This document discusses medieval Islamic philosophical writings on the nature of intelligible concepts and forms. It argues that intelligible concepts cannot be divided or imprinted on material things, as this would lead to contradictions. It also argues that the faculty of reason deals with potentially infinite intelligible concepts, so the essence that receives these concepts cannot subsist in a physical body or faculty.
This document discusses medieval Islamic philosophical writings on the nature of intelligible concepts and forms. It argues that intelligible concepts cannot be divided or imprinted on material things, as this would lead to contradictions. It also argues that the faculty of reason deals with potentially infinite intelligible concepts, so the essence that receives these concepts cannot subsist in a physical body or faculty.
This document discusses medieval Islamic philosophical writings on the nature of intelligible concepts and forms. It argues that intelligible concepts cannot be divided or imprinted on material things, as this would lead to contradictions. It also argues that the faculty of reason deals with potentially infinite intelligible concepts, so the essence that receives these concepts cannot subsist in a physical body or faculty.
of its dimensions is related to the single indivisible intelligible essence
that has been abstracted from matter, or [] it is related to each one of its supposed parts, or [] it is related to some parts and not others. If [] none of the material parts is related, then necessarily the whole thing is not related. If [] some of them are related and not others, then those that are not related to it are not part of its meaning at all. And if [] all the supposed parts are related in some way, then either each supposed part is related to: [a] the essence as a whole, or [b] a part of the essence. [a] If each supposed part is related to [] the essence as a whole, then the parts are not the parts of the intelligible concept, but rather each of them is a single intelligible in its own right, or indeed, the intelligible itself, and it will be actually intelligible an infinite number of times at once. [b] If each part is related differently to the essence, the essence must then be divisible in the intellect. However, it has been posited to be indivisible, so this leads to a contradiction. Moreover, if each part is related to something different in the essence than every other part, the divisibility of the essence is all the more apparent, and this is irrational. This shows that the forms that are imprinted in matter are merely similar to the particular divisible things, and that every part of them is related either actually or potentially to some part of those things. Moreover, something that is multiple with regards to the parts of its definition has a unity with respect to its completeness, which is indi- visible. How can that unity of definition, insofar as it is a unity, be imprinted in something divisible? If it could, the same would occur to it as we mentioned above to the parts of the definition of the nonmultiple thing. In addition, it may be determined that the supposed intelligibles about which the rational faculty can reason one by one in actuality are potentially infinite, and none have precedence over any others. It has also been verified that something that is capable of a potentially infinite number of things cannot possibly have a receptacle that is a body or a bodily faculty. This has been demonstrated in the Physics. Thus, it is impossible for the essence that receives the intelligibles to subsist in a body at all, nor is it possible for its action to be in a body or through a body. Reading ashbāh for ashbāh. (apparitions). It is not clear what Ibn Sı̄nā means by saying that none has precedence (awlā). Possibly, the second section of Kitāb al-Najāt, which deals with physics or natural science.