Daf Ditty Shekalim 8: The Appearance of Impropriety

Daf Ditty Shekalim 8: The Appearance of Impropriety
Halakha 1 · MISHNA On three occasions during the year the ceremony of the collection of
the Temple treasury chamber is performed. During the ceremony, a priest enters the treasury
chamber with three containers, lifts up [torem] some of the coins, and places them in the containers.
These funds, known as the collection of the chamber, are used to purchase animals for communal
offerings and other needs of the Temple.
These three occasions are: Half a month, fifteen days, before Passover, on the day before the
first of the month of Nisan; half a month before Shavuot, on or around the twentieth of Iyar; half
a month before the festival of Sukkot, on the day before Rosh Hashanah.
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Halakha 2 · MISHNA The funds are collected from the Temple treasury chamber
with three baskets, each measuring three se’a. On the baskets is
written, respectively, alef, beit, gimmel, based on the order in which the baskets are
filled, to indicate from which basket coins should be taken to buy sacrifices. The coins
were used in the order of their collection. Rabbi Yishmael says: The letters written
on them were in Greek, alfa, beta, gamma.
Steinzaltz
Korban HaEdah
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The one who collects the funds from the chamber must not enter while wearing a cuffed
garment [ḥafut], and not with a shoe, and not with a sandal, and not with phylacteries, and
not with an amulet, since all of these have places into which money can be inserted. The concern
is that perhaps the one collecting the funds will one day become poor, and people will say that
it is because of the sin of stealing the shekels of the chamber that he became poor, as they will
suspect that he stole money and hid it in those places. Or perhaps he will become rich
and people will say that he became rich from stealing the funds of the chamber, even though
he did not actually do so.
Even though one should not suspect someone of stealing consecrated shekels, the one collecting
the funds from the chamber must nevertheless take these precautions, as a person must appear
justified before people just as he must appear justified before the Omnipresent [HaMakom],
and it is stated:
‫ ְוַאַחר‬,‫כב ְו ִנְכְבָּשׁה ָהָא ֶרץ ִלְפֵני ְיהָוה‬ 22 and the land be subdued before the LORD, and ye
,‫ֵמ ְיהָוה‬ ‫ְנִק ִיּם‬ ‫ ִוְה ִייֶתם‬--‫שׁבוּ‬
ֻ ‫ָתּ‬ return afterward; then ye shall be clear before the
,‫וִּמ ִיְּשׂ ָרֵאל; ְוָה ְיָתה ָהָא ֶרץ ַהזּ ֹאת ָלֶכם‬ LORD, and before Israel, and this land shall be unto
.‫ִלְפֵני ְיהָוה‬--‫ַלֲאֻחָזּה‬ you for a possession before the LORD.
Num 32:22
“And you shall be guiltless before the Lord and before Israel”
From here it may be inferred that it is not enough to be innocent before God; one must also be
innocent before the Jewish people. Even in situations where there is little concern that one may
commit a sin, the proper course is to remain above any possible suspicion of misconduct. And the
verse states:
‫ְבֵּﬠיֵני‬ --‫טוֹב‬-‫ְוֵשֶׂכל‬ ‫ֵחן‬-‫ד וְּמָצא‬ 4 So shalt thou find grace and good favor in the sight of
.‫ִהים ְוָאָדם‬w‫ֱא‬ God and man.
Prov 3:4
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“So shall you find grace and good understanding in the sight of God and man”
Rav Avrohom Adler writes:
Taking the coins into boxes
The Mishnah says that they would take coins out of the chamber of Shekalim with 3 containers,
each holding 3 se’ah. They were number in Hebrew (alef, bais, and gimel), but Rabbi Yishmael
says they were numbered in Greek (alpha, beta, and gamma).
The one entering the chamber to take the coins would not wear anything with a hem, with shoes
or sandals, with tefillin, or an amulet, lest someone would suspect that he took some of the coins
for himself, causing him wealth or poverty.
The Mishnah explains that one must be clean in the eyes of people, just as he must be clean in the
eyes of Hashem. This is learned from the verse which instructed the sons of Reuven and Gad to be
clean “from Hashem and from Yisrael”, and the verse which instructs to “find grace and good
intellect in the eyes of Hashem and people.”
Sizes
The Gemora cites the Mishnah which says that if necessary, one may clear away 4 or 5 boxes.
Rabbi Ze’aira asked Rabbi Yoshiya how large these boxes are, and he said that we can learn the
size of these unspecified boxes from the case of Shekalim, which defines the size of the boxes. He
cited a braisa which says that each time they took coins, they used three boxes, each of 3 se’ah, for
a total of 9 se’ah for each time, for a total of 27 se’ah each year, over the three times the coins
were taken. The Gemora explains that the boxes were numbered to ensure that they would use the
coins in the order they were taken.
The Gemora cites the Mishnah which says that one is liable for carrying on Shabbos if he takes
out enough wine to pour a cup. Rabbi Ze’aira asked Rabbi Yoshiya how large the cup referred to
is, and he said we can learn the size of this unspecified cup from the case of the four cups of Pesach
night, which the braisa says can be fulfilled with one revi’is of Italian wine.
Assuming each cup is diluted in three parts water, this means that each cup is the size of a revi’is.
The Gemora asks how much diluted wine would one liable for carrying, and answers this from a
braisa. In the braisa, Rabbi Yehuda says that one is liable for carrying enough water to soak a
bandage. One is liable for carrying one gulp of wine, while Rabbi Yehuda says that the measure is
enough wine to pour a cup. This indicates that the measure for diluted wine is a cup (i.e., revi’is),
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as that is the definition Rabbi Yehuda uses for all wine. The Gemora asks what size of cup we
should use and says that we use 1.25 titarton cups.
The Gemora asks whether one can drink the 4 cups of Pesach night without a break, and the
Gemora concludes that this is valid, from Rabbi Mana who says in the name of Rabbi Yossi that
if one heard hallel in shul, he has fulfilled his obligation. Since he will not say hallel later, at the
seder, he will drink the third and fourth cups with no interruption. The Gemora asks if one can
drink each cup in many sips. The Gemora explains that the reason we don’t add any cups in
between the third and fourth is to avoid intoxication. Therefore, if he drinks slowly, which helps
avoid intoxication, he definitely fulfills his obligation.
USING GREEK LETTERS IN THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH
Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:1
The Mishnah says that the letters Alef, Beis, and Gimel were written on the three boxes used for the
Terumas ha'Lishkah to denote which box was separated first. Rebbi Yishmael notes that the three
letters on the boxes were written in Greek -- Alpha, Beta, and Gamma.
Why were these letters written in Greek?
The KORBAN HA'EDAH explains that the use of Greek letters on the boxes of the Terumas
ha'Lishkah is based on the verse, "Yaft Elokim l'Yefes v'Yishkon b'Ohalei Shem" -- "Ascribe beauty
to Yefes, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem" (Gen 9:27). The beauty of Yefes in this verse refers
to the script of Greek letters (Greek, or "Yevanis," is the language of Yavan, the patriarch of Greece,
who was one of the sons of Yefes). The "tents of Shem" refers to the Beis ha'Mikdash (as the Gemara
in Megilah (9b) says; based on this verse, the Gemara there permits a Sefer Torah to be written with
Greek script).
On a deeper level, this may be understood as follows. Hash-m created many objects of physical beauty
in the world. They were not created to serve man's indulgences and gratify his appetite for pleasure.
Rather, they are meant to be used in the service of Hash-m by inspiring awe for His majesty. As the
verse states, "Grace is falsehood, beauty is vain; the woman who fears Hash-m -- she will be praised"
(Prov 31:30). Beauty is falsehood, unless it is used for the sake of Yir'as Hash-m, the fear of Hash-m.
For this reason, the Midrash (Ex Rabah 35) teaches that the world is not entitled to use such beautiful
items as gold and the cedars of Levanon; those items were created only for use in the Beis ha'Mikdash
and the Mishkan. Similarly, the Gemara in Kidushin (49b) says that when Hash-m put beauty into the
Hashem
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world, He gave nine portions of beauty to Yerushalayim and one portion to the rest of the world.
Yerushalayim is the place where beauty is utilized in the way it was intended to be used -- for the
service of Hash-m.
The Greeks prided themselves in their ability to beautify their language and all of the objects of their
creativity, which they channeled towards self-indulgence and hedonism. The use of the letters of the
Greek alphabet in the Beis ha'Mikdash, where such beauty inspires awe for Hash-m's majesty,
demonstrates that the proper purpose of physical beauty is for the sake of serving Hash-m.
This also explains a practice described by the Gemara in Horayos (12a). When the Kohen Gadol is
anointed, oil is smeared on his head "in the shape of the Greek letter, Xi." When the Kohen Gadol
performs the Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash and wears his regal garments of "honor and glory" (Ex
28:2), he is a living demonstration of how beauty is channeled towards Yir'as Shamayim. Similarly,
oil is smeared on the Rekikin loaves of the Minchah offerings "in the shape of the Greek letter, Xi"
(Menachos 74b). (See also Insights to Menachos 75:1.)
The Collection Baskets

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:2
The third perek of Massekhet Shekalim opens with a discussion of the collection and use of
the Shekalim in the Temple. When the Shekalim were collected, they were brought to the Temple
where they were stored so that they could be used to purchase communal sacrifices as necessary.
As we learned, the collection was taken up in the month of Adar, and beginning with the first day
of Nisan, the new year began with regard to the Temple service.
The Mishnah on our daf teaches that all of the collected money was brought to a specific Temple
office. It was removed three times during the year – 15 days before each of the shalosh regalim –
and put into baskets from which it was dispensed to the people who had accepted upon themselves
the responsibility of tending to the needs of the Temple service. Before each holiday the money
was distributed into three kupot – baskets – one of them representing the donations of the people
living in Israel, one on behalf of the people living in the countries near Israel and one for the people
who lived in the further reaches of the Diaspora.
The funds are collected from the Temple treasury chamber with three baskets,
each measuring three se’a. On the baskets is written, respectively, alef, beit, gimmel, based on
the order in which the baskets are filled, to indicate from which basket coins should be taken to
buy sacrifices. The coins were used in the order of their collection. Rabbi Yishmael says: The
letters written on them were in Greek [the language commonly in use during the period], alfa,
beta, gamma.
2
https://steinsaltz.org/daf/shekalim8/
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The Mishnah also teaches that great care was taken to make sure that no one would steal – or be
suspected of stealing – from these monies. No one was permitted to take the money from the
Temple office if he was wearing clothing or shoes in which he could conceal money. To support
the ruling that obligates people to show care not only before God, but also before people, and
ensure that they do not suspect you of wrongdoing, the Mishnah refers to passages in
Num 32:22 and Prov 3:4 that clearly indicate the need to be concerned with both heavenly and
this-world suspicions.
Rabbi Jeremy Rosen writes:3

One week into Shekalim and already we are in chapter three. We have moved on from collecting
the shekels for the Temple treasury to the procedure by which the priests removed these shekels
to fund Temple activities. A mishnah on yesterday’s page taught that it was done three times
yearly. Ahead of major festivals, a priest would enter the treasury and remove the needed funds in
three baskets.
On today’s page, the rabbis are concerned that the priest who removes the funds is above suspicion.
Specifically, he must not be dressed in loose clothing lest people suspect he has discretely slipped
a few coins into a pocket or up his sleeve. Here is the mishnah:
Those dispersing the funds should not enter the chamber wearing either a decorated cloak,
shoes, sandals, tefillin or an amulet. Perhaps he will one day become poor, and people will
say that it is because of the sin of stealing from the chamber that he became poor. Or perhaps
he will become rich, and people will say that he became rich from stealing the funds of the
chamber.
The decorated cloak (also sometimes translated “cuffed garment”) as well as the tefillin (worn in
boxes) and amulet (usually housed in a leather pouch) all might provide a hiding spot for a few
pilfered coins. The Gemara later suggests that even a curly-haired priest should not perform the
ritual of retrieving Temple shekels because people might suspect him of hiding them in his tresses.
The mishnah seems less concerned that the priest will actually steal sacred funds than with the
notion that his appearance will make people suspicious that he is stealing. And once people get
that idea in their heads, they will find evidence for it. Whether the priest subsequently becomes
rich or poor, they will say it is because he stole — either he is benefiting from those coins, or he
is suffering divine punishment for his crime!
This idea that it is important to appear upright is reiterated in the Gemara on the top of tomorrow’s
page where the rabbis offer scriptural proof:
Rabbi Shmuel Bar Nahman in the name of Rabbi Yohanan said that we see this principle
from the Torah, the Prophets and the Writings (the three major sections of the Hebrew
Bible) that a person should always be careful to be above suspicion (literally: to be clean in
the eyes of God and human beings).
3
Myjewishlearning.com
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From the Torah: And you shall be guiltless before the Lord and before Israel. (Numbers 32:22)
Fom Joshua: You should be loyal to God and Israel. (Joshua 22:22)
From Proverbs: And you should find favor and approval in the eyes of God and human
beings. (Proverbs 3:4)
Rabbi Gamliel Zuga asked Rabbi Yossi bar Rabbi Bun: Which of these (proofs) is the most
compelling?
He replied: You shall be clean in the eyes of God and human beings.
Who was Gamliel Zuga? He doesn’t appear in the Babylonian Talmud and in the Jerusalem
Talmud he is usually seen asking questions of more prominent sages, as he is here.
There were four very famous Rabbi Gamliel's, all from the princely dynasty of Rabbi Yehuda
HaNasi. But this one is not famous and his relation to the others is not clear. Perhaps, though, there
is a clue in his name. “Zug ” means “pair.” Maybe this Gamliel was so-called because he
overlapped with another Gamliel. Or perhaps he was named after his grandfather or was one of
twins. Whatever the case, if he was anything like the other more famous scholars who bear the
same name, he had to deal with the Roman authorities and was therefore much more aware of the
outside world than many of his contemporaries. This is likely why he gravitated toward the more
universal quote, the one that says it is important to not only behave well but be above suspicion
not only before God, but before all people (not just Israel) as well.
Several Halachos throughout shas are based upon the principle that a person is required to conduct
himself in a manner which avoids suspicion.4
For example, in Yevamos (25b) we find that if a single witness testifies that a woman’s husband
is dead, the woman is permitted to remarry. Yet, the halachah is that the witness himself should
not marry this woman.
Observers might suspect that he fabricated his testimony in order to be able to marry this woman.
Another example is in Shabbos (23a), where a farmer is technically allowed to leave ‫ פאה‬for the
poor at any spot in his field he wishes. Yet the halachah requires that he designate ‫ פאה‬at the
corner, in order not to arouse suspicion. These are only two examples of many. There is a puzzling
4
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Shekalim%20008.pdf
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statement of Rabbi Yosi (Shabbos 118b) who states, “May my portion be among those who are
suspect of wrongdoing, but who are truly innocent.”
If there is an obligation to stay clear of suspicion, why did R’ Yosi wish to be among those who
are the object of such mistrust?
Furthermore, the story is told (Shabbos 127b) of an emergency mission on the behalf of the Jews,
when Rabbi Yehoshua and his students had to visit an influential woman who had intimate
connections with many Roman officials.
Rabbi Yehoshua had to meet with her in private, and several aspects of his visit appeared
suspicious. His students, however, did not misinterpret any of his actions, and for that they were
rewarded. The question, asks Maharsha, is how did Rabbi Yehoshua allow himself to appear as
being compromising, when our Gemara obliges a person to remain clear of suspicion?
Maharsha answers that if a person has no choice other than to enter into a scenario where his
conduct might seem unusual, he must attempt to minimize or even avoid suspicion as much as
possible. This is why Rabbi Yehoshua clarified his actions to his students.
Rabbi Yosi on 118b never wished to act strangely and to be the object of suspicion. This would
have been prohibited. Rather, if he prayed that if he would be suspected of illegal behavior even
while acting normally, he knew that the reward of his restraint would be great.
The Shelah HaKadosh, zt”l, explains that a gabbai tzedakah should not assume that since he is
known to be trustworthy, he need not keep a clear record of who gave what and how it was spent.
The Midrash recounts that even Moshe Rabbeinu was under suspicion by some until he gave a full
account of all the money he had received and for what it was used.
How much more so is this true for us! We need to keep clear records and share them with the
people, as the verse says: “You should be blameless in the eyes of the Jewish people.” Ensuring
that people are happy with us is part of our obligation to love our fellow Jews, but the Pele Yoetz
points out that scholars often neglect this point.
They believe that if they are truly blameless, they do not have to worry about others wrongly
suspecting them of questionable behavior. The truth is that one who doesn’t act to assuage the
suspicions of others is putting a “stumbling block before the blind!”
When the Beis HaLevi, zt’l, was the Rav in the town of Slutsk, the Russians instituted a new
currency and prohibited the use of the old. Knowing full well that the Rav was steeped in learning
all the time, the shamash decided to take advantage of the situation. He pocketed the Rav’s salary
paid in new currency, and exchanged it for an equal amount of the old. Upon receipt of the money,
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the Rav thanked him as usual, and the unscrupulous shamash figured that the Rav suspected
nothing.
In actuality, the Rav did know—he merely kept silent to spare the man embarrassment. For weeks,
not only did the Rav refrain from using the illegal currency, he was also careful to ensure that no
one else would either.
Until the shamash thought better of his actions and changed to the new bills, the Beis HaLevi took
the time to bury the old currency payment every payday!
Protect Your Reputation

Rabbi Yehuda Alpert writes:5
,‫ ַאְבָרָהם‬:‫ַאְבָרָהם‬-‫ ֶבּן‬,‫ יט ְוֵאֶלּה תּוְֹלֹדת ִיְצָחק‬19 And these are the generations of Isaac, Abraham's
.‫ ִיְצָחק‬-‫הוִֹליד ֶאת‬ son: Abraham begot Isaac.
Gen 25:19
"And these are the generations of Yizchak the son of Avraham, Avraham begot Yitzchak"
Rashi comments in the name of the Medrash that the pasuk stresses twice that Yitzchak was the
son of Avraham, because Yitzchak's physical appearance bore an uncanny resemblance to that of
his father Avraham.
The Medrash continues that Yitzchak's likeness to Avraham was ordained deliberately and
miraculously by Hashem in order to dispel the insinuations of the scoffers of the generation who
were murmuring that since Avraham and Sarah had been married for decades without children,
Yitzchok's biological father must have been Avimelech and not Avraham. This speculation was
summarily dismissed when Yitzchak was born bearing a striking similarity to Avraham, attesting
to their genetic relationship.
5
https://images.shulcloud.com/373/uploads/Newsletters/Newsletter-Ahavat-Shalom---Issue-16.pdf: Copyright © 2017 by
TorahWeb.org. All rights reserved.
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The meforshim are troubled, why was Hashem so concerned with the baseless allegations of those
who sought to malign and ridicule Avraham?
Rav Mordechai Gifter (Pirkei Torah) suggests that the Medrash is instructing us regarding the
malignant nature of negative speech, mockery, and derision. Even when it is completely without
merit, it can be exceedingly pernicious and dangerous, to the degree that Hashem had no choice
but to quash it swiftly and overwhelmingly.
This is because even one cynical remark can have devastating and far reaching consequences,
whose ripple of effects can sometimes still be reverberating generations later. The pasuk states,
,‫ ֶלֶחם וּ ְנִזיד ֲﬠָדִשׁים‬,‫לד ְוַיֲﬠֹקב ָנַתן ְלֵﬠָשׂו‬ 34 And Jacob gave Esau bread and pottage of lentils; and
-‫ ֶאת‬,‫ ַוָיָּקם ַוֵיַּל•; ַו ִיֶּבז ֵﬠָשׂו‬,‫ַויּ ֹאַכל ַוֵיְּשְׁתּ‬ he did eat and drink, and rose up, and went his way. So
{‫ }פ‬.‫ַהְבֹּכָרה‬ Esau despised his birthright. {P}
Gen 25:34
"And Yaakov gave to Esav bread and a pottage of lentils, and he ate and drank and arose and
left, and Esav despised the birthright"
The Gemara (Bava Basra 16b) claims that the five consecutive verbs at the conclusion of the pasuk
are an allusion to five transgressions that Esav performed on that very day: He engaged in relations
with a betrothed maiden, he killed a person, he denied the existence of Hashem, he denied the
resurrection of the dead, and he disparaged the birthright.
However, even though he committed five misdeeds on that same day, the only aveirah mentioned
explicitly in the Torah is that he denigrated the birthright, which is ostensibly the least egregious
sin on the list.
Rav Ahron Kotler explains that this is because Esav's precipitous decline and all that later ensued
was triggered by his one comment besmirching the birthright.
In fact, the Baal Haturim notes that the language "vayivez Esav", "and Esav disparaged", is only
found once more in Tanach in the pasuk "vayivez be'einav lishloach yad be'Mordechai levado",
‫ ִלְשׁ“ַח ָיד ְבָּמ ְרֳדַּכי‬,‫ו ַו ִיֶּבז ְבֵּﬠיָניו‬ 6 But it seemed contemptible in his eyes to lay hands on
;‫ַﬠם ָמ ְרֳדָּכי‬-‫ ֶאת‬,‫ִהִגּידוּ לוֹ‬-‫ִכּי‬--‫ְלַבדּוֹ‬ Mordecai alone; for they had made known to him the people
‫ַה ְיּהוִּדים‬-‫ָכּל‬-‫ ְלַהְשִׁמיד ֶאת‬,‫ַו ְיַבֵקּשׁ ָהָמן‬ of Mordecai; wherefore Haman sought to destroy all the Jews
‫ַﬠם‬--‫ַמְלכוּת ֲאַחְשֵׁורוֹשׁ‬-‫ֲאֶשׁר ְבָּכל‬ that were throughout the whole kingdom of Ahasuerus, even
.‫ָמ ְרֳדָּכי‬ the people of Mordecai.
Esther 3:6
"but it seemed contemptible to him to lay hands on Mordecai alone".
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This indicates that Haman's despicable plot to eradicate the Jewish people centuries later in the
times of Esther, can also be attributed to Haman's ancestor Esav, and his flippant insult of the
birthright all those years ago.
Therefore, just as Hashem protected the reputation of Avraham and Sarah, we must all vigilantly
protect our own reputation from the potential scoffers of our time. This includes conducting
ourselves in a fashion which is beyond reproach and lacking any possible perception of
impropriety.
The Mishnah (Shekalim 3:2) our daf prohibits the treasurer of the Beis Hamikdash from entering
into the vault while wearing clothing, shoes, or an amulet, that could conceal a potential theft, "lest
he become rich and people say that he became rich from the appropriation of the chamber; for one
must be free of blame before others as he must be free of blame before Hashem, as it states, (see
above citation) 'And you shall be guiltless before Hashem and before Yisrael' (Num 32:22)."
Similarly, the Gemara (Bava Basra 13a) bars communal collectors of charitable funds from
exchanging small coins with their own private monies, or collectors of food who have leftovers
from purchasing it for themselves.
These inherently innocent activities are proscribed because they can potentially be misconstrued
by others. Rashi (Avodah Zarah 12a) claims that this concern is also one of the underlying
motivations behind the general notion of Maris Ayin, which prohibits many otherwise permissible
actions when they could be reasonably misinterpreted by an onlooker as inappropriate.
At the same time, the Mishnah (Avos 1:6) enjoins us to judge all people and situations favorably,
and to refrain from looking askance at anyone. If every ambiguous act should be viewed positively
when does Maris Ayin apply?
Why would any onlooker ever be justified in presuming the worst?
Rabbi Chaim Chizkiyah Medini (Sdei Chemed) explains based upon the rule of the Mishnah
(Avodah Zarah 11b) which states that when a road is generally used exclusively for idol
worshipers, it is prohibited to use the road for any reason, as onlookers will understandably assume
that the traveler intends to join the idol worshipers. However, if the same path leads to a second
destination as well, it is permitted to use the road, and onlookers would be obliged to judge the
traveler favorably. Therefore, only when most reasonable and plausible assessments of the
situation suggest that a sin was intended or performed, would the issue of Maris Ayin arise.
However, if Maris Ayin only applies when the circumstances imply that an aveirah was likely
performed, why must the treasurer of the Beis Hamikdash or the gabbai tzedakah be overly
cautious when performing their regular duties, which give no indication whatsoever of nefarious
intent?
The Chafetz Chaim resolves that while a private citizen can depend upon the presumption of
innocence, a communal leader who is in the public sphere must take every possible precaution to
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avoid suspicion, because communal figures often can't assume that they will be afforded that same
courtesy.
For this reason, the Medrash Tanchuma states that Moshe voluntarily provided a complete
accounting of all of the expenditures involved in the building of the Mishkan, in order to avoid
any potential feelings of mistrust.
In addition, Rav Pam records that while collecting tzedakah, Rav Yisrael Salanter would not even
allow himself to remain secluded in a room together with someone else's money (see Bava Basra
165a).
The Chasam Sofer once lamented that ironically it is often easier to be found virtuous before
Hashem than in the eyes of Yisrael, however, the chillul Hashem created by failing to protect our
reputation, can sometimes be the gravest sin of all.
If we take the necessary steps to always conduct ourselves in a fashion that is beyond reproach, in
our individual lives and when conducting activities on behalf of the community, may Hashem
protect us from the potential scoffers of our time, and enable us to fulfill the mandate of being
"guiltless before Hashem and before Yisrael."
Board Member Accused of Cheating6
She’elah
A member of the congregation complains that a Trustee of the synagogue has

cheated him in a professional matter and owes him a significant sum of money.
The member contends that synagogue board members should be reputable and
representative of the best in our tradition, and he feels that this Trustee has shown
a character flaw serious enough to warrant removal from the Board. He has asked
the Board to take that action.
The synagogue constitution, which governs the selection of Trustees, does not
address the issue. If the facts are established beyond dispute, what course of
action should be taken?
Teshuvah
6
https://www.ccarnet.org/responsa-topics/temple-board-member-accused-of/
13
We begin this responsum by stating our operating presumptions. We presume that any
individual named to a position of leadership in a synagogue is of high moral character.
We presume that an individual who already serves on a synagogue board has not thus
far given the congregation any reason to suspect that he or she possesses serious
character flaws or that he or she may even be guilty of criminal activity. And we presume
that the serious allegations mentioned in this she’elah are just that: allegations, not yet
proven.
We will therefore respond to this question not with a general pronouncement on the fitness
of communal officials, but with a very specific pronouncement on what to do if a currently
serving board member is definitely found to have acted unethically in a matter not
connected to his or her synagogue responsibilities.
We note, first of all, the absence of specific precedents. The structure of Jewish
communal leadership has changed over the centuries, and in the pre-modern Jewish
communities within which most halakhic activity took place there was no position exactly
equivalent to the modern synagogue board member. Historically, too, the ability of the
Jewish community to police itself was severely hampered at times by both internal and
external circumstances. Internally, real authority often rested with lay leadership rather
than with rabbinic scholars, thereby rendering purely halakhic considerations irrelevant;
externally, the interference of Gentile governments often removed Jews from the
jurisdiction of the Jewish community. Nevertheless, there are significant indirect
precedents.
Rabbinic literature discusses several types of communal officials, including the parnas,
the gabbai tzedakah, and the sheliach tzibur. References to the parnas, the community’s
chief official(s), stress the importance of high moral conduct; virtually all these references,
however, are aggadic in character.1 Generally, comments about the parnas are silent on
the individual’s personal character and conduct, with the notable exception of BT.
Yoma 22b:
“We appoint as parnas over the community only one who has a basket of crawling
creatures hung at his back [i.e., who has some improper or unsavory aspect to his past],
so that if he becomes too overbearing, we may say to him: look behind you.”
14
The implication here is that a parnas is not necessarily a person of blameless moral
character.2
On the other hand, the sheliach tzibbur (shatz) is supposed to be an individual of spotless
character. “The sheliach tzibur should be worthy [hagun]. What is worthy? One who is
free of sin and about whom an evil report has not circulated, even in his youth. He should
be humble and pleasing to people; he should have a pleasant voice and should be
accustomed to reading Torah, Prophets, and Writings.”3
The reason for emphasizing the worthiness of the shatz, of course, is that he is the
community’s representative in prayer.4 As the Mishnah Berurah comments:5
“Many books have discoursed at length about the shame caused by appointing an
unworthy shatz, for hereby good fortune is denied to Israel.”
An unworthy shatz causes great harm because God does not respond well to the prayer
of the unrighteous. Good character in a shatz is preferable to a good voice.6
For the third type of communal official, the gabbai tzedakah, good character is also
essential.7 On the other hand, he is understood to be subject to extraordinary temptation.
For this reason, the halakhah builds in numerous safeguards to remove every possible
opportunity for dishonesty, as well as situations that could give rise to rumors of
dishonesty in the community.8 If less-than-upstanding individuals do hold this office, they
must have obtained it through high handed tactics, perhaps even bringing the power of
the Gentile government to bear on Jewish communal affairs.9
While there is no mention of removal of a parnas for any reason, there is considerable
discussion of removal of an unworthy shatz or a gabbai tzedakah suspected of financial
malfeasance. The halakhah is far more restrictive with respect to a shatz, though the
penalties are mitigated somewhat by means of repentance.10 If the shatz is already
serving in that position, he cannot be removed for something he did before he was
appointed; nonetheless, should there arise even a rumor that he has done something
inappropriate since assuming the position, “even if it is the smallest thing, then even one
person can protest and have him removed.”11 This opinion is expanded in the Arukh Ha-
shulchan:12
15
When we say we do not appoint someone who is the subject of an evil report, this means
appointing him a priori. But if an evil report goes out concerning an incumbent shatz, we
do not remove him, for one does not remove a person from his position on the strength
of a mere rumor. But if the rumor is persistent, and we know that his enemies have not
planted it…then we do remove him. Even a single individual may protest and have him
removed, as long as we know that person’s motivation is sincere. However, if
the shatz does repent of this transgression, he is not to be removed.13
The idea that repentance suffices to prevent a shatz from losing his position, even if he
has committed deliberate and grave sins, is found in the Arukh Hashulchan in a comment
upon the words of R. Moshe Isserles. It has the effect of nullifying virtually any dismissal
of a shatz, except in cases of flagrant and unrepented wrongdoing:14 It must be, therefore,
that [Isserles] does not mean an accidental transgressor who sins only once; for even a
deliberate sinner who sins only once and then repents may be appointed shatz, for if he
repents then his bad reputation is immediately cancelled. His disqualification as a
deliberate sinner is only if he sins a number of times. And if he transgresses a number of
times accidentally, in this case he is still fit.
In the case of a gabbai tzedakah the issue is somewhat muddled. Clearly there is concern
that a gabbai might violate the trust of his office; this is obviously the reason why he may
be required to render an accounting. This is how the Siftey Kohen understands Isserles’
gloss to YD 257:2. Isserles states: “And in any case, in order that they be ‘clean before
God and Israel,’ it is desirable that they render an accounting. This applies to
worthy gabbaim. But one who is unworthy, or who obtained his position through
coercive means…” Siftey Kohen explains that “one who is unworthy” is “one who was
appointed with consent of the community and is then accused of malfeasance serious
enough to be examined by a judge.”15
But it is not explicitly stated what the consequences are if he is found to have acted
improperly. Isserles states: “if the community wishes, they may dismiss the gabbai and
replace him with another, and this does not cast suspicion upon [the one dismissed].
The same is true for other officials.”16 Siftey Kohen explains that individuals serve for set
terms, and therefore if the community chooses someone else to fill the position at term’s
end this should not be taken as a slap at the former office holder. He is concerned,
however, because Isserles seems to imply that “within the time of service the
16
community cannot dismiss them because of suspicion of impropriety. And this is not
explained as well as it should be in the words of Isserles.”17
Siftey Kohen‘s difficulty is noted and incorporated by the Arukh Hashulchan, who ignores
any possibility that a gabbai cannot be replaced mid-term for wrong-doing and cites Siftey
Kohen in such a way as to take for granted that a gabbai can be removed if he has
violated the trust of his office.18
The case at hand.
In the present case, again, we are dealing with an incident be-di’avad, after the fact. We
are not deciding whether an ethically dubious character should be appointed to a
synagogue board, but whether, if an accusation against a person hitherto considered
blameless is proven, that individual should be forced to resign.
First of all, a synagogue board member is not a parnas. He or she is not the administrative
head of an autonomous or semi-autonomous corporate Jewish community, nor do we live
in a time and place in which oligarchical rule and its abuses are accepted as norms. The
absence of halakhic strictures concerning the character of a parnas or his removal from
office should not be taken as a sign that we should tolerate unethical conduct among
today’s communal leaders.
There is also no direct parallel between the position of synagogue trustee and
the sheliach tzibur. The position of trustee involves responsibility for the welfare of the
congregation, including a great degree of fiscal responsibility, but it certainly does not
carry the same theological weight as that of shatz. And there is no precise analogy to be
drawn between the modern-day board member and the gabbai tzedakah. While
the halakhah concerning the latter speaks at length about financial probity, this always
refers to communal funds, not personal business dealings. It does not call for the
dismissal of a communal official for financial wrongdoing against a member of the
community, though we may wish that it did.
Nevertheless, the lack of a specific precedent should not mean that there is nothing to be
done in this situation. With regard to all three communal officials there is a basic
assumption of righteous and ethical conduct. The parnas is not to govern in an oppressive
fashion. A member of the community may protest against the shatz when the latter has
committed some misdeed. And the gabbai tzedakah is subject to elaborate procedures
17
and strictures to avoid even the appearance of financial wrongdoing in office.19 The
people must be able to trust in their institutions and the individuals who administer them.
It is therefore imperative that, when a congregant has contested an individual’s moral or
ethical fitness to serve as a board member, the complaint be resolved speedily and fairly.
In our case, the congregant charges that the board member “has cheated him in a
professional matter and owes him a significant sum of money.” The language of the
complaint is vague and is open to three interpretations: 1) the accused actually violated
civil or criminal law in taking money that belonged to the accuser; 2) no law was broken
but the accused acted in a manner that was morally culpable; 3) the accused and the
accuser were involved in an unfortunate dispute where no law was broken and neither
side’s action was morally superior.
If the case is one of the third type, then there would certainly be no compelling reason to
compel the trustee to step down, although the local rabbi might take steps to mediate the
dispute or to encourage the parties to seek professional mediation. We hasten to add this
note: it is of vital importance that the rabbi and the congregation respect the rights of the
board member as well as those of his accuser. The board member, whose reputation and
good name are at stake, is as entitled to his “day in court” as is the congregant who is
charging him with dishonesty. Mere accusation is not sufficient to disqualify a person from
communal office. If it is found, after a careful and responsible investigation of the facts,
that the board member has not committed the ethical infraction of which he is accused,
he deserves public exoneration from the synagogue and a public apology from his
accuser.
If, however, the case is of either the first or second type, then the Jewish legal and ethical
tradition demands that prompt action be taken to safeguard the standards of moral
conduct that our leaders ought to exemplify. As a first step, the rabbi and the
congregational leadership through sensitive intervention might convince the board
member to do teshuvah, to admit his wrong and to make restitution to his accuser. Should
the board member respond favorably to this request, then he should remain on the board
even if the accuser refuses to be mollified.20 If the trustee refuses the opportunity to repent
and to make restitution, then he should be persuaded to step down from the board
voluntarily. We say “voluntarily,” because as we have seen, tradition does not demand
the removal of a communal official for misdeeds unrelated to his office.21 Nonetheless,
misdeeds remain misdeeds, even if they are not impeachable offenses. If the board
18
member refuses to resign, he should be regarded as one who is unfit to hold communal
office. He should not be reappointed or re-nominated to any position of leadership in the
congregation once his term expires.
Modern political tradition, especially in the British Commonwealth,

suggests yet another solution:
When a cabinet minister faces a serious accusation of misbehavior, he/she steps down
temporarily until the matter is cleared up. This is one of the rare instances where we can
learn from political precedent.
Notes
• For example: “One who is engaged in the needs of the community is like one
who engages in the study of Torah” (YT. Berakhot 5:1). “There are four who
cannot be tolerated. .and a parnas who lords it over the community without
cause” (BT. Pesachim 113b). “Who are those that terrorize the land of the living?
R. Hisda said: This is the parnas who intimidates the community when not for the
sake of Heaven. R. Yehudah said in the name of Rav: A parnas who intimidates
the community when not for the sake of Heaven will never have a son who is a
Torah scholar” (BT. Rosh Hashanah 17a). “Our rabbis taught: There are three for
whom the Holy One weeps every day…and for a parnas who lords it over the
community” (BT. Hagigah 5b).
• However, Rashi ad loc. explains this as referring to some family blemish (dofi ba-
mishpacha).
19
• SA OC 53:4.
• Jewish tradition has understood the sheliach tzibur (abbreviated as shatz) to be
quite literally the “representative of the community” in prayer. The shatz chants
the prayers on behalf of the congregation, acting as their agent. This is expressed
physically by having the shatz face the Ark, and not the congregation, during
prayer. The role of the shatz was largely eliminated from Reform worship.
• Shulchan Arukh OC 53:5.

• SA OC 53:5.
• The gabbai tzedakah was the communal official responsible for collecting,
counting, and distributing charitable funds. See Yad, Hilkhot Matanot Aniyim 9:1:
those in charge of tzedakah must be “well known and trustworthy.”
• See, e.g., M. Shekalim 3:2; BT. Shekalim 7a, 9a; SA, YD 257:1, 2, 6.
• See Isserles to SA, YD 257:2: the gabbai tzedakah must render an accounting
of his actions in office “if he obtained his position through coercive or violent
means.”
• See Mishnah Berurah 53, # 14 and 16.

• Mishnah Berurah 15 ad loc.
• Arukh Ha-shulchan OC 53:7
• Mishnah Berurah 53, # 15.
• Arukh Ha-shulchan, OC 53, par. 8.
• Shakh, SA, YD 257, # 3.
• SA, YD 257:2, citing the Kol Bo.
• Shakh, YD 257, # 4.
• Arukh Hashulchan, SA, YD 257, par. 13.
• The principle is neki’im tih’yu me-Adonai ume-Yisrael; Num. 32:22; M. Shekalim
3:2, SA, YD 257:2.
20
• It is axiomatic that, when those who have wronged us seek to repent and make
amends, we accept their effort as we would have them accept ours. BT. Yoma 87a-
b; Yad, Hilkhot Teshuvah 2:9; SA, YD 606:1.
• The position of shatz, of course, is an exception to this rule: as the
representative of the community before God, all aspects of the character of the
shatz relate directly to his (and — today — her) fitness for office. This is not true of
the gabbai tzedakah, whose position affords the closest analogy to that of
synagogue trustee.
The appearance standard: Criteria and remedies for when a mere

appearance of unethical behavior is morally unacceptable
21
Muel Kaptein7 writes:8
1 INTRODUCTION
“You must […] avoid engaging in any activity that involves even the appearance of impropriety.”
IBM includes this statement in its Code of Conduct and is not the only company that forbids both
actual and apparent unethical behavior by its employees. Dell states in its Code of Conduct, “We
avoid even the appearance of impropriety;” General Motors declares, “We expect all employees
to avoid the appearance of or involvement in conflicts of interest;” and Nestlé stipulates,
“Employees must refrain from any activity or behavior that could give rise to the appearance or
suspicion of such conduct or the attempt thereof.” The codes of ethics of other large companies,
like Walmart, AT&T, Apple, General Electric, and Exxon Mobil, also forbid employees from
giving rise to the appearance of specific unethical behaviors or of unethical behavior in general.
There is also some anecdotal evidence of the application of this so-called appearance standard
(Thompson,1992). For example, directors from the Bank of Hawaii (Engleman, 2005), Google
(Paczkowski, 2009), Hulman & Co (Associated Press, 2012), Churchill Downs Incorporated
(Menmuir, 2014), and Uber (Golson, 2016) had to resign either to prevent them from creating the
appearance of unethical behavior or after they have created the appearance of unethical behavior.
The appearance standard—also called the double standard of behaving and appearing ethically
(Gilman, 2003)—is neither new nor only typical in the business sector. As early as the first century,
Saint Paul advised the Thessalonians to “abstain from all appearance of evil” (The King James
Bible, 1 Thessalonians 5: 22). Several professional codes, for example, those of court judges,
lawyers, auditors, doctors, and politicians, include the appearance standard. The first canon of the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association (2011) is, “A judge […] shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” The appearance standard does not seem
unimportant either. The appearance of unethical behavior is seen to be almost as important
(Luban, 2001) or just as important as actual unethical behavior (Abramson, 2000; Dopuch, King,
Schwartz, & Zhang, 2003). For Gilman (2003), the appearance standard might be the most
important standard by which to judge the actions of public officials. McKoski (2010) observes that
7
MUEL KAPTEIN is a Professor in Business Ethics and Integrity Management at RSM Erasmus University. His research interests
include the management of ethics, the measurement of ethics, and the ethics of management. He has published articles in journals
like Academy of Management Review, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of Organizational
Behavior, Human Relations, and Organization Studies. Muel is also equity partner at KPMG, where he co‐founded KPMG Ethics
& Integrity in 1996.
8
https://library..com/doi/full/10.1111/beer.12195
22
people in all kinds of professional positions, from doctors to teachers, from sports figures to
journalists, are often publicly judged by the appearance standard.
At first glance, the appearance standard is appealing. It is highly ambitious in that it goes further
than prohibiting actual unethical behavior (Pingree, 2007), and it is a great catchall for improper
behavior because appearance encompasses many things (Abramson, 2000). The standard thus acts
as a safety net because it catches behavior that would otherwise “slip through the cracks” of a code
of ethics (McKoski, 2010, p. 1964), and as a tidewater mark because it is the leading edge of the
organic expansion of ethics (Gilman, 2003). However, the appearance standard is a paradoxical
norm in that, as Thompson (1992) argues, it forbids behavior that is in itself not wrong. As such,
some scholars regard the appearance standard as controversial and contestable (Bauer, 2012;
Gilman, 2003; Pingree, 2007; Samaha, 2012; Smith, 2011). For Luban (2001, p. 26), the problem
is that appearance is a “conceptual accordion that can expand as widely as suits the eyes of the
beholder” while the beholder has not analyzed the observed behavior properly. It is remarkable
that while there is extensive debate about the appearance standard in different fields, for example,
in the legal field (Abramson, 2000; Bassett & Perschbacher, 2013; Brewer, 2003;
McKoski, 2010), the standard has hardly received any attention in the business (ethics) literature.
An exception is the application of the appearance standard to auditors carried out by Collins and
Schultz (1995), Spira (1999), and Page and Spira (2005).
The reference that companies make to the appearance standard and the ongoing debate about it
outside the business (ethics) literature raise the question about the meaning and implications of the
standard for the behavior of business employees (including directors and managers). For instance,
should an employee not have a good friend who works with a competitor (even if the employee is
able to completely separate friendship from business interests)? Should an employee not own any
shares in another company that does business with his employer (even though the employee is not
influenced by it in his work)? Should an employee not use in private life products of competitors
(even if the employee is quite loyal to his work)? This article examines both the criteria for when
mere appearance of unethical behavior by employees is morally unacceptable and the remedies for
preventing and resolving such instances. We develop a model of both these criteria and remedies
because as of yet, there is no such model, not even of the appearance standard in general. Our
focus will be on the individual, as opposed to the organizational, level, and our approach is
conceptual instead of empirical.
Before presenting the model, we first define the appearance standard and introduce the Corporate
Integrity Theory (Kaptein & Wempe, 2002) that we employ to develop the model. We use this
theory because it is a balanced approach that looks at how an employee's character, behaviors, and
23
the consequences of those behaviors are related to each other to form a coherent whole. After
describing the seven criteria, we introduce the corresponding remedies. We then discuss a real-life
example to illustrate the applicability of the model. In general, the following are the contributions
of this article: it focuses on a hardly examined but relevant question for the business ethics
literature; it presents criteria that will help us ascertain when mere appearance of unethical
behavior is morally unacceptable; it presents a coherent set of remedies; and it advances the debate
about the appearance standard by using an integrity approach for understanding the standard.
2 DEFINITION OF THE APPEARANCE STANDARD

Outside the business (ethics) literature, the appearance standard is largely discussed with reference
to the appearance of impropriety (i.e., Abramson, 2000; Luban, 2001; McKoski,2010). Other
related terms used are the appearance of immoral behavior, corruption, and wrongdoing
(Driver, 1992; Hellman, 2001; Levin, 2001). This article relates the appearance standard to
unethical behavior and, following Gilman (2003), treats all of the above terms as synonymous. All
these terms refer to inappropriate normative behavior understood as behavior that is disapproved
by society in general or by codes of ethics in particular. This understanding follows Jones’ (1991)
definition of unethical behavior.
In the literature on the topic, appearance is also referred to as an impression, suspicion, belief,
form, and mimetic (Carson, 1994; Driver, 1992; Gustafson, 1987; Samaha, 2012; Smith,2011). In
this article, there is no distinction made between these terms. Samaha (2012, p. 1570) argues that
appearance is “an external show or the outward aspect of something based on sense impression,
which can be processed into a belief about the world.” Something can appear or be perceived as
something regardless of the ultimate factual accuracy of that perception (Bassett &
Perschbacher, 2013). This is because appearance involves available information that might or
might not accurately reflect reality, whereas reality refers to “things that are not illusory, that occur
in fact, or that have an objective existence” (Samaha, 2012, p. 1571).
The appearance standard concerns the appearance of unethical behavior when unethical behavior
is in fact absent (Thompson, 1992). The appearance standard is about behavior that is morally
unacceptable only because of how it appears or is perceived. The idea behind the appearance
standard is therefore not that actual unethical behavior is acceptable for as long as others are not
aware of it (cf. Kolstad, 2016). This would be hypocritical, as Grant (1997) argues, or deceptive,
as Provis (2010) claims. The key question regarding the appearance standard is when does
someone who gives the appearance of engaging in an unethical behavior—while actual unethical
behavior is absent—nevertheless behaves unethically simply because the appearance has been
24
created. Therefore, the appearance standard is not about figuring out whether there is actual
unethical behavior, because there is as a matter of fact no unethical behavior. Likewise, the
appearances are not in themselves or intrinsically unethical because then they would already
belong to the domain of unethical behavior.
3 AN INTEGRITY APPROACH TO THE APPEARANCE STANDARD

So far, outside the business ethics literature, both a consequentialist and a deontological approach
have been used to defend the moral appropriateness of the appearance standard. Driver (1992) can
be seen as the founder and primary proponent of the consequentialist approach to the appearance
standard. For her, appearing to behave unethically is morally unacceptable not because the
behavior has negative consequences in and of itself but because, due to resemblance, the behavior
is misconstrued by others to be unethical. Driver identifies three negative potential consequences
of such misconstruals: others are offended, the lives of others are made miserable, and the person
setting a bad example corrupts himself (by developing “a taste for doing the real thing” (p. 333),
thus breaking down the resistance to unethical behavior) and others (because observing apparent
unethical behavior reduces the pressure to avoid these unethical behaviors themselves). Therefore,
Driver argues, people should not give cause for such misinterpretations when they lead to such
negative consequences.
Hellman (2001) presents a deontological approach to the appearance standard. She advances
reasons why the appearance standard can be defended independent of, according to her,
controversial, empirical claims about the consequences of the appearance. For Hellman, the
responsibility to avoid appearing to behave unethically is based on the relationship between an
actor and the observer. If an actor has a responsibility toward an observer, then the actor also has
a moral obligation not to give the observer reasons to misinterpret his actions and distrust him.
However, “without a relationship, there is no such obligation” (p. 666). Although observers may
lack the ability to confirm or refute their suspicions, this does not preclude them from forming
reasonable convictions about a behavior. Hellman concludes that an actor should therefore modify
their behavior to accommodate the epistemic limitations of the relevant observers (i.e., with whom
they have the right sort of relationship) whose suspicions are reasonable (albeit mistaken), even if
no harm is caused.
Both Driver's and Hellman's approaches to the appearance standard may be useful for showing
when mere appearance of unethical behavior by employees is morally unacceptable. In Driver's
consequentialist approach, the mere appearance of unethical behavior involving employees may
be morally unacceptable when the appearance has specific negative consequences, such as it
25
offends one or more stakeholders, it damages stakeholder's interests, or it reduces the motivation
of employees and other stakeholders to behave ethically. Hellman's deontological approach may
be useful in that what counts as morally unacceptable does not depend on the actual expectations
and reactions of stakeholders (the observers); otherwise, we run the risk that morality falls into the
hands of the illogical and ill-informed. For this deontological approach, merely appearing to
behave unethically is morally unacceptable when employees give stakeholders—that is, the
observers with whom they have a relationship (thus not everyone in the world)—reason to
misinterpret their actions.
Corporate Integrity Theory, as developed by Kaptein and Wempe (2002), does not adopt either a
deontological or a consequentialist approach. The integrity approach holds that both deontological
and consequentialist arguments are relevant in determining when behavior in the business context
is morally acceptable or unacceptable, because both arguments “complement each other in many
instances” (p. 83). According to Kaptein and Wempe, when we choose only one of these
approaches, we do not do justice to the other one, and we are not in a good position to determine
when behavior is morally unacceptable. In addition, following only one approach can lead to an
impasse in a debate about what counts as morally unacceptable behavior because one tries to
convince with arguments from one's own approach and not from the other's.
The Corporate Integrity Theory also holds that in determining what is morally acceptable and
unacceptable behavior, we should not only look at the behavior and its consequences but also at
the actor's character. A person's character is the object of a virtue ethics approach, which is
concerned with determining the virtues or the excellent traits of character that a person should
possess (Hursthouse, 1999). Integrity is about how an actor's character and behaviors and their
consequences are related to each other to form a coherent whole. The corporate integrity theory
emphasizes the coherence between virtue, deontological, and consequentialist ethics (Kaptein &
Wempe, 2002).
Although neither virtue ethics nor integrity theory has been explicitly related to the appearance
standard, some scholars suggest that a violation of the appearance standard leads to undermining
one or more virtues, such as credibility, objectivity, impartiality, and accountability
(Abramson, 2000; Gray, 2005; Michaely & Womack, 1999; Thompson, 1993). Other scholars
suggest that integrity is at stake when there is an appearance of unethical behavior. For example,
Thompson (1992) is concerned that the integrity of someone who acts as the judge in their own
court case is compromised, Flamm (1996) notes that judicial decisions that appear improper
undermine the integrity of the courts, and Bauer (2012, p. 94) notes that financing political parties
threatens the “integrity of the electoral process.” Gray (2005) argues that an employee who creates
26
the impression of being involved in an unethical behavior may damage their own integrity and the
confidence others have in their integrity. Moreover, as ambassadors and representatives of their
company (Kaptein & Wempe, 2002), employees may then also damage corporate integrity.
An integrity approach may be useful in defining when mere appearance of unethical behavior by
employees is morally unacceptable. It is a balanced approach, as suggested by Kaptein and Wempe
(2002), in the sense that it takes into account character, behavior, and consequences. This balancing
act is necessary to apply the appearance standard well, as Gilman (2003) posits. An integrity
approach is also balanced in the sense that, on the one hand, it determines within concrete or
specific situations when behavior is morally (un)acceptable. “The [integrity] approach takes
seriously the whole: the individual, the context, and the past” (Kaptein & Wempe, 2002, p. 97).
This renders the integrity approach pragmatic, flexible, and realistic (Kaptein & Wempe, 2002).
On the other hand, this approach seeks to avoid lapsing into subjectivism and relativism by
searching for moral criteria that apply to every situation.
4 CRITERIA FOR EXPLAINING HOW MERE APPEARANCE OF

UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR ARISES
We now discuss the criteria that explain why or how there can be mere appearances of unethical
behavior. When we know what these criteria are, we can specify when such an appearance of
unethical behavior becomes morally unacceptable and consequently, the possible remedies that
would prevent or resolve them. With this definition, we build the model (see Figure 1) of the
criteria for when there can be mere appearances of unethical behavior (propositions 1–4), the
criteria for when such an appearance is morally unacceptable (propositions 5–7), and the remedies
to prevent and resolve mere appearances of unethical behavior (propositions 8–11).
Figure 1
27
Criteria and remedies for when a mere appearance of unethical behavior is
morally unacceptable
We propose here four criteria for how mere appearances of unethical behavior come about. We
begin with the presence of conflicts of interests (whether there is any reason for the belief of
unethical behavior), followed by the entanglement of these interests (concerns the extent to which
it is difficult for the observer to find out whether the employee deals with the conflicts of interests
in an ethical way), the employee's reputation for lack of integrity (that feeds the observer's
impression about how the employee deals with the entangled conflicts of interests), and deviant
outcomes (the extent to which there are indications that the entangled conflicts of interests are not
dealt with in an ethical way). This approach agrees with Gray's (2005, p. 88) observation, made
within the legal context, that “a finding of an appearance of impropriety is often based on a
combination of factors and the cumulative effects of the circumstances.” That these criteria explain
why there can be mere appearances of unethical behavior does not preclude that they, especially
the first two criteria, also explain actual unethical behavior. This is logical because the mere
appearance is created by some combination of things (e.g., the individual, the context, and the past)
that seem to lead to unethical behavior but, in fact, do not actually do in the particular case because
there is no unethical behavior. At the same time, this does not imply that all criteria that explain
actual unethical behavior are relevant for creating mere appearances of unethical behavior. The
four criteria reflect what integrity stands for by involving aspects of the three main ethical theories.
The criteria conflicts of interests and their entanglement refer to deontological ethics because they
are about someone's behavior, that is, the position someone enters into and how transparently one
behaves in that position. Reputation for lack of integrity refers to virtue ethics because it concerns
one's moral characteristics. Lastly, deviant outcomes refer to consequentialist ethics because this
criterion concerns the consequences of the suggested unethical behavior. The extent to which these
four criteria apply together gives rise to mere appearance of unethical behavior.
4.1 Conflicts of interests

The first criterion that explains how there can be mere appearances of unethical behavior is the
presence of conflicts of interests. Like Kaptein and Wempe (2002), who start their exposition of
Corporate Integrity Theory by depicting companies in terms of conflicting interests, we also start
here with conflict of interests because it is the ground of supposed unethical behavior. The standard
conception of a conflict of interests, as advanced by Davis (2001) and elaborated by Coleman
(2005), postulates that one person is in a relationship with another, which requires the person to
exercise judgement on behalf of the other, and that the person has a (special) interest that tends to
interfere with the proper exercise of judgement within that relationship, thereby making the
28
person's judgment less reliable than it would normally be. According to this definition, a conflict
of interests can arise when a person is required to exercise judgment on behalf of another. The
conflicting interests are, what Thompson (1993) calls, the primary and secondary interests.
Primary interests are determined by the professional duties of the person. They are the primary
consideration in any professional decision that the person should make (Carson, 1994). Secondary
interests are, as Thompson (1993) suggests, not wrong in themselves, but they become problematic
when they are (believed to be) assigned more weight than primary interests. Hence, in a conflict
of interests, a primary interest tends to be unduly influenced or even dominated (Thompson, 1993)
by a secondary interest, which then renders the judgment of the person making the decision less
reliable (Coleman, 2005). When there is a conflict of interests, there is “reason to worry” (Borden
& Pritchard, 2001, p. 79) that the judgment and performance may be compromised, without
suggesting or presuming that the decision is necessarily compromised.
Conflicts of interests are thus relevant for explaining the appearance of unethical behavior. For
this reason, we expect that the more prevalent the conflicts of interests are, the more likely it is
that the impression of unethical behavior will be created. Thompson (1993) proposes standards for
assessing conflicts of interests. He identifies factors that make conflicts more or less problematic.
The severity of a conflict of interests depends on, for example, the likelihood that professional
judgment will be influenced or will appear to be influenced. In assessing such likelihood,
Thompson assumes that, within a certain range, the greater the value of the secondary interest (e.g.,
the size of the financial gain), the more probable its influence. More precisely, the greater the
weight of the secondary interest(s) compared to that of the primary interest(s) (i.e., the greater the
negative difference in weight between the interests), the greater the chance that the secondary
interests will be chosen over the primary interest; thus, that the person will behave unethically. A
specific example comes from the study of Steinman, Shlipak, and McPhee (2001), where they
show that physicians perceive a strong association between the value of a gift and its potential to
influence physicians’ prescribing practices. The scope of the conflict of interests also affects the
likelihood of a mere appearance of unethical behavior, particularly the nature of the relationship
that generates the conflict: longer and closer associations are more problematic (Thompson, 1993).
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Daf Ditty Shekalim 8: The Appearance of Impropriety

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Daf Ditty Shekalim 8: The Appearance of Impropriety

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:

Taking the coins into boxes

USING GREEK LETTERS IN THE BEIS HA'MIKDASH

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:1

The Collection Baskets

Rabbi Jeremy Rosen writes:3

Protect Your Reputation

"but it seemed contemptible to him to lay hands on Mordecai alone".

Why would any onlooker ever be justified in presuming the worst?

Board Member Accused of Cheating6

A member of the congregation complains that a Trustee of the synagogue has

The case at hand.

Modern political tradition, especially in the British Commonwealth,

community” (BT. Hagigah 5b).

• Shulchan Arukh OC 53:5.

those in charge of tzedakah must be “well known and trustworthy.”

• See Mishnah Berurah 53, # 14 and 16.

3:2, SA, YD 257:2.

b; Yad, Hilkhot Teshuvah 2:9; SA, YD 606:1.

• The position of shatz, of course, is an exception to this rule: as the

The appearance standard: Criteria and remedies for when a mere

2 DEFINITION OF THE APPEARANCE STANDARD

3 AN INTEGRITY APPROACH TO THE APPEARANCE STANDARD

4 CRITERIA FOR EXPLAINING HOW MERE APPEARANCE OF

4.1 Conflicts of interests

• Deltell, G. (2017). Gérard Deltell on business of supply. House of Commons. Retrieved

• Edelman Trust Barometer. (2013). Annual Global Study. Retrieved

• Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York, NY: .

• Hursthouse, R. (1999). On virtue ethics. Oxford: Oxford University

• KPMG. (2013). Integrity survey. Retrieved

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