Introduction

Ibn Rushd’s Incoherence of the Incoherence is very distinctive in form.

Conceived as an extensive reply to Ghazālı̄’s assault on philosophy, The
Incoherence of the Philosophers, Ibn Rushd’s work quotes the vast majority
of Ghazālı̄’s text, so that his readers can read his opponent’s words side
by side with his own. To consider The Incoherence of the Incoherence a
philosophical dialogue may seem somewhat unfair to Ghazālı̄, since Ibn
Rushd always has the last word. However, it does retain much of the
character of a debate thanks partly to the fact that Ghazālı̄ has the foresight
to anticipate many of the objections to his views, as well as to the fact that
Ibn Rushd gives him a fair hearing. This particular exchange concerns
the nature of causation, and it constitutes the seventeenth of twenty issues
that Ghazālı̄ tackles in criticizing the philosophers (the last four of which
are about the “natural sciences”).
This debate between Ghazālı̄ and Ibn Rushd is both rich and involved.
Not only does it contain their respective positions on the issues of causa-
tion and miracles, it also contains what Ghazālı̄ takes to be the position
of the philosophers (primarily Ibn Sı̄nā, though he goes largely unmen-
tioned), what Ibn Rushd takes to be the position of the philosophers
(which is not always identical with Ghazālı̄’s interpretation, nor is it
always the same as his own position), positions Ghazālı̄ takes for the sake
of argument to refute the position of the philosophers, objections raised
by Ghazālı̄ to what he takes to be the position of the philosophers, Ibn
Rushd’s responses to these objections, objections raised by Ibn Rushd
to Ghazālı̄’s position, and so on. Needless to say, the dialectical state
of play can become difficult to follow at times (e.g. is Ghazālı̄ stating
another objection or is he articulating an alternative philosophical posi-
tion?). However, with some rearranging, two main threads emerge in
the dialogue.
In the debate on causation, Ghazālı̄ is advocating an occasionalist view
according to which existing things do not have any real causal powers.
Rather, every time fire burns cotton, the fire itself does not produce any
of the burning effects; they are, instead, caused directly by God. Naturally
occurring events do not manifest the causal powers of the objects involved
in those events; they are mere occasions for God to insert the appropriate
effects in their habitual order. Ghazālı̄ adheres to this view partly because
it leaves room for God to refrain from inserting those effects in certain
instances, or makes it possible for God to insert effects other than the
habitual ones. These instances are none other than miracles. By contrast,

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