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4 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
The Crisis of Free Expression
Ali Inan
Lahore, Pakistan
M uch has happened in recent decades,
from the rise of Islamophobic troll
workshops in India to renewed anti-
Semitism in Europe and Facebook-created
“bubbles” in the United States, to thwart the
pseudo-religious faith that free expression is an
unquestionable value, an unequivocal sign of
ethical and civic advancement. Now the French
President Emmanuel Macron seems a fretted man.
He first suggested to modernize Islam along French
lines. Then following the violent murder of a
schoolteacher by a Muslim teenager, he offered
France’s backing to caricatures of the Prophet
(pbuh) that most Muslims see as blasphemous. The
‘crisis’ of Islam for Europe has not only deepened,
but also given birth to a more challenging global
‘crisis’ of free expression.
Macron and his supporters are misled by ideo-
logical dogma. It is one thing to uphold freedom of
expression — a responsibility of all democratic
leaders. It is relatively another to install an entire
nation behind a certain manifestation of that free-
dom. In one noticeable case of growing
majoritarian reaction against an already estranged
faction, high schools throughout France intended
to distribute fliers with demeaning images of the
Prophet (pbuh) in order to uphold “the values of the
Republic.” Part of the blame for this growing mess
must sit on Macron’s ever more despairing desire to
defeat his overtly anti-Islam challenger Marine le
Pen at her own game in presidential elections due in
2022.
France’s close neighbor Germany has been
outlawing disparaging “fake news” and cracking
down on social media enterprises. France itself has
announced the denial of the Holocaust to be a crime
— an incongruity that besets its support for free
speech. A bewildered Muslim today may well ques-
tion why insults against the Prophet and Islam
should turn out to be the litmus test of a strongly
and regularly compromised principle.
Determined to settle once and for all the “cri-
sis” of Islam, Macron and his supporters pretend
that the right to insult the devout is an indispens-
able move in mankind’s journey from religious
delusion to secular illumination. The historical
proof for this conviction may appear strong in the
case of France, which in the late 18th century
started to identify its new identity against a formi-
dable and tyrannical church. However, the country,
currently, has a sizeable non-Christian minority,
mostly from the Muslim countries it once cruelly
colonized, and it appears highly unlikely that
Macron or anyone else can manage to affront this
traditionally degraded population into an Illumina-
tion.
As Le Monde reported, Macron scoffed during
a cabinet meeting at American “multiculturalism,”
calling it a “form of defeatist thought.” In fact, there
is a great deal he can learn from the United States,
the impenetrable citadel of free speech. The First
Amendment didn’t have to be rescinded for
denouncing such insulting discourse. Rather, anti-
racist campaigners generated extensive social rec-
ognition for their principled belief — that the nobil-
ity of a once methodically humiliated people be
revered. Condescending of America’s experience,
Macron could at least consider Simone Weil, the
uncommon French sage to allow for the presence of
her country’s colonial subjects and to recognize that
18th-century articles of faith cannot remain the
only guidebook to human co-existence.
Exploring France’s cataclysmic political and
moral breakdown in the late 1930s and early 1940s,
Weil came to see duties and obligations rather than
rights as the foundation of an irreversibly varied
society. For her, phrases like “I have the right” sug-
gest a “latent war and awaken the spirit of conten-
tion.”As Weil observed, “to place the notion of
rights at the center of social conflicts is to inhibit
any possible impulse of charity on both sides.”
The nature of conflict, grown vicious, even
deadly, is damaging societies around the world
today while the inclination to benevolence grows
ever frailer. Nonetheless, the damage has been
done — and not only to the belief of free expression,
but also to the principle of co-existence. Macron
must suppress the evil notion that insulting the
central beliefs of nearly 2 billion Muslims would
maintain the essential values of French people. If
not addressed timely and appropriately, the crisis
of Islam would aggravate, and the crisis of free
expression worsen.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Current edition
December 2020

4 Editorial
Pakistan Energy Shortage
The Crisis of Free Expression
34 Powering the Powerless in Pakistan
A roadmap to finally solving Pakistan’s energy crisis through “energy productivity”
Pakistan Islamists
8 Radical Leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi is Dead – But His Ideology Will Live On in Pakistan Victoria Belt and Road
Leader of a right-wing party with pull, Rizvi’s death will not diminish extremist politics in Pakistan
36 Australia and China: It’s Complicated
Even amid the current tensions, the state of the relationship is more complex than headlines would suggest
South Asia Conflict
10 The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Diplomatic Repercussions for Pakistan Opinion
While Nagorno-Karabakh is over 2,000 kilometers from Pakistan’s borders, its conflicts may have a lasting effect on Pakistan’s diplomacy
40 Pak-US Relations and the Indian Factor
Pakistan has always accused the US of not understanding its regional interests
Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations
12 Pakistan’s Prime Minister Khan on ‘Historic’ First Visit to Afghanistan Point of View
The uneasy neighbors are trying to turn the corner from a relationship marked by suspicion and downright hostility toward a partnership for
peace in the region 42 In Support of Large Dams
Pakistan is blessed with a large hydroelectric potential and should not ignore it

Pakistan-India Relations
Perspective
13 What Explains the Timing of Pakistan’s Anti-India Dossier?
Islamabad has come forward with evidence about India’s role in spreading terrorism in Pakistan. That might be a politically smart move 43 Umpteen Commissions on Civil Service Reforms
Unless the two sides come to consensus on problems of the civil service, no commission can reverse the downward trend

Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms
Military Vs Militants
14 The Complex Calculus Behind Gilgit-Baltistan’s Provincial Upgrade
Kashmir, India, and China: The creation of Pakistan’s newest province will have far-flung geopolitical ripples 44 Pak-Afghan Trust Deficit
The election of Joe Biden as US president has added new dimensions to the already complex situation

US Pakistan Policy
Strategic Studies
16 From Trump to Biden: Will Anything Change for Pakistan in Washington?
Brace for more of the same when it comes to Pakistan-US relations under Joe Biden 46 Can Biden Salvage The Iran Nuclear Deal?
Biden administration would have to first ascertain its expectations, pre-conditions prior to talks with Iranian govt

New Development Bank

Middle East Landscape
18 Why the BRICS Grouping Is Here to Stay
Western reactions to 12th BRICS Summit are largely dismissive, but critics overlook tangible benefits for member countries 47 What The Future Holds For Palestine?
The Palestinian struggle has long been an accepted moto in Arab/Muslim narrations and continues to be used to this day to mobilize the populace

Middle East Studies

World Bank
20 No Exit Why the Middle East Still Matters to America
Washington needs to figure out its interests in the Middle East and craft a strategy to advance them 49 Apartheid in the World Bank and the IMF
These institutions were designed with colonial principles in mind, and they remain largely colonial in character to this day

Natural Resources
US Presidency
24 As the World Burns Climate Change’s Dangerous Next Phase
By 2050, many areas around the world will face flood levels every year 50 Trump is Leaving Biden A Landmine Field in the Middle East
Biden will bring change to policy-making in Washington, but he will still struggle with Trump’s legacy

Afghan Argument
G-B Polling
28 It’s Time to Trust the Taliban
Afghanistan’s jihadi insurgents are ready to give America what it wants: defeat without humiliation 53 The Importance of Being G-B
Nothing can bar G-B’s people from taking in their own hands power to self-rule with the region’s security underwritten

China-Taliban Relations
Coronavirus Pandemic
30 China’s Stake in the Afghan Peace Process
Afghanistan is already of strategic importance to Beijing. As U.S. troops leave, China’s influence will grow 54 In the Time of Pandemic, Debt Relief Efforts Need to Go Further
For the global economy to recover quickly, not only the poorest but all small and vulnerable nations should have access to debt relief

Security Alliances
Climate Change
32 The Middle East Strategic Realignment Reverberates Through South Asia
As momentous as the slow collapse of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the strategic reorientation within the Middle East is, its impact on South Asia 56 Lessons Learned From COVID-19 Can Help Us Fight Climate Change
will also be momentous Just like COVID-19, climate change is destroying lives and ruining livelihoods on a daily bases across the world

6 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020

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December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 7
Pakistan Islamists

Radical Leader Khadim Hussain

Rizvi is Dead – But His Ideology
Will Live On in Pakistan
Leader of a right-wing party with pull, Rizvi’s death will not diminish extremist politics
in Pakistan

s People gather near an ambulance carrying the body of Khadim Hussain Rizvi, leader of religious and political party Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP),
during the funeral service as the outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) continues, in Lahore, Pakistan November 21, 2020.

Rizvi’s politics of agitation achieved nota- ing clashes with the security agencies.
ble gains. A few days before his death, he His party has always been accused
was in the capital, demanding the expul- of getting support from various state
institutions. While Rizvi denied that his
It is important to note party was working on someone’s agenda,
he often talked about revealing the
here that before Rizvi’s names of officials who asked him to
ascendance to power, march to Islamabad for the 2017 sit-in
against former Prime Minister Nawaz
there were serious Sharif’s government. In any case, that
differences over the doesn’t mean that the TLP’s support
question of leadership base doesn’t exist. In the 2018 general
election, the TLP was able to muster
sion of France’s ambassador to Pakistan more than 2 million votes nationwide
By Umair Jamal over the issue of controversial cartoons and also won two provincial assembly
@UmairJamal15 depicting the prophet Mohammad. The seats in Sindh. In Punjab, Rizvi’s party
government had no option but to sign an fielded more candidates than the Paki-
number of its National Assembly candi-
dates was even more than those fielded
by a bigger religio-political parties’ amal-
gam, the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal
(MMA).
Rizvi’s death is going to create a
huge challenge for the TLP’s second tier
of leadership. It is important to note here
that before Rizvi’s ascendance to power,
there were serious differences over the
question of leadership. Rizvi was able to
sideline several other potential candi-
dates and consolidated power over the
last few years. His death will ensure a
fight among several groups within the
party for the leadership of the group.
There has not been any other leader who
even comes close to Rizvi’s persona.

K hadim Hussain Rizvi, the head
of the Tehreek-i-Labaik
Pakistan (TLP), a group that has
been the face of right-wing agitation for
some years in Pakistan and often
brought the country’s capital to a
standstill due to its anti-blasphemy
rallies, died on November 19.
The reasons for Rizi’s death are
unknown. Reportedly, he had been suf-
fering from fever for several days. In any
case, the demise of Rizi will have a lasting
impact on Pakistan’s political landscape.
In Pakistan, Rizvi’s party has been
perceived by most as a force to be reck-
oned with over the last few years. For his
followers, Rizvi was a charismatic leader
who brought electoral relevancy to a
religious group that has not been known
for its street politics in Pakistan. When it
comes to right-wing politics in Pakistan,
Rizvi competed with several groups and
leaders and virtually stole the limelight.
Thus, the succession process is expected
to be tense and may divide the TLP into
several groups. Rizvi’s son may be
appointed as the leader of the party to
head off any potential leadership battles.
In any case, the TLP’s support base
across the country is genuine and will not
go away with the death of Rizvi. “A
leader’s death, however, instrumental or
charismatic he may have been, is not
enough to do away with an extremist
organization. TLP’s ideology has strong
roots in Pakistan, and many buyers,”
said scholar Madiha Afzal on Twitter.
For the foreseeable future, we may
not see a lot of activity from the TLP at
the political end, but the party should be
s Khadim Hussain Rizvi of religious and political party Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), gestures to s People gather to attend funeral services for Khadim Hussain Rizvi, leader of religious and political
his supporters during a protest against the cartoon publications of Prophet Mohammad in France and party Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), at the Minar-e-Pakistan monument as the outbreak of the
expected to return to the streets soon,
comments by the French President Emmanuel Macron, in Karachi, Pakistan November 7, 2020. coronavirus disease (COVID-19) continues, in Lahore, Pakistan November 21, 2020. and perhaps with increased support. If
the party falters during the post-Rizvi
No other right-wing group in Paki- From securing resignations of ministers agreement with Rizvi that promised leg- stan’s Peoples Party (PPP) and emerged transition phase, we may see a different
stan has challenged the state the way to shutting down cities and forcing the islative changes to fulfill his demands, as one of the most organized political group or leader emerging from the ashes.
Rizvi’s group has been able to do at will. state into rethinking various policies, and also freed TLP workers arrested dur- parties in the province. Moreover, the

8 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020

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December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 9
South Asia Conflict
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict:
Diplomatic Repercussions
for Pakistan
While Nagorno-Karabakh is over 2,000 kilometers from Pakistan’s borders, its conflicts
may have a lasting effect on Pakistan’s diplomacy
s Russian peacekeepers’ military vehicles with Russian national flags parked at a check point on the road to Shusha in the separatist region of
Nagorno-Karabakh, on November 17, 2020.
By Shahid Hussain
London, United Kingdom
A rmenia and Azerbaijan each
claim a historical and religious
connection to the region of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian
claim rests on the fact the territory was
part of a larger medieval Christian
Armenian polity, whose borders far
exceeded the boundaries of modern day
Armenia. Azerbaijan also claims a
historical connection to the land,
arguing the territory was frequently
invaded and ruled by Muslim Ottoman
Turks throughout the late medieval and
early modern period. Since the breakup
of the Soviet Union, the two countries
have fought a number of times over the
region, which is largely recognized as
part of Azerbaijan but has been occupied
by Armenia for decades.
In the most recent conflict between
10 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
Baku and Yerevan, Turkey’s military and
political support was vital and contrib-
uted to a number of Azerbaijani military
victories. These victories eventually cul-
minated in a Russia-backed peace deal,
which returned vast swathes of disputed
territory to Baku’s control. However,
while many commentators have cited
Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan, it is also
important to acknowledge the wider
support given to Baku by its other major
ally, Pakistan.
As soon as the Russian-brokered
peace deal came to light, Pakistan issued
a statement congratulating the “broth-
erly people of Azerbaijan on the libera-
tion of their territories.” The press
release went one step further, saying
Pakistan hoped for a period of “stability
and prosperity” and that Azerbaijan’s
victory “will pave the way for the return
of internally displaced people to their
ancestral lands,” a clear statement of
support for Azerbaijan’s historic right to
Nagorno-Karabakh. Pakistan has
repeatedly supported Azerbaijan’s posi-
tion on the dispute at the United Nations
and other international forums. While
its support for Azerbaijan is hardly sur-
prising, the diplomatic repercussions for
Islamabad may be far-reaching.
Many Armenians believed their
former patron, Russia, would provide
substantial military support to the Arme-
nian separatist forces in Nagorno-
Karabakh, citing the dangerous role Tur-
key was playing in the conflict. Russia’s
decision not to intervene militarily in the
conflict, and its refusal to send fighters to
the disputed enclave, is the result of a
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
s Islamabad hopes liberation of territories ‘will pave way for return of internally displaced persons to ancestral lands’.
complex web of diplomatic relationships
in the region. Among those factors is the
recent strengthening of ties between
Moscow and Islamabad. Pakistan and
Russia have conducted joint military
drills and the South Asian nation partici-
pated in recent war games hosted by
Russia. Pakistan could be an important
partner for Russia, particularly given
that the two can play an active role in
settling regional disputes, including in
Afghanistan. The fact that Pakistan’s
recent statement acknowledged Russia’s
role in ending the fighting is a subtle nod
to Moscow’s importance to Pakistan and
the wider region.
s An Israeli-made IAI Harop loitering munition, commonly called suicide drones, widely reported as
being used by Azerbaijani forces.
Russia may also have wanted to
avoid upsetting another of its South
Asian allies. Whilst playing a delicate
balancing act between Azerbaijan and
Armenia, Iran still issued frequent state-
ments of support for Baku, with supreme
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
leader Ali Khamenei arguing that
“Azerbaijan has the right to liberate its
occupied territories.” The diplomatic
Israel’s support was
solidified after the
country’s ambassador
to Azerbaijan visited the
city of Ganja to offer his
condolences to civilian
victims of Armenian
rocket attacks
fallout for Russia from supporting Arme-
nia would have potentially upset its rela-
tionship with its firm ally Iran and also
threatened to destabilize the recent
détente with Pakistan. Perhaps this is
one of the reasons President Vladimir
Putin decided to remain neutral in the
conflict.
It is also important to note Israel’s
support for Baku, raising the prospect of
a reset between Tel Aviv and Islamabad,
particularly given their shared support
for Azerbaijan. During the recent con-
flict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Israeli-
made IAI Harop drone was reportedly
deployed to devastating effect against
Armenian forces. Israel’s support was
solidified after the country’s ambassador
to Azerbaijan visited the city of Ganja to
offer his condolences to civilian victims
of Armenian rocket attacks. Their shared
support for Azerbaijan, combined with
Israel’s recent peace deals with Arab
Muslim states, including the UAE and
Bahrain, may potentially bring Paki-
stan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan closer
to establishing formal diplomatic rela-
tions with Israel. In fact, just this month,
Khan said he was “under pressure” to
recognize Israel. The fact that the two
sides also support a common ally in the
Caucasus could act to bring them closer
together.
Peace has been re-established in the
Caucasus for now and Pakistan can
stand to benefit in many ways, not only
by strengthening its relationship with
Azerbaijan, but also by using the conflict
as a springboard to further the Russia-
Pakistan détente, as well as raising the
tantalizing prospects of closer relations
with Israel. While Nagorno-Karabakh is
over 2,000 kilometers from Pakistan’s
borders, its conflicts may have a lasting
effect on Pakistan’s diplomacy.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 11
Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations Pakistan-India Relations

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Khan on What Explains the Timing of

‘Historic’ First Visit to Afghanistan Pakistan’s Anti-India Dossier?
The uneasy neighbors are trying to turn the corner from a relationship marked by Islamabad has come forward with evidence about India’s role in spreading terrorism in
suspicion and downright hostility toward a partnership for peace in the region Pakistan. That might be a politically smart move
By Rahim Faiez By Umair Jamal
Kabul, Afghanistan @UmairJamal15

A rmenia and Azerbaijan each

claim a historical and religious
connection to the region of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian
claim rests on the fact the territory was
part of a larger medieval Christian
Armenian polity, whose borders far
exceeded the boundaries of modern day
Armenia. Azerbaijan also claims a
historical connection to the land,
arguing the territory was frequently
invaded and ruled by Muslim Ottoman
Turks throughout the late medieval and
early modern period. Since the breakup
of the Soviet Union, the two countries
have fought a number of times over the
region, which is largely recognized as
part of Azerbaijan but has been occupied
by Armenia for decades.
In the most recent conflict between
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran
Khan met with Afghan President Ashraf
Ghani on his first official visit to Kabul
on Thursday, focusing on the ongoing
peace talks with the Taliban as well as on
building trust and strengthening rela-
tions between the two often acrimonious
neighbors.
Ghani called Khan’s visit “historic”
while the Pakistani prime minister
assured the Afghan leader that his gov-
ernment would do “everything possible”
to help reduce violence in the war-torn
country.
The visit comes at a crucial time for
Afghanistan as Kabul government nego-
tiators and the Taliban are holding U.S.-
brokered negotiations in Qatar, where
the Taliban maintain a political office, to
chart a course for a post-war Afghani-
stan.
“You come with a with a series of
very important messages … but funda-
mental to this is that violence is not an
answer, a comprehensive political settle-
ment for an enduring peace within the
framework of our values, our Constitu-
tion in the Islamic Republic is the way to
the future,” Ghani told Khan at the presi-
dential palace.
Khan acknowledged Pakistan had
played a key role in getting the Taliban to
the negotiating table and that Islamabad
remains concerned that “despite the
Afghanistan’s chief
peace envoy Abdullah
Abdullah, who visited
Pakistan in September
as the uneasy neighbors
turned a corner from a
relationship marked by
suspicion and downright
hostility toward a
partnership for peace
in the region
talks in Qatar, the level of violence is ris-
ing.”
“Whatever is possible, we will do to
help reduce the violence,” and help move
the Afghan-Taliban talks toward a cease-
fire, Khan said. “The whole objective of
this visit is to build trust, to communi-
cate more. … We will be helping you.”
Neither of the leaders addressed
this week’s announcement from Wash-
ington of an accelerated U.S. troop with-
drawal from Afghanistan, which has
rattled both sides in the Afghan conflict.
There are fears of worsening violence
and regional chaos, which some say
could embolden the Islamic State
group’s local affiliate to regroup and
perhaps even try to build another “ca-
liphate.”
Under an earlier deal between the
U.S. and the Taliban that outlined a grad-
ual pullout, the remaining U.S. forces
were to leave Afghanistan by next April.
The Pentagon now says some 2,500
troops will leave by January, just days
before President-elect Joe Biden’s inau-
guration, leaving another 2,000 or so
U.S. forces in place.
Pakistan has been applauded by
Washington and Kabul for its role in
getting the Taliban to the peace table,
first in direct talks with the United
States, which resulted in an agreement
that led to the so-called intra-Afghan
negotiations now underway in Doha.
Khan’s visit followed that of Afghan-
istan’s chief peace envoy Abdullah
Abdullah, who visited Pakistan in Sep-
tember as the uneasy neighbors turned a
corner from a relationship marked by
suspicion and downright hostility
toward a partnership for peace in the
region.
While in Islamabad, Abdullah urged
Pakistan’s powerful military to use its
influence to press the Taliban to reduce
attacks and the level of violence. The
insurgents, who hosted Osama bin
Laden and al-Qaida until their regime
was toppled by the 2001 U.S.-led inva-
sion, now have control over half of
Afghanistan.
However, many Afghans still view
Pakistan with deep mistrust, blaming it
for the resurgence of the Taliban and for
giving the insurgents a safe haven from
which to operate.
Also, Pakistan is seen by many in
Afghanistan as wanting to keep the
Taliban as possible leverage against
influence in Afghanistan by its long-time
enemy India, which has been critical of
any post-war government in Afghani-
stan that would include the Taliban.
L ast month, Pakistan came
forward with a dossier allegedly
presenting evidence of India’s
involvement in funding terrorist
activities in the country. In a joint press
conference, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
Shah Mahmood Qureshi and the
director-general of the ISPR, Major
General Babar Iftikhar, revealed
documentary evidence that has never
been shared publicly before.
While the veracity of the evidence
remains open for debate, depending
upon how one looks at it, one thing that
requires explanation is the timing of the
revelations.
It is likely that Pakistan’s security
agencies have been sitting on the evi-
dence for some time, waiting for an ideal
opportunity to make it public. It is
important to note here that this is not the
first time that Pakistan has shared a dos-
sier alleging Indian attempts to
destabilize the country. Previously, how-
ever, details hardly presented any proof
with documents, videos, audios, local
links, and conversations.
One explanation for the revelations
at this time is that Islamabad is trying to
get the attention of the incoming govern-
ment in the United States. However,
experts believe that it is unlikely to yield
any concrete results for Pakistan. “Re-
garding the allegations, there are docu-
mented links between India and some
anti-Pakistan groups. Given what Paki-
stan has done to India in the past, India
has incentives to hit back. But in DC (and
beyond), where Pakistan still has major
credibility issues, there will be skepti-
cism,” tweeted Michael Kugelman.
Explaining Pakistan’s motives
behind the latest revelation, Avinash
Paliwal noted on Twitter that “This
might be meant to set the tone for the
Biden’s approach on India,” but he
believes it will “not make much of a dent
on U.S. approach towards India.”
“It will not dissuade India from car-
rying out offensive operations vis-a-vis
Pakistan. In Indian eyes, the payback is
too late, too little, and very legitimate.
Pakistan, which has used proxy warfare
as a policy tool for decades, will have
little international political support on
this,” Paliwal added.
Over the past few days, Pakistan and
India have been going back and forth to
reject each other’s claims and the matter
is likely to die down as more develop-
ments pile up in the coming days. More
importantly, as President Donald Trump
continues to delay President-elect Joe
Biden’s transition to the White House, it
is unlikely that anyone in Washington is
even paying attention to Pakistan’s
claims at this point. However, this does-
n’t mean that the claims do not carry any
significance and do not require scrutiny
from the international community.
The more important and neglected
explanation of the military’s decision to
disclose an alleged Indian hand in
spreading terrorism in Pakistan has to
do with domestic politics.
Arguably, the timing of the disclo-
sure underscores the government’s
attempt to take back political space from
the opposition parties over the question
of the military’s support for the current
regime. The entire press conference was
prepared and presented meticulously,
ensuring that it was covered by all possi-
ble mediums in Pakistan. The entire
state machinery — from the prime minis-
ter and the government’s social media
accounts to the country’s electronic
media — volubly maintained the
irrefutability of the evidence presented.
Moreover, with the latest revelations,
Pakistan’s security apparatus has gained
plenty of praise for its diligence and
exposing New Delhi’s alliance with a
number of domestic militant groups and
personnel.
It is important to note that some of
the individuals mentioned in the dossier
belong to groups that have recently got-
ten coverage from the opposition parties’
rallies against the government and its
support base within the country’s secu-
rity establishment. For instance, the
opposition parties’ Quetta rally talked
about the missing persons in
Balochistan, with the leader of the Paki-
stan Muslim League-Nawaz, Maryam
Nawaz, even criticizing the government
on the issue.
The press conference placed plenty
of focus on exposing the links of
Balochistan-based militant groups with
India, and in the process, nullified the
opposition’s narrative against the
national security establishment. So far,
opposition parties have been quiet about
the explosive disclosure and have
resisted making any major statements.
If nothing else, the attempt boosts
the government’s political standing to
some extent and restores the military’s
leadership position back to where it was
before the opposition starting its naming
and shaming campaign. The govern-
ment is planning to ban all political gath-
erings across the country, ostensibly due
to the rising COVID-19 cases.
As it appears, there is a major war of
narratives underway to discredit the
opposition and undermine any momen-
tum that they may have built with their
previous rallies. The latest disclosures
about India are important ammunition
in the hands of the government in that
war.

12 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020

globalagemagazine.kipscss.net globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 13
Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms
The Complex Calculus Behind
Gilgit-Baltistan’s Provincial Upgrade
Kashmir, India, and China: The creation of Pakistan’s newest province will have
far-flung geopolitical ripples
s Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan during a visit to Gilgit-Baltistan on Nov. 1, 2020.
By Sudha Ramachandran
Bengaluru, India
O
n November 1, Pakistan Prime
Minister Imran Khan
announced his government’s
decision to grant Gilgit-Baltistan
“provisional provincial status.”
In the far north of Pakistan-
controlled territory, GilgitBaltistan is
strategically located. It shares bound-
aries with Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corri-
dor, China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autono-
mous Region, India’s Jammu and Kash-
mir, and Pakistan’s Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa province, as well as a Paki-
stan-controlled swathe of territory in
western Kashmir that Islamabad refers
to as “Azad Kashmir.”
The Pakistani decision will impact
the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan signifi-
cantly. They will now become Pakistani
citizens. Provincial status for Gilgit-
Baltistan will also have implications for
Kashmiris as well as for India and China.
Khan’s announcement evoked a
swift response from India, which claims
14 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
the region as part of greater Kashmir.
“Firmly” rejecting Pakistan’s attempt “to
alter the status of these Indian territo-
ries,” India’s Ministry of External Affairs
called on Pakistan “to immediately
vacate all areas under its illegal occupa-
tion.”
Pakistan is scheduled to hold elec-
tions to the Gilgit-Baltistan legislative
assembly on November 15. India has
strongly objected to this on the grounds
that Pakistan has “no locus standi on
territories illegally and forcibly occupied
by it.”
India regards Gilgit-Baltistan as
Indian territory. A part of the former
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir,
Gilgit-Baltistan comprises a major
chunk of the territory Pakistan occupied
during its war with India that year.
Gilgit-Baltistan together with Azad Kash-
mir is referred to by New Delhi as Paki-
stan Occupied Kashmir (POK).
According to the Indian argument,
since Gilgit-Baltistan was a part of the
former princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir, whose Maharaja acceded to
India, it is legally India’s.
However, it appears that the hold of
the Maharaja over Gilgit-Baltistan, and
especially Gilgit, was at best notional as
he had leased the area to the British.
When the Maharaja signed the Instru-
ment of Accession with India in October
1947 to defend his territory from a Paki-
stan-backed tribal invasion, the Gilgit
Scouts, a local military force headed by
the British, mutinied and demanded
accession to Pakistan.
Pakistani analysts argue that the
people of Gilgit-Baltistan therefore
joined Pakistan of their own free will.
India has a different perception of
Gilgit-Baltistan’s relationship with
Jammu and Kashmir. It argues that even
if Gilgit-Baltistan was on lease to the
British, with the lapse of British para-
mountcy, Gilgit came under the
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Gilgit-Baltistan is the
only overland link
between China and
Pakistan and is key to
the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor.
All of CPEC’s roads,
railway lines, and oil
and gas pipelines
linking Pakistan with
China have to go through
the territory. Without
Gilgit-Baltistan, CPEC
would not be possible
Maharaja’s rule again. And since the
Maharaja signed the Instrument of
Accession with India, Gilgit-Baltistan is
an integral part of the Indian Union.
In the seven decades since Gilgit-
Baltistan came under Pakistani occupa-
tion, it has remained under Islamabad’s
control, while India continues to lay
claim to it.
Interestingly, not only is Gilgit-
Baltistan disputed territory but also its
status in Pakistan has remained fuzzy.
Official maps of Pakistan include this
region but it finds no mention in the Paki-
stani constitution. Residents of Gilgit-
Baltistan are not citizens of Pakistan but
they pay taxes to the Pakistan govern-
ment. And although a 2009 ordinance
provided for self-rule in Gilgit-Baltistan,
this is in name only as the region is
tightly controlled by Islamabad, with few
powers vested in the Gilgit-Baltistan
assembly.
Pakistan chose to keep Gilgit-
Baltistan in a state of limbo all these
years because it feared that annexing
Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir
would formalize the de facto division of
Jammu and Kashmir and weaken
Islamabad’s claims to territory under
New Delhi’s control. Furthermore, it was
keen to project an image to the interna-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
tional community and Kashmiris in par-
ticular that it was committed to their
independence.
So what lies beneath Islamabad to
make Gilgit-Baltistan a Pakistani prov-
ince now?
Chinese pressure appears to have
prompted Islamabad’s decision.
Gilgit-Baltistan is the only overland
link between China and Pakistan and is
key to the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor. All of CPEC’s roads, railway
lines, and oil and gas pipelines linking
Pakistan with China have to go through
the territory. Without Gilgit-Baltistan,
CPEC would not be possible. Having
made multi-billion dollar investments in
CPEC projects, China is keen to ensure
that its projects have legal and constitu-
tional validity. It has therefore been push-
ing Pakistan since 2015 to confer consti-
tutional status on Gilgit-Baltistan.
In addition to Chinese pressure, the
Imran Khan government’s decision
appears to be a response to India’s deci-
sion in August last year to revoke Jammu
and Kashmir’s autonomy and to inte-
grate it more closely into the Indian
Union by bringing it under New Delhi’s
direct rule. Drawing Gilgit-Baltistan into
Pakistan as a province is Islamabad’s
rejoinder to New Delhi’s decision.
Both the Pakistani and Chinese gov-
ernments have been watching with
apprehension the growing muscularity
of the present Indian government. Since
2014 when it came to power, the
BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP), which
takes a hard line on Jammu and Kash-
mir, has issued statements that have
rattled Islamabad and Beijing. Some of
these were a reassertion of India’s inter-
est and claims over Gilgit-Baltistan.
In August 2016, for instance, India’s
Prime Minister NarendraModi prom-
ised an all-party delegation that he
would take up the issue of the Pakistan
government’s atrocities in Balochistan
and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir at vari-
ous international forums. In his Inde-
pendence Day speech two days later, he
said that the people of these regions and
Gilgit had written to him expressing grat-
itude to him for raising his voice against
Pakistan’s atrocities against them.
Modi’s reference to the human
rights situation in these regions, espe-
cially at a time when Gilgit was roiled in
unrest over Pakistan’s crackdown on
local activists protesting CPEC, set alarm
bells ringing in Islamabad and Beijing.
Would India’s expression of sympathy
for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and
Balochistan groups provide a shot in the
arm to anti-Pakistan activists and orga-
nizations there? Would it worsen the
security situation, putting at risk CPEC
projects?
Even more worrying to China and
Pakistan was the statement India’s
Home Minister Amit Shah made a day
after Kashmir’s autonomy was revoked
in 2019. Declaring that the “entire
Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part
of the Union of India,” Shah clarified in
his speech to Parliament that Jammu
and Kashmir included territories under
Pakistani occupation including Gilgit-
Baltistan as well as Aksai Chin (which is
under Chinese occupation).
And Army Chief General
BipinRawat, who is currently India’s
chief of defense staff, had said in Sep-
tember 2018 that the army is prepared
for “an operation to retrieve Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir from the clutches of
Pakistan, if the government wants so.”
It is likely that India’s robust reiter-
ation of its claims over Pakistan Occu-
pied Kashmir in recent years and its
stated willingness to wrest back control
over territories under Pakistani occupa-
tion speeded up Pakistan’s decision to
bestow provincial status on Gilgit-
Baltistan.
Islamabad’s announcement on
Gilgit-Baltistan being bestowed with
provincial status has been opposed by
Kashmiri separatists, who are calling on
Pakistan to rethink its decision as it is
“demoralizing Kashmiri people and
debilitating their ongoing struggle for
the right to self-determination.”
By conferring provincial status on
Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan will be
strengthening India’s long-standing
argument that Islamabad’s so-called
support to the Kashmiri cause is not so
much about supporting their right to
self-determination and independence
but a bid to annex the territory of all of
Kashmir.
In that context, will its extension of
provisional provincial status to Gilgit-
Baltistan, pending final settlement of the
dispute with India over Kashmir, work to
convince Kashmiris that Islamabad is
still espousing their cause for independ-
ence?
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 15
US Pakistan Policy
From Trump to Biden: Will
Anything Change for Pakistan in
Washington?
Brace for more of the same when it comes to Pakistan-US relations under Joe Biden
s President Barack Obama talks with Vice President Joe Biden at the conclusion of a meeting with his national security team on Afghanistan and Pakistan in
the Situation Room of the White House, February 17, 2010.
By Umair Jamal
@UmairJamal15
W hile many other Asian
leaders simply cong-
ratulated Biden, Khan was
oddly specific in his message. In a way,
his message shows Islamabad’s policy
concerns that could become a challenge
under the Biden presidency.
Khan, in his message, said that he
looks forward to working with Biden to
end illegal tax heavens. Arguably, the
message underscores Pakistan’s con-
cerns with the Biden administration’s
possible view of Islamabad’s position at
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
It is important to note here that the
Obama administration advocated add-
ing Pakistan to the FATF’s grey-list due
to the country’s weak anti-money laun-
dering structures. Biden served as
Obama’s vice president through both of
his terms in the White House and he
understands how and where to push
16 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
Pakistan to gain concessions. Certainly,
under Biden, Pakistan will have to work
hard to plug loopholes in its money-
laundering laws.
Moreover, Biden’s presidency also
means that Pakistan may again go back
to the Obama era’s “Af-Pak” approach
when it comes to Washington’s dealings
with Islamabad. The term “Af-Pak” had
been met with a lot of disapproval in Paki-
stan in the past. Showing resentment
toward Obama’s policy of hyphenating
Pakistan with Afghanistan, former Pres-
ident Asif Ali Zardari said: “Afghanistan
and Pakistan are distinctively different
countries, and should not be lumped
together in the generic label of Af-Pak.”
However, the Obama administra-
tion termed Pakistan’s role as key in sta-
bilizing Afghanistan. It is expected that
Biden will continue with the same
approach of pushing Pakistan to play a
greater role in Afghanistan. As we have
seen under the Obama and Trump
administrations, Biden’s relationship
with Pakistan will be driven by
Islamabad’s assistance to the United
States in Afghanistan. Biden may not
bring back the Af-Pak hyphenation to
describe his Pakistan and Afghanistan
policy, but behind closed doors, that is
likely what Pakistan is going to get from
Biden’s White House. Arguably, Presi-
dent Donald Trump has followed the
same approach with his regional strategy
linking Afghanistan and South Asia.
Under the Trump administration,
Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace pro-
cess has remained critical. In the short
run, Pakistan doesn’t need to worry
much unless the new administration
introduces substantial changes to the
existing approach of finding a political
settlement in Afghanistan in coopera-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Many in Islamabad
are hopeful that under
Biden, India will not get
a free pass on Kashmir
and the reported human
rights violations there.
In the past, Biden has
made plenty of noise
about Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s
Kashmir policy.
However, it is unlikely
that Biden will push it to
a point where it annoys
India, he will not
jeopardize the United
States’ relationship
with India
tion with the Afghan Taliban.
In his policy statements, Biden has
maintained that Washington “needs
special ops capacity to coordinate with
our allies” and any troops withdrawal
from Afghanistan should be done
responsibly. This essentially means that
Biden may review the U.S.-Taliban deal
and may not withdraw troops under the
agreed timeline. Further, the Biden
administration may bring more focus to
conditions like Taliban’s severing of ties
with Al-Qaida, reduction in violence and
more. The peace process may very well
be more complicated from here onward
as Taliban are not going to make any
concessions regardless of who is in
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
s In 2008, Pakistan awarded Biden the second-highest civilian honor, ‘Hilal-e-Pakistan.’ Joe Biden and
Senator Richard Lugar favored a proposal to bring $ 1.5 billion non-military aid to Pakistan. Lugar was
also awarded ‘Hilal-e-Pakistan.’
power in the U.S.
At this point, Islamabad may not be
sure how the Biden administration will
view India’s role in Afghanistan. Paki-
stan remains adamant that India cannot
have any substantial role in the Afghan
peace process. How will Pakistan’s
approach change if Biden allowed India
more role in Afghanistan?
Many in Islamabad are hopeful that
under Biden, India will not get a free pass
on Kashmir and the reported human
rights violations there. In the past, Biden
has made plenty of noise about Prime
Minister Narendra Modi’s Kashmir pol-
icy. However, it is unlikely that Biden
will push it to a point where it annoys
India. It is important to note that for the
U.S., China is going to be the key concern
in the region, and India’s role in this cal-
culus remains vital for Washington.
Biden may make all the right noises
about human rights violations in Kash-
mir, but he will not jeopardize the United
States’ relationship with India.
This again leaves Pakistan in the
usual position when it comes to the coun-
try’s relationship with the U.S.: What is
Islamabad’s value for Washington if the
Afghan peace process concludes suc-
cessfully? Beyond the security-focused
lens, what is it that will keep Washington
interested in Islamabad once Afghani-
stan goes out of the picture? It is possible
that under the Biden administration, the
India-Pakistan conflict may get greater
coverage and increase the possibility of
U.S. intervention but that in no way will
translate to Islamabad’s gain.
Under Biden, not much will change
for Pakistan. The usual script of a
transactional relationship driven by
both states’ security needs will deter-
mine the contours of Pakistan-U.S. bilat-
eral cooperation.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 17
New Development Bank
Why the BRICS Grouping Is Here
to Stay
Western reactions to 12th BRICS Summit are largely dismissive, but critics overlook
tangible benefits for member countries
By Oliver Stuenkel
@OliverStuenkel
I n what has become a yearly ritual,
columnists in Western newspapers
used this week’s BRICS’ Leaders
Summits to question the grouping’s
existence and predict or recommend its
demise. In the Wall Street Journal,
Sadan and Dhume argued last month
that “the five-member club makes less
sense than ever” and recommended that,
“instead of building up Brics, India
should help dismantle it.”
These same arguments have existed
for nearly a decade. Just like in 2011,
when the Financial Times’ Philipp
Stevens announced that it was “time to
bid farewell to BRICS,” writers point to
the many differences between the five
member countries, contrasting China’s
and Russia’s authoritarian political sys-
tems with democracy in Brazil, India,
and South Africa, and pointing to con-
flicting geopolitical interests and funda-
mentally different economic realities.
And yet, the BRICS countries stub-
bornly hold not only yearly presidential
summits, but also regular consultations
between foreign ministers and national
security advisors, along with countless
18 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
yearly meetings in other areas, including
public health, agriculture, and educa-
tion. Most remarkably, even the election
of Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right populist
who admires the United States and fre-
quently attacks China, as president of
Brazil has not noticeably altered the
group’s commitment to continuing its
process of slow institutionalization.
During the past years, BRICS sum-
mits have seen their fair share of ten-
sions, to be sure. During the grouping’s
11th Leaders Summit in Brazil last year,
Bolsonaro canceled the BRICS outreach,
a parallel summit where regional leaders
are invited by the host to meet with
BRICS presidents, after the Brazilian
president had insisted on inviting Vene-
zuela’s Juan Guaidó, whom none of the
other BRICS countries recognize as pres-
ident. The situation was privately criti-
cized by diplomats from other BRICS
member countries, given that their
respective presidents would have liked
to use the opportunity of meeting up
with presidents from across Latin Amer-
ica – and yet, no president considered
cancelling the trip halfway around the
world. In the same way, frequent and
growing geopolitical tensions between
China and India trouble their bilateral
relationship, but have not led to the
group’s demise. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, in 2014 the grouping created the
New Development Bank, and the bank is
currently preparing to accept new mem-
bers – most likely Uruguay, the United
Arab Emirates and the Philippines –
thus expanding its global footprint.
There are four reasons why calls for
or predictions of the BRICS grouping’s
demise are premature.
First of all, critics, especially in the
West, tend to blow the differences
between BRICS countries out of propor-
tion or overlook what unites the five
member countries. Commentators fre-
quently point to profound differences
between BRICS countries on issues such
as U.N. Security Council reform, sup-
ported by India, Brazil and South Africa,
but rejected by Russia and China. Yet few
question the usefulness of the EU,
NATO, or the G-7 despite equally fre-
quent internal disagreements – Ger-
many, for example, is part of the G-4 and
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
s The leaders of BRICS member nations during a previous meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Osaka, Japan, June 28, 2019.
supports reforming the U.N. Security
Council, while Italy opposes the group-
ing. In the same way, there are numerous
examples of democracies working with
non-democracies being part of the same
club – just think of NATO and Turkey,
which saw its democracy flounder
numerous times since becoming a mem-
ber.
More importantly, most pundits
overlook that, despite different political
systems, economic characteristics, and
geopolitical rivalries, the BRICS mem-
bers share a profound skepticism of the
U.S.-led international liberal order and
the perceived danger unipolarity repre-
sents to their interests. This commit-
ment often trumps other aspects often
seen as more important from a Western
perspective. The crisis in Venezuela
offers a useful example: Despite
Bolsonaro’s anti-socialist convictions
and decision to no longer recognize Nich-
olas Maduro as president, the Brazilian
government ended up siding with the
Venezuelan dictator in rejecting the
United States’ rhetoric about a potential
military intervention, which, Latin Amer-
ican leaders feared, was setting a danger-
ous precedent. A similar dynamic
became apparent in 2014, when the
BRICS countries refused to criticize Rus-
sia’s President Vladimir Putin after the
annexation of Crimea, widely seen as a
flagrant violation of international law.
Despite the BRICS countries’ strong
commitment to non-intervention and
the defense of sovereignty, they consid-
ered the United States’ forceful response
– including sanctions and pressure on
others to diplomatically isolate Russia –
as a symbol of a unipolar order that the
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
BRICS are seeking to overcome.
It was thus no coincidence that
three of the five most prominent leaders
who have so far chosen not to congratu-
late U.S. President-elect Joe Biden are
BRICS members. While the govern-
ments of Brazil’s Bolsonaro and Russia’s
Putin have not commented on the elec-
tion at all, China’s Xi Jinping decided to
delegate the task to Foreign Ministry
spokesman Wang Wenbin. Their reac-
tion to Trump’s defeat is no coincidence.
While the current U.S. president
attacked the liberal international order
the United States had helped create, and
favored a world shaped by great powers
and spheres of influence, Biden symbol-
izes, from the BRICS’ perspectives, a
return to the pre-Trump world, as the
recent article “Why America Must Lead
Again“ in the magazine Foreign Affairs
attests.
In addition, the economic rationale
for keeping the BRICS grouping alive
remains sound. Over the past two
decades, trade and investment among
the five member countries skyrocketed,
even though it is still largely limited to
each member countries’ ties to China.
Given growing economic dependence
across the grouping on Chinese demand
and investment, voluntarily rejecting the
possibility for cabinet members and hun-
dreds of bureaucrats to engage their Chi-
nese counterparts sounds implausible –
particularly given that mutual knowl-
edge among BRICS members, particu-
larly between Brazil, South Africa, and
the group’s Asian members, is still very
limited.
BRICS meetings can also stabilize
bilateral ties. For example, the yearly
meetings between high-ranking govern-
ment ministers and pre-scheduled
facetime with Xi provided a welcome
excuse for Bolsonaro to tone down his
anti-China rhetoric and adopt a more
pragmatic approach as the 11th BRICS
Summit was approaching. In an increas-
ingly China-centric world, actively dis-
mantling the BRICS grouping would
seem like a diplomatic own goal, particu-
larly for South Africa and Brazil, who are
still struggling to adapt to a post-
Western world.
Finally, not only is the cost of BRICS
membership limited, but the diplomatic
benefits it generates remain significant.
For Bolsonaro, for example, hosting Xi,
Putin, India’s Narendra Modi and South
Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa last year will
stand out as the most important diplo-
matic event of his presidency, allowing
him to look statesman-like. Particularly
now that Bolsonaro faces growing diplo-
matic isolation in the West over Brazil’s
environmental record, the BRICS serve
as all-weather friends who would never
openly criticize Brazil’s internal matters.
In the same way, it is often forgotten that
the BRICS allowed Putin to host pomp-
ous summits with numerous interna-
tional leaders at a time when the West
actively sought to isolate Russia’s presi-
dent.
Even as the 12th BRICS Summit
generated very little international visi-
bility – in part because it took place vir-
tually, and in part because it was eclipsed
by other events such as the US elections
– member countries are very unlikely to
heed the often-voiced advice to disman-
tle the BRICS grouping.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 19
Middle East Studies
No Exit Why the Middle East Still
Matters to America
Washington needs to figure out its interests in the Middle East and craft a strategy to
advance them
s U.S. President Donald Trump in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 2017.
By Steven A. Cook
@stevenacook
T he record of American failure in
the Middle East over the last two
decades is long and dismaying.
The most obvious catastrophe was the
2003 invasion of Iraq. But the trouble
started long before that fiasco. The U.S.
victory in the Cold War, the “third wave”
of democratization around the world,
and the wealth that globalization
generated were positive developments,
but they also produced a toxic mix of
American arrogance and overambition.
Across the political spectrum, officials
and analysts came to believe that Middle
Eastern societies needed Washington’s
help and that the United States could use
its power in constructive ways in the
region. What followed were fruitless
quests to transform Arab societies,
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
stamp out jihadism, and end Iran’s
development of nuclear technology. The
fact that five Arab countries are now in
various stages of collapse contributes to
an overall sense within Washington that
the U.S. approach requires a radical
20 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
overhaul.
A new consensus has formed among
U.S. foreign policy elites: it is time for
Washington to acknowledge that it no
longer has vital interests in the region
and vastly reduce its ambitions accord-
ingly, retrench its forces, and perhaps
even end the era of “endless wars” by
withdrawing from the Middle East alto-
gether. After two difficult decades, such
arguments might seem compelling. But
leaving the Middle East is not a sound
policy. Washington still has critical
interests there that are worth protecting,
even if political, technological, and social
changes have made those interests less
vital than they were decades ago. Instead
of using U.S. power to remake the region,
however, policymakers need to embrace
the more realistic and realizable goal of
establishing and preserving stability.
Unfortunately, all the loose talk in
recent years about withdrawal has
undermined Washington’s influence.
Thanks to a perception among Middle
Eastern leaders that the United States
intends to abdicate its leading role,
China and Russia have emerged as alter-
native power brokers: a negative devel-
opment not only for Washington but for
the people of the region, as well. To pre-
vent a worst-case scenario, in which
regional actors take matters into their
own hands, sowing more instability,
more chaos, and more bloodshed, Wash-
ington needs to snap out of it, figure out
its real interests in the Middle East, and
craft a strategy to advance them.
GET OUT
Those calling for scaling back, retrench-
ing, or withdrawing from the Middle
East were once voices in the wilderness.
Not anymore: what was once a fringe
position has become the conventional
wisdom. Take, for example, three places
in the region that have bedeviled Wash-
ington over the last decade: Syria, Libya,
and Iran. In 2011, only a few lonely
voices argued for a U.S. military inter-
vention after Syria’s dictator, Bashar al-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Assad, moved to crush a popular upris-
ing. Meanwhile, opposition to the use of
force in Congress, at the White House, in
the Pentagon, and among the foreign
policy commentariat was overwhelming.
Similarly, that same year, when the Lib-
yan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi
threatened to massacre his way out of a
rebellion, most U.S. officials and ana-
lysts agreed that the American role
should be limited to establishing a no-fly
zone to prevent the regime from using
airpower. The question of what to do
about Iran’s nuclear program generated
more debate than did the conflicts in
Syria and Libya, and a number of influ-
ential voices advocated U.S. military
action. But the primary disagreement
was not about whether to use force or
pursue diplomacy but about whether the
deal that the Obama administration even-
tually crafted represented the best possi-
ble diplomatic outcome.
Perhaps the most striking example
of the shift in establishment views about
using force in the Middle East was the
U.S. reaction to the September 2019
attack on oil installations in Saudi Ara-
bia, which most Western intelligence
agencies believe was carried out by Iran.
For the better part of the last 40 years, it
has been a policy of the United States to
defend the oil fields of the Persian Gulf.
Yet when an apparent Iranian attack
temporarily took a significant portion of
the world’s oil supply off the market,
American foreign policy specialists
across the political spectrum raised
alarms not about Iran’s aggression but
about the potentially grave conse-
quences of a U.S. military response. Such
restraint may have been appropriate, but
the near-total absence of debate was
remarkable. After all, the most impor-
tant strategic rationale for the U.S. pres-
ence in the region—and the justification
for spending billions of dollars over
decades to ensure U.S. military predomi-
nance in the area—was the need to pre-
serve the free flow of energy resources
out of the Persian Gulf.
More than simply revealing a wide-
spread reluctance to use force, the
nondebate over whether to respond mili-
tarily to the attacks pointed to a deeper
problem: the lack of a shared framework
for thinking through U.S. interests in the
region. The set of interests that long
shaped U.S. policy toward the Middle
East has lost salience. Meanwhile, the
always complex region has become even
more complicated. Confronted with
these new realities, a form of analytic
exhaustion has set in among U.S. offi-
cials and analysts—a collective throwing
up of the hands that partly explains the
widespread appeal of retrenchment and
withdrawal.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Throughout the Cold War and
through the first decade of this century,
ensuring cheap gasoline for U.S. con-
sumers, supporting Israeli security,
fighting terrorists, and preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction were all goals that Ameri-
cans and their leaders demonstrated a
willingness to spend resources on and
even sacrifice lives for. All four remain
important, but they have become less
critical in recent years. The boom in
hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, has
allowed the United States to become
energy independent (or nearly so). This
has raised questions among political
leaders and analysts about whether pro-
tecting the free flow of fossil fuels from
the Middle East is worth the investment
to the United States.
Israel continues to enjoy significant
U.S. support, but demographic and
political changes in the United States
will likely reduce Washington’s largess
in the coming decades. And it is increas-
ingly hard to make the case that Israel
still needs U.S. assistance. Israel is a rich
country with an advanced economy that
is well integrated with the rest of the
world, especially in the information tech-
nology sector. Its per capita GDP is on
par with those of France and the United
Kingdom, and Israel’s strategic position
has never been better. Iran remains a
challenge, but the Israel Defense Forces
can deter Tehran and its allies, and the
Israelis have a far more sophisticated
military than any of their neighbors.
Israel has developed its ties with Arab
countries in the Persian Gulf, including
normalizing relations with Bahrain and
the United Arab Emirates—even as it has
tightened its half-century grip on the
West Bank. Put simply, Israel is no lon-
ger an embattled ally.
At the same time, terrorism no lon-
ger exerts anything like the force it once
did on U.S. foreign policy. The United
States has not suffered another mass-
casualty assault on the scale of the 9/11
attacks, the Islamic State (or ISIS) has
been all but wiped out in Iraq and Syria,
and, in the age of COVID-19, Americans
seem to have more to fear from the mun-
dane tasks of daily life than from terror-
ism. What is more, advocates for with-
drawal argue, terrorism is largely a func-
tion of the U.S. presence in the region,
since extremists exploit it to validate
their jihadi calls for resistance to a heret-
ical oppressor. At the very least, the argu-
ment goes, with fewer U.S. forces in the
region, the threat to Americans at home
would lessen.
Finally, the cause of non-
proliferation took a devastating hit from
the ill-fated invasion of Iraq, which was
sold principally as a mission to disarm
Saddam Hussein’s regime. This was an
extraordinary blunder given that Iraq
did not in fact possess weapons of mass
destruction. To the extent that they care
about the issue at all, most Americans,
including many in the foreign policy com-
munity, now see nonproliferation as a
problem best solved through diplo-
macy—or at least a problem that does not
require the kind of military infrastruc-
ture the United States currently main-
tains in the region.
STAY PUT
If safeguarding the flow of oil, protecting
Israel, fighting terrorism, and prevent-
ing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction no longer make the Middle
East a priority for American foreign pol-
icy or justify a significant U.S. military
presence there, then what does? The
answer is that, when managed properly,
the U.S. presence in the region offers a
degree of stability in a part of the world
wracked by violence, collapsing states,
and resurgent authoritarians. A Middle
East shaped by a high degree of U.S.
involvement is hardly a bastion of liberal
democracy and prosperity. But a truly
post-American Middle East would be
even worse.
Start with Iran. The United States
has been unable to coerce or cajole the
Islamic Republic into abandoning its
quest for nuclear weapons, ceasing its
support for terrorist groups, or ending
its brutal repression of its own citizens.
At this point, Washington should dis-
pense with those goals. Instead, it should
pursue a more efficient and less danger-
ous policy: containment. This would
mean taking regime change off the table
but limiting the exercise of Iranian
power around the region by establishing
implicit rules about acceptable Iranian
behavior. Containment is not just an
exercise in diplomatic hardball, how-
ever; it requires the presence of military
forces and the credible threat of their
use.
Many in the U.S. foreign policy com-
munity hope that under a different presi-
dential administration, the United
States will reenter the 2015 Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action, in which Iran
agreed to verifiably limit its nuclear
activities in exchange for sanctions
relief, or negotiate a new agreement. But
the regional dynamics do not lend them-
selves to such an outcome. No matter
how well crafted a new deal might be, it
would raise hackles in Israel, Saudi Ara-
bia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Those countries would do everything
they could to undermine any new agree-
ment, no matter how much military hard-
ware the United States offered them in
return for their assent. And even if they
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 21

s Protesters in Cairo, Egypt, September 2012.
did play along, all that hardware would
make it a lot easier for them to try to
undermine the deal by using those weap-
ons against Iran or its proxies. In that
way, an effort to stabilize the region
through negotiations could very well
have the opposite effect.
Containment, however, would
hardly mean simply allowing the Irani-
ans to develop nuclear weapons; the
strategy would not preclude dialogue,
sanctions, or the use of force to prevent
that outcome. In fact, it would involve a
mix of all three. Containment wouldn’t
be pretty, and no one who pursues it
would win a Nobel Peace Prize. But it
promises something that is at least
achievable: a reduction of tensions in the
Persian Gulf.
Iran is hardly the only source of
such tensions. Although diminished,
jihadi groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS
still pose a serious threat. Those who
advocate some form of withdrawal often
argue that reducing the U.S. military
presence in the Middle East might miti-
gate that danger. Yet it is wishful think-
ing to believe that jihadi terrorism would
wither away after the last U.S. soldier
departed; the ideologies that drive
extremism are firmly entrenched in the
region, and they call for violence against
heretics regardless of whether they
occupy any particular territory.
To combat this persistent threat,
what Washington needs is not a “war on
terror” built on visions of regime change,
democracy promotion, and “winning
hearts and minds” but a realistic
approach focused on intelligence gather-
ing, police work, multilateral coopera-
tion, and the judicious application of
22 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
violence when required. Setting aside its
bombastic “America first” rhetoric, the
Trump administration’s 2018 National
Strategy for Counterterrorism offers a
fairly good road map, dispensing with
the false hope that Washington can fix
the politics of the region while laying out
an approach to counterterrorism that
has a chance of reducing the problem to a
manageable level.
Meanwhile, even in the age of
fracking, Middle Eastern oil will remain
important to the United States. But pro-
tecting the sea-lanes through which a
significant percentage of the global oil
supply travels requires a far smaller mili-
Past experience
suggests that declaring
victory and going home
can have serious and
negative consequences
tary footprint than the one Washington
has established in the last two decades. A
small group of U.S. Navy ships with a
complement of fighter jets stationed on
air bases in the region or on an aircraft
carrier would suffice. Realigning U.S.
resources in that way would have the
added benefit of reducing the risk that
future U.S. policymakers would be
tempted to pursue projects that have
little, if any, relationship to freedom of
navigation, thus making overreach less
likely.
Perhaps the greatest change to
Washington’s approach to the region
should be in its relations with Israel. The
United States should no longer be
Israel’s patron. This is not because Wash-
ington ought to punish Israel for its con-
duct in the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank, which has made a two-state solu-
tion impossible. Rather, it is a reflection
of the success of U.S. policy, which has
sought to ensure Israeli security and
sovereignty. Both have now been estab-
lished beyond any doubt.
American leaders should want good
relations with a strong and secure Israel.
But the United States no longer needs to
provide Israel with aid. Toward that end,
the two countries should mutually agree
to phase out U.S. military assistance over
the next decade. Owing to demographic
and political shifts in the United States,
an end to such aid is likely to come in the
not-too-distant future anyway. An
agreement to phase it out in a planned
and predictable way would give the
Israelis some say in how the process
unfolds and avoid an alternative sce-
nario in which U.S. aid becomes condi-
tional—a form of behavioral modifica-
tion. Even without military aid, the U.S.-
Israeli partnership would remain strong.
The two countries would still mutually
benefit from continued cooperation in
the defense, security, and technology
sectors. Israel’s adversaries would strug-
gle to put any daylight between Wash-
ington and Jerusalem.
THE COSTS OF
INACTION
This is what a realistic U.S. Middle East
policy looks like: containing Iran, retool-
ing the fight against terrorism to reduce
its counterproductive side effects, reor-
ganizing military deployments to
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emphasize the protection of sea-lanes,
and downscaling the U.S.-Israeli rela-
tionship to reflect Israel’s relative
strength. Such an approach would leave
unfulfilled the grand ambitions that
Americans have pursued: the spread of
democracy, the overthrow of Iran’s the-
ocracy, the resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. But it would also
avoid the disasters that would ensue if
the United States were to depart. To see
what the region might look like in that
scenario, one need only look at recent
episodes in which U.S. inaction contrib-
uted to catastrophic outcomes.
Take, for example, the Saudi-led
military intervention in Yemen, which
began in March 2015. The costs of this
misadventure have been high, especially
for Yemeni civilians: untold numbers
have been injured, and some 13,500
have died, according to some estimates,
many owing to an outbreak of cholera
made possible by the intense devastation
caused by the Saudi bombardment. The
war has also destabilized the Arabian
Peninsula, making it harder for Wash-
ington to counter extremism and protect
the free flow of energy. None of these
outcomes was preordained, and some of
them might have been mitigated or
avoided altogether had the United States
not signaled its desire to leave the Middle
East.
The Saudis undertook the interven-
tion after U.S. actions signaling a pull-
back bumped up against a crisis in the
region. First, they watched as the United
States withdrew from Iraq, paving the
way for Iran to become the dominant
force in Iraqi politics; allowed the Assad
regime in Syria to squash a broad-based
uprising, with help from its patrons in
Tehran and Moscow; and negotiated a
nuclear deal with Iran. This was deeply
unsettling to the Saudis, fueling their
fears that they were being left at the
mercy of the Iranian regime and its drive
for regional hegemony. Then, in 2014, a
group called Ansar Allah (commonly
known as the Houthis) overthrew the
Yemeni government in Sanaa. The Sau-
dis—faced with what they perceived to be
Tehran’s support for the Houthis and
American indifference to Iran’s growing
power—felt compelled to go to war.
The Saudis’ fears that they could no
longer rely on their American protectors
grew stronger after the Trump adminis-
tration declined to respond with force to
a series of Iranian provocations in the
summer of 2019, including the attack on
Saudi oil facilities. Should Riyadh come
to feel that Washington has truly cut it
loose, it might take measures to protect
itself that once seemed unthinkable,
including developing its own nuclear
weapons. If Saudi Crown Prince
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Mohammed bin Salman is as impetuous,
strong-willed, and arrogant as is widely
believed, he might decide that only a
nuclear arsenal can provide Saudi Ara-
bia with the security it needs and the
room for maneuver it craves in its con-
flict with Iran. If the Saudis went down
that path, the results would be disas-
trous.
Iraq is another place where a U.S.
exit would do far more harm than
good—even though, for withdrawal advo-
cates, Iraq represents the original sin of
Washington’s flawed Middle East policy
of the last two decades and is thus one of
the first places in the region from which
the United States must withdraw. Today,
Iraq is in terminal collapse and saddled
with layers of complex political, eco-
nomic, and social problems. The coun-
try’s political class and institutions are
thoroughly corrupt. Even so, it would be
a mistake to leave now. The 2003 inva-
sion was a strategic blunder—but so
would be leaving Iraqis to the predations
of terrorists and the regime next door.
Washington got
bogged down in the
Middle East because it
lost sight of what really
matters
U.S. counterterrorism missions in
Iraq offer a relatively inexpensive way to
help the Iraqis keep ISIS and other
extremists at bay and, in the process, to
contribute to the development of mili-
tary and security institutions that can
bolster Iraq’s independence. Iraq will
probably never be free of Iranian influ-
ence, but it need not be left so weak that
Tehran can continue to use the country
to advance its malign regional interests.
To withdrawal advocates, this will sound
like a slippery slope to an endless mis-
sion in Iraq. But past experience sug-
gests that declaring victory and going
home can have serious and negative con-
sequences for Iraq and the region. Just
consider what happened the last time
Washington decided to do that, in 2011:
one result was the rise of ISIS, which
eventually dragged the United States
back into Iraq anyway.
A final, and less familiar, area in
which a U.S. withdrawal from the Middle
East would make matters worse is the
eastern Mediterranean, where tensions
over the status of Cyprus, maritime
boundaries, and access to natural gas
deposits pit a dizzying array of countries,
including multiple NATO allies and vari-
ous U.S. strategic partners, against one
another. Not only have these complex
and related disputes created a dangerous
situation at sea, but they threaten to
make worse the already grim situation in
nearby Libya, where a civil war contin-
ues to rage and has drawn in a number of
countries, including Egypt and Turkey,
which nearly came to blows in recent
months. The United States has been con-
spicuously absent from the scene except
for a number of well-timed naval deploy-
ments over the summer, which seemed
to cool tensions momentarily. But a lack
of U.S. involvement in these brewing
conflicts would increase the chances that
they would spin out of control.
WHAT REALLY
MATTERS
It would be a blessing if the United States
could simply end its “endless wars” and
walk away from the Middle East. But
doing so would be no way to conduct
foreign policy. There would be benefits
to leaving the region, but they would be
far outweighed by the costs.
Washington got bogged down in the
Middle East because it lost sight of what
really matters in the region. The first two
decades of this century were an era in
which almost everything and anything
was justified in terms of U.S. interests.
The goal now should be to clarify what is
important and match national resources
to protecting those things. Declaring
defeat and going home will solve noth-
ing.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 23
Natural Resources
As the World Burns Climate
Change’s Dangerous Next Phase
By 2050, many areas around the world will face flood levels every year
By Michael Oppenheimer
@ClimateOpp
I n late August, more than 600
separate wildfires ravaged
California, killing seven people.
Meanwhile, two tropical cyclones struck
the Gulf Coast only days apart: first
Tropical Storm Marco and then
Hurricane Laura, the latter of which
killed 26 people in the United States and
tied the record for the strongest storm to
hit Louisiana. Extreme events such as
these signal a worrying trend. In the
coming decades, as temperatures
continue to climb, seemingly isolated
climate disasters will begin to overlap,
their impacts becoming more than
additive. Scientists expect to see more
intense tropical cyclones and more heat
waves. Each disaster could compound
the damage of the next, with less and less
time for people to recover in between.
Many observers assess the threat of
climate change in terms of the frequency
or severity of extreme events. They have
viewed each crisis—be it a Texas hurri-
cane or a California wildfire—as distinct
from others. But consider how people
feel on the fourth day of a heat wave as
opposed to the first. Their resilience
24 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
begins to drain away. Viewing weather
events as independent occurrences is
like trying to understand a movie by look-
ing at a series of brief clips; they are
important plot points, but not the whole
story. In fact, viewing climate change as
the accumulation of individual events
underestimates the threat, because such
events do not take place in a vacuum. As
recent research shows, features of the
climate interact with one another —
interactions that exacerbate the impact
on people and ecosystems.
Two interactions are particularly
worrisome. First, as extreme events
become more intense and more fre-
quent, they will increasingly occur close
together in time and location, worsening
the overall impact. Alone, a single
extreme event—such as a hurricane or a
wildfire—can devastate wide areas. But
back-to-back climate catastrophes com-
pound the misery of each. The second
type of interaction is longer term. It hap-
pens when one of the earth’s mecha-
n i s m s f o r r e g u l a t i n g t h e c l i-
mate—systems involving air, the ocean,
land, or ice—runs amok, setting off a
chain reaction involving other such
mechanisms.
These new risks to the planet should
challenge the conventional wisdom on
fighting climate change. In the United
States and other wealthy countries,
efforts to adapt to global warming have
always played second fiddle to efforts to
reduce carbon emissions. This emphasis
is understandable, since if greenhouse
gas emissions are not restrained, suc-
cessfully adapting to climate change will
be impossible for most of humanity:
countries will suffer major damage, and
lives will be lost. Adaptation has also
seemed less attractive because it
involves no global silver bullets. But
policymakers no longer have the luxury
of downgrading adaptation, because
climate change’s devastating effects are
no longer in the future; they are occur-
ring now.
A CONFLUENCE OF
CRISES
Extreme events can wreak havoc on soci-
ety. In 1953, a powerful storm in the
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
North Sea killed more than 2,000 people
in the Netherlands and the United King-
dom. In 2003, a searing heat wave
gripped western Europe, contributing to
somewhere between 35,000 and 70,000
deaths. In 2012, Superstorm Sandy
struck the northeastern coast of the
United States, causing nearly $80 billion
in damage. These episodes unleashed
cataclysmic consequences, but few com-
munities had to face them more than
once over several generations. Such
events occur worldwide multiple times
per year but rarely in the same place. The
North Sea storm, for instance, appears to
have been a once-in-a-century event for
its region; the 2003 heat wave, a once-in-
500-year event; and Sandy’s flooding of
New York City, a once-in-250-year
event.
But soon, some once-in-a-lifetime
catastrophes will become annual deba-
cles. As temperatures rise, the odds that
such events will occur at any specific
location in a given year are growing
quickly, particularly in coastal areas. By
2050, many such areas around the world
will face flood levels every year that only
recently occurred once per century.
When extreme events strike the
same location more frequently, the con-
fluence can be more devastating than the
sum of its parts. Consider a string of
extremely hot days in one particular
place—the odds of which, computer cli-
mate models confirm, are growing rap-
idly. A few consecutive days of unusually
hot weather is manageable, but a week or
two, far less so. As a heat wave goes on,
s Dogs stranded after Hurricane Florence in Leland, North Carolina, September 2018.
the electrical grid struggles to supply
enough power for all the air conditioning
being used. Blackouts are triggered.
With no air conditioning, the human
body’s own system for mitigating heat
breaks down, too. Some die of heat
stroke and respiratory disease. For those
who lack air conditioning (which is a
majority of the world’s population),
many of whom live in aging, urban apart-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
ments that are slow to cool naturally, the
risk is greatest. As hot days bunch
together, such households will see long
stretches without relief, since the indoor
temperature lags a day or two behind the
outdoor temperature.
Another scientific finding suggests
that the problem does not stop there: in
many locations in the future, episodes of
high humidity will be more likely to
accompany hot days than they are now.
Heat plus humidity equals more human
misery than heat alone or humidity
alone—and more than the sum of the
two. Above a certain threshold, the
human body can no longer dissipate its
own metabolic heat through perspira-
tion. More and more often, in an expand-
ing area of the world, outdoor activity
involving any significant effort—farm
labor, construction work, or even a soc-
cer game—will be life threatening.
The devastation caused by multiple
extreme events is not hypothetical, as the
2017 hurricane season showed. In
August of that year, Hurricane Harvey
struck the Gulf Coast of the United
States, deluging parts of the areas
around Houston, Texas, with more than
four feet of rainfall and causing over $90
billion in damage. A couple of weeks
later, Hurricane Irma flattened parts of
the Leeward Islands, in the Caribbean,
while striking a glancing blow to Puerto
Rico. Just two weeks after that, Hurri-
cane Maria made a direct hit on Puerto
Rico, destroying its infrastructure and
causing about 3,000 deaths. At some
point in their paths of destruction, each
storm was classified as Category 4 or 5,
the highest levels of intensity.
Like heat waves, consecutive hurri-
canes of this magnitude can exacerbate
misery. The link in this case was not nec-
essarily geographic or temporal. Hurri-
cane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico
26 days after and over 2,000 miles away
from Hurricane Harvey’s strike on
Texas. But these two events connected at
a distance. The damage in Puerto Rico
was made worse because the U.S. Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency
had exhausted its financial and person-
nel resources on the previous two
storms, especially Harvey. Add to that
the island’s financial troubles, its lack of
representation in Congress, and the
T r u m p a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s h o s t i l-
ity—perhaps not surprising, given the
island’s overwhelmingly Hispanic popu-
lation—and the result was gross mis-
management that worsened the disaster.
Even extreme events scattered
across the world can compound one
another. Consider crop failures. About
15 percent of the world’s grain is con-
sumed not in the country where it was
grown but after being exported. The big-
gest exporters of grain—Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Russia, Ukraine, and the United
States—are spread out around the world.
That is a good thing from the perspective
of food security, because it minimizes the
chances of simultaneous crop failures.
But global warming is increasing those
odds. Yields of corn, soybeans, and other
key crops fall sharply as temperatures
rise and the amount of water they receive
falls. As a result, there is now a growing
possibility of simultaneous crop failures
in two far-apart breadbaskets — some-
thing that could disrupt the global food
supply and lead to malnutrition and, in
some places, widespread starvation.
THE TIPPING POINTS
Beyond the prospect of extreme events
coinciding or connecting, another sort of
interaction is just as worrying: those
among the various systems that drive the
climate. Scientists have long worried
about tipping points—thresholds
beyond which small changes in the
global temperature can lead to rapid,
disruptive effects. For example, if large
portions of the Greenland and Antarctic
ice sheets melt and disintegrate, a pro-
cess already underway along their
fringes, the global sea level will rise much
more rapidly than it has for thousands of
years. As Arctic permafrost across North
America and Eurasia melts, it will
release large amounts of methane and
carbon dioxide, further increasing the
rate of global warming. If a key ocean
current in the North Atlantic slows down
as a result of global warming, climate at
the high latitudes will be disrupted.
Although scientists have looked at these
possibilities with a wary eye for decades,
they have been unable to nail down the
exact temperature at which these rapid
responses would occur—or to determine
if precise tipping points even exist.
But if such thresholds exist and
were crossed at relatively low tempera-
tures, the result would be disastrous: the
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 25
widespread dislocation of ecosystems
and societies with little window of
opportunity to adapt. Even worse,
there’s evidence to suggest that several of
these phenomena would interact. If a
threshold in one system were crossed,
there might be a ripple effect, causing
thresholds in others to be crossed, too.
For example, a rapid loss of Greenland
ice would pour water into the surround-
ing sea, slowing ocean circulation.
Because this current normally channels
warm water northward, its slowing
would create something akin to a series
of rear-end collisions in a traffic jam,
causing a warming of Antarctic waters
on the other side of the world. That, in
turn, would have another knock-on
effect, speeding the breakup of parts of
the Antarctic ice sheet. The global sea
level would surge even higher.
When these building blocks of the
climate are examined individually, the
chances of crossing multiple thresholds
more or less simultaneously appears
small. Some of these phenomena are
unlikely to occur in this century or even
the next without a major trigger. But that
is precisely what the interaction of these
various systems might create: one sys-
tem may go haywire, triggering the dis-
ruption of others. At this juncture, there
is still a great deal of uncertainty about
how high that probability is. But the
potential for such interactions adds
another reason to be extremely cautious
about venturing beyond the targets set in
t h e 2 0 1 5 P a r i s c l i m a t e a g r e e-
ment—keeping warming to well below
two degrees Celsius above preindustrial
levels and trying to limit the increase to
1.5 degrees Celsius. Exceeding those
targets would mean entering a climatic
terra incognita.
UNPREPARED FOR
UNKNOWNS
The interaction of extreme events cre-
ates risks of an entirely new type and
magnitude. Using computers to predict
when and where such events may occur
is of little immediate help, since model-
ing of those events is in its early stages.
Nor can one extrapolate from past expe-
rience, since the climate is evolving well
outside of what humans have lived
through. It’s not that a confluence of
risky climate events at a particular place
and time is entirely new. But what is new
is that the likelihood of some conflu-
ences is increasing rapidly and globally.
Further complicating predictions is
the question of how people and govern-
ments will respond. People who are not
directly involved in an extreme event
tend not to remember the lessons
learned from such past events long
26 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
enough to prepare for the next. Some
studies suggest that it takes multiple
similar incidents to leave a deep enough
impression to convince them to learn
from their experience and adapt accord-
ingly. Only then will they think ahead
and act to protect lives and property or
get out of harm’s way by relocating to
safer terrain.
Climate change’s devastating effects
are no longer in the future; they are
occurring now.
Even highly developed countries are
underprepared for climate risks, espe-
cially in certain geographic areas, eco-
nomic sectors, or demographic seg-
ments. Before Hurricane Katrina struck
in 2005, New Orleans had an emergency
escape plan, but it didn’t consider poorer
people who didn’t have cars, most of
whom were Black. As a result, many
stayed in their houses and drowned or
wound up in New Orleans’s Superdome,
which had been set up as a shelter. Other
countries may be able to handle one
threat but completely overlook another.
Japan, for example, has millennia of
experience dealing with earthquakes,
floods, and typhoons, and its disaster-
risk-management system is the envy of
the world. Yet the country failed to pre-
pare for a new type of disaster that arose
in 2011: an earthquake triggering a tsu-
nami, which flooded a nuclear reactor.
As these examples suggest,
although governments can learn
through experience with individual
disasters, they are almost never ready for
new combinations of them. That does
not offer much reason for optimism
when it comes to preparations for cli-
mate change. Indeed, in a world where
climate risks rarely interact, govern-
ments are already inadequately planning
for potential disasters. As those risks
increasingly compound one another,
governments will lag even further
behind the threat.
THE ADAPTATION
IMPERATIVE
Nearly all accounts of the climate prob-
lem from scientists and other experts
end with a plea for rapid reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions. But govern-
ments should emphasize adaptation
equally. That means developing for-
ward-looking policies to protect people,
infrastructure, ecosystems, and society.
It means restructuring or replacing per-
verse incentives that encourage people
and industries to settle in exposed areas.
It means giving more resources to inter-
national agencies to help the least devel-
oped countries. Most of all, it means
thinking many years ahead to gather
extensive resources and political will for
often unpopular policies. Very little of
this job can be done quickly. Adaptation
should have begun in earnest decades
ago.
Emphasizing emission reductions
but not adaptation to climate change is
misguided, because no matter what hap-
pens to emissions over the next 30 years,
the planet will get significantly hotter.
Trapped heat that has been absorbed by
the oceans over decades is bound to
emerge, warming the earth. Years of
emissions have accumulated in the atmo-
sphere and will have a lagged effect on
the climate. Although the world may be
capable of meeting the targets set in the
Paris agreement, it is more likely than
not that it will fail to do so. Ever since
international climate change negotia-
tions began in 1991, countries have
talked the talk more than they have
walked the walk. If the targets aren’t met,
climate change will produce more events
that a greater number of governments
will either have to learn to adapt to at a
very high price or altogether fail to man-
age.
Even achieving the Paris targets
would not be a free pass to avoid adapta-
tion. Attaining those goals would give
the world some welcome breathing
room. But the resulting warming would
still create serious consequences, such as
a hundredfold uptick in the frequency of
floods along large swaths of the world’s
coasts. It is true that no amount of adap-
tation will be enough if emissions remain
unconstrained, because that would lead
to warming that would go far beyond
what humans have ever experienced. But
it is also true that no amount of emission
reduction will be enough to spare com-
munities that do not also adapt.
Governments must also remember
that the ability of people and places to
adapt to climate change is highly
unequal, largely because of unfair
arrangements determined too often by
racial, gender, ethnic, age, or other dif-
ferences. Many of the interactions
between extreme events will become
apparent only suddenly, so accommo-
dating them will require extra flexibility
to respond rapidly—a capacity that much
of the population in less developed coun-
tries and major segments of wealthy
countries have long been deprived of.
The bottom line is that few if any
countries are sufficiently prepared to
deal with what is in store. A yawning gap
has opened up between what they know
about the risks of climate change and
what they are doing to reduce them. In
the riskier new era of climate change, the
longer countries take to close that gap,
the more painful and deadly the out-
comes.
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Afghan Argument
It’s Time to Trust the Taliban
Afghanistan’s jihadi insurgents are ready to give America what it wants: defeat without
humiliation
s A Taliban representative attends international talks on Afghanistan in Moscow on Nov. 9, 2018.
By Anatol Lieven
Doha, Qatar
I n the peace process now underway
with the Afghan Taliban, one-and-
a-half significant U.S. interests are
at stake. The “half” is the only real hang-
up to signing a deal and bringing home
American troops right now.
For Afghans, of course, the stakes in
the present war are different and infi-
nitely higher than for Americans, for
whom the only vital interest is also the
easiest to achieve: a Taliban agreement
not to host international terrorists them-
selves and to do their utmost to prevent
Afghanistan from once again being used
as a base for terrorism against the West
in general and the United States in par-
ticular.
One can be confident that the
Taliban would not only agree to this but
also follow through on the agreement.
It’s not just because Taliban supporters
and interlocutors, in public statements
and private conversations (including my
own), have almost universally, if grimly,
acknowledged that hosting al Qaeda in
the run-up to 9/11 was a dreadful mis-
take that cost them their rule over
Afghanistan. It’s also because the
Taliban are now engaged in a bitter fight
28 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
with the forces of the Islamic State (who
most certainly are anti-Western interna-
tional terrorists) for control of parts of
Afghanistan. The Taliban’s role as an
enemy of the Islamic State (as well as
prudent preparation for the possible
collapse of the U.S.-backed order in
Kabul) has led Russia and China to
launch talks with the Taliban.
Finally, while the Pakistani military
has backed the Afghan Taliban as a client
movement against Indian influence in
Afghanistan, it has absolutely no interest
in encouraging a repeat of 9/11 and the
disasters that followed for Pakistan. And
if Pakistanis did have any such intention,
their Chinese backers (with their own
worries about Islamist extremism in
Xinjiang) would deter them very
strongly.
The second real U.S. interest in the
process is what is called in Washington
“credibility” but which is better known
by its older and more honest name,
“prestige”—in this case, the avoidance of
obvious and humiliating defeat, which
would undermine respect for U.S.
strength and embolden U.S. enemies
elsewhere. As a U.S. general told me a
decade ago, he and his colleagues could
not say what victory would look like in
Afghanistan, but they could all say what
defeat would look like. It would look like
Saigon in 1975. In the case of Afghani-
stan, this would most probably however
take the form not of outright Taliban
victory but of the collapse of the Afghan
state, followed by Taliban victory over
large areas and deepened and perma-
nent civil war with other ethnic forces.
Apart from prestige, there is also a
concrete U.S. interest in preventing such
an outcome. Such a full-scale civil war
would lead to a greatly increased flow of
Afghan refugees to Europe. Given what
happened because of the Syrian refugee
crisis, this could deal a death blow to
liberal democracy in Europe, and the
resulting European nationalist backlash
would crush the entire image of U.S.-led
democracy in the world. To prevent it,
however, would require agreement with
and major concessions to Turkey and
Iran, undermining America’s
geopolitical position in the Middle East.
The key question therefore is
whether a deal can be struck with the
Taliban concerning control over the
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Afghan state, and if it can be reached,
whether it would stick. The key question
here is not culture or ideology—but
power. Afghanistan already has an
Islamic constitution, which can be
tweaked to look even more Islamic. But
in terms of power at the center, the
Taliban will inevitably demand either a
strong central government in which they
will have a very large share or a neutral
government (perhaps under a new par-
liamentary constitution) with very little
real power.
And whatever happens, they will
demand de facto (though not necessarily
explicit and formal) control over their
core areas of support in Greater
Kandahar, Greater Paktia, and Kunduz,
including de facto military control by
Taliban forces incorporated into the
Afghan National Army and police. To
judge by their record in the 1990s, most
ordinary opponents of the Taliban in
these areas would be allowed by the
Taliban to go home in peace. Hard-line
anti-Taliban leaders would have to leave
or die.
The questions therefore are whether
such a power-sharing agreement could
be reached between the existing Afghan
state and the Taliban, and if it were
reached, whether it would stick at least
long enough for the United States to with-
draw without humiliation. If such a deal
collapsed after a few years—well, that
would be dreadful for Afghanistan, but
the U.S. public would have forgotten all
about Afghanistan by then, and no doubt
the U.S. establishment would find some-
one else to blame for U.S. failure.
At present, it looks quite impossible
for the Kabul government to agree to
such terms. Washington can, of course,
coerce it by the threat of unilateral with-
drawal but has then thrown away most of
its ability to maintain any pressure on
the Taliban. This is where the region
comes in. To restrain Taliban behavior
after U.S. withdrawal will not in fact be
the task of the United States but of
Afghanistan’s neighbors—Pakistan,
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Iran, China, Russia, and India—and they
should therefore be centrally included in
Any idea of long-term
U.S. bases in
Afghanistan—which
China, Russia, and Iran
fear could be used to
threaten them—will
have to be abandoned.
This is something the
Taliban are absolutely
bound to demand, and
the United States should
find it easy to give
the peace process. But of course, present
U.S. relations with Russia and China
hardly allow this, and the United States
does not have direct relations with Iran
at all. Chinese help is also needed to
influence Pakistan not to seek to use
Afghanistan as a base for terrorism
directed against India.
There is one thing that the United
States can give China, Russia, and Iran in
return for their help and which it must
give up anyway as part of any agreement
with the Taliban. Any idea of long-term
U.S. bases in Afghanistan—which China,
Russia, and Iran fear could be used to
threaten them—will have to be aban-
Some of the worst
atrocities against
women in recent years
have taken place in
areas controlled by
forces allied with the
United States and the
Afghan government
doned. This is something the Taliban are
absolutely bound to demand, and the
United States should find it easy to give.
For far from being strategic assets, these
bases are in the long run somewhere
between a strategic liability and a collec-
tion of hostage camps. Given their geo-
graphical position and the virtually cer-
tain long-term instability of Afghani-
stan, it would be strategically foolish to
leave U.S. forces there permanently.
Apart from anything else, they are not a
true threat to Iran but on the contrary an
excellent potential target for Iranian-
backed attacks.
Finally, two other issues should at
least be mentioned. The Taliban do not
threaten women’s modern rights in most
of Afghanistan because such rights have
never existed in most of Afghanistan.
Some of the worst atrocities against
women in recent years have taken place
in areas controlled by forces allied with
the United States and the Afghan gov-
ernment. Just as prior to 1992 (when the
city was destroyed by the U.S.-backed
mujahideen), since 2001, an island of
relative liberalism and progress has been
created in central Kabul. It may perhaps
be possible to get the Taliban in the
future to respect this to some extent in
return for a free hand in their own
areas—but only if Kabul and its Western-
ized elites have to remain secure as the
conduit for large sums of outside finan-
cial aid. If the West wants Kabul to play
this role in the long run, it will have to go
on paying for it in the long run.
One last issue does not affect the
United States much but is a grave
scourge for Europe, Russia, and Iran: the
Afghan heroin trade. I have heard from
sources I trust that the Taliban leader-
ship would be very happy to suppress
this trade, as they did in 1999-2001, if
they could get the same deal that they
offered in those years: international rec-
ognition and copious international aid
channeled through them. Morally, the
Taliban have always been uneasy about
the trade (especially as the number of
Afghan addicts has increased)—and it
also tends by its nature to undermine
central command and to promote inde-
pendent warlordism—whereas aid
directed through the Taliban leadership
would help consolidate their power.
If the United States went down this
path, then following a peace deal it might
find itself in the position of funding the
Taliban to fight against the heroin-
trading warlords whom Washington has
been backing for the past 17 years to fight
against the Taliban. And thus the
Afghanistan war would end, perhaps
appropriately, in the darkest of black
comedies.
l Anatol Lieven is a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and a senior
research fellow at New America in Washington. He is the author, among other
books, of America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 29
China-Taliban Relations
China’s Stake in the Afghan
Peace Process
Afghanistan is already of strategic importance to Beijing. As U.S. troops leave, China’s
influence will grow
s China’s President Xi Jinping and Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah shake hands during their meeting at the Great Hall of the People in
Beijing, China, Tuesday, May 17, 2016.
By Sohrab Azad
@azadsohrab
N egotiations between the Afghan
government delegation,
comprising government
officials and civil society leaders, and the
Taliban started last week in Doha, Qatar.
Representatives from the international
community visited and promoted a
productive peace process — showcasing
the complexity of the Afghan conflict.
The signing of the U.S.-Taliban
agreement this past February paved the
way for this direct dialogue, prompting
Afghanistan’s neighbors to become more
involved to prepare for an eventual U.S.
withdrawal.
Even in a time of intense geo-
political competition between the
United States and China, stability in
Afghanistan is one of the few shared
interests remaining. It is a task that
requires international support. The
peace talks were delayed for over six
months due to argument over prisoner
releases; meanwhile, the Taliban
increased the severity of their attacks on
30 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
Afghan security forces and civilians.
Nevertheless, the Trump adminis-
tration is staying course with its initial
plans to withdraw all U.S. troops from
Afghanistan by mid-2021. The move
toward troop withdrawal will likely not
change even if President Donald Trump
loses his re-election bid this November.
His opponent, former Vice President Joe
Biden, also believes that American forces
need to be dramatically reduced to under
2,000 and that the expensive war in
Afghanistan needs to end.
An inevitable consequence of this
U.S. retreat is that other great powers
will fill the military and economic vac-
uum left in Afghanistan. China’s interest
in Central Asia is far reaching and it will
look to use Afghanistan as a corridor for
its “March West.” The only uncertainty is
how this will affect a future Afghan gov-
ernment and its development as a
regional economic force.
CHINA’S MILITARY
PUSH IN THE REGION
Since U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay
Khalilzad embarked on his shuttle diplo-
macy to encourage peace talks in 2018,
China and Pakistan have been inviting
the Taliban to discuss regional security
and stability within Afghanistan. Similar
to the U.S., China worries about their
internal security being threatened by
Afghan-based terrorist groups. In
exchange for China’s support for the
Taliban to be included in the Afghan
government, there is an understanding
that the Taliban must prevent Uyghur
secessionist groups from China’s
Xinjiang region from crossing the border
and settling in bases in Afghanistan.
This assurance is especially crucial
to the Chinese Community Party’s
topline agenda to combat any separat-
ism or unrest in Xinjiang. That priority
has prompted the Chinese government
to crack down on the Uyghur Muslim
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minority, even placing them in concen-
tration camps in what is internationally
condemned as cultural genocide. The
same goal led China to offer to build key
highway networks for the Taliban to
prompt the militant group to reduce
violence and establish peace in the coun-
try.
Although China has continued to
deny that Beijing is interested in build-
ing overseas military bases, it was
reported early last year that China built a
second foreign military base in
Tajikistan, near the strategic Wakhan
Corridor – the strip connecting Afghani-
stan to China. The base is supposedly in
place for counterterrorism efforts
against Uyghur militants and combat-
ting other insurgents crossing the border
into western China. Similarly, in 2018,
the Afghan Embassy in Beijing con-
firmed that China is helping Afghanistan
set up a mountain brigade in the north,
but said that there will no Chinese troops
on Afghan soil.
However, there have been reports
from the Ministry of Defense in Afghani-
stan that a Chinese expert delegation
visited Kabul and discussed a location
for the base in 2018. Further plans have
not been revealed. After the U.S. with-
drawal, Beijing’s intentions will become
clearer and Kabul may be incentivized to
accept military assistance — especially
since China has already asked for similar
counterterrorism guarantees from the
Taliban — whether the civil war ends or
continues.
The U.S. withdrawal from Afghani-
stan is not an anomaly but part of a
broader, bipartisan push from American
policymakers to withdraw forces from
overseas conflicts, even in the Middle
East. Only a few hundred Americans are
left in Syria to protect oil fields and
Trump and Prime Minister Mustafa al-
Kadhimi of Iraq recently stated that
troop levels in Iraq will decrease to
3,000. This vacuum is widespread, and
the recent Beijing-Tehran strategic
agreement is a testament to that. The
security and trade partnership outlines
enhanced joint training and exercises,
joint research and weapons develop-
ment and intelligence sharing. As China
further postures itself in South Asia,
Central Asia, and the Middle East, the
influence of the West will rapidly dwin-
dle, with Afghanistan no exception.
CHINA’S RISING
ECONOMIC PRESENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s modern-
day silk road project – the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) – serves as the country’s
foundation to project massive economic
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
influence coupled with enhancing part-
nerships in security, trade, and energy.
China’s flagship BRI project, the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
could be expanded to Afghanistan to
further connect the Central Asian repub-
lics under a Chinese umbrella. The pri-
mary reason Chinese investment in
Afghanistan has been sluggish is due to
intense instability and American pres-
ence, but those key aspects may sud-
denly change in the coming future.
Afghanistan’s natural resources are
estimated to be worth around $1 trillion,
and Chinese companies have been tak-
ing notice. For instance, in 2008, the
Chinese Metallurgical Group Corpora-
tion (MCC) and the Jiangxi Copper Com-
pany Limited (JLC) consortium won a
30-year lease to extract the second larg-
est copper deposit in the world (valued at
least $50 billion) for $3.4 billion. In
2011, the China National Petroleum Cor-
poration (CNPC) won a $400 million bid
to drill three oil fields for 25 years, con-
taining roughly 87 million barrels of oil.
However, the development of the mine
and oil fields have not progressed at all,
which has left the Afghan government
frustrated.
China preemptively won these con-
tracts and are biding their time until
Afghanistan becomes more stable to
conduct their economic operations. That
also helps explain the Chinese push to
quell violence by directly talking to the
Taliban and offering them industrial
projects. Moreover, Beijing may very
well be building a strategic relationship
with Kabul and the Taliban to ensure
similar contracts can be won in the
future to generate momentum for their
BRI expansion.
Since the launch and expansion of
CPEC, Beijing has gained influence and
leverage over Islamabad. China recently
convinced Pakistan to open five key bor-
der crossings with Afghanistan to facili-
tate bilateral trade and the transit trade
of Afghan exports to India – decreasing
Afghanistan’s dependence on the
Chabahar port in Iran. Pakistan’s will-
ingness to allow exports to rival India as
tensions escalate in the Kashmir region
reveals China’s ability to persuade
regional partners to do its bidding to set
the foundation to propel BRI. Further-
more, Afghanistan’s ambassador to
China confirmed that the country is look-
ing forward to having the same kind of
relationship China has with Pakistan.
Enhanced Chinese development will
most likely also be in the form of loans to
the various institutions of Afghanistan.
Michael O’Hanlon — a senior fellow
and the director of research in foreign
policy at the Brookings Institution –
argues that once the U.S. withdraws, if
China makes smart investments in
Afghanistan, it will be beneficial to both
parties. He states, however, that Kabul
must “be aware of the financial terms;
China tends to seek equity after provid-
ing loans with high interest rates that the
host nation sometimes defaults upon.”
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has
rejected loans from China before as he
understands the crippling debt and eco-
nomic dependence associated with it, a
sentiment also pushed by Washington
onto Kabul. However, as the Americans
leave, a future Afghan government may
prove to be more inviting to Chinese com-
panies and assistance for another
nationwide reconstruction project. In
Afghanistan, peace is a prerequisite to
development and China’s willingness to
invest and expand displays the impor-
tance of Afghanistan as a military and
economic corridor.
AFGHANISTAN’S
GOVERNANCE IN THE
FUTURE
The Afghan peace negotiations are rid-
dled with uncertainties: when a ceasefire
will occur, how long the peace talks will
take, and what system of governance will
be formed. The Afghan peace team and
the Taliban hold vastly different beliefs
about women’s rights and autonomy, the
role Islam should play in state affairs and
how democracy should be implemented.
This gap in values will most certainly
cause delays and leave ordinary Afghans
frustrated.
Once U.S. troops leave next year, the
democracy Afghanistan manifested in
the past two decades may also begin to
gradually collapse. Corruption among
high-level officials and limited govern-
ment control in most Afghan provinces
have proved that democracy in Afghani-
stan has always been an illusion, meant
to satisfy expectations of the United
States in order to continuously receive
aid. Once the illusion fades, so will the
act of protecting that façade. There will
be a clash between Afghans who want to
expand and progress democracy and
those who simply used it for political
capital and financial incentives.
China’s growing influence in
Afghanistan may even shift Afghan gov-
ernance styles to resemble Beijing’s —
one that is more hierarchical and with
autocratic tendencies, a system that the
Taliban does not oppose. The next few
years will be crucial in efforts for rebuild-
ing Afghanistan and the people who call
it home will finally know the truth: Will
real change be ushered in or is this sim-
ply another familiar phase in the recent
tragic history of the country?
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 31
Security Alliances
The Middle East Strategic
Realignment Reverberates
Through South Asia
As momentous as the slow collapse of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the strategic
reorientation within the Middle East is, its impact on South Asia will also be momentous
By Michael Rubin
@mrubin1971
T here is an unfortunate tendency
in U.S. strategic circles to
compartmentalize by geography:
China watchers look at China, but for too
long ignored its inroads in Africa and the
Americas. Russia specialists watch the
Kremlin but ignore Moscow’s inroads far
beyond Russia’s borders. The Middle
East, meanwhile, may have been the
focus of U.S. strategy for the past
quarter-century, but both the State
Department and Pentagon divide it
between European, Near Eastern, and
African bureaus. Simply put, not
everything conforms neatly to a U.S.
bureaucracy notoriously unwilling or
unable to adjust to the world around it.
So it is with recent Middle East
peace moves. What is happening in
Arab-Israeli peace is historic, and no
amount of partisanship in Washington
can credibly detract from it. But as
32 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
momentous as the slow collapse of the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the strategic
reorientation within the Middle East is,
its impact on South Asia will also be
momentous. While India increasingly
embraces the new order, however, Paki-
stan’s reactionary rejection of Saudi Ara-
bia’s peace moves may raise new chal-
lenges for the United States and regional
security.
There can be no mistaking the
importance of the strategic realignment
in the Middle East. The decision first by
the United Arab Emirates and next Bah-
rain to normalize relations with Israel
formalize a détente that has been years
in the making. All indications are that
Saudi Arabia could be next. Put another
way, Israel waited thirty years for the
first Arab-Israeli peace agreement; it
took another fifteen years for the next,
and another quarter-century for Abu
Dhabi to formalize peace with Jerusa-
lem. Now, the space between agree-
ments is being measured in days and
weeks rather than years and decades.
Whereas cash greased peacemaking
with both Egypt and Jordan, the recent
peace deals are more ideological. Arab
capitals are recognizing Israel because
they want to, not simply because they
need money. Iran, of course, is a major
reason for the change. From its founda-
tion, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
sought Israel’s genocidal eradication as
core policy. While Iran’s post-
revolutionary policy toward the Gulf
Arab states has been more nuanced, the
Iranian government’s willingness to
export revolution throughout the Middle
East and incite unrest in Bahrain,
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia had led Gulf
states to view the Iranian regime as a
fundamental challenge. Saudi Arabia
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has further suffered repeated and direct
attacks by Iranian proxies in Yemen.
Sudan, which once pledged firm rejec-
tion of negotiations with let alone recog-
nition of Israel now seeks to join the mod-
erate camp. Iraq, once home to the most
radical Palestinian factions, may not
have peace with Israel on its agenda, but
no longer seeks to obstruct it either.
Other countries are coalescing into
a more rejectionist camp against the new
order. Turkey, once a part of a pro-
Western democratic and counter-terror
bloc, now is a state-sponsor of terrorism
s Pakistan’s army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa is welcomed by Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Defence
Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
in all but name. Qatar increasingly posi-
tions itself as the banker to the
rejectionist bloc. The Palestinian
Authority, meanwhile, is doubling down
on its rejectionism, an attitude which the
European Union subsidizes.
Washington already struggles for
how to address the new realities as one-
time allies and hosts to U.S. forces make
common cause with anti-American ter-
rorist groups. The Middle East realign-
ment, however, may also reverberate
through South Asia, albeit not in entirely
positive ways. Certainly, Israel and India
have already broken the ice, notwith-
standing India’s substantial economic
ties to Iran. Saudi Arabia’s pivot toward
the peace bloc, however, is causing Paki-
stan to move the other direction and to
seek solace in the newly-coalescing radi-
cal bloc.
This may not entirely surprise. Paki-
stan is among the world’s most anti-
Semitic countries, never mind that it has
no Jewish community and few Paki-
stanis have ever met a Jew. That intoler-
ance is a legacy of Saudi-funded religious
seminaries, charities, and political assis-
tance. Perhaps the student has now
become the teacher: As Riyadh grows
closer to Jerusalem, the Pakistani politi-
cal leadership recoils, even at the
expense of its long partnership with
Saudi Arabia.
What was once below the surface
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now peculates openly. On August 5,
2020, Pakistani foreign minister Shah
Mahmood Qureshi launched a tirade
against Riyadh for Saudi Arabia’s pro-
crastination on convening an Organisa-
tion of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for-
eign minister meeting on Kashmir and
the Israel-United Arab Emirates peace
deal. Riyadh has its own grievances:
Saudi officials were also reportedly apo-
plectic at Pakistani prime minister
Imran Khan’s appeal to ease sanctions
on Iran. They are also upset that Paki-
stan treats Iran’s demands as equally
legitimate to Saudi Arabia’s in diplo-
matic mediation.
In August 2020, Pakistan dis-
patched Qamar Javed Bajwa, the chief of
the Army Staff, and Faiz Hameed, the
director-general of the Inter-Services
Intelligence, to Riyadh to conduct dam-
Turkish president
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
meanwhile, hopes to
leverage Turkish-
Pakistani solidarity on
Kashmir into Pakistani
acceptance of his
broader anti-Saudi
obsession
age control. It did not work. That Saudi
Crown Prince and Defense Minister
Muhammad bin Salman did not receive
them shows the depth of Saudi anger.
This may soon change. Within Paki-
stan’s leadership, there is now a debate
about whether to continue Pakistan’s tilt
toward Saudi Arabia or instead, pursue
anything for Kashmir strategy and privi-
lege Iran, Turkey, and Qatar.
Alas, the rejectionist camp within
Pakistan appears to be winning the argu-
ment. They see in Turkey a willing part-
ner to make Kashmir a religious impera-
tive rather than a diplomatic issue. Turk-
ish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
meanwhile, hopes to leverage Turkish-
Pakistani solidarity on Kashmir into
Pakistani acceptance of his broader anti-
Saudi obsession.
Pakistan may see in Erdoğan and
perhaps Iran a substitution for recent
diplomatic losses: Malaysia is quiet now
that Mahathir Mohamad is out of power.
The new government both has different
perceptions about its role in the world
and is mindful of more immediate
Malaysian interests: India is the largest
buyer of Malaysian palm oil. Democratic
Party nominee Joe Biden has quieted his
criticism of the extension of Indian law
to Kashmir as he courts Indian-
American votes, a constituency ener-
gized by his choice of Kamala Harris,
whose mother is Indian. Pakistan was
livid, meanwhile, with Saudi Arabia
efforts to win a $15 billion deal to build
an oil refinery in India. As Haqqani
notes, Pakistan-Saudi trade is “a meagre
$3.6 billion, Saudi trade with India has
risen to $27 billion and is expanding
further.”
Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani
ambassador to the United States and
now a scholar at the Hudson Institute
noted that Pakistan was putting ideology
above more pragmatic concerns: “The
Saudis do not look kindly upon ultima-
tums and will be especially offended
when it comes from a country that has
frequently sought economic bailouts
from the Kingdom.” At issue is not only
Saudi subsidies but also Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan’s decades-long military ties
as well as the remittances which Paki-
stani workers send home from their
Saudi jobs.
The U.S. State Department and Pen-
tagon must recognize the import of Paki-
stan’s shifting alliances. Pakistan’s spon-
sorship of terror against India and
Afghanistan is already problematic, and
the U.S.-Taliban deal only empowers
radical Islamists further and formalizes
their de facto safe-haven. To then tie
Pakistan more deeply into the Turkey
and Qatar anti-peace Middle East bloc
means those same groups might soon
become more involved in undercutting
peace and security in the Middle East.
Countries that prioritize ideology above
both peace and their economic develop-
ment tend to spiral downward into ever
more radical postures as they seek to
distract from their own failings. It seems
strange to consider, but Saudi Arabia is
quickly becoming a moderating force in
the region. For Pakistan to recoil from
that moderation bodes ill for its future.
l Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 33
Pakistan Energy Shortage
Powering the Powerless in Pakistan
A roadmap to finally solving Pakistan’s energy crisis through “energy productivity”
By Muhammad Salar Khan
@salarppolicy
I n a developing country like
Pakistan, a reliable, uninterrupted,
and affordable energy supply is a
fundamental precondition for reducing
poverty, encouraging investment, and
boosting economic growth. Among other
challenges, the newly elected Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaf government under the
leadership of Imran Khan inherits a very
stagnant energy sector. Despite broad
access to electricity (99 percent of the
population had access to electricity in
2016, compared to 59 percent of the
population in 1990), the country
experiences massive blackouts (load
shedding of 6-8 hours a day for
households and 1-2 hours a day for the
industry). Because of poor energy
management, Pakistan’s energy
resources have been used inefficiently
for decades. As a result, the nation faces a
serious energy crisis that has often
stymied manufacturing and the service
sector and disrupted power supplies in
communities and households across the
nation. According to a survey by the
World Bank, 66.7 percent of the
businesses in Pakistan cite electricity
shortages as a more significant obstacle
34 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
to business than corruption (11.7
percent) and crime/terrorism (5.5
percent). In light of these factors, there is
an urgent need to innovate in the energy
sector of the country.
Fortunately, Pakistan has a high
renewable energy potential, which has
been elaborated in many studies on Paki-
stan. A recent report published by
USAID attests to Pakistan’s energy
potential, stating that it can potentially
produce 100,000 MW from solar energy
alone. Despite the potential, Pakistan
remains “powerless” when it comes to
adequately powering lights for its
homes, machinery for its factories, and
stoves for its kitchens. Data from many
sources, including the Ministry of Water
& Power and Pakistan Economic Sur-
veys, over the past five years show that
Pakistan has been facing an average
shortfall of between 4,000-5,000 MW.
This acute energy crisis is a result of
flawed energy policies pursued for
decades, the high cost of generation, and
aging and inadequate transmission,
among other causes. In addition to
transmission losses and distribution
thefts, an entrenched bureaucratic cul-
ture marked by poor organization, plan-
ning, and project implementation
among Pakistan’s power operating com-
panies only compounds the problem.
Power shortages are also rooted in
Pakistan’s irrational and increasingly
unaffordable energy mix: 64 percent
thermal, 30 hydropower, and 6 percent
nuclear. A high reliance on thermal
power plants (which in turn are run by
natural gas, oil, or coal) and hydropower
seldom assure a continuous flow of
power. Heavy dependence on oil-based
energy makes power high-priced. The
prevailing energy crisis is costly to the
economy in the form of huge subsidies
and high circular debts. Politicians and
policymakers in Pakistan have made
little real attempt to diversify the
nation’s energy supplies and to shift
dependence form expensive and
imported oil toward potentially cheaper
and cleaner resources available in the
country (Pakistan’s dependence on oil
imports is 24 percent, compared to
India’s 18 percent and Bangladesh’s 21
percent). Pakistan’s stubborn reliance
on fossil fuels continued even after the
oil shocks of 1973 and 1979.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
The misguided energy mix also exac-
erbates the nation’s already serious envi-
ronmental problems, which manifests
itself in poor air quality and unsafe
drinking water. Pakistan ranked a dis-
mal 148th out of 175 countries, according
to Yale and Columbia University’s Envi-
ronmental Performance Index.
One solution to Pakistan’s energy
crisis (and interrelated environmental
deterioration) is to provide incentives
for the development of distributed
energy resources, i.e., encourage a shift
toward renewable energy resources such
as solar, wind, and biogas. Fortunately,
Pakistan is endowed with renewable
energy resources. It not only has poten-
tially bountiful supplies of solar energy
but also could tap possible sources of
wind power, especially along the coastal
areas of the Arabian Sea. The prospects
for renewable energy in Pakistan are
heartening. Energy experts estimate that
Pakistan has a total renewable energy
potential of about 167.7 GW, more than
enough to meet the nation’s total
demand for electricity.
Better late than never, Pakistan has
started to acknowledge its renewable
energy potential as evidenced by the
construction of Quaid-e-Azam Solar
Park, with a nameplate capacity of 1,000
MW. There is a need for more additional
steps beyond the Solar Park. In fact, all
these steps should be part of a
multipronged “energy productivity”
policy. By encouraging energy conserva-
tion (efficiency), on the one hand, and
facilitating a move toward clean
renewables, on the other, the productiv-
ity policy will not only enhance energy
security but also improve the environ-
ment.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
VS. ENERGY
PRODUCTIVITY
Energy efficiency (doing more tasks with
less energy, as defined by Berkeley phys-
icist Richard Muller) is “cheaper than
cheap.” It doesn’t cost much. A
McKinsey & Company report finds that
savings made from energy conservation
and efficiency would be enough to pay
for projects such as expanding wind
from energy production and installing
solar panels.
In general, discussions about
energy efficiency often fixate on its abil-
ity to lower energy consumption, reduce
expenditures, and curtail greenhouse
gas emissions. It is worth exploring if
this mantra would work in developing
Pakistan.
Like any emerging economy, Paki-
stan focuses on growth and poverty alle-
viation, and the additional goods and
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Technological penury
is one prime reason why
Pakistan has not been
able to capitalize on its
high abundance of
renewable energy
potential. The lack of
technological knowhow
also helps to explain
why non-hydro
renewables currently
account for less than
4 percent (roughly
900 MW) of total
installed electricity
capacity against the
medium-term plan of
having a minimum
capacity of 9,700 MW
by 2030
services needed to produce these gains.
More business activities, infrastructure,
housing, education, and health services
require more energy consumption. Para-
doxically, the very idea of energy effi-
ciency remains unappreciated, in part,
by a perception that it is a tool designed
to reduce rather than expand consump-
tion and production. Since the focus in
Pakistan remains on growth, which the
nation views as central to its future good,
energy efficiency is dismissed as short-
hand for cutting down on growth.
In fact, presenting energy efficiency
as “doing more with less,” as is the case in
developed countries, tends to get lost in
translation in countries such as Paki-
stan. Thus, a change in the energy effi-
ciency paradigm is needed to better pro-
mote energy efficiency in a way that links
such efforts to improved living standards
and increased prosperity. A more inclu-
sive alternative narrative such as energy
productivity should be advocated — that
is, producing more goods and services
with the same energy (equivalently, “do-
ing more with the same”). As opposed to
the traditional energy efficiency para-
digm focusing solely on fewer inputs
(“more with less”), energy productivity
focuses on generating more outputs with
the same inputs.
Beyond the reframing of energy
efficiency as a rhetorical concept, there is
a need for developing a sound and
thoughtful energy productivity policy
framework. Such a policy framework
would inculcate renewable energy as a
significant aspect of energy productivity
policy. In the process, it would amelio-
rate energy security, address environ-
mental degradation, stimulate economic
growth, and, last but not least, mitigate
public worries.
However, the energy productivity
policy and its subsequent implementa-
tion cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Cau-
tious deliberations by concerned institu-
tions must take place to advance the tac-
tical and strategic goals that are sought.
In this regard, the government of Paki-
stan must play a prominent role not only
to ensure political stability and institu-
tional revamp but also to guarantee
regional peace and security.
Aside from the distinct challenges of
financing “sunk” and “fixed” costs amid
the historic debts and chronic losses,
another significant constraint is the lack
of appropriate technology in the imple-
mentation of energy productivity policy.
Pakistan needs to stay abreast of high
technology to harness its renewable
energy resources and materialize its
energy efficiency goals. There are studies
that talk about technological impover-
ishment of Pakistan. Technological pen-
ury is one prime reason why Pakistan has
not been able to capitalize on its high
abundance of renewable energy poten-
tial. The lack of technological knowhow
also helps to explain why non-hydro
renewables currently account for less
than 4 percent (roughly 900 MW) of
total installed electricity capacity against
the medium-term plan of having a mini-
mum capacity of 9,700 MW by 2030.
Given this, the role of technology trans-
fer in developing renewables and adopt-
ing energy conservation is worth explor-
ing.
To sum it up, I promote an alterna-
tive approach of energy productivity
policy that not only redefines energy
efficiency, but also includes it along with
an emphasis on renewable sources to
address energy crises in Pakistan. Con-
cerned ministries would have to be cog-
nizant of the conditions in the energy
productivity policy that would amelio-
rate power blackouts. For successful
implementation of the policy, the gov-
ernment would have to ensure that regu-
latory agencies coordinate their efforts
with power companies to improve
energy distribution, generation, and
transmission. Undoubtedly, the govern-
ment would show its firm resolve in pro-
moting energy productivity reforms and
eliminating constraints to effective
energy productivity policy implementa-
tion. Only then the nation will witness an
“energized” homeland, healthy environ-
ment, improved economy, and, ulti-
mately a better quality of life for all citi-
zens.
l Muhammad Salar Khan is a Ph.D. Public Policy candidate and graduate research
assistant at ScharScool of Policy & Government, George Mason University.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 35
Victoria Belt and Road
Australia and China:
It’s Complicated
Even amid the current tensions, the state of the relationship is more complex than
headlines would suggest
s A staff member wearing a face mask stands near a display of Australian wines at the China International Import Expo in Shanghai on November 5, 2020.
By Katie Howe
Canberra, Australia
I n 2012, on the 40th anniversary of
diplomatic relations with China,
Australia’s first ambassador to
Beijing reflected on the growth potential
in the relationship. Dr. Stephen
Fitzgerald stated that Australia needed
to think about its relationship with China
beyond economics, to develop a
multidimensional perspective.
“Engaging through many channels and
at many levels will help us get the access
and clarity of voice we need,” said
Fitzgerald at the time. “That’s what a
mature relationship would look like and
a good political relationship depends on
maintaining that intensity of contact.”
Throughout 2020, the Australian
government’s inability to develop that
relationship has contributed to the dete-
rioration of relations between Canberra
and Beijing – to the extent that a number
of former prime ministers, foreign min-
isters, and ambassadors to China have
publicly expressed concern over the lack
36 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
of government-to-government engage-
ment.
The Morrison government’s central
focus on the economic aspects of its rela-
tionship with China stands in sharp con-
trast to the nuanced relations it has
developed with other regional partners
like Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia.
This inability to communicate with and
understand Australia’s largest two-way
trading partner has severely impacted
export businesses, particularly those
that cater to China’s economic transition
to consumption-led growth.
A litany of regulations, inspections,
and new tariffs have resulted in fresh
produce exports such as lobsters and
cherries rotting on the docks as they
remain unclaimed at entry ports
throughout China. To seasoned China
watchers, these activities have the dual
purpose of conveying Beijing’s concern
over the relationship and activating the
Australian business community as lob-
byists. China’s response to the decline in
bilateral relations has been tactical,
delivered progressively across specific
import categories and supported by offi-
cial comments in state media outlets.
The premier commodities of the
trade relationship remain untouched –
notably the A$80 billion worth of iron
ore that Australia exports to China annu-
ally. Fortescue Metals Group has rein-
forced its existing relationships with
Chinese partners and shareholders, in
addition to signing agreements with new
buyers. BHP CEO Mike Henry recently
addressed the China Development
Forum in Beijing, noting the company’s
long-term commitment to the country.
“China has become [our] most impor-
tant trade partner, our largest market,
and an increasingly significant supplier
of goods and services,” Henry said in his
speech. “Given the strength and speed of
its economic recovery from [COVID-19],
China is in a unique position to contrib-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
ute to the world’s path back from the
pandemic.”
AUSTRALIA’S CHINA
LEGACY
In 1972, Australia became the second
Western nation after Sweden to estab-
lish diplomatic relations with the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. To date, Austra-
lia remains the only Western country to
have elected a Mandarin-speaking head
of government, former diplomat Kevin
Rudd. In 2020, the head of the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT), former ambassador to China
Frances Adamson, is also a Mandarin
Over the past five
decades, Australia has
successfully built four
generations of China
specialists ranging from
expatriates and
entrepreneurs to
students and scientists.
Some, like Rudd and
Adamson, have even
reached the upper
echelons of political
leadership
speaker.
In fact, the relationship that Fitzger-
ald aspired to almost a decade ago has
kept trade and communication channels
open during this period of tension. Over
the past five decades, Australia has suc-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
cessfully built four generations of China
specialists ranging from expatriates and
entrepreneurs to students and scientists.
Some, like Rudd and Adamson, have
even reached the upper echelons of polit-
ical leadership.
Despite Canberra’s diplomatic
gaffes and even a controversial Senate
hearing into issues facing the Chinese
Australian community, relations with
China have been consistently main-
tained through the broader scope of the
relationship. A range of well-established
channels and key influencers (often state
premiers) have ensured ongoing bilat-
eral communication and engagement.
Bede Payne, the executive director
of AustCham Shanghai, sees the rela-
tionship as more complex and resilient
than how it is often depicted in main-
stream media. “AustCham has operated
in the China market for more than 25
years and many of our members have
been here longer than that,” he com-
mented. “Our people-to-people relation-
ships are strong and won’t disappear
overnight.”
CURRENT STATE OF
PLAY
Australia ranks in China’s top 10 sources
of principal imports. While iron ore,
natural gas, coal, and gold make up the
bulk of these (A$98 billion in 2018-19),
service industries such as education and
tourism (valued at A$16 billion in 2018-
19) have become an important part of the
trade relationship. Given that success in
these industries requires a more sophis-
ticated, bilingual understanding of the
market, this area of growth has been led
by the Chinese Australian business com-
munity. The greatest disruption experi-
enced by these sectors has been travel
restrictions and quarantine protocols
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Yet the relationship extends further
than just these commodities. China is
Australia’s largest market for a number
of industries, such as wool (90 percent
destined for China), barley (48 percent),
and cotton (68 percent). Ninety percent
of Australia’s top ten importing indus-
tries are within the manufacturing sec-
tor, producing items such as
pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments,
and surgical equipment destined for
China. The two-way investment rela-
tionship exceeds a combined total of
A$138 billion and Australia is one of the
world’s strongest daigou (overseas per-
sonal shopper) markets.
The recent expansion of these mar-
kets has diversified Australia’s economic
relationship with China, increasing the
range of industries engaged with the
country. Service imports such as aged
care and consumer items that cater to the
middle class have increased the eco-
nomic dependence of SMEs and family-
owned businesses on the health of the
bilateral relationship – so much so that
in August, Australia recorded its largest
annual bilateral trade surplus of A$77.4
billion.
This economic integration is so com-
plex that, regardless of the country’s own
political cycles, Australia’s growth and
resilience relies upon its understanding
of Beijing’s planned economy. For more
than 50 years, the relationship has con-
sisted of multiple trade, investment,
collaborative research, and commercial-
ization initiatives that have ensured Aus-
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 37
tralia’s relevance to China’s key develop-
ment goals. The latter include a healthy
population, strong consumer market,
increased renewable energy use, and a
net-zero emissions economy by 2060.
Many of these initiatives have
remained untouched by the fluctuations
of diplomatic relations and over the past
18 months many projects have been
newly established or advanced. Payne
says that despite diplomatic tensions,
Australia’s national brand remains
strong in the mainland. “Our reputation
– for providing safe, reliable, high qual-
ity products – hasn’t changed at the con-
sumer level,” he said. “Products in
health, food, beverage and fresh produce
will continue to be in demand.”
BUSINESS AS USUAL
FOR KEY INITIATIVES
The strength and complexity of the rela-
tionship rest upon a range of industry-
led ventures operated at the state level of
business and government. While the
federal government is a Liberal /
National coalition, 62 per cent of Austra-
lia’s states and territories are managed
by Labor governments, which are
strongly connected to China.
One of the most engaged states is
Western Australia, which has main-
tained a government office in Shanghai
since 1996. Featuring an export-led econ-
omy that is heavily reliant on the agricul-
tural and mining sectors, the state was
recently praised in an opinion piece by
China’s consul-general in Perth for its
consistent support of trade and cultural
exchange.
In 2020, the Queensland govern-
ment completed the first round of its
Commercialization Partnership Pro-
gram, placing local innovators into incu-
bators across China. Designed to develop
technology transfer and commercializa-
tion projects, the program concentrates
on the agriculture, food processing, medi-
cal research, and renewable energy sec-
tors.
The Victorian government coordi-
nates a range of programs through its
China Strategy, which was introduced by
Premier Daniel Andrews five years ago.
It has also planned a range of infrastruc-
ture developments that will boost the
state’s manufacturing sector by support-
ing China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Andrews has committed to traveling to
China at least once every 12 months to
maintain key relationships on the main-
land. By contrast, the last Australian
prime minister to visit China was
Malcolm Turnbull in 2016.
Underpinning these projects and
trade deals is Australia’s expatriate com-
munity in China, which includes multi-
38 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
The U.S. election has
provided opportunities
for a reset in China
relations for both the
United States and
Australia
generational diplomats, trade emissar-
ies, and entrepreneurs. Relations
between the embassy, the Australian
Chambers of Commerce, Austrade, and
the expatriate business community have
remained solid throughout 2020. These
channels have also been utilized recently
by Australia’s minister for trade, to rein-
force the importance of the China mar-
ket and engage directly with those on the
ground.
Payne points to the recent China
International Import Expo (CIIE) as
further evidence of the strength of the
commercial relationship. Despite the
travel and quarantine restrictions, Aus-
tralia’s presence this year increased over
2019. “More than 180 Australian compa-
nies were in attendance as exhibitors,”
he said from Shanghai. “The mood was
generally very positive and by the end of
the expo a significant number of con-
tracts and MOUs had been signed.”
LOOKING TOWARD THE
BIDEN ERA
The U.S. election has provided opportu-
nities for a reset in China relations for
both the United States and Australia.
Considering the well-documented
impact that U.S. politics has on Austra-
lia’s own Capital Hill, it’s worth reflect-
ing on the potential change that a Biden
administration could deliver.
President-elect Biden’s trade and
business policies both acknowledge the
need for improved relations with China.
His forward economic strategy, which
focuses on building small business, sup-
porting entrepreneurs, investing in tech-
nology, and reinforcing the American
manufacturing industry, implies a
greater engagement with China. Most of
his top trade advisors have emphasized
the need to address the trade war impact
on America’s farming and manufactur-
ing industries.
Biden’s foreign policy priorities –
addressing greenhouse gas emissions,
containing the coronavirus, promoting
fair trade practices, developing interna-
tional technology standards, and
encouraging North Korea to dismantle
its nuclear weapons program – also
depend on a stronger relationship with
Beijing. Long-time advisor and Biden’s
reported secretary of state pick Antony
Blinken noted at a U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce event in September that economi-
cally decoupling from China was “unre-
alistic and ultimately counter-
productive.”
The president-elect is also sensitive
to the impact of anti-Chinese sentiment
upon the U.S. electorate’s fastest-
growing ethnic group, having consulted
a number of community organizations
prior to the election. Former National
Security Advisor Thomas Donilon, a
keen proponent of the Obama adminis-
tration’s “pivot” to Asia and host of the
2013 summit between Barack Obama
and Xi Jinping, is rumored to be Biden’s
pick for ambassador to China.
Australia’s effort to simultaneously
maintain strong relations with the
world’s leading creditor and the world’s
largest debtor will continue to be a long-
t e rm c hal l e ng e f or e c onomis t s ,
policymakers, and exporters. This
month, Australia deftly handled both
parties by renewing its support for the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue while
committing to the world’s largest free
trade deal, the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership. If this is any indi-
cation of its long-term economic and
geopolitical approach to the region, the
coming years should be quite interest-
ing.
l Katie Howe has been involved in Australia-China relations since 1995.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Opinion
Pak-US Relations and the Indian
Factor
Pakistan has always accused the US of not understanding its regional interests
By Durdana Najam
@durdananajam
T he relations between Pakistan
and the US have remained
enigmatic with the result that
people call it a relationship of
convenience. Pakistan accuses the US of
changing sides after having used it for its
objectives. The underlying reason for the
lack of understanding and trust between
the two countries in spite of having come
closer on different occasions through
different alliances and security
agreements has been the absence of a
shared vision in any issue both the
countries joined hands to pursue. There
was a relative congruence during the war
against the Soviets from 1979-1989, but
looking deeper, even that appears to
have been used by each party to
accelerate its own security agenda rather
than a united common cause. As the
political scientist, GW Choudhry put it,
“The United States and Pakistan were
moving in the same direction for
different reasons. The US was guided by
its global policy of containing
international communism, and Pakistan
40 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
was motivated by problem of national
security and defence.” This
‘asymmetrical diplomacy’ remained at
the heart of both the nation’s negotiating
pattern giving rise to mistrust at
different points in time.
Pakistan has always accused the US
of not understanding its regional inter-
ests and demanding policies that would
rather make things difficult for Pakistan.
It has been this gap that led Pakistan to
fork into a different path while ostensi-
bly keeping to the common cause with
the US. The problem had been the
absence of a sense of value to remain
engaged. Experts believe that Pakistan
had been used as a pawn by the US to
achieve its external goals, and for Paki-
stan, it was India that it needed the US
for.
Pakistan inherited a large army with
meagre resources on the partition with
India. It needed US support to modern-
ise and equip its army and arsenals that
could be used to fight with the Indians
when needed. Pakistan chose an anti-
communist narrative to forge a common
interest with the US. Ayub Khan had
assumed that the military support Paki-
stan received from the US could be used
against India without causing a major
breach. In his memoir, he acknowl-
edged: “The objectives that the Western
powers wanted the Baghdad Pact to
serve were quite different from the
objectives we had in mind. Pakistan had
never made any secret of [its] intentions
or [its] interests and the US knew that
Pakistan would use its new arms against
its eastern neighbour.”
According to Vali Nasr, the Iranian-
American academic and author, “Many
observers think that Pakistan’s regional
interest from the US are so far removed
from those of the United States that no
degree of aid and friendship can bridge
the gap, making a collapse in the rela-
tionship inevitable all along.” American
ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson
wrote in one of her cables that money
alone would not solve the problem of
Taliban and Al Qaeda operating in Paki-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
stan. Pakistan’s Afghan policies stem
from its deep-seated fear about her
regional standing vis-à-vis India and
Iran, the two main contenders among
many in Afghanistan. She further wrote:
“The Pakistan establishment, as we saw
in 1998, with the nuclear test, does not
view assistance — even sizable assistance
to their own entities — as a trade-off for
national security.”
Pakistan’s inability to trust the US
emanates from the larger insecurity Paki-
stan has suffered from since its birth in
1947. India’s ‘plot’ to undo Pakistan or
make it a vassal state has been Pakistan’s
greatest fear so far. This fear originates
from the role India had played in the
secession of East Pakistan. It was pre-
cisely India that prompted Pakistan to
seek a large outside ‘balancer’. Accord-
ing to Ayub Khan, “The crux of the prob-
lem from the very beginning was the
Indian attitude of hostility towards us:
we had to look for allies to secure our
position.”
Since the US has been unable to
comprehend Pakistan’s geopolitical situ-
ation and the problems emanating from
having a much larger and hostile India,
Pakistan induced a sense of obligation in
the minds of the Americans to do away
with the power disparity with India. The
US did assist Pakistan in this regard, but
not when it was needed the most — in the
1971 war. Interpreted as a betrayal, Paki-
stan learned the lesson that it could
never trust or depend on the US. It was a
turning point for Pakistan and the begin-
ning of its relations with China.
The 1971 war with India and the
resultant breakup of Pakistan affected
South Asia’s political dynamics in three
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
ways: 1) India emerged as the leading or
dominant power of the region; 2) Paki-
stan’s insecurity towards India intensi-
fied leading to the idea of ‘Strategic
Depth’, and 3) ‘fear of Hindu India’
drifted Pakistan towards the policy of
Islamisation. The idea behind the so-
called Strategic Depth had been: 1) to
offset India’s influence in Afghanistan by
installing there a Pakistan-friendly gov-
ernment; 2) by replacing Pashtun
nationalist and separatist sentiment
with Islamism; 3) by training and pre-
serving the ideological non-state actors
To reinforce Pakistan’s
security perception, the
US-India relations came
full circle with the return
of the Republican
government of George
W Bush in 2001
for Pakistan’s regional policy objective
and 4) by keeping the Durand Line con-
tested.
To reinforce Pakistan’s security
perception, the US-India relations came
full circle with the return of the Republi-
can government of George W Bush in
2001. The US took a ‘less absolutist’ view
of New Delhi’s nuclear aspirations. The
Republicans described India as “one of
the largest democracies of the twenty-
first century”, and proclaimed that the
Bush administration would be “more
sensitive to Indian security concerns,
and more willing to accommodate
India’s own aspirations to be a great
power”.
As the war on terrorism broke out,
India found a golden opportunity to
heighten its security concerns against
Pakistan and flaunt it as a ‘rogue’ country
sponsoring terrorism in Indian occupied
Kashmir. It had almost become a custom
with many countries to link their mili-
tants with Al Qaeda and become recipi-
ents of the many benefits it brings.
Burma did it with the Rohingya, perse-
cuted and crushed them as the “Taliban”.
India was no exception. It was quick to
link Kashmir, the flashpoint of Pakistan-
India rivalry, with the War on Terror and
achieved several important military,
political, economic and nuclear agree-
ments with the US. It also helped India
put the Kashmir issue into the deep
freezer.
The war against terror had made
Kabul the ‘new Kashmir’ — a battle-
ground for India-Pakistan rivalry; but
choosing to ignore this strategic change,
the US obsessed with capturing Osama
bin Laden, made a major mistake. By
2005-06, Musharraf was accusing
Karzai of giving access to Indian agents
of Pakistan’s western borders and
blamed India’s RAW for funding the
Baloch tribes in Balochistan. Many
senior Pakistani military officials noted
that the aim was to “de-nuclearise”, “de-
radicalise” and de-Islamise” Pakistan.
To achieve this purpose, they had joined
hands. The difference between the two
is: “The Americans act out of ‘stupidity’,
as its actions have been counterproduc-
tive to its interests. Indians, on the other
hand, have promoted their interests ‘cun-
ningly’. Knowing exactly what they are
doing.”
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 41
Point of View Perspective

In Support of Large Dams Umpteen Commissions on

Pakistan is blessed with a large hydroelectric potential and should not ignore it
Civil Service Reforms
Unless the two sides come to consensus on problems of the civil service, no commission
can reverse the downward trend
By Hasaan Khawar
@hasaankhawar

By Imtiaz Ali Qazilbash

@ETOpEd

C
ivil service reforms have been
making the headlines. A host of
measures have been proposed
recently such as directory retirement
rules, performance contracts, revised
promotion rules, a new rotation policy
and creation of National Executive
Service. Most of these ideas however

I n June 2018, in my presentation to

the Supreme Court before Justice
Saqib Nisar, I explained the
situation of the water power sector and
the impediments in its development over
the last four decades. I pointed out that
we had 87 hydroelectric projects in hand
and that the Bhasha Dam with 4500 MW
generation was the best project which
should have been started 36 years ago.
The other very good project was
Mohmand Dam.
It was after my presentation that the
then Chief Justice started campaigning
for Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand Dam.
Prime Minister Imran Khan gave his
support to this venture. He inaugurated
the Mohmand Dam in May 2019 and
inspected the construction of the
Diamer-Bhasha Dam after the contract
for its construction was signed on May
13, 2020. This is of great satisfaction to
me since I had made it my mission since
1975 to push for more dams in the coun-
try.
Ghulam Faruque, the chairman of
the Pakistan Industrial Development
Corporation (PIDC), had set up the
Power Development Section at PIDC.
We were then a small group of engineers
and this led to the establishment of West
Pakistan’s Water and Power Develop-
ment Authority (WAPDA) for the inte-
grated and multipurpose development
of water power resources.
The authority successfully com-
pleted major dams and hydroelectric
projects as well as other projects includ-
ing salinity and water logging. In those
18 years from 1958 to 1976, we in
WAPDA had completed $3.5 billion
worth of projects. WAPDA was then a
world class organisation. This was one of
the major reasons that Pakistan was con-
The 1975 high-level
decision of conducting
the feasibility studies
on the Indus sites and
the ranking was carried
out by the reputable
Montréal Engineering
Company between the
years 1981 to 1984. They
ranked eight projects on
the Indus and ranked
Bhasha the best project
technically and
economically, noting
that it would displace
the least number of
people
sidered to be a star developing country at
the time.
In 1975, when the Tarbela Dam pro-
ject was nearing completion we arranged
a high-level conference on the role of
hydroelectric resources in the develop-
ment of Pakistan. This conference was
chaired by the minister for water and
power and attended by 200 electrical
and civil engineers including WAPDA
officials and concerned federal secretar-
ies.
In my keynote paper I had given two
recommendations which were accepted
by the conference: since Tarbela was
nearing completion we should urgently
take up major hydroelectric projects on
the Indus and to determine which sites
and in what order the projects on the
Indus should be undertaken; and a rank-
ing study to be done by a reputable for-
eign consulting company.
Action on these decisions was
delayed because during General Zia’s
martial law, starting in 1977, economic
and social development was not a prior-
ity. WAPDA’s three retired general
chairmen for the next 15 years could
build the hydroelectric projects. Kick-
backs could only be had by placing
orders for thermal power stations; hence
only thermal power stations were built
for over four decades.
Despite this, the 1975 high-level
decision of conducting the feasibility
studies on the Indus sites and the rank-
ing was carried out by the reputable
Montréal Engineering Company
between the years 1981 to 1984. They
ranked eight projects on the Indus and
ranked Bhasha the best project techni-
cally and economically, noting that it
would displace the least number of peo-
ple.
As a member of the Planning Com-
mission’s Energy Working Group
in1991-92, I presented a programme of
34 large and medium hydroelectric pro-
jects and hundreds of small ones.
These projects were taken up in year
2000 by WAPDA’s member water
Sardar Tariq in the programme for water
power development and they called it
WAPDA’s Vision 2025. They got it
approved by the chief executive and
started work on refining feasibility stud-
ies of a large number of projects.
Pakistan is blessed with a large
hydroelectric potential and should not
ignore it. It has been my life-long mis-
sion to push for hydroelectric develop-
ment. I have stressed this necessity in
various conferences and symposiums
and will continue to do so.
have been proposed in the past in some
form or the other. In fact, civil service
reforms have been quite popular with
successive governments ever since the
creation of Pakistan.
In 1948, the Justice Munir Commis-
sion introduced salary cuts. In 1958, the
Administrative Reorganization Com-
mittee created the present-day Section
Officer system in the secretariat. Justice
Cornelius also headed two successive
bodies in 1959 and 1969 and proposed
some restructuring measures but those
were never implemented. In 1970s, the
National Pay Commission and the
Administrative Reform Committee,
under the socialist influence, created 22
unified pay grades that have lasted ever
since.
All these changes however hap-
pened without much dilution in bureau-
cratic powers on ground until the Law
Reforms Ordinance of 1972, when the
magistrates were stripped of the powers
of committal proceedings and public
prosecutors took up the gatekeeping
function. This was later validated by a
Supreme Court judgment in 1996, sepa-
rating executive from judiciary and lim-
iting the powers of executive magis-
trates.
Then in 2001, General Musharraf’s
devolution scheme altogether trans-
formed the civil service functioning in
districts. The Deputy Commissioners
were divested of the so-called benign
executive magistracy powers and the
prestigious title of ‘DC’ that they have
held since the British era. This was a mas-
sive blow to the civil service and espe-
cially the all-powerful District Manage-
ment Group. Many thought it would be
the end of civil service as they knew it.
But the resilient steel structure cre-
ated by the British did not crumble.
Instead it metamorphosed into a new
form, which perhaps was more suited to
modern day needs and also much more
powerful. Under the politically elected
Nazims, the District Coordination Offi-
cers became directly responsible for 13
departments and started enjoying exec-
utive powers over offices like works, edu-
cation and health, over which they had
only been exercising informal influence.
Under the PML-N
government, Ahsan
Iqbal was given the task
to reform the civil
service and many of the
proposed measures that
we see today such as
performance contracting
were proposed during
his time but could not be
implemented
Once the politically elected local govern-
ments were gone, the DCOs became even
more powerful. This system however
was reversed later and the DCOs were
transformed back to DCs, with much
lesser powers.
Besides the Pakistan Administra-
tive Service, other service groups were
also subjected to numerous changes over
the years, such as massive reforms in
police under the Police Order of 2002
and transformation of the Income Tax
group into the Inland Revenue Service.
In parallel, the ambition of civil ser-
vice reforms lingered on. The National
Commission of Government Reforms
presented its findings in 2008 but were
not implemented. Under the PML-N
government, Ahsan Iqbal was given the
task to reform the civil service and many
of the proposed measures that we see
today such as performance contracting
were proposed during his time but could
not be implemented. Most recently, the
PTI government also created two task
forces on civil service reforms, a pay and
pension committee and a cabinet com-
mittee on institutional reforms.
Notwithstanding these umpteen
commissions and committees, the civil
service structure has only deteriorated
with time. The civil servants feel that
they are inadequately compensated,
held overly accountable and face a host
of external pressures that prevent them
from doing their job. On the other hand,
the politicians believe that civil servants
have become increasingly non-
responsive to their needs, delay imple-
mentation of their decisions and have a
vested interest to resist change.
These diametrically opposite views
however are the primary reason why
these reforms failed to make a dent.
Unless and until the two sides come to a
consensus on problems and remedies of
the civil service, no number of commis-
sions can reverse the downward trend in
civil services.
l
The writer is a public policy expert and an honorary Fellow of Consortium for
Development Policy Research.

42 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020

globalagemagazine.kipscss.net globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 43
Military Vs Militants

Pak-Afghan Trust Deficit

The election of Joe Biden as US president has added new dimensions to the already
complex situation

By Kamran Yousaf
@Kamran_Yousaf

P rime Minister Imran Khan

undertook his maiden visit to
Kabul last month. He was
accompanied by Foreign Minister Shah
Mahmood Qureshi, DG ISI Lt-Gen Faiz
Hameed and other senior officials. The
visit was important in the context of
Afghanistan’s current situation.
While the intra-Afghan talks are
underway in Doha, Pakistan and
Afghanistan have been trying for months
to remove mistrust between them. The
heart of the problem is the series of com- In 2011, Pakistan’s ISI and Afghanistan’s first quarter of 2021.
plaints both have against each other. NDS agreed on an MoU for intelligence While all eyes are on the intra-
Afghanistan has long accused Pakistan sharing and cooperation. However, the Afghan dialogue, if Pakistan and Afghan-
of harbouring or supporting the Afghan then NDS chief refused to sign the MoU istan are able to develop a mechanism
Taliban and the Haqqani network. The as the Ghani administration faced stiff whereby instead of indulging in blame
rhetoric was lowered in recent months resistance from within on the issue. As a game they address their concerns
after Pakistan played a key role in bring- result that agreement could not see the through talks and behind the scenes this
ing the Taliban to the negotiating table light of the day. The elements skeptical of would go a long way in shaping not just
but the trust deficit is far from over. Simi- Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace pro- the bilateral ties but also regional peace.
larly, Pakistan has its own grievances. It cess are still in the Kabul administration It’s a tough task as spoilers within and
has openly stated that the Afghan soil is and may undermine the push for seeking outside Afghanistan will certainly make
being used by groups such as outlawed cooperation between the two intelli- all-out efforts to undermine any initia-
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and
Baloch terrorist groups to create trouble
in Pakistan. Not long ago, DG ISPR
Major General Iftikhar and FM Qureshi
presented what they termed “irrefutable
proofs” against India for using Afghan
soil against Pakistan.
Against this backdrop, the key issue
between the two countries is to address
concerns for each other. In the past,
efforts and promises were made but noth-
ing changed on ground as blame game
continued. At the conclusion of PM
Imran’s daylong visit, a joint statement
mentioned specific steps the two sides
agreed to in order to address each other’s
security concerns.
“By December 15, 2020: Re-
energising joint intelligence services-led gence agencies. tive that brings Pakistan and Afghani-
work on analysing, mapping and cooper- To ensure the latest initiative does stan closer. The election of Joe Biden as
ating against enemies of peace and those not meet the same fate as the previous US president has added new dimensions
undermining the peace process.” effort, there has to be a greater role from to the already complex situation. On
This part of the joint statement was the leadership of the two countries. paper, he may not have much difference
the most significant. Both countries have Increased and better communication at with Trump on Afghanistan, but he may
set a clear timeline to deal with the issue the highest level is one way to go about. review the agreement with the Taliban
of militants or groups that pose a threat The positive thing is that PM Imran’s with a view to extracting more conces-
to each other. visit is not one-off. The two countries sions from the insurgent group. This will
But will both sides really implement agreed to continue these high-level certainly put added pressure on Paki-
this plan? The question is valid since past exchanges. Ghani accepted Imran’s visit stan.
efforts could not bring positive results. and is likely to travel to Islamabad in the

44 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020

globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Strategic Studies
Can Biden Salvage The Iran
Nuclear Deal?
Biden administration would have to first ascertain its expectations, pre-conditions prior
to talks with Iranian govt
By Fatima Raza
fatima@issi.org.pk
W hen President Donald
Trump unilaterally
abandoned the Iran nuclear
deal on May 8, 2018, it initiated a series
of unfortunate events plunging the Iran-
US relations into a deep pit of despair. In
these twilight months of his presidency,
Trump resorted to imposing a series of
harsh sanctions against Iranian banks
and individuals. This will only add an
unnecessary layer of bureaucratic
rigmarole for president-elect Joe Biden’s
administration to unravel if it chooses to
mend ties with Iran. In the event of doing
so, the first order of business would be to
reinstate the Iran nuclear deal. But
would it be so easily done?
The incoming Biden administration
would have to at first ascertain its expec-
tations and pre-conditions prior to talks
with the Iranian government with refer-
ence the latter’s violations of the JCPOA
and its regional behaviour. It is an essen-
tial pre-requisite as Iranian officials have
indicated frequently that re-negotiation
of the 2015 agreement is unquestion-
able. Thus, managing expectations and
careful utilisation of leverage that both
sides hold is crucial for a possible return
to the JCPOA.
The US would also have to take all its
allies on board, especially the EU signa-
tories, while reassuring them that it is a
reliable signatory of multilateral agree-
ments. Trump’s unceremonious depar-
ture from the JCPOA had previously left
its European allies in the lurch, scram-
bling to keep Iran compliant to the deal
and prevent regional instability. Thus,
gaining back the trust of its long-term
allies would require the US to present a
clear policy toward Iran. In case of a pos-
sible reinstatement of the deal, the US
must also prepare to appease its Arab
46 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
The US drone strike tionary Guard Corps (IRGC) com-
mander, General Qassem Soleimani,
on the Iranian ordered by Trump following which anti-
commander, General US protests erupted within Iran, was the
Qassem Soleimani, final nail in the coffin.
All these measures have prompted
ordered by Trump an increase in anti-US narrative in the
following which anti-US Iranian political scenario making it
harder to negotiate with the US or its
protests erupted within Western allies regarding easing the crip-
Iran, was the final nail pling sanctions on Iran. This difficulty is
in the coffin. For the likely to continue if the US fails to indi-
cate its willingness to engage Iran in sub-
new US president, the stantive talks leading to concrete steps
time to act will be
during the initial months
of his presidency so a
that might address the latter’s economic
woes. Thus, for the new US president,
the time to act will be during the initial
months of his presidency so a multilat-
multilateral agreement eral agreement can be put in place pre-
venting Iran from further uranium
can be put in place enrichment and violating the nuclear
preventing Iran from deal.
The overarching US policy
further uranium approach toward Iran is unlikely to
enrichment and change under Biden as he has indicated
violating the nuclear during his campaign that he would seek
to limit Iran’s regional activities and take
deal tough measures, if provoked by Iran’s
allies and Israel, who oppose the nuclear continued uranium enrichment steps.
deal. The new US administration will find its
Iranian presidential elections are hands full undoing Trump administra-
scheduled to be held in June 2021 and tion’s policies in this region. Trump’s
would prove a decisive factor in deter- abandoning of the JCPOA was unilat-
mining the trajectory of the US-Iran rela- eral, abrupt and quite hasty, however,
tions through the next four years. salvaging the deal would have to be a
Trump’s abortive campaign to maximise gradual and multilateral process in
pressure on Iran facilitated the rise of nature. Patience on both sides will be key
right-wing conservative political wave of and let us hope that sanity prevails all
dissent against the US within Iran. The over for a better chance of long-term
US drone strike on the Iranian Revolu- regional peace and stability.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
Middle East Landscape
What The Future Holds For
Palestine?
The Palestinian struggle has long been an accepted moto in Arab/Muslim narrations and
continues to be used to this day to mobilize the populace
By Arhama Siddiqa
@arhama_siddiqa
F or the Palestinians, their trials
and tribulations have only
intensified. Even today, Israel
continues to bomb the Gaza Strip on an
almost daily basis. Israeli settlement
expansion continues unabated. In the
past month alone, there have been plans
to add 6205 settlement units on
Palestinian land. According to the World
Bank, the Palestinian economy is
estimated to shrink by almost 8 percent
this year as it struggles in the backdrop of
the Covid-19 pandemic. Unemployment
in the West Bank and Gaza is at 18.2%
and 48.5% respectively.
The coronavirus pandemic is
spreading at an exponential rate in Gaza,
which has been described by many as the
world’s largest open-air prison as well as
one of the most overcrowded areas on
the planet. Complications arising from
lack of Covid-19 testing kits and personal
protective equipment (PPE) are being
further compounded by Israeli imposed
blockades on medical supplies reaching
Gaza. Health officials have forewarned
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
that since Covid cases in Gaza have
reached calamitous stages, it is only a
matter of time before the Palestinian
enclave medical system completely col-
lapses.
There is however a thin ray of light
for the Palestinian populace. On Sep-
tember 24, an agreement was reached
between the two Palestinian factions:
Hamas and Fatah, where the two sides
agreed to hold the first elections in
nearly 15 years. Most recently, on
November 17, the two sides met in Cairo
to discuss implementation of reconcilia-
tion towards elections. Elections have
not been held in Palestine since 2006.
PALESTINE DURING
THE TRUMP ERA
There is no doubt that the Trump admin-
istration has profoundly changed the
political panorama for the Palestinian
issue. While over the years, the United
States has always supported Israel - pay-
ing mere lip service to the two-state solu-
tion, while giving Israel free reins to do
as they pleased – the Trump government
did not hesitate to set the bar high in
terms of crushing what little hope the
Palestinians had.
After giving false hopes to the Pales-
tinians in the form of an ultimate deal
which would resolve the conflict, Presi-
dent Trump proceeded to recognize Jeru-
salem as Israel’s capital and even moved
the US Embassy there from Tel Aviv,
thus cementing his campaign promises
of giving great importance to the evan-
gelical Christians as well as the Jewish
lobby in the US. Concurrently, he
refused to denounce the illegal Israeli
settlement expansion and instead in the
face of Palestinian outcry, withdrew fund-
ing to the United Nations Relief & Works
Agency (UNRWA) on which millions of
Palestinians depend on for sustenance.
His Middle East plan recognized Israeli
sovereignty over Israeli expansion over
settlement blocs in the occupied West
Bank. According to the new map, Pales-
tine would consist of boroughs of frag-
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 47
 While Biden is a
strong advocate of the
two-state solution, he
has always rebuffed
calls for leveraging US
aid to Israel in order to
pressure the latter,
stating that the idea of
cutting of aid to the US
‘only true ally in the
region’ was absolutely
unthinkable
mented land and capital in occupied East
Jerusalem.
During his final year, he also medi-
ated Israeli rapprochement with three
Arab states (UAE, Bahrain and Sudan) in
exchange for suspending annexation.
Annexation is however continuing to
this day and the Palestinian cause is
more isolated than ever.
WHAT DOES THE
FUTURE HOLD FOR
PALESTINE UNDER
BIDEN?
The results of the US 2020 elections have
been taken by many as a precursor of
some breathing space to the Palestinians
48 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
after four years of unrelenting assault on
their rights and aspirations. Already, it
can be seen that in the period before Joe
Biden takes office, the Palestinian
Authority (PA) is making moves such as
re-establishing security ties with Israel
and sending Palestinian officials back to
Bahrain and the UAE, despite their offi-
cial recognition of the state of Israel. All
these steps are an effort to return to the
status quo. Of course, given the devastat-
ing situation in Gaza, this also is an
opportune time for the PA to collect the
$890 million in tax transfers, Israel has
been withholding due to severing of ties
in May.
While Biden is a strong advocate of
the two-state solution, he has always
rebuffed calls for leveraging US aid to
Israel in order to pressure the latter, stat-
ing that the idea of cutting of aid to the
US ‘only true ally in the region’ was abso-
lutely unthinkable. Though he initially
opposed the shifting of the US embassy,
he has clearly said his administration
will not reverse this decision and will
instead reopen the US consulate in East
Jerusalem in order to serve the Palestin-
ians. He has also enunciated on several
occasions that under his supervision, the
US will renew all ties with the PA and
reverse the cancellation of support to
Palestinian sustenance programs be it
for economic development or humani-
tarian assistance. However, these are
also conditioned only if the PA stops wel-
fare payments to the families of Palestin-
ian prisoners and terrorists who have
been slain by Israeli forces.
On the subject of the Boycott,
Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) move-
ment, the new US President is a unwa-
vering adversary and has clearly
depicted that he believes this lobby is
“wrong”. With reference to the UAE,
Bahrain and Sudan rapprochement with
Israel, Biden has encouraged it and
urged other Arab states to engage in
bolder steps toward normalization with
Israel.
CONCLUSION
All things considered, there will be a radi-
cal departure from unconditional, open
advocacy for Israel towards some con-
sideration of Palestinian rights in terms
of tone and diplomatic approach. How-
ever, it is also very clear that President
Trump’s policies of appeasement of the
Israeli far right will not vanish with a new
US administration. Now more than ever,
Palestinians need to present a united
stand and thus create a political strategy
which goes beyond dependence on an
American policy towards a Palestinian
solution and can counter Israeli disre-
gard for any semblance of peace or
adherence to international law.
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
World Bank
Apartheid in the World Bank
and the IMF
These institutions were designed with colonial principles in mind, and they remain
largely colonial in character to this day
By Jason Hickel
@jasonhickel
M ost people assume that
inequality between the global
South and the global North
(the United States, Western Europe,
Japan, Canada and Australia) has been
declining over the past few decades.
After all, colonialism is behind us, and
surely poorer countries are gradually
“catching up” to richer ones. But, oddly
enough, exactly the opposite has
happened. The per capita income gap
between the South and the North has
quadrupled in size since 1960, in what
can only be described as a striking
pattern of divergence.
This trend is due in large part to
power imbalances in the world economy.
To put it simply, rich countries have dis-
proportionate influence when it comes
to setting the rules of international trade
and finance – and they tend to do it in
ways that serve their own economic
interests, quite often at the expense of
everyone else.
Nowhere is this problem more
apparent than when it comes to the dis-
tribution of power in the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), two of the key institutions that
govern global economic policy. We
might expect that representation in
these institutions would be modelled
along the lines of the United Nations
General Assembly, or perhaps calculated
according to population. But in reality,
they are deeply undemocratic.
The problem starts at the top. The
leaders of the World Bank and the IMF
are not elected, but are nominated by the
US and Europe. According to an unspo-
ken agreement, the president of the
World Bank has always been from the
US, while the president of the IMF has
always been European.
Moreover, voting power in these
institutions is skewed heavily in favour
of rich countries. The US has de facto
veto power over all significant decisions,
and together with the rest of the G7 and
the European Union controls well over
half of the vote in both agencies. Middle-
and low-income countries, which
together constitute 85 percent of the
world’s population, have a minority
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
share.
If we look at the voting allocations in
per capita terms, the inequalities are
revealed to be truly extreme. For every
vote that the average person in the global
North has, the average person in the
global South has only one-eighth of a
vote (and the average South Asian has
only one-20th of a vote).
Not only is there minority control
over global economic policymaking,
there is also a clear racial imbalance at
play: on average, the votes of people of
colour are worth only a fraction of their
counterparts. If this was the case in any
particular country, we would be out-
raged. We would call it apartheid. Yet a
form of apartheid operates right at the
heart of international economic gover-
nance today, and has come to be
accepted as “normal”.
Voting power in the World Bank is
allocated according to each country’s
financial shares. In the IMF, it is primar-
ily according to gross domestic product
(GDP), with some consideration also
given to a country’s “market openness”.
As a result, the countries that became
rich during the colonial period now enjoy
disproportionate power when it comes
to determining the rules of the global
economy. Inequality begets inequality.
Defenders of this system argue that
this is a legitimate approach: it makes
sense, they say, that bigger economies
should have more power over decisions
related to the global economy.
These imbalances in voting power
help explain why the World Bank and the
IMF have been able to impose neoliberal
structural adjustment programmes
across the global South over the past 40
years. These programmes – focused on
privatisation, austerity, and forced mar-
ket liberalisation – have created lucra-
tive profit opportunities for multina-
tional companies, but have had a devas-
tating effect on the South: during the
1980s and 90s, they caused incomes to
decline and poverty to rise, and in some
cases triggered decades of recession and
stagnation. To this day they continue to
have a negative impact on health out-
comes, including infant and maternal
mortality.
There have long been calls by civil
society and political leaders in the global
South to democratise the World Bank
and the IMF. At minimum, critics have
argued that the leaders of these institu-
tions should be elected in a transparent
process. And they have called for a “dou-
ble majority” system such that signifi-
cant decisions should require not only
shareholder majorities but also mem-
ber-state majorities.
For decades, these demands have
fallen on deaf ears. But this year they
received a boost from the UN Secretary-
General António Guterres, who, while
giving a lecture for the Nelson Mandela
Foundation, called for democratic
reform of voting power at the World
Bank and the IMF. This represents an
historic opening, and campaigners
should seize it. If we want to have a shot
at a fairer global economy, we need to
start by decolonising the institutions of
economic governance.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 49
US Presidency
Trump is Leaving Biden A Landmine
Field in the Middle East
Biden will bring change to policy-making in Washington, but he will still struggle with
Trump’s legacy
s US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John Abizaid and Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan greet Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his wife
Susan as they arrive at Neom Bay Airport in Neom, Saudi Arabia on November 22, 2020
By Joe Macaron
@macaronjoe
U
nited State President Donald
Trump has caused much
damage by questioning the
legitimacy of the US elections and the
victory of his opponent, Joe Biden. His
refusal to accept the results of the vote
has not only caused much trouble at
home but it has also undermined the
image of the United States abroad and its
moral authority to preach smooth power
transition and commitment to
democratic ideals to foreign leaders.
This, along with the policies he is
leaving behind after four years in the
White House, is setting up a turbulent
transition for Biden at home and most
probably a rough start for the new
administration abroad, especially in the
Middle East.
In recent weeks, Trump’s adminis-
tration has been giving unprecedented
attention to the region. At least four US
officials have visited Israel and close Gulf
allies in recent weeks: Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo, Special Representative
50 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
for Iran and Venezuela Elliott Abrams,
Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs R Clarke Cooper from the State
Department and the White House
adviser, Jared Kushner.
Meanwhile, Trump has ramped up
sanctions on Iran and is suspected of
giving a green light for Israel to kill Ira-
nian nuclear scientist Mohsen
Fakhrizadeh. A US aircraft carrier group
led by the nuclear-powered USS Nimitz
has also moved back into the Gulf region.
This offensive posture seems linked to
US domestic politics rather than to a
clear policy objective.
Allies of the outgoing administra-
tion in the Middle East may have con-
gratulated Biden, but they are also giving
the impression that they will join hands
with Trump and the political opposition
to the Democratic White House he will
soon lead.
Still, they, along with the rest of the
Middle East, are gearing up for the Biden
presidency. Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman now seems
inclined to resolve the dispute with Qatar
(even though it is not clear yet if he will
give this foreign policy win to Trump or
Biden) and ease relations with Turkey;
he is also more cautious about normali-
sation with Israel. MBS is aiming to
defuse tensions so he can start on the
right foot with the Biden administration.
Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-
Sisi seems to be making conciliatory
moves. The Egyptian government has
been releasing political prisoners in
recent weeks. In Turkey, Erdogan has
felt less constrained to let go of his son-
in-law Berat Albayrak as finance minis-
ter whose primary added value until
recently was being the indispensable
contact person for Kushner and Trump’s
White House. Iran is also trying to avoid
escalation in the region, hoping to poten-
tially restore nuclear talks with Biden
and get US sanctions relief.
It seems Middle Eastern leaders are
expecting Biden’s presidency to be the
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
This expected shift of
priorities in Washington
to deter Russia and
China on a global scale
will be most probably be
viewed by Middle East
leaders once again as a
sign of weakness and as
an affirmation of the
limits of US power
exact opposite of Trump’s and to bring
back aspects of Barack Obama’s. But this
may not be the case, as his recent
appointments of national security offi-
cials have shown. However, the new
administration will certainly change the
way US foreign policy is conducted in at
least three ways.
First, institutional decision making
will be restored in Washington. US for-
eign policy under Trump was danger-
ously personalised by a leader with nar-
cissistic and authoritarian inclinations,
which helped foreign leaders gain more
influence in the White House. Officials
who challenged his authority were fired
from his administration or pushed to
resign and those who stayed were loyal-
ists or opportunists. Traditional foreign
policymaking was sidelined and so was
inter-agency cooperation. Trump did
not trust key institutions like the Penta-
gon and the State Department, which
were defunded or marginalised under
his administration.
Once Biden and the Democrats are
officially in power, Middle East leaders
will no longer be able to get their way by
exchanging late-night WhatsApp mes-
sages with Trump’s son-in-law or pre-
tend the US State Department is a trivial
agency. They will have to turn to tradi-
tional diplomacy, dealing with the
embassies and official emissaries. The
re-establishment of this institutional
process also means a return to rivalries
between US agencies over foreign policy
issues, most notably in the Middle East.
This will likely slow down the decision-
making process in Washington.
Second, the Biden administration
will bring back the predictability of US
foreign policy. The domestic turmoil of
Trump’s presidency – the high-level
investigations, the impeachment, the
racial tensions, the Twitter rants, the
constant change of appointed officials,
etc – affected not only US politics but
also political dynamics abroad.
The outgoing president’s penchant
for unconventional foreign policy moves
– using tariffs as a political tool, bashing
allies, casually issuing threats to use
force, and engaging traditional foes like
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and Afghan-
istan’s Taliban – also brought uncer-
tainty on the international scene. Biden
will likely bring back positive engage-
ment with traditional allies, especially in
Europe, and return to foreign policy rhet-
oric that can be more easily anticipated.
Some Middle Eastern
leaders are wary of the
coming change in
Washington. If the
Biden administration
sets a new tone in
exposing their
authoritarianism or
goes too far in engaging
the Iranian regime,
these staunch Trump
allies might be inclined
to ignore Biden’s
demands on human
rights issues and exploit
their new alliance with
Israel to stand their
ground
Third, there will likely be a major
shift in the US priorities in the Middle
East. The Biden administration will
most likely align with the thinking of the
Washington establishment, seeking to
pull US resources out of the Middle East
to focus on deterring Russia and China, a
move that Trump is now making more
difficult by antagonising Iran.
The Biden administration will seek
to mitigate conflicts across the Middle
East and will most probably face resis-
tance from concerned actors looking to
maximise their strategic positions. This
expected shift of priorities in Washing-
ton to deter Russia and China on a global
scale will be most probably be viewed by
Middle East leaders once again as a sign
of weakness and as an affirmation of the
limits of US power.
Trump has overly invested in the
Middle East with emphasis on a
transactional approach, and Middle East
leaders should prepare to not to be over-
indulged by Washington in the next four
years. His core approach was the
advancement of an Arab-Israeli alliance
against Iran at the expense of traditional
Arab partners like Jordan, and the sup-
port of disparate allies ranging from Tur-
key’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Saudi
Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman.
Unlike Trump, the Biden presi-
dency will most probably be reactive
instead of proactive in the Middle East.
This means minimal engagement with
Iran, complex relations with Turkey and
the appeasement of Israel. Biden will be
somewhere between Trump and Obama
and will have to reckon with Trump’s
legacy in the Middle East, which includes
new preconditions to strike a deal with
Iran and a timid Arab-Israeli normalisa-
tion process.
Some Middle Eastern leaders are
wary of the coming change in Washing-
ton. If the Biden administration sets a
new tone in exposing their authoritari-
anism or goes too far in engaging the
Iranian regime, these staunch Trump
allies might be inclined to ignore Biden’s
demands on human rights issues and
exploit their new alliance with Israel to
stand their ground. They can directly
cooperate with Israel or use its clout in
Washington to pressure the Biden
administration.
The legacy of the outgoing Trump
presidency may offer some opportuni-
ties for the new administration moving
forward, but the regional challenges will
persist. The Trump team has already
planted a field of foreign policy land-
mines in the Middle East and clearing it
over the next four years will be a fraught
endeavour. Middle East leaders will test
Biden early on and the new US president
will have to show some spine if he is to be
taken seriously over the next four years.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 51
G-B Polling

The Importance of Being G-B

Nothing can bar G-B’s people from taking in their own hands power to self-rule with the
region’s security underwritten

By M. Ziauddin
@MuhammadZiauddi

G
ilgit-Baltistan (G-B) has, since
the advent of the $62 billion
CPEC, become too important for
Pakistan in the context of both
geopolitics and geo-economics to be
treated as no more than an
inconsequential backyard of the country.
More so because CPEC is an integral part
of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
So, the earlier we merge, via an
appropriate constitutional amendment, More serious were during the vote counting process, which
would have helped enhance the integrity
G-B into Pakistan as our fifth province reports that candidates of the election results management. At
the better it would be for both Pakistan
and China and our mutual economic
and their agents were places presiding officers had to issue
barred from ROs’ offices polling station results to the polling
progress. But the wisdom of this move
agents on plain papers under their
would need to be first tested against its during the preparation stamps and signatures, the legality of
impact, one way or the other, on our case
that India had violated the relevant UN of the preliminary which has yet to be established.
Instances of polling agents seated
resolutions by merging Indian Occupied results in at least three where they could not observe the voting
Kashmir (IOK) with the Indian Union. constituencies, and process were reported from six constitu-
And mind you, there is no such thing as
delays in the release of encies. More serious were reports that
“provisional provincial status”. Those
candidates and their agents were barred
soliciting the political support of G-B’s provisional results on from ROs’ offices during the preparation
people by selling them such dubious
notions are only indulging in deception. Form-47 (Provisional of the preliminary results in at least three
constituencies, and delays in the release
However, nothing can bar G-B’s Consolidated Statement of provisional results on Form-47 (Pro-
people from taking in their own hands of Results of the Count) visional Consolidated Statement of
the powers to self-rule with the region’s
in more than 10 Results of the Count) in more than 10
security underwritten by Pakistan, no
constituencies. These issues also caused
matter which political party or coalition constituencies major political contenders to question
of parties rules in Islamabad at any given
13 Astore-I, GBA-15 Diamer-I, GBA-17 the credibility of the outcome and raise
time.
Diamer-III, which prevented the Elec- allegations of electoral fraud.
As such, electing a government to
tion Commission of Gilgit Baltistan The ECGB could have released
rule G-B should be a matter concerning
(ECGB) from implementing the provi- results progressively as they were
solely its people and that of the region’s
sions of Section 9(1) of the Elections Act, received from the polling stations to
election commission (EC) which should
2017 requiring re-polling in one or more ensure media reported accurate official
guarantee level-playing field to any
polling stations or the entire constitu- results promptly, instead of using a par-
political party with roots in G-B to con-
ency if female turnout is less than 10% of allel system to gather information and
test the election. That the contesting
the total votes polled in that constitu- report unofficial and potentially unreli-
parties in the just concluded election not
ency. able results.
only lacked a level-playing field but also
At places breaches of the secrecy of This preliminary report is based on
faced a number of pitfalls has dented to
vote was witnessed as “stamping of bal- the summary observation of 436 polling
an extent the credibility of the results.
lots by others on behalf of voters, and stations observed in 23 constituencies,
According to FAFEN’s preliminary
voters registered at the polling stations more than 37% of 1,137 polling stations
report a vibrant and competitive election
turned away for various reasons despite — 385 male, 386 female and 402 com-
campaign turned intense and heated
having their NICs”. bined.
towards the end over the controversy of
Similarly, the ECGB did not consis- Incidents of minor violence inside
federal minsters running election cam-
tently ensure the provision of Form 45 polling stations involving candidates,
paigns in violation of legal limits.
(the Result of the Count) and Form 46 polling agents, political workers and
Gender disaggregated turnout data
(the Ballot Paper Account) to all polling polling staff were observed in 47.8%
was not available for GBA-8 Skardu-II,
agents present at the polling stations constituencies.
GBA-9 Skardu-III, GBA-12 Shigar, GBA-

globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 53
Coronavirus Pandemic
In the Time of Pandemic, Debt
Relief Efforts Need to Go Further
For the global economy to recover quickly, not only the poorest but all small and
vulnerable nations should have access to debt relief
By Patricia Scotland
@PScotlandCSG
I n the last few months, due to the
devastating effect the coronavirus
pandemic has had on the global
economy, the fiscal clock has been
ticking more rapidly than ever before for
many small and vulnerable states across
the world.
With Joe Biden’s victory in the
United States presidential election,
which increased the possibility for mean-
ingful global cooperation on pressing
issues disproportionately affecting vul-
nerable states like climate change, cou-
pled with the development of several
COVID-19 vaccines that could help bring
the pandemic under control, these coun-
tries recently started to see a faint light at
the end of the tunnel.
But the path to economic salvation
is still full of obstacles, and the upcoming
winter months are still expected to be
long and dark for many nations whose
economies are crumbling under the
54 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
weight of the extra debt they accumu-
lated to respond to the pandemic.
In this context, the G20’s recent
decision to extend until the middle of
next year the Debt Service Suspension
Initiative (the DSSI), which it introduced
in April to help the world’s poorest coun-
tries cope with the economic fallout of
the COVID-19 crisis, has been most wel-
come.
But extending the DSSI on its own
cannot resolve the mammoth pandemic-
related fiscal challenges poorer nations
are facing. Encouragingly, the G20
seems to recognise this, and have also
introduced a “Common Framework for
Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI”,
which aims to address the problem of
unsustainable debts many DSSI-eligible
countries will continue to face in the
aftermath of the pandemic on a case-by-
case basis.
While these initiatives by the G20
are undoubtedly important steps in the
right direction, their scope is limited. For
all of the world’s nations to get back on
their feet after this unprecedented public
health emergency, the debt relief efforts
by the world’s richest nations need to go
even further.
THE PROBLEM OF
ELIGIBILITY
The main factor limiting the success of
these well-meaning G20 initiatives in
mitigating the economic effect of the
pandemic is “eligibility”.
Currently, some 73 low-income
countries around the world are eligible
to take advantage of the DSSI. However,
many small, middle-income countries,
who are also suffering the economic con-
sequences of the pandemic, are left out of
this initiative and its extension.
A recent Commonwealth Secretar-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
s A combo of photos of world leaders attending the virutal G20 Riyadh Summit. The G20 recently
decided to extend until the middle of next year the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (the DSSI),
which it introduced in April to help the world’s poorest countries cope with the economic fallout of the
COVID-19 crisis.
iat paper demonstrated that due to the
new fiscal pressures introduced by the
COVID-19 pandemic, the debt to GDP
ratios of the 32 small state members of
the Commonwealth could rise by an aver-
age of 27 percentage points by the end of
2021 – twice the increase projected for
other developing countries in the Com-
monwealth.
Despite the economic devastation
they are experiencing, some of these
small states are not eligible to take part
in the DSSI, because after years of pru-
dent financial management and invest-
ment, they are now classified as “middle-
income” countries, not in need of finan-
cial assistance.
Of course, despite being in the mid-
dle-income bracket, these nations are
also struggling with the loss of income
they have experienced because of the
pandemic, and they may face economic
collapse if they do not receive the neces-
sary assistance from the international
community. And their economic strug-
gles will unavoidably have an effect on
the global economy.
If the G20 wants to avoid the very
global disruption they have sought to
prevent through the DSSI and Common
Framework for Debt Treatment, they
need to support more than just the poor-
est countries. They need to expand the
eligibility for G20 debt restructuring
initiatives from just the poorest coun-
tries to all nations in need of support.
Most economists agree that regard-
less of a country’s income classification,
debt relief is necessary when persistent
debt overhang is accompanied by nega-
tive or sluggish growth. In other words,
there is no economic justification for the
G20’s refusal to expand the eligibility for
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
its debt restructuring and suspension
schemes to struggling middle-income
countries. In fact, it is clear that offering
support to a wider range of countries
would increase the speed of global eco-
nomic recovery.
Expanding the scope of these
schemes also makes political sense for
G20 member states.
The G20 should
therefore work with the
IMF and World Bank to
help countries better
understand their growth
potential, and where
projected income is
highly uncertain,
provide for outright
debt relief
If small and vulnerable states are
not given some debt relief, they cannot
support their citizens’ most basic needs.
This could lead to new migration waves,
increasing the pressures already faced by
rich nations that are part of the G20.
Moreover, a lack of debt relief could lead
to some small, middle-income countries
becoming dependent on international
aid.
THE NEED FOR DEBT
WRITE-OFFS
But simply expanding the eligibility cri-
teria for COVID-19 debt restructuring
and suspension schemes will also not be
enough to bring the global economy back
on track. Given the scale of the economic
disruption caused by the pandemic,
some countries will require more than
debt relief – they will need a clean start.
Across the board, it is well accepted
that once the pandemic is over, the
global economy will look much different
than before. Countries are now spending
for recovery, but once the dust is settled,
they will all find themselves in an eco-
nomic landscape much different to the
one before the pandemic.
As such, future income will be hard
to predict and this means that the debt
restructuring exercises under existing
schemes or a new expanded initiative
could prolong, rather than resolve, the
core solvency problems of certain states.
The G20 should therefore work with
the IMF and World Bank to help coun-
tries better understand their growth
potential, and where projected income is
highly uncertain, provide for outright
debt relief.
In this way, highly indebted and
possibly insolvent countries will have the
space and time to restructure their econ-
omies in line with the opportunities pre-
sented by the post-COVID-19 landscape.
COMMONWEALTH
SUPPORT
The Commonwealth is ideally positioned
to assist the IMF and the World Bank in
their debt relief efforts, given its already
strong partnership with these institu-
tions and its long-established and highly
respected debt management pro-
gramme.
We can only tackle the debt
sustainability problems created by the
pandemic, and prevent the potential
follow on effects of such crises, by
extending eligibility for existing debt
relief schemes and offering debt write-
offs for most struggling countries. These
goals can be achieved through increased
collaboration between the Common-
wealth, global governance institutions,
and the G20.
After months of uncertainty and
suffering, we now appear close to win-
ning the fight against COVID-19. Vac-
cines may help us defeat this deadly virus
in the coming months, but if we do not
act now, its effect on vulnerable econo-
mies across the world will continue to
devastate millions of people in the years
to come. This pandemic could be an
opportunity to build a more just and pros-
perous world for everyone. But we must
act now and address the systemic chal-
lenges facing small and vulnerable
nations if we are all to enjoy the dawning
of a post-COVID-19 world.
l
Patricia Janet Scotland, Baroness Scotland of Asthal PC QC, is the sixth Secretary-
General of the Commonwealth of Nations. She was elected at the 2015 Common-
wealth Heads of Government Meeting and took office on 1 April 2016.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 55
Climate Change
Lessons Learned From COVID-19
Can Help Us Fight Climate Change
Just like COVID-19, climate change is destroying lives and ruining livelihoods on a daily
bases across the world
s Without needing to read academic studies and examining climate models, every farmer and herder in Africa knows the bottom line: the weather is changing
and it is changing fast, writes Ibrahim.
By Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim
@hindououmar
T he pressing need to develop a safe
and effective COVID-19 vaccine
and make it available to everyone
everywhere to bring an end to the
ongoing coronavirus pandemic resulted
in a rare collaboration between world
governments, scientists and private drug
manufacturers.
The economic and social devasta-
tion caused by this catastrophic global
public health emergency not only under-
lined the importance of multilateral
international collaboration, but also
forced us to acknowledge the glaring
social and economic inequalities that
exist both in wealthy and poor countries.
The pandemic showed us what hap-
pens when political leaders dismiss sci-
ence and refuse to take the necessary
steps to protect all their citizens, and the
rest of humanity, from public health
crises and other natural disasters. Hun-
56 | GLOBAL AGE December 2020
dreds of thousands of lives and liveli-
hoods unnecessarily lost to this disease
should serve as a warning to not repeat
the mistakes of the recent past, and be
prepared for similar threats that
undoubtedly await us in the future.
While we do not know what disease
outbreaks we may face in the coming
years, there is one threat that we know is
already at our doorstep: climate change.
Today, climate change is still the
most significant threat to global eco-
nomic and social stability. Scientists say
we have a critical and rapidly closing
window of opportunity to curb the dev-
astating effects of climate change by lim-
iting global temperature rises to 1.5
degrees Celsius.
We know what happens when sci-
ence is ignored – we have seen the conse-
quences of not taking warnings from
scientists seriously in the early phases of
the coronavirus pandemic. And we are
already paying the price for ignoring
climate science – there are more fires,
floods, droughts and other unpredict-
able weather events across the world
today than ever before.
While climate change is undoubt-
edly a global problem, the African conti-
nent is expected to be the region hardest
hit by its consequences.
The World Meteorological Organi-
zation (WMO) recently warned that
2016-2020 is expected to be the warmest
five-year period in Africa on record, and
rang the alarm bells for the fate of agri-
culture, public health systems, water
resources and disaster management
capabilities on the continent. A
Greenpeace report published earlier this
year, meanwhile, warned of extreme
heat becoming the new normal in most
countries on the continent if the temper-
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
ature rise caused by global warming is
not kept under 1.5 degrees Celsius. If
global temperatures rise just 1.5 degrees
Celsius, the report said, people living in
the city of Lagos in Nigeria would experi-
ence heat stress for the first time, as
would Abidjan on the Ivory Coast. If the
rise in temperatures reach 4 degrees
Celsius, Luanda in Angola and Kinshasa
in the Democratic Republic of Congo
would also become heat stressed accord-
ing to the report.
Like COVID-19, climate change is
not a hidden threat. Thanks to the efforts
of scientists and environmental activists
across the world, the international com-
munity is aware that if it does not take
swift action, climate change will devas-
tate populations and economies across
the world. This is why 194 states and the
European Union have signed and rati-
fied the Paris Agreement on climate
change.
While political leaders and policy
makers may need scientific reports and
briefings to comprehend the gravity of
the looming threat, for rural communi-
ties and Indigenous Peoples in Africa
and across the world, and for many of my
fellow Chadians, the risks are far from
theoretical. Without needing to read
academic studies and examining climate
models, every farmer and herder in
Africa knows the bottom line: the
weather is changing and it is changing
fast.
In my country, Chad, more than half
of the people are impacted by floods,
droughts and extreme heat. In the Sahel,
the rich and the poor, the young and the
old, people living in cities and rural com-
munities are all experiencing the conse-
quences of climate change directly.
Much has been said of the economic
hardships experienced due to the tempo-
rary border closures brought on by
COVID-19, especially in landlocked coun-
tries like mine. For nomadic pastoralists
in the Sahel, who routinely need to cross
the border, however, these closures only
brought some minor additional chal-
lenges. In the last few months, the Sahel
region has seen some of the worst floods
in recent history. The borders were shut
and lives were put on hold not by any
government, but raging flood waters.
According to the UNHCR, the UN Refu-
gee Agency, 700,000 people have been
displaced and otherwise affected by this
year’s floods.
Just like COVID-19, climate change
is destroying lives and ruining liveli-
hoods on a daily bases across the world.
But the media is not giving the same
attention to this crisis. While you can
find the daily coronavirus death toll or
infection rate in any given African coun-
try with a simple Google search, getting
globalagemagazine.kipscss.net
up-to-date, detailed data on the climate
crisis’ effects on the continent is almost
impossible. Nobody is bothering to
count the lives lost and ruined due to
climate change. And if you do not count,
if you do not make everyone aware of the
magnitude of the crisis, you cannot
resolve the crisis.
The weather disasters in Africa
often get minimal media coverage. Tele-
vision channels and newspapers report
on any given disaster for a few days, pub-
lish the death toll and some statistics on
the estimated economic damage, and
move on to another story. Yet for those
affected, the disaster itself is just the
Throughout the
pandemic, governments
in the Sahel region have
been trying to educate
the public through
public advertisements to
wash their hands and
remain socially distant
to stem the spread of the
virus. They even
imposed lockdowns and
penalised individuals
who broke the new
regulations
beginning. When their crops disappear
under floodwaters or pastures burn up in
flames, hunger becomes a daily reality
for communities. The natural resources
they relay on to survive start to dwindle,
water becomes scarce and all this often
leads to increased tensions and conflicts.
Homes, schools and marketplaces
destroyed by natural disasters remain in
ruins for years, increasing homeless-
ness. With the destruction of health and
sanitation infrastructures, coupled with
rising temperatures, diseases like
malaria and typhoid become rife, devas-
tating struggling communities further.
Throughout the pandemic, govern-
ments in the Sahel region have been try-
ing to educate the public through public
advertisements to wash their hands and
remain socially distant to stem the
spread of the virus. They even imposed
lockdowns and penalised individuals
who broke the new regulations. How-
ever, when floods and droughts caused
by global warming engulf our region and
devastate our people, they do not issue
similar warnings or take precautions.
They only offer their prayers and thank
any donors for their help. Of course there
is nothing wrong with praying or hand-
ing out a bag of rice to a hungry family,
but are they really doing anything to pre-
vent similar disasters in the future? Are
they implementing the policies neces-
sary to prevent global warming?
If we do not act, and act fast, we will
experience temperatures up to 6 degrees
Celsius higher than today by the end of
this century. The future of all our chil-
dren, the future of humanity at large, is
at risk. For this we must all be leaders
and take charge of our own destiny. We
need to demand that our governments
declare a climate emergency and take
action. We also need to be open to mak-
ing adjustments to our ways of life. We
do not need to be brave – we just need to
be realistic. If we do not adapt, global
warming is going to destroy us: with
cyclones, flash floods, droughts, fires,
extreme heat waves, and wildfires.
As we finally near the end of the
coronavirus pandemic, and as govern-
ments start to make plans to rebuild econ-
omies devastated by this global health
crisis, we need to make climate change
our new focus. Especially in the Sahel
region, where the devastating conse-
quences of climate change are already
being felt by many, it is time to declare a
climate emergency and embark on a
“green” recovery that aims to help not
only the masses affected by COVID-19,
but also millions of others suffering
because of climate change.
Reinventing the economy to be car-
bon neutral will require strong political
leadership, and collaboration between
governments and the private sector. But
we, the people, can also do a lot to help
kick start change. We can demand our
leaders to make the climate emergency a
policy priority. We can make small
changes to our own lives to help protect
the environment. We can support those
actively fighting for climate justice.
Unfortunately, we cannot defeat
climate change simply by isolating in our
homes, wearing masks, and creating a
vaccine. To defeat climate change, we
need to build an entire new political and
economic system that does not protect
the fossil fuel industry – a new system
that can deliver economic prosperity
while also protecting biodiversity and
reducing carbon emissions.
Luckily, it is not too late. We can still
prevent deforestation, restore ruined
ecosystems and manage our lands in a
way that not only increase productivity
but also protect the lives and livelihoods
of Indigenous populations. By listening
to scientists and working together we
came a long way in defeating COVID-19.
We now need to use the lessons we
learned during this pandemic to tackle
the climate emergency.
l Hindou Oumarou is the co-author of the Climate Letter to the leaders of Africa’s
54 countries.
December 2020 GLOBAL AGE | 57
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