power), a Bhavantar Bhugtan yojana (cash payments to farm-
ers), and scores of other government yojanas. “Mama has created a jo-chahiye-le-
lo16 (handouts) policy,” says a resident of Gwalior, “but where will the youth go
without industry?”...”. On the other hand, there has been little or no effort at pro-
viding public goods. Another article17, for example, talks about the lack of public
service provision in MP, “The bypass was supposed to be paved; it wasn’t. A canal
was to be built 10 years ago; nothing has happened. The government declared that

13
  https://​times​ofind​ia.​india​times.​com/​blogs/​bloody-​mary/​the-​pakoda-​trap-​madhya-​prade​sh-​voters-​are- ​
crying-​for-​jobs-​oppor​tunit​ies-​but-​parti​es-​are-​handi​ng-​out-​sops-​patro​nage/
14
  Mai means mother baap means father, and sarkar means government in Hindi.
15
  Which means ‘Scheme’ in Hindi.
16
  Which means “Take what you want” in Hindi.
17
  https://​www.​google.​com/​amp/s/​thepr​int.​in/​opini​on/​in-​madhya-​prade​sh-​elect​ion-​bjps-​caste-​patro​nage-​
battl​es-​15-​year-​corru​ption/​155813/​3famp

13
 S. Munshi

the village would become a nagar panchayat18; taxes were collected from the villag-
ers but there’s no administrative change.” Such journalistic accounts clearly point to
the attempt of the BJP to woo poor voters through clientelistic dole-outs instead of
providing public services, especially when development has been very scant ( ḡ low),
as predicted by the theoretical model. In fact, this is true even when the elite party
(BJP) is at the helm in the Centre, State and local levels and any doubt regarding its
ability to provide public goods does not arise19.

3.2 The Muslim Brotherhood parties

The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic organization founded in Egypt in 1928. Here

we discuss the approaches of the Brotherhood (or ikhwan) parties in three countries:
Egypt, Yemen and Indonesia.

3.2.1 Egypt

“As the oldest and largest Islamist movement in the Arab world, the Egyptian Mus-
lim Brotherhood (MB) has long constituted a bellwether for the evolution of politi-
cal Islam.” (Pahwa (2017)) Like the BJP in India, the Muslim Brotherhood origi-
nated within relatively privileged communities in Egypt. Thachil (2014) writes of
its membership base to be “disproportionately stocked with highly educated, urban,
middle-class professionals in Egypt.” Masoud (2014) similarly writes, “the cadres of
the Muslim Brotherhood have long been drawn primarily from among well-educated
Egyptians of the middle classes”.
Yet with Mubarak’s ouster20, there was scope for greater political competition and
hence opportunity for services to play an important role in post-Mubarak elections21.
Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) emphasized ‘private welfare
over mandated public redistribution, both during its electoral campaign and when it
was in office following its 2011 victory. In fact, while in office, FJP was reported to

18
 According to Wikipedia (https://​en.​wikip​edia.​org/​wiki/​Nagar_​panch​ayat), “A Nagar Panchayat or
Notified Area Council (NAC) in India is a settlement in transition from rural to urban and therefore a
form of an urban political unit comparable to a municipality. An urban centre with more than 12,000 and
less than 40,000 inhabitants is classified as a Nagar Panchayat”.
19
  For example, since public goods are provided at the local level, if BJP was not in power at that level,
then there could arise doubt that it has not provided public goods simply because it couldn’t. Such a sce-
nario does not arise here. Please see more discussion on this in Sect. 3.4 below.
20
  See Brownlee (2013) for example, for an account of what is popularly known as the Arab Springs, and
Masoud (2015) for what might have happened to democracy in the Arab world after the initial show of
promise.
21
  See Pahwa (2013), for example, for an account of the ideational and political transformation of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) since its inception. Of how they adapted to “democratic and ‘secu-
lar’ political ideas by reframing them in religious terms... creating... a hybrid ‘secularized’ Islamism.
This hybridization has both enabled and constrained the Brothers’ adaptation to democracy in the post-
Mubarak period.” She further summarizes, “The ‘translation’ of democratic norms into Islamic terms,
and Islamist norms into democratic political procedure, allowed the MB to keep its political and religious
missions alive side-by-side.”

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

focus on enabling Brotherhood-linked non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to

provide basic services (including bread), rather than improving public distribution
channels.’ Hence it strengthens the ‘importance of private welfare in an elite party’s
efforts to build and maintain a broad social coalition.’ For example, Clark (1995)
elucidates on the nature of such services: “Islamic medical clinics, schools, banks,
day-care centers, supermarkets and clubs form a vibrant component of all areas of
social action, and enjoy the support of large numbers of citizens. While these social-
welfare associations are the least well-known features of Islamic activism,they are
becoming essential to the provision of services for the poor and even sometimes the
middle classes in Egypt. Islamic medical clinics are one of the most successful of
the Islamic activities. Located in the basement of mosques or attached to them, they
provide an intermediate form of health care between the expensive private hospi-
tals and the government’s often inadequate services. With their quality care and low
fees, they are representative of Islamic grassroots social-welfare activities.”
Often such services are entrenched in clientelistic rhetorics. Masoud (2014) for
example, talks about a newspaper article titled, “Oil and sugar are distributed among
the poor in exchange for voting ‘yes’ in al-Munūfiyya,” where it was alleged “that a
leader of a local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party was
busily delivering basic foodstuffs to poor voters in his area and then busing those
voters to polling stations to cast their ballots for what the story described as “the
Brotherhood’s constitution.” This and many more such articles (both academic and
popular) highlight the clientelistic exchanges that forge electoral bonds between elite
political parties and the poor masses22.
In contrast, Egyptian Salafist Al-Nour party, with an underprivileged core allows
the Salafists to take ‘programmatic positions to appeal to poor voters, reducing their
demand for an electoral approach based on private welfare.’ Researchers have also
emphasized the underdeveloped Egyptian economy in general. Masoud (2014), for
example, discusses “Egypt’s endemic poverty, high rate of illiteracy, and large agrar-
ian sector” in the context of rise of the Islamists in Egypt. Hence we find, as sug-
gested by our model, how an elite party turns clientelistic to woo the poor voters, in
the background of very low provision of public goods.

3.2.2 Yemen

Let us now turn to the ikhwan party of Yemen. The Yemeni Congregation for Reform
(Tajamma‘ al-Yamani li al Islah, more commonly known as Islah) has been formed
during the period of political liberalization following the unification of North and
South Yemen in 1990 and was formally launched on September 13 1990. They had
competed in parliamentary elections held in 1993, 1997, and 2003 and each time
have emerged as the second largest party in terms of seats won, though much behind

22
  Many researchers have noted that Islamists earn the loyalties of the masses through their provision
of social services to those unable to afford them. See Masoud (2014) for many such references. Grewal
et  al. (2019) show how such social services especially attract the economically weaker sections, who
believe that supporting the Islamists will confer divine rewards on them in afterlife.

13
 S. Munshi

the dominant and ruling23 GPC (General People’s Congress). The social profile of
the membership of Islah’s Islamist wing, like its Egyptian counterpart, is dominantly
urban and middle class.
We see that clientelistic provision of goods and services has been an important
component of Islah’s strategic approach, especially among the urban poor. van Hear
(1994), for example, in his intensive study of Yemeni returnees from Saudi Ara-
bia following the Gulf War crisis, documents huge settlements of these returning
migrants in shantytowns which received very little assistance towards rehabilitation.
These settlements suffered from lack of basic amenities. In this context he notes,
“A charitable organization sponsored by Islah, a political party based on appeals to
Islam and to tribal loyalties, was responsible for the provision of some water supply,
bread distribution and Koranic education in parts of the shanty settlements.” Like
the Seva Bharati (SB) and the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA) in India, the Islah
Charitable Society (ICS) is the primary wing that provides such services (Carapico
(1993)). As with the Indian counterparts, ICS (SB, VKA) was technically autono-
mous from its electoral affiliate, Islah (BJP) but was organizationally and financially
closely linked to it. This was especially hastened by very poor provision of pub-
lic services (low ḡ  ). Thachil (2014) highlights that “communities in these shanty-
towns suffered from a lack of basic provisioning... the ICS’s efforts in furnishing
food, water, and education appear to have been quite electorally effective.” Weeden
(2008) notes that in the 1993 elections, “residents of the shantytoens returned the
favor, voting heavily for the main Islamic party [Islah].” This also points to the fact
the clientelism has taken the form of vote-buying (or unconditional payments prior
to election with the hope to gaining electoral support from the beneficiaries during
the election).

3.2.3 Indonesia

The case of Indonesia is similar to the case of BJP in the Indian state of Kerala—
where clientelism by the elite party fails to achieve the desired outcome, primarily
due to better levels of public goods.
Following the collapse of Suharto’s regime in 1998, Indonesia experienced rapid
transformations towards democracy in its political life. Of the seven major national
parties, the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS)
constitutes what we call an elite party since it has a distinctly urban middle-class
and a relatively privileged core (see Machmudi, 2008 and Porter, 2002 for details
about the rise of PKS). For instance, Hamayotsu (2011) describes, “Sustained eco-
nomic growth and urbanization throughout the 1980s and 1990s have brought about
the Muslim urban middle class that is self- consciously and publicly religious. In
the university campuses in cities and suburban neighborhoods, various dakwah

23
  See Longley (2007) and Longley (2010), for accounts of ‘patronage politics’ pervading the upper ech-
elons of the Yemeni society and corrupt practices that are practiced by the politicians to retain power. In
Longley (2013), she argues how effectively regime changes have been cosmetic and nothing really has
changed from within. See Carapico (1993) for a somewhat more positive outlook at Yemeni politics.

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

(missionary) organizations and religious study groups mushroomed to meet—and

further promote—spiritual aspirations of the Muslim youth, especially students. The
campus dakwah movements including Jemaah Tarbiyah (the Education Movement)
which later formed the PKS, gained prominence among students at a time when
other oppositional and campus activism was severely restrained under the Suharto
regime.” He further elaborates, “The majority of the members are typically young,
well educated and extremely pious. The average age of the party leaders is around
mid 30s to early 40s. ... A number of top leaders including Central Board members
and members of parliament have a PhD in various fields, mainly in non-religious
fields such as engineering and economics.” According to Thachil (2014), “Although
the party ranked first out of Indonesia’s seven major parties among voters in the top
three income deciles, it ranked only fourth among those in the bottom four deciles.”
To expand its support base among the poor24, just like the BJP, it adopted a policy
of “voluntary assistance to the poor rather than systematic redistribution.” For exam-
ple, Hamayotsu (2011) writes, “My findings suggest that PKS’s daily commitment
to welfare services for the underprivileged populations not only helps to reinforce
its religious image and identity but also to expand informal long-term community
ties between the party elites and supporters that help the party run effective electoral
campaigns.” Based on intensive interviews, he concludes, “One of the most popular
services PKS has developed is free health care. In many districts when doctors and
health care experts are available among cadres, PKS deploys qualified personnel to
provide free medical checkups and medication in neighborhoods where such service
is scarce.”. He elaborates on several other core welfare services that PKS provides
at the grassroots level25 like education, health, society and economy, culture and stu-
dents’ training26.
However, in spite of its best efforts, the party’s vote share has stagnated since
2004 and it is unable to increase its vote share beyond 8% of total votes cast. Thachil
(2014) writes, “Yet the PKS’s stagnating performances and continued inability
to win substantial support outside the urban areas caution against assuming that
an expansion (or even an acceptance) of welfare will necessarily yield electoral
dividends.”

24
  Tomsa (2012) analyses how the PKS has evolved from being a staunchly Islamist party to a more
moderate one over time.
25
  Hamayotsu (2011) in fact states that these efforts could gain ground especially where the state appa-
ratus in delivering these services has failed. “Indonesia’s weak state bureaucracy—prone to patronage-
based distribution of public resources—has left government ineffective in delivering even basic welfare
services such as healthcare to the poor. This chronic problem has been aggravated by decentralization
processes launched in 2001. The state’s inability to meet fundamental societal needs has left huge service
gaps to be filled by non-state actors, especially religious welfare movements, which have flourished since
the late 1990s.”
26
  For example, “The women’s wing of the party also expanded its structures (Pos Wanita Keadilan,
Women’s Justice Station) tasked to provide a range of social services. The wing is focused on family-
friendly services targeted at housewives, mothers, and children, including donation of books and school
materials, mobile libraries for children, promotion of recycled products, classes on home health care and
baby nutrition, catering, and sewing training to empower single mothers.” (Hamayotsu, 2011)

13
 S. Munshi

Why might this be so? A part of this electoral failure, in the light of the theoreti-
cal model, can be attributed to the high level of public goods (high ḡ  ) among the tar-
get population. Hamayotsu (2011) explains, with respect to PKS’s weak penetration
in some constituencies. “... PKS’s relatively weak infiltration is explained by com-
peting vertical socioeconomic networks built around traditional religious institutions
and clientelist relations. ... These institutions, ruled like quasi-kingdoms by revered
kyai (Islamic teachers), provide comprehensive socioeconomic and cultural services
to surrounding communities and exert enormous influence as political brokers at
the grassroots level.” Similarly, a 2004 UNDP report27 notes that, strangely, under
Suharto’s long-standing (authoritarian) regime “rapid growth was accompanied by
a relatively equal distribution of income,” which resulted in a “sustained fall” in the
number of people living below the poverty line28. Hence the question of how recep-
tive poor voters are to clientelistic benefits, arises29.
We now turn to brief discussions on some more aspects of such patronage
politics.

3.3 Budget

Is it true that countries where such clientelism and patronage politics are practiced,
devote larger shares of GDP to transfers? If that is the case, then providing clientelist
benefits is the rational response for politicians to both elite and non-elite voters,
simply because there’s a larger pool of funds to redistribute30. Research however,
claims the opposite (and hence proves that choosing clientelism is a matter of strate-
gic choice). For example, Bastagli et al. (2012), show that the “group of ‘advanced
economies’ dedicates a much larger share of national income specifically to social
transfers. This contrasts with the figures from sub-Saharan Africa, where social
spending is much lower across the board, and where transfers play a less important
role.” Hence we can conclude that the pattern of government spending cannot be
taken as an unqualified indicator of clientelistic spending and that there is no obvi-
ous positive correlation between aggregate income of a government and spending on
targeted transfers.
Given that, it is even more surprising to study the figures for India, where an
elitist party at the Centre, BJP, has substantially increased its outlay on targeted

27
  United Nations Development Programme, Indonesia National Human Development Report 2004, p.
7., available at http://​hdr.​undp.​org/​sites/​defau​lt/​files/​indon​esia_​2004_​en.​pdf.
28
  In fact, Indonesia outperforms India on almost every measure of social development. In 2010, India’s
poverty rate was 35%, Indonesia’s 18%, under-5 mortality rate in India was 63 per 1000 live births, in
Indonesia, it was 35, and India’s literacy rate remained 30 percentage points lower than that of Indonesia
(63–93). Hence Indonesia seems more to resemble Kerala than Chhatisgarh.
29
  In a very interesting study, Pepinsky et al. (2012) show that Islamic parties have political advantage,
only when voters are unsure about the economic policies of the parties. “We show that when citizens
rate parties’ economic policies as either favorable or unfavorable, Islamic parties have no advantage over
non- Islamic parties. However, when citizens are unsure about economic policies, Islamic parties do have
a distinct political advantage.”
30
  I am very thankful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.

13
Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

transfers rather than expenses on public goods, thereby strengthening the argument
of the model that such diversion of funds from public goods provisioning to trans-
fers is indicative of their efforts at trying to win over poor voters. This is contrary to
international trends. For example, consider Government of India’s expenditure on
the Midday Meal Scheme and Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS). We
can see that public expenditure (as a percentage of GDP at current market prices)
on public services and public provisioning of school meals has been reducing since
2013-14. During this same period though, Government-spending on Cash Based
scheme has been rapidly rising31. This is suggestive of the fact that the BJP govern-
ment at the Centre is diverting funds from public services to cash transfers.
In fact, even when we turn to more disaggregated data at the state level, we still
find BJP’s tendency to fund direct transfers rather than public goods provisioning.
For example, consider expenditure on Education (as a ratio to Aggregate Expendi-
ture) and DBT (Direct Benefit Transfer) Fund Transfer for two states namely Uttar
Pradesh (BJP-ruled) and Kerala (non-BJP-ruled). The data suggests that since BJP
came to power in Uttar Pradesh in 2017-18, there has been a huge increase in DBT
Fund Transfer, and a reduction in expenditure on education as a ratio to aggregate
expenditure in Uttar Pradesh. However, left-ruled Kerala, for instance, had a rela-
tively small decline in education as a ratio to aggregate expenditure and a small rise
in DBT Transfer compared to Uttar Pradesh32. Hence, it seems to be the case that
the elitist party, BJP, both at Union and state levels, have laid emphasis on cash
transfers rather than providing public goods, in an effort to expand their electoral
support amongst the poor masses.

3.4 Other possibilities

Is it possible that the elitist party is not the party in power (or in the decision-making
position) and therefore cannot as opposed to will not provide public goods? In other
words, is it the case that the party is constrained in some (structural/constitutional)
way in providing public goods, and hence doles out clientelistic favours, so that cli-
entelism, is not, after all, a voluntary choice?33 Our findings, as the case of Madhya
Pradesh illustrates, show that this is not the case. Hence, we find instances where the
elitist party is the ruling party (and in decision-making capacity at the lowest level)
but still chooses to dole out targeted transfers instead of investment in public goods,
and the conditions under which it does so, corroborate well with the predictions of
the theoretical model.

31
 The data on GDP at current market prices is obtained from https://​dbie.​rbi.​org.​in, data on Cash
Schemes is obtained from https://​dbtbh​arat.​gov.​in, the data on Midday meals and ICDS is obtained from
the union budgets, available online at https://​www.​india​budget.​gov.​in/.
32
  The data on “Expenditure on Education As Ratio to Aggregate Expenditure” can be obtained from
“State Finances : A Study of Budgets”, RBI (https://​rbi.​org.​in/​Scrip​ts/​Annua​lPubl​icati​ons). The DBT
Transfer data is obtained from DBT Bharat (https://​dbtbh​arat.​gov.​in) from “State wise DBT Fund Trans-
fer”.
33
  Once again, I am extremely thankful to an anonymous referee for bringing up this facet of clientelistic
politics.

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 S. Munshi

4 Conclusion

Studies show that in several places like new democracies in Latin America, post-
communist Europe, South and southeast Asia, and parts of Africa, political par-
ties do not compete for votes based on coherent programmatic issues that can be
neatly represented on a left-right spectrum. Yet they attract electoral support and
perform well politically, though such practices subvert reforms. Exploring such
clientelistic-linkages between parties and voters and concentrating on factors that
strengthen (or weaken) such linkages, is the focus of this paper.
This paper studies clientelism under very specific circumstances. It studies
how clientelism is adopted and how it is effective in a ‘divided democracy’ where
an established political party is trying to attract a voter population, that has not
been part of its core support base. For example, we look at the efforts of the BJP
in attracting the poor in India, or the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated
parties in attracting the poor in countries like Egypt, Yemen and Indonesia. And
we study why in some instances the elite parties succeed while in others they
don’t.
We find that clientelism is likely to yield better results in areas where the pro-
vision of public goods is relatively very costly and public goods are scant, and
where the total expenditure incurred in delivery of clientelistic goods is ‘small’
(small relative to the expenditure on public goods). Our findings are supported by
historical and contemporary political experiences of elite parties in several coun-
tries like that of the BJP in India, and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties
in Egypt, Yemen, and Indonesia.

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